This thesis examines the capacity of left-wing governments in Latin America to implement their policy preferences in the context of the current phase of globalisation. In particular, it focuses on the policy area of privatisation. It addresses the debate concerning the extent to which increasing economic globalisation is forcing governments, regardless of their partisanship, to ‘converge’ upon a similar set of market-friendly economic policies. The thesis focuses on the ability of the left wing governments in Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay to implement their preferences in the policy area of privatisation, and the role of domestic political institutions in either facilitating or impeding these governments from doing so, using a qualitative comparative case study methodology. It hypothesises that the configuration of political institutions is a significant factor in determining the capacity of a government to pursue distinct partisan policies. The thesis finds that although the three governments had similar policies towards privatisation, the divergence in outcomes was a product of the political institutional configuration in each state. In particular, the level of executive power, and in the Uruguayan case, mechanisms of direct democracy, proved key determining factors.