This exploratory study examines management accounting at international development NGOs. There is little extant literature, despite the large size and longevity of some such organisations. Given the lack of prior studies, preliminary interviews helped inform a working theoretical model which draws on new institutionalism and the concepts of stakeholders and loose coupling. Based on three case studies of large international development NGOs, the findings reveal management accounting is overall broadly homogeneous, with some nuanced distinctions within and between the cases. The findings also reveal the scope of management accounting as limited (relative to comparable sectors); rarely extending beyond budgeting, monitoring spending variances and monitoring conversion ratios. This is despite their size, using complex accounting software, and having qualified accountants as staff. The findings and working theoretical model lead to an explanatory framework. Due to a positive approach to stakeholders, accounting is largely shaped by coercive isomorphic pressures from external regulative forces. This leads to a focus on donor compliance that is loosely coupled with a focus on beneficiary impact. Accordingly, external accountability reporting to donors dominates the accounting function - crowding-out both the capacity and incentive to enhance management accounting. This study provides an original contribution in the form of an explanatory framework for why management accounting is relatively limited and broadly homogeneous in the international development NGO sector. It thus reveals a relationship between the nature of management accounting and the contested merits of restricted funding. The study also contributes to our understanding of an institutional agent; in the cases no such agents were apparent. The study also highlights to practitioners, accounting standard-setters and large donors, a neglected interplay between accountability and efficiency.