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IMF conditionality and the economic exposure of its shareholders

Breen, Michael orcid logoORCID: 0000-0002-5857-9938 (2014) IMF conditionality and the economic exposure of its shareholders. European Journal of International Relations, 20 (2). pp. 416-436. ISSN 1354-0661

Abstract
There is substantial evidence that International Monetary Fund policies are driven by the powerful states which intervene to align policy with their preferences. In particular, many have argued that the United States uses its position as the Fund’s largest shareholder to achieve its foreign policy objectives. As a result, a substantial volume of literature argues and presents evidence to support the claim that International Monetary Fund decisions faithfully reflect US interests. My findings extend these claims. Using a new dataset on the presence in International Monetary Fund agreements of binding conditions, which cause the agreement to be suspended or terminated if they are not met, I demonstrate that International Monetary Fund agreements contain fewer binding conditions when a suspension of International Monetary Fund lending plausibly would impose greater hardship on creditor country banks and exporters.
Metadata
Item Type:Article (Published)
Refereed:Yes
Additional Information:This version of the article is the final proof of the accepted article. SAGE has granted authors' permission to post this version to institutional repositories 12 months after online publication. This article was first published online, September 2012.
Subjects:Social Sciences > Globalization
Social Sciences > International relations
Business > Economic policy
Social Sciences > Political science
DCU Faculties and Centres:DCU Faculties and Schools > Faculty of Humanities and Social Science
Research Initiatives and Centres > Centre for International Studies (CIS)
DCU Faculties and Schools > Faculty of Humanities and Social Science > School of Law and Government
Publisher:SAGE Publications
Official URL:http:/dx.doi.org/10.1177/1354066112448257
Copyright Information:© 2014 SAGE Publications
Use License:This item is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-Share Alike 3.0 License. View License
ID Code:19969
Deposited On:09 Jun 2015 10:04 by Michael Breen . Last Modified 26 Sep 2018 10:43
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