This thesis investigates the role of the European Central Bank (ECB) during the eurocrisis and the COVID19 pandemic. It asks the question of whether the role of the ECB has affected the balance between independence and accountability. It does so by using a combination of economic and political theories to analyse the legal framework and actions of the ECB. This thesis furthermore places the actions in perspective by comparing with the US Federal Reserve (FED). This thesis starts in chapter 2 by examining the origins of central bank independence (CBI). Chapter 3 continues by defining the concept of accountability. This thesis uses the work of Amtenbrink (1999) to generate criteria for accountability. This chapter further examines the independence and accountability of the ECB and FED before the euro-crisis. Chapter 4 continues by examining the actions of the ECB through conventional policies. The role of the ECB during the euro crisis through its conventional policies was larger than expected. Chapter 5 of this research continues by evaluating the role of the ECB through its unconventional policies. Its role increased and changed from a cautious and conservative central bank to a more active bank. Chapter 6 of this thesis continues by examining the role of the ECB during the COVID19 crisis. Chapter 7 continues by discussing the judicial review. The level of judicial review both indicates the level of independence and the first step towards accountability. Chapter 8 continues by discussing the various methods of accountability. This chapter concludes that transparency has improved but that the main method of accountability has failed. Chapter 9 concludes that the new role of the ECB required higher levels of accountability. The accountability however did not develop to the level required, thus upsetting the balance between independence and accountability.