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THE EVOLUTION OF PEACEBUILDING

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Peacebuilding has evolved to encompass a variety of practices and fields of study. It has also taken on various directions and become entangled with other ideas. In its broadest sense, peacebuilding continues to have a dual purpose: first, to address and resolve conflict legacies and root causes, and second, to put in place mechanisms that prevent future acts of violence and foster lasting peace. The broad, comprehensive, and fluid definitional scope has made peacebuilding's open-ended heuristic possible. Its meanings and applications have evolved over time, and have entangled with other related ideas and methods. Because of these factors, peacebuilding incorporates aspects of conflict prevention, peacekeeping, conflict resolution, transitional justice, statebuilding, economic development, gender, and environmental concerns. Moreover, the chapter contends that the development of peacebuilding theory and practice has been an iterative and mutually constitutive process influenced by actual events, normative aspirations, as well as the expansion of academic research on the subject.

This chapter offers a brief overview of the intellectual map and evolution of peacebuilding in theory and practice. The first part of the chapter explores how the concept of peacebuilding has changed over time, moving from an academic discipline to a tool for implementing policy and back again. It then provides a succinct summary of essential discussions (turns) that have influenced the ontological, epistemological, and methodological focus of academic (and, to some extent, policy) work on peacebuilding. The chapter looks at new directions that aim to decentre and pluralize the field's direction. Following this discussion, the chapter examines how peacebuilding has evolved into an all-encompassing concept that connects a variety of interventionist strategies, tactics, and institutional frameworks. It looks at how security, development, transitional justice, women, youth, and the environment are related to peacebuilding. The final section of this chapter discusses the popularity of the concept of peacebuilding among policymakers as well as academics. This popularity is mainly attributable to its appealing normative nature, broad definitional flexibility and elasticity, and capacity to entangle with various associative concepts and practices.

The origin and evolution of the concept of peacebuilding

While peacebuilding as a practice of mending societies and political orders has been a common historical feature of many societies, its contemporary meaning is associated with two major figures. First, the original conceptualization of peacebuilding is attributed to one of the founders of peace studies, Johan Galtung, (1976: 111) who conceptualized peacebuilding as an

associative approach that searched for structures that "must be found to remove the causes of war and to offer alternatives in situations in which war might occur." The 'associative' element at the heart of peacebuilding's original concept entails a process of responsive engagement, continuous learning and adjustment, and dealing with enabling and disenabling conditions. Galtung's conception of peacebuilding promotes the liberal values of equity, interdependency, and openness toward diversity. However, his propositions on peacebuilding remained neglected for most of the Cold War period, where international policy and scholarly debates were mainly focused on superpower dominance (see Ryan 2013).

In this context, peacebuilding started to be associated with the democratic peace thesis (Russet 1993) whereby power, hegemony, and self-interests were tamed and modified by normative and institutional systems of rights, responsibilities, and duties (see Owen 1997). Although not directly linked, a decade later, these liberal contours of peacebuilding resurfaced in the work of Michael W. Doyle on liberal peace, which was anchored by three pillars: representative democratic governance, protection of human rights, and transnational independence (see Doyle 1986; 2012). Doyle's work on liberal peace not only mainstreamed peacebuilding within the International Relations scholarly debates but also provided an impetus to the United Nations Secretary-General's 'Agenda for Peace', which defined peacebuilding as "actions to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid relapse into conflict" (UN Secretary-General 1992: para 21). Doyle (2015: x) called the UN endorsement of peacebuilding a shift "from its Cold War commitment to sovereign inviolability to a new intrusiveness in settling civil wars".

Since then, peacebuilding has become an important part of academic and policy discussions concerning the UN and its involvement in civil wars. The UN, regional organizations, and global and national civil society have established a broad range of practices, norms, and institutional structures that can be widely described as international peace architecture (Richmond, 2022). This architecture is much broader than the institutional divisions of the United Nations responsible for peacebuilding, such as the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs or the Peacebuilding Commission and other bodies. It encompasses various international, governmental, and non-governmental activists, civil society, and social movements (see Richmond and Visoka 2023). In particular, the meaning of peacebuilding has continued to evolve ever since. Within the UN, Kofi Annan, who succeeded Boutros-Ghali as Secretary-General, played a crucial role in implementing the peacebuilding agenda. In one of his reports, he described post-conflict peacebuilding as "actions undertaken at the end of the conflict to consolidate peace and prevent a recurrence of armed confrontation" (UN Secretary-General 1998: para 63). In 2000, the Brahimi Report defined peacebuilding as "activities undertaken on the far side of the conflict to reassemble the foundations of peace and provide the tools for building on those foundations something that is more than just the absence of war." (UN General Assembly 2000:3). In 2007, the UN Secretary-General's Policy Committee agreed on the following conceptual basis for peacebuilding to inform UN practice:

> "Peacebuilding involves a range of measures targeted to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacities at all levels for conflict management, and to lay the foundations for sustainable peace and development. Peacebuilding strategies must be coherent and tailored to specific needs of the country concerned, based on national ownership, and should comprise a carefully prioritized, sequenced, and therefore relatively narrow set of activities aimed at achieving the above objectives" (see UN Peacebuilding Support Office 2010).

In all definitional reiterations, peacebuilding emerges as a set of measures and aspirations to achieve peace as an ultimate social goal. There is a wide disagreement on means

and methods for implementing peacebuilding, indicators for measuring success, and the ideological, political, and contextual caveats that should guide peacebuilding practices. While the minimalists equate success with ending violence and returning to security, the maximalists view success as eradicating the underlying causes of conflict (Visoka 2016). The minimalist understanding of peacebuilding considers the absence of civil war (negative peace) and the prevalence of order and stability (regardless of the quality of peace and governance) as sufficient conditions and determinants of success (see Call 2008). The middle ground understanding of peacebuilding success focuses on the satisfactory completion of a mandate narrowly defined. For example, Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis (2006: 60) argue that the success of peacebuilding "can be measured in terms of the degree to which the mandate was implemented and by whether or not a stable peace was attained." Similarly, Richard Caplan (2005: 251) relates the success of peacebuilding with the "substantial progress towards eliminating or significantly reducing the threat of violent conflict, achieving a durable political settlement, and establishing viable state or territorial institutions" More ambitious understanding of peacebuilding, which are related to the original meaning of it, consider the sustainable (positive) peace.

The evolution of peacebuilding turns

Peacebuilding as a field of research and policy has constantly evolved and taken non-linear turns. To a large extent, peacebuilding studies have followed broader disciplinary developments in International Relations, especially among the critical side of discipline (Baele and Bettiza 2021). Since the 2000s, peacebuilding studies have had a proliferation of 'turns' (Visoka 2019; Richmond and Visoka 2023; Hunt 2023). Turns in peacebuilding studies represent specific theoretical, conceptual, methodological, and empirical lenses through which peacebuilding as an academic and policy field is viewed and analyzed in academic and policy debates (Simangan, 2022). This section explores peacebuilding turns that have emerged as critiques, responses, and alternatives to previous turns, significantly shaping its evolution and intellectual legacy.

The liberal turn

As indicated in the previous section, peacebuilding has been envisaged and embedded within liberal norms and principles of democracy and market economy. According to Michael W. Doyle (1983a: 206-207), the key to the liberal peace thesis is the existence of a domestic liberal democratic system where political and civil rights are respected and advanced, and governments are democratically elected and exercise limited powers, economic activity is mainly free from state intervention, and the social welfare of citizens is protected. Most relevant for peacebuilding, Doyle (1983a: 229-232) suggests that establishing liberal peace through republican polity and a market-oriented economy prevents wars because people at the domestic level calculate the cost of war rationally and thus exercise their influence to avoid conflicting relations with other nations; and because the cost of war damages international cooperation and economic interdependence, liberal states tend to resolve inter-state disputes through accommodation and peaceful consensus. In other words, liberal peace has emerged as an external version of democratic peace, which is seen as the domestic version of peace in established Western democracies.

The thematic and normative scope of liberal peacebuilding is gradually incorporated within UN policy discourse and mandates. For example, the UN Secretary-General (2001: 2) endorsed a liberal version of peacebuilding when he argued that peacebuilding efforts should

"focus on fostering sustainable institutions and processes in areas such as sustainable development, the eradication of poverty and inequalities, transparent and accountable governance, the promotion of democracy, respect for human rights and the rule of law and the promotion of a culture of peace and non-violence." The core attribute of liberal peacebuilding is democratization, which entails building democratic institutions and social practices that promote an open society, liberal economy, human rights, and the rule of law is seen as a promising strategy to ensure the peaceful transformation of societies affected by conflict. The other core attribute of liberal peacebuilding is economic reconstruction and marketization, which assumes that economic interdependence and open markets lead to sustainable peace (Russett and Oneal, 2001; del Castillo, 2008). While these segments of peacebuilding are associated with liberalism, scholars have questioned the linkage between liberal peace and liberalism (Joshi, Lee, and Mac Ginty, 2014); as well as the linkage between liberal peace, democratisation, and intervention and imperialism (Newman, 2009; Paris, 2010; Jahn, 2013). As a result, there is a wide consensus that liberal peace engrains elements of liberalism, but it uses realist methods and approaches in imposing democracy, pacifying and civilizing other states (Visoka and Lemay-Hébert, 2022).

Although liberal peace remains the dominant approach, especially among the Western and European policymakers, it has fallen short in promoting democracy and a market economy in many conflict-affected societies (Richmond, 2014). The failure of liberal peace is attributed to a wide range of systematic, operational, and contextual factors. Partially, the blame is attributed to international peacebuilders for lacking political will, resources, and capacities to implement a liberal peace agenda effectively. Partially, the blame is attributed to local actors who are seen as peace spoilers driven by narrow political and nationalist agendas as well as fragmentation and blockages. Nevertheless, it is in the ruins of failed liberal peacebuilding that new conceptual turns have emerged, the most prominent being the hybrid peace turn. The new peacebuilding turns tend to brand themselves as alternatives to liberal peace but do not advocate illiberal practices and norms. Instead, they suggest a more pluralist, contextual, emancipatory, and non-hegemonic version of liberalism.

The hybrid turn

One of the primary critical shifts in peacebuilding studies has been the hybrid peace turn, which has emerged inductively from analyzing the limits of liberal peacebuilding in practice, and efforts for reenvisaging peacebuilding in theory and practice. While talk of hybridity was present in the early critique of liberal peace, it only gained traction after 2010 when, both in theory and practice, the limits and setbacks of liberal interventions and post-conflict statebuilding became apparent in Iraq and Afghanistan. At its core, hybrid peace shows that most peacebuilding interventions encounter hybridization rather than a liberalization of conflict-affected societies (Mac Ginty, 2010; Richmond & Mitchell, 2012). Hybrid peace and hybrid political order are seen as inevitable outcomes of the friction between external intervention and local agency and backlash. As such, they might produce a more contextually-relevant, stable, effective, and legitimate peace and political order. Thus, the hybrid turn has expanded our understanding of peacebuilding from a linear and top-down process to a more complex and relational practice and struggle between various forces.

For Oliver P. Richmond (2011: 151), hybridity represents "a transmutation of both the liberal and the local discourses of peace, even in view of their relatively unequal material relations." He argued that there exists an inevitable 'local-liberal hybridity' in all peacebuilding settings, which entails the interaction between the local and the internationals, where both co-exist rather than assimilate or dominate and where the locals resist, modify or adapt to the

liberal peace (Richmond, 2010: 687). Along the same lines, Mac Ginty (2011: 69) perceives hybrid peace as a spectrum of possible outcomes spanning from those arrangements that impose an external peace and order to those where local actors preserve traditional and indigenous forms of peacemaking and governance. Thus, the political added value of hybrid peace is the opening of space "to look at alternatives" that promote emancipation, justice, and equality in conflict-affected societies (Richmond and Mac Ginty, 2015: 177)

While most of the scholarship on hybrid peace presents a positive view of local agency and capacity for conflict prevention and peacebuilding, critics tend to highlight the negative features of such an equilibrium, which "typically concludes in a compromised peacebuilding outcome" (Barnett, Fang, and Zürcher 2014: 608). While hybrid political orders that emerge in post-conflict settings might generate more stability and local legitimacy, they can also risk entrenching ethnic and political divides in the country and encourage elite peace capture and emergence of counter-peace forces where the post-war order, power-sharing, and the dominant regime is challenged. Dominik Zaum (2012: 125) adds that diverse and incompatible reasons and motives among peacebuilding organizations - which often fall outside liberal peace - can contribute to hybrid outcomes more than being products of local resistance against international actors. Despite this criticism, the contribution of hybrid peace has been in emphasizing relations rather than static affairs, conceiving social processes in terms of their fluidity rather than solidity, and decentring analyses from elites and institutions to non-elite entities and the field of everyday practices, and finally tracing dynamic changes and transformations (see Visoka, 2017). Hybrid peace has been the anchoring concept that has triggered a broad range of conceptual and empirical research on all aspects of governance, peacekeeping, security, justice, and development.

The local turn

Initially, local peacebuilding was promoted by John Paul Lederach (1997), who argued that peacebuilding measures should not only consider the elite but also include middle-level and community-based actors, structures, and institutions. Thus, the early work on the local turn in peacebuilding studies is associated with the work of civil society engagement for building peace from below and the emergence of local infrastructures for peace (Paffenholz, 2015). Key advocates of local turn, Roger Mac Ginty and Oliver P. Richmond (2013: 764), define it as "an exercise necessary to understand the changing conditions of peace: understanding the critical and resistant agencies that have a stake in a subaltern view of peace, how they act to uncover or engage with obstacles, with violence, and with structures that maintain them." They claim that at the local level, local agency can be manifested through small-scale acts of peace and resistance to violence, which can contribute to and legitimate a more legitimate, democratic, and emancipatory peace (see Mac Ginty and Richmond 2015: 770). In short, what happens at the local and everyday level is as important as what occurs at the institutional level.

Since the early 2010s, the local turn has triggered a broad range of conceptual and empirical research that emphasized sub-national and everyday features and indicators of peace (Mac Ginty, 2013), everyday legitimacy (Lemay-Hébert, 2012), local peace agreements (Kaldor, Theros, and Turkmani 2022), and local economic realities (Vogel, 2022). Building on the hybrid and local turns, Oliver P. Richmond (2011) proposed a 'post-liberal peace' defined as the transformation of the liberal peace to engage proactively with the local, recognize their needs, and seeks their support and consent. Later on, he developed the concept of peace formation, which denotes the interaction between local and international actors in finding ways of establishing peace processes, with particular emphasis on privileging local dynamics of forming peace, which includes a wide variety of traditional, critical, and hybrid mechanisms

for resolving issues. Similarly, building on the local turn, Mac Ginty (2021) has developed a detailed account of everyday peace which is suggested as a concept to take notice of the informal individual, family, and community domains that are equally impactful as other political structures and institutions in shaping peace. Other scholars, such as Severine Auteserre, have focused on studying everyday practices and narratives that underline peacebuilding endeavors to explain the success and failure of international intervention. She argues that interveners' everyday practices and habitus "influence the effectiveness of international peace efforts in many different ways" (Auteserre 2014: 12), suggesting more significant engagement with local knowledge and bottom-up solution to conflict resolution.

Although the local is often portrayed as an antidote to liberal peacebuilding, key proponents of liberal peace also agree that peacebuilding strategies should address both "local sources of hostility" as well as "local capacities for change…" (Doyle and Sambanis, 2000: 781). For example, early proponents of the liberal peace have recognized that local legitimacy is crucial for effective peacebuilding. In response to the critique of local turn, the UN officials have argued that their peacebuilding engagements have always been local since they have worked with grassroots, districts, and national levels to address the root causes of conflict and transform the parameters of how society functions (see UN Peacebuilding Fund 2022). The local turn has contributed to decentring of knowledge and agency in peacebuilding studies, evident with growing empirical research highlighting the contribution and challenges of local peacebuilding initiatives (see Leonardsson and Rudd 2015). However, the merit of the local turn in peacebuilding studies has been the revitalization of the debate on the need for greater local inclusion, ownership, and legitimacy of peacebuilding interventions. Over the years, the UN and other international actors started to incorporate within their mandates the discourse of local ownership and people-centred measures to ensure that peacebuilding interventions enjoyed wider local acceptance (UN Secretary-General 2018). In addition to being state-centric, it remains unclear how meaningful and impact the efforts for local ownership have been, especially its translation into programmes and projects (see UN Peacebuilding Fund 2022).

Other interdisciplinary turns

Beyond these significant turns in peacebuilding studies, it is essential to highlight the emergence of other perspectives, such as feminist approaches to peacebuilding (Väyrynen et al., 2021), the spatial turn to conflict and peace, the non-western turn, the digital turn, and other researcher-centred approaches which emphasized the experiences, positionality, and dynamics that identity, representation, and systems of beliefs have on producing knowledge. The feminist turn – which is discussed in the next section as part of the women, peace, and security agenda – emphasizes gender perspectives, experiences, and positionalities and offers alternative views on the meaning of conflict, violence, peace, security, and development (see Väyrynen, Parashar, Féron, and Confortini 2021). The spatial turn in peacebuilding studies emphasizes the spaces, places, and geographies of violence, peace, and reconciliation. As Annika Björkdahl and Stefanie Kappler (2021: 14) argue: "the physical environment shapes social interactions, governs movement through space, and enables or hampers the likelihood of peace being built, while also molding the manifestations of peace on the ground." Encouraged by the local turn, there is growing interest in exploring non-western and decolonized perspectives in peacebuilding studies. This critical research agenda seeks to decentre knowledge production by promoting alternative perspectives on peacebuilding interventions (see Visoka and Musliu 2019). Another major turn is the use of digital technologies in peacebuilding processes. Digital peacebuilding has become a field of practice, policy, and scholarly research that seeks to

understand the role and impact of digital transformations and application in peace processes (Richmond, Visoka, and Tellidis, 2023; Hirblinger, Hansen, and Hoelscher, 2022). The UN and global civil society organizations increasingly use digital technologies to analyze conflicts and design interventions.

Different scholarly and policy turns have undoubtedly widened and deepened knowledge of peacebuilding. As Charles T. Hunt (2023: 5) argues, "perhaps with each additional 'turn' we get a step closer to a 'thicker' conceptual understanding of war and peace and enhancing more context-sensitive peacebuilding." However, there is growing concern that disciplinary turns can have "fragmenting and destabilizing effects" (Baele and Bettiza, 2021: 315), which can undermine rather than advance knowledge on a specific topic. There is a risk that the discipline of peacebuilding becomes deeply divided into multiple intellectual camps looking thus sight of the bigger picture and the overall normative and intellectual purpose of the field in the first place.

The evolution of peacebuilding nexuses

Since its inception, peacebuilding has been an associative and integrative concept that is envisaged to act in concert with broader political, economic, and societal processes and dynamics. Peacebuilding is fundamentally meant to be entangled and interconnected with other concepts, processes, and developments. Thus, nexuses are part of peacebuilding strategies, which aim to enhance the chance for success by complementing, integrating, and comprehensively engaging all sectors and dimensions of political and social life in conflict-affected settings. The growing number of peacebuilding nexuses demonstrates also the effort of international community to mitigate unwanted developments and avoid failure. The logic appears to be that the more holistic peacebuilding approaches are the higher the chances of success. This section offers a brief overview of peacebuilding nexuses to demonstrate the nested and associated characteristics of the concept in theory and practice and the direction it has taken over the years.

The peacebuilding, security, and development nexus

One of the first interdisciplinary areas in peacebuilding studies has been the nexus between peace, security, and development. The policy and scholarly debates in the last three decades have shown that the linkage between peace and development is complex and multi-layered (see Uvin 2002). Socioeconomic inequality is a crucial determinant of violent conflicts and, thus, a crucial area for conflict prevention and post-conflict peacebuilding and reconstruction (Mac Ginty and Williams, 2016). Aid conditionality is considered crucial for peace enforcement and a valuable incentive for peacebuilding. Most importantly, post-conflict economic development is seen as a crucial pillar of peacebuilding (Caplan, 2005; del Castillo, 2008). Over time, this inevitable nexus between conflict, security, and development has forged solid inter-agency cooperation between the UN, World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund, manifested through coordinated responses and joint activities in conflict-affected settings. As a result of this partnership and neoliberal consensus, post-conflict economic reconstruction has included a wide range of activities such as rehabilitation of essential services and rebuilding of physical and human infrastructure; stabilization and structural reform policies, creation of a market economy and attracting investment; regulation of institutional and legal aspects of economic activity, and privatization and reform of the fiscal system. Such measures try to balance catering to human security and undertaking structural reform that brings stability and economic

growth.

Similarly, restoring security is seen as a precondition for initiating economic, political, and social development and preventing the potential recurrence of violence (Muggah 2009). Thus, security-related provisions are becoming a common feature of comprehensive peace agreements. The UN defines security sector reform (SSR) as "a process of assessment, review and implementation as well as monitoring and evaluation led by national authorities that has as its goal the enhancement of effective and accountable security for the State and its peoples without discrimination and with full respect for human rights and the rule of law" (see UN Secretary-General 2008: 6). As part of the security sector reform, UN and other international organization have undertaken activities to reform the police sector, establish new security forces, reform the intelligence sector, train border and prison guards, and develop other necessary public security providers (UN Secretary-General 2008). Thus, over the years, the SSR became an essential component of peacebuilding due to the intertwined nature of peace, security, and development, where human rights, human security, and aid remain fragile without an adequate security infrastructure. Reforming the security sector is seen as crucial for promoting good governance; facilitating free, fair, and democratic elections and power transitions; reducing the prospects for military coups; and regaining social trust in security and political institutions (Rubin, 2008: 35). Among the most critical aspects of security sector reform is the effective disarmament, demilitarization, and reintegration of former combatants, thus ensuring the rule of law, civilian control, and democratic accountability (UN Secretary-General, 2000).

However, the main critique of the peace, security, and development nexus has been the adverse impact of neoliberal development and market-oriented economics, which deepen social and economic inequality, brews corruption and elite peace capture, as well as prolongs dependency on foreign aid and economy (see Pugh, Cooper, and Turner 2008). Both proponents and critics of liberal peacebuilding have proposed more equitable and growth-oriented economic adjustment policies than radical neo-liberal and marketization reforms. Moreover, the evidence from three decades of the admixture of peacebuilding and development has started to debunk early assumptions about conflict, security, and development. Erin McCandless (2021) shows that conflicts can also occur in developed countries; neoliberal economic reforms deepen poverty, inequality, and instability; conditionality has been an ineffective measure to incentivize reforms; the fuzziness and vagueness of human security have undermined its implementation in practice; and that conflict-sensitive and ethical development assistance has been unevenly implemented.

Similarly, SSR in peacebuilding contexts is criticized for failing to grasp better conflict sensitivities, designing appropriate interventions, and sufficiently involving the affected communities. One of the most controversial aspects of post-conflict peacebuilding is the inclusion of ex-combatants in implementing a peace settlement. While some see this as an opportunity to transform and control potential peace spoilers in the war-to-democracy transition, others challenge it by arguing that such a strategy ultimately excludes emerging moderate parties and civil society groups and above all, hinders transitional justice and any effective accountability for past human rights abuses.

The UN's approach to post-conflict security and the rule of law remains exclusionary, top-down, and institutionalist, which fails to connect properly with the needs and demands of the conflict-affected society. SSR programs tend to be rushed and insufficiently consult civil society organizations and local communities. They also tend to rely on models and approaches that do not fit the local context, culture, and needs (Kurtenbach and Ansorg, 2022). For example, the primacy of security over socioeconomic development has widely undermined the success of security reform programs in Iraq and Afghanistan (see Nilsson 2022). Such interventions lack local ownership and have limited societal impact (Fitz-Gerald, 2012).

Moreover, since SSR is conducted by multiple international actors, including via bilateral cooperation with the host government, there is often a lack of coordination and cohesion in such security assistance, which tends to undermine the policymaking and implementation process (UN Secretary-General, 2008). Ultimately, in practice, the nexus between peacebuilding, security, and development is more than just about resolving the root causes of the conflict. However, they primarily serve the purpose of reducing local resistance to international intervention and imposing an externally designed political order. It is about buying social stability at the expense of long-term conflict resolution and emancipation (Richmond and Visoka, 2021).

Transitional justice and peacebuilding nexus

Dealing with the past is one of the most challenging yet essential segments of peacebuilding in conflict-affected societies. Violent conflicts not only result in human losses and physical destruction but also take a heavy toll on society's political and social fabric. This results in profound grievances and a prevailing sense of injustice. In order to move on, societies have to face their past, namely engage with various forms and approaches for remembering and acknowledging the past injustices, offering a measure of justice to the victims and survivors, and all other affected communities through retributive and restorative justice, as well as providing assurances that past injustices will not happen again through structural and institutional reforms (UN Secretary-General, 2004). In particular, seeking justice for war crimes through courts and judicial processes is considered crucial for setting the record straight and attributing the responsibility for such severe crimes, and offering closure and a measure of justice to the victims, survivors, and other affected communities. It is this vision that foregrounds the nexus between post-conflict justice and peacebuilding. As Catherine Baker and Jelena Obradovic-Wochnik (2016: 281) argue: "both transitional justice and peacebuilding are discourses and practices of intervention aimed at (post)violent societies: transitional justice is intended as a set of mechanisms aimed at confronting and dealing with human rights abuses and atrocities, while peacebuilding is more wide-ranging but often aimed at strengthening institutions as a means of preventing further violence." UN Secretary-General's (2004: 1) report 'Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-conflict Societies' maintained that "Justice, peace and democracy are not mutually exclusive objectives, but rather mutually reinforcing imperatives." The report further argued "the consolidation of peace in the immediate post-conflict period, as well as the maintenance of peace in the long term, cannot be achieved unless the population is confident that redress for grievances can be obtained through legitimate structures for the peaceful settlement of disputes and the fair administration of justice" (UN Secretary-General, 2004: 3).

However, dealing with the past and guaranteeing non-recurrence remains one of the most complex aspects of post-conflict reconstruction. While the nexus between transitional justice and peacebuilding is seen as crucial to filling the gap between peace and justice, concerns have emerged that measures to bring about justice after conflict can destabilize and undermine peacebuilding efforts (Sriram, 2007). The desired outcome of transitional justice measures is to play a positive societal role, for example, by contributing to ethnic reconciliation, easing psychological healing, fostering human rights and the rule of law, deterring adverse incidents, and preventing future conflict. Evidence shows that such measures can exacerbate ethnic divisions, undermine political stability, and derail local peace, justice, and reconciliation efforts (Oskar, Ron, and Paris, 2010). In most cases, the international, hybrid, and national war crimes trials could have been faster and more efficient (Visoka, 2016). They have largely failed to deliver a measure of justice to victims and survivors.

Unintentionally, because broader transitional justice mechanisms did not accompany them, these trials have harmed society more than contributed to truth, justice, and reconciliation. In particular, as the national elites have perceived transitional justice processes as a geopolitical tool of the international community to discipline and control them, there has been local resistance to comprehensively dealing with the legacies of the conflict (see Sharp 2018). Thus, since transitional justice strategies have increasingly become part of peacebuilding strategies, they tend to become politicized and instrumentalized by both international and national actors (Sriram, 2007).

Women, peace, and security nexus

One of the major developments in peacebuilding theory and practice is the mainstreaming of gender issues and the inclusion of women in peace processes. The landmark UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) has paved the way for greater engagement and policy adjustment to ensure meaningful inclusion of women in conflict prevention, peace talks, and post-conflict peacenbuilding, development, and governance. In particular, this resolution called on all actors involved in peace processes to adopt gender-sensitive perspectives, mechanisms, and arrangements to ensure that gender-based violence, including domestic violence, and other forms of abuse are addressed as part of the comprehensive peacebuilding interventions (UN Security Council 2000). The Women, Peace, and Security Agenda consists of four pillars: greater participation of women in peace processes; protection of women from sexual and gender-based violence; prevention of violence against women; and providing relief for recovery (see Deiana 2022). Another social category which has received more attention in the recent years has been youth and their role in promoting peace. Following the Arab Spring and other revolutions and unrests across Middle East and North Africa, youth peacebuilding has emerged as an important segment of peacebuilding interventions. Following the same logic as the women, peace, and security agenda, the UN Security Council Resolution 2250 (2015) urged the UN member states to increase the participation and protection of youth in conflict settings, and called for greater investment on conflict prevention and youth-led peacebuilding. Since then, the UN, regional organizations, and individual states have taken a broad range of measures to ensure greater involvement of women in peace processes. Yet, as acknowledged by the UN in seven other subsequent resolutions, the women, peace. and security agenda continues to encounter obstacles and challenges in ensuring women's full involvement in peace processes (see Davis and True 2019).

In academia, the women, peace, and security agenda has empowered feminist approaches to peacebuilding, which previously have been widely overlooked by the mainstream International Relations debates. As a result of this, the sub-field of feminist peacebuilding has become one of the most vibrant areas of research which offers conceptual, methodological, and empirical insights for understanding and explaining the status and position of women in peace processes (see Davis and True 2019; Richmond and Visoka 2022). Feminist approaches have helped redefine and challenge the official narratives and definitions of peace and peacebuilding by highlighting female insecurities, overlooked forms of violence, and discrimination. For example, feminist peacebuilding identifies masculinity, patriarchy, and other institutionalized and normalized forms of discrimination as important root causes of gender-based violence (see Riley 2022). They also offer alternative approaches to peacebuilding and conflict resolution, which grasp better the contextual, relational, and emotional factors that can help understand conflict as well as design proper peacebuilding responses. Yet, serious concerns have been raised by non-western feminist scholars who have challenged the neoliberal and Western domination of the women, peace, and security agenda,

which has had a limited emancipatory effect at the global stage (Basu 2016). The feminist turn in peacebuilding has experienced similar fractions as the mainstream debates: among those who favour institutional and pragmatic responses and those who propagate more indigenous, hybrid, and localized forms of feminism (see Deiana 2022).

Climate change, peace, and security nexus

The latest nexus in peacebuilding studies is the connection between climate change, peace, and environmental damages that conflicts cause. While the link between climate change, peace, and security can be indirect, there are growing concerns that "climate change can multiply risks known to contribute to insecurity, overburden state capacity, and make already vulnerable communities more susceptible" (UN DPPA 2020: 5). There is already evidence that climate-related emergencies across Africa, Southeast Asia, and Pacific islands have caused humanitarian crises and reinvigorated political tensions. Prior to the intensification of policy and scholarly debates on climate change and its categorization as an upcoming global emergency, the focus of the discussion has been on evaluating the environmental causes and consequences of violent conflicts and the post-conflict environmental peacebuilding efforts (Conca and Dabelko, 2002). Broadly defined, environmental peacebuilding concerns the cooperation among states and other domestic actors in addressing environmental issues, such as water, land, and food scarcity, as well as concerns building resilient structures and responses to natural disasters and human-caused environmental damages (see Swain and Öjendal, 2018; Ide, 2019). In a narrower sense, Florian Krampe and Ashok Swain (2021: 565) define environmental peace as "efforts that link the management of natural resources to conflict prevention, conflict resolution, and peacemaking, as well as post-conflict peacebuilding." Environmental peacebuilding tends to promote dialogue and technical cooperation to resolve environmental problems, which are seen as crucial for tackling the environmental causes and triggers of conflicts. Other areas of environmental peacebuilding concern addressing past and present injustices and environmental damages, as well as building domestic and transborder institutional mechanisms for resolving environmental problems (Dresse, Fischhendler, Nielsen, and Zikos, 2019: 109-111).

Although environmental peacebuilding encompasses a broad range of initiatives, it remains "largely dominated by rational choice and neoliberal conceptions of the biophysical environment and peacebuilding, on the premise that parties will prefer to engage in mutually beneficial cooperation rather than zero-sum conflict based on a cost–benefit calculation" (Dresse, Fischhendler, Nielsen, and Zikos 2019: 103). The policy agenda and institutional setup for environmental peacebuilding within the UN have significantly developed over the years, pioneered and led by the UN Environment Programme (UNEP). However, as Krampe and Swain (2021: 573) point out, "UNEP has had difficulties assessing its actual impact on peace" and thus, "there is very little knowledge of what type of environmental initiatives are in fact contributing to peace in post-conflict societies and what are the potential pitfalls." Others have highlighted that "clear causal mechanisms linking environment and peacebuilding remain poorly specified" (Johnson, Rodríguez and Hoyos 2021: 2), and that environmental peacebuilding can have side-effects" (Ide, 2019: 3).

Despite these shortcomings, there is growing interest within the UN and other international organizations to mainstream the climate change, peace, and security agenda. An independent report commissioned by the G7 members in 2015 considered climate change as "one of the major threats to the stability of states and societies in the decades to come." (G7 2015: 5). The concept of climate security has emerged as the new umbrella term which refers to the efforts for preventing and resolving violent conflict that may arise from global warming,

environmental degradations, and other ecological disasters (UN DPPA 2020). Aware of the limits of institutional capacities and resources in handling climate-related conflicts, there is growing recognition among the UN that "policy-makers should look to indigenous knowledge and systems to resolve conflict associated with climate change-related threats and their impacts" (UN DPPA 2019: 1).

Conclusion

This chapter has provided a comprehensive overview of the evolution of peacebuilding in both theory and practice. Since its inception, peacebuilding has been promoted as a connecting and associating activity that sits at the nexus of numerous international, national, and local actors as well as numerous social, political, economic, and security sectors and that is open to various ideologies, analytical stances, and methodological frameworks. In light of its open-ended or empty-shell nature, which includes both the backward-looking aspect of addressing the causes of the conflict and the forward-looking aspect of creating structures to prevent the conflict from reoccurring, peacebuilding as a concept and practice has the heuristic flexibility to become a guiding label for practically any measure, approach, or intervention that is justified as being for peacebuilding.

While this fluidity has significantly impacted its evolution and transformation, peacebuilding has developed due to strategic and unplanned endeavors, complex progressive and regressive dynamics, academic criticism, and the desire for scholarly distinction. In short, peacebuilding as a field of intervention has evolved through limited progress, social experimentation, and political engineering, and a mix of normative commitments and geopolitical expediency has driven it. As shown in this chapter and other contributions to this handbook, the liberal peace framework has emerged as a normative scaffold following the end of the Cold War, the fall of communism, and the apparent victory of liberal democracies. However, implementing liberal peacebuilding in post-conflict settings has produced limited results, which has triggered criticism and opposition to Western-led and top-down peacebuilding. Similarly, the hybrid turn and the subsequent emphasis on the localization of peacebuilding initially emerged as a scholarly critique and later was adopted into policy and programming. Over time, peacebuilding theory and practice have expanded and have recognized the importance of legitimacy, ownership, space, gender, and other agencies and sensitivities in conflict settings. Consequently, peacebuilding has become one of the most vibrant fields in International Relations, where multiple norms have been experimented with, contested, modified, and ultimately turned into international and national policies.

The conceptual and praxiological fluidity has permitted peacebuilding to be turned in different directions, and entangled with other processes and concepts, such as security, development, justice, gender, and climate. The peace, security, and development nexus demonstrate the shape-shifting character of peacebuilding and the recognition that peace without socio-economic is incomplete and that security is vital for peacebuilding. However, as with other nexuses in peacebuilding interventions, this nexus was only partially informed by scientific and evidence-based judgments. It is also driven by other motivating factors, such as the congruence of major powers' interests for global stability, tackling fragile states, and investment in statebuilding to avoid challenges to their global power and dominant status. Moreover, the brutality of violent conflicts, humanitarian emergencies, and the risk of regional instability has made unavoidable greater recognition of the nexus between conflict, security, and development. Similarly, the mainstreaming of transitional justice in peacebuilding strategies, as much as it has been about promoting human rights and justice for the victims, has often been used by the international community to punish insurgency, violent rebellion, quests

for self-determination, and ultimately discourage challenges to political orders. The gender, youth, and climate turns in peacebuilding praxis are also motivated by a combination of event-driven, norm-building activism and desire for reinvention to retain the relevance of international institutions and legitimacy of global actors in light of new emerging crises that not only expose policy inefficiency but risk losing power to other competing actors. Thus, the key takeaway from the evolution of peacebuilding in the past three decades is that the open-ended and fluid meaning, analytical currency, and entanglement with emerging priorities will continue to change. While peacebuilding will likely remain widely embedded within the ideological values of liberalism, democracy, and human rights, its meaning and application in practice will likely change to represent the interests and consensus of key international and national actors as dictated by specific situations.

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