Winds of change:
Democratic transitions and long-term democratic support

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Abstract

Do democratic transitions affect citizens' subsequent support for democracy? We propose that the type of democratic transition (citizen-centered vs elite-centered) shapes citizens' support for democracy through the investment created by citizen participation in the transition and the expectations this generates about the future under democracy. We test our hypotheses using democratic transitions data from Geddes et al. (2014) and harmonized survey data of citizens' support for democracy from nearly 500,000 respondents in 78 established and new democracies over the period 1946-2015. Our results show a consistent negative effect of elite-centered transitions on support for democracy, while the effects of citizen-centered transitions are less robust and much more context-dependent. Using an augmented difference-in-difference estimation we can underpin these findings by isolating the causal effect of transitions. Our results indicate the political socialization effect and long-lasting impact of major political events on individuals' democratic attitudes.

Keywords: Democratization, transitions, public opinion, political learning.

Introduction

Do democratic transitions affect citizens' subsequent support for democracy? A key debate in the comparative democratization literature is around which transition type (elite- or citizen-centered) is more consequential in successful democratization processes. The elite-centered camp sees democratization, and subsequent consolidation, as the product of elite bargaining and interaction.[1] In contrast, the citizen-centered camp sees democratic development as the product of societal pressure for political representation and democratic rights.[2]

While these views are antagonistic regarding whose actions (elites or citizens) are more important for democratic consolidation, they share one common assumption: support for democracy is crucial for democratic consolidation.[3] However, we know surprisingly little about whether and how democratic transitions impact support for democracy, as existing research is based on theoretical work,[4] anecdotal evidence,[5] or single case studies.[6] Our paper is the first to test this relationship in a global comparative empirical framework that allows us to draw generalizable inferences on the effect of transition type on support for democracy, moving beyond the existing focus on regime-level outcomes.[7]

Against this background, we systematically examine how democratic transitions impact long-term support for democracy in new democracies. We believe this to be an important avenue of inquiry for two reasons. First, existing evidence shows that support for democracy matters for democratic survival as it is the glue that holds democracies together and gives them legitimacy.[8] Second, by unpacking how transition types impact support for democracy we can uncover the potential mechanisms explaining why new democracies are more vulnerable in the first years of their founding.[9] In the absence of strong institutions that can prevent elite opportunism, different levels of support for democracy can explain why democracies formed through mobilization survive longer than those formed through other types of transition.[10] Citizens' support (and demand) for democracy is likely to discourage elite opportunistic power

grabs.[11] Second, understanding the starting point for building a democratic culture and legitimacy[12] is important as not all democracies are born equal, and certain countries may require more effort by activists and civil society organizations to promote democracy.[13] Our results help us understand the contexts in which such efforts might be more difficult, but also much more needed.

This paper builds on this to advance novel theoretical propositions that clarify how democratic transitions affect support for democracy. We conceptualize democratic transitions as the breakthrough event that brought down autocracy and signaled to the broader population that the winds of change were blowing. Our conceptualization of transition types captures the extent to which citizens participated in and influenced the breakthrough event that brought democracy, distinguishing between citizen-centered and elite-centered transitions. Our theoretical explanation starts from the idea that political events can shape attitudes because political crises force people to re-evaluate their ideas about politics.[14] More simply, the type of transition (and the extent of citizen involvement) creates an immediate point of reference for citizens that will influence their subsequent support for democracy. We expect citizen-centered transitions to positively impact support for democracy, and elite-centered ones to suppress it. The former makes citizens more invested in the resulting democracy as they can participate if brought about, thereby valuing more their democratic gains. Citizen involvement in the transition reduces the ability of political elites to use the origin of democracy as a source of legitimacy.[15] The latter type of transition makes citizens feel excluded from the resulting democracy as they were not able to participate in bringing down the regime.

We test our theoretical propositions by combining data on democratic transitions between 1946 and 2015 from Geddes et al. (GWF)[16] with a harmonized survey data set of individual-level support for democracy from almost 500,000 respondents in 78 established and new democracies between 1995 and 2015.[17] We use multi-level regression models and an

augmented difference-in-difference strategy to test our theoretical expectations while accounting for observed and unobserved confounding factors. The empirical analysis shows that citizens who were at least 15 years old at the time of transition are shaped by the transition event in line with our theoretical expectations: elite-centered transitions depress individual support for democracy while citizen-centered transitions increase it. Furthermore, our results also indicate that better economic performance and reduced corruption matter more for increasing support for democracy amongst citizens regardless of the transition type they experienced. These patterns highlight why democracies formed through elite actions are more vulnerable to autocratic reversal.[18]

To better deal with potential co-linear age and cohort effects, we use an augmented difference-in-difference estimation strategy that uses individuals from established democracies as the reference category for both transition types to estimate the average effect of transitions on individuals' support for democracy. We compare individuals who were at least 15 years old at the time of the transition with individuals who were at least 15 years old at a reference year (1989 in democracies), thereby acting as a placebo group for our treatment and cohort comparison.[19] The results of this approach indicate that both elite-centered and citizen-centered transitions negatively affect individual support for democracy, with the former type of transition (i.e., elite-centered) reducing that support by about 65 percent more compared to the latter (i.e., citizen-centered). Finally, a series of robustness tests show that our results are robust to alternative operationalization of transition types, estimation strategies, and alternative explanations.

Our paper makes several contributions to the literature on democratization, authoritarian legacies, and support for democracy. First, it provides systematic and generalizable evidence of the political socializing role that major political events (i.e., democratic transitions) play in shaping individuals' democratic attitudes.[20] Our findings

augment the burgeoning literature on support for democracy[21] by providing systematic evidence that citizens' support for democracy is not solely based on its performance but is also impacted by the lived experience of historical events.

Second, this is the first paper to systematically study the legacies of historical events on individuals' political attitudes,[22] going beyond single case-study evidence.[23] Here we show that long-term political attitudes are influenced by political events that bring down an autocracy, not only by regimes' governing strategies or the ideologies underpinning their rule.[24] Our findings underscore the importance of new democracies investing in democratic promotion,[25] especially if the transition is elite-centered, as they are more vulnerable to elite attempts to hijack the democratization process.[26]

Finally, we contribute micro-level evidence to the emerging literature on the long-term effects of contentious politics (Kadivar 2018; Davenport et al. 2019; Pinckney 2020). We qualify existing arguments on the potential socializing effect of non-violent resistance (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011; Bayer et al. 2016; Pinckney 2020) by showing that the energy required to produce political change through collective action does not automatically translate into more support for democracy but rather is more context-dependent.

Support for democracy after transitions

We understand support for democracy in its explicit sense, in which citizens not only have a positive, principled appreciation of democracy but also reject autocratic alternatives.[27] This conceptualization is the most widely used in the literature to measure democratic legitimacy.[28] The socializing effect of democratic transitions on support exerts the logic of collective learning[29] in which historical events (also known as period effects) impart a common set of lessons to everyone living in that society. We propose that democratic transitions impart these lessons through the expectations they create about the future and the role citizens play in that process.

We differentiate between two groups of citizens and compare their support for democracy. The first are democratic citizens or individuals who have lived their whole life under democracy and have the highest level of support for democracy as they have already been socialized into democratic norms.[30] The second group of citizens is new to democracy and has lower levels of support for democracy because they were previously exposed to authoritarian socialization and indoctrination.[31] Within this second group, we expect to observe the differential effect of transition events on long-term support for democracy. More precisely, as a country democratizes, we expect the events that signaled the fall of the autocratic regime and their type (citizen-centered vs elite-centered) to impact citizens' support for democracy.[32]

Democratic transitions are events characterized by uncertainty about the future, as state-society relations undergo a substantial transformation that requires elites and citizens to update and reconsider their role in politics and society. Democratization events signal impending change, challenge existing beliefs about the political organization of the country, and require citizens to adapt to a new political reality. While newly democratic citizens may have some understanding of democracy's *promise* of political representation and redistribution, their reference point is their experience under autocracy. Existing research on the legacy of authoritarianism on political attitudes focuses mostly on how autocratic governing strategies shape long-term democratic satisfaction,[33] how individuals and society shift away from the ideology of the previous regime,[34] and more specifically how experience with communism affects individuals' left-right self-identification.[35] Our paper moves beyond the focus of legacy studies on the characteristics of the previous regime (i.e. governing strategies or ideology) and examines how experiencing the event that brought down the regime shapes individuals' political attitudes. We believe that democratic transition events create an immediate point of reference for citizens that will influence their subsequent support for democracy.

We distinguish between citizen-centered and elite-centered democratic transitions[36] to capture the mechanisms through which these events influence citizens' support for democracy. Citizen-centered transitions are democratic transitions in which citizens participate, and to which they contribute by casting their vote, participating in an electoral campaign, or supporting or taking part in protests to demand democracy. On the other hand, elite-centered transitions are democratic transitions in which only elites participate, either to serve the demands of a small constituency (i.e. rebellion) or simply by using their power to shape and opportunistically capture political power post-transition.[37] These transitions usually happen through a coup, an elite pact, or a small insurgency winning a civil war against the regime, and inherently exclude most citizens.

The main distinction between these transition types is the extent to which the vast majority of citizens participate in, influence, and shape the breakthrough event that brought down autocracy and delivered democracy. By putting the focus on the breakthrough event that led to the collapse of autocracy, we can better capture whether elites or citizens were consequential in ending autocracy. The extent to which citizens participated in the breakthrough event affects their support of the resulting democracy through two mutually reinforcing mechanisms: personal investment in democracy and the promise of better political and economic outcomes under democracy. The former assumes that citizens will be more invested in making democracy work because they participated in the event that brought democracy, while the latter refers to the promise of a better socio-political future based on shared beliefs, expectations, and norms, but also on promises of material redistribution in democracy. These two mechanisms reinforce each other, as citizens will feel more invested in democracy if the future has the potential to bring an improvement to the status quo.

Existing work on the drivers of democratic support emphasizes either the importance of generational socialization or the contemporary performance of political regimes. First, the

generational socialization literature highlights the importance of living through and being socialized in a democracy as the main driver of democratic support.[38] Existing work finds systematic differences between individuals based on their socialization experience under autocracy and democracy.[39] More generally, this literature emphasizes the importance of the "impressionable years"[40] and how an individual's life experience under particular regime characteristics[41] impacts their pro or anti-democratic attitudes. Second, the regime performance literature focuses on how democracy's performance in delivering socially desirable outcomes drives individual support for democracy. This approach still emphasizes the lived experience of individuals, but its focus is the effects of contemporaneous regime performance outcomes such as the protection of personal and political freedoms,[42] reduction of corruption,[43] or improved economic performance.[44]

Our theoretical propositions on the effect of democratic transitions bridge these two approaches in the literature by highlighting how the lived experience through a transition during one's impressionable years impacts individuals' expectations of what democracy will deliver. This, in turn, has long-term effects on citizens' investment in the new democracy and their support for it.

The differential effect of transition types on support for democracy

We argue that citizen-centered democratic transitions are more likely to be associated with increased support for democracy because citizens' participation in and influence of transition events bring a higher belief in the possibility of improving the political status quo. Citizens' investment in democracy is higher for citizen-centered transitions because it requires them to participate in events where they risk being punished by security forces[45] or because they need to coordinate their efforts in voting for candidates in an electoral confrontation between opponents and proponents of an authoritarian regime.[46] We propose that transitions emerging from popular uprisings[47] and through elections meet the criteria to be called "citizen-centered".

Firstly, popular uprisings need to gain momentum to achieve success in removing an autocrat and ushering in democracy.[48] This requires citizens to participate in multiple events, defying the regime and refusing to cooperate with it while facing the risk of suffering violent punishment.[49] Moreover, while only a small fraction of the population physically participates in concentrated mobilization, the momentum shifts away from the regime when moderates and non-participating societal groups withdraw their implicit support for the regime and side with the opposition.[50] This shift in momentum is reinforced by the democratization demands of the mobilized opposition which promises a change for the better.[51]

Moreover, these transitions have a pro-democratic socializing effect on participants and observers. This happens because they increase citizens' perception of their ability to influence politics, they emphasize the importance of cooperation and compromise to achieve a long-term solution and diffuse political power from elites to citizens.[52] Then, these dynamics will directly impact citizens' expectations of democracy. For example, the early months of the Arab Spring brought hope and expectations of a new era of democracy, transparency, and economic growth within the region.[53]

Secondly, transitions through elections capture the notion that citizens have had the opportunity to participate in elections and select candidates without imposition or manipulation by the government. Often, elections that initiate democratization pit proponents and opponents of autocracy against each other,[54] but through their participation citizens ultimately choose who prevails. More simply, we are interested in whether citizens can participate in and influence the actual event of the election through their choice, and not so interested in the potentially unfair electoral designs that elites might put in place to protect their interests.[55] Producing political change through elections is costly for citizens because elections in autocratic contexts are skewed in favor of the incumbent to such an extent that they are more likely to lead to continuity rather than political change.[56] Citizens' ability to produce political change in

autocratic elections requires massive efforts to mobilize voters, spread messages of political change (often in the face of harassment and censorship by the regime), monitor the fairness of the electoral campaign, and ensure massive participation on election day (despite risk of punishment). While an opposition victory is not impossible in autocratic elections, it requires a level of opposition mobilization, unity, skill, and heroism far beyond what would normally be required for victory in a democracy.[57] However, electoral campaigns are won through promises of socio-political change in the future, changes that involve better provision of economic and social benefits to the population.[58] If it does not promise to change the regime's practices when it comes to redistribution and political participation, the opposition is less likely to be able to crystallize the popular support required to overthrow an authoritarian incumbent in an election.

While the processes of producing change through mass mobilization and elections differ, they both require massive coordination and participation by citizens such that they tip the scales away from autocracy and in favor of a democratic change in the political status quo. This in turn reinforces citizens' hope for a better future under a democratic system. Based on these arguments, we can formulate our first hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1 (H1): *Individuals who experienced citizen-centered democratic transitions have higher levels of support for democracy compared to individuals who did not experience such events.*

Elite-centered transitions are characterized by a process in which a small elite group ushers in democracy out of personal interests rather than out of genuine concern for societal welfare and redistribution.[59] These transitions thus have a very low level of investment from citizens as they are excluded by default from the event that brings democracy. Furthermore, the expected social and economic benefits for citizens are minimal since elites need to satisfy their allies rather than the broader population. This in turn decreases the extent to which citizens

perceive themselves as a part of the resulting democracy and decreases their investment in a democracy that has been biased in favor of a small elite.

Elite-centered transitions are rigged affairs in which elites compete for power to protect their interests and resources[60] and have more to do with the opportunity to design favorable laws and institutions that protect elites' interests under democracy. Elites can thus create electoral rules that consolidate existing power structures and build institutions that allow them to put in place favorable policies through lobbying or financing campaigns.[61] Similarly, coup-driven democratic transitions are characterized by an opportunity to seize power and ensure access to state resources under democracy.[62] In these transitions, the stronger elite faction wins the competition for political power and has the power to dictate the terms of democratization.[63]

Similarly, transitions that happen after a civil war tend to be guided by a winner-take-all mentality[64] in which the victors see themselves as a revolutionary vanguard that deserves special treatment under the new democracy.[65] For example, Robert Mugabe and his ZANU-PF allies used their involvement in the independence struggle to legitimize their access to privileged political and economic resources.[66] Regimes emerging out of violent struggle are characterized by elite cohesion and unity, a dynamic that is generally more conducive to creating patronage networks and excluding rather than including certain societal groups.[67] While the underlying dynamics through which democratic change happens in the aftermath of these elite processes differ, they all share the exclusion of the group (i.e. citizens) whose support for democracy is crucial for consolidation.

Venezuela's rise and demise as a consolidated democracy amid a continent engulfed by military takeovers illustrates best our theoretical propositions on how elite pacts impact citizens' support for democracy. The agreements forged between Venezuelan elites between 1957 and 1958 led to a two-party system in which the same group of elites would rotate in power,[68] essentially increasing barriers to entry and participation in politics for most citizens.[69]

While this made Venezuela the political darling of the developing world (due to its political stability) (Karl 1987), it also led to its demise in the mid-1990s as citizens' disillusionment with democracy and the state of the Venezuelan political system allowed an opportunistic Hugo Chavez to be voted into office and transform it into an autocratic regime.[70] In sum, we expect that:

Hypothesis 2 (H2): *Individuals who experienced elite-centered transitions have lower levels of support for democracy compared to individuals who did not experience such events.*

Research Design

We test our theoretical expectations by combining data on support for democracy at the individual level with regime transition data (between 1946 and 2015) in a sample of democratic countries identified using Geddes et al.'s[71] data on political regimes.[72] We use a harmonized survey data set of almost 500,000 respondents collected between 1995 and 2015 from 78 established and new democracies. In our sample, 14 countries went through an elite-centered and 36 through a citizen-centered democratic transition, while 28 have been democratic since (at least) 1946.[73] Our sample includes the most recent uninterrupted democratic spell for each country.[74]

Outcome: Measuring support for democracy

Our individual-level dependent variable captures the extent to which individuals perceive democracy as the best form of government. Respondents were asked whether they agreed or disagreed with the statement "democracy is the best form of government". Responses ranged from four to five categories and were harmonized to range from 0 to 100, where higher values indicate more agreement with this statement.[75]

To achieve a large coverage of countries over time and measure support for democracy, we merged existing publicly available survey data from countries that were classified as democratic at the time of the survey, some of which were established and some new democracies. The chosen data sets have been designed to be fielded in multiple countries, which ensures that questions are not country-specific, have been conducted as academic studies, and include questions related to democratic attitudes.[76] Our survey data covers the period from 1995 to 2015 based on the following public opinion surveys:[77]

- World Value Survey (WVS), 1995-2004
- Latinobarometer (LB), 2002-2017
- Americas Barometer (AB), 2008-2018
- Asia Barometer (ASB), 2010-2018
- European Values Study (EVS), 1999-2009
- Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES), 2002-2007.

Independent variables: measuring transition types

Our key independent variables distinguish between elite-centered and citizen-centered democratic transitions using autocratic breakdown events coded by Geddes et al. They identify the pivotal events that mark changes in the rules for choosing leaders and policies.[78] An autocracy ends when a competitive election is won by someone not allied to or supported by the regime, when the government is ousted via a coup, popular uprising, or civil war, or when the ruling group changes the rule for leader selection such that the group that holds power changes.

Elite-centered transitions involve events in which elites or a small group of individuals change the rules for choosing the leader and policies by making a pact, enacting a coup, or winning a civil war. These types of events, by definition, restrict the participation and influence of citizens. Citizen-centered transitions involve breakthrough events in which the rules for choosing leaders and policies are determined by citizen involvement in elections or popular

non-violent dissent. Our main conceptual distinction captures the extent to which citizens were able to participate in and influence the event that is deemed pivotal in bringing down autocracy and which signaled to the population that democratic change would ensue.[79] We only consider the most recent democratic transition, which ushered in the most recent democratic spell for each country under observation.[80]

Figure 1: Prevalence of transition experienced by 2015

Data: Geddes et al. (2014)

We use two separate, binary independent variables to capture the type of democratic transition (i.e., elite-centered vs citizen-centered) through which a country's democratic spell started. The reference category is established democracies that did not experience a regime transition. Figure 1 shows the type of transition each country experienced, and which countries did not experience any transition since 1946. For example, Spain's transition to democracy in 1976 is considered to be elite-centered as it emerged out of a pact between King Juan Carlos I and the elites of the Franco regime. In contrast, the fall of the Communist regimes in Eastern Europe in 1989 is mostly considered a citizen-centered transition as these regimes broke down under pressure from the citizenry in a domino-like effect. The exception in this case is Russia and the former Soviet Republics, whose transitions in 1991 are considered elite-centered as they were the result of Gorbachev's glasnost policy. We address potential challenges to the validity of our independent variables in the next sub-section.

We test our hypotheses using individual-level data by generating two independent variables that capture whether a survey respondent lived in a country that experienced a transition and was 15 years or older at the time of the transition and the type of transition the respondent experienced.[81] We only consider individuals at least 15 years of age to have experienced a transition because individuals become aware of their political and social surroundings in early adulthood.[82] Yet, we consider that any individual 15 years or older can be impacted by a democratic transition and we consider its effect to be homogenous for individuals above that age. Our independent variables thus take a value of 1 if a respondent was 15 or older when an elite-/citizen-centered democratic transition happened, and 0 otherwise, which includes younger generations in a new democracy who did not experience the transition as they were too young at the time of the event. The value of 0 also includes all individuals who live in consolidated democracies that did not experience a transition post-1946, thereby giving us a reference for the models that include all the democracies in the sample.

Control variables

To rule out potential confounding factors driving the relationship between the type of transition and support for democracy, we include individual- and regime-level variables in our models. At the individual level, we control for the age of the respondent, and the level of education using a categorical variable, whether they are employed and whether they are male or female. At the macro level, we include several variables to exclude the possibility that levels of support for democracy are driven by the current state of affairs in the society.[83] We control for the level of economic development, using the natural log of GDP/capita and level of GDP growth (source: World Bank), because economic performance has been linked to positive support for democracy.

Next, we control the level of political corruption and civil liberties as citizens evaluate democracy based on its ability to protect their rights but also reduce corruption.[84] Both indices

run from 0 (normatively worse) to 1 (normatively better).[85] Finally, we account for the redistribution of economic resources by including a variable capturing the extent to which regime spending is particularistic (oriented towards selected groups) or public (oriented towards everyone in the society).[86] All macro-level control variables are lagged by one year to avoid conflating the measurement of the outcome and control variables.[87]

Empirical results

In this section, we present two types of analysis. First, we estimate the impact of transitions on individual support for democracy using multi-level linear models, directly testing H1 and H2. Second, to rule out the potential for endogeneity due to reverse causality and unobserved heterogeneity, we use a difference-in-difference estimation approach adapted from the estimation strategy proposed by Dinas and Stoker, and Dinas and Northmore-Ball.[88] We explain this approach in more detail later in this section.

Individual-level support for democracy

In this section, we use individual-level democratic support data to compare individuals who have experienced a certain type of transition with those who have not experienced the event (because they lived in a democracy) or were too young to be aware of its implications (under 15 years of age). Since our dependent variable is continuous, we use a multilevel linear model to estimate the effect of transition type on support for democracy while accounting for individual and macro-level confounders. Models 1-3 include all countries for which we have data. The coefficients of the transition variables compare the support for democracy of citizens that experienced either an elite-centered or citizen-centered transition with that of younger generations that grew up after the transitions as well as people living in stable democracies. In Models 4 and 5 we reduce the sample[89] to only include current democracies that experienced a regime transition to compare the effect of experiencing a transition only with individuals who

grew up in an autocracy but were too young to be aware of its implications. We include country-survey year random effects, as this is the level on which individuals are clustered. We do not use country-fixed effects, as we are interested in cross-country heterogeneity about regime transitions.

Table 1. Individual-level support for democracy, 1995-2015.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Countries	All	All	All	Transitions only	
Transition (ref: none – established democracies + young generations)					
Citizen-centered transition	2.023***	0.069	0.105		
	[0.113]	[0.136]	[0.136]		
Elite-centered transition	0.014	-1.854***	-1.781***		
	[0.179]	[0.192]	[0.193]		
Transition (ref: none – young generations)					
Citizen-centered transition				0.910***	1.026***
				[0.148]	[0.150]
Elite-centered transition				-1.042***	-.906***
				[0.203]	[0.204]
Years since transition					0.126***
					[0.027]
Individual controls	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country-level controls (t-1)	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Data FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	74.892***	68.653***	48.086***	53.425***	58.284***
	[0.764]	[0.743]	[5.853]	[6.750]	[6.924]
Observations	487,765	487,765	487,765	398,479	383,215
N of groups	384	384	384	317	304

Significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors in brackets. The results are based on a multi-level model, incl. country-survey year random effects. Individual controls: age, gender, education, working. Country-level controls: civil liberties, public goods, political corruption, GDP growth, Log GDP/capita. Full results are presented in Appendix 4.

Table 1 above summarizes the effect that elite and citizen-led transitions have on the long-term support for democracy of individuals who have experienced those events. The results in Table 1 consistently indicate that individuals who experienced an elite transition at the age of 15 or older are less supportive of democracy compared to individuals who did not experience such events (Model 1-3) because they were too young or lived in a democracy. Table 1 shows that the direct impact of citizen-driven transitions is less conclusive. Individuals who were 15 or older at the time of a citizen-centered transition are more supportive of democracy, but only in Models 4 and 5, when we compare only respondents who live in countries that experienced

a transition. In other words, the potential positive effect of involvement in the transition does not increase democratic support to the extent that living in a democracy does (Neundorf and Pop-Eleches 2020). More importantly, the consistent effect on support for democracy of experience with a particular transition type shows that our results are not driven by a particular model specification and are robust to alternative explanations based on observable or unobservable factors.[90]

The main assumption underlying our theoretical propositions is that individuals use the characteristics of transitions to create expectations about what democracy will deliver for them. While we cannot test this assumption directly in an observational analysis, we try to investigate its main observable implications as an empirical extension of our analysis: better political and economic performance condition the impact of transition type by increasing support for democracy. However, we refrain from developing theoretical expectations about this as the changes we observe could be a direct consequence of the type of transition.[91] This would potentially introduce post-treatment bias[92] in our estimates and prevent us from causally identifying the effect of these changes. However, we believe it is important to descriptively explore what are the avenues through which transition types affect democratic attitudes. Moreover, this analysis has the role of accounting for the possibility that democratic transitions might be protracted, that social, political and economic changes expected by citizens might take longer or might not match their expectations.

Figure 3 summarizes the results of this analysis, which confirms that better control of political corruption, more public spending, and higher GDP/capita increase support for democracy regardless of the type of transition an individual experiences. These results further reinforce findings from the literature on democratic attitudes which show that individuals'

Figure 3. Marginal effects of transition type change in macro-variables based on individuals' support for democracy. (Sample: countries with transition)



Note: The results are based on separate multi-level models, incl. country-survey year random effects. The models include individual and macro-level controls. Full results are presented in Table A6 in the Appendix. Figure A2 further plots the density distribution of the change variables for both types of transition.

support for democracy is heavily driven by economic concerns, but also by their dislike of corruption.[93] In contrast, in both types of transition improvements in civil liberties do not seem to increase support for democracy, further reinforcing the idea that it is dependent on economic performance with better civil liberties receiving secondary importance. Surprisingly, positive changes in the level of GDP growth reduce support for democracy among individuals who experienced elite-centered transitions while such changes slightly increase support for democracy in citizen-centered transitions. A possible explanation for this finding has to do with perceptions about who benefits from economic development. In other words, if democratization is solely a continuation of autocratic politics by other means,[94] then it is fair to assume that citizens are not the beneficiaries of economic growth in regimes formed through elite-centered transitions. If that holds, then already existing grievances about the lack of legitimacy of the transition are further exacerbated by the perceived inequality of who has *truly* benefited from democratization.

Difference-in-difference estimation

The results of the models estimating the effect of elite and citizen-driven democratic transitions from Table 1 show that elite-centered transitions depress support for democracy. While we test the effect of transition type on support for democracy, our reference category changes between the different models, which makes it hard to compare what constitutes more or less support for democracy. For example, in Models 1 to 3 from Table 1, we compare individuals who were 15 or older at the time of transitions with individuals from established democracies (who have never experienced a transition in their lifetime) *and* with individuals who were under 15 at the time of transition and have only been exposed to the legacy of the transition without being directly exposed to the transition itself (beyond childhood).

Next, in Models 4 and 5 we compare individuals that experienced the transitions with younger generations from the same country. The approach presented in Table 1 further has its limitations, as we do not adequately account for potential life-cycle (age) versus generational (cohort) effects. In all countries which experienced democratic transition, older respondents belong to the group that experienced a transition, while the younger respondents did not. The simple regression approach presented above, however, does not allow us to disentangle whether the differences are mainly driven by the effect of age (i.e., the older are always more positive about democracy, while the young are more likely to rebel against the status quo) or whether the observed effect is because those generations experience, for example, a mass-driven transition.

To account for this changing threshold for our comparison and to better deal with potential co-linear age and cohort effects, we use an augmented difference-in-difference estimation strategy that uses individuals from established democracies as a reference or placebo category for both types of transition experience.[95] This allows us to compare the difference in support for democracy *within* a cohort by comparing individuals who had experienced elite-

centered or citizen-centered transitions (because they were 15 years of age or older when a transition occurred in their country) with individuals from cohorts in established democracies that never experienced a transition event but were at a similar point in their life cycle.[96]

Using democratic cohorts as a benchmark has the advantage of using the same reference group to estimate the effect of transition experience, eliminating the potential confounding effect of age, and eliminating the potential confounding effect of unobservables (or period effects) such as general swings in public opinion that might affect people cross-nationally.[97] We use the following model specification to estimate this difference-in-difference model:

$$(1)\ DemSup_{ijt}=\alpha + \beta_1 Elite\text{-}centered_j + \beta_2 Citizen\text{-}centered_j + \gamma Cohort + \beta_3 Elite\text{-}centered_j * Cohort + \beta_4 Citizen\text{-}centered_j * Cohort + \delta * T_\tau + Survey_k + \varepsilon_{ijt}$$

The dummy variables "*Citizen-centered*" and "*Elite-centered*" in the model classify whole countries as cases that experienced either of the two transition types with democracies as a reference category. The "*Cohort*" variable captures whether an individual was 15 years of age or older at the moment of transition. By specifying the age of 15 or older at the time of transition, we can compare the effect of the transition type between cohorts belonging to the same transition category (i.e. citizen-centered or elite-centered) while using individuals of the same cohort from democracies as a reference group. This is achieved by centering the median transition year (1989) for individuals who lived in established democracies to capture whether they were 15 years of age or older at the time of transition.[98] However, since individuals aged 15 or older from an established democracy can never experience a transition, despite being potentially aware of its implications, they serve as a reference group that allows us to compare the effect of transition type (elite-centered or citizen-centered) on individuals that were above a certain age (15+) and those that were below this age threshold. In other words, individuals from democracies serve as a placebo group against which we compare the effects of elite-centered or citizen-centered transitions for cohorts from countries that experienced the same

type of transition, thereby eliminating any potentially unobserved confounders correlated with age or period and enacting the difference-in-difference strategy.

We obtain the coefficient of the difference-in-difference estimation for elite-centered transitions from the β_3 coefficient and for citizen-centered transitions from the β_4 coefficient. Our difference-in-difference model also includes survey (or year) fixed effects to account for period effects, four-time polynomials to capture the effect of time since the end of the regime (T_τ), individual control variables (age, age^2, education, employment and gender) and pre-treatment controls (5-year average of civil liberties, political corruption, type of public spending, log of GDP/capita and GDP growth) to eliminate potential confounding of observables on cohorts.

The results of our difference-in-difference estimation depend crucially on the parallel trends assumption, which requires that the difference in support for democracy across cohorts due to age be the same in established democracies and new democracies (based on transition type).[99] Figure 4 shows that the evolution of support for democracy is the same across cohorts in established democracies (our reference category),[100] and in new democracies that experienced either an elite-centered or a citizen-centered transition.[101]

Figure 4. Birth cohort trends in support for democracy by transition type.



Figure 5 below summarizes the results of the difference-in-difference estimation – displaying β_3 and β_4 of equation 1 – showing that individuals who experienced an elite-centered transition are less supportive of democracy compared to individuals of 15 years or over in 1989 living in democracies that never experienced a transition event, thereby supporting our second hypothesis. Next, the results indicate a similar negative effect for experience with citizen-centered transitions, although smaller in size by about 65 percent compared to elite-centered transitions.

However, this negative effect is not surprising considering that citizens emerging from autocracies tend to have lower levels of support for democracy compared to citizens who have lived their entire lives in a democracy.[102] The more important comparison here is between the effect size of elite-centered and citizen-centered transitions, with the former having an effect that is about 65 percent bigger (more negative regarding democracy) than the latter. These results reinforce our finding that elite-centered transitions systematically depress support for democracy because citizens feel left out of the process and unrepresented by the new regime. The less robust effect of citizen-centered transitions on democratic mood indicates the somewhat complicated legacy of these transitions.

Figure 5. Within-cohort comparison of transition-type experience (15+ years old) vs democratic experience (15+ years old in 1989)



Note: The coefficients and their 95% confidence interval represent β_3 and β_4 of equation 1.

Our results are robust to alternative measures of transition and regimes, to alternative explanations and possible unobserved heterogeneity. We refer the readers to Section A1 of the Online Appendix for a longer summary of the robustness checks and subsequent sections for the full results of the robustness checks.

Conclusion

This paper offered novel theoretical propositions and systematic empirical evidence of how citizens' lived experience through a democratic transition impacts their support for democracy in the long term. It built on existing arguments about the role of socialization (i.e. lived experience) and regime performance as drivers of democratic support[103] to highlight how major historical events, such as democratic transitions, can have socializing roles that leave long-term legacies. Moreover, our paper is the first one to go beyond theoretical work,[104] anecdotal evidence,[105] or single case studies.[106] We provide a first test of this relationship in a global comparative empirical framework that allows us to draw generalizable inferences on the effect of transition type on support for democracy, moving beyond the existing focus on regime-level outcomes.[107]

Our results show that transition events that exclude citizens by default and diminish their input into historical events that bring democracy depress long-term support for

democracy. We find less support for the opposite contention, that citizen-centered transitions are more conducive to long-term democratic support. Moreover, the results show that this negative effect cannot be entirely overcome by better regime performance in the provision of public services. Better economic performance, redistribution, and control of corruption seem to matter more in mediating the effect of the transition type, while improvements in civil liberties have only a marginal, negligible effect.

Two implications emerge from our study. First, it shows the importance of historical events in shaping support for democracy, thereby highlighting the role of democratic transitions, a largely ignored factor that impacts key public attitudes. Second, our results show the importance of regime performance in shaping the legacy of the transition and possibly, the likelihood of democratic consolidation. In other words, new democracies can build support and legitimacy for their institutions by ensuring that citizens benefit from the process. This avenue seems to be crucial for democratic consolidation as previous research indicates that support for democracy matters for democratic survival[108] because new democracies are at a higher risk of reverting to authoritarianism.

These implications also indicate several avenues for future research. First, the inconsistent effect of citizen-centered transitions indicates the need for further investigation into the conditions under which individual participation is conducive to a higher level of legitimacy for democratic governance. Since our measure conflates transitions through elections and popular mobilization, future research should disentangle the separate effects of these events and their characteristics on support for democracy. Second, the puzzling negative effect that GDP growth has on support for democracy when the regime emerged out of an elite-centered transition deserves further investigation. As discussed in the results section, we believe this effect is driven by citizens perceiving elites to overwhelmingly benefit from economic developments, yet this contention deserves further empirical investigation.

Data Availability Statement

The replication dataset and do-files will be uploaded on the journal's Harvard Dataverse upon acceptance.

Endnotes:

[1] Acemoglu and Robinson, *Economic Origins of Democracy*; Bermeo, "Democracy and the Lessons"; Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization*; Linz and Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition;* ; Schmitter and O'Donnell, *Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain*.

[2] Chenoweth and Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works*; Collier, *Paths toward Democracy: The*; Higley and Burton, *"The Elite Variable in"*; Pinckney, *From Dissent to Democracy*; Stephens, *"Democratic Transition and Breakdown"*.

[3] Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization*; Linz and Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition;* Higley and Burton, *"The Elite Variable in"*.

[4] Schmitter and O'Donnell, *Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain*; Meirowitz and Tucker, "People Power or a".

[5] Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization*; Linz and Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition.*

[6] El-Mallakh, "How Do Protesters Affect"; Ketchley and El-Rayyes, "Unpopular Protest: Mass Mobilization"; Abadeer et al., "Did Egypt's Post-Uprising" .

[7] Bayer et al., "The Democratic Dividend of"; Kadivar, "Mass Mobilization and"; Pinckney, 2020; Olar, "Democratization Boost or Bust?" .

[8] Claassen, "Does Public Support Help"; Linz and Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition.*

[9] Svolik, "Which Democracies Will Last?".

[10] Bayer et al, "The Democratic Divident of"; Kadivar, "Mass Mobilization and the"; Pinckney, *From Dissent to Democracy*.

[11] Lührmann and Lindberg, “A Third Wave of”.

[12] Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization*.

[13] Finkel et al, “Can Online Civic Education”.

[14] Bermeo, “Democracy and the Lessons” .

[15] Linz and Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition*.

[16] Geddes et al., “Autocratic Breakdown and Regime”

[17] Neundorf et al., “How do Inclusionary and”.

[18] Svolik, “Which Democracies Will Last?”.

[19] Dinas and Stoker, “Age-Period-Cohort Analysis”; Dinas and Northmore-Ball, “The Ideological Shadow of” .

[20] Abadeer et al., “Did Egypt’s Post-Uprising” .

[21] Claassen, “Does Public Support Help”; Mattes and Bratton, “Learning about Democracy in”; Rose et al, Democracy and Its Alternatives.

[22] Bermeo, “Democracy and the Lessons”.

[23] El-Mallakh, "How Do Protesters Affect"; Ketchley and El-Rayyes, "Unpopular Protest: Mass Mobilization".

[24] Dinas and Northmore-Ball, “The Ideological Shadow of”; Pop-Eleches and Tucker, “Communist Legacies and Left-”; Neundorf et al., “How do Inclusionary and”; de Leeuw et al, “Are Would-be Authoritarians”.

[25] Finkel et al, “Can Online Civic Education”.

[26] Svolik, “Which Democracies Will Last?”; Albertus and Grossman, “The Americas: When Do”; Lührmann and Lindberg, “A Third Wave of”.

[27] Linz and Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition;* ; Rose et al, Democracy and Its Alternatives.

[28] Claassen, “In Mood for Democracy?”.

[29] Barner-Barry and Rosenwein, Psychological Perspectives on Politics.

[30] Fuchs-Schündeln and Schündeln, "On the Endogeneity of".

[31] Neundorf and Pop-Eleches, “Dictators and Their Subjects”.

[32] In Figure A1 of the Online Appendix, we graphically show that transition events are subsequently followed by increases (often dramatic) in democracy scores. We use V-Dem’s liberal democracy index to capture the evolution of democracy levels following transition events as coded by Geddes et al. In the robustness section, we show that the effects of transition events hold regardless of whether we capture our sample of democracies using Geddes et al.’s classification or V-Dem’s score of liberal democracy (see Coppedge et al, “V-Dem Methodology V9”).

[33] Neundorf et al., “How do Inclusionary and”.

[34] Dinas and Northmore-Ball, “The Ideological Shadow of”; de Leeuw et al, “Are Would-be Authoritarians”.

[35] Pop-Eleches and Tucker, “Communist Legacies and Left-”.

[36] We acknowledge that a clear-cut distinction between transition types is difficult as these are complex social and political events that include various actors with interests in the outcome of the transition. However, we believe that classifying the event that signalled to society the end of the regime gives us leverage in explaining variation in individual democratic support. In Section A2.3 and A2.4 of the Online Appendix we provide a longer discussion of the validity of our operationalization of transitions and perform analysis using alternative operationalizations of transitions (see Section A6). Despite the difficulties of perfectly distinguishing between transition types based on whether they were solely citizens or elites driven, we show that the main intuition of the theoretical argument holds under various operationalizations of transition types.

[37] Albertus and Menaldo, *Authoritarianism and the Elite Origins*.

[38] Rose et al, *Democracy and Its Alternatives*.

[39] Neundorf, "Democracy in Transition: A"; Neundorf and Pop-Eleches, "Dictators and Their Subjects"; Neundorf et al., "How do Inclusionary and"; Neundorf et al, "Autocratic and Democratic Imprinting".

[40] Mannheim, "The Sociological Problem of".

[41] Neundorf et al, "Autocratic and Democratic Imprinting".

[42] Rose et al, *Democracy and Its Alternatives*.

[43] Wagner et al, "The Quality of Institutions".

[44] Mattes and Bratton, "Learning about Democracy in".

[45] Chenoweth and Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works*.

[46] Przeworski, *Democracy and the Market*.

[47] We refer to these interchangeably also as civil resistance or nonviolent resistance transitions. These simply capture the popular, mostly nonviolent mobilization of citizens out in streets with the purpose of enacting pro-democratic, political change.

[48] Chenoweth and Belgioioso, "The Physics of Dissent" .

[49] Ritter and Conrad, "Preventing and Responding to" .

[50] Lohmann, "The Dynamics of Informational" .

[51] Chenoweth and Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works*.

[52] Chenoweth and Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works*; Pinckney, *From Dissent to Democracy*.

[53] Brown, "Tracking the Arab Spring"; Macdonald and Waggoner, "Dashed Hopes and Extremism" .

[54] Przeworski, Democracy and the Market.

[55] Albertus and Menaldo, Authoritarianism and the Elite Origins.

[56] Bunce and Wolchik, Defeating Authoritarian Leaders in; Levitsky and Way, *Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes*.

[57] Diamond, "Elections without Democracy: Thinking", p.24.

[58] Svolik, The Politics of Authoritarian.

[59] We classify coups, elite pacts, or civil wars as elite-centered transitions.

[60] Albertus and Menaldo, *Authoritarianism and the Elite Origins*.

[61] Albertus and Menaldo, *Authoritarianism and the Elite Origins*.

[62] Miller, *Shock to the System*.

[63] Derpanopoulos et al, "Are Coups Good for" .

[64] Goldstone and Ulfelder, "How to Construct Stable".

[65] Bayer et al, "The Democratic Divident of" .

[66] Levitsky and Way, *Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid regimes*.

[67] Levitsky and Way, "Beyond Patronage: Violent Struggle" .

[68] Levine, "Venezuela since 1958: The".

[69] Coppedge, *Strong Parties and Lame Ducks*.

[70] Coppedge, *Strong Parties and Lame Ducks;* Foa and Munk, "The Signs of Deconsolidation.".

[71] Geddes et al., "Autocratic Breakdown and Regime".

[72] In Appendix 9.2 we further present models that replicate the main models (testing H1 and H2) using the V-Dem "Regime of the World" classification for democracies instead of the Geddes et al. classification. We exclude Iraq from the analysis presented below. Geddes et al. code Iraq as democratic since 2004. However, the transition was mostly imposed through a foreign intervention and therefore does not fit our classification of internally driven transitions. We also had to exclude Germany, as it is not possible to distinguish between East and West Germany in the measures of support for democracy. As the two parts of Germany had very different experiences in regime transition post-1946, this is however essential.

[73] Table A1 in the Online Appendix summarizes the countries included in the analysis, the number of observations, and the type and year of transition for each country.

[74] Our sample excludes all autocracies that never experienced a transition (e.g., North Korea) and all autocratic country-years even if data on support for democracy might be available.

[75] The exact question wording in each of the various surveys is listed in Appendix 2.6. Here we also provide additional details of the data harmonization process and a step-by-step guide.

[76] Neundorf et al., "How do Inclusionary and" .

[77] To account for possible effects of the survey data harmonization process, we include a dummy variable for each of the data sets (using the World Value Survey as a reference) in the regression models presented below. The estimates of these are not reported but are available upon request from the authors. In Section 3 of the Online Appendix we run an analysis using country-level data about support for democracy from a Bayesian latent measurement model (see Claassen, "Estimating smooth country-years") that allows us to account for the uncertainty around the measure of that support and which accounts for the idiosyncrasies of each survey methodology that might bias responses to questions (Dahlberg et al, "Democracy in Context: Using").

[78] Geddes et al, "Autocratic Breakdown and", p. 317.

[79] More information on our coding based on Geddes et al. can be found in Section 2.3 of the Appendix. In Appendix 7, we further present results for the four sub-categories of citizen-centered and elite-centered transitions - popular uprisings, elections, elite pacts, and civil war transition.

[80] In our data set, Turkey for example had three democratic transitions in 1950, 1961, and 1983. In our analysis, we only include the most recent democratic transition (1983) as it is the one that started Turkey's uninterrupted democratic spell. Geddes et al data classify Turkey as democratic up to the last available year of 2017. Other countries that experienced more than

one transition since 1946 include Argentina, Ecuador, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Niger, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, and Thailand. See Appendix Sections A2.3 and A2.4 for more information on the coding of the transitions and a discussion of the validity of our measure.

[81] On average respondents in the sample who experienced a transition were 33.6 years old at the time of the transition.

[82] Bartels and Jackman, "A Generational Model of". We unpack the impact of this age cut-off by comparing groups experiencing transition types in different age groups. See the robustness checks section for a longer discussion of this issue and the results reported in Section A9.3 of the Appendix.

[83] Karp et al, "To Know It Is"; Wagner et al, "The Quality of Institutions" .

[84] Claassen, "In Mood for Democracy?" .

[85] Coppedge et al, "V-Dem Methodology V9"

[86] We standardized this variable such that it ranges between 0 and 1 so that it has a similar scale to the other structural indices used in the models (see Coppedge et al, "V-Dem Methodology V9").

[87] One potential objection to the use of macro control variable would be that these values are measured post-treatment (i.e. transition), which would induce post-treatment bias in our results. To account for this possibility, we re-estimate our main models by including pre-treatment values of the macro variables. The pre-treatment values are being calculated as the 5-year moving average of each macro variable before the transition. For established democracies, we centre the 5-year average at 1989, similar to the approach we have taken in our DiD setup (explained below). The results of our models with pre-treatment macro controls can be found in Table A14 of the Online Appendix. More importantly, our results remain substantively identical to the ones reported in the main text.

[88] Dinas and Stoker, Age-Period-Cohort Analysis; Dinas and Northmore-Ball, "The Ideological Shadow of".

[89] The main difference between the two models is that we account for the number of years since the transition in Model 5 as it is possible that as more time passes since the transition, its legacy may diminish on the respondents. Including this control variable does not seem to affect the effect of experiencing a particular type of transition.

[90] Section A1 of the Online Appendix discusses in detail all the robustness checks we have done. In the paper we only provide a short summary of this due to space constraints.

[91] Albertus and Menaldo, *Authoritarianism and the Elite Origins*; Pinckney, *From Dissent to Democracy*.

[92] In Table A14 of the Online Appendix we show that our results are not driven by post-treatment bias as the main results remain substantive identical to the introduction of pre-treatment macro control variables.

[93] Karp et al, "To Know It Is"; Wagner et al, "The Quality of Institutions" .

[94] Albertus and Menaldo, *Authoritarianism and the Elite Origins*; Riedl et al, "Authoritarian-Led".

[95] In an ideal research design, we would want to compare this group with individuals that lived in an autocracy but never experienced a democratic transition. However, this approach is not feasible for two main reasons. First, citizens' support for democracy is difficult to measure accurately in an autocracy as revealing anti-regime sentiments can attract punishment (see Davenport, "State Repression and Political Order"), therefore making people falsify their preferences regarding regime type (see Kuran, *Private Truths, Public Lies*). Second, for these reasons, all the survey data measuring support for democracy only comes from new and established democracies.

[96] Recent advancements in the literature on staggered adoption of treatment in difference-in-difference research designs (see Callaway and Sant'Anna, "Difference-in-Differences with" and Baker et al, "How Much Should We") indicate the danger of using untreated units as a reference category, because they can potentially be treated at a later stage, thereby biasing the results. However, our set-up does not suffer from this shortcoming as individuals in established democracies can never be treated, regardless of treatment timing, thereby ensuring a constant placebo sample for comparison.

[97] Dinas and Stoker, "Age-Period-Cohort Analysis"; Dinas and Northmore-Ball, "The Ideological Shadow of" .

[98] We use 1989 as a centering year for democracies as this is the median year of transitions in our data set. In addition, the transitions that took place in 1989 signaled a shift in the acceptability of authoritarianism as a system of government (see *Fukuyama, The End of History*). In section A8.3 of the Online Appendix we use other years to center individuals from democracies and find very similar results.see

[99] Dinas and Stoker, "Age-Period-Cohort Analysis" .

[100] The overlap at both ends of the birth cohort range is driven by the smaller number of observations for those birth cohorts (born before 1919 and after 1990) compared to the other cohorts. The results reported in Figure 4 remain identical when restricting the analysis to birth cohorts for which the evolution over time of support for democracy is perfectly parallel (born after 1919 and before 1991). These are not reported due to space constraints but can be provided on request by the authors. These results can also be fully replicated using the paper's replication files.

[101] Figure A4 in the Online Appendix shows that the same trends hold when plotting the evolution of support for democracy by age groups at the time of the survey. In Section A8 of the Appendix, we also report results in which we relax the assumption that age and period

effects operate in parallel fashion for both transition types and report additional robustness checks. The results we report here remain substantively the same.

[102] Neundorf and Pop-Eleches, “Dictators and Their Subjects” .

[103] Rose et al, *Democracy and Its Alternatives*; Mattes and Bratton, “Learning about Democracy in”.

[104] Schmitter and O’Donnell, *Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain*; Meirowitz and Tucker, "People Power or a".

[105] Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization*; Linz and Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition.*

[106] El-Mallakh, "How Do Protesters Affect"; Ketchley and El-Rayyes, "Unpopular Protest: Mass Mobilization"; Abadeer et al., “Did Egypt’s Post-Uprising” .

[107] Bayer et al., “The Democratic Dividend of”; Kadivar, "Mass Mobilization and"; Pinckney, *From Dissent to Democracy*.

[108] Claassen, “Does Public Support Help”.

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Supplementary Analysis

Winds of change:

Democratic transitions and long-term democratic support

Appendix 1: Discussion of the main robustness tests of the paper

A potential threat to our inferences comes from our operationalization of transition types. For example, some elite-centered transitions might have been initiated by popular mobilization, whereby elite actions that brought down the regime are only an afterthought once the transition was completed. Moreover, transitions can be complicated events and the ultimate cause of regime demise may be hard to pinpoint at times (Gleditsch, Radean, and Olar 2022). If this were true, then we should observe no difference in the effects on support for democracy of experience with the two transition types, and alternative operationalizations of transition types should undermine our results. In Section 6 of the Online Appendix, we present several robustness checks to show that our results hold when using alternative operationalizations of transition types and mobilization occurring around transition events. A summary of these can be found below.

First, we compare our operationalization of transition types with the one proposed by Pinckney (2020), who codes democratic transitions that were "initiated, led and brought to fruition through a peaceful, organized campaign from the bottom up, a campaign of nonviolent resistance" (Pinckney, 2020: 3). We find five different democratic periods which we classify as elite-centered transitions (Bulgaria 1990, Latvia 1991, Peru 2000, Portugal 1974, and South Africa 1994), while Pinckney (2020) classifies these as civil resistance (i.e. citizen-centered) transitions. We re-code these transitions as citizen-centered and re-run Models 3 and 4 from Table 1 (see Table A7 in the Appendix). Our results remain identical, as elite-centered transitions exert a negative effect on support for democracy, while the effect of citizen-centered transitions on individual support for democracy only becomes positive when comparing individuals from countries that have experienced a transition.

Second, we generate dummy variables capturing whether there was non-violent, anti-regime mobilization in the transition year and the two years prior,[1] using NAVCO 1.3 (Chenoweth and Shay 2020). We use this variable to generate experience with mobilization just as we did with our main independent variables. We re-run the same models (Models 3 and 4) as above, first only with the mobilization experience variable, then with the original operationalization of transition type and finally with the re-coded transition type variables. The results – as shown in Table A8 – remain identical to the results we report in the paper. In turn, the effect of experiencing non-violent, anti-regime mobilization in the two years prior to the transitions does not exert a systematic effect on support for democracy as its sign depends on the model specification.

We also ran alternative models in which we account for the length of non-violent mobilization (Kadivar 2018) experienced by an individual before transition. The results show that either longer exposure to mobilization reduces support for democracy or it is not statistically significant in the long run[2] (see Table A9), while the effect of transition type remains consistent with previously reported results. Finally, we also account for post-transition

[1] We use the two years prior to the transition since the average length of mobilization around transition is 1.8 years.

[2] Similar to our main independent variables, we only count the number of years an individual has experienced until transition from the moment they turn 15 years old, with an average of 1.4 years of exposure to mobilization for respondents. The democracy-inducing effect of non-violent resistance has been assumed in previous work on non-violence (Bayer, Bethke, and Lambach 2016; Bethke and Pinckney 2021; Chenoweth and Stephan 2011; Pinckney 2020), but these arguments are mostly based on anecdotal evidence and ours is the first systematic empirical test of these propositions at the individual level.

mobilization in the two years after transition using the approach explained above (see Table A10 in the Appendix). This shows that post-transition non-violent anti-regime mobilization increases support for democracy, while the effect of our original measure of transition type remains identical. More generally, these results increase our confidence that the breakthrough event that brought down autocracy matters in shaping people's support for democracy in the long run and our results are not driven by mobilization events that could lead us to mischaracterize the transition type.

In Table A11 in the Appendix, we disaggregate our measure of experience of transition type by estimating the separate effects of popular uprisings, elections, elite-driven and civil war transitions on support for democracy at individual and country levels. The reason for doing this is that elites often negotiate electoral institutions that benefit their interests and allow them to compete in fair elections (Schedler 2002). If this were the case for our transitions through elections, we should observe either a negative effect or no difference compared to individuals from established democracies or from younger generations. Re-estimating our individual-level models from Table 1, we do not find evidence of this being the case. More specifically, we find that individuals that experienced transition through elections still exhibit higher support for democracy, while elite-centered and civil war transitions have a negative effect on that support. Surprisingly, the effect of popular mobilization campaigns on it is still negative. These results indicate that our estimate of the positive effect of citizen-centered transitions is somewhat conservative, indicating some heterogeneity of experience for these transition types, which is worth investigation in future research.

In Appendix 9, we present a series of additional sensitivity tests, which all confirm the robustness of our findings. First, we include additional country-level controls, which focus on post-transition countries (M4 in Table 1), including the type of the previous regime (Geddes et al. 2014) as well as indicators of transitional justice – amnesties and prosecutions – taken from Dancy et al. (2019). Second, we change the classification of democracies included from the democracy indicator of Geddes et al. (2014) to the V-Dem "Regime of the World" indicator (Coppedge et al. 2019).

We also unpack our approach of the collective learning effect of transitions by separating respondents into several groups (see Section A9.3 of the Appendix): 1) those who were born within 10 years of the transition (acting as a placebo group), (2) those that were 14 years of age or younger at the time of transition, (3) those in their formative years at the time of transition (15 - 29 years old) and (4) those that experienced the transition after their formative years (aged 30+). When re-estimating Model 3 from Table 1 we include binary variables capturing all these groups, thereby comparing these groups with individuals from established democracies and individuals born more than 10 years after transition. These results show that citizen-driven transitions are strongest during formative years, while elite-driven transitions leave a stronger impact when people are older. More importantly, these additional models show a consistent negative effect of elite-centered transitions if experienced when aged 15 or older, while the effect of citizen-centered transitions is much more context-dependent. The results also show that transitions do not affect people that were born *after* the event, which gives further robustness to our empirical approach. Finally, as some of the transitions studied here were hand-coded (see Table A2), we re-ran the main models that exclude these cases (see Figure A9). Finally, in Appendix A10 we show that our results are not driven by post-treatment bias due to the inclusion of the macro control variables. The inclusion of their pre-treatment 5-year average in the models, does not alter the results we report in the paper.

Appendix 2: Summary Statistics of transitions and survey data

Table A1. Transition type, year of transition and number of observations by country

Country	*Number of Observations*	*Year of elite-centered transitions*	*Year of citizen-centered transitions*
Albania	4129	0	1991
Argentina	15159	0	1983
Australia	3430	0	0
Austria	2862	0	0
Bangladesh	2479	0	1990
Barbados	3337	0	0
Belgium	5236	0	0
Bolivia	13911	0	1982
Bosnia	2412	0	1991
Brazil	19331	0	1985
Bulgaria	4138	1990	0
Canada	3242	0	0
Chile	14454	0	1989
Taiwan	4805	0	2000
Colombia	16675	0	1958
Costa Rica	15156	1949	0
Croatia	2293	0	1991
Cyprus (G)	1370	0	0
Czech Rep.	5277	0	1989
Denmark	2370	0	0
Dominican Rep.	13619	0	1978
Ecuador	18333	0	1979
El Salvador	14797	1994	0
Estonia	3118	0	1991
Finland	3931	0	0
France	3923	0	0
Georgia	1289	0	2003
Greece	2570	0	1974
Guatemala	13850	1995	0
Haiti	6349	2004	0
Honduras	14876	0	1981
Hungary	3938	0	1990
Iceland	2955	0	0
India	2604	0	0
Indonesia	2205	0	1999
Ireland	3763	0	0
Israel	1139	0	0
Italy	4469	0	0
Jamaica	5417	0	0
Japan	5186	0	0
South Korea	4647	0	1987
Latvia	3235	1991	0
Lithuania	2769	1990	0
Luxembourg	2486	0	0
Malta	2207	0	0
Mexico	19115	0	2000

Mongolia	1176	0	1993
Moldova	2928	1991	0
Montenegro	2213	0	2006
Netherlands	3896	0	0
New Zealand	2188	0	0
Nicaragua	14989	0	1990
Nigeria	1725	0	1999
Norway	4174	0	0
Panama	15264	0	0
Paraguay	14898	1993	0
Peru	19954	2000	0
Philippines	4650	0	1986
Poland	3744	0	1989
Portugal	5790	1974	0
Romania	4847	0	1989
Slovakia	3504	0	1989
Slovenia	3958	0	1991
South Africa	4956	1994	0
Spain	5810	1976	0
Sweden	3928	0	0
Switzerland	3621	0	0
Thailand	1384	0	2007
Trinidad and Tobago	3727	0	0
Turkey	7370	0	1983
Ukraine	4021	1991	0
Macedonia	3050	0	1991
Great Britain	4210	0	0
United States	3615	0	0
Uruguay	18145	0	1984
Venezuela	6875	0	1958
Serbia	2299	0	2000
Total	**487,765**	**14**	**36**

Table A2. Author coded transitions in addition to Geddes et al. (2014)

Country	Transition	Year	Notes
Croatia	Citizen-centered	1991	Independence Referendum in 1991
Slovenia	Citizen-centered	1991	Independence Referendum held in 1990
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Citizen-centered	1991	Independence Referendum in 1991
Montenegro	Citizen-centered	2006	Independence Referendum in 2006
Macedonia	Citizen-centered	1991	Independence Referendum in 1991
Estonia	Citizen-centered	1991	
Latvia	Elite-centered	1991	
Lithuania	Elite-centered	1990	
Moldova	Elite-centered	1990	
Ukraine	Elite-centered	1991	

A2.3. Transition type and coding decisions

In our data set, Turkey for example had three democratic transitions in 1950, 1961, and 1983. In our analysis, we only include the most recent democratic transition (1983) as it is the one that started Turkey's uninterrupted democratic spell. Geddes et al data classify Turkey as democratic up to the last available year of 2017. Other countries that experienced more than one transition since 1946 include Argentina, Ecuador, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Niger, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, and Thailand.

Our categorization of elite-centered vs citizen-centered transitions is based on the autocratic regime data from Geddes et al (2014). They identify the end of an autocratic regime when a competitive election is won by someone not allied or supported by the regime, when the government is ousted via a coup, popular uprising, or civil war, or when the ruling group changes the rule of leader selection such that the group that holds power changes. We rely on their coding to classify our transitions as elite-centered and citizen-centered.

We define an elite-centered transition as a transition in which a small group of elites usher in democracy through a pact, after a successful coup or by winning a civil war. These transitions are characterized by the participation of a small group of actors in the process, with a small constituency and which is mostly closed to wider participation by the citizens. We code as Elite-centered transitions (receiving a value of 1) if the transitions fall within one of the following categories coded by Geddes et al. (2014) (see also their codebook for more clarification on how they code various situations):

- 1 – regime insiders changed the rules for choosing leaders and policies, or the executive was removed by elites (other than the military) ending the time period for which a set of formal and informal rules were in force.
- 5 – the regime was overthrown by military coup (ouster by the military of the regime in power).
- 6 – the regime was ousted by insurgents, revolutionaries, or combatants fighting a civil war (organized armed conflict).
- 8 – new leader chosen in regular autocratic succession changed the formal and informal rules defining the regime after his accession to power.

We define a citizen-centered transition as a transition in which the citizenry was actively involved in the process that led to the democratic transition, such as free elections or through popular nonviolent dissent. We code as citizen-centered transitions (receiving a value of 1) if the transitions fall within one of the following categories:

- 2 – the incumbent, party, coalition or candidate supported by the incumbent lost an election and allowed the candidate or party that won to take over power.
- 3 – the regime held a competitive election in which no major candidate or party supported by the incumbent ran, and the winner was allowed to take power.
- 4 – the regime was ousted by a popular uprising, defined as widespread, mostly unarmed demonstrations, riots and/or strikes.

A2.4 Measurement validity

The first challenge to our categorization of transitions refers to our focus on the pivotal event that brought down democracy rather how the transition was initiated (Pinckney 2020). One could make the argument that elites' actions to end autocracy may be epiphenomenal to long-

term mobilization by society (Kadivar 2018; Pinckney 2020) since determining the ultimate cause of leader exit or regime change may be challenging in the face of popular mobilization (Gleditsch, Radean, and Olar 2022). Portugal's transition to democracy in 1974 and Romania's in 1989 highlight these challenges. Portugal's transition was started by the so-called Carnation Revolution in which people went out onto the streets to support the coup attempt by a group of military officers led by General Spinola. The coup was not preceded by popular mobilization (Solsten 1993), despite being called the "Carnation Revolution". It was rather the actions of the military that spurred popular mobilization and led to regime change, not the other way around. However, an interpretation of Portugal's successful democratization is that it succeeded because of the mobilization, rather than because of the coup (Fernandes 2015).

In contrast, Romania's transition to democracy is viewed by certain scholars as elite-centered (Powell and Thyne 2014) as elites out of favor with Ceaușescu used the popular mobilization in the streets as a cover for their coup. While the counterfactual is hard to establish, there is not much evidence to highlight that the coup would have been attempted (Siani-Davies 2005) in the absence of the protests that started about a week and a half before Ceausescu's execution on the 25th of December 1989. So, if our measure misclassifies transition types due to mobilization around transition, our results should be undermined by alternative operationalizations of transition types.

We do not believe that our results are affected by the issues discussed above for two reasons. First, if mobilization during transition matters more than the (elite-centered) event that brought down the regime, then we should observe no statistical difference between the effect of citizen-centered and elite-centered transitions. Our results would be undermined if this were true. However, we find systematic, different effects on support for democracy between the two transition types. If most transitions happen through mobilization, then we should observe similar levels of mobilization before the transition for both transition types. When comparing the length of mobilization before the transition[3] we find that elite-centered transitions had an average of 0.5 years of mobilization compared to 1.6 years of mobilization for citizen-centered transitions.[4] In the robustness tests sub-section and Section A6 of the Appendix, we provide a discussion and further analysis that deal with these issues by using alternative operationalizations of the independent variables such as the initiation of the transition (Pinckney 2020), the length of transition (Kadivar 2018) , or post-transition mobilization.

The second challenge to the validity of our operationalization of transition type refers to classifying election transitions as citizen-centered transitions since elites may try to game democracy and shape the institutional environment in their favor (Albertus and Menaldo 2014; 2018), thereby mooting any real choice of the population at the ballot box. The gaming of democratization through electoral rules should work against our proposed hypothesis if it prevents citizens from participating in or influencing the election event. Our data indicates that such restrictions were not present in our cases of democratic transitions via elections. In 24 of the 29 transitions through elections, multiple parties participated in the election, there was a choice of candidates on the ballot, and opposition parties were allowed to participate freely,[5] while the remaining five elections were independence referendums in which the electorate voted overwhelmingly for independence and democracy.[6] We can thus be fairly confident that

[3] We measure this by counting the number of years in which there was non-violent, anti-regime mobilization using NAVCO 1.3 (Chenoweth and Shay 2020).
[4] A two-sample t-test with equal variance shows this difference is statistically significant.
[5] Calculated using data on elections from NELDA (Hyde and Marinov 2012).
[6] See Table A2 in the Online Appendix.

citizens were able to participate in the election event associated with democratization along the lines of our theoretical argument.

A2.5. Evolution of democracy post-transition event

Figure A1. Evolution of democracy post-transition event



Note: The graph only includes the countries that experienced transitions from Models 1 to 5 in the main text as the samples from those countries are the workhorse for our inferences.

2.6 Coding of the dependent variable: Support for democracy

Each respondent in the various surveys was asked how much they agreed or disagreed with the statement that '*democracy may have problems, but it is better than any other form of government*.' We standardized this variable across datasets to range from 0 to 100, with higher values meaning more support for democracy.

Dataset	#Cat	Question wording
Latino-barometer	4-R	Do you strongly agree (1), agree (2), disagree (3), or strongly disagree (4) with the following statements? Democracy may have problems, but it is the best system of government.
WVS/EVS	4-R	I'm going to read off some things that people sometimes say about a democratic political system. Could you please tell me if you agree strongly (1), agree (2), disagree (3), or disagree strongly (4), after I read each one of them? Democracy may have problems but it's better than any other form of government.
Americas Barometer	7	Democracy may have problems, but it is better than any other form of government. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement? (1) Strongly disagree – (7) Strongly agree
Asian Barometer	4-R	Do you agree or disagree with the following statement. Democracy may have its problems, but it is still the best form of government. (1) Strongly agree, (2) agree, (3) disagree, (4) strongly disagree.
CSES	4-R	Please tell me how strongly you agree or disagree with the following statement: Democracy may have problems, but it's better than any other form of government. (1) agree strongly, (2) agree, (3) disagree, (4) disagree strongly.

Notes: Variables that have been reversed in their order have an -R behind the number of categories.

2.6.1. Additional information on data harmonization of individual-level data

As part of this project, we produced a new dataset, which harmonizes numerous existing public opinion surveys from across the world to create a unique global public opinion dataset (links included):

- World Value Survey (WVS), 1981-2014
- European Values Study (EVS), 1981-2010
- Latinobarometer (LB), 1995-2015
- Americas Barometer (AB), 2004-2014
- Asian Barometer (ANB), 2001-2014
- Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES), 1996-2015

In our analyses we exclude countries that were not democratic at the time of the survey, as we focus on post-transition attitudes. We use the democracy dummy from the V-Dem "regimes of the world" indicator to classify countries as democratic Based on the availability of the outcome question and our selection criteria (democracies), our data consist of over 369 individual country-year datasets, which were included in the six studies which we included in our data harmonization. Putting all these together, covers 78 countries and almost 500,000 respondents for which we have responses on the democratic support outcome variable.

We provide a step-by-step guide to allow other researchers to build their working files or to replicate our data harmonization process. To create the harmonized dataset, four steps need to be followed:

1. Download all datasets. Click here to access data and documentation.

2. Decide which countries, years, and variables are needed. We have compiled three documents that should be used for this. For more information on each, please see the step-by-step guide:
    - *Waves by Country*: provides details on coverage for each country. Use this file to see the coverage over time for each country. We list which study included each country-year.
    - *Variables by Dataset Wave*: This spreadsheet gives the names of variables contained in each dataset. Each tab refers to a group of variables, and these tabs correspond to the tabs in the "Question Wording" spreadsheet. See more in step-by-step guide.
    - *Question Wording*: question wording for each variable in each dataset. Use this dataset to assess comparability in question wording between the datasets for the same variable.

3. Prepare datasets that belong to each study first by recoding the variables into common variable names and categories and if necessary merge single files for each study to create longitudinal files. We provide a template STATA do-file for step 3 called "template_within_data_prep.do". You can also download the do-file to create country labels in the zip-folder below.

4. Merge all separate, prepared studies into one big dataset. We provide a template STATA do-file for step 4 called "template_merge.do".

We have prepared a codebook of all the data and variables that we harmonized for our project following this step-by-step data harmonization.

Appendix 3: Macro-level support for democracy

In this section we run the main analysis of the paper aggregated at the country-level to account for inherent measurement uncertainty around measures of democratic support and potential idiosyncrasies of each survey methodology that might bias the responses to the questions on supporting democracy (Dahlberg, Axelsson, and Holmberg 2020). We use Claassen's (2019) democratic support data between 1988 and 2015 from 99 democracies, of which 18 countries had elite-centered transitions, 48 had citizen-centered transitions and 33 had been democracies since (at least) 1945, to estimate the effect of transition types on democratic support. Democratic mood is measured using survey questions, based largely on the same datasets listed above, which asks respondents to evaluate the desirability of democracy, to compare it with autocratic alternatives and evaluate undemocratic forms of government. Claassen (2019) uses a Bayesian dynamic latent variable model to obtain smooth country-year estimates of democratic mood.

We use the data to test whether at the aggregate level, individuals from countries that experienced a citizen-centered or an elite-centered transition exhibit higher/lower levels of democratic support compared to individuals from established democracies that did not experience such transitions. One advantage of this data is that we can account for the uncertainty around the latent measure of democratic support by using approach suggested by Schnakenberg and Fariss (2014). This approach duplicates the dataset 1,000 times and assigns a random draw from the posterior distribution of the latent variable to each country-year observation for democratic support, with 1,000 models being estimated and results across multiple sets of data are combined to create one set of coefficient and standard error estimates.

Table A3 below summarizes the results of this estimation approach. The results from Table A3 indicate that countries, which experienced elite transitions, have lower levels of support for democracy as compared to democracies or countries with citizen-centered transitions. The effect is statistically significant even when accounting for country-level controls or including a lagged dependent variable (Models M2 and M3), lending initial support to Hypothesis 2. Similarly, the effect of citizen-centered transitions is negative and statistically significant, but the effect of elite-centered transition is much bigger (Models M1 and M2) than the one for citizen-centered transitions. In sum, these results also indicate that the process through which democracy emerged could serve as a potential explanation for why new democracies differ in their levels of democratic support.

Table A3. Aggregate democratic support at the country level, 1988-2015

	Model M1	Model M2	Model M3
Transition (ref: none – established democracy)			
Elite-centered	-0.644***	-0.664***	-0.263**
	[0.061]	[0.060]	[0.091]
Citizen-centered	-0.260***	-0.202***	-0.216**
	[0.047]	[0.049]	[0.060]
Country-level controls (t-1)			
Civil liberties		1.440***	0.370
		[0.153]	[0.261]
Particularistic vs public goods		0.093	0.528**
		[0.106]	[0.0155]
Pol. Corruption		0.670	-0.269
		[0.124]	[0.168]
GDP/growth		-0.415	-0.087
		[0.290]	[0.339]
Logged GDP/capita		0.088**	0.117**
		[0.028]	[0.036]
Lagged DV			0.249***
			[0.033]
Constant	0.243***	-2.137***	-1.023***
	[0.037]	[0.253]	[0.293]
Observations	2,145	2,145	2,145

Significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Results present linear regression coefficients and standard errors in brackets. Clustered standard errors by country. Unit of analysis: country-year.

Appendix 3.1: Predicting type of transition by lagged democratic support

The models in Table A4 estimate the effect of democratic support on democratic transitions in autocracies (Model M4) using a logistic regression model, and the effect of democratic support on the type of transition (Models M5 and M6) using a multinomial regression model. This is done to test for the potential of reverse causality in our data. A potential concern for the results in the main paper is that a citizen-centered transition could happen when there are higher levels of democratic support as citizens would be more likely to organize to press for democracy. Similarly, in the cases of elite-centered transitions, these would be more likely in cases with low levels of democratic support as elites could seize on an opportunity to consolidate power. Results from Table A4 show that while the coefficient sizes follow the above logic, these are not statistically significant in either model, thereby allowing us to discard the possibility of reverse causality.

Table A4. Multi-nominal logistic regression, reference: No transition

	Model A4 – Democratic transition	Model A5 - Elite-centered	Model A6 - Citizen-centered
Lagged support for democracy	-0.017	-1.123	0.118
	[0.333]	[1.276]	[0.342]
Country-level predictors (t-1)			
Civil liberties	5.474***	-1.335	7.274***
	[2.015]	[2.460]	[2.446]
Particularistic vs public goods	-2.049	-2.532	-1.884
	[1.277]	[2.844]	[1.393]
Pol. Corruption	-2.207	-1.535	-2.788
	[1.740]	[1.500]	[1.920]
GDP/growth	-3.617	-3.692	-3.697
	[2.501]	[3.127]	[2.855]
Logged GDP/capita	-0.319	-0.521	-0.324
	[0.280]	[0.331]	[0.313]
Constant	-1.982	0.802	-3.137
	[2.572]	[2.477]	[2.887]
Observations	464	464	464
Number of countries	49	49	49

Significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors in brackets.
Clustered standard errors by country. Unit of analysis: country-year.

Appendix 4: Full results of Table 1 from the main text

Table A5. Full results of the models presented in the main text

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Countries	All	All	All	Transitions only	
Experience with (15+ years) – ref: none					
Citizen-centered	2.023***	0.069	0.105	0.910***	1.027***
	[0.113]	[0.136]	[0.136]	[0.148]	[0.151]
Elite-centered	0.014	-1.854***	-1.781***	-1.042***	-0.906***
	[0.179]	[0.192]	[0.193]	[0.203]	[0.204]
Individual controls					
Age		0.102***	0.101***	0.069***	0.065***
		[0.003]	[0.003]	[0.004]	[0.004]
Education (ref: non/primary)					
Secondary		2.147***	2.131***	1.933***	1.954***
		[0.092]	[0.092]	[0.101]	[0.103]
Degree		6.657***	6.640***	5.895***	5.983***
		[0.113]	[0.113]	[0.128]	[0.131]
Working		0.633***	0.625***	0.619***	0.624***
		[0.076]	[0.076]	[0.085]	[0.087]
Female		-0.924***	-0.927***	-0.831***	-0.855***
		[0.073]	[0.073]	[0.083]	[0.085]
Country-level controls (t-1)					
Civil liberties			-1.204	2.983	2.617
			[5.052]	[5.205]	[4.911]
Particularistic vs public goods			4.840**	4.461**	
			[2.028]	[2.139]	[2.268]
Pol. Corruption			3.746*	2.925	1.931
			[2.058]	[2.232]	[2.172]
GDP/growth			10.666*	12.266*	-4.608
			[6.194]	[6.817]	[6.526]
Logged GDP/capita			1.640***	0.830	0.190
			[0.635]	[0.766]	[0.786]
Years since transition					0.127***
					[0.027]
Data FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Constant	74.892***	68.653***	48.086***	53.425***	58.285***
	[0.764]	[0.743]	[5.853]	[6.750]	[6.925]
Observations	487,765	487,765	487,765	398,479	383,215
N of groups	384	384	384	317	304

Significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors in brackets. The results are based on a multi-level model, incl. country-survey year random effects. Unit of analysis: Individuals.

Appendix 5: Results change in macro controls

Table A6. Full results of models interacting transition type with change in macro controls (Sample: countries with transition only)

	Model A6.1	Model A6.2	Model A6.3	Model A6.4	Model A6.5
Experience with (15+ years) – ref: none					
Citizen-centered transition experience	1.203***	0.797***	0.629***	0.020	0.818***
	[0.335]	[0.154]	[0.167]	[0.228]	[0.160]
Elite-centered transition experience	-1.317**	-1.477***	-1.690***	-2.042***	-0.964***
	[0.577]	[0.245]	[0.233]	[0.262]	[0.205]
Individual controls					
Age	0.070***	0.070***	0.070***	0.070***	0.070***
	[0.004]	[0.004]	[0.004]	[0.004]	[0.004]
Education (ref: non/primary)					
Secondary	1.940***	1.940***	1.955***	1.972***	1.945***
	[0.102]	[0.102]	[0.102]	[0.102]	[0.102]
Degree	5.908***	5.912***	5.929***	5.950***	5.914***
	[0.128]	[0.128]	[0.128]	[0.128]	[0.128]
Working	0.609***	0.618***	0.616***	0.643***	0.622***
	[0.085]	[0.085]	[0.085]	[0.085]	[0.085]
Female	-0.833***	-0.833***	-0.832***	-0.820***	-0.829***
	[0.083]	[0.083]	[0.083]	[0.083]	[0.083]
Country-level controls (t-1)					
Civil liberties	5.222**	4.656**	4.976**	3.644*	4.443**
	[2.126]	[2.060]	[2.318]	[2.126]	[2.124]
Particularistic vs public goods	-6.129	5.089	5.259	3.362	4.058
	[5.942]	[5.017]	[5.398]	[5.131]	[5.201]
Pol. Corruption	2.805	7.409***	2.503	3.596	2.838
	[2.198]	[2.326]	[2.312]	[2.205]	[2.219]
GDP/growth	10.204	12.509*	10.934	10.214	2.976
	[6.744]	[6.568]	[6.831]	[6.749]	[12.044]
Logged GDP/capita	0.850	0.697	0.742	-0.170	0.884
	[0.757]	[0.738]	[0.774]	[0.822]	[0.766]
Change in civil liberties	7.671***				
	[2.333]				
Citizen-centered x change civil liberties	-0.660				
	[0.622]				
Elite-centered x change civil liberties	0.545				
	[1.191]				
Change in corruption		12.549***			
		[2.370]			
Citizen-centered x change corruption		1.216*			
		[0.653]			
Elite-centered x change corruption		3.474***			
		[1.155]			
Change in public spending			-2.085		
			[1.496]		
Citizen-centered x change public spending			1.348***		
			[0.423]		
Elite-centered x change public spending			3.173***		
			[0.585]		
Change in ln GDP/capita				1.257	

				[0.828]	
Citizen-centered x change ln GDP/capita				1.599***	
				[0.319]	
Elite-centered x change ln GDP/capita				1.903***	
				[0.320]	
Change in GDP growth					10.513
					[9.848]
Citizen-centered x change GDP growth					1.861
					[1.803]
Elite-centered x change GDP growth					14.567***
					[3.965]
Data FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Constant	56.468***	51.106***	52.434***	62.872***	52.182***
	[6.723]	[6.522]	[7.250]	[7.293]	[6.810]
Observations	397,559	397,559	397,559	397,559	397,559
Number of groups	316	316	316	316	316

Significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors in brackets. The results are based on a multi-level model, incl. country-survey year random effects. Unit of analysis: Individuals.

Figure A2. Distribution of change in macro controls (average 5 years before transition to today).



Appendix 6: Alternative operationalizations of transition types

Table A7. Recode transitions based on Pinckney (2020)

	Model A3.1 - All Countries	Model A5.1 - Transitions only
Experience with (15+ years) – ref: none		
Recoded Citizen-centered transition experience	-0.072	0.725***
	[0.131]	[0.144]
Recoded Elite-centered transition experience	-1.717***	-0.998***
	[0.222]	[0.232]
Individual controls		
Age	0.101***	0.069***
	[0.003]	[0.004]
Education (ref: non/primary)		
Secondary	2.133***	1.937***
	[0.092]	[0.101]
Degree	6.638***	5.893***
	[0.113]	[0.128]
Working	0.621***	0.616***
	[0.076]	[0.085]
Female	-0.929***	-0.833***
	[0.073]	[0.083]
Country-level controls (t-1)		
Civil liberties	0.198	3.832
	[4.902]	[5.056]
Particularistic vs public goods	4.895**	4.421**
	[2.013]	[2.135]
Pol. Corruption	3.359	2.690
	[2.079]	[2.271]
GDP/growth	-3.681	-5.591
	[6.074]	[6.579]
Logged GDP/capita	1.616**	0.912
	[0.649]	[0.788]
Data FE	Y	Y
Constant	47.694***	52.620***
	[5.900]	[6.880]
Observations	487,765	398,479
Number of groups	384	317

Significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors in brackets. The results are based on a multi-level model, incl. country-survey year random effects. Unit of analysis: Individuals.

Table A8. Mobilization at and during the transition

	Model A5.2- All countries	Model A5.2 -Transition only	Model A3.3 All countries – Main transition measure	Model A5.3 Transition only – Main transition measure	Model A3.4 All countries – Recoded transition measure	Model A5.4 Transition only – Recoded transition measure
Experience with (15+ years) – ref: none						
Mobilization at transition	-0.253*	0.376***	-0.090	0.076	-0.257	-0.091
	[0.137]	[0.145]	[0.174]	[0.178]	[0.180]	[0.184]
Citizen-centered transition	--	--	0.159	0.864***	0.088	0.780***
			[0.170]	[0.180]	[0.173]	[0.182]
Elite-centered transition	--	--	-1.738***	-1.074***	-1.642***	-0.973***
			[0.208]	[0.218]	[0.228]	[0.237]
Individual controls						
Age	0.097***	0.071***	0.101***	0.068***	0.101***	0.069***
	[0.003]	[0.003]	[0.003]	[0.004]	[0.003]	[0.004]
Education (ref: non/primary)						
Secondary	2.151***	1.944***	2.132***	1.933***	2.135***	1.938***
	[0.092]	[0.101]	[0.092]	[0.101]	[0.092]	[0.101]
Degree	6.652***	5.898***	6.641***	5.895***	6.640***	5.894***
	[0.113]	[0.128]	[0.114]	[0.128]	[0.114]	[0.128]
Working	0.593***	0.618***	0.625***	0.619***	0.623***	0.617***
	[0.075]	[0.085]	[0.076]	[0.085]	[0.076]	[0.085]
Female	-0.936***	-0.830***	-0.927***	-0.831***	-0.928***	-0.832***
	[0.073]	[0.083]	[0.073]	[0.083]	[0.073]	[0.083]
Country-level controls (t-1)						
Civil liberties	-0.204	3.230	0.293	3.885	0.204	3.824
	[4.942]	[5.093]	[4.832]	[4.971]	[4.897]	[5.055]
Particularistic vs public goods	5.465***	5.194**	5.184***	4.809**	4.849**	4.400**
	[2.027]	[2.148]	[1.982]	[2.097]	[2.011]	[2.135]
Pol. Corruption	3.385	2.537	3.396*	2.732	3.414	2.719
	[2.096]	[2.288]	[2.050]	[2.234]	[2.078]	[2.271]
GDP/growth	-3.698	-5.476	-3.246	-5.014	-3.705	-5.612
	[6.123]	[6.628]	[5.988]	[6.470]	[6.068]	[6.577]
Logged GDP/capita	1.716***	1.021	1.490**	0.771	1.605**	0.912
	[0.654]	[0.794]	[0.640]	[0.776]	[0.648]	[0.788]
Data FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Constant	46.738***	51.730***	48.617***	53.655***	47.794***	52.635***
	[5.946]	[6.926]	[5.820]	[6.768]	[5.895]	[6.877]
Observations	487,765	398,479	487,765	398,479	487,765	398,479
Number of groups	384	317	384	317	384	317

Significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors in brackets. The results are based on a multi-level model, incl. country-survey year random effects. Unit of analysis: Individuals.

Table A9. Length of exposure to nonviolent, anti-regime mobilization

	Model A3.5 – All countries	Model A5.5 – Transition only	Model A3.6 – All countries	Model A3.6 – Transition only
Experience with (15+ years) – ref: none				
Length of mobilization	-0.047*	0.019	-0.079***	-0.042
	[0.024]	[0.025]	[0.025]	[0.026]
Citizen-centered transition	--	--	0.331**	0.975***
			[0.143]	[0.154]
Elite-centered transition	--	--	-1.691***	-1.043***
			[0.192]	[0.203]
Individual controls				
Age	0.095***	0.075***	0.099***	0.070***
	[0.003]	[0.003]	[0.003]	[0.004]
Education (ref: non/primary)				
Secondary	2.159***	1.949***	2.142***	1.936***
	[0.092]	[0.101]	[0.092]	[0.101]
Degree	6.630***	5.904***	6.618***	5.894***
	[0.114]	[0.128]	[0.114]	[0.128]
Working	0.583***	0.632***	0.620***	0.623***
	[0.075]	[0.085]	[0.076]	[0.085]
Female	-0.952***	-0.825***	-0.943***	-0.830***
	[0.073]	[0.083]	[0.073]	[0.083]
Country-level controls (t-1)				
Civil liberties	-0.413	3.192	-0.067	3.611
	[4.935]	[5.084]	[4.808]	[4.958]
Particularistic vs public goods	5.360***	5.201**	5.064**	4.795**
	[2.025]	[2.143]	[1.973]	[2.090]
Pol. Corruption	3.677*	2.649	3.737*	2.795
	[2.104]	[2.283]	[2.050]	[2.226]
GDP/growth	-4.769	-5.506	-4.336	-5.079
	[6.157]	[6.612]	[6.000]	[6.449]
Logged GDP/capita	1.716***	0.982	1.493**	0.812
	[0.654]	[0.792]	[0.638]	[0.774]
Data FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
Constant	46.925***	52.076***	48.880***	53.477***
	[5.942]	[6.911]	[5.798]	[6.746]
Observations	484,428	398,479	484,428	398,479
Number of groups	383	317	383	317

Significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors in brackets. The results are based on a multi-level model, incl. country-survey year random effects. Unit of analysis: Individuals.

Table A10. Nonviolent anti-regime mobilization after transition.

	Model A3.7 – All countries	Model A5.7– Transition only	Model A3.8 – All countries	Model A5.8 – Transition only
Experience with (15+ years) – ref: none				
Mobilization post-transition	0.573**	1.097***	0.601**	0.664**
	[0.292]	[0.300]	[0.304]	[0.310]
Citizen-centered transition	--	--	0.028	0.822***
			[0.141]	[0.154]
Elite-centered transition	--	--	-1.810***	-1.073***
			[0.193]	[0.203]
Individual controls				
Age	0.094***	0.073***	0.101***	0.068***
	[0.002]	[0.003]	[0.003]	[0.004]
Education (ref: non/primary)				
Secondary	2.148***	1.940***	2.127***	1.929***
	[0.092]	[0.101]	[0.092]	[0.101]
Degree	6.648***	5.894***	6.636***	5.891***
	[0.114]	[0.128]	[0.114]	[0.128]
Working	0.577***	0.630***	0.626***	0.621***
	[0.075]	[0.085]	[0.076]	[0.085]
Female	-0.942***	-0.829***	-0.928***	-0.832***
	[0.073]	[0.083]	[0.073]	[0.083]
Country-level controls (t-1)				
Civil liberties	-0.308	2.853	0.130	3.699
	[4.947]	[5.058]	[4.826]	[4.958]
Particularistic vs public goods	5.446***	5.248**	5.223***	4.849**
	[2.029]	[2.133]	[1.979]	[2.091]
Pol. Corruption	3.280	2.373	3.254	2.580
	[2.099]	[2.274]	[2.048]	[2.228]
GDP/growth	-3.738	-5.446	-3.229	-4.981
	[6.129]	[6.582]	[5.979]	[6.452]
Logged GDP/capita	1.806***	1.088	1.538**	0.821
	[0.655]	[0.789]	[0.639]	[0.774]
Data FE	Y	Y	Y	Y
Constant	46.069***	51.470***	48.353***	53.387***
	[5.951]	[6.880]	[5.812]	[6.750]
Observations	487,765	398,479	487,765	398,479
Number of groups	384	317	384	317

Significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors in brackets. The results are based on a multi-level model, incl. country-survey year random effects. Unit of analysis: Individuals.

Appendix 7: Separating transition type into four categories

Table A11. Disaggregated transition types and democratic support, individual level-data.

Countries	Model A3.9 All	Model A5.9 Transition only
Experience with (15+ years) – ref: none		
Citizen-centered: Election transition	0.387***	1.199***
	[0.146]	[0.159]
Citizen-centered: Popular mobilization transition	-1.072***	-0.287
	[0.265]	[0.276]
Elite-centered: Elite transition	-1.701***	-0.952***
	[0.197]	[0.207]
Elite-centered: Civil war transition	-3.234***	-2.654***
	[0.769]	[0.788]
Individual controls		
Age	0.101***	0.069***
	[0.003]	[0.004]
Education (ref: non/primary)		
Secondary	2.141***	1.945***
	[0.092]	[0.101]
Degree	6.644***	5.899***
	[0.113]	[0.128]
Working	0.637***	0.635***
	[0.076]	[0.085]
Female	-0.926***	-0.828***
	[0.073]	[0.083]
Country-level controls (t-1)		
Civil liberties	4.863**	4.503**
	[2.041]	[2.153]
Particularistic vs public goods	-0.350	3.960
	[5.082]	[5.239]
Pol. Corruption	3.614*	2.795
	[2.070]	[2.246]
GDP/growth	10.097	11.751*
	[6.229]	[6.858]
Logged GDP/capita	1.454**	0.564
	[0.641]	[0.775]
Constant	49.346***	55.326***
	[5.898]	[6.814]
Data FE	Y	Y
Observations	487,765	398,479
Number of groups	384	317

Significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors in brackets. The results are based on a multi-level model, incl. country-survey year random effects. Unit of analysis: Individuals.

Figure A3: Coefficient size of transition types based on Table A11



Appendix 8. Difference-in-Difference (DiD) Estimation

A8.1. Full results of the DiD estimation

Table A12. Full results of the DiD estimation used for Figure 4 in the main text

	Model 7 - DiD
Elite-centered x 15+ Years at Transition	-6.606***
	[0.509]
Citizen-centered x 15+ Years at Transition	-4.080***
	[0.500]
15+ at Transition (C: 1989)	4.211***
	[0.489]
Elite-centered Transition	4.166***
	[0.628]
Citizen-centered Transition	5.003***
	[0.650]
Constant	65.378***
	[2.264]
Data FE	Yes
Individual Controls	Yes
Pre-treatment Controls	Yes
Time polynomials	Yes
Observations	471,581
R-squared	0.060

Significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors in brackets

Figure A4. Parallel trends assumption by age group in established and new democracies.



A8.2 Relaxing period and age parallel trends assumption

Model 7, on which Figure 4 in the main paper is based, assumes parallel age and period effects. This assumption is similar to the parallel-trends assumption in the more traditional difference-in-difference approaches in the sense that difference across cohorts are due to age or period effects would be the same in the absence of the treatment (i.e. experience with transition). The advantage of the current DiD estimation approach is that we can relax these assumptions and investigate the robustness of our results. Precisely, to relax the parallel age and period assumption by interacting the transition variable with age, and respectively with period (survey-year). Figure A8.2 below reports the DiD coefficient comparing experience of transition with democratic cohort under the relaxed parallel period (top-panel) age assumption (bottom-panel). The results mirror substantively the results we reported in the main text, with both transition experiences having a negative effect on democratic, yet the effect size of elite-centered transitions being much bigger than the one for citizen-centered.

Figure A5. Relaxed parallel period and age trends assumption for DiD estimation.



A8.3 Unpacking DiD time heterogeneity in transition experience and democratic cohorts

In the results reported for the DiD estimation we center the transition year for democracies at 1989 as this is the median value of transition year in our dataset. This means that our comparison cohort is formed of all the individuals from democracies that were at least 15 years old in the 1989 and the negative effects of transition experience are reported in comparison to this cohort. However, our cohort transition years range between 1949 and 2003 which means that our selection of a centering year for democratic cohorts might be driving our results. Also, some of these cohorts have experienced democratization as part of different democratization waves. To account for this temporal heterogeneity, we separate our cohorts into several transition waves and examine whether selecting different centering years for democracies affect our main results. Figure A8.3 below summarizes the results of this approach and the results we reported previously are almost identical. The only difference is that there seems to be no differences in democratic support between cohorts that experienced Citizen-centered transitions between 1949 and 1958 with democratic cohorts that were at least 15 years old in 1954. However, this result is most likely driven by the fact that only Costa Rica had a Citizen-centered transition during that time period. We consider the following transition waves:

- Transitions taking place between 1949 and 1958 with 1954 centering year for democratic cohorts.
- Transitions taking place between 1974 and 1984 with 1979 as centering year for democratic cohorts.
- Transitions taking place between 1985 and 1995 with 1989 as centering year for democratic cohorts.
- Transitions taking place between 1999 and 2003 with 2001 as centering year for democratic cohorts.

Figure A6. Unpacking DiD time heterogeneity in transition experience and democratic cohorts



Appendix 9: Robustness tests

A9.1 Include additional macro controls

To test the robustness of our findings, we add additional information about the previous regime (Model A5.10) and transitional justice (Model A5.11). To capture the previous regime type we generate a series of binary variables that take a value of 1 if the previous regime was a monarchy, single-party regime, personalistic or military. The data on regime types comes from Geddes et al. (2014) and the variables have a similar spell structure to the ones capturing transition type (explained in the main model). Similarly, the duration variable is a count of years for how long the previous regimes has been in power from the same dataset. Next, the data on amnesties captures whether an amnesty was awarded in a country-year in the post-transition period for crimes committed during the authoritarian period and it takes a value of 1 if any amnesties were awarded to former elites. Finally, the prosecution variable captures whether domestic, foreign or international courts of law were used to hold accountable perpetrators of human rights violations in the post-transition period, with the violation having taken place in the authoritarian period. This variable takes a value of 1 if such prosecutions took place in former authoritarian country. Both these variables come from the data project by Dancy et al. (2019).

Table A13. Accounting for previous regime type and transitional justice

	Model A5.10		Model A5.11	
	coef	s.e.	coef.	s.e.
Experience with (15+ years) – ref: none				
Citizen-centered	0.918***	[0.155]	1.470***	[0.183]
Elite-centered	-0.970***	[0.214]	-0.730***	[0.265]
Previous regime				
Regime type (ref: monarchy)				
Party	3.468	[2.557]	1.500	[2.585]
Personal	2.599	[2.616]	2.089	[2.706]
Military	3.058	[2.601]	0.673	[2.760]
Duration	-0.080***	[0.030]	-0.071*	[0.038]
Transitional justice				
Amnesty			4.404***	[1.010]
Prosecution			-1.764	[1.106]
Country-level controls (t-1)				
Civil liberties	0.421	[5.519]	4.009	[7.246]
Public goods	5.231**	[2.325]	3.708	[2.866]
Pol. Corruption	2.401	[2.305]	1.548	[2.896]
GDP/growth	12.081*	[7.074]	-3.614	[8.988]
Logged GDP/capita	1.772*	[0.910]	2.071*	[1.126]
Individual-level controls	y		y	
Data FE	y		y	
Constant	47.411***	[7.930]	43.242***	[9.521]
Observations	368,482		243,425	
Number of groups	289		185	

A9.2 Changing the classification of democracies

In the main models presented in the paper, we use the classification provided by Geddes et al. (2014) to select countries that are classified as democracies. We test the robustness of this case selection by replicating Models 3 and 4 from Table 1 in the main text using the V-Dem "Regime of the World" classification. Countries that are classified as either electoral or liberal democracies are selected for the analysis. For example, there are 319 country-years that are classified as democratic by Geddes et al., but are not classified as democratic by V-Dem, while 85 country-years are classified as democratic by V-Dem, but not Geddes et al. Figure A7 presents the results, replicating the Models 3 and 4 presented in Table 1 of the paper.

Figure A7. Replication of results using V-Dem "Regime of the World" classification for democracies



A9.3 Changing the age cut-off points at transition

Here we replicate the results of Model 3 from Table 1, splitting respondents who experienced a transition into two groups: into several groups: 1) those who were born within the 10 years after the transition (acting as a placebo group), (2) those that were up to 14 years of age at the time of transition, (3) those between in their formative years at the time of transition (15 - 29 years old) and (4) those that experienced the transition after their formative years (aged 30+). M3 is based on all countries, the coefficients capture the difference between people who have experienced a democratic transition compared to people living in established democracies AND younger generations in the transitioning countries.

Figure A8. Different age cut-off points at transition



A9.4 Exclude countries where transitions were hand-coded

As some of the transitions studied here were hand-coded (see Table A2), we re-ran the main models (M3 and 4) that exclude these cases.

Figure A9. Results excluding countries where transitions were hand-coded



Appendix A10. Pre-treatment macro controls and post-treatment bias

Table A14. Pre-treatment macro controls and democratic support, 1995-2015.

	Model A10.1	Model A10.2	Model A10.3
	All	Transition only	
Transition (ref: none – established democracies + young generations)			
Citizen-centered transition	0.094		
	[0.136]		
Elite-centered transition	-1.803***		
	[0.192]		
Transition (ref: none – young generations)			
Citizen-centered transition		0.881***	0.992***
		[0.149]	[0.151]
Elite-centered transition		-1.074***	-0.929***
		[0.203]	[0.204]
Individual controls			
Age	0.102***	0.070***	0.067***
	[0.003]	[0.004]	[0.004]
Education (ref: non/primary)			
Secondary	2.137***	1.944***	1.960***
	[0.092]	[0.102]	[0.103]
Degree	6.652***	5.913***	5.997***
	[0.114]	[0.128]	[0.131]
Working	0.620***	0.613***	0.617***
	[0.076]	[0.085]	[0.087]
Female	-0.929***	-0.832***	-0.857***
	[0.073]	[0.083]	[0.085]
Pre-treatment 5-year average in macro controls:			
Civil liberties	-1.139	-4.124*	-2.432
	[1.543]	[2.388]	[2.351]
Particularistic vs public goods	2.325	2.456	-14.145
	[9.888]	[10.257]	[10.977]
Pol. Corruption	-1.017*	-2.054***	-1.165
	[0.614]	[0.705]	[0.739]
GDP/growth	14.106***	14.747***	13.223***
	[1.806]	[2.140]	[2.141]
Logged GDP/capita	-0.163	-0.948	-2.397
	[1.474]	[1.550]	[1.567]
Years since transition			0.133***
			[0.031]
Constant	70.247***	81.901***	73.650***
	[5.212]	[6.116]	[6.401]
Individual controls	Y	Y	Y
Data FE	Y	Y	y
Observations	486,845	397,559	382,295
Number of groups	383	316	303

Significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors in brackets. The pre-treatment controls for established democracies were centered at 1989, similar to the approach of the DiD estimation.

Table A15. Violence during the transition and democratic support, 1995-2015.

	Model A11.1	Model A11.2	Model A11.3	Model A11.4	Model A11.5
Countries	All	All	All	Transitions only	
Experience with (15+ years) – ref: none					
Citizen-centered	1.971***	-0.006	0.003	0.923***	1.034***
	[0.130]	[0.151]	[0.151]	[0.174]	[0.176]
Elite-centered	0.005	-1.868***	-1.799***	-1.078***	-0.950***
	[0.180]	[0.193]	[0.193]	[0.215]	[0.217]
Violence at transition	0.191	0.273	0.378	-0.038	-0.049
	[0.242]	[0.240]	[0.240]	[0.252]	[0.251]
Individual controls					
Age		0.102***	0.101***	0.078***	0.075***
		[0.003]	[0.003]	[0.004]	[0.004]
Education (ref: non/primary)					
Secondary		2.149***	2.134***	1.977***	1.998***
		[0.092]	[0.092]	[0.106]	[0.108]
Degree		6.658***	6.641***	5.889***	5.983***
		[0.113]	[0.113]	[0.135]	[0.138]
Working		0.633***	0.624***	0.590***	0.598***
		[0.076]	[0.076]	[0.091]	[0.092]
Female		-0.923***	-0.927***	-0.907***	-0.936***
		[0.073]	[0.073]	[0.089]	[0.091]
Country-level controls (t-1)					
Civil liberties			0.153	5.624	4.158
			[4.820]	[5.175]	[5.147]
Particularistic vs public goods			4.840**	5.152***	4.222*
			[1.977]	[2.231]	[2.443]
Pol. Corruption			3.442*	3.206	2.302
			[2.045]	[2.338]	[2.279]
GDP/growth			-3.236	-3.436	-2.608
			[5.972]	[7.098]	[7.220]
Logged GDP/capita			1.525**	0.664	0.037
			[0.639]	[0.832]	[0.848]
Years since transition					0.126***
					[0.028]
Data FE	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Constant	74.888***	68.645***	48.393***	54.776***	59.718***
	[0.764]	[0.742]	[5.805]	[7.313]	[7.528]
Observations	487,765	487,765	487,765	359,701	344,437
N of groups	384	384	384	282	269

Significance: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors in brackets.