This thesis focuses on Thomas Hobbes’ conception of a corporeal God and its role within his overall philosophical system. I show that Hobbes’ corporeal God was not a late development within his system but was something which was present from his early works. To this end, my aim is twofold. First, I offer a mainly literal and sincere interpretation of both Hobbes’ ontology and his corporeal God. I establish that Hobbes’ reliance upon God as motion – to account for all aspects of the natural world – is consistent with his explicit position that certain knowledge of the operations of the natural world is impossible. The central claim I make is that Hobbes sought to do more than merely find a way of preserving an abstract conception of God and, instead, wanted God to be an integral part of the universe. I argue that Hobbes achieved this by equating his corporeal God with motion: the constant effect of Hobbes’ corporeal God-as-motion on extension is responsible for the manifestation of the natural world. Secondly, I situate Hobbes’ corporeal God within its contemporaneous context. I argue that while Hobbes’ characterization of his ontological system is certainly unusual, its purpose was not. Hobbes was seeking to account for the activity of the natural world alongside a passive understanding of bodies. I illustrate the strong parallels as well as the important differences between Hobbes’ system and that of Henry More, Ralph Cudworth and Margaret Cavendish. To this end, I argue that Hobbes’ system can be understood as a form of partially extended substance-dualism. I argue that if we must classify Hobbes’ position with a philosophical label then we should understand his ontological theory as a modified form of Stoicism.