Back to the Future:
'Balkanization'
and the
Euro-Atlantic Processes of the (Western) Balkans

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Declaration

I hereby certify that this material, which I now submit for assessment on the programme of study leading to the award of Doctor of Philosophy is entirely my own work, and that I have exercised reasonable care to ensure that the work is original, and does not to the best of my knowledge breach any law of copyright, and has not been taken from the work of others save and to the extent that such work has been cited and acknowledged within the text of my work.

Signed:  (*Candidate*)

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To Husni,
for believing in me
when I needed it
the most.

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List of Abbreviations and Acronyms

Note. This list also includes abbreviations and acronyms which appear in Appendix A, B, and C. For political parties, also see the country in square brackets.

AA	Alliance for Albanians
ACT	Allied Command Transformation
ARBiH	Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
ARPS	Aborigines' Rights Protection Society
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ASNOM	Assembly for the National Liberation of Macedonia
BiH	Bosnia and Herzegovina
Brexit	British Exit from the EU
CARD	Coordinated Annual Review on Defense
CDA	Critical Discourse Analysis
CEFTA	Central European Free Trade Agreement
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CSCE	Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe
CSDP	Common Security and Defense Policy
DOS	Democratic Opposition of Serbia
DPA	Democratic Party of Albanians [(North) Macedonia]
DPC	Defense Planning Committee
DPS	Democratic Party of Socialists [Montenegro]
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
DS	Democratic Party [Serbia]
DSS	Democratic Party of Serbia
DUI	Democratic Union for Integration [(North) Macedonia]
EC	European Community
ECC	European Economic Community
ECMM	European Community Monitor Mission
ECPR	European Consortium for Political Research
ECSC	European Coal and Steel Community

EDF	European Defence Fund
EEA	European Economic Area
EEAS	European Union External Action Service
EPC	European Political Cooperation
ESDI	European Security and Defense Identity
ESDP	European Security and Defense Policy
EU	European Union
EUFOR	European Union Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina
EULEX	European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo
EUPM	European Union Police Mission
FRY	Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
FYROM	Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
G17+	G17 Plus [Serbia]
HVO	Croatian Defense Council
ICJ	International Court of Justice
ICTY	International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
IFOR	Implementation Force in BiH
IMRO	Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization
IPA	Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance
IPAP	Individual Partnership Action Plans
IR	International Relations
ITA	Interim Trade Agreement
JNA	Yugoslav People's Army
KDOM	Kosovo Diplomatic Observer Mission
KLA	Kosovo Liberation Army
KVM	Kosovo Verification Mission
LBD	United Democratic Movement
LDK	Democratic League of Kosovo [Kosovo]
LDP	Liberal-Democratic Party [(North) Macedonia]
LSV	League of Social Democrats of Vojvodina [Serbia]
MAP	Membership Action Plan

NAACP	National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
NAC	North Atlantic Council
NACC	North Atlantic Cooperation Council
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDP	People's Democratic Party [(North) Macedonia]
NED	National Endowment for Democracy
NSA	National Security Agency
NSDP	New Social Democratic Party
OAU	Organization of African Unity
OED	Oxford English Dictionary
OFA	Ohrid Framework Agreement
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PCERM	Party for the Full Emancipation of the Roma of Macedonia [(North) Macedonia]
PDP	Party for Democratic Prosperity [(North) Macedonia]
PDP-NDP	Party for Democratic Prosperity-People's Democratic Party [(North) Macedonia]
PDPA	Party for Democratic Prosperity of Albanians [(North) Macedonia]
PESCO	Permanent Structured Cooperation
PfP	Partnership for Peace
PLO	Palestinian Liberation Organization
RCC	Regional Cooperation Council
RFM-LM	Reformist Forces of Macedonia-Liberal Party
SAA	Stabilization and Association Agreement
SACEUR	Supreme Allied Commander Europe
SAP	Stabilization and Association Process
SČP	Serbian Četnik Movement [Serbia]
SDA	Party of Democratic Action [BiH]
SDS	Serb Democratic Party [BiH]
SDSM	Social Democratic Union of Macedonia [(North) Macedonia]
SECI	Southeast European Cooperative Initiative

SEDM	South East Defense Ministerial
SEE	South East Europe
SEECP	South East European Cooperation Process
SEEGROUP	South East Europe Security Cooperation Group
SEEI	South East European Initiative
SFOR	Stabilization Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina
SFRY	Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
SNO	Serbian National Renewal [Serbia]
SNS	Serbian Progressive Party [Serbia]
SOC	Serbian Orthodox Church
SP	Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe
SPO	Serbian Renewal Movement [Serbia]
SPO–NS	Serbian Renewal Movement–New Serbia [Serbia]
SPS	Socialist Party of Serbia [Serbia]
SRS	Serbian Radical Party [Serbia]
SVM	Alliance of Vojvodina Hungarians [Serbia]
TEU	Treaty on European Union
UBK	Administration for Security and Counterintelligence of (North) Macedonia
UNMIBH	UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina
UNMIK	United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo
UNPREDEP	United Nations Preventive Deployment Force
UNPROFOR	United Nations Protection Force
URS	United Regions of Serbia
VMRO-DPMNE	Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization – Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity [(North Macedonia]
VRS	Army of the Republika Srpska
WEU	Western European Union
WWI	World War I
WWII	World War II

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Abstract

Back to the Future: 'Balkanization' and the Euro-Atlantic Processes of the Western (Balkans) by **Liridona Veliu Ashiku**

The aim of this thesis is to explore how 'balkanization' underpins policies of the EU and NATO towards the (Western) Balkans. As a discourse which mediates between the Euro-Atlantic processes of the (Western) Balkans as foreign policy on one hand and the identity of the (Western) Balkans on the other, 'balkanization' constructs a disintegrated (Western) Balkan 'other' who stands juxtapositionally to the Western 'self'. By asking the central question – *How does 'balkanization' shape the Euro-Atlantic processes of the (Western) Balkans, and vice versa?* – this thesis expands on an understanding of EU and NATO policies towards the (Western) Balkans as shaping and being shaped by ideas of 'selves' and 'others'.

This dissertation relies on a poststructuralist theory and method of identity and foreign policy for bringing out the empirical complexity of identity construction. It presents with an analysis of texts from the West and the (Western) Balkans. Though the main period under study covers post-Yugoslav events from (North) Macedonia's independence in 1991 to its change of name in 2018, the discourse is traced genealogically back to its World War I roots, showing in this way how current Euro-Atlantic processes are underpinned by older articulations of identity. The analysis focuses on two (Western) Balkan countries: (North) Macedonia and Serbia.

This dissertation shows how EU and NATO policies towards the (Western) Balkans being underpinned by 'balkanization' have emerged from and led to the constant reinvention of the unity of the West through 'balkanizing' the (Western) Balkans. The study further illustrates how this dynamic is maintained by and instrumentalized for the political elites. It argues that the Euro-Atlantic processes of the (Western) Balkans though seemingly aimed at uprooting them from their shameful past into a brighter future within the EU and NATO, instead trap the (Western) Balkans into old articulations of their identity as 'balkanized' for this serves the united West and the political elites.

Introduction

> It is today natural that the Balkan peoples need Europe. But on the other hand [,] the question whether anyone needs the Balkans, or rather whether the Balkans can be of any use to Europe, is rarely posed. It would stand a good chance of prompting an ironic smile and the thought, 'Who on earth would be interested in inviting the devil in?'
>
> *Ismail Kadare* (2001, p. 13)

How does 'balkanization' shape the Euro-Atlantic processes of the (Western) Balkans, and vice versa? This thesis argues that the Euro-Atlantic processes of the (Western) Balkans as a foreign policy are shaped by and in turn shape the identity of the (Western) Balkans as 'balkanized' for this constructs a united West. The first section lays out the background of the relationship between the (Western) Balkans, the EU, and NATO in the context of the Euro-Atlantic processes of the former. I set out to transcend the technocracy of these processes through posing the main research question which sees them as linked to the identity of the (Western) Balkans and the West. The second section develops on poststructuralist theory adopted for studying these identity and foreign policy links through a constitutive logic. This section also locates the goal of applying this theory within an overall genealogical approach which aims to destabilize 'balkanization' and with this also the identity of the (Western) Balkans and the West. The third section presents with the argument and main contribution of this dissertation as an empirical contribution to the Balkan area studies, and it explains what that means in the context of the (Western) Balkans while operating from a poststructuralist theory and method. It also mentions sideline theoretical contributions located in a trivium of three strands of literature – Balkanism, Regionalism, and Europeanization – which were identified a posteriori to the processes of analysis and to which I return only in the conclusions. This project is neither guided by an intention of building on any of these theories on the (Western) Balkans, nor by contributing to the general identity and foreign policy academic debate in the discipline of International Relations (IR). Though its insights can be extended to theoretical debates, the primary goal remains one of questioning and contributing to a better understanding of the specific nature of 'self'/'other' dynamics between the (Western) Balkans and the West and the modes of their operationalization. Finally, the fourth section presents with a summary of chapters.

Background and Research Question: The (Western) Balkans, the EU, and NATO

The relationship between the (Western) Balkans and the West – with the latter being embodied by the EU and NATO in this dissertation – is old, though the Euro-Atlantic processes of the (Western) Balkans which envision their integration into the EU and NATO are a contemporary phenomenon that kicked off after the disintegration of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) in the 1990s. This relationship has typically been a complicated one, particularly since the (Western) Balkans have often occupied the position of Europe's "incomplete self" (Todorova M. , [1997] 2009, p. 16) due to their in-betweenness as being located geographically in Europe but considered not quite European. This in-betweenness has partially contributed also to the extensive semantic coloration of the (Western) Balkans. They have been called the Balkans, South East (or Southeast) Europe (SEE), and most lately "Western Balkans", among others, with the latest neologism being particularly important with regards to the Euro-Atlantic processes of the (Western) Balkans.

The "Western Balkans" neologism was not the first to establish the (Western) Balkans as a *region*, but it is the one that most specifically connects the regional nature of the (Western) Balkans with their Euro-Atlantic integration prospects. Though the term "Western Balkans" as a geographic annotation can be traced back to the late nineteenth century[1], the important appearance of the label in the context of the Euro-Atlantic processes took place during the Austrian presidency of the European Council (1998) and it included Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH)[2], Croatia, Kosovo, Montenegro, (North) Macedonia, and Serbia. The regional approach towards the (Western) Balkans had been established just briefly prior to these conclusions which is when conditionality as a tool of "political and economic conditions as the basis for a coherent and transparent policy towards the development of bilateral relations" (European Council, 1997) with the (Western) Balkans was introduced. The (Western) Balkans, however, would not be referred to as "potential candidates for EU membership" until the European Council (2000) Santa Maria de Feira conclusions. Their eligibility to become EU members would be judged by, among others, their capacity to fulfil the accession criteria set by the European Council (1993) in Copenhagen (also known as the

[1] See Petrović (2009, p. 28) who locates the "Western Balkans" as a geographic name in 1897 in the writings of the English writer H. Thomson, or in *The Illustrated London News* in 1928.

[2] I hereafter use the abbreviation BiH to refer to Bosnia and Herzegovina. It stands for "Bosnia i Herzegovina" in Bosnian, Croatian, and Serbian.

"Copenhagen criteria") instituted by the Treaty on European Union (TEU) (1992) (also known as the Maastricht Treaty).

The situation with NATO is different in the sense that the countries' accession to the Alliance operates in an individual rather than regional basis. However, regional security arrangements as important for maintaining international peace and security envisioned already in The North Atlantic Treaty of NATO (1949) have quite often stalled the (Western) Balkan's progress in its NATO prospects due to conflictual intra-regional dynamics. Aspirations of all (Western) Balkan countries for joining the EU and NATO – except for Serbia that does not aim to join the latter – have generally been unanimous, but their progress has been protracted and dubious (see Table 1). Only one former (Western) Balkan country – Croatia – joined the EU in 2013, while Kosovo, to date, has not even signed the Partnership for Peace (PfP) agreement with NATO.

Table 1. (Western) Balkan Countries on their Path to EU and NATO Accessions

Country	**EU Accession**		**NATO Accession**	
	Stage	**Year**	**Stage**	**Year**
Albania	Candidate	2014	Member	2009
BiH	Potential candidate: SAA signed	2015	In negotiations	2008
Croatia	Member	2013	Member	2009
Kosovo	Potential candidate: SAA signed	2016	Applied for PfP	2012
Montenegro	Candidate	2010	Member	2017
(North) Macedonia	Candidate	2005	Member	2020
Serbia	Candidate	2012	Joined PfP	2016

Note. BiH and Kosovo were considered potential candidates for EU membership already since 2000 and again during the Thessaloniki summit in June 2003. The years of 2015 and 2016 for BiH and Kosovo respectively refer to when the countries signed their Stabilization and Association Agreements (SAAs) as an important milestone in their progress towards the EU.

In these Euro-Atlantic processes, the (Western) Balkans have been treated and assessed as both a regional single subject and as a subject constituted of separate countries. However, in whichever of the formats, this thesis maintains that their Euro-Atlantic performances – their success, failure, fast, or stalked progress in approaching the EU and NATO – have been shaped by and have in turn shaped the identity of the (Western) Balkans as 'balkanized'. That is, despite what seems like a technocratic nature of the stages of the Euro-Atlantic progress of the (Western) Balkans, through asking – *How 'balkanization' shapes the Euro-Atlantic processes of the (Western) Balkans, and vice versa?* – this thesis aims to transcend the apparent technocracy of the Euro-Atlantic processes by questioning, problematizing, and locating it

within tangled *identity* dynamics between the (Western) Balkans and the West which regulate and are regulated by the Euro-Atlantic processes as a *foreign policy*.

It is this relationship between the identity of the (Western) Balkans on one hand, and the Euro-Atlantic processes of the (Western) Balkans as a foreign policy on the other, that this dissertation is concerned with. More specifically, however, the thesis explores how the *discourse* of '*balkanization*' shapes this relationship by mediating between certain articulations of the identity of the (Western) Balkans and the West, and the Euro-Atlantic processes of the former. But what is 'balkanization'? I have elsewhere argued that

> '[b]alkanization' has no clear definition… [I]n its more specific definitions, 'balkanization' is tightly connected to historical events related to wars and conflicts in the Balkans. In its most general description though, 'balkanization' refers to the division, partition, compartmentalization, or splitting up of a whole into hostile and sometimes homogenous parts. Retaining its main conceptual thread, 'balkanization' nowadays persists to refer to the unwelcomed *disintegration*[3] of a previously existing unit and all the undesirable symptoms that come with it. However, the word has moved beyond its reference to the Balkan Peninsula to currently describe similar scenarios taking place in a variety of places and spaces, disciplines, and fields of thought such as economy, architecture, gastronomy, poetry, and others. (Veliu, 2019, p. 2)

Readers of this dissertation are invited to approach what follows in the next pages, indeed, with an understanding of the general definition of 'balkanization', but with an enhanced awareness on its specific links to the (Western) Balkan region. Even in those instances where "it might seem that 'balkanization' is being used as detached from the Balkan Peninsula, it continues to transmit negative stereotypes of the Balkans" (Veliu, 2019, p. 2). 'Balkanization', no matter the scope of its recontextualization, is the discourse which, in a Foucauldian sense, "form[s] the objects of which [it] speaks" (Foucault, [1969] 1972, p. 49). The explicit object – and subject[4] – in this case, is the fragmented (Western) Balkans. Though, as explained below, since

[3] All italics and footnotes within direct quotations are hereafter mine unless stated otherwise.

[4] For more on the object/subject distinction, note how Foucault ([1982] 1983, p. 208) claimed that the goal of his work was "to create a history of the different modes [of *object*ification] by which, in our culture, human beings are made *subjects*". Beyond the subject/object dichotomy in philosophy in which a subject is considered to be possessing subjectivity and agency – the ability to experience and perceive – while an object is passive and perceived, Foucault's conceptualization of what subjects are – and which I adopt in this dissertation – transcends this dichotomy. In a nutshell, Foucault's conceptualization of subjects is concerned not just with who subjects are, but with how they came to be who they are. The two, in fact, are inextricably linked since subjects are who they are because of power and a series of forces operating behind articulations of their identity. That is, subjects are subjects because they are subjected to these forces; and in this they are treated as objects, objectified. This is also how 'balkanization' construct the (Western) Balkans both as an object and as a subject.

identity operates through 'self'/'other' constellations between subjects, 'balkanization' not only constructs the (Western) Balkans, but it also constructs the West – the EU and NATO.

This dissertation is, therefore, concerned with enquiring into how these articulations of the identity of the (Western) Balkans as perpetually disintegrating conveyed through 'balkanization' shape the Euro-Atlantic processes of the (Western) Balkans. These processes stand not for objective, technical, and bureaucratic foreign policy processes with a life of their own which operate independently of certain perceptions of who the (Western) Balkans are. Quite the contrary; they are processes which have been shaped based on the identity of the (Western) Balkans as, among others, 'balkanized'. The research question, therefore, implies that the 'balkanization' discourse mediates between the identity of the (Western) Balkans as a fragmented 'other' and the Western policies or approaches towards the (Western) Balkans such as their Euro-Atlantic processes. As explored below, to answer this question I rely on a poststructuralist theory of identity and foreign policy as constitutively linked. This then also implies the "vice versa" part of the research question. Within the frames of this thesis, the relationship between the Euro-Atlantic processes of the (Western) Balkans and their fragmented identity is not considered to be unidirectional. That is, it is not just the fragmented identity of the (Western) Balkans which shapes their Euro-Atlantic processes, but it is also the Euro-Atlantic processes which shape and construct the identity of the (Western) Balkans (and the West). This dissertation deconstructs this construction of identities by asking *how* the same is maintained and regulated, and *how* it shapes and is being shaped by the Euro-Atlantic processes of the (Western) Balkans as a foreign policy.

Approach: Poststructuralist Conceptualization of Identity and Foreign Policy

This thesis relies on a *poststructuralist theory* and *method of discourse analysis*. Applying a specific model of discourse analysis as offered by Lene Hansen (2006), this thesis is supported by the work of French poststructuralists, particularly Jacques Derrida, Michel Foucault, Julia Kristeva, Ernesto Laclau, and Chantal Mouffe. Admittedly, due the empirical nature of this dissertation, theoretical debates on poststructuralist key concepts are kept at a minimum, and the complexity and richness found in the work of these scholars suffer loss. I do not engage, for example, with psychoanalytical and Lacanian poststructuralist approaches, and neither do I engage with discourse analysis as a general approach which includes a variety of

methodological routes stretching from formal linguistics to Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA). Though there are always points of convergence as well as differentiation between different traditions of poststructuralism as proposed by different scholars – even between Derrida and Foucault which are paired up here – as well approaches to discourse analysis, I should be upfront with the readers here and say that the specificity of theoretical underpinnings of these strands of literature has been sacrificed for the sake of speaking to the subject matter: the nature of the relationship between the identity of the (Western) Balkans as 'balkanized' with the West, and its constitutive links with Euro-Atlantic processes.

The theoretical and the methodological principles of studying the 'self'/'other' dynamics between the (Western) Balkans and the West and their relationship with the Euro-Atlantic processes of the (Western) Balkans as a foreign policy are elaborated in Chapter 1. However, it is important at this stage to establish that at the heart of this dissertation lies a conceptualization of such a relationship as *constitutive*. Hansen (2006, p. xvi) claims that "[t]o theorize foreign policy as discourse is to argue that identity and policy are constituted through a process of narrative adjustment, that they stand, in social science terminology, in a constitutive, rather than causal, relationship". Though within the frames of this dissertation it is 'balkanization' which stands for the discourse while the Euro-Atlantic processes of the (Western) Balkans as a foreign policy stand for discursive practices (see Chapter 1 on the difference between the two), the "constitutive significance of representations of identity for formulating and debating foreign policies" (Hansen, 2006, p. 5) is carried throughout this dissertation. This thesis identifies, diversifies, and questions the fragmented identity of the (Western) Balkans conveyed through 'balkanization' through the significance of its relationship with the Euro-Atlantic processes of the (Western) Balkans; as it, constitutively, also problematizes the Euro-Atlantic processes of the (Western) Balkans through their relationship with the identity of the (Western) Balkans as fragmented – and as the thesis further demonstrates – of the identity of the West as united.

The fragmented identity of the (Western) Balkans cannot be seen as isolated from that of the West, particularly in the context of EU and NATO policies towards the region. This then embarks us on another important theoretical conceptualization of identity as the manifestation of perceptions of 'self' and 'other' between subjects of discourse. Though identities are not necessarily constructed through a radically different 'other' but rather through 'others' which

are sometimes more different than and sometimes more alike the 'self', "[t]o speak to the politics of identity is to acknowledge the link between the construction of the Other and 'our' understanding of Self" (Hansen, 2006, p. xx). 'Balkanization', as best illustrated in Chapter 2, is the discourse of the fragmented (Western) Balkan 'other', though unavoidably also the discourse of the Western 'self' particularly since the latter came up with the word – "balkanization", circulated and circulates the same to date, and utilizes it to convey pejorative versions of the identity of the (Western) Balkans. Indeed, even when recontextualized to describe other subjects, 'balkanization' always conveys something about the (Western) Balkan 'other', but it would also always convey something about the Western 'self' – if we care to see what that is. Locating the ontological foundations of the identity of the (Western) Balkans and the West within 'self'/'other' dynamics in which the two are constituted through differences and similarities, broadens up the scope of what this thesis has to offer from insights on the (Western) Balkans and their Euro-Atlantic processes to insights on the Western 'self'.

Finally, these identity articulations of 'self'/'other' between the (Western) Balkans and the West which shape and are in turn shaped by Euro-Atlantic processes, are not just a reflection of what they appear like today. To treat them as such would equal essentializing and reducing them into immobile and isolated 'selves'/'others' who have no precedents. This would be incompatible with a poststructuralist conceptualization of identity which takes into consideration the fluid and open-ended nature of identities, and this not only due to it being the result of 'self'/'other' dynamics, but also because these dynamics never stop fluctuating. Interpreting them as I do in this thesis means only capturing particular 'self'/'other' constellations in specific moments – 'screenshotting' them, if you will. These contemporary 'screenshots' of identity which shape and are shaped by foreign policies are preceded by older articulations of identity which continue to be invoked in the present to argue and account for contemporary policies. Recognizing this means also recognizing that a *genealogical* reading is paramount for conducting poststructuralist discourse analysis.

This is also why this dissertation offers not just a contemporary but also a genealogical account on the relationship between the (Western) Balkans and the West as shaping and being shaped by the Euro-Atlantic processes of the (Western) Balkans beyond the accession of the region into the EU and NATO. A genealogical reading which identifies not just predominant representations but also those whom those representations marginalize, is especially important

if considering the asymmetric relationship between the (Western) Balkans and the West discussed further below. This is what, among others, this thesis does. Any poststructuralist attempts to answer the main research question, would have to start with a rejection of any metahistorical obviousness surrounding the discourse of 'balkanization'. This dissertation investigates key representations of identities of both the (Western) Balkans and West that 'balkanization' has fostered through time with the purpose of locating the same into current figurations of the (Western) Balkans in relation to the EU and NATO. This, in its essence, is an exercise of genealogy whose main purposes is the contestation, demystification, and denaturalization of the discourse of 'balkanization'.

It should be said, however, that genealogy is bigger than discourse analysis. Located in his Nietzschean inspiration which he illustrates in the "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History" (Foucault, 1977) chapter, genealogy, as with many other Foucauldian notions, is not spared from extensive discussions[5] on what its task specifically is in comparison to archeology. To a certain extent, however, these discussions are misleading. As quoted in Mahon (1992, p. 212), to Martin Jay's question on whether Foucault stopped doing archaeology having now transitioned to a genealogical approach, Foucault had replied: "I never stopped doing genealogy. Genealogy defines the target and the finality of the work and archaeology indicates the field with which I deal in order to make a genealogy". Along these lines, the genealogical examination of 'balkanization' is the goal of the analysis in so far as problematizing 'balkanization' which derives from investigating the forces underpinning it helps to best understand the Euro-Atlantic processes of the (Western) Balkans. Only when that which "was previously considered immobile" (Foucault, 1977, p. 147) becomes impermanent, inconstant, and changeable, can any innovative contributions be made in further connecting 'balkanization' to the Euro-Atlantic processes of the (Western) Balkans. As such, the nature of this project is relentlessly genealogical.

[5] There is an extensive debate on, not just the nature of genealogy as an approach, method, or theory, but also its fuzziness in Foucault's work and particularly in relation to its differentiation – or the lack of it – from archeology. See, for example, Úna Crowley (2009) who differentiates between an archaeological and a genealogical account by locating Foucault's changeover from archeology to genealogy in his *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of Prison* ([1975] 1995) and *The History of Sexuality* ([1984] 1990). Martin Saar (2008, p. 312) considers genealogy "a hybrid discourse with a logic of its own". For more on this see also Dreyfus and Rabinow ([1982] 1983), among others.

Argument and Empirical Contribution: 'Balkanized' (Western) Balkans, United West

In this thesis, I argue that perceptions of the identity of the (Western) Balkans as 'balkanized' shape and continue to be shaped by the Euro-Atlantic processes of the (Western) Balkans because they serve perceptions of the identity of the West as united. The argument can also be rephrased differently for what it also says is that instead of integrating the (Western) Balkan subject, the Euro-Atlantic processes of the (Western) Balkans further 'balkanize' it. This is visible in invocations of older articulations of the identity of the (Western) Balkans as fragmented that go back in the past, but which are recalled within contemporary premises to argue for policies and make the same appear as solid and consistent. An appearance of contemporary policies such as the Euro-Atlantic processes of the (Western) Balkans as solid and consistent ultimately supports an idea of the West as a united subject. As the thesis demonstrates, references to the 'balkanized' identity of the (Western) Balkans have been invoked from the past in the present to argue for the importance and utility of contemporary policies which can only successfully be led and implemented through concerted and joint action of both the EU and NATO. Simplistically and metaphorically, the reader here can think along the lines of the 'balkanized' (Western) Balkan 'other' being the terminally sick child of the two parents – the EU and NATO – whose illness keeps parents in their saint matrimony as a united Western subject. This also enables them to avoid a divorce, for the importance and utility of their parenthood can fully be exercised if the two act jointly.

Issues which might get the EU and NATO thinking about a 'divorce' have historically stretched beyond matters which have to do with the (Western) Balkans – Kuwait, Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, and most recently Ukraine, to name but a few. However, their roots are rather located in internal divergencies and disagreements between the Atlanticists for whom a transatlantic alliance with NATO has always been important and perhaps even sufficient from a defense and security perspective, and the Europeanists for whom a separate European defense and security identity has been a must. The 'balkanized' identity of the (Western) Balkan 'other', as this thesis demonstrates, has been utilized to 'heal' these divergencies by providing the space for a constant readjustment of the division of rights and responsibilities between the EU and NATO. This in turn has given an appearance of the West as united and maintained an appearance of the (Western) Balkan subject as 'balkanized', while the Euro-Atlantic processes of the (Western) Balkans have become the tool – the policy – which is not only shaped by but

in turn shapes and recirculates in the present such articulations of identity. The Euro-Atlantic integration processes of the (Western) Balkans are rather the integration processes of the EU and NATO, and it is the unity of the Western subject and the crisis it faces which these processes depend on – not the unity and integration of the (Western) Balkan subject.

The main argument of this dissertation is illustrated through capturing 'self'/'other' identity constellations within the context of several key events that have been important in shaping the relationship between the (Western) Balkan and the West – that is, through 'screenshotting' the relationship between the (Western) Balkan 'other' and the Western 'self' in its particular reconfigurations through time. It is these 'screenshots' that speak to a reoccurring pattern of identity dynamics which, though perpetually invoked within the contemporary context of the (Western) Balkan countries' accession into the EU and NATO, are genealogically traced back in the past and captured through three main *genealogical basic discourses* – the *Balkan Wars/World War I (WWI)*, the *World War II (WWII)/Colonial*, and *Balkanism*. These genealogical discourses show links to three *contemporary basic discourses* – the *Yugoslav Crisis*, *Stabilization*, and *Europeanization*. That is, the contemporary policies of *observation*, *intervention*, and *integration* that the three contemporary basic discourses of the Yugoslav Crisis, Stabilization, and Europeanization respectively promote, are argued through the invocation of certain older articulations of the identity of the (Western) Balkans as 'balkanized'.

The Yugoslav Crisis contemporary basic discourse located in the early 1990s and its Balkan Wars/WWI genealogical counterpart, rely on a layer of the identity of the (Western) Balkans as regressive, distant, backward, and away from the West. This layer has historically informed a policy of observation and inaction by the West, which policy in turn has further ingrained the (Western) Balkans into the same layer of identity that gave rise to the policy itself. The shift to the contemporary basic discourse of Stabilization and its policy of intervention which takes swift during the NATO bombings of Serbia in 1999 and the removal of Slobodan Miloševic from office, similarly to the genealogical basic discourse of WWII/Colonialism, was conditional to a shift towards a different identity layer of the (Western) Balkan 'other' as hopeful and at the West's doorstep. As such, this 'other' who though backward, lived unignorably in West's backyard and was, hence, closer to the West, was also an 'other' worthy of West's attention and intervention. Europeanization, as the most

contemporary basic discourse, refreshingly shows a more self-reflective Western 'self' willing to acknowledge the role that the (Western) Balkan 'other' has played in its own formation. Like its genealogical counterpart – Balkanism – this basic discourse argues for including the (Western) Balkans within the Euro-Atlantic structures as an integral part, though to date this remains an empty promise even as some (Western) Balkan countries such as Croatia have joined both the EU and NATO. This because Europeanization retains a liminal (Western) Balkan 'other' who, ironically, though portrayed as having always been European is congruently expected to perpetually prove its 'Europeanness' by abandoning its 'Balkanness'. The discourse is inherently unstable for it fails to address its main blank spot: if the (Western) Balkans have always been European, then isn't their 'Balkanness' European too?

These identity/foreign policy dynamics are also maintained by the (Western) Balkan political elites who mirror the basic discourses and share their discursive themes for their political benefits. The discursive move through which this happens is a joint effort of both (Western) Balkan and Western political elites to invoke genealogical references on the identity of the (Western) Balkans as a distraction from the inherently unstable nature of these discourses. Revitalizing versions of the identity of the (Western) Balkans from the past to argue for contemporary policies generates political support and followership for these policies by adding to their credibility and making them appear as grounded in historically confirmed, chronically reappearing, and hence convincingly authentic representations of identity. The dissertation illustrates how key (Western) Balkan political personalities such as Milošević, Zoran Đinđić, Vojislav Koštunica, Ivica Dačić, Aleksandar Vučić, Ali Ahmeti, Nikola Gruevski, Zoran Zaev to name but a few, have successfully reinvented themselves as both nationalists and Euro-Atlantic enthusiasts through such discursive moves which the West did not call out when – and because – they, ultimately and in different points of history, supported Western foreign policy interests in the (Western) Balkans. The 'nitty-gritty' of such discursive games contextualized in specific key events are expanded on the following chapters (see Chapter 2-6). At this stage, however, it is important to reiterate that, regardless the political benefits which (Western) Balkan political elites generate through the instrumentalization of Western policies towards the (Western) Balkan 'other', the one main argument of this dissertation maintains: the Euro-Atlantic processes of the (Western) Balkans are shaped by and continue to shape an image of the (Western) Balkans as 'balkanized' for this in turn ultimately

supports an image of the West as united. Just like the West, the (Western) Balkan political elites use this dynamic to their own advantage and at the expense of marginalized peoples who are trapped in everlasting variations of their identity as 'balkanized'.

What does this argument contribute to? Possibly to various avenues, though it is set to offer an *empirical* contribution to a better understanding of the (Western) Balkans as an *area* which has predominantly and historically been enduring these dynamics. Answering Kadare's (2001) quote from the beginning of this introduction, it demonstrates that Europe and the West have historically needed the (Western) Balkans; and that this 'devil', among others, is the cause as well as the consequence of who the West is today. So useful have pejorative conceptualizations of the (Western) Balkans been that not only have they enabled the Western subject to appear as united, but their depth and complexity – which has also been reflected on the very ontology of who the (Western) Balkans are – have also fostered a great deal of scholarship, particularly by Western scholars. Though from a poststructuralist perspective who/what anyone/anything is can always be a matter of extensive debate, when it comes to the (Western) Balkans this is particularly evident. As Goldsworthy (2002, p. 34) claims, "it has become impossible to define a country as 'Balkan' without having to explain oneself". This might also be the reason (among others, I am sure) that poststructuralists such as David Campbell (1998) or Hansen (2006) have built full-fledged poststructuralist theories and methods through the complex character of the (Western) Balkan subject. This, among others, is the reason that this dissertation does not have as a primary aim to make a theoretical contribution per se to the many theories developed on/from the (Western) Balkans or beyond, especially if considering that the post-1990s (Western) Balkans became not just a testing ground for EU and NATO policies but also a hotbed of "theoretical laboratories" (Bărbulescu & Troncotă, 2013, p. 66). Its sideline theoretical contributions on Balkanism, Regionalism, and Europeanization, developed a posteriori and are addressed in the conclusions. Though I can imagine this dissertation speaking to identity and foreign policy theorists beyond the discipline of IR, it remains primarily guided by the purpose of making an empirical contribution to area studies which leads to a better understanding of the complexity of the relationship between the (Western) Balkans and the West through questioning the same.

What does it mean, however, to aim for an empirical contribution to area studies while operating from within a poststructuralist epistemology? How can one genealogically question

the ontological foundations of the (Western) Balkans and the West as discursive subjects and destabilize their geographic parameters while aiming to also ground their contribution within a certain geographic area? Others have already raised the need for a theoretical hybridization between poststructuralism and area studies as a means of resisting Euro-American theoretical hegemony (see Jackson, 2003). It should be clarified that within the frames of this dissertation the answer to these questions is found one, in clarifications of what a region entails from a poststructuralist perspective; and two, in differentiating between the material and the non-discursive. These two postulates are of theoretical nature and they are, therefore, more extensively discussed in Chapter 1. Here it might be sufficient to briefly touch upon the two to elucidate the area within which this dissertation's contribution is meant to find place.

The notion of a region, from a poststructuralist perspective, does not differ much from other notions that have to do with processes of collective identity building. "[R]egion building can be seen as a kind of identity politics" according to Iver B. Neumann (1999, p. 148), which "unavoidably involves accentuating similarities between Self and other". To connect this to how poststructuralism is not antagonistic to an area studies contribution, what this means is that though poststructuralism rejects anything intrinsic about identity claiming that it is discursively constituted through foreign policy and vice versa, a contribution to a better understanding of, in these circumstances a "region" (or a country, nation, institution, etc.) is possible as long as its regional identity – including its geography – is seen as defined by and in turn defining of foreign policies. One can make a contribution to Balkan or Southeast European studies – as this dissertation aims – while operating from within a poststructuralist epistemological framework if one's conceptualization of the (Western) Balkans as a region is studied as embedded in an identity politics of 'self'/'other' – between the (Western) Balkans and the West – which operates in a constitutive relationship with foreign policy – the Euro-Atlantic processes of the (Western) Balkans.

The other argument in favor of a poststructuralist approach to area studies has to do with differences between materiality and non-discursivity. Beyond the debate on area studies, such differences have been important to poststructuralism's own ontological uncertainty. The strong emphasis that poststructuralism places on the notion of discourse has led to an assumption that it rejects empirical materiality. To claim that (regional) identity is discursively constituted means that identity is constituted through language as "a corpus of statements, or a

collection of discursive facts" (Foucault, [1969] 1972, p. 27) which produce meaning. This is also why identity is relational – it links and differentiates, includes and excludes, constructs 'selves'/'others' as per the logic of binary oppositions through which language operates. Through this then, the strong emphasis on the notion of discourse translates into an emphasis on the notion of language which has led to the assumption that as per poststructuralist principles, material things do not exist *outside* of language. This has, of course, been challenged by many, but is perhaps best settled by Laclau and Mouffe ([1985] 2001, p. 108):

> The fact that every object is constituted as an object of discourse has nothing to do with whether there is a world external to thought... An earthquake or the falling of a brick is an event that certainly exists, in the sense that it occurs here and now, independently of my will. But whether their specificity as objects is constructed in terms of 'natural phenomena' or 'expressions of the wrath of God', depends upon the structuring of a discursive field. What is denied is not that such objects exist externally to thought, but the rather different assertion that they could constitute themselves as objects outside any discursive condition of emergence.

Taking this all back once again towards the intention of making an empirical contribution to Balkan area studies, what this confirms is indeed, a rejection of any extra/non-discursive space in which the region of the (Western) Balkans but also the West exist as subjects, but also a confirmation of the empirical materiality of both as "geographically bounded forms of discursive differences" (Jackson, 2003, p. 50). As such, the (Western) Balkans offer with the generous possibility for combining an area studies contribution (as contextual locality) with an ontological critique of that 'area'. Reiterating Pierre Bourdieu (1991, p. 222) here, this dissertation maintains that criteria which bring regions together "are not in the slightest respect natural". The nature of frontiers of such regions, however, including those of the (Western) Balkans as "the product of a legal act of delimitation, produces cultural difference as much as it is produced by it" (Bourdieu, 1991, p. 222). This sameness/differences logic which defines regions within 'self'/'other' identity dynamics between the (Western) Balkans and the West has historically invoked foreign policy decisions which have implied real material consequences for both subjects.

The heavier end of these consequences, however, is normally endured by one of the discursive subjects, for the relationship between 'self'/'other' dynamics and foreign policies is examined, most often, because it is problematic. It is problematic because it is a relationship which involves some degree of *asymmetry* of power – that is, power/knowledge in Foucault's ([1984] 1990) sense. The asymmetry of power/knowledge in the case of the (Western) Balkans

and the West is clearly visible in the latter's power to produce knowledge on the former from its semantics to its positionality as a recipient of Western foreign policies. Though etymologically "Balkan" as a name remains disputed to date, the fame it acquired was due to the many Europeans' travelogues and memoires (see Todorova, [1997] 2009, pp. 21-37). Its derivatives such as "balkanization" or the "(Western) Balkans" were not just made (in)famous by but were invented in the West. The first ever use of "balkanization" (2013), as per the Oxford English Dictionary (OED) can be located in 1914 by Edward H. Bradford (1914, p. 5). Other names such as SEE are also products of Western knowledge on the (Western) Balkan subject. This asymmetric relationship of knowledge production also implies an asymmetry of power, which is also why 'balkanization' remains the discourse of the Western 'self' and the (Western) Balkan 'other'. This is also what has led many (Petrović, 2009; Abazi & Doja, 2016; Hasanović, 2021) to infer that the (Western) Balkans are not defined by who they *are*, but by who they *are not* – that is, the EU and NATO, the West.

That subjects are not defined just by who they are but also by who they are not is already implied theoretically by poststructuralism. Further, that the Western subject has had the upper hand in the 'self'/'other' dynamics is also not a particular novelty but rather historical occurrence which continues to date if considering that it is the EU and NATO that predominantly set conditions to the (Western) Balkan subject and not the other way around. Aiming for an empirical contribution to area studies, however, means *questioning* this specific asymmetrical relationship, locating it within an area of its own empirical materiality. This is also reflected in the critical- rather than solution-oriented nature of the main research question: *How* does 'balkanization' *shape* the Euro-Atlantic processes of the (Western) Balkans, and vice versa? Recalling once again Neumann (1999, p. 37) here, "[i]ntegration and exclusion are two sides of the same coin, so the issue here is not that exclusion takes place but *how* it takes place". This dissertation therefore, rather than promising a mind-blowing "eureka" effect, offers "a better understanding of *who* 'the actors' are, *how* they were constituted, *how* they maintain themselves, and *under which preconditions* they may thrive" (Neumann, 1999, p. 37) in the 'self'/'other' dynamics between the (Western) Balkans and the West and the many peculiar other actors which constitute the two. The insights derived from this vocation can certainly speak to those generally interested on theories of identity and foreign policy, as well as those interested on theories built around the (Western) Balkans – such as Balkanism,

Regionalism, or Europeanization, which I address in the conclusions. Its main purpose, however, remains the utilization of a better understanding of the empirical materiality of the relationship between the (Western) Balkans and the West for explaining the (lack of) progress of the (Western) Balkans in their Euro-Atlantic endeavors. Theories are employed to serve this purpose, not the other way around.

Outline of the Thesis: Back to the Future Across Events

The structure of this dissertation defies some of the traditional rules of writing. This not only due to the density of empirical material included in the main text on which I elaborate in Chapter 1, but also due to the interpretative orientation of the four main empirical chapters which focus on the two (Western) Balkan countries – (North) Macedonia and Serbia. Before briefly introducing these chapters and three others that precede them, it should be clearly set at this stage that the reader should expect chapter-specific findings but not necessarily chapter-specific arguments in these chapters. These chapters are all oriented towards historically contextualizing, exemplifying, and personalizing the one main argument of this dissertation. At its core, this dissertation vouches for de-summarization, deconstruction, and problematization, not for further simplification of 'balkanization'. Therefore, the chapters are written in a manner that they decompose the main argument within specific key events[6], specific actors[7], and the two (Western) Balkan countries. This is also why I invite the reader to approach the empirical chapters as a reading exercise of decentralizing the main research question into specific historicized episodes of many names and characters, institutional tools and actors, events and subevents, their features and details, which serve as 'screenshots' of particular identity constellations and foreign policies.

Though at a grander scale the chapters are dedicated to (North) Macedonia and Serbia, the key events which are analyzed as parts of the basic discourses are the vessel of analysis. As Hansen (2006, p. 28) claims, "mapping debates around key events offers a methodological technique for tracing the stability of official discourse as they can be used to construct a

[6] For an extended timeline of other regional and global key events beyond those I focus on in this dissertation, see Appendix A and B.
[7] For a list of all historical and political actors mentioned in this dissertation including those from Appendix A and B, see Appendix C.

timeline which in turn can be employed when empirical material is selected". These events, therefore, in combination with the two countries, primarily serve as key intertextual nodes for the selection of the research material and inclusion of other (Western) Balkan actors beyond (North) Macedonia and Serbia. It is key events which make this dissertation one on the (Western) Balkans as a subject and not (North) Macedonia and Serbia as two separate ones. Details on the epistemological relevance and rationale behind the choice of key events and just generally the research design, are further given in Chapter 1: *"Studying the (Western) Balkans: Theory and Method of Discourse Analysis"*. Overall, the chapter illustrates how a rigorous poststructuralist theory and method as proposed by Hansen (2006) is best fitting for answering the main research question, despite some problematic aspects associated with it.

The chapter following – *"'Balkanization': Genealogy of the Discourse"* – is concerned with diversifying, denaturalizing, and destabilizing the 'balkanization' discourse by tracing it genealogically back to its roots. It identifies three *genealogical basic discourses* – the Balkan Wars/WWI, the WWII/Colonial, and Balkanism which then serve to draw links to the three main *contemporary (from the time under study) basic discourses* as elaborated in the following chapters – the Yugoslav Crisis, Stabilization, and Europeanization. Basic discourses, simply said at this stage, are smaller units of interpretations of 'balkanization' structured around common layers of otherness, common spatial and temporal characteristics, which serve to support specific policies. Identifying these three genealogical basic discourses in this chapter serves to illustrate how contemporary dynamics of 'self'/'other' between the (Western) Balkans and the West which condition and are in turn conditioned by the Euro-Atlantic processes of the former are not fresh and unsullied manifestations of links between identity and foreign policy but are rather rearticulated versions of older similar dynamics.

The four empirical chapters following are where the contemporary empirical analysis takes place, though in reference to the genealogical chapter which precedes them. In the service of an analysis which must be "historically and contextually grounded" (Hansen, 2016, p. 9), the chapters focus on the two countries, as contextualized through specific key events chronologically ordered as part of the three main basic discourses. Starting from the first:

- The chapter *"(Socialist Yugoslav Republic of) Macedonia: Oasis of Peace and/or Apple of Discord"* covers two key events most specifically related to (North)

Macedonia: its independence in 1991 as part of the Yugoslav Crisis basic discourse; and the armed conflict of 2001 as part of the Stabilization basic discourse.

- The chapter *"(Socialist Yugoslav Republic of) Serbia: Once Upon a Time There Was One Country"* covers three key events most specifically related to Serbia: the 1995 war in BiH as part of the Yugoslav Crisis basic discourse; and the 1999 Kosovo war which is inextricably link to the fall of Slobodan Milošević from power in 2000 as part of Stabilization.
- The chapter *"Serbia Anew is Born: The exodus of Montenegro and Kosovo"* covers three key events: the 2003 Thessaloniki summit – an event which is intentionally picked as a key regional episode – as mediating between Stabilization and Europeanization; and two other key events – the 2006 independence of Montenegro, and the 2013 "Brussels Agreement" between Kosovo and Serbia as part of the Europeanization contemporary basic discourse.
- Finally, the chapter *"FYRO/(North) Macedonia: The Sun too is a Star"* also covers the 2003 Thessaloniki summit; and two other key events – the 2009 visa liberalization for (North) Macedonia, and the 2018 "Prespa Agreement" on the country's change of name.

The order of chapters is also set to follow a chronological positionality of events in which I start with the earliest – the 1991 independence of (North) Macedonia, and finish with the latest key event – the 2018 "Prespa Agreement". Again, contrary to traditional expectations, the chronological progression of events might seem as incompatible with a general poststructuralist conceptualization of history as nonlinear. However, narrating analysis in a chronological manner means not necessarily operating from a linear conceptualization of time. The location of contemporary links of identity and foreign policy within genealogical variations of such links in the past – that is, conducting a "history of presence" (Foucault, [1975] 1995) – does not necessarily exclude a chronological interpretation of events. This for as long as such interpretation remains concerned not with tracing present day phenomena to their origins, but with contesting them as discontinuous episodes whereby the past became the present and the present becomes the future. While traditionally, poststructuralist accounts might have focused on one key event (see Campbell, 1998; Hansen, 2006) and had not much

to worry about chronology, in cases of studies such as this dissertation which cover a wide diapason of time stretched through several events, a chronological presentation of analysis seemed more proper.

Finally, the concluding chapter reruns the main research question through a period of nation-state building during the Yugoslav Crisis, transition during Stabilization, and then Europeanization, but while factoring in the transatlantic component of the Euro-Atlantic processes of the (Western) Balkans. It is a reiteration of what has been illustrated and contextualized in the preceding chapters – the role that the 'balkanized' (Western) Balkan 'other' has historically played for the unity of the Western 'self', and how contemporary foreign policy processes such as the Euro-Atlantic integration of the (Western) Balkans are shaped by and shape the same dynamics. It also accentuates the role of the (Western) Balkan political elites which others have already recognized, and it rejects its conceptualization as a passive reproduction of Western articulations of the identity of the (Western) Balkans – the imitation of the Western sense of 'other' within the (Western) Balkan sense of 'self' is an active and politically calculated reproduction. I elaborate on the trivium of Balkanism, Regionalism, and Europeanization and offer my insights to further expand on them. The concluding remarks also briefly touch upon shortcomings of this dissertation and areas for further research.

Chapter 1
Studying the (Western) Balkans: Theory and Method of Discourse Analysis

This chapter is concerned with setting the theoretical and methodological principles that served best answering the research question – *How does 'balkanization' shape the Euro-Atlantic processes of the (Western) Balkans, and vice versa?* Poststructuralist discourse theory emerged as compatible with certain suppositions engrained in the research question which have to do with identity and foreign policy. Specifically, the thesis relies on Lene Hansen's (2006) elaborations on the theory and method of poststructuralist discourse analysis. In the third section of this chapter, I elaborate on poststructuralist conceptualization of key notions of this dissertation such as discourse, identity, foreign policy, and others. Its three subsections ponder and answer questions of analytical lenses, research material, and design, based on specific methodological principles, while providing with the rationale behind methodological decisions. This is preceded by two other sections. In the first section I position my 'self' as the author of this thesis within the 'self'/'other' nexus between the (Western) Balkans and the West. This is important not as much as a disclosure or disclaimer of authorship towards queries on my subjectivity as someone coming from the (Western) Balkans, but rather as an introduction into the poststructuralist discourse theory and method applied in this dissertation as inspired by and compatible with my subjectivity as an author from which, among others, this thesis emerged and ultimately continues to feed back in. In the second section I critically engage with poststructuralists like Campbell (1998), Hansen (2006), and James Der Derian (2009) from a perspective of their Western positionalities that has converted the empirical materiality of (Western) Balkans into a tool for these scholars' theoretical contributions, and I elaborate on how this thesis sets a different example.

(My) 'Self/Selves' and the 'Other(s)' between the (Western) Balkans and the West

During my first time attending the European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR) joint sessions in April 2019, in Mons, Belgium, I presented the theoretical and methodological chapter of this dissertation. The discussant of my paper who had worked in the Democratic

Republic of the Congo (DRC)[8] said: "I had no idea that balkanization had anything to do with the Balkans". To me, however, it was the (Western) Balkans all that 'balkanization' had ever to do with. Though it is ironic, it is no surprise that 'balkanization', being de/re-contextualized from the Balkan Peninsula to an extent that it is being used to denote "Deconstructed Dish: Burgers get Balkanized" (Pollack, 2011), has come to be used as disassociated from the (Western) Balkans. I realized how far in the opposite sides of the spectrum were me and my discussant: they could use 'balkanization' without ever thinking about me, whereas I could not hear/read of 'balkanization' ever without feeling that it has something to do with me personally. This section expands on the reflexive positionality of my 'self' as an author and as someone coming from the (Western) Balkans imbedded in 'self'/'other' dynamics between the (Western) Balkans and the West.

This study does not employ reflexivity as an autobiographical methodological tool. Therefore, the purpose of this section is not an epistemological theorization of my 'self'. Rather, the purpose is positioning my 'self' within the 'self'/'other' dynamics of the (Western) Balkans and the West, and with that also clarifying – however briefly – how epistemological choices elaborated in this chapter also emerged from the need of a better understanding of my 'self'. That is, the choice of theory and method presented here, and their compatibility with the main research question, also emerged from and in turn elicited an emergence of knowledge on my 'self/selves' as someone coming from the (Western) Balkans but operating from a Western invented epistemology and methodology, writing about it in English, while being based in a Western educational institution and having done so for the past ten years my life.

The asymmetry of power between the (Western) Balkans and the West is at the heart of this introspective inquiry. This asymmetry of power which exposes the West as having the upper hand in defining the nature of the relationship between its 'self' and the (Western) Balkan 'other' is also important for clarifying my own subjectivity as an author in relation to the (Western) Balkan 'self' as asymmetrically positioned visa-à-vis the West. This requires some elaborations on reflexivity as important for 'self'/'other' studies which involve collective parameters like the (Western) Balkans as a region. As noted by Neumann (1999, p. 36),

[8] 'Balkanization' is frequently used in reference to the DRC. From an analysis through Twitter, I infer that DRC occupies the second of all spaces associated with 'balkanization' after the Unites States to explain the conflict in the Eastern Congo specifically (Veliu, 2018, pp. 71-72).

> [i]n analyzing the self/other nexus, it is particularly hard not to ponder the ways in which the writer is implicated in what he or she writes about… It is not enough to reflect on what we do (that is, on why we study this or that slice of world politics) and why we do it. We must also *pay attention to what that which we do, does*.

Paying attention to "what that which we do, does" (Neumann, 1999, p. 36) becomes vividly important especially if considering the already asymmetric relationship between the (Western) Balkans and the West in which the former occupies a marginal position visa-à-vis the West. It becomes even more important, however, when reflecting on how *that which we do, does* something not only to the object/subject of research but also to our very personal 'self' as embedded in a more collective sense of 'self' like the (Western) Balkans.

This leads me to a disclaimer. Admittedly, much like Diana Mishkova's (2019, p. 5) book, this dissertation began as inspired by a "a clear political agenda: reinstating the subjectivity and the agency of 'the Balkans'" and this is also where the theoretical and methodological choices discussed in this chapter rose from. Having been brought up as an ethnic Albanian from (North) Macedonia in the (Western) Balkans while acquiring most of my formal education in Western universities, my interest in 'balkanization' was born from almost a defensive aspiration and a scholarly 'patriotic' endeavor to convince the Western subject of all the good that the (Western) Balkans could offer outside/beyond 'balkanization' – that is, to relate to the beginning of this section, an endeavor of convincing my discussant, that the West should not only know that 'balkanization' had everything to do with the (Western) Balkans a proof of which I was, but that it also had so much to do with the Western 'self'. This is – perhaps ironically – vivid in the choice of a Western-born epistemology employed in this dissertation, and moreover the language in which it is written. These aspirations seemed oriented towards converting the (Western) Balkan 'subject' into an equal negotiator in the 'self'/'other' relationship between the (Western) Balkans and the West and hence making the relationship less asymmetrical.

What this implied, however, was enabling the (Western) Balkan 'subject' to imagine its 'self' outside of the Western gaze for this asymmetry could be remedied not only by convincing the Western 'self' to acknowledge the (Western) Balkan 'other', but also by enabling the (Western) Balkans to acknowledge its 'self' independently of the Western subject. This it to say that reinstating the subjectivity and the agency of the (Western) Balkans implied an imperative of some sort of a Balkan uniqueness and specificity separate from the Western

gaze. This then explains the inclusion of text from the (Western) Balkans and the choice to opt for a study of discursive encounter explained below.

What soon became evident and as this dissertation further demonstrates, rather than producing a clear "discourse of the [Western] Self with the [(Western) Balkan] Other's 'counter-construction' of Self and Other" (Hansen, 2006, p. 68), the discursive encounter between the (Western) Balkans and the West entails a unique relationship where the (Western) Balkan 'self' mimics/imitates the Western constructions of the (Western) Balkans as its 'other'. That is, while the West has had the upper hand in defining its 'self', the (Western) Balkans have not and they have instead reflected their appearance as West's 'other' into their sense of 'self'. Therefore, it is no wonder that the pathway towards a better understanding of my 'self' seemed to be through the Western gaze, for as Marina Antić (2006, p. 154) claims "the Balkan self is never separate from the European gaze and Europe is thus never absent from the Balkan self-identification".

Contrary to what Wendy Bracewell and Alex Drace-Francis (1999, p. 8) claim on approaches which focus "on the Balkans as the Other to the West, not on the Balkans as Self" as responsible for merely "re-margin[alizing] the Balkans", in this dissertation I choose to engage with the (Western) Balkan series of reflected gaze as the West's 'other' "to the point of absurdity. This is perhaps the only way to disarm them [and my 'self'] from a marginal position" (Antić, 2006, p. 162). Studying the (Western) Balkans while acknowledging them as the West's 'other' instead of running after the discovery of a self-sufficient 'self', is not depriving them from their sense of 'self' and agency and hence re-marginalizing them. As Mikhail Bakhtin (1984, p. 287, emphasis in the original) says:

> The very being of man (both external and internal) is the deepest *communion*. To be means to *communicate*… To be means to be for another, and through the other, for oneself. A person has no internal sovereign territory, he is wholly and always on the boundary; looking inside himself, he looks *into the eyes of another* or *with the eyes of another*… I cannot manage without another, I cannot become myself without another; I must find myself in another by finding another in myself.

Rather, studying the (Western) Balkans as West's 'other' equals an attempt of de-marginalizing them by acknowledging the power asymmetry at play which has deprived them of a clear knowledge of/on the 'self' at the first place.

From a self-reflexive perspective, positioning my 'self' within an asymmetrical relationship of 'self'/'other' between the (Western) Balkans and the West in which the (Western) Balkans cannot – but moreover need not – be 'rescued' as separate from the Western gaze, has brought a sense of liberation from the author's responsibility as a social agent which Neumann (1999) spoke of. This particularly since such responsibility is, at the first place, seen as incompatible with some poststructuralist approaches, and this is important considering the poststructuralist theory and method I rely on for writing this thesis. Following Laclau and Mouffe ([1985] 2001), James Fitzgerald (2014, p. 10), for example, argues against perceptions of authors as agents of social change considering this to be "an erroneous conceptualisation of authorship which is anathema to a 'poststructuralist/intertextual' ontology". He claims that "speaking of oneself can be achieved in the act of authorship, but the subject should recognise that any such attempt is necessarily conditioned by the ontological limits that deny the self's existence as a whole or static entity" (Fitzgerald, 2014, p. 67) for "if society is defined by a multiplicity of discourses that exist in perennial flux, then the self cannot but exist in a state of perennial flux also" (p. 66). Fitzgerald (2014, p. 68) argues instead for "a reflexivity that does not seek to capture the self, but does not deny that such attempts are made by the author".

However, while he offers the footnote as an embodiment of reflexivity "as that which interrupts, occupies, and with its persistent protrusion into the 'main text', facilitates the heterogeneous interpretations of arguments" (Fitzgerald, 2014, p. 5) which the author wishes to claim as their own, this dissertation employs reflexivity through the inclusion of dense empirical material and quotation precisely in the main text. This has to do with the asymmetrical dynamics of 'self'/'other' between the (Western) Balkans and the West which have resulted with the former being marginalized and which account for the conscious choice to include research material from the (Western) Balkans in the empirical corpus. Placing this material in footnotes and tiny letters, rather than serving as protrusion into the main text, would further accommodate to the already marginalized position of the (Western) Balkan 'other' vis-à-vis the Western 'self'. The most intense intrusion in the Western gaze would be the inclusion of this material within the margins – and not outside – of the page, right there where Western text has gotten accustomed to occupying an assertive role. Considering the marginal position of the (Western) Balkan 'other', the discursive encounter between the (Western) Balkans and the West requires a sense of responsibility in making sure that this direct encounter takes place

not in the margins, but at the center of the textual space. Directly quoting dense empirical material within the main text does not only facilitate the heterogeneous interpretations of arguments, but also presents with the opportunity to come clear on attempts made by me as an author to capture my distinct (Western) Balkan 'self' in its encounter with the West even though the same exists only in a state of perennial flux and regular negotiations with the Western gaze.

These attempts of 'fix and flux', capturing and releasing meanings, are also reflected in the use of brackets and single quotation marks – including the "(Western) Balkans", titles of chapters, 'balkanization', the 'self'/'other', etc. Their reflexive value, not only from my perspective as an author but also the reader's perspective, resides in intruding the absurd and controversial simplicity that the (Western) Balkan subject has endured in its complexity. In other words, the only simple thing to know about the (Western) Balkans has been their complexity. Direct quotations, I am aware, might read as dense and even disturbing to the reader, as well as the use of other typographic tools like brackets or single quotation marks. However, indeed, they are meant to disturb and elicit a reflective reaction from the reader and from me as an author while reading or writing this thesis which exposes this controversial nature of the (Western) Balkan subject as simultaneously simple and complex, as perpetually transforming, changing names and signifiers, yet within some common stable denominator of being Balkan. The theory and method of poststructuralist analysis is well suited to this intension as well as to the overall goal of answering the main research question which connects the Euro-Atlantic processes of the (Western) Balkan 'other' to their simple yet complex fragmented identity conveyed through 'balkanization'. It, however, is also associated with what can be seen as problematic aspects, particularly when it comes to the Balkan area studies and in relation to empirical contributions offered in this thesis. The following section expands on these aspects.

Contribution and Critique of Poststructuralist Studies on the (Western) Balkans

How does/should one study the (Western) Balkans? The nature of the research question guided the choice of theory and method applied in this thesis, while the complex ontology of the (Western) Balkan subject also raises some complex questions on most compatible

epistemologies for studying it. Janković (1988, p. 9) had – before Balkanism[9] as the discourse and simultaneously the academic vocation of studying the Balkans (see Todorova, [1997] 2009) appeared – proclaimed that "[t]here are no special methods to be used in studying the Balkans different from those used to deal with any other geographical region or period of history". They criticize literature on the (Western) Balkans which seeks "the roots of everything 'Balkan' in its ancient history" (Janković, 1988, p. 1). Studies like these have conditioned a primordial view on the *homo balcanicus* as "an evasive human species" (Daskalov, Mishkova, Marinov, & Vezenkov, 2017, p. 1) and a source of eternal troubles and quandaries. Along the lines of Bjelić's (2002, p. 6) question: "[w]hat then is Balkan specificity?" (Bjelić & Savić, 2002, p. 6) others have insisted on a distinguishing ontological status of the (Western) Balkans (see for example Todorova, 1996, [1997] 2009, 2010; Goldsworthy, 1998; Fleming, 2000). The latter tendencies have required approaches which recognize the existence of a (Western) Balkan subjectivity and with that (a) (Western) Balkan 'self'/'selves'.

The debate on the (lack of) subjectivity of the (Western) Balkan subject which is incorporated in the decision to treat the (Western) Balkans as a subject of its own material specificity but also an ideational construction is discussed in Chapter 2. However, locating the research question within a theory and research method that would fit both – the (Western) Balkan specificity of 'self' with its own materiality, and the impossibility of its isolated ontological status from the Western subject – demands an epistemology which transcends fixed ideas of 'self' and 'other', and the relationship between the two. A *poststructuralist discourse theory* emerged as most compatible for doing this due to its conceptualizations of key notions like *identity*, *foreign policy*, and their *constitutive* relationship, as well as *discourse* which I discuss in the following section. Lene Hansen's (2006) approach to the study of discourse is also the main methodological stratagem for this study due to, among different reasons, challenging causal epistemology and arguing for a logic of interpretation that, along the lines of David Campbell (1993, p. 708), "acknowledges the improbability of cataloguing, calculating, and specifying 'real causes', concerning itself instead with considering the

[9] Note that in this dissertation, Balkanism (like Europeanization) stands for both a basic discourse (an analytical unit) and a strand of literature. For more on the latter see "Conclusions"; for more on the former see Chapter 2.

manifest political consequences of adopting one mode of representation over another". This is also why Hansen is most often referenced in the chapter.

Two important clarifications are due here. One, poststructuralist studies on the (Western) Balkans, despite their theoretical compatibility with the main research question here, have left their 'bitter taste' on the (Western) Balkan subject in addition to the praise gained[10]. This is already mentioned in the Introduction but deserves to be expanded on here. Second, it should be noted that these debatable aspects of poststructuralist accounts on the (Western) Balkans have to do with the Western positionality of some key scholars and the theoretical and methodological choices it conditioned, rather than with inherent conceptual problems of poststructuralist theory as such and as introduced by them. The latter is particularly important as the treatment that the (Western) Balkan subject has received in the hands of poststructuralists like Campbell (1998), Hansen (2006), or James Der Derian (2009) and its utilization for theoretical and methodological contributions to the field might have created an impression and an impetus for the scholarly treatment of the (Western) Balkan subject as a theoretical construct and a 'muse' without an empirical materiality of its own. This has also partially been fueled by misconceptions on the poststructuralist denial of empirical materiality.

The denouncement of empirical materiality of an area, however, is not a poststructuralist principle even by these scholars' own standards and theoretical commitments. This dissertation further illustrates that. It does so by offering an empirical contribution to Balkan area studies through a poststructuralist theory and method of identity and foreign policy. To best materialize this aim, however, I reverse the priority of contribution in an opposite direction from that of, for example, Campbell (1998), Hansen (2006), or Der Derian (2009). While their work utilizes the (Western) Balkan subject for the advancement of Western poststructuralist thought, I instead utilize their Western poststructuralist work for the advancement of Balkan area studies and a better understanding of the empirical materiality of

[10] See Aleksandar Čarapić (2007) and Danijela Majstorović (2008) from the University of Belgrade and University of Banja Luka respectively as examples of local reviews of Hansen's (2006) book. Čarapić (2007, p. 677) claims that "[e]ven for someone who was born and grew up in Bosnia (like the reviewer himself), and who still feels topics related to the Bosnian war as extremely painful, this book remains a real pleasure to read", while Majstorović (2008, p. 499) considers it as "mark[ing] the start of a much-needed critical analysis on discourses surrounding the contemporary Bosnian condition. As such, it is both an important read for anyone interested in the recent Balkan studies and a serious call for furthering the discourse analytical research agenda". See for more, however, Goldsworthy (2014, p. 3) on how "it is increasingly problematic to use language criteria as the means of determining the boundaries between literary 'tribes'".

the (Western) Balkans as an area. This is where this thesis is categorically different from the work of these scholars – in its intention – which is further supported by my own (Western) Balkan positionality elaborated above, and the inclusion of local research material from the (Western) Balkans unlike other poststructuralist studies on the (Western) Balkans.

Campbell (1998, p. ix), for example, makes it clear in the preface of *National Deconstruction: Violence, Identity and Justice in Bosnia* that "[a]lthough emphatically concerned with Bosnia, this book is not, however, about Bosnia per se". The very title already suggests this, but sidelining BiH at the expense of demonstrating the "distinctive contribution of deconstructive though" (Campbell D. , 1998, p. 240) is not just a persistent feature of the entire book – it is its contribution, what resides at the heart of Campbell's intention. It is "misguided *European* intellectuals" that Campbell (1998, p. 3) is concerned with, therefore, he says, his book "can be read as the *problematization of the problematizations* that reduce Bosnia to a problem" (1998, p. xi). Certainly, BiH as an empirical materiality and even perhaps the region could benefit from the problematization of accounts that reduce them to a problem, but this is a 'collateral benefit' of what the book truly targets.

It is almost misleading when Campbell's (1998, p. 2) first chapter speaks of Amira Muharemović, Ziad, and a "taxi driver, whose name [Campbell and his co-traveler(s)] sadly did not catch". These "*three* face-to-face encounters" (Campbell D. , 1998, p. 2) are only used to kick off discussions as they operate in the service of the two main contributions of the book summed up in the conclusions: one, recognizing that "a range of political options informed by deconstructive thought might *possibly* better address the conflict" (Campbell D. , 1998, p. 240, emphasis in the original); and second, recognizing that "in order to enact the promise of democracy, justice, and multiculturalism, all political proposals have to be *preceded* by the qualification of a "perhaps" and *followed* by an insistent and persistent questioning" (Campbell D. , 1998, p. 242, emphasis in the original). Campbell's primary concern is the analytical and theoritical distinctive value of deconstructive thought through BiH, and not the destincitive empirical materiality of Amira, Ziad, and the nameless taxi driver through deconstructive thought. Therefore, indeed, Campell (1998, p. 3) says that he seeks to "explore the ethical and political possibilities enabled by poststructuralist thought *in* the context of the Bosnian war", and the book successfully does this – expanding on such possibilities. This, hoewers, is enabled *through* and not just *in* the context of the Bosnian war.

The end goal and the ultimate beneficiary of academic titles is also generally easily detectable in the echo of their contributions and traces left on other scholars. Exceptions aside, I am sure, rarely would authors intend for their contribution to find applicability on one scholarly space for it to end up in another one. Even if these exist, that is not the case with Campbell (1998) or other poststructuralists who erected fortified epistemologies through the (Western) Balkan subject. This becomes more explicit as one comes across following studies that pick up on such epistemologies, though reviews are a sufficient testimony of where readers locate the value – exactly where these authors intend to. Let us take, intertextually, Hansen's (1999) own review of Campbell (1998). Though she finds him to sometimes be "too sweeping" (p. 253), Hansen (1999, p. 252) considers Campbell to have "provided not only the *first book-length poststructuralist study* of the Bosnian war and the international policy toward it, but also the formulation of a *deconstructivist ethics of international relations*". Years later, Hansen's (2006) assembled her own poststructuralist contribution of its own kind in *Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War* gaining more than 2700 citation according to Google Scholar, *through* – again – the Bosnian war. Hansen's (2006) book is not only built as a supplement and correction of Campbell's (1998), but it makes its own distinctive "*contribution* to the debates on identity and foreign policy within the discipline of IR" (Hansen, 2006, p. xvii) by providing with "a poststructuralist theory of the relationship between identity and foreign policy and an in-depth discussion of the methodology of discourse analysis".

The war in BiH, however, for the purpose of the book, is "a case study in that it illustrates the application of the theory, but it is also a 'case *plus*' in that it wants to offer a thorough analysis of the Western debate on Bosnia" (Hansen, 2006, p. xx). Indeed, while Hansen and others might have shed much light on the war in BiH, the empirical materiality of the war is only the added, extra, plus, almost accidental contribution of their work. Once again, it is the theoretical fetishization of the (Western) Balkan subject which enables an epistemological contribution. This is what, though perhaps blown out of proportions, might have led Rutgers and Richter-Montpetit (2020, p. 6) to claim that "Hansen illustrates these methodological shortcomings through the fable of the Little Mermaid, wittily locating the analysis in Copenhagen, then abruptly travels to Pakistan and Bosnia for empirical evidence". Hansen's (2000) take on Little Mermaid's silent security dilemma, however, is not the only time that had her and other poststructuralists travel from their 'shores' to the (Western) Balkans

or elsewhere in search of silent subjects. Hansen (2000) does this again through the mass rapes in BiH as empirical evidence towards the theoretical recognition of wartime rape as a collective security problem. While Hansen's (2020, p. 380) response to Rutgers and Richter-Montpetit that their claims are "fundamentally at odds" with the theoretical and epistemological contributions of the article might have a ground, this does not, however, exonerate the Western production of knowledge from the role it played in the theoretical exhaustion of the empirical materiality of subjects other than the West in the service of its own theoretical, methodological, and empirical advancement.

This ethical concern is too broad to be captured here, but another example that has contributed to it and deserves mentioning is James Der Derian. Take a specific essay of his which Der Derian (2009) titled "S/N: International theory, *balkanization* and the new world order". Through a brief genealogical account on 'balkanization' among others, Der Derian (2009, p. 97), in a single essay, ambitiously "inscribes the political transformation of a region, the intellectual practices of a discipline and the prospects for a new world order". He captures the analytical power of 'balkanization' as "a concept that moved from a natural position upholding a superpower order, to critical attitudes toward the order of things and, once historically transvalued, to a multiplicity of contested meanings that no single power or doctrine could possibly fix" (Der Derian, 2009, p. 100) to speak to the idea of order as such "in *our* own field of international relations, at a time when radical transformation of superpower politics has taken place" (p. 99). 'Balkanization', to Der Derian, is an idea, a concept, a useful theoretical construct to make sense of the global state of politics. For him and other Western (poststructuralist) scholars rarely has the opposite been the intention. This is also why Der Derian is not concerned with the consequences that a key transformative moment in international politics can have on the (Western) Balkan subject. Rather, through the (Western) Balkan subject, Der Derian (2009, p. 111) utilizes the "critical history of how 'balkanisation' has travelled" claiming that it could "yield a very different, much less essentialist definition of 'order' [even] in the Middle East". Der Derian joins others whose main intention has been the theoretical profiting from the conceptual utility of the (Western) Balkan subject, rather than the empirical materialization of the benefits that theoretical advancements could bring to the region. The empirical materiality of the (Western) Balkan subject has most often and predominantly been the tool and not the goal of the analysis. This,

among others, is what might have led Aleksa Djilas (2007) to write about "The Academic West and the Balkan Test", or Mishkova (2019, p. 1) on the (Western) Balkans as "the favored European 'deconstruction site'".

The empirical marginalization of the (Western) Balkans becomes visible also in these scholars' choices of texts, and which, from a poststructuralist perspective, are empirical choices. Though Hansen (2006, p. 77), for example, offers discursive encounter as a methodological option which opens the space for the inclusion of local texts, she herself chooses not to engage in a study of discursive encounter. She says that such a choice is "influenced by pragmatic questions of linguistic abilities in that one usually needs to know the language of the Self as well as the encountered Other". This begs the question: does the local only and always speak local, and does the Balkan only and always speak Balkan? The textualization of the (Western) Balkans, which followed especially after the 1990s and in which poststructuralism gave its own contribution, relied on Western texts. This has most often been justified through the pragmatic complexity of learning new languages and which, considering the urgency that some war in the (Western) Balkans must have presented, was a futile endeavor since, of course, by the time that these authors would learn the local languages, who knows, the (Western) Balkans might have irredeemably been 'balkanized'. But Vesna Goldsworthy (2014, p. 3) raises key questions about this, as she says: "[t]he Balkans 'write back' not only in a multitude of local languages but, increasingly, in English too". Therefore, if not for preceding scholars, at least for upcoming ones, the excuse of language will become difficult to retain and it will, inevitably, raise the question of whether the authors' Western positionalities which inform their intention of contribution confines them to avoid engaging with these texts and talking *with* instead of *through* or *on behalf of* the 'other'.

This thesis is different precisely due to its intention of using a Western theoretical and methodological framework developed through the (Western) Balkan subject to offer an empirical contribution to the Balkan area studies with theoretical implications. It reverses and restores the analytical gaze from one that passes through the (Western) Balkans and on to theory, to one that travels back from and through poststructuralist theory on to the (Western) Balkans. This choice is embodied, perhaps, most explicitly in the selection of research material inclusive of local texts as exemplified in the two research material matrices presented below (see Table 2 and 3). Indeed, I agree with Edin Hajdarpašić (2009, p. 2) that "the question of

'theory' [is] one of critical importance for the revitalization of Balkan Studies agendas" and that there is a "noted theory-averseness among some Balkan scholars" (p. 5). I deem the question of empirics, however, and of an unapologetic stance to choose not to contribute to universal theoretical 'umbrellas' under the shade of which the (Western) Balkans reside, just as critically important. To those who might find it unusual that a poststructuralist study insists on its empirical contribution to materiality, I say it is time to let poststructuralism out of its metaphysical 'jail' and Western guardianship.

Poststructuralist Theory and Method of Identity and Foreign Policy

Reading the research question – How does 'balkanization' shape the Euro-Atlantic processes of the (Western) Balkans, and *vice versa*? – without giving the same attention to its "vice versa" part, might give the false impression of addressing a causal relationship between 'balkanization' as a discourse on one hand which relies on certain articulations of the identity of the (Western) Balkan 'other' as fragmented, and the Euro-Atlantic processes of the (Western) Balkans on the other. However, the conscious choice to include "vice versa" in the research question is meant to imply a constitutive rather than a causal relationship between the two. As Hansen (2006, p. xvi) argues, "to theorize foreign policy as discourse is to argue that identity and policy are constituted through a process of narrative adjustments, that they stand, in social science terminology, in a *constitutive*, rather than causal relationship". It is essential to be established at this point that within the frames of this study, 'balkanization' as a discourse is considered to mediate between different layers of the *identity* of the (Western) Balkan 'other' as fragmented and the Western 'self' on one hand, and the Euro-Atlantic processes of the (Western) Balkans as *discursive practices* on the other; and that the two – the identity of the (Western) Balkan 'other' and Western 'self', and the Euro-Atlantic processes of the (Western) Balkans as policies – are being looked at as being in a constitutive rather than causal relationship.

Such a position, even from the outset, would also be conveyed through the choice of notions like the very reference to 'balkanization' as a discourse. What, nevertheless, needs a clarification, is the differentiation between 'balkanization' as a discourse and the Euro-Atlantic processes of the (Western) Balkans as discursive practice(s). Differentiating between the poststructuralist notions of "discourse" and that of "discursive" or "discursive practices" is yet

another discussion of parameters too broad to be done justice here, though a light clarification might be necessary. The notion of discourse is a key theoretical concept in the study of the politics of representation, as much as one on which no common scholarly understanding has been reached. Foucault ([1969] 1972, pp. 48-49), although giving to it a central place in his examinations of the power-knowledge nexus, gave a loose definition[11] of what discourses are not, in claiming that

> 'discourses', in the form in which they can be heard or read, are not, as one might expect, a mere intersection of things and words: an obscure web of things, and a manifest, visible, coloured chain of words… discourse is not a slender surface of contact, or confrontation, between a reality and a language (langue), the intrication of a lexicon and an experience.

To date, much remains unclear on what discourses exactly are. What is clear is that Foucault ([1969] 1972, p. 49) required that discourses are no longer treated "as groups of signs (signifying elements referring to contents or representations) but as *practices* that systematically form the objects of which they speak". The notion of discourse is intrinsically associated with that of discursive practice(s).

This intrinsic association might also be the reason that the two have often been equated and used interchangeably, even though the former has more to do with knowledges as such, while the latter with what knowledges do and how they operate. Carol Bacchi and Jennifer Bonham (2014, p. 173) make a compelling case for, as they say, "reclaiming discursive practices", from all those who "use the term discursive practice/s to refer to linguistic usage". The list of these authors is long, and Bacchi and Bonham give quite a few examples, including here the renowned discursive theorist, Michael Shapiro (1981, pp. 18, 27), who uses "linguistic or discursive practices" interchangeably. Bacchi and Bonham (2014, p. 174, emphasis in the original) instead, argue that "discursive practices are the practices *of* discourses—which is why they are called *discursive practices*—rather than language in use or how people '*practise* discourse', i.e.—write or speak". For this they refer to Foucault's corpus and claim that "it is not the 'things said' in terms of their content or linguistic structure that interests him but the operation of a whole package of relationships, including symbolic and material elements, that make those 'things said' legitimate and meaningful" (Bacchi & Bonham, 2014, p. 178).

[11] For more on the debate on the (lack of) clarity on the notion of discourse, see among others Howarth (2000) and O'Brien (2013).

Indeed, in different instances Foucault had confirmed this, as for example in one of his lectures at the Collège de France. He had claimed that "we were able to isolate a distinctive level of investigation among all those approaches which permit the analysis of systems of thought: the analysis of *discursive practices*. This context discloses a systematic organisation that cannot be reduced to the demands of logic or linguistics" (Foucault, 1977, p. 199). This dissertation adopts the argument proposed by Bacchi and Bonham (2014) and within the frames of this study, 'balkanization' stands for the discourse – that is, the language and the knowledge it conveys on the identity of the (Western) Balkan 'other' and the Western 'self'; while the Euro-Atlantic processes of the (Western) Balkans as a foreign policy stand for the discoursive practices which are shaped by and in turn shape this knowledge. That is, the Euro-Atlantic processes of the (Western) Balkans stand for "the rules governing a knowledge" (Cousins & Hussain, 1984, p. 94) on the two subjects. They are the "regimes of truth[(s)] (knowledge)" (Bacchi & Bonham, 2014, p. 182) on the (Western) Balkans and the West which frame their identity under a particular light, and which in turn are shaped by this identity.

Attention to discursive practices is, according to Jennifer Milliken (1999), also one of the three main theoretical commitments which discursive scholars should share. Milliken (1999, p. 229) refers to discourse productivity as the function of discourses in making "intelligible some ways of being in, and acting towards, the world, and of operationalizing a particular *'regime of truth'* while excluding other possible modes of *identity* and action". Through this function, discourses produce speech and act, specific knowledgeable practices, places and groups of people, audiences, and common sense. Milliken (1999, p. 236) explains how "foreign policy studies address discursive productivity by analysing how an elite's 'regime of truth' made possible certain courses of action by a state… while excluding other policies as unintelligible or unworkable or improper". As an example of scholars who adopt this approach of studying foreign policy studies that Milliken refers to, Hansen (2006, p. vi) reaffirms that "[f]oreign policies are legitimized as necessary, as in the national interest, or in the defense of human rights, through reference to identities, yet *identities* are simultaneously constituted and reproduced through formulations of *foreign policy*". Hence, "[i]dentities are thus articulated as the reason why policies should be enacted, but they are also (re)produced through these very policy discourses: they are simultaneously (discursive) foundation and product" argues Hansen (2006, p. 21).

Conceptualizing the Euro-Atlantic processes of the (Western) Balkans as discursive practices supports also the epistemological move of recognizing the identity of the (Western) Balkans as discursively constituted in turn by discourses like 'balkanization' which emphasize rather one of the many characteristics of the (Western) Balkan identity – fragmentation or disintegration, and which then is further diversified into other spatial and temporal characteristics reflected into specific layers of otherness of the (Western) Balkan 'other' on which basis certain Western policies are argued. The relevance of this lies in the goal of this study to, among others, challenge the naturalization, ahistoricity, and primordialism associated with 'balkanization' and the fragmented identity of the (Western) Balkans it conveys.

This then takes us to another key notion in this dissertation: identity. Drawing on Hansen (2006, p. 6), this thesis employs a notion of identity based on the poststructuralist conceptualization of "identity as discursive, political, relational, and social". Hansen (2006, pp. 38-41) calls for "an ontology of identity that is flexible as to the forms of identity that one might encounter in concrete foreign policies", and which maintains that, as Ole Wæver (1996, p. 115) had noted, "identities are never completely closed, never fully satiated, one is never simply that which one is". This is to say that there is nothing objective about who the (Western) Balkans or the West are and that there is no extra-discursive realm in which their Euro-Atlantic policies as a foreign policy reside in. Quite the contrary, the two open-endedly constitute each other.

This constitutive nature of the relationship between identity and foreign policy is also what fuels the causal-constitutive theory divide[12] between the 'scientific' causal and 'reflectivist' constitutive explanatory approaches in IR. From a post-structuralist perspective, to claim that identity articulations conveyed through 'balkanization' are causally related to the

[12] It is worth recalling here an alternative elaboration of causality given by Milja Kurki (2006, 2008) who considers this divide misleading. Kurki (2006, p. 191) argues for a reconceptualization of Humean empiricist causality, admitting that there is a prevalent legacy of Humean assumptions in IR theory which need to be challenged. As a holistic approach in which components of both causal and constitutive positions are included and further developed, Kurki (2006, 2008) considers that an Aristotelian conception of causation would extend the hitherto IR epistemological positions on causality into deeper and broader conceptualization, and this will, in turn, help overcome the existing causal vs. constitutive theory divide. However, to Kurki's (2006, p. 190) claim that "[r]ejecting a causal approach to the social world has been relatively easy for these ['constitutive'] theorists because they have uncritically accepted the positivist Humean understanding of causation as characteristic of causal analysis", Hansen (2006, p. 10) had responded that "it is [equally] problematic to move… to the vaguer everyday use as this would make the concept of causality so broad as to be virtually meaningless".

Euro-Atlantic processes of the (Western) Balkans means to operate from yet another discursively constituted space. That is, from a poststructuralist perspective causality itself presents a specific discourse with a logic of its own. Due to this, as Hansen (2006, p. 10) states, "for poststructuralists what constitutes 'proper knowledge' is not a theory's ability to uncover causal truths as knowledge is historically and politically situated". It is within the frames of this argument that the main research question in this thesis is answered from a perspective of a constitutive relationship between 'balkanization' and the Euro-Atlantic processes of the (Western) Balkans, while situating the same historically and politically.

Deriving from this then, on the basis of a diachronic theory of knowledge as always constructed and contextualized, as Hansen (2006, p. 25) states, for poststructuralism there is "no extra- or non-discursive realm of explanations from which one might construct competing explanations. There is no 'extra-discursive' materiality that sets itself forward independently of its discursive representation". Since there is no material reality 'out there' to be measured against other discursively constructed variables, "it is impossible to conceptualize the relationship between identity and foreign policy in terms of causal effects and that one cannot, as a consequence, formulate hypotheses about the (relative) explanatory power of discourse as opposed to material explanations" (Hansen, 2006, p. 17). Importantly, this is not to say that from a poststructuralist perspective materiality does not exist, but rather that the same cannot be viewed, examined, and predicted as isolated and insulated from a corresponding ideational aspect (see Laclau & Mouffe [1985] 2001, p. 108; Wendt, 1999, pp. 55-56).

The complexity of non-causal explanatory accounts, while on one side disposes of reductionism of quarantined and decontextualized phenomena, on the other it too risks being reduced to an approach of drawing quasi-causal links between representations of identities and policies. Hansen (2006, p. 31) considers poststructuralist and critical constructivist studies on the Bosnian war to have fallen under this 'trap' by ignoring the nature of constellations of identity and policy as "complex and open-ended". This multiplicity is to be seen only when identity formations in relation to policy practices surpass and diversify the simple dualism of 'self' and 'other', as "[t]he conceptualization of identity as discursive, political, relational, and social implies that foreign policy discourse always articulates a Self and a *series of Others*" (Hansen, 2006, p. 6). This is Hansen's innovative contribution in the study of discourse. Beyond Campbell's (1998) radical 'other', Hansen conceptualizes identity as considerate of

degrees of differences, radicalization, and *otherness*. This is also what this dissertation offers to do, though – and this more than a forewarning is an invitation to the reader – at the risk of the complexity and open-endedness that the analysis requests to be incorporated, acknowledged, and reflected in the writing. The following empirical chapters better illustrate this.

While I return to Hansen's gradations of otherness in the following subsection, this takes us back to Milliken's (1999) second shared theoretical commitment of discourse theory scholars in studying discourses as systems of signification which construct meanings. As structured systems of signification, discourses are used to understand and convey social realities and the material world. Due to this, the study of discourse is tightly connected with linguistics and semiotics. However, what Milliken introduces as an agreed upon or shared view of discourse scholars, they themselves challenge by emphasizing that there are essential distinguishing elements between Ferdinand de Saussure's binary oppositions and the later Derridian approach on signification of relationships, and which then also form the basis of a differentiation between a structuralist and poststructuralist conceptions of discourse and analysis. As Hansen (2006, p. 17) states, the poststructuralist view on language is that of a "social and political, an inherently unstable system of signs that generate meaning through a simultaneous construction of identity and difference". This is also what preconditions identities' juxtapositional oscillations between 'selves' and 'others' as a "[p]oststructuralism's relational conception of identity implies that identity is always given through reference to something it is not" (Hansen, 2006, p. 6). Connecting the two discourse theoretical commitments, we see how the productive nature of discourses is interconnected with the productive nature of language.

The discursive juxtaposition of the 'self' and 'other' emerges through a two-dimensional mechanism of *linking* through *similarities*, and *differentiation* through *contrasts*. Theorizing identity through a dual process of linking and differentiation, means acknowledging that "meaning and identity are constructed through a series of signs that are linked to each other to constitute relations of sameness as well as through a differentiation to another series of juxtaposed signs" (Hansen, 2006, p. 42). The juxtaposition of identity formation conditions the fluid nature of discourse, one shifting and altering between the two tendencies simultaneously through order and disorder. This reveals the play of practice and the

third theoretical commitment of the discursive community according to Milliken (1999, p. 230) to a conceptualization of discourses as "unstable grids, requiring work to 'articulate' and rearticulate' their knowledge and identities (to fix the 'regime of truth') and open-ended meshes, making discourses changeable and in fact historically contingent". Due to these playful tendencies of discourses, Milliken (1999, p. 234) says that "it would therefore be appropriate to examine how different Western discourses do and do not overlap". It is also along these lines that Hansen (2006) diversifies the Western discourse on the Bosnian war while differentiating between the American and European debate; and it is along the same lines that in this study, the Euro-Atlantic processes of the (Western) Balkans, though considered as connected, are also addressed as processes that quite often point out to points of divisions between the EU and NATO.

It must be said, however, that to frame both the EU and NATO as one Western subject is not only a decision which derived from how both actors have often approached the (Western) Balkans through a joint comprehensive framework particularly after the Thessaloniki summit of 2003. It also derived by noticing that throughout the empirical research material, various references were found in which the two actors have self-identified as bound by inseparable commitment to certain universal values – freedom, democracy, and rule of law among others (though again, these too change) – which have stimulated both to perpetually renew their partnership as a united subject. For this, as this thesis further argues, the portretization of the (Western) Balkans as 'fragmented' on the basis of which joint policies of the EU and NATO have evolved has been utilized. That the EU and NATO are sufficiently conjoined to be considered as one subject is further enforced by the fact that the two share the majority of members – the EU and NATO have 27 and 30 member states, respectively, of which 21 are members of both. Once again, however, this is not a reason for divergencies and points of contestation between the two to be ignored, and they are more explicitly illustrated through the discursive themes' tables in following chapters.

Positioning this dissertation along the logic of a fluctuating nature of discourses and their permanent impermanence, as well as the complex and interpretative character of key poststructuralist notions like identity and foreign policy and their constitutive relationship, does not equal to positioning it just along the lines of a vague and negligent method. The choice to refrain from a causal logic of inferences should in no way imply that a chaotic and

disorganized methodology of discourse analysis is tolerable[13]. This has quite often been an argument for outcasting discourse analysis from the 'serious' methods of research by considering it, as Milliken (1999, p. 227) states, "'dissident scholarship' and work that is 'foreign' to the rest of International Relations discipline". This is also why Hansen's method of discourse analysis grounded on poststructuralist conceptualization of identity and foreign policy as elaborated above, besides being compatible with the goal of contribution I intend to make to the study of the (Western) Balkans 'other' in relation to the Western 'self' in the context of the former's Euro-Atlantic processes, due to the clarity and rigor it vouches for and demonstrates is adopted as this dissertation's method of research. The subsections below further expand on its tools and lenses.

Degrees of otherness and analytical lenses

Above I referred to Hansen's conceptualization of 'self'/'other' identity constellations beyond a radical duality as her innovative contribution. Exposing *degrees of otherness* is central to Hansen's approach of examining identity and policy constellations. After making the case for "a theory of identity whose ontological flexibility facilitates the empirical study of different degrees of radicalization" (Hansen, 2006, p. 41), Hansen developed an analytical framework and methodology around it. These "less-than-radical construction of the Other… [are] carried out by a privileged Western subject, who is constructing not only the identity of the Other but also the concrete policies it should be undertaking to comply with this proscribed identity" (Hansen, 2006, p. 40). Before examining the diversity and complexity of different manifestations of otherness, Hansen (2006, p. 41-42) suggests, as a first analytical step, the identification of "those terms that indicate a clear construction of the Other" and only after this should the analysis proceed with the second step of locating the same within a wider web of sign through a consideration of both functions, linking and differentiation. That is, poststructuralist discourse analysis takes place first, at the level of explicit articulations of layers of identity.

Adapting this to the frames of this study, the first condition of explicit references to a (Western) Balkan 'other' as an 'other' conveyed through 'balkanization', is already implied in

[13] See Hansen (2006, p. xix) as she argue that "it's time for poststructuralism to take methodology back". See also Greckhamer and Cilesiz (2014) on empirical discourse analysis.

this study not being the first of its kind to examine the (Western) Balkans as an 'other' to the Western 'self' (see as pivotal Bakić-Hayden & Hayden, 1992, 1995; Todorova, [1997] 2009; Goldsworthy, 1998; Campbell, 1998; Hansen, 2006). Moreover, the genealogical examinations on the 'balkanization' discourse (see Chapter 3) which reveal clear construction of a fragmented (Western) Balkan 'other', further clarify the characteristics based on which the otherness of the (Western) Balkan subject is constructed. Genealogical dimensions of identity which then in conjunction with the policies that they support create *basic discourses* within 'balkanization', are further reflected into the contemporary dimensions of the identity of the (Western) Balkan 'other', their policies, and the contemporary basic discourses that are argued towards the (Western) Balkan subject. A reflection of the explicit level of articulation throughout all of these – both genealogical and contemporary basic discourses of 'balkanization' which mediate between the identity of the (Western) Balkans and the West and the Euro-Atlantic processes of the former – are the names of the basic discourse – Balkan Wars/WWI, WWII/Colonial, and Balkanism as genealogical; as well as the Yugoslav Crisis, Stabilization, and Europeanization as contemporary (see following chapters), their layers of identity, their spatial and temporal dimensions, as well as the policies that they stand for. This is to say that these basic discourses and their constitutive components are located at the level of speech/text i.e. they are named and appear in the chapters as they appear in the research material.

Before the third step of situating the 'self' and 'other' within a wider net of 'selves'/'others' – by reading through linking and differentiation – takes place, Hansen (2006) suggests for one to have in mind that discourses are always spatially, timely, and ethically situated. "Spatiality, temporality, and ethicality are analytical lenses that bring out the important political substance of identity construction, not explicitly articulated signs" (Hansen, 2006, p. 46). The third dimension, ethicality, is defined by Hansen (2006, p. 50) as a powerful discursive move through which an issue is taken "out of the realm of the strategic and 'selfishly national' and re-located within the 'higher grounds' of the morally good". In this dissertation, such an ethical component and its temporal and spatial parallel elements of 'balkanization' begins located in the first time that the West got really distressed by the (Western) Balkans during the Balkans Wars of 1912 and 1913. Though this would lead to an observationist ethicality under the Balkan Wars/WWI genealogical basic discourse, it is what prompted the

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (1914) to ask in its report: "What then is the duty of the civilised world in the Balkans?". Other basic discourses ague for other ethicalities as the following chapters illustrate.

The fourth step of the analysis is then the identification of *basic discourses*. Basic discourses are smaller units of the main discourse under analysis, which "point to the main points of contestation within a debate and facilitate a structured account of the relationship between discourses, their points of convergence and confrontations; how discourses develop over time in response to events, facts and criticism; and how discursive variations evolve" (Hansen, 2006, p. 52). Considering oppositional and points of acquiescence among and within discourses, means reading through linking and differentiation, and hence unearthing deeper levels or different layers of otherness. Due to this, basic discourses are key to the research design and analysis due to their two main functions: first, they are of content relevance in that they enable the diversification of the main discourse at stake, and they open the space for an analysis which stretches beyond a single version of the (Western) Balkan 'other'; and second, they are of form and structure relevance in that they allow for the analysis to take a comprehensive format if organized along units of basic discourses which emerge not merely as technical and arbitrary, but are also units full of content.

Stepping closer to applying these analytical lenses to the specific research material and data, Hansen (2006, p. 52) adds that, although it is text from which basic discourses surface, basic discourses "are not necessarily the most frequently argued discourses, especially if a lengthy debate is examined, nor are they necessarily the ones argued by governments or international institutions". Hansen (2006) presents six suggestions that can serve as theoretical and methodological guidelines for identifying basic discourses: first, basic discourses should be extracted from "a larger number of texts, preferably from a wide variety of sources, media, and genres" (p. 52); second, they should emerge around key representations of identity which might be "geographical identities, historical analogies, striking metaphors, or political concepts" (p. 53); third, key representations of identity should derive out of an in depth genealogical examination of the discourse and the different conceptual variations it has been assigned with throughout history; fourth, basic discourses should be built upon a consideration of the first two analytical steps i.e. degrees of otherness through space, time and ethicality; fifth, they can also be identified through recognizing different policies as they come across

through very different constructed 'selves' and 'others'; and sixth, it is to have in mind that "at least one basic discourse will be argued relatively quickly as an issue manifests itself on the foreign policy agenda, while the other basic discourse(s) will be argued in response to and in criticism of this position" (p. 54).

Despite these clarifications, there remain methodological aspects left to be clarified – or discovered – through the research process itself. Questions such as how many of these discourses are to be identified and out of how many textual entries are unanswered. Indeed, Hansen (2006, p. 52) claims that "[t]here is no fixed number of basic discourses that one should always identify within a debate, but it is useful to settle for a small number, usually two or three discourses". This implies that some degree of arbitrariness is always involved in the process of analysis. Some further guiding principles on the selection of the research material that I elaborate in the next section have been utilized for minimizing arbitrariness and focusing the analysis on what has hopefully remained to be most crucial material for answering the research question.

Figure 1. Analytical Conceptual Map



Note. The figure adapted from *Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War* (Hansen, 2006) visualizes key theoretical notions of the thesis and the relationship between them. The lingual functions of linking and differentiation shape 'self'/'other' identity dynamics. These dynamics are in a constitutive relationship with policies. The relationship is spatially, temporally, and ethically situated, and enabled by discourses.

Before stepping into the specificities of textual selection in the following subsection, for whom might find it useful and for my own clarity, both Hansen's key theoretical notions with the main methodological and analytical reading lenses are visually portrayed in Figure 1 above.

Intertextuality and research material

Intertextuality is as an essential literary device to discourse analysis. There is much to say about intertextuality and discourse analysis (see also see Fairclough, 1993; van Dijk, 1997; van Leeuwen, 2015; Wodak & Meyer, 2001 on CDA). Though delving into theoretical elaborations on intertextuality does not speak to the original contribution of this dissertation (that is an empirical rather than a theoretical or methodological one), intertextuality is a crucial epistemological mechanism. For Julia Kristeva (1980, p. 36) who coined the term, intertextuality is seen when "in the space of a given text, several utterances, taken from other texts, intersect and neutralize one another". In attempts of fusing de Saussure's work on semiotics with Bakhtin's dialogism, Kristeva (1980, p. 65) claims that

> [w]hat allows a dynamic dimension to structuralism is his [Bakhtin's] conception of the "literary word" as an intersection of textual surfaces rather than a point (a fixed meaning), as a dialogue among several writings: that of the writer, the addressee (or the character), and the contemporary or earlier cultural context…. Bakhtin situates the text within history and society, which are then seen as texts read by the writer, and into which he inserts himself by rewriting them.

For Kristeva (1980, p. 66), "any text is constructed as a mosaic of quotations; any text is the absorption and transformation of another".

An in-depth intertextual analysis would stretch across different texts, media, and genres, and it should analyze "first, how identity and policy are articulated within the original text; second, how the construction of identity and policy of the original text is represented in later re-readings; and third, how the original and its re-readings compare" (Hansen, 2006, p. 59). Hansen (2006) identifies three main models of intertextual analysis which are different in the scope and content of the texts included under scrutiny, starting from the least inclusive one and which "is directly based in official foreign policy discourse and centers on political leaders with official authority" (Hansen, 2006, p. 60) and focuses on articulations of identity only in official discourses; while the second intertextual research model goes a step further in considering a wider policy debate, including text and speech of oppositional actors. Under the

third intertextual research model, Hansen (2006) recognizes two other subdivisions: the first i.e. "3A" subdivision is one of connecting popular culture – including here "film, fiction, television, computer games, photography, and comic books" (p. 62) – with official policy discourses; while the second i.e. "3B" subdivision of the third intertextual research model is one inclusive of text of a marginal status "which is concerned with policy but has a marginal status" (p. 62). Within the frames of this study, the marginal positionality of text refers to local texts coming from the (Western) Balkans which have a marginal position due to 'balkanization' being, above all, the discourse of the (Western) Balkan 'other' – which implies also textual 'othering', and the Western 'self' – which implies textual Western self-centeredness. This asymmetry of power is also one of the reasons that this study conducts an analysis of a *discursive encounter* which includes the (Western) Balkan responsiveness to 'balkanization' as invented by the Western subject, and hence also de-marginalizes the discourse.

It should be stressed that materializing the goal of de-marginalizing 'balkanization' as a Western invented and dominated discourse on the (Western) Balkan 'other' proved to be a challenging task not only due to the substantive difficulties in fulfilling all the theoretical and methodological aspirations set in this chapter which demand a rich textual analysis, but also due to some difficulties of formal nature set by the University's guidelines. On the first difficulty, leaving aside the methodological expectation that poststructuralist discourse analysis be grounded in a variety of text and a wealthy pool of research material, obtaining material from local sources was a daunting task. This because online repositories of text in the (Western) Balkans are nearly inexistent [at least in (North) Macedonia and Serbia], and websites have proven to be generally unstructured making it difficult for one to obtain data through filtering tools. This is different from Western repositories being those of institutional texts like EUR-Lex, or Western press like LexisNexis or NewsBank. (North) Macedonia, for example, faces enormous difficulties in digitalizing even later and let alone earlier data. The most unfortunate proof of this is the disappearance of archives that were collected over decades by certain outlets which then collapsed (see Trpkovski, 2020; see also Marusic, 2018a). As an almost ironical proof of the Western nature of 'balkanization', it was insightful – to put it mildly – that the Library of Congress had microfilms of Macedonian newspapers that I could obtain from distance which archives in (North) Macedonia did not have.

On the second difficulty, de-marginalizing the discourse was further impeded by DCU regulations on PhD dissertations (see https://www.dcu.ie/sites/default/files/2021-02/dcu-postgraduate-academic-regulations_20_21_final_approved-by-academic-council-june-2020.pdf) which compel PhD candidates to abide by the 90,000 wordcount as including of references. Fitzgerald (2014, p. 3) already raises a similar issue by claiming that this instruction "actively punishes works which are derived from broad readings of multiple sources". With regards to this thesis, however, this rule rather actively punishes attempts of de-westernizing Western knowledge on its othered subjects because the translation of titles of sources in local languages which the guidelines request and the Western audience expects are also included in the wordcount. This, I believe, should be noted and changed in the future by allowing for more flexible guidelines especially for thesis which challenge historical hegemonic discourses and include the marginalized in narrating their own stories.

Going back to Hansen's model of analysis, the notion of *genre* is of an utmost importance as it raises questions of different modalities of authority. A genre is about the different degrees and ways that different actors claim authority and control over knowledge, which then results with different degrees and ways of proprietorship to power. While Hansen (2006, p. 65) points out that there is no agreement as to what a genre means, they recognize the genre of "policy documents, journalism, academic writing, and literary non-fiction. These distinctions, although rough, point to crucial differences in how texts establish not only identities and foreign policies, but also how they construct authority and employ forms of knowledge". With the inclusion of different genres of texts then, the importance of building an analysis of discourse on a diverse and extensive set of texts becomes even more necessary. For methodological expectations to be successfully met, intertextual analysis must take place within and across genres of different strand of literature. However, in such circumstances, text selection risks on becoming an infinite endeavor. It is clear that one should read as much as possible, but how much can one read?

Hansen gives a few suggestions on this. She provides with two intersectional text categories which formulate a textual selection matrix: first, that of distinguishing between historical material and contemporary or from the time under study texts – while the second is where most text should be taken from; and second, that of differentiating key texts which she defines as "those which are frequently quoted and function as nodes within the intertextual

web of debate" (Hansen, 2006, p. 82) from general material which remains broad in its definition. Hansen (2006) stresses out that priority is to be given to primary texts like presidential statements, speeches, and interviews in the case of official foreign policy; parliamentary debates in the case of the political debate; and reportage and editorials in the study of the wider media discourse. With secondary sources Hansen refers to conceptual histories or critical genealogies which contest and desubstantialize any 'objective' or innate meanings conveyed through discourses. An example of this would be Todorova's ([1997] 2009) *Imagining the Balkans* which appears in the role of both – historical general text due to the genealogical elaborations it provides with, and a key text due to being an intertextual node. Hansen (2006, p. 84) considers these general historical discourses important for "defining the basic discourses within the primary study as well as for contesting the construction of history within contemporary debates".

Without going into details on genealogy here, it is worth stressing the importance of conceptual histories as fitting the genealogical nature of this dissertation and the goal of destabilizing 'balkanization'. According to Hansen (2006, p. 53), conceptual histories are important not only "to create a comparison with past discourses, but also, in Foucault's terms, to conduct a genealogical reading which traces the constitution of the present concept back in history to understand when and how it was formed as well as how it succeeded in marginalizing other representations". Hansen (2006, p. 79) also claims that "[h]istorical studies have a further genealogical and critical potential in that they trace how previously important representations have been silenced and written out of the discourse of the present". From the perspective of aiming to destabilize 'balkanization' through enabling a textual discursive encounter of 'self'/'other' constellations between the (Western) Balkans and the West, genealogical titles are highly important for this dissertation.

Finally, the research material is further reduced through focusing on two (Western) Balkan countries – (North) Macedonia and Serbia. Two are the main reasons behind the rationale for this selection. The first refers to their different reactions to the dissolution of SFRY – the most archetypical contemporary event of the (Western) Balkan 'other' fragmenting – and which make for an interesting component to explore in relation to different nuances of the (Western) Balkan 'other' that they might have added. While (North) Macedonia was referred to as the 'oasis of peace' being the only republic to leave SFRY peacefully, Serbia

struggled to accept the exodus of the other republics. The two countries are portrayed as very different if not opposing examples of 'balkanization', yet both parts of the (Western) Balkan 'other'. The second reason has to do with the two countries representing hotbeds of key regional frictions between countries and ethnic groups in the post-Yugoslav space. These key events have been at the forefront of the post-1990s portrayal of the (Western) Balkans as a whole and what has also determined some of the most important decisions of the EU and NATO on the (Western) Balkans. As such, they represent an inclusive combo of intraregional dynamics, and useful filters for selecting research material.

Here, two other notes of clarification are in place: first, the choice and the structuring of research material on a country-by-country basis is a helpful analytical tool for configuring the process of analysis, but it is also of content relevance. The reasons for this choice are to be found in the simultaneously coexisting homogenous and heterogenous nature of the (Western) Balkans. Although the (Western) Balkans as a neologism conveys a single 'other' as a subject striving for successful Euro-Atlantic processes, the approaches of EU and NATO towards the (Western) Balkans remain nevertheless ones of assessing these countries both regionally and individually on their Euro-Atlantic performances. Second, to treat the (Western) Balkan countries separately as a criterion for the selection of the research material does not equate treating them just as separate in the process of analysis. This, as the key events illustrate, is practically impossible due to the highly interlocked history of the (Western) Balkans which has led to them being seen as a single subject and one among West's other 'others'. Table 2 on (North) Macedonia and Table 3 on Serbia below reveal Hansen's *textual* selection matrix as adapted to the frames of this study in the context of the two countries. Rather than text, I refer to the material selected through these matrices as research *material* as a more generic term to include material other than text – in the literal meaning of it – like documentaries. Though the tables are meant to succinctly visualize the research material without having to go into details behind specific type of texts or individual key titles, it should be noted that the matrices are simplified summaries of the material analyzed and that much is left outside of these. They are merely meant to give an idea of the logic behind the selection of research material by pointing out mostly the types of text included. Key titles presented in the matrices are selected one from each key event (see for more on key events below) and one of their historical counterparts, though the intertextual nodes between these which are left out of the tables are many.

Table 2. Research Material Matrix for (North) Macedonia

Material	**Temporal Location**	
	Time under Study	**Historical**
General	• Newspaper articles extracted through LexisNexis, *AIM*, *Dnevnik*, *Flaka e Vëllazërimit*, *Makedonija Denes*, *Nova Makedonija*, *Vest*, and others • Speeches, transcripts, opinions, news and official texts from the European Commission, European Parliament, European Council, European Union External Action Service (EEAS), NATO, UN, U.S. Congress and others • Speeches, transcripts, opinions, news, stenographic notes and official texts from the Macedonian Government, Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of European Integration, and National Assembly • Individual speeches and addresses of key figures such as Kiro Gligorov, George H. W. Bush, Ali Ahmeti, Bill Clinton, and others	Historical retrospective titles such as: • *Makedonski Sovremeni Politički Temi: Iskažuvanja, Obrakanja i Reagiranja, Pisma*[14] by Stavrev (1995) • *Makedonija e se što imame* by Gligorov (2000) • *Persiatje politike* by Maliqi (2011) • *Peacemakers: American Leadership and the End of Genocide in the Balkans* by Pardew (2017) and others
Key texts	• "Deklaracijata za Suverenost na Socijalistička Republika Makedonija" (Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia, 1991a) • "Declaration on Yugoslavia and on the 'Guidelines on the recognition of new States in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union'" (UN Security Council, 1991d) • "Framework Agreement" (2001) of Ohrid [also known as the "Ohrid Framework Agreement" (OFA)] • Council of the European Union (2003a) decision on "Concordia" • Council of the European Union (2009) regulation EC No 539/21 on visa liberalization • "Prespa Agreement" (Final agreement for the settlement of the differences and the establishment of a strategic partnership, Mac.-Greec., 2018)	• "Kruševo Manifesto of the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (IMRO) (1903) • "The Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia" (1991) • "Final Communiqué" (NATO, 1996) on the "Berlin Arrangements" • Council of the European Union (2001) regulation amending Regulation EC No 539/21 • "Greece and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia Interim Accord (with related letters and translations of the interim accord in the languages of the contracting parties)" (1995) and others

Note. Visualization adapted from *Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War* (Hansen, 2006).

There is also much to be said about the access and selection of the research material. A point of clarification when it comes to (North) Macedonia – besides the lack of online

[14] All translations from original texts in Albanian, Bosnian, Croatian, Macedonian, and Serbian are my own.

repositories of text mentioned above – should be made with regards to the conceptual power of intertextuality which made it possible for material that was not available in original sources to be extracted from conceptual histories and other types of texts. Vladimir Jovanovski's (2009) book, for example, which refers to many articles from newspapers and outlets such as *Večer, Nova Makedonija, Puls, Republika, Borba*, and even *Tanjug*; or Sevdail Demiri's (2015) book on the history of the Albanian press in (North) Macedonia, though not included in Table 2 as many other titles, have played a crucial role in compensating for text which was inaccessible.

It should be said that the different categories of text are meant to guide the selection of the research material rather than to prescriptively establish it. For example, by looking at Regulation No 539/2001 (Council of the European Union, 2001) listing the third countries whose nationals must be in possession of visas when crossing the external borders of the Schengen area and those whose nationals are exempt from that requirement, one notices how certain key contemporary titles become genealogical when one switches analyzing from one to another key event – of course, given that one is analyzing multiple key events. To give other examples, "The Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia" (1991) presents a key contemporary title for as long as the analysis is situated within the 1991 independence of (North) Macedonia as a key event. However, the title becomes genealogical text when the analysis is resituated within the 2001 conflict in (North) Macedonia. The text remains still key as the Ohrid Framework Agreement (2001) (hereafter referred to as OFA) makes amendments specifically to the Constitution. However, the Constitution remains no longer a key contemporary text. Similarly, Resolution 1244 (UN Security Council, 1999b) is a contemporary text of the Kosovo war in 1999, but it converts into a genealogical one once the analysis is resituated within the hereafter referred to as "Brussels Agreement" (see First Agreement of Principles Governing the Normalization of Relations, 2013) between Serbia and Kosovo.

Table 3. Research Material Matrix for Serbia

Material	**Temporal location**

	Time under study	Historical
General	• Newspaper articles extracted through LexisNexis, *AIM*, *Vreme*, *Prishtina Kosovo Daily*, *Koha Ditore* and others • Speeches, transcripts, opinions, news and official texts from ICTY, The White House, European Commission, European Parliament, European Council, EEAS, NATO, UN and others • Speeches, transcripts, opinions, news, stenographic notes and official texts from the Government of Serbia, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of European Integration, and National Assembly. • Studies, articles and publications of the Institute for Balkan Studies of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, and the Serbian Institute for Contemporary History • Individual speeches and addresses of key figures such as Slobodan Milošević, Radovan Karadžić, Alija Izetbegović, Bill Clinton and others	Historical retrospective titles such as: • *Godine Raspleta* by Milošević (1989a) • "The Death of Yugoslavia" documentary by Mitchell (1995) • *To End a War* by Holbrooke (1999) • "The fall of Milosevic" documentary (Richards, 2001) • *Balkan Babel: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia from the Death of Tito to the Fall of Milosevic* by Sabrina Ramet (2002) • Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milošević (2005) and others
Key texts	• "Dayton Agreement" (General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1995) • Resolution 1244 (UN Security Council, 1999b) • "The EU and NATO Concerted Approach for the Western Balkans" (NATO, 2003f) • "Constitution of the Republic of Serbia" (Ustav Republike Srbije, 2006) • "Brussels Agreement" (First Agreement of Principles Governing the Normalization of Relations, 2013)	• Resolution 816 (UN Security Council, 1993a) • "Gazimestan speech" by Milošević (1989b) • "EU-Western Balkans Summit" declaration in Thessaloniki (European Commission, 2003e) • "Constitutional Charter of the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro" (2003) • "Accordance with international law of the unilateral declaration of independence in respect of Kosovo" by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) (2010) and others

Note. Visualization adapted from *Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War* (Hansen, 2006).

Another note should be made with regards to the difficulties encountered with online research material from earlier key events such as the BiH war in 1995 or the Kosovo war in 1999 which was either not existing or was removed and made inaccessible for various reasons. While on one hand this was a hindrance to the process of the analysis, on the other it presented with a methodological opportunity of stepping into an interesting web-archiving analysis of older versions of current websites captured in their earliest format through the WayBack Machine of the Internet Archives (http://web.archive.org/). For researchers that adopt a

genealogical approach, web-archiving is a tool of significant value which demands further theoretical and methodological conceptualization. Though not explored fully within the confines of this study, for some titles seen in Table 2 and 3, web-archiving has been a most helpful device, as have the matrices been for the selection of the research material. Other questions with regards to the research design elaborated in the section below have further helped in condensing the research material and in guiding the analysis in general.

Questions and research design

An intertextual analysis through the above-mentioned analytical lenses supports a well-structured and cohesive research design. The general postulate is that the broader the scope of intertextual analysis, the more reliable is the analysis. Choices of intertextual models and with that also research material, condition choices of 'self' or 'selves' for research; timespan of study which can focus on a specific moment or longer periods of time; and number of events. Each of these dimensions, including that of an intertextual model, are visualized in Figure 2 below.

Further, aiming to challenge the Western dominated nature of 'balkanization' by seeing how the discourse is articulated internally in the (Western) Balkans, it is of just as much interest to examine how policies are in fact constructing the (Western) Balkan perception of 'self' by looking at how the (Western) Balkans respond to the Western construction of them as an 'other'. This would then mean that the study belongs to, what Hansen (2006, p. 76) calls, a "*discursive encounter*" model. Hansen (2006, p. 76) claims that most studies do not address "how the Other constructs itself as well as the opposing 'West.' Studying the discourses of both Self and Other – which then becomes multiple Selves when viewed from the inside of the Other – is significant in that it provides knowledge of the discursive and political room of maneuver of foreign policy issues". This study aims at examining not only the Western discourse *on* the (Western) Balkans, but also that *of* the (Western) Balkans. This is best reflected in the tables of discursive themes in the following chapters. It should be said, however, that insights drawn from this encounter further reveal that the (Western) Balkan political elites in the country mirror and instrumentalize the Western discourse on the (Western) Balkan 'other' for political interests while utilizing the Euro-Atlantic processes of

the region as a tool in maintaining dynamics of a fragmented (Western) Balkan 'other' and a united Western 'self'.

Figure 2. Research Design of this Dissertation



Note. The figure adapted from *Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War* (Hansen, 2006) visualizes the research design of this thesis. Number of selves examined are multiple and engaged in a discursive encounter. The temporal perspective includes the historical development of the discourse from its genealogical to contemporary manifestations. Events considered are multiple stretching from (North) Macedonia's independence in 1991 to its change of name in 2018. These events are connected by the Euro-Atlantic processes of the (Western) Balkans as an issue. Textually the thesis incorporates marginal discourses by including oppositional political and media debate, and texts from the (Western) Balkans.

A few clarifications are in place here with regards to the discursive themes which appear throughout all empirical chapters. According to Hansen (2006, p. 51), "[f]oreign policy debates are constituted through individual texts, but these texts converge around common *theme*s". Discursive themes belong to either one of the three basic contemporary discourses – Yugoslav Crisis, Stabilization, and/or Europeanization – and which in turn are what constitutes 'balkanization' as an overarching discourse of the (Western) Balkan 'other' and the Western 'self'. Even when argued by local actors, the discursive themes are meant to illustrate how far aligned or misaligned are the (Western) Balkans with the Western view on the (Western) Balkan 'other' within the context of specific key events. The inclusion of the themes argued by local actors is not meant to necessarily juxtapose their position as a (Western) Balkan 'self' from how the West sees them, but to see if, how, and when they come closer or further away

from the Western construction of the (Western) Balkan 'other'. In other words, they illustrate how the (Western) Balkans operate *within* and not outside of 'balkanization'. As such and beyond their narrating function, discursive themes are "key analytical tool[s] of basic discourses" (Hansen, 2006, p. 145) that not only diversify basic discourses into smaller thematical units and policies argued by specific actors, but also illustrate how the (Western) Balkans respond to and constitute together with Western actors their role as the West's fragmented 'other'.

Further, discursive themes are important for identifying *discursive blank spots* which "appear as a discourse is seeking to reconcile its articulation of multiple identities, or as it tries to account for events and policy formulations within a particular construction of identity" (Hansen, 2006, p. 145). It is the responsibility of the discourse analyst to see these discursive blank spots. They are best identified through spotting incompatibilities between the main basic discourse argued and the version of identity of the 'other' which a theme tries to convey. To cover for blank spots and draw attention to essentialized and reductionist versions of identity, actors invoke genealogical references to the identity of the 'other' from the past. From a research perspective, however, these genealogical references only further expose discursive blank spots for they make apparent incongruencies between the identity of the 'other' that those genealogical references construct and the 'other' of the discursive theme applied with regards to a specific key event. Blank spots stand for incongruencies and inconsistencies in the logic of basic discourses which, though flexible and open-ended, strive to transmit essentialized versions of the (Western) Balkan 'other'. Identifying discursive blank spots, therefore, resides at the heart of destabilizing what might otherwise seem like natural and consistent identities that basic discourses strive to present as stable and true. Discursive blank spots expose constructions of identities as making possible certain courses of actions and giving life to certain policies, and in this they also hold accountable actors to which these constructions are beneficial. As Hansen (2006, p. 212) says, "[a]s constraining as discursive structures might be, they do, however, dependent on human agency for their reproduction and humans (particularly those in political, media, and academic power), hold therefore a responsibility for their discursive choices".

Going back to the important questions asked when formulating the research design, a key component is the diapason of *time* that the study examines. Hansen (2006, p. 79) says that

"[t]here are no fixed rules as to the number of moments that should be chosen in a comparative-moments study, but one should ensure that moments are not so far apart in time". Having undertaken a historical genealogical approach, the study begins with a consideration of the earliest known mentioning of the word "balkanization" (2013) which the OED locates in 1914 by E. H. Bradford (1914, p. 5) and which coincides with the first report of Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (1914) on the Balkan Wars of 1912 and 1913, up to the hereafter referred to as "Prespa Agreement" (see Final agreement for the settlement of the differences and the establishment of a strategic partnership, Mac.-Greec., 2018) between (North) Macedonia and Greece. It should be noted, however, that the main period under study – that is, contemporary – begins with (North) Macedonia's independence in 1991.

This timespan might read as too ambitious, were it not for the choice of *events* that reduce the research material into a feasible set of texts. While the first part of analysis is conducted through a genealogical examination of material which is structured along the Balkan Wars, WWI, and WII as events, most contemporary analysis is centered around specific events "characterized by heightened political, military, and media activity" (Hansen, 2006, p. 79) within a Macedonian and Serbian context. (North) Macedonia is analyzed through events like the independence in 1991 – as part of the Yugoslav Crisis contemporary basic discourse; armed conflict of 2001 – as part of the Stabilization discourse; Thessaloniki Summit in 2003 – where the switch between Stabilization and Europeanization takes place; and visa liberalization in 2009, and the "Prespa Agreement" in 2018 – as part of the Europeanization basic discourse; while Serbia is analyzed through the BiH war in 1995, and the Kosovo war in 1999 – as part of Yugoslav Crisis; the fall of Milošević from power in 2000 – when Stabilization really kicks in, Thessaloniki Summit in 2003 – again, as the switch between the Stabilization and Europeanization; Montenegro's independence in 2006, and the "Brussels Agreement" in 2013 – as part of Europeanization (see Figure 3 below).

It should be noted that the two cases are connected more specifically through one key event which is the Thessaloniki Summit of 2003. Further, as Hansen (2006, p. 79) says, "[o]ne should note also that events will often be studied through analysis of 'events within events'". As such, the year of 2003 is important due to other events that take place more specifically within the two countries like the assassination of Serbia's Prime Minister, Zoran Đinđić, in

2003; and the operation EUFOR "Concordia" in (North) Macedonia in 2003 as the first ever military operation of the EU.

Figure 3. Key Events in (North) Macedonia and Serbia and Contemporary Basic Discourses



Note. The figure visualizes key events – the 1991 independence of (North) Macedonia, the 1995 BiH war, the 1999 Kosovo war, the fall of Milošević in 2000, the 2003 Thessaloniki Summit, death of Đinđić, and operation "Concordia", the 2006 independence of Montenegro, the visa liberalization in 2009, the 2013 "Brussels Agreement", and the 2018 "Prespa Agreement" analyzed in this thesis as part of three basic discourse – Yugoslav Crisis, Stabilization, and Europeanization – with a focus on the two (Western) Balkan countries – (North) Macedonia and Serbia.

It should also be said that despite the guidance that methodological notions and principles have provided with during the process of the collection of the research material and its analysis, some degrees of arbitrariness, as mentioned above, has remained part of the research design. Specific methodological decisions are also contextual, and it would be difficult and perhaps needles to theorize them. Filtering devices like keywords and the further specificity of locating the same within, for example, headlines when platforms allow it, has been yet another advantageous tool worth mentioning without which the, perhaps, infinite research material existing out there would have been dreadful to collect and analyze.

Conclusions

Examining 'balkanization' in relation to the Euro-Atlantic processes of the (Western) Balkans is a demanding endeavor due to, among others, the deeply rooted links of the constellations of identity of the fragmented (Western) Balkans 'other' and the Western 'self' being old. Recognizing this as essential to be included in the analysis is a poststructuralist move in itself due to the genealogical requirement it poses. However, recognizing phenomena as deeply perplex processes that in a way never start from now and are rather manifestations of longer developments of the power/knowledge nexus invisible to the bear eye, does not mean that only an all-inclusive study can count as reliable. Choices need to be made, and in this chapter, I presented and elaborated on the grounding logic of a research approach, theory, and methodological and analytical principles inclusive of choices of text and research material. As Hansen (2006, 73) states, "[a]t the heart of foreign policy research should be an engagement with politically pertinent issues, but 'reality' is always larger than the number of questions one can ask of it". The 'reality' of the Euro-Atlantic processes of the (Western) Balkans and their constitutive relationship with the (Western) Balkan 'other' and the Western 'self' will always be larger than what the main research question can ever offer as an answer.

The choice of the period under study, cases, and events might seem most reductionist to some, and too ambitious to others. Within the confines of this four and a half years-project, these choices are guided first and foremost by questions of how doable it would be to abide by those within the timeframe of the project, and within the formal constraints of the thesis. To concerns with regards to, perhaps, the needlessness of such research ambitions which could have been much modest but produce the same insights, I should say that insights are not what guided methodological choices – insights are what succeeded them. Would I, for example, have analyzed only one key event for each of the two countries to elaborate on Europeanization as a contemporary basic discourse? Perhaps. However, what Europeanization stood for, its characteristics, the time span, and key events it was grounded in is what became visible after and not prior to the analysis of the key events. This goes for all basic discourses that the following chapters elaborate on.

Chapter 2
'Balkanization': Genealogy of the Discourse

The purpose of this chapter is the diversification, denaturalization, and destabilization of the 'balkanization' discourse through a genealogical analysis. Having elaborated on the theoretical and methodological value of basic discourses as analytical categories (see Chapter 1), here I explore genealogical discourses of 'balkanization' which unify around common radical ideas of 'self'/'other', similar temporal and spatial dimensions, as well as patterned links between identity and policy. I then present three such genealogical basic discourses: *Balkan Wars/WWI*, *WWII/Colonial*, and *Balkanism* (see Table 4). It is important to reiterate that they are extracted from journalistic and academic texts, and they are units of analytical relevance. They assist in conceptually structuring different interpretations of 'balkanization' by drawing on the breaking points and similarities between them. However, they are more than a conceptual review of texts and literature as their value resides in later locating such genealogical identity and foreign policy patterned dynamics into the three main contemporary basic discourse – the Yugoslav Crisis, Stabilization, and Europeanization – explored in the following chapters. That is, their substantive serves when illustrating how contemporary foreign policies such as the Euro-Atlantic processes towards the (Western) Balkan 'other' are built upon and further perpetuate older articulations of the identity of the (Western) Balkans as 'balkanized'.

Table 4. Genealogical Basic Discourses of 'Balkanization'

Basic Discourse	**Identity**		
	Layer of Otherness	**Temporality and Spatiality**	**Ethicality**
Balkan Wars/WWI	The Balkans	Backward and away	Observation
WWII/Colonial	Yugoslav/Colonial	Hopeful and at the doorstep	Intervention
Balkanism	Liminal	Western construct	Deconstruction and integration

The temporal situatedness of the genealogical discourses follows a chronological criterion in that the Balkan Wars/WWI discourse is located around events of the Balkan Wars and WWI; on the other hand, WWII/Colonial discourse took a swift in the aftermath of WWII; while the critical readings of 'balkanization' captured under Balkanism became apparent at the beginning of the twenty-first century. The spatiality of the discourses also varies as *the Balkan* subject of the Balkan Wars/WWI discourse holds contextual links to the Balkan Peninsula, and it is used to describe occurrences located in the geography of the (Western) Balkans; whereas

the WWII/Colonial discourse presents a *Yugoslav/Colonial* subject which is in the process of approaching the West and gaining global dimensions. Thirdly, Balkanism scrutinizes and deconstructs both, but in doing so it produces knowledge on the (Western) Balkans as a *liminal* subject constructed by the West. Ethically, revealing conceptual links to the Yugoslav Crisis discourse, the Balkan subject of Balkan Wars/WWI discourse is located away from the Western 'self', and it is meant to be contained, controlled, and enclosed in the Peninsula while the West *observes*. The WWII/Colonial discourse transmits a Yugoslav/Colonial subject who is of dimensions unseen before, and it grows not only geographically but also conceptually by entering the vocabulary of a diverse set of disciplines and fields of thought. With this the Yugoslav/Colonial 'other' reaches closer to the West, like in the Stabilization discourse, and it therefore makes *intervention* inevitable. As a critical endeavor, Balkanism questions the two other basic discourses. Through a genealogical examination, scholars deconstruct radical conceptualizations of the (Western) Balkans and West as inherently different from each other – much akin to this chapter. However, they inevitably construct radically different conceptualizations of the identity dynamics between the (Western) Balkans and the West in which the two are, in fact, not that different and separate after all. This, I argue, reveals an ethical dimension of *integration* which is similar to the contemporary basic discourse of Europeanization.

It is also important to note that, methodologically, all basic discourses – genealogical and contemporary – are at the level of "explicit articulations" (Hansen, 2006, p. 53). Basic discourses should be named as they explicitly appear in text. However, while the contemporary basic discourses – the Yugoslav Crisis, Stabilization, and Europeanization – abide better by this principle, the three genealogical discourses are named as per the historical periods they are born in and which they predominantly describe. An exception to this is Balkanism which appears in the 1990s, but which in addition to the period it is born in, also deconstructs historical connotations of 'balkanization' dating from before its own appearance. I believe this naming adds clarity to the analysis, especially as matters further complexify when links are drawn between genealogical basic discourses and contemporary ones in the following chapters (see Chapters 3 – 6).

Balkan Wars/WWI: Watch and Learn

The Balkan Wars/WWI genealogical basic discourse of 'balkanization' – as the name suggests – gained its more specific manifestations in reference to the events of the Balkan Wars (1912-1913) and WWI (1914-1918). The (Western) Balkan 'other' – appearing as the Balkans – was portrayed as constrained within the Balkan Peninsula and a specimen that the West can learn from by watching it and observing from a safe distance. The fear for a similar dynamic spilling over to the rest of Europe existed as the very coining of the word was meant to explain events taking place in the West echoing events that had previously happened in the (Western) Balkans. However, within the Balkan Wars/WWI discourse the fence between the West and the (Western) Balkans was kept high. The (Western) Balkan subject of Balkan Wars/WWI was an 'other' placed at a significant distance from the West and secluded, it is primitive and barbarous, incapable of change. As such, the (Western) Balkan subject is not worthy of intervention, and therefore, the West observes as it crumbles into ruins.

This is vivid already in the first known written appearance of 'balkanization' in 1914 by E. H. Bradford's statement (1914, p. 5) at the College of Surgeons Fellowship:

> It can be said that the occasion is ripe for the higher development of surgery in America. How long the present Balkanization of Europe is to continue, and how much chaos is to result, no one can tell, but it is certain that the Mexicanization of North America will stop at the Rio Grande.

Bradford used the word only once, and while he provided with no context on his choice of word, the address suggests that the author was worried about the United States being engulfed by war and terror which had already sparked in the (Western) Balkans. This refers not just to the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria by the Bosnian Serb, Gavrilo Princip, in Sarajevo on June 28, 1914 – which had led to the outbreak of WWI –, but also to the wars that the (Western) Balkans had fought against the Ottoman Empire and internally during the Balkan Wars. Further, "[i]t is worth of notice" had added Bradford (1914, p. 6), "that at the present time when we are in the confusion and welter of war and in the upheaval of traditions, when the foundations of our civilization seem to be shaken… that the one profession whose value is unquestioned is that of the surgeon". That the first traceable written appearance of 'balkanization' is decontextualized from the (Western) Balkans not just geographically but also in the context of a branch of medical practice seems just as much

surprising as not. As the next section below better illustrates, to date 'balkanization' is predominantly recontextualized in a variety of geographic spaces and fields of thought which have no end. Noteworthy is that though in such context, as in the quote of Bradford, direct references might not be made to the (Western) Balkan subject, 'balkanization', which bears pejorative nuances, reflects the same inevitably unto the (Western) Balkan subject whose name is involved into the word by default.

Following E. H. Bradford, 'balkanization' appeared earliest in a *New York Times* article of December 20, 1918. The article was on Walther Rathenau, and the interview which took place in Berlin referred to Rathenau as "the head of the German General Electrical Company, one of the largest employers of labor in Germany" (Greenwall, 1918). It documents one of the earliest political takes on 'balkanization':

> Black ruin will face us, and there will be a great tide of emigration probably to South America and the Far East and certainly to Russia. It will be most dreadful, and the result will be the Balkanization of Europe. The disappearance of Germany from a position of importance will be the most dangerous fact in history. Sooner or later the Eastern powers will press on the Western civilization. (Greenwall, 1918)

Rathenau complaint about a post-WWI Germany which "is ruined for generations to come… politically, industrially, and economically" (Greenwall, 1918) adding that "there is a danger of losing parts of our country". Once again, 'balkanization' presents a threat to the Western civilization, however, direct references to the (Western) Balkan subject – though self-evident – are missing in the article.

This illustrates how, though references are made to the (Western) Balkan 'other' as fragmented and a threat to the Western civilization, the main preoccupation which guided the creation of the word – and the discourse it stands for – is what was going on with the Western 'self' and not the (Western) Balkan 'other'. When 'balkanization' as a term was coined, the West needed facing its own reality including WWI and the disintegration of the Austro-Hungarian and Russian empires. As Todorova ([1997] 2009, p. 32) states, "when the term was coined, at the end of World War I, only one Balkan nation, Albania, was added to the already existing Balkan map; all others had been nineteenth century formations". The (Western) Balkans who had lived through a similar fate became a relatable subject. Having previously suffered a comparable scenario to that of the fragmentation of the Ottoman, Austro-Hungarian, and Russian empires, the (Western) Balkans served as a valuable comparison and hence an

alternate reality for the now disintegrating West to process itself as one which, if no longer to be blamed for the situation, then at least not the only one experiencing it. The following chapters demonstrate how not only would 'balkanization' come to serve the same purpose to date – that is, assisting the West with coping with its own internal fragmentations – but that it will be utilized for the unity of the Western 'self' through the Euro-Atlantic processes of the (Western) Balkans as policies which are born and built on the articulations of its identity as 'balkanized'. At this stage, 'balkanization' was presented as a threat to the Western 'self' while the (Western) Balkans as a subject appeared as absent in the discourse, because the Balkan Wars/WWI genealogical basic discourse of 'balkanization' relies on a clear distinction and distance between the (Western) Balkan 'other' and the Western 'self' which warns the latter of something that the former was to blame for and which had taken place somewhere away from the West – in the Balkan Peninsula.

Such warnings of an upcoming threat, as seen by the quotes above, presented a twofold connotation: they set the alarm on possible territorial fragmentations in the West, and they also spoke of threats that could ruin the whole Western civilization. Therefore, as Todorova ([1997] 2009, p. 3) claims, "[b]alkanization not only had come to denote the parcelization of large and viable political units, but had also become a synonym for a reversion to the tribal, the backward, the primitive, the barbarian". Another illustrative example of this is provided by Paul Scott Mowrer (1921), a *Chicago Daily News* correspondent who had previously reported on both, the First Balkan War and WWI. He referred to 'balkanization' as "[t]he creation, in a region of hopelessly mixed races, of a medley of small states with more or less backward populations, economically and financially weak, covetous, intriguing, afraid, a continual prey to the machinations of the great powers, and to the violent promptings of their own passions" (Mowrer, 1921, p. 25). Mowrer (1921, p. 8) makes a distinction between "eastern and southeastern Europe" or "Central and Southern Europe" on one hand, and "Western Europe and America" on the other, as he claims that "[i]t is to be feared that in Western Europe and America, ideas popularly prevail, of the peoples of Central and Southern Europe" and that "these tendencies [of national and racial unrest], in their constructive phases, are really less developed in the culturally backward nations of 'Balkanized Europe' than in the advanced civilizations of the West" (p. 75). Mowrer, but also Rathenau and Bradford from above, spoke of the 'balkanization' of the Western 'self' which is visible also in Mowrer's (1921) book title

– *Balkanized Europe: A study in political analysis and reconstruction*. This, however, is not juxtapositional to how the (Western) Balkan 'other' continues to be encapsulated away in the Balkan Peninsula. The clear separation between the Western civilization and this threat referred as 'balkanization' is a witness to this. However, that 'balkanization' was initially used to denote threats on the Western 'self' is also not juxtapositional to how the (Western) Balkan subject remains contextualized within the Peninsula, and this is particularly due to those references being made during and in relation to events igniting precisely in the area: the Balkans Wars and WWI.

This foregrounds the question of the spatiality of the (Western) Balkans as communicated through the Balkan Wars/WWI genealogical basic discourse and how it connects to the policy of observation that the basic discourse argues for. To notice the explicit distinction between the (Western) Balkans and the West that the Balkan Wars/WWI basic discourse draws by isolating the first within the Balkan Peninsula, means recognizing that it is not that the West fails to perceive the risk of 'balkanizing'. According to Mowrer (1921) a part of Europe was already 'balkanized'. What is means is that, the (Western) Balkans are not deemed a subject deserving of the West's attention. The spatiality of the (Western) Balkan 'other' of the Balkan Wars/WWI genealogical basic discourse of 'balkanization' is what determines the observationist policy that the discourse undertakes towards the (Western) Balkan 'other'. Temporal characterizations as backward, chaotic, dangerous, and a threat to the Western civilization would have not sufficed for such policy unless the subject was spatially situated somewhere away from the Western 'self', in the Balkan Peninsula and the historical events that happened there. What determines the policy of basic discourses, therefore, is a combination of the temporal and spatial parameters – and not one or the other – of the 'othered' subject like the (Western) Balkans. This becomes clearer below through the elaborations on the two other basic discourses. Specifically, the WWII/Colonial basic discourse relies on disparaging temporal characteristics of the (Western) Balkans in combination with a different spatial situatedness hence formulating a different layer of otherness. This synthesis is used to justify a policy of intervention – rather than of observation.

Subsequent to Mowrer (1921), other earlier references to 'balkanization' which used the word in relation to or right after the Balkan Wars and WWI spoke of a threat that the West was facing or soon would. At the same time, they hardly acknowledged the (Western) Balkans

due to the presumed distance and distinction between them and the West. Examples of this are found in the writings of Stephen Graham (1922) and Arnold J. Toynbee's (1922). Graham's (1922) *Europe – Whither Bound? (Quo Vadis Europa?)* begins with:

> The pride of Christian culture, the greatest human achievement in history, with, as we thought before 1914, the seal of immortality set upon her, is now perhaps moving towards *dissolution* and death. Europe has begun a rapid decline, though no one dares to think that she will continue in it downward until she reaches the chaos and misery and barbarity from which she sprang.

While temporal references such as these on barbarity from the quote and others on backwardness were used continuously by Graham, it is Europe too that Graham is worried about and not the (Western) Balkans ascribing in this way such characteristics to the (Western) Balkan subject while keeping them locked away in the Peninsula. He wrote of the German Keiser who "had a seat made for himself in 1915 that he might look homeward in the evening. Thus he turned his back on the Balkans" (Graham, 1922). During the Balkan Wars/WWI basic discourse, the Keiser – and with that Europe and the West – could still turn their back to the (Western) Balkans, but this would become eventually more difficult during the WWII/Colonial basic discourse (see below).

Similarly, Toynbee (1922, p. 26), preoccupied by the "growing influence in the Western world of Near Eastern people who are still only imperfectly assimilated to Western civilization" claimed that such "[b]alkanisation is an unmistakable and an unsatisfactory, though it is to be hoped only a temporary, result". Just before the Balkan Wars, Toynbee had travelled on foot across the older territories of Greece as he called them, and while also being active during WWI as an editor of a *Blue Book* published by the British government on Armenia. His main concern was the Greece and Turkey relationship which he called "the contact of civilizations" implying that the two stand distinctively for two different cultural developments. Moreover, the latter, imperfectly assimilated to the Western civilization, was considered the cause to the devastating effects of 'balkanization' which, hopefully, were to be only temporary. This transitory phase that the Western subject was experiencing implied that the Western subject can or could have protected itself from such backwardness and barbarity as identity characteristics of the (Western) Balkan 'other'. It then suggested that the latter is evitable due to the distance between the two and that the separation is made possible by the situatedness of the latter somewhere away, in the Balkan Peninsula.

Other Balkan Wars/WWI references which perceive and wish to foster the above-mentioned distance, appear also in the writings of Leon Trotsky (1923) such as his article for the Soviet *Pravda*: "Victorious France is now maintaining her mastery only by Balkanizing Europe…. Britain's traditional mask is of hypocrisy. As a result, our unfortunate continent is *cut up, divided, exhausted, disorganized and Balkanized* – transformed into a madhouse". As he wrote about the 'United States of Europe' – a federal republic of European states created by the proletariat as a solution to the post-WWI burning problems of Europe's economy – Trotsky's article presents one of the earliest writings which juxtaposes 'balkanization' – and with that also the fragmented (Western) Balkan subject – with an economically united Europe with centralized industrial production. A Europe like this, after WWII – though not exactly under Trotsky's terms – appeared in the version of the EU through the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). While following chapters better illustrate how a united EU – but also NATO – developed through the 'balkanized' (Western) Balkan 'other', Trotsky's (1923) reference to 'balkanization' here remains relevant due to the clear separation between Europe to which resembling a "madhouse" was so unfitting that other subjects characteristics had to be invoked to describe its state at the time. This is to say that the condition Europe was in could not be described as a state of, for example, 'Europeanization', but it instead was considered as 'balkanization'. This approach would not only further ascribe to the (Western) Balkan characteristics of madness in addition to barbarity, backwardness, and what not, but also establish clearly the distinction between the (Western) Balkans and Europe. It implied that Europe could not act as its 'self' and disintegrate at the same time. That is, a disintegrating Europe was unlike Europe's real 'self' but rather alike its 'other' – the (Western) Balkans.

Similar references to 'balkanization' but also other descriptions of the (Western) Balkans that might not specifically mention 'balkanization', as Todorova ([1997] 2009, p. 3) states, show how "[t]he 'civilized world' (the term is introduced not ironically but as a self-proclaimed label)" she says, "was first seriously upset with the Balkans at the time of the Balkan wars", but also how the approach that the West undertook – the policy it argued for – was one of observation and inaction, or at best reflections on the (Western) Balkans. A key illustrative document of this is a report by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace which had convened a group of American and European experts to investigate the causes and

conducts of the Balkan Wars. Its introduction written by Paul Henri Benjamin Balluet d'Estournelles de Constant, reads as follows:

> It is to the interest of all the governments, as well as of the peoples, that the light of truth should at last illuminate and regenerate these unhappy countries. The duty and the purpose of the Carnegie Endowment was to contribute in dissipating the shadows and dangers of a night indefinitely prolonged… Yes, we have plenty to do at home, but let us give up all exterior action if we pretend to wait until everything in our own house or conduct is reformed, before we can attempt to help *others*. (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1914, p. 4)

The report concludes with a crucial question: "What then is the duty of the civilised world in the Balkans?" (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1914, p. 273). The second Carnegie Endowment for International Peace report of 1993 was not based on a fact-finding mission. Rather, it was a reprint of the 1914 report with an added introduction by George Frost Kennan who had been the U.S. ambassador to the Soviet Union in the 1950s and to Yugoslavia in the 1960s (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1993). As such, it is a testament to the revival of the genealogical Balkan Wars/WWI basic discourse into the Yugoslav Crisis contemporary discourse with both arguing for a secluded Balkan 'other', immobile and in need of help, and a contemplating West asking its 'self': to intervene or not to intervene?

The birth of 'balkanization' centered around events such as the Balkan Wars and WWI, allows for few important observations. First, the basic discourse of Balkan Wars/WWI situated the (Western) Balkan subject – the Balkans – in the Balkan Peninsula, still away from the West, in that it was used to describe events which had taken place in the spatiality of the (Western) Balkans though as lessons learnt or patterns of current and upcoming threats to the West and particularly Europe. This later changed as the following section demonstrates, due to 'balkanization' being recontextualized to a variety of other spaces and situations with no references to events enclosed in the Peninsula. Second, due to this spatiality, the (Western) Balkan 'other' transmitted through this basic discourse was a secluded 'other' separate and essentially different from the West. This 'other' was one which the West found difficult to imagine or even consider as 'self' and is hence taking the position of a spectator and observer. Third, the temporal layer of the Balkan 'other' portrayed the (Western) Balkans oscillating between their tribal and backward nature. The essentially derogatory nuances of 'balkanization' will never seize to accompany the discourse, and hence from that perspective not much changes in the temporal realm that the discourse undertakes. However, variances can

be found on the spatial proximity between the (Western) Balkans and the West which determines other layers of otherness and consequently other alternative scenarios for the West to build its policies thereon and which are no longer based on observation but on intervention and/or integration.

WWII/Colonial: At the Doorstep

Different from the Balkan Wars/WWI genealogical basic discourse which locates the (Western) Balkan subject within the Balkan Peninsula, the WWII/Colonial basic discourse of 'balkanization' sees the 'balkanized' (Western) Balkan subject everywhere – and this not just geographically all around the world, but also conceptually by eventually placing it even in burgers (see Pollack, 2011). This brings the (Western) Balkan subject closer – but not less threatening – to the West. While it is correct that 'balkanization', as a word, was conceived in a discursive move of temporal hindsight through which the West saw its present through the lens of events belonging to the (Western) Balkans' past, the Yugoslav/Colonial subject of the Balkan Wars/WWI basic discourse was a secluded 'other' which was still contained in its own space and time. If the Balkan Wars/WWI subject is located in the Balkan Peninsula though 'balkanization' had reached the Western 'self', the WWII/Colonial subject – appearing most often as the Yugoslav/Colonial subject – came to the West's doorsteps. In the events following WWII, the 'balkanization' of the West continued intensely. The (Western) Balkan subject becomes then – though still a separate and unwanted 'other' – capable of change and not that far away from the West. Its temporality had not really changed much as, with some minor variations, it yet remained a backward or rather troubled 'other', but it is an 'other' that, spatially, could no longer be contained in the Peninsula.

The WWII/Colonial basic discourse fostered an encounter between the Western 'self' and the (Western) Balkan 'other' through a policy of intervention. This happened partially due to some hopeful events taking place after WWII like the creation of the SFRY which made the (Western) Balkans, though still a backward 'other' (since basic discourses coexist), also an intriguing and hopeful subject to engage with. Partially, however, this encounter most often took place due to the impossibility of avoiding it since the 'other' had already approached the Western 'self' sufficiently to be impossible to enclose it back in the Peninsula – or anywhere else. The latter possibility – intervening due to unavoidability – is connected to the anti/post-

colonial struggles which took the West – and particularly Western Europe – by swift after WWII. The positionality of the West's colonial 'other' and the (Western) Balkans remained similar in that both projected 'others' of the West. Nonetheless, they remained different in that, among others, the former had already encountered and been incorporated to some extent into the Western 'self'. With this, the Western 'self' could no longer just observe as done previously and maintain unchanged its position. Rather it was obliged to engage with events happening in the colonized lands. Ethically, therefore, the type of intervention that this basic discourse argued for was not just one of intervening due to finding the subject capable of change, but also because of seeing it mandatory to intervene due to the proximity of such events on the West's doorstep. This section expands on both scenarios.

For there to be a switch in Western policies towards the (Western) Balkan 'other', there needed also to be a shift across layers of otherness. Intervention as a policy of the West towards the (Western) Balkans, genealogically – but also in contemporary circumstances – seems to be argued for either when there is a change in the temporality of the (Western) Balkan subject – that is if those who are backward and uncapable of change become somehow less backward and hence capable of change just enough to make an intervention arguable; and/or because there is a shift in the spatiality of the (Western) Balkan subject – that is, its proximity with the West changes, it comes closer, and, with this, impossible to be ignored or just observed, but rather obliges the West into a response. The first type of shifts is usually located in reference to 'balkanization' which point out to some aspects of SFRY as a short but existing period when Balkan peace and cohabitation was possible. Though one would expect that the creation of SFRY in 1945 would put to rest articulations of the identity of the (Western) Balkan 'other' as fragmented that the Balkan Wars and WWI gave rise to, and though this will show to not be the case as the use of 'balkanization' flourished following WWII, some post-WWII references on 'balkanization' however did in fact address a more hopeful identity of the (Western) Balkans and hence worthy of encountering the West. Some of these references also recalled SFRY as "this multinational state that overcame its pre- war Balkanization only by the supranational stature of founding father Josip Broz Tito" (Pond, 1981) or as a country which "brought several historically hostile Balkan states into a multinational federation" (Yugoslavia can it last as a union of republics?, 1990). Richard Gwyn (1988), for example, considered that Yugoslavia "just may be the source for the creation of a new multinational principle" that could

even cure Europe from being 'balkanized'. Gwyn's refences to SFRY as a successful post-WWII creation painted an image of the identity of the (Western) Balkan 'other' as being able to rise beyond historical divergences and was therefore not just a hopeful case, but also one that the West could draw positive lessons from.

To see this sudden hopefulness of the (Western) Balkan subject it suffices to give a better look to Gwyn's (1988) article as he wrote the following:

> Yugoslavia's shining accomplishment is to exist. It straddles all the fault lines of Europe, between West and East, between Catholic and Orthodox and Muslim, between Roman and Cyrillic alphabets, yet it keeps them - somehow - glued together… as you walk among the mosques and churches in Sarajevo, and listen to the bazaar music, you realize that Yugoslavia has made the multinational theory work. And you marvel.

As one moves further away from WWII and rather approaches the 1990s, naturally that with the unrest rising in SFRY, such marveling experiences are harder to come across. However, basic discourses are not relevant due to the intensity of their presence, but rather the radical layer of otherness that they rely on and on the basis of which different policies are built. One way that intervention would come to be argued for is precisely through references to the Yugoslav 'other' that navigated through its internal troubles for circa half a century.

In any case, before the 1990s, the research material that includes both 'balkanization' and references to the (Western) Balkans as capable of change due to its SFRY experience is vast. As all basic discourses, the WWII/Colonial discourse coexists with the other two identified in this dissertation. This means that the period it covers is not constrained merely to events surrounding WWII and the creation of SFRY; moreover, it is reflected into contemporary circumstances not just in the West but also locally – in the latter quite often in the form of Yugonostalgia. However, the genealogical references analyzed on the (Western) Balkan subject precede the main period under study – contemporary period – which begins with the 1990s crisis, and therefore they are: one, predominantly from a period between the creation of SFRY and the start of its dissolution; and two, predominantly from texts that refer specifically to 'balkanization' in conjunction to a (Western) Balkan subject capable of change.

Within such a period, references to the Yugoslav subject as capable of change are numerous, and Gwyn's (1988) is one among the different texts of different genres which are too many to elaborate on. At the same time, the Western press references are most revealing of the nature of the basic discourse which, besides constructing a subject worth intervening

due to proofs of it being capable of peaceful cohabitation, further contributed to the hopefulness of the (Western) Balkans by recalling their struggle against fascism. This is also why David Binder (1981) wrote about "the uprising led by Tito against Fascist invaders in the name of freedom, independence, socialism and 'brotherhood and unity'", though being worried that the (Western) Balkans seem to currently be undergoing through "a new kind of self-induced balkanization". It is also worth noting that, though the (Western) Balkan subject is portrayed as troubled but capable of change, the Serbian subject in particular is quite often set aside as the nationalist factor to blame for any difficulties that the multi/supra-nationalism of Tito suffers. It is interesting to see how later, as the discourse manifests itself within a contemporary context in the genealogical encounter between Bill Clinton and Slobodan Milošević (see Chapter 4), Western leaders use it in a similar fashion to recall a (Western) Balkan subject who stood proudly against fascism and was capable of living peacefully for a while, but also with this justify a policy of interventionism that culminated with bombing Serbia.

The troubled but hopeful (Western) Balkan subject appeared also indirectly in the Western press before or in the early 1990s when 'balkanization' was used often in references to decentralization. In an interview of 1977 for the *PBS NewsHour*, Robert Hawkins from the State of California's Local Government Reform Task Force, argued for decentralizing the tax system through expanding the role of local governments. He claimed that "there's evidence now to suggest that in fact some of the Balkanization may be quite rational in terms of responding to communities of interest that have different preferences for public goods and services, responding to problems that have different boundaries" (MacNeil & Lehrer, 1977). Along the lines of similar connotations of decentralization pertaining taxation, the *Los Angeles Daily News* wrote that "the so-called 'Balkanization' of numerous, small local governments can work well, though in a way that may mystify bureaucratic planners who distrust systems (such as markets) that cannot be directed from above" (Editorial - tax and plan, 1988). Janusz Bugajsk (1990) even referred to 'balkanization' as a "blessing" claiming that "although it could provoke conflict, far-reaching decentralization may be an unavoidable method for guaranteeing self-determination for the region's diverse nationalities". The *Orlando Sentinel* wrote about "positive balkanization" (Chrysler may make the history books in Medicare revolution, 1986) within the context of the U.S. national health insurance program, Medicare,

saying that "[m]anaged by corporate city-states, Medicare has a chance to make sense in a way that it so often fails to do now". Though not directed specifically to the (Western) Balkans, such references rearticulated the (Western) Balkan subject not just as someone who has now approached the Western 'self', but that it is "not necessarily a bad thing" (E.M.B., 1984). This hopefulness engrained into the Yugoslav/Colonial subject of the WWII/Colonial basic discourses is what makes it essentially different from the hopeless and distant Balkan subject of the Balkan Wars/WWI discourse.

Other articulations of identity which implied a policy of intervention but this time not due to hopefulness but due to inevitability, were embodied in the West's colonial 'other' and its decolonial struggles that made it impossible for the West to adopt a policy of observation. Following WWII, another tendency showed 'balkanization' as adopted by the colonial 'other' – itself the product of Western dominance. The wind of post-WWII decolonization processes was also observed through 'balkanized' lenses, stretching 'balkanization' from the (Western) Balkans across Europe and the United States to Africa and Asia, despite Benyamin Neuberger (1976) finding the concept used in modern African political literature already in the 1920s. Neuberger (1976, p. 523) lists a few anti-colonial African leaders among which Kobina Sekyi, Kwame Nkrumah, Léopold Sédar Senghor, Ahmed Sékou Touré and others, who typified 'balkanization' differently in their own ways[15], and who "[a]ll are agreed that an inherent feature is fragmentation". Beyond Africa and the Organization of African Unity (OAU), 'balkanization' is found applied to a variety of other post-colonial spaces including Asia – in particular with regards to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) (Indonesian Foreign Minister on China, Cambodia and ASEAN, 1982) and Lebanon (President Mubarak's appeal on the Situation in Lebanon, 1983), but also India and Yemen (Abu-Rabi, 1989). This section examines predominantly the African adaption of 'balkanization' to see the layer of the (Western) Balkan 'other' that it assumed to argue for its anti-imperialist struggles.

A separate example is the Lebanon case, especially since 'lebanonization' or 'beirutization' – just as 'balkanization' was picked by the Lebanese subject – were also interestingly adobted by the (Western) Balkans (see Chapter 3) to convey a fragmented 'other'

[15] 'Balkanization' displays as "balkanisation" in most of these authors' writings due to them calling for their respective countries' independences from the French imperial power. Using "balkanisation" instead of "balkanization" hints towards the French lingual influence over these territories as in French the word is strictly used as "balkanisation".

as described by the West. What this illustrates is that though the WWII/Colonial genealogical basic discourse of 'balkanization' was utilized by the West to call for a policy of intervention, the 'balkanized' or 'lebanonized' 'others' among themselves, in fear of facing the hopelessness of their conditions – which is how the Balkan Wars/WWI basic discourse portrayed the (Western) Balkan 'other' –, replaced the subject of their condition with an 'other' who was not them. We see also how in the case of both the colonial and the (Western) Balkan 'other', such an approach was adopted when the subjects wanted to elicit a policy of nonintervention by the West. Therefore, the Crown Prince Hassan bin Talal of Jordan, for example, was cited to blame Israel for intending to "to divide the area [Lebanon] into small, mutually hostile, political units", adding that with this "[t]he delicate minority balance has been upset in Lebanon because Syria's ruling group, which represents 12% of the population, is worried about the Balkanization of the 'fertile crescent'[16] and eager to extend its influence" (Jordan's crown prince plegges respect for Israeli borders, 1982, footnote added). Along similar lines, Isam Sartawi, an adviser to Yasser Arafat and a senior member of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), called for a "full pan-Arab" (Palestinian official on recognition of Israel, 1982) task as they warned that "Israel would intervene with one specific objective, namely to balkanize Lebanon in order to destroy the entity of the Lebanese state" and that "[t]he balkanization of Lebanon comes as a fulfilment of the longterm Israeli objective, namely the balkanization of the Arab east".

Why such examinations of the use of 'balkanization' as extrapolated into a colonial context are important is due to the proximity – that is spatiality – of the othered subject who, just as the colonial 'other', implied the attention of and action by the West. That 'balkanization' might also imply a tendency to be rejected internally within the (Western) Balkan subject, however, deserves to be recognized as it illustrates how the interventionists policies of the West that the WWII/Colonial basic discourse called for, were not always open-heartedly accepted neither by its colonial, nor by its (Western) Balkan 'other'.

To go back to the African adaption of 'balkanization', an archetypical example of such rejection of Western policies is William Edward Burghardt Du Bois (1945, p. 72) who claimed

[16] The fertile crescent, also known as 'the cradle of civilizations' is a region in the middle East with the shape of the crescent moon. Though there is no consensus with regards to the countries the region covers, the area is believed to cover modern day Egypt, Iraq, Iran, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine, Syria, and Turkey.

that the West used 'balkanization' to subjugate other smaller states into "'spheres of influence' and investment centers, and then often succumb into disfranchised colonies". He equated 'balkanization' with "universal sneering at small nations" (Du Bois Edward Burghardt, 1945, p. 72). Du Bois converted the (Western) Balkans into a subject to learn from, by claiming that the (Western) Balkans

> form in the mass an ignorant, poor, and sick people, over whom already Europe is planning 'spheres of influence.' Even greater is the pressure upon negroid nations…. It has for years been the unquestioned dictum of literature and history that the inferiority of Negroes could be proved by the failure of efforts like those of these countries to establish independent nations. (Du Bois Edward Burghardt, 1945, p. 67)

Inspired among others by the writings of Du Bois, upon Ghana's declaration of independence from Britain in 1957, Kwame Nkrumah, the first Prime Minister and President of the new country but also one of the figures of OAU's establishment in 1963, drew continuous parallels between the (Western) Balkans and contemporary Africa (see Nkrumah, 1961, 1963). To Julius Kambarage Nyerere's regionalization attempts of unifying East Africa before independence, Nkrumah has reportedly been referring to as "'balkanization' on a larger scale'" (Mwakikagile, 2010, p. 582). "While Nkrumah advocated immediate continental unification, Nyerere sought a regional approach as the more realistic way to eventually achieve continental unity under one government" says Mwakikagile (2010, p. 353), adding that to Nkrumah and "to a number of us, the two – balkanization and colonization – were twins" (p. 546). Beyond their differences, African anti-colonialist thinkers seemed to agree on the threat that 'balkanization' posed due to the interventionist Western policies it entailed.

The relationship of 'balkanization' with colonialism bears self-contradictory tones. The term was used to describe both, weaknesses and inability for independence deriving from centuries of colonial rule which then fostered calls of national self-determination on one hand. It was also used to denote the threat of fragmentations and divisions which former colonies faced after the end of colonial rule and which fostered calls of supranationalism and unity on the other. What is of relevance is that the colonial 'other' adopted the derogatory[17] Western view on the (Western) Balkan 'other' and with this it further reproduced the same. Such

[17] An exception to the derogatory use of 'balkanization' is that of Emeka Ojukwu as cited in Neuberger (1976, p. 529): "For a time there were endless wars in Europe; incessant conflicts until the old European empires were dismantled, until the Balkans were balkanized - then came peace. Europe found peace through Balkanization, why not Africa through Biafranization".

reproduction elicited calls for action and reaction by the decolonial leaders first, towards the colonial subject – and which communicates that there is hope in such endeavors; and second, towards the West, obliging it to act and let its colonial 'other' go. Therefore, whether peacefully and orderly or through struggle and revolutions, the West could not just observe but was forced into action. Though such actions might not equal a policy of interventionism as it would later during Stabilization, prospects of political reconfigurations communicated by 'balkanization', become a possibility only after WWII. Without the existence of such prospects, both action and intervention would be futile endeavors and policies difficult to argue for, and a more passive course of observation and inaction would have been the only approach worth taking.

Indeed, the WWII/Colonial basic discourse of 'balkanization' shows that, as I argue elsewhere, "the word 'balkanization' will always convey something pejorative about the Balkan people" (Veliu, 2019, p. 9). With the growth of its explanatory dimensions and the contexts that it is applied to – particularly the colonial one – also its derogatory nature expanded. What this process also does, however, is witnessing the (Western) Balkan subject approaching the West. The growing dimensions of 'balkanization' which reached the West's colonial 'other', while on one side encouraged negative inclinations and dispositions towards the (Western) Balkan 'other' by further reproducing articulations of its identity as 'balkanized' and hopeless, they also brought the (Western) Balkans closer to the Western 'self' by becoming a scenario which the West could no longer avoid since the subject who was under its rule – the colonial 'other' – had been if not fully integrated, then at least not completely separate from the Western 'self'. This made action and intervention unavoidable. Another more convincing layer of the WWII/Colonial basic discourse that implied some worth in Western engagement with the (Western) Balkan subject beyond observation and into intervention was, of course, the potential for changing into a subject of peaceful cohabitation as the SFRY was and of courageous Nazi resistance. For there to be intervention there needed to be a hopeful Yugoslav subject as well as a closer colonial 'other' which made mere observation infeasible. The WWII/Colonial basic discourse combined the two by portraying a Yugoslav/Colonial subject capable of change and closer to the West, and with that also worthy of intervention.

Balkanism: Asking the Questions

To refer to critical examinations on 'balkanization' as a discourse is an analytical move which requires some explanation. In theories and methods of poststructuralist analysis, intertextuality is an accompanying element in the study of both genealogical and research material from the times under study. Such an intertextual analysis requests a tripled layer of reading and analyzing the research material. The first move focuses on the original texts; the second incorporates later re-readings of this material; and the third, compares the original texts with its re-readings. Since original texts are already by default a platform where the extraction of basic discourses derives from, then there is no good reason for its re-readings to be deprived from the same analytical potential. On the contrary, if one goes by Foucault's ([1969] 1972, p. 49) account on discourses as "practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak", then again there is no good reason for one to ignore the analytical value in scrutinizing the later critical readings of 'balkanization' as discourses of their own epistemic reality which form the objects/subjects of which they speak. This further supports the position that there is no extra-discursive realm from which anyone who engages with the discourse of 'balkanization' – including those who conduct a critique on the same, including this dissertation – operate from. As already stated before, denying the existence of an extra-discursive realm does not equal denying the materiality of a discourse (see Laclau & Mouffe, [1985] 2001, p. 108; Wendt, 1999, pp. 55-56; see also Hansen, 2006, pp. 19-20). Furthermore, basic discourses, such as the critical one on 'balkanization', are in fact analytical categories which assist in systemizing existing knowledge as to best serve the process of analysis and help answer the research question(s). This then explains my choice to refer to these critical examinations which, among others, stand for academically embedded discursive practices, as another basic discourse of 'balkanization'.

Balkanism is a discourse *on* and *of* 'balkanization'. This because, as more evidently, those who laid their critical investigations on 'balkanization', mostly academics and scholars, examined genealogically and critically the historical path the discourse had come to life through. Some went even a step further to attempt and reclaim 'balkanization' beyond its pejorative nature or use the term in a subversive manner. Whether as merely deconstructed or additionally reclaimed, the (Western) Balkan 'other' conveyed through 'balkanization' is a constructed one. With this, its temporal proximity vis-à-vis the West is also constructed.

Similarly, these authors deconstructed the discourse on the (Western) Balkan 'other' in general and 'balkanization' in particular which bears, among other, the predominant characteristic of fragmentation. This deconstructive incentive is an endeavor which inevitably led to disputing and then dispersing any assumed inherent features of the (Western) Balkans. This is by default an integrationist endeavor, just as what Europeanization as a contemporary basic discourse also appears to be (see Chapter 5 and Chapter 6) – insofar as it is led by the goal of uncovering and exposing as discursively constituted what had by then been considered as intrinsically different from the West. As Simić (2013, p. 127) clearly stated, "the wars fought in the Balkans *do not differ* substantially from other civil or religious wars fought in Europe or elsewhere". The integrationist nuances of the critical discourse on 'balkanization' are even more vividly seen in the attempts of those who aimed at reclaiming the discourse by using it in a subversive manner, or adding to it nuances other than pejorative, but it is also implicitly noticed in the work of Todorova ([1997] 2009) and others who followed along the lines of or slightly divergent from Balkanism. Both tendencies emerged predominantly following the events of 1990s which led to the Yugoslav Wars and the dissolution of Yugoslavia, and which were in turn preceded by the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the end of communist rule in Central and Eastern European states.

Congruently to the work of Samuel Huntington (1993), Robert Kaplan (1993), Noel Malcolm (1998), and others who argued for an interventionist approach to the rising unrest in the (Western) Balkans related to the dissolution of Yugoslavia, Todorova (1994; 1996; [1997] 2009, 2010) and a wave of other scholars came to inspire a contrary and unique fad to the study of the (Western) Balkans. This trend was led by the purpose of challenging rather than reproducing the rejuvenated (Western) Balkan identity markers and stereotypes present at the time. Todorova (2010, p. 176) claimed that she found it to her "surprise and delight that balkanism was an uninhabited category". In her *Imagining the Balkans* "whose initial working title was 'Balkanism'" (Todorova, 2010, p. 176), she argued that "balkanism expresses the idea that explanatory approaches to phenomena in Southeastern Europe, that is, 'the Balkans', often rest upon a discourse (in the Foucauldian sense) or a stable system of stereotypes (for the ones who shun the notion of 'discourse'), which place the Balkans in a cognitive straightjacket" (Todorova, 2010, p. 176). Todorova's groundbreaking work shared with Edward Said's (1979) *Orientalism* the focus on the critique of discourses which placed the (Western) Balkan 'other'

(in the case of Todorova) and the Oriental 'other' (in the case of Said) in particular subject positions (in the Foucauldian sense) vis-à-vis the West. Due to such a shared ambition and communalities, a debate rose which aimed to establish whether the two were different enough as separate academic-explanatory endeavors. The discussions were predominantly revolving around questions of postcolonialism and the different or equivalent relation of the (Western) Balkans and the Orient to colonial rule; as well as argumentations on the (lack of) geographic specificity of the (Western) Balkans.

Todorova (1996, p. 10) had since maintained that Balkanism is "seemingly identical, but actually only a similar phenomenon" to Orientalism. She summarized the differences between the two as follows: the geographic and historical concreteness of the (Western) Balkans unlike the traveling, mostly metaphorical, and symbolic nature of the Orient; the mostly Christian composition of the (Western) Balkans versus the largely Muslim Orient; the possibility for the (Western) Balkans to be addressed as a scholarly category i.e. region; the predominantly poststructuralist methodological approach of Said distinctive from the historical one of Todorova; and which then relates to the lack of a colonial predicament for the (Western) Balkans as "[p]ostcolonial studies have an established epistemological pedigree in poststructuralist theory" (Todorova, 2010, p. 178). She engaged thoroughly in deconstructing as compatible or not a postcolonial label to the (Western) Balkans and objected it due to not considering the legacies of the Ottoman, Habsburg, or Romanov empires as colonial ones. The reasons argued as against treating the Ottoman Empire – despite its long presence in the (Western) Balkans – as a colonial ruler are as follows:

> First, there is no abyss or institutional/legal distinction between metropole and dependencies. Secondly, there is no previous stable entity which colonizes… Thirdly, there was no amelioration complex, no civilizing mission obsession comparable to the French or the English colonial project. Fourthly, there is no hegemonic cultural residue from the Ottoman Empire comparable to the linguistic and general cultural hegemony of English in the Indian subcontinent and elsewhere, or of French in Africa and Indochina. (Todorova, 2010, p. 179)

Todorova (1996) had previously added that in certain aspects, Balkanism had evolved even against or despite Orientalism. The (Western) Balkans being after all in Europe, white, and predominantly Christian, had served as a "substitute for the emotional discharge that Orientalism provided, exempting the West from the charges of racism colonialism, Eurocentrism and Christian tolerance against Islam" (Todorova M. , [1997] 2009, p. 188).

Todorova's argument was maintained also by Katherine Elizabeth Fleming (2000, p. 1224), who acknowledged that the "language of orientalism still retains its force in noncolonial settings". However, she still locates the essential differences between Balkanism and Orientalism on the lack of history and tradition of West European academic interest in the (Western) Balkans in comparison to the Orient. Fleming (2000, p. 1226) saw these differences in terms of chronology, longevity, style, aim and quantity. For her (2000, p. 1225) as for Todorova, Orientalism and balkanism "are not the same thing". Along similar lines, Andrew Hammond (2007) argued that the divergences between Balkanism and Orientalism existed and they are best expressed through few components: first, the lack of a clear and powerful opposite that the Orient plays in relation to Europe and European civilization, hence the (Western) Balkans is the 'other' from within Europe which "represents a Europe disfigured by the presence of the 'non-European', serving to illustrate the ease with which the self can be subverted" (p. 205); second, the lack of antiquity due to the absence of an imperial culture which has resulted not only with the absence of any positive comments, but also with the idea that "the region has nothing worth commenting on at all" (pp. 206-207); third, the propensity to feminize the Middle East, while on the other side emphasizing the patriarchy of the (Western) Balkans, its maleness and "noble savagery" (p. 208); and finally, the lack of sexual allure that travelers found in the region where, as Hammond said, "even the Balkan female is defeminized" (p. 210). Therefore, for Hammond (2007, p. 215), "the emphasis should now be on furthering knowledge of the specificities of balkanism", and not on its confluence with Orientalism.

The specificities of Balkanism that these authors referred to, are also an acknowledgment of the geographic specificities of the (Western) Balkans which is another point of contestation in the discussions on the differences between Balkanism and Orientalism, certainly related to the (lack of) colonial past of the (Western) Balkans. The more historiographic approaches (Flemming, 2000; Hammond, 2007; Green, 2005) aligned with Todorova argue for a real geographic existence and specificity of the (Western) Balkans. In addition, other more Lacanian psychoanalytical scholars such as Bjelić who agree that "the Balkan region was never colonized in the modern sense, as the Orient was, despite being subjected to Ottoman rule" also ask "[w]hat then is Balkan specificity? What were the historic contingencies engendering the Balkan specificities?" (Bjelić & Savić, 2002, p. 7). The

endeavor of Bjelić (2002, p. 4) to place the (Western) Balkans in a "discourse-geography" context was reassuring of Balkanism as it held that "[w]hether Balkan nationalism is post-imperial or post-colonial, it is fair to say that it remains distinctly liminal" (p. 6). This was attuned to Todorova's ([1997] 2009, p. 17) claim that "[u]nlike orientalism, which is a discourse about an imputed opposition, balkanism is a discourse about an imputed ambiguity". However, Lacanian scholars located the (Western) Balkans at the very space between geography and discourse: the dilemma of choosing between the two was no longer in need of being resolved. This in-between ontology of the (Western) Balkans, was explained by Dunja Njaradi (2012) as the result of recent slow transition of post-colonial studies into a specific form of critical regionalism very potent in the work of Judith Butler and Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (2007; Spivak 2008). Having established their position on the differences between Balkanism and Orientalism, Njaradi (2012, p. 193) confirmed that "like Orientalism, Balkanism could be seen as a mechanism of stereotyping the Other, and could in principle be applied to any country in Eastern Europe. Yet the fact that not every country will be referred to as a Balkan country does make a difference".

Numerous are the scholars who consider postcolonialism and Orientalism as sufficient in understanding the relationship between the (Western) Balkans and the West (Bakic-Hayden & Hayden, 1992; Skopetea, 1992; Goldsworthy, 1998; Neuburger, 2004). Milica Bakić-Hayden and Robert M. Hayden (1992), for example, considered "balkan" an orientalist variation. Moreover, Bakić-Hayden (1995, p. 920) agreed that "while it is important to recognize the specific rhetoric of balkanism, however, it would be difficult to understand it outside the overall orientalist context". Referring to former Yugoslavia as a case of gradation of 'Orients', the author developed the concept of "nesting orientalism" which referred to "a pattern of reproduction of the original dichotomy upon which Orientalism is premised. In this pattern, Asia is more 'East' or 'other' than eastern Europe; within eastern Europe itself this gradation is reproduced with the Balkans perceived as most 'eastern'; within the Balkans there are similarly constructed hierarchies" (Bakić-Hayden, 1995, p. 918). Mary Neuburger (2004, p. 5) also stated that "Orientalism holds an untold explanatory context in the Balkans" and that "orientalization and mongrelization of and within the Balkans were not mutually exclusive". Vesna Goldsworthy (1998, p. 2) called attention to "[t]he process of literary colonisation, in its stages and its consequences, is not unlike real colonisation". She further (1998, p. 1) drew

on the similarities between the (Western) Balkans and the Orient as colonial subjects and said that "[w]hile volumes of Orientalist and subaltern studies explore representations of areas of Western domination over the Eastern world, the Balkan Peninsula provides a unique instance in modern times of Eastern colonisation of an area of Europe". It is interesting to see how "nesting orientalism" continues to be picked up even more recently and specifically in attempts of theorizing the relationship between the (Western) Balkans and the EU and NATO (see Petrović, 2011; Lleshaj, 2013). Srećko Horvat (2013), for example, spoke of the internalization of inferiority by the (Western) Balkans as a "process of self-colonization", right after Croatia became the twenty-eighth member of the EU. Horvat (2013) referred to it as a "pseudo-integration" that derived from the imaginative blackmail of "[i]f we do not enter in the EU, we will remain in the Balkans". Such approaches which see Orientalism as most compatible for the study of the discursively constructed nature of the (Western) Balkan subject have developed congruently to Balkanism and survived just as much to date.

Overall, discussions on the (lack of) colonial predicament in the (Western) Balkans connected to the (lack of) geographic specificity of the region are important for illustrating how Balkanism as a basic discourse problematizes not just the temporality of the (Western) Balkan 'other' as backward or troubled – which the Balkan Wars/WWI and WWII/Colonial basic discourses built – but also its spatiality. The latter was done by questioning the geographic specificity of the region and how its lack or presence positions the (Western) Balkan subject in relation to other discourses of otherness such as Orientalism. This is to say that Balkanism – under which I also include those who question or oppose it as a critical scholarly endeavor – approached critically the (Western) Balkan 'other' as constructed, and de facto exposing as constructed the barriers and the proximity between the (Western) Balkans and the West which is what makes Balkanism an integrationist endeavor.

The integrationist ethicality of Balkanism becomes clearer in the ambitious efforts of some authors to reverse the otherwise pejorative connotations of 'balkanization' into something positive. According to Stjepan Meštrović (1994, pp. viii-ix), "there is no good reason to understand 'balkanization', that is the breaking up of a unit into increasingly smaller units that are hostile to each other, as something that must apply only to 'the Balkans'". He reclaimed 'balkanization' by considering it a genuinely postmodern phenomenon if one understands postmodernism to be a rebellion against the metanarratives of Enlightenment,

taking into account how postmodernism vanquished Enlightenment's rationalism and left democracy without secure philosophical foundations. Campbell (1998, p. 167) equated the European and American fear of 'balkanization' to the fear of multiculturalism which derived from a "fictive notion of a prior time of unfragmented community that is itself produced by a discourse of coherence". He claimed that "balkanization stems from the desire for a bounded community and the nostalgia for a politics of place rather than a problematization of identity politics" (Campbell D. , 1998, p. 169). In 2010, Andrej Grubačić (2010) urged: "Don't mourn, balkanize!". He spoke of "balkanization from below as a tradition and narrative that affirms social and cultural affinities, as well as on customs in common resulting from interethnic mutual aid and solidarity, and resulting in what can be termed an interethnic self-activity, one that was severed through the Euro-colonial intervention" (Grubačić, 2010, p. 158). Recognizing that the concept had now entered the realm of mathematics, international law, digital world, software and others, Srdjan Jovanović Weiss (2011) overturned the negative connotations of the discourse while further inscribing it in the field of architecture by asking: "[a]rchitects are not particularly happy with how desolate corporate architecture has become clean minimalist forms turned into postmodern cubes. What if we Balkanized it?". He claimed that 'balkanization' "also has positive aspects, it depicts political self-determination: not in order to fight, but rather to maintain its differentiation, its autonomy", and as such "[i]t is a chance for the small" (Weiss, 2011) versus the sophisticated and selective potencies of capitalism and corporations.

Similar attempts to reclaim 'balkanization' by revealing how the discourse enjoys no special position in the (Western) Balkans because it has been and can be contextualized just as well in Europe and elsewhere, also reveal another interesting tendency which, in a way, took back the deconstructed obviousness of the discourse into the production of other meanings. As they tried to contextualize the term to other spaces or look at it from different perspectives, initiatives to rescue 'balkanization' from the vocabulary of political insults are brought together by proving the point that 'balkanization' is not an inherent feature of the (Western) Balkan subject and that the Western 'self' might even benefit from integrating it into its structures. These new perspectives, although reflecting intentions of breaking the derogatory nature of the discourse and its logocentric order, continued to generate further conceptual associations of 'balkanization' to some apocalyptic variations. Therefore, although

integrationist in their arguments, attempts to reclaim ‘balkanization’ as something positive, or to defend the (Western) Balkans by claiming that they “certainly have no monopoly over barbarity” (Todorova M. , [1997] 2009, p. 7), also regenerated more conceptual archetypes reflected through the discourse. As a result, a complete integration never happens. This, partially, can be explained by the coexisting nature of basic discourses, which is to say that Balkanism coexists with the WWII/Colonial and the Balkan Wars/WWI genealogical basic discourses of ‘balkanization’. However, this is also explained by the nature of critical investigations themselves, which in their efforts of denaturalizing subjects, inevitably further produce them by virtue of mentioning the same if not more. In other words, critique, in its deconstruction, constructs. This only further supports my decision to subject both, critical and reclaiming tendencies on the ‘balkanization’ discourse under a genealogical investigative lens. They too inevitably contributed and contribute to the construction of knowledge and meanings surrounding the discourse and are particularly reflected into the contemporary basic discourse of Europeanization.

Conclusions

This chapter presented with a genealogical analysis of the discourse of ‘balkanization’ through phases prior to the main period under study which begins in 1991. Patterned dynamics of identity and foreign policy were identified through the different layers of otherness, as well as the spatial, temporal, and ethical dimensions of the identity that they convey, forming in this way three main genealogical basic discourses. The Balkan Wars/WWI discourse placed the (Western) Balkans in a geographically recognized place, the Peninsula, away from the West; it saw them as backward and primitive from a temporal perspective; and it gave rise to an observationist approach by the West. This discourse foresaw a possible Western duty in the Peninsula but whose time had not come yet. The WWII/Colonial basic discourse on the other hand, converted the (Western) Balkans into a subject worthy or in demand of intervention. The (Western) Balkan subject, also embodied by the West’s colonial ‘other’, came closer to the West’s doorstep. Though remaining troubled from a temporal perspective, its spatiality brought the (Western) Balkans to a space where the West could no longer ignore and was, hence, obliged to intervene. The Balkanism basic discourse questioned and deconstructed artifacts of the two other basic discourses. One strand of critical studies on ‘balkanization’ went even

further by attempting to recontextualize the concept into new settings, possibly even affirmative ones. However, both critical investigations that questioned the discourse and those that aimed at reclaiming it, are united in their approach of treating the (Western) Balkan 'other' as one which is discursively constituted at least in its temporality. When it comes to its spatiality, for some scholars (Western) Balkans are just an invented space, for others (Western) Balkans have a geographic specificity. Within the frames of this project, the (Western) Balkans are treated as an invented 'other' with geographic proportions.

It should also be clarified here that even if it might seem incongruent to speak of Balkanism as a genealogical basic discourse when the period under study in the dissertation begins with (North) Macedonia's independence in 1991, what is genealogical makes sense only in relation to what is contemporary. In this logic, Balkanism is the genealogical counterpart of Europeanization which predominantly takes shape in the 2000s, just as the WWII/Colonial discourse shows similarities to the Stabilization basic discourse of predominantly the late 1990s, while the Balkan Wars/WWI basic discourse is the genealogical counterpart of the Yugoslav Crisis discourse of the early 1990s. As such, the value of identifying basic genealogical discourses lies in better understanding the contemporary basic discourses identified in the research material from the time under study – Yugoslav Crisis, Stabilization, and Europeanization – and which more specifically capture the (Western) Balkans in relation to the EU and NATO. Genealogical discourses expose the (Western) Balkans as an 'other' who was not already there, but as a subject who has engaged with the West long before the EU and NATO existed, as well as the (Western) Balkans' aspirations for joining the two. That is, the different layers of otherness which the genealogical discourses are built upon are important to illustrate how current and more contemporary policies such as the Euro-Atlantic processes of the (Western) Balkans continue to be underpinned by older identity variations as 'balkanized'. This chapter elaborated on 'balkanization' as a discourse guiding Western policies towards the (Western) Balkans on a basis of articulations of the latter's identity as fragmented. The chapters following, however, illustrate how 'balkanization' is not just the discourse of the fragmented (Western) Balkan 'other', but also the discourse of the united Western 'self' maintained through the Euro-Atlantic processes of the former.

Chapter 3
(Socialist Yugoslav Republic of) Macedonia: Oasis of Peace and/or Apple of Discord

This chapter contextualizes the bigger research question – *How does 'balkanization' shape the Euro-Atlantic processes of the (Western) Balkans, and vice versa?* – in (North) Macedonia through two key events: the independence of 1991 and the armed conflict of 2001. The goal is to deconstruct the discursive splits – 'balkanization' – that the (Western) Balkan 'other' endured during (North) Macedonia's independence in 1991 and the armed conflict in 2001, in order to see how the same has shaped the Euro-Atlantic processes of the (Western) Balkans. Vice versa this translates into seeing how EU's and NATO's policies towards the (Western) Balkans shaped the 'self'/'other' dynamics between the (Western) Balkans and the West. Therefore, the chapter connects the deconstructed identity articulations of the (Western) Balkan 'other' with the development of the Western 'self'.

Articulations of the identity of the (Western) Balkan 'other' and the policies that they are utilized for are captured through three main contemporary basic discourses: the Yugoslav Crisis, Stabilization, and Europeanization (see Table 5 below). In the first and second section, I elaborate on the Yugoslav Crisis and Stabilization. In the case of (North) Macedonia, the analysis of the Yugoslav Crisis is centered in 1991 when the country declared its independence, whereas Stabilization is centered around the armed conflict of 2001. 'Snapshots' of the relationship between certain identity articulations of the (Western) Balkan 'other' and the policies they gave rise to during these events are further diversified into the discursive themes of each basic discourse and illustrated through the discursive themes tables (Table 6 and 7) at the beginning of each of the two sections. Europeanization which is centered around the 2000s is explored in the following chapters.

Table 5. Contemporary Basic Discourses of 'Balkanization'

Basic Discourse	**Identity**		
	Layer of Otherness	**Temporality and Spatiality**	**Ethicality**
Yugoslav Crisis	*Yugoslavia*	*Regressive and distant*	*Observation*
Stabilization	*South East Europe*	*Backward in the backyard*	*Intervention*
Europeanization	Western Balkans	European and forward looking	Integration

The discursive themes point towards one main argument: the (Western) Balkan 'other' undergoes continuous splits during 1991 and 2001, whereas the Western 'self' unites. Direct

references to relevant events show how the unity of the latter is maintained through the 'balkanized' former. These dynamics are perpetually maintained by grounding contemporary policies towards the (Western) Balkans in older articulations of their identity located within either one of the two basic genealogical discourses of 'balkanization' – the genealogical Balkan Wars/WWI and WWII/Colonial discourse. Such genealogical references ultimately enable not only the unity of the Western 'self' by covering blank spots in their discursive themes, but also the reinvention of (Western) Balkan political elites.

(North) Macedonia during the Yugoslav Crisis: The 1991 Independence

On 28 April, the UN Security Council (1993) declared that the SFRY had ceased to exist. The year of 1991, therefore, found (North) Macedonia in the first stages of the dissolution of SFRY. This basic discourse examined in this section came to be known as the *Yugoslav Crisis*. In attempts of configuring its post-Yugoslav identity, the country proclaimed its sovereignty in January 1991 (Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia, 1991a), held an independence referendum in September, and sent out a declaration to the international community to be recognized as a sovereign and independent state (Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia, 1991g) in December of the same year.

Despite (North) Macedonia's secession from Yugoslavia to have been the only peaceful one granting it the sobriquet of an 'oasis of peace', the country was viewed as a component of *Yugoslavia*. The Yugoslav Crisis contemporary basic discourse portrays the Yugoslav 'other' as *regressive* and *distant* to the West, relaying on the *Balkan Wars/WWI* genealogical basic discourse. This distance is reflected in the discourse of both the EC and NATO that treat the crisis as a civil war, claiming that it is "only for the peoples of Yugoslavia themselves to decide" (NATO, 1991a), and that the Yugoslav Crisis was "an internal problem requiring internal agreement" (European Commission, 1991f). Like the Balkan Wars/WWI genealogical basic discourse, the Yugoslav Crisis argues for an *observationist* policy towards the (Western) Balkans. This policy is epitomized in the Brioni Declaration (1991) (also known as Agreement) which formed the basis for an observer mission to monitor the withdrawal of the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) from Slovenia – the European Community *Monitor* Mission (ECMM). Though earlier 'balkanizing' events of the Yugoslav Crisis had not established the (Western) Balkans as an area of interest for the West to intervene and, let alone, integrate, they ignited

the spark of the Euro-Atlantic processes for the region as a mean of soothing the radiating detrimental effects of 'balkanization'. Therefore, even if during 1991 the Euro-Atlantic prospects for (North) Macedonia and the region were off the table, European Community's (EC) and NATO's policies towards the (Western) Balkans are important from a genealogical perspective as approaches which preceded the later promise of integration.

The first subsection explores four discursive themes used to support four policies and rearticulations of the (Western) Balkan 'other' – *Equality*, *(Semi-)Sovereignty*, *Territorial Integrity*, and *Human and Minority Rights* (see Table 6).

Table 6. (North) Macedonia: Yugoslav Crisis Discursive Themes

Event	Discursive Theme	Rearticulated Identities	Policy	Actors
1991 Independence of (North) Macedonia	Equality	Separating the Albanian subject from the Macedonian subject	Special status and autonomy	- PDP-NDP
	(Semi-) Sovereignty	Keeping the Macedonian (and the BiH) subject semi-attached to 'Yugoslavia'	Alliance of Yugoslav States/Asymmetric Federation, or Step-like Federation	- Kiro Gligorov - Alija Izetbegović
		Separating the Macedonian subject from the Yugoslav subject	Confederation and/or independence	- VMRO-DPMNE
	Territorial Integrity	Retaining the Yugoslav subject as it is	Neutrality, cease-fire, and sanctions	- EC - NATO
	Human and Minority Rights	Uniting the Yugoslav subject with 'human' as a subject and splitting it into 'minorities' and 'communities'	Recognition of self-determined and independent republics	- EC - NATO

The second subsection reveals how the Yugoslav Crisis has its roots in older variations of the (Western) Balkan 'other', predominantly in the Balkan Wars/WWI genealogical basic discourse referred to by both Western and the (Western) Balkan political elites. The third subsection, then, switches from the (Western) Balkan 'other' towards the Western 'self'. It shows how genealogical references through which the (Western) Balkan 'other' is seen within a contemporary event such as the Yugoslav crisis would come to serve the fragile unity of the Western 'self' through the 'balkanization' of the (Western) Balkan 'other'. Indeed, the precarious condition of the Western 'self' lasts during the Yugoslav Crisis. (North) Macedonia's 1991 independence, however, as the earliest key event analyzed in this dissertation, illustrates how the 'balkanization' of the (Western) Balkan 'other' will come to

serve as the vessel for exposing the disunity of the Western 'self', and how this then becomes a catalyst for addressing the internal disputes within and between the EC and NATO.

It is worth noting that all other sections of this dissertation dedicated to specific key events as part of basic discourses and their subsections follow the same structure as this one: relying on a logic of exploring the (Western) Balkan 'other' 'balkanizing', the Western 'self' uniting, and in between the two I explore genealogical references invoked to maintain these identity dynamics alive within contemporary policies such as the Euro-Atlantic processes of the (Western) Balkans.

(Western) Balkan 'other': Disintegration of Yugoslavia begins

Despite the attempts particularly of the first (North) Macedonian president, Kiro Gligorov, to portray the country as a sui generis case – an oasis – of peace and reasonability amidst the 'balkanization' of Yugoslavia, (North) Macedonia was not immune to disintegrating forces. On the contrary, the future of the country was uncertain during the Yugoslav Crisis due to, as *The Independent* would best put it: "… Macedonians ha[d] never quite persuaded the world that they exist" (Tanner, 1991). Now that Yugoslavia was about to dissolve itself, Macedonians were threatened with a similar fate. Their subsistence was endangered by what was often referred to as 'the four wolves': Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, and Serbia – the country's four neighbors. The observes for Greece at the UN claimed that "[i]t was dangerous to invent a 'nation'" referring to the Macedonian nation. Though the "name issue" between (North) Macedonia and Greece is elaborated as a separate discursive theme in a different chapter (see Chapter 6) it should be mentioned that the Greek Ambassador to the United Kingdom, George D. Papoulias (1991), referred to (North) Macedonia as "pseudo-Macedonia" describing it as "Josip Tito's creation". Along the same lines, Bulgaria's President, Zhelyu Zhelev, called the Macedonian nation a "communist invention" (Prime minister of Macedonia in Bulgaria, 1991), while Bulgaria to date continues to unease the country's accession to the EU[18]. Serbia's rising elites headed by figures such as Slobodan Milošević and Vojislav Šešelj were vocalizing the Serbian Orthodox Church (SOC) which had not forgiven the Orthodox Christians in (North) Macedonia for breaking away and establishing a Church of their own in 1967. Therefore, 1991

[18] Bulgaria is blocking the start of membership talks between the EU and (North) Macedonia based on claims of distortion of historical events, documents, and artefacts (see Gotev, Michalopoulos, & Trkanjec, 2020).

finds (North) Macedonia at best in a position of postponing matters that would not cease to haunt it for decades to come.

The country also risked disintegrating internally, being faced with demands from the ethnic Albanian community living there. Ethnic Albanians in (North) Macedonia had kept the gates open for the Western neighbor, Albania, to remain involved in the fate of its compatriots. With the September 1990 amendments to the 1974 Yugoslav constitution which introduced political pluralism and multiparty elections, ethnic Albanians organized into two main political parties: Party for Democratic Prosperity (PDP) and the People's Democratic Party (NDP)[19]. During 1991, both parties boycotted the independence referendum, the census, and the Assembly session where the new constitution was brought. Later, in 1992, a referendum on *autonomy* was organized by ethnic Albanians throughout (North) Macedonia which the Macedonian government refused to hold valid. The PDP-NDP memorandum published in the Albanian daily in (North) Macedonia, *Flaka e Vëllazërimit,* demanded for the Conference on Yugoslavia – which the EC had established as an arbitration procedure to help solve the Yugoslav crisis – to "discuss the position of Albanians in Macedonia and to recognize… [their] *special status* within Macedonia" (Parliamentary Group of PDP and NDP, 1991b). Obtaining special status for the Parliamentary Group of PDP and NDP (1991a) reflected "not asking for rights, but for *equality*". Such policy argued for a discursive split of the Macedonian subject into the 'Macedonians' and the 'Albanians' – an unresolved division which would loudly echo later during the armed conflict of 2001 (see section below).

The position of Macedonian authorities articulated around one main discursive theme – *(Semi-)Sovereignty* – urging two similar policies that entailed further fragmentation or some type of reconfiguration of SFRY. The more uncompromising option which argued for an independent state was proposed by one of the emerging right-wing political parties, the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization – Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity (VMRO-DPMNE). In its election platform of 1990, VMRO-DPMNE "aimed at preparing the conditions for the unification of Macedonia" for which it needed a "*sovereign* national state of the Macedonian people" [Izborna programa (21 juni do 5 juli 1990 godina), 2012] for the

[19] In 1997, NDP merged with the Party for Democratic Prosperity of Albanians (PDPA) – itself a fraction of PDP, to form the Democratic Party of Albanians (DPA). DPA would later come to play a crucial role during the armed conflict of 2001 as a key event.

expatriates "to return to their lost Homeland". Despite its more radical position, however, VMRO-DPMNE would continue to be open to the realization of its manifesto within a *confederation* with other Balkan states, though they and many other *independence* advocates would cite the "Kruševo Manifesto" (Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization, 1903) and the "Declaration of the Anti-Fascist Assembly of the People's Liberation of Macedonia for the Fundamental Rights of the Citizen of Democratic Macedonia" (Anti-fascist Assembly for the National Liberation of Macedonia, 1944) with the latter being noted for its preferences for a Balkan federation[20] over Yugoslavia.

A softer tone to confederative alternatives which were rather aimed at retaining some – although not all – unity of the Macedonian subject with the Yugoslav one, was given by what is commonly referred to as the Gligorov-Iztebegović plan. The Macedonian and the Bosnian Herzegovinian presidents, Gligorov and Alija Izetbegović respectively, had developed a strategy, referred to differently across time: *Alliance of Yugoslav States*, *Asymmetric Federation*, or *Step-like Federation*. The original text of the plan is inaccessible, giving rise to a lot of perplexity. What is known about it through Izetbegović's different statements as well as Gligorov's (2000) memoir, is that the platform envisioned BiH and (North) Macedonia as semi-independent (yet sovereign) in a federation (or confederation) where the other Yugoslav republics could choose to stay or leave. This was an attempt of the two presidents to establish a sovereign status before and, if left alone, in a unity with Serbia, whose intentions for apportioning the two republics to unify the Serbian people, according to Gligorov (2000), were well-known. Partly due to Serbia's discontent, the plan did not work. Partly, however, the plan would have not worked due to the lack of explicit support from the West, as reflected in a journalist's question to Izetbegović: "If the idea of a step-like federation had been proposed by someone from Europe, if NATO stood behind it, or someone as… Joschka Fischer, would it have succeeded?" (as cited in Katz, 2014, p. 207). With regards to this, Gligorov (2000, p. 257) would recall a conversation with Lord Peter Carrington, the Chairman of the Conference on

[20] The Balkan Federation project is an idea which stretches beyond the contemporary Macedonian context and VMRO-DPMNE. It should be clarified, however, that it is generally referred to as a left-wing political movement aimed at unifying the (Western) Balkans. The 1944 Anti-fascist Assembly for the National Liberation of Macedonia (ASNOM) which recirculated the idea, in its first plenary session also proclaimed the Macedonian nation-state of ethnic Macedonians and the Macedonian language as the official language of the Macedonian state. This is where the right-wing VMRO-DPMNE coincides with ASNOM.

Yugoslavia, who had said: “Mr. Gligorov, all of this is good, but there is one big deficiency – this is all rational. And the situation in Yugoslavia is not such!”.

The Gligorov-Iztebegović plan had been doomed to fail from the beginning. Even if both the EC and NATO had declared to be in favor of retaining the territorial integrity of SFRY, they would simultaneously undermine the same. This is best illustrated through the discursive blank spot between the two main discursive themes which dominated the West’s approach towards the Yugoslav crisis and (North) Macedonia during 1991: *Territorial Integrity* with the United States as its main proponent; and *Human and Minority Rights* with the EU as its main advocator. It should be stated, that as other key events illustrate, many of the discursive themes and their policies are jointly supported by both the EU and NATO, though one’s preferences of one option versus the other might be more explicit. The United States’ explicit tone for the preservation of the Yugoslav territorial integrity through neutrality stands out, especially in Congress: “Our policy is to avoid taking sides in the complex ethnic dispute” (1501 Congress Record - House, 1991, p. 15490) affirmed the Member of the U.S. House of Representatives, Jerry Kleczka, and that they should “stick with neutral language” and “not engage in divisive ethnic disputes” (1501 Congress Record - House, 1991, p. 15491). More importantly, in a statement issued by the Department of State, the spokesperson Margaret Tutwiler (1991, p. 386) made explicit that the U.S. policy towards Yugoslavia stood in support of “the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia within its present borders”.

However, though declared neutral in its position towards the Yugoslav crisis, the United States not only backed EC’s sanctions (European Commission, 1991g) and UN Security Council (1991a) Resolution 713, but also implemented complementary measures “to exert pressure on parties to the conflict to participate meaningfully in the EC-sponsored Conference on Yugoslavia” (United States Department of State, 1991). Furthermore, while determined to express its support for the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia, the United States kept an open door for a change of borders as its policy towards Yugoslavia also stated: “We firmly believe that Yugoslavia’s external or internal borders should not be changed *unless* by peaceful consensual means” (Tutwiler, p. 386). An unacceptable involuntary change of borders had also been in the vocabulary of major organizational actors like the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), EC, NATO, and the UN, and, therefore, they had all been intensively engaged in facilitating multiple cease-fire agreements between Croatia, Serbia, and

Slovenia. Despite such categorical declarations of not accepting any unilateral change of borders – including those by the United States which were vividly reflected into NATO's general position – some of the measures of the West would not only accept Yugoslavia's territorial reconfiguration but would further stimulate the same.

The discursive blank spot between the declarations of neutrality for preserving the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia on one hand, and at the same time the promotion of self-determination as a *right of minorities* and with that *a human right* – an omnipresent discursive theme in EC's and NATO's documents – on the other, reveals inconsistencies within the Yugoslav Crisis basic discourse and its non-intervention, or rather observation stance. NATO (1991a) had already in November declared that

> The prospect of recognition of the independence of those republics wishing it, can only be envisaged in the framework of an overall settlement, that includes adequate guarantees for the protection of human rights and rights of national or ethnic groups. The right to self-determination of all the peoples in Yugoslavia cannot be exercised in isolation from the interests and rights of national or ethnic groups within the individual republics.

In an important declaration on Yugoslavia (UN Security Council, 1991c), the EC had informed the UN that its Member States "confirm their attachment to… the principle of self-determination. They affirm their readiness to recognize… those new states which…" fulfilled the criteria set out in the declaration. Subsequently, (North) Macedonia had issued a "Declaration on International Recognition of the Republic of Macedonia as a Sovereign and Independent State" (Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia, 1991g). The EC declaration, among others, asked from all the Yugoslav republics to continue to support "the continuation of the Conference on Yugoslavia" (UN Security Council, 1991c) which the EC had established already in August 1991 with the purpose of setting up an arbitration body known as the Badinter Arbitration Committee[21] charged with providing the Conference on Yugoslavia with legal advice. Upon (North) Macedonia's request for international recognition, the Committee

[21] The Committee is referred to as the Badinter Arbitration Committee in honor of Robert Badinter who was appointed as the President of the five-member Committee consisted of presidents of four other Constitutional courts: Germany, Italy, Spain, and Belgium.

in 1992 concluded that "the Republic of Macedonia satisfies the tests" (Türk, 1993) to become an independent state[22].

Though declaring in favor of Yugoslavia's territorial integrity, the EC, in cooperation with the CSCE and the UN and being backed up by NATO, had also initiated a few initiatives alongside the imposed sanctions and the facilitated case-fire agreements, opening the way to the redrawing of Yugoslavia's borders. Of particular importance is the Brioni Declaration (1991) which ended up in undermining the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia that both the EC and NATO were simultaneously upholding. Even if the Brioni Declaration formed the basis for an observer mission to monitor the withdrawal of the JNA from Slovenia, it opened the way to Slovene officials alone to control Slovenia's borders and to removing any authority JNA might have had in overseeing that part of the Yugoslav territory. This was known to have isolated not only the Yugoslav federal Prime Minister, Ante Marković, from preserving the federation, but it had also caused two other difficulties: it left Croatia alone to be defended from the JNA, and it enabled Serbian nationalist' platforms to reshuffling and redrawing Yugoslavia's borders. The Slovenian President, Milan Kučan, had earlier in the year met Slobodan Milošević, and they had made a deal for the former to move out of the way of the latter in their nationalist plans in exchange of allowing Slovenia's independence (Ramet, 2006, p. 392). This would also be one of those many examples which illustrate how the political elites in the (Western) Balkans would instrumentalize their relationship with the West and, more specifically, discursive blank spots, which reveal inconsistencies in EU's and NATO's policies, for their own political agendas. The further the (Western) Balkans disintegrate, i.e. 'balkanize', the more these dynamics become a pattern where politicians in the (Western) Balkans instrumentalize the policies of the West – and with that also the articulations of identity in which those policies are argued from – to their advantage.

Genealogical references: Balkan Wars/WWI, Balkan knots, and ghosts of the past

Gligorov's (2000, p. 257) attempts to set (North) Macedonia away and aside from the historical "Balkan records of hatred" would end in vain. The Western press would indeed, as Tanner

[22] See also Pellet (1992) for other opinions on other Yugoslav republics and note that, from all the republics, the Badinter Committee concluded that only (North) Macedonia and Slovenia completed the conditions to be independent states.

(1991) wrote for *The Independent*, recognize (North) Macedonia as "an oasis of rational thinking", but it would also place the country within "a[nother] country [Yugoslavia] where xenophobia, militarism and garbled theories of national greatness have become the norm". Moreover, (North) Macedonia would also be referred to as "the apple of discord" and an "illegitimate child" (Gligorov, 2000, p. 400), "one of the most intractable Balkan knots" (Eyal, 1991), a "Trojan horse" whose "language was created overnight" and whose prospect for independence seemed "laughable" (Tanner, 1991), as well as "an atom bomb in our own backyard" (LaFranchi, 1991). The state was, hence, associated with an abundance of derogatory metaphors: "the name Macedonia conjures up images of gunpowder, brutal gendarmes and moustachioed revolutionaries" stated Tanner (1991), predicting that "the fate of 'Mother Macedonia' will most likely be decided not by the Macedonians themselves, but by their neighbours" as the West watched.

Such references draw striking resemblances to Scott Mowrer's (1921, p. 25) definition of 'balkanization' as "[t]he creation, in a region of hopelessly mixed races… a continual prey to the machinations of the great power" (see Chapter 2). These and the general observationist approach of the West during the Yugoslav Crisis make apparent the unignorable likeness of the Yugoslav Crisis contemporary basic discourse of 'balkanization' with the Balkan Wars/WWI genealogical basic discourse. One must educe that, similarly, during the initial uses of 'balkanization' as a word, Europe was coping with the collapse brought about by WWI and the dissolution of the Russian and the Austro-Hungarian empires. Cut to 1991, the Soviet Union was in its final stages of disintegration, bringing unpredictability in a new post-Cold War era. Yugoslavia's fragmentation would once again offer to the West an 'other' through which to process the unavoidable reconfigurations of the 'self'. Hence, (North) Macedonia, despite its apparent unique portrayal, remained within its basic discourse of the past. An evidence of this is that it was not spared from the cancellation of all agreements on cooperation that had taken place between the European Economic Community (EEC) and SFRY, neither was it spared from sanctions by the EC (European Commission, 1991g) and the UN Security Council (1991a) general and complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Yugoslavia brought through Resolution 713 [23].

[23] See also the UN Security Council (1991b) Resolution 724 with the purpose of following up on the effective implementation – or the lack, thereof – of the embargo brought with Resolution 713.

Therefore, with some small variations, the West is almost unanimous in its observationist response towards the Yugoslav crisis and so it is undivided in drawing references to older articulations of the identity of the (Western) Balkans to argue for its contemporary policy of observation. (North) Macedonia was no exception to this. This is further illustrated in statements such as the one by the European Commissioner, Sir Leon Brittan, who went back in time to recall the disintegration of Austria-Hungary as he spoke of Yugoslavia (European Commission, 1991h), adding elsewhere that "we are right to be alarmed by the potential implications of ethnic hatred" (European Commission, 1991a). Further, debates at the UN level also show Western countries such as Luxemburg describing Yugoslavia as being "in the grip of domestic upheavals which conjure up the phantoms of the past and the ghosts of conflicts" (UN General Assembly, 1991). The U.S. Congress stirred references to "ethnic rivalries" in Yugoslavia "which have existed for hundreds of years, and are inexplicably intertwined with the history of this region" (1501 Congress Record - House, 1991, p. 15491), while the U.S. President, George H. W. Bush (1991, p. 231), spoke of "ancient ethnic hatreds, resentment, and even revenge". The Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs, Ralph R. Johnson (1991, p. 397), claimed that "[g]iven Yugoslavia's crazy-quilt ethnic makeup and history of deep-seated ethnic disputes, we believed that the only alternative to some form of democratic unity was violence, suffering and long-term instability. And I think we were right on that". Such analogies to older articulations of the identity of the (Western) Balkans, however, show that neither the United States nor the West in general were willing nor interested to be proven wrong, but rather to be proven right in their assumptions.

Arguing through Territorial Integrity and supporting a policy of neutrality, while simultaneously upholding the discursive theme of Human and Minority Rights and advocating for self-determination policies, reveals inconsistencies operating within the Yugoslav Crisis basic discourse. The Human and Minority Rights allowed for self-determination through peaceful means, but observation makes sense on a subject incapable of peaceful transformation. That is, the discursive blank spots threaten to portray the discourse as unstable, incongruent, and therefore, suspicious to the audiences to which it is 'sold'. Such discrepancies between the two discursive themes (and in another key events also within single themes) are covered through genealogical references to the identity of the (Western) Balkans. Genealogical

references to the Balkan Wars/WWI basic discourse which portray a hopeless and distant Balkan subject in conjunction with the Territorial Integrity discursive theme, make a policy of observation seem plausible and strongly logical, while at the same time creating inconsistencies within the discourse as revealed by the Human and Minority Rights discursive theme apparently weaker and less visible. Covering discursive blank spots through genealogical references, therefore, though damaging the 'other' by perpetually trapping them into older articulations of identity, are useful to political actors and the policies they argue for.

However, those references, invoked by the West to cover for discursive blank spots, would be later instrumentalized by the (Western) Balkan political elites. To instrumentalize a discursive blank spot means to take advantage of the ambiguity surrounding the basic discourse. That is, local political elites take advantage of West's discursive blank spots and in this, like the West, they reproduce genealogical references to cover such spots. For example, many Macedonian politicians at the time, when arguing for their own political agendas employed the above-mentioned genealogical references to Balkan Wars/WWI basic discourse. The Balkan Wars also appear in discussions among the Macedonian MPs in the Assembly next to "barbarism" (Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia, 1991c) and the absolutely necessary march towards "the civilized world i.e. Europe" (Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia, 1991f). In addition, Trajan Micevski asked before the national Assembly: "Did Slovenians and Croats come to fight on our side? Did they come to help us in the Balkan wars?" (Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia, 1991d), while Dosta Dimovska referred to the "so-called revendication historical rights of Bulgaria, Greece and Serbia from the period of the Balkan Wars" (Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia, 1991e). References to the Balkan Wars/WWI genealogical discourse were particularly useful to VMRO-DPMNE that argued the most for an independent state. Invoking the "Kruševo Manifesto" (Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization, 1903) is evidence to this. The manifesto, though controversial, is argued by Macedonian historiographers to have promoted modern Macedonian nationalism (see Marinov, 2019). Indeed, the 1903 document is older than the Balkan Wars (1912 and 1913), but it comes closest to the Balkan Wars/WWI genealogical basic discourse due to inspiring an anti-Ottoman uprising and calling for defeating the Ottomans, something that the Balkan Wars would achieve a decade later. Employing West's discursive blank spots which needed the Balkan Wars/WWI genealogical basic discourse to make the Yugoslav Crisis contemporary

discourse appear as stable, worked in the benefit of an independent (North) Macedonian state – possibly, the best scenario for a tiny country threatened by war internally and externally.

At the level of the (Western) Balkan subject, however, this meant only further fragmentation. Utilizing Western discursive blank spots for materializing political platforms through invoking genealogical articulations of the identity of the (Western) Balkans, resulted in further engraving the (Western) Balkans within pejorative conceptualizations of the past. Beyond the narrow political interests of political elites, it is hard to see how this served the (Western) Balkan subject. It rather served the basic discourses of the West – Yugoslav Crisis – to appear consistent in its policy – observation – by portraying the (Western) Balkan 'other' in a certain light. This is also where the Euro-Atlantic processes of the (Western) Balkans would come to be portrayed as the ticket out of these genealogical identity variations. Gligorov, for example, claimed that "the suitable help to Yugoslavia for the overcoming of all these problems would be for the process of association with the EC to be precipitated, a perspective to be gained that we are entering the European space" (Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia, 1991b). Precipitated association and integration processes with the EU and NATO, would, paradoxically, be framed as the way out of older articulations of the identity of the (Western) Balkans by the same actors who would perpetually return the (Western) Balkan 'other' to its disintegrated identity articulations of the past. This would become even more apparent over time and once the EU and NATO policies towards the region are configured into a more consistent policy such as the Euro-Atlantic integration processes of the (Western) Balkans.

Western 'self': The post-Cold War Atlanticists versus Europeanists divide

The invocation of older genealogical articulations of the identity of the (Western) Balkans for the vindication of contemporary policies by the political elites from the (Western) Balkans and the West alike is further connected to matters which extend beyond the (Western) Balkan 'other' and which have to do with the Western 'self'. Ultimately, the purpose of invoking othered articulations of identity is the justification of successful policies which enable the 'self' to persevere and its elites to remain in power. The two discursive themes that the West had framed the Yugoslav crisis through, regardless of appearing in both the EU and NATO

approaches, point to bigger divisions, controversies, and the lack of unity within the Western 'self' on issues beyond the (Western) Balkans.

Some elements within the EC were quite keen in showing that Europe could manage issues on its own and independently of NATO, especially on matters of defense and security that were taking place right there, in Europe. Doubts around this had risen especially since 1991 is also the year of the liberation of Kuwait and the Gulf War as NATO's first post-Cold War and out-of-area operation[24], which portrayed Europe as inactive and paralyzed due to internal disagreements. Sir Brittain himself speaks of "[t]he *disunity* of Europe's response to the Gulf crisis" (European Commission, 1991j) which served as "a reminder and a reassertion of US military predominance" and "demonstrated the limits of current European political and security integration" (European Commission, 1991d). The European Commission's President, Jacques Delors, while attempting to praise EC's twelve members unity claiming that "[t]he Twelve were *united* on the basic positions" (European Commission, 1991b), also added that "to be brutally honest, public opinion sensed that Europe was rather *ineffectual*". Such infectiveness was particularly threatening in times when Europe was keen on expanding further and unifying in a fundamentally changed post-Cold War world and disintegrated Soviet Union, with the purpose of remaining influential and of occupying a role in the newly emerging multipolar scenario. NATO (1991b) considered that times of "dramatic developments are taking place in Europe" that required a "new approach to security", as did the EC calling for "rediscovering its true *self*" (European Commission, 1991e) within "the new international order" (European Commission, 1991b).

The disintegrated and rearticulated identity of the (Western) Balkans 'other' would come to assist and serve the united West with such reinventions of 'self'/'selves'. The later key events would further witness to this pattern, but the year of 1991 is already indicative. The internal EC controversies reflected disputes between the Atlanticists on one hand headed by the United Kingdom who saw European defense as an internal pillar of NATO, and the Europeanists headed by France and Germany predominantly, who were rather keen in developing a unique security and defense identity on the other. Through the Single European

[24] Note that NATO was not a direct participant in the Gulf War. However, Allied Command Europe played a major role in supporting NATO member states threatened by the conflict, particularly its Mediterranean members and Turkey.

Act (European Communities, 1986) the EC had set goals of furthering both economic integration through the establishment of a single market by 1992, and political integration through the European Political Cooperation (EPC) as the precursor of the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) instituted by the Maastricht Treaty in 1992. The year of 1991 is, therefore, brimming with the "unanimous desire to reinforce the identity and role of the Union as a political entity on the international scene" (European Council, 1991, p. 3) and the visible necessity to demonstrate that "[w]e are not passive spectators. Both US and the European Community are players" (European Commission, 1991a).

The (Western) Balkans became the vessel for meeting this necessity. While everyone seemed in an agreement for retaining an influence in the new international order, the Yugoslav crisis – among other events – made apparent the weaknesses of EPC and with this it debilitated the position of the Europeanists. The Yugoslav crisis, indeed, exposed the disunity within the European 'self', but the victory of the Atlanticists, however, witnesses to the retention of the Western 'self' as the Euro-Atlantic unity between the EU and NATO. TEU which was signed in 1992 proposed no significant changes in the areas of foreign and security policy, and the Western European Union (WEU) which stood for the European 'pillar' within NATO continued to play the same role under the Atlanticists' insistence on the sufficiency of the Euro-Atlantic alliance. Even if the Yugoslav wars would later enhance the desire to strengthen EU's foreign policy and its defense identity, at the same time, the 'balkanized' (Western) Balkans would continue to be used as a trophy of successful joint action partly of the internal unity of EU and/or NATO, and partly of the transatlantic unity between the two.

The role that the disintegrated (Western) Balkans 'other' played in this retention is detectable in the spoken discourse of many EU officials. Commissioner, Frans Andriessen, referring to the Yugoslavia disintegrations and the Soviet Union, affirmed that "*unity* cannot be taken for granted and must contend with other trends which point to *fragmentation*" (European Commission, 1991i). In addition, Sir Brittan claimed that "Yugoslavia provides a textbook example of the sort of crisis in which, for one reason or another, the Americans may choose not to commit forces on the ground, yet where they might welcome the deployment of European forces" (European Commission, 1991h), and for many years to come, as this dissertation demonstrates, the 'balkanization' of the (Western) Balkans would continue to play

this reference role for developing the most suitable arrangement between the EU and NATO and retaining the unity of the Western 'self'.

With this, the role that the Western 'self' would play in the retention of the Balkan 'other' as 'balkanized' is also detectable. The *Associated Press* wrote that "Germany on Monday became the first major country to recognize Croatia and Slovenia" (Buric, 1991), adding *Radio Belgrade*'s commentary: "'Germany, for the third time this century, assumed the right to chart the map of Europe'". The European Commissioner, Martin Bangemann, had confirmed that "[i]t would be difficult for a confederation to be a member of the European Union. This makes the question of the accession of Yugoslavia more complicated" (European Commission, 1991c). Indeed, the integration of a confederation which in many ways was undermined by the West would have complicated Yugoslavia's accession to the EU. However, a disintegrated Yugoslavia made matters anything but simple, as the later key events would demonstrate. The accession of (Western) Balkan countries and former Yugoslav constituents into the EU and NATO to date remains problematic and grounded in different but older articulations of the identity of the (Western) Balkans. Since the retention of the unity of the Western 'self' is maintained through policies towards the (Western) Balkans 'other' grounded in older articulations of the identity of the (Western) Balkans, maintaining those genealogical articulations alive becomes essential. The Euro-Atlantic processes of the (Western) Balkans, therefore, not only are grounded in but reproduce what seems like new and what are only rearticulated genealogical variations of the identity of the (Western) Balkans. The year of 1991 is just the first among other key events – including the armed conflict of 2001 in (North) Macedonia elaborated below – which illustrate these dynamics.

(North) Macedonia during Stabilization: The Armed Conflict of 2001

Though it took a decade, the armed conflict of 2001 revealed that the 'oasis of peace' was neither an oasis, nor peaceful. Different from the 1991 independence, the armed conflict of 2001 in (North) Macedonia which began when the ethnic Albanian National Liberation Army (NLA) militant group attacked the security forces of (North) Macedonia in January 2001[25],

[25] See Communiqué no. 4 of the NLA claiming responsibility for the bombing of a police station near Tetovo sent to the Macedonian daily *Dnevnik* as quoted in a report by the International Crisis Group (2001).

was not an event[26] which needed to plead for the attention of the hesitant West. Three other key regional events – the war in BiH, in Kosovo, and the fall of Milošević (see Chapter 4) – place the armed conflict within the *Stabilization* basic discourse. In 2001 the EU and NATO were well beyond an observationist mood and ready to *intervene*. By then, the Yugoslav subject had acquired a different layer of otherness – called quite often *South East Europe* (SEE) – which highlights proximity to the West. The (Western) Balkans were referred to as "the European 'near abroad'" (Griffiths & Meyer, 2001) and (North) Macedonia considered as a country needing to be "put back on its road to Europe" (The White House, 2001e).

These conflicts, however, even if perceived closer hence deserving of West's intervention, were also seen as "darkening our [NATO's] doorstep" (NATO, 2001h). The (Western) Balkan 'other' remained – though in the West's *backyard – backward*. The closer encounter of the two is necessary, as the NATO Secretary General, Lord Robertson argued, "to prevent such 'black holes' from emerging right at our doorstep" (NATO, 2001k). Notwithstanding the events in BiH and Kosovo had brought about mechanisms of Stabilization such as EU's Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe (SP) and the Stabilization and Association Process (SAP), as well NATO's South East European Initiative (SEEI) and the Membership Action Plan (MAP) signed by (North) Macedonia in 1999 after joining the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program in 1995, such contemporary policy tools continued to coexist and be built on older historical and pejorative notions of the (Western) Balkans – this time on the *WWII/Colonial* genealogical basic discourse.

As per the structure of every section dedicated to a key event in this dissertation, the first subsection describes here the discursive splits of the (Western) Balkan 'other' through the 2001 armed conflict in (North) Macedonia as argued by the EU, NATO, and local actors. A 'screenshot' of this is Table 7 which incorporates the positions of both the EU and NATO, and actors from (North) Macedonia articulated through four main discursive themes – *Equality*, *Terrorism*, and *Multiethnicity*. The second subsection locates intervention as a policy undertaken by the West within older articulations of the identity of the (Western) Balkans, that is the WWII/Colonial genealogical basic discourse of 'balkanization'. It once again illustrates how (North) Macedonia's political elites join the West in invoking such references. The third

[26] See the Minorities at Risk Project (2004) on events about the inter-ethnic difficult coexistence of Albanians and Macedonians in the country between 1990 and the 2001 armed conflict.

subsection turns towards the Western 'self' during 2001, examining its reconfigurations and attempts of maintaining unity through the 'balkanized' (Western) Balkan 'other'.

Table 7. (North) Macedonia: Stabilization Discursive Themes

Event	Discursive Themes	Rearticulated Identities	Policy	Actors
2001 Armed Conflict	Equality	Splitting the 'Albanians' from the 'Macedonians'	Liberation through rebellion and war	- NLA
			Reform through democratic means	- DPA - PDP
	Terrorism	Splitting the 'Albanians extremists/terrorists' from the Macedonian subject	Counter attacks and "No negotiations with terrorists"	- EU - NATO - Macedonian government and opposition
	Multiethnicity	Splitting the 'Albanian extremist/terrorist' from the 'Albanian political parties'	Political dialogue and the OFA	- EU - NATO - DPA - DPD

(Western) Balkan 'other': Back to ten years ago

It was not an astonishing thought that the 1991 dissatisfaction of the ethnic Albanians in (North) Macedonia would, at some point, require attention. Although Albanians had been represented by different political parties since the inception of the new state, for a decade the government barely addressed their concerns. The requests involved: constitutional and legal changes with regards to the position of the minorities in the country not yet recognized as a constitutive people in (North) Macedonia; the acknowledged equal status of Albanian as an official language; the guaranteed right to higher education in mother tongue; the use of national symbols; as well as equal constitutional relevance of the Macedonian Orthodox Church in comparison to other religions. These matters had all been raised ten years ago as (North) Macedonia was crafting its independence, and the repeated discursive topic of 1991 – *Equality* – therefore, with some variations on the means of accomplishing it, remained intact.

The two most active ethnic Albanian political parties which had won seats in the 1998 elections – the Democratic Party of Albanians (DPA) and PDP – were only reconfigurations of the older PDP and NDP that ethnic Albanians had supported euphorically. However, with the new actor – the NLA – on stage, and after ten years of waiting, a shorter pathway to the satisfaction of the Albanian aspirations appeared at the horizon. The NLA and the two main

political parties had their differences on the means of reaching their goals – the NLA took the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) example and wanted to fight a *war of liberation*. Its leader, Fazli Veliu, claimed that "[n]obody likes the armed struggle, but it is necessary … [W]e just want equal rights" (International Crisis Group, 2001, p. 12). The DPA and DPD on the other hand, argued for *reforms* through *democratic* means. Notwithstanding their differences, the three main ethnic Albanian political actors, during the armed conflict of 2001 in (North) Macedonia, argued predominantly through the same discursive theme: Equality. Though not explicitly arguing for a policy of territorial fragmentation, they differentiated and split the Albanian subject from the Macedonian one.

The ruling government and opposition argued that the conflict was one which "brings into question the territorial integrity of Macedonia" (Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia, 2001a) since "[t]he terrorist group's [NLA's] agenda" said the Macedonian representative at the UN, Naste Calovski, "was to destabilize Macedonia by 'liberating' part of Macedonia's territory in the North, adding it to Kosovo and creating a larger, independent Kosovo State" (United Nations, 2001). Macedonian political actors argued for a policy of *counterattacks* against the NLA and *no negotiations* with those who they had labeled as the 'terrorists' and/or 'extremists' through the *Terrorism and Extremism* discursive theme. The Macedonian President, Boris Trajkovski, had claimed that "terrorism is nothing else but terrorism" (Edwards, 2001), adding that "[w]e have never been in a position to discuss or to have any kinds of talks with terrorists" (Macedonia president rejects talks, 2001). Their discursive theme, however, also further 'balkanized' the Macedonian subject into 'Macedonians' and 'Albanian extremists/terrorists'.

In their discursive split, the Macedonian authorities expected the support of the West. They had been dutiful to the requests of the EU and NATO for accepting refugees during the Kosovo war in 1999, and as the U.S. Envoy, James Pardew (2017, p. 264) – lead negotiator for the OFA – states in his memoir, "most senior ethnic Macedonian leaders believed that the international community should endorse the government's aggressive use of the police and the army to defeat the NLA in the countryside" instead of involving them in a dialogue. While the international community did not explicitly endorse force against the NLA, it did join the authorities in discursively splitting the 'Macedonians' from the 'Albanian extremists/terrorists'. In a statement by the U.S. Press Secretary, Ari Fleischer, the United

States aligned with its "European allies and other countries of the United Nations in strongly condemning the terrorist violence perpetrated by armed extremists" (The White House, 2001b). Lord Robertson, jointly with the EU High Representative, Javier Solana[27], confirmed that "the International Community has clearly stated its commitment to the democratic institutions, territorial integrity and sovereignty of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia" (NATO, 2001j), while both condemning and calling for the isolation of "extremists" (European Commission, 2001) and "extremist groups" (NATO, 2001c) in the country.

However, without including the demands of ethnic Albanians in the process a long-lasting solution to the problem could obviously not be found. To 'feed two birds with one scone', the EU and NATO relied on *Multiethnicity* while further splitting the 'Albanian extremist/terrorists' subject into the 'NLA extremists/terrorists' and the DPA and DPD as legitimate political representatives of the 'innocent' Albanian civilians. Arguing for facilitating a *political dialogue* which resulted with the *OFA* on August 13, 2001, implied the need to circumvent the ban on negotiations with the terrorists – a reason to *intervene* which the 'extremist/terrorists' could not provide with. The DPA leader, Arbën Xhaferi, had condemned NLA's actions as "an act against the interests of the Albanians in Macedonia" (International Crisis Group, 2001, p. 3). With this, DPA's Xhaferi, and DPD's Imer Imeri became the "legitimate political representatives not armed extremists" (NATO, 2001c) of the "legitimate grievances of local ethnic Albanians" (The White House, 2001b). As leaders of the major Albanian political parties in (North) Macedonia, DPA and DPD provided with an alternative to including the ethnic Albanian demands and open a process of dialogue, while keeping the 'terrorists/extremists' who threatened the territorial integrity of (North) Macedonia seemingly off the table of negotiations. James Pardew (2017, pp. 271-274) who had negotiated the talks together with the EU Envoy, François Léotard, later admitted that the NLA was – though implicitly – a participant in the discussions. Multiethnicity enabled the West to congruently support the Macedonian authorities in their defense of territorial integrity through "no negotiations with terrorist", while intervening and facilitating a dialogue whose failure could have put to risk much of what the West had already invested in the region.

[27] Note that Solana was also the Secretary General of NATO from 1995 to 1999. In this dissertation he plays one or the other role depending on the key event covered.

Nonetheless, Multiethnicity has its own blank spots. Contradictory remarks on a well-functioning multiethnic society whose territorial integrity was threatened by the 'extremists/terrorists' on one side, and valid demands for the improvement of the conditions for minorities in (North) Macedonia on the other, point towards the instability of this discursive theme. For example, Lord Robertson had stated that "[t]his nation stands out as a successful example of a well-functioning, multi-ethnic society in a region which has for too long suffered from conflicts among different ethnic groups" (NATO, 2001b). However, he had also spoken of the "legitimate concerns of the local ethnic Albanian population" (NATO, 2001f) which was needed to argue for Multiethnicity and negotiate an agreement that would supposedly convert (North) Macedonia into a well-functioning, multi-ethnic society. Had (North) Macedonia really stood for an example of a well-functioning and multi-ethnic society, then how could the concerns of ethnic Albanians be legitimate? And with that, of what use was the OFA? Just like the Territorial Integrity discursive theme was meant to keep an 'open door' for West's policy of observation while SFRY disintegrates, Multiethnicity was meant to keep an 'open door' for Western intervention to, paradoxically, help function an otherwise well-functioning, multi-ethnic society. Such discursive blank spots are covered through references to genealogical basic discourses which enable certain policies, though incongruent – such as "no negotiations with terrorists" who threaten the territorial integrity of a well-functioning society, but also a political dialogue with Albanians in the country who have legitimate concerns about the multi-ethnic society they live in – easily ignorable or unnoticeable.

Identifying blank spots in discursive themes is important not just for identifying inconsistency or lack of transparency on how such themes were rather serving the West's self-interest, but also for showing how these blank spots are utilized by the local political actors to remain in or come to power. For example, NLA's Commander, Ali Ahmeti (2015, 1:17:00), when retrospectively asked during an interview: "your dream, Mr. Ahmeti, was one of Albanians of Macedonia uniting with those of Kosovo and Albania or building a multiethnic Macedonia?", he responded: "when I started my activities, I started them for Albania – for these lands to be Albania, neither Macedonia nor Kosovo". Paul Wood (2001) wrote for the *BBC*: "The NLA know that the West might support a battle for human rights, but it will not support a battle for territory". The NLA, therefore, kept matters of territorial demands silent and argued through the Equality discursive theme as compatible with Multiethnicity – a well-

functioning, multi-ethnic society in which ethnic groups are equal. This suited the West in keeping controversial territorial discussions hushed, the Macedonian authorities content, and declaring OFA as yet another Western trophy of success. It also suited the NLA who, just like the KLA, had been interested in invoking Western intervention as a way of materializing its policies.

Discursive blank spots were utilized by the NLA not just for indirectly incorporating their interest within the OFA, but for becoming a full-fledged political actor after the war. The NLA transformed into a political party in 2002 called the Democratic Unity for Integration (DUI) with Ahmeti as its leader. Rubin (2001) wrote for the *Los Angeles Times*: "Rebel Leader no longer persona non grata" referring to Ahmeti. Had the West gone either with the story of a well-functioning and multi-ethnic society, or with the legitimate concerns of Albanians in (North) Macedonia – but not with both – the NLA would either not have been able to argue through Equality which would have delegitimized them after the conflict, or they would have not been 'extremists/terrorists'. In this way, however, they were both – subjects with reasonable concerns and illegitimate/unreasonable 'extremists/terrorists'. By including the 'extremists/terrorists' in the talks, the West legitimized them as the major political representative of the legitimate concerns of ethnic Albanians in (North) Macedonia. Even currently – two decades after the conflict and with short falls from a governing position – ethnic Albanians continue to be represented by DUI whose leader was among those that Lord Robertson had referred to as "[a] band of armed thugs" (NATO, 2001e). Robertson had also equalized the NLA with Slobodan Miloševič, referring to them as "armed extremists seeking to break apart nations, such as in Bosnia and Herzegovina ten years ago" (NATO, 2001h). Leaders like Miloševič, however, before falling from power, played the role of West's peacekeepers for quite a while (see Chapter 4). Other political figures in Serbia such as Aleksandar Vučić, Tomislav Nikolić, and Ivica Dačić who had nationalists background connected to Miloševič, reversibly continue to play that role after his death (see Chapter 5), just as those labelled as 'terrorists/extremists' such as Ahmeti. These actors are currently key negotiators for the countries' Euro-Atlantic integration processes, as they are also a syndrome of discursive blank spots through which the West turned a 'blind eye' to local political elites instrumentalizing its discursive themes for their own self-interest.

Genealogical references: WWII/Colonialism, monsters, and fortune tellers

Different discursive themes and with that Stabilization as the basic discourse surrounding the armed conflict of 2001 in (North) Macedonia – just as the Yugoslav Crisis and Europeanization – also rely on older genealogical articulations of the identity of the (Western) Balkans. In so doing, they make apparent the role that the political elites play in referring to older historical articulations while arguing for controversial contemporary policies. It is the Kosovo War and the fall of Milošević which preceded the conflict of 2001 in (North) Macedonia that reveal more explicit links to the WWII/Colonial basic discourse of 'balkanization'. Yet, references to the same are also found during the conflict in (North) Macedonia – though less as the event comes closer to the 2003 shift from Stabilization to the Europeanization basic discourse (see Chapters 5 and 6).

The interventionist policies that the WWII/Colonial genealogical basic discourse of 'balkanization' share with Stabilization as a contemporary basic discourse are seen in 2001 texts which involve genealogical references that witness to some encounter between the West and its (Western) Balkan 'other'. A quote by Lord Robertson is particularly revealing of this:

> In the early days of navigation, the maps featured many blind spots. But the mapmakers were too embarrassed to admit their ignorance. So they simply wrote "Here Be Monsters", suggesting that there was no need for the seamen to travel to these spots in the first place. In some respects, the early cartographers were behaving like some of us when we face tough choices. Our first instinct may be to avoid these tough decisions, and to simply choose a less painful alternative. Like the mapmakers, we tend to be afraid of the unknown. Eventually, however, we are forced to make the tough decisions. And then we usually find that they were the right decisions. We find out that there were no monsters waiting. (NATO, 2001i)

Robertson had stated this as he spoke of the right choices that NATO had made in having opted "for engagement over indifference regarding our less fortunate neighbours" (NATO, 2001i), including the (Western) Balkans. Though the quote is an evidence of reconciliatory nuances, it is also an admittance that, prior to reaching such a stage of awareness, perceptions of "less fortunate neighbors" were those of monsters. Further, even if it is unclear to which stages of the "early days of navigation" Robertson refers to, it might be safe to say that modern early 1500s colonialism involving the European discoveries of the African and American coasts or what is known as the Age of Discoveries might have incorporated such maps. This only further witnesses to the links between WWII/Colonial 'balkanization' and Stabilization and the similarities in the articulations of identities they both relied on.

An encounter with the former monsters, however, is as far as WWII/Colonial 'balkanization' and Stabilization seem to advocate for (integration as the next step is what Europeanization would later argue for). This is visible in quotes which locate the armed conflict of 2001 in (North) Macedonia within a – maybe not monstruous – yet backward 'other'. An episode from Pardew's (2017) memoir is particularly illustrative of this. Describing being stuck in his hotel room in Skopje, he "discovered a unique Balkan form of reality TV while flipping through television channels – a fortune teller call-in show. In this primetime program, a dour middle-aged female fortune teller sat at a table shuffling Tarot cards" (Pardew, 2017, p. 298). He goes on further describing the show and wrapping up with "I was struck by the cultural differences that made such a prime-time TV show possible in the Balkans" (Pardew, 2017, p. 298). Such mysticism of monsters and fortune tellers corresponds to the portrayal of a colonial 'other' that postcolonial literature debunks (see Said, 1979), hence, further witnessing to the links between Stabilization and the WWII/Colonial basic discourses of 'balkanization'. Pardew was one of the most crucial figures during the armed conflict of 2001 in (North) Macedonia, and such references show how the policies he argued for, which resulted with OFA, are, therefore, located within older genealogical articulations of the identity of the (Western) Balkans grounded in perceptions of striking "cultural differences" (Pardew, 2017, p. 298). What is also striking, however, is that as he saw such shows as representative of "a unique Balkan form of reality TV" (Pardew, 2017, p. 298), *The Jenny Jones Show* featuring Miss Cleo – a television infomercial psychic and a Tarot reader – had been entertaining the U.S. audiences since 1997. Miss Cleo stands for the black and mystic colonial 'other' and for Pardew's avoidance to see such culturally different figures and practices – though present at home – as backward and located somewhere else than home.

(North) Macedonia remained grounded within older pejorative articulations of the identity of the (Western) Balkans – and this in both Western and local discourses. Written questions to the European Parliament (2001) continued to speak of "talk[s] of a new 'powder keg' in the Balkans", referring to the conflict of 2001 and "acts of barbarism". Franz von Daniken, the State Secretary of Switzerland, spoke to NATO of "the Balkans equation" (NATO, 2001d) where "the sum of conflict, violence and nationalism is a constant"; while *BBC*'s Wood (2001) wrote that "[a]s so often in the Balkans, once the guns come out, nothing can be taken for granted". Internally, however, Risto Tomovski (2001), for example, mirrored

for the local daily *Nova Makedonija* as he confirmed that "in our Balkans, where as we have seen in the past ten years, anything is possible"; or Petar Gošev reproduced in the parliamentary debate of (North) Macedonia that "the real Europeanization of Macedonia" is seen in the development of the country as "a civil society, as opposed to the now more vampiric tribal-collectivist concepts that belong to the Middle Ages" (Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia, 2001b). Pejorative articulations of the identity of the (Western) Balkans during the 2001 armed conflict in (North) Macedonia persisted, but, as during the 1991 independence, they were reproduced by the West and by the political elites in (North) Macedonia alike to cover this time for a policy of intervention rather than of observation.

The mirroring of Western articulations of the identity of the (Western) Balkans is so deeply ingrained in the region that beyond taking place in the reproduction of those rearticulations of identity between the (Western) Balkans themselves, it reflects the same towards the colonial 'other'. An example of the first can be found again in an article of *Nova Makedonija* where Vladimir Gelevski (2001) wrote:

> We continue to witness that the devil is plotting and digging, deeply and systematically, here in the Balkans…. People in the civilized world strive to make their lives easier, to reach other planets and worlds, and to conquer diseases. However, the Albanians, who apparently still think that they are living in the 19th century, dream of how to unite and all join together in one country.

An example of the second can be located in a description of the (North) Macedonian Ambassador in Bulgaria, Ljubiša Georgievski: "Now Albania, Bulgaria and Greece must do their best not to allow further spillovers, or else the whole area may be *Beirutized*" (With BC-Balkans-fighting Macedonia's conflict may "Beirutize" Balkans, Ambassador says, 2001) . In reference to Beirut, Caroline R. Nagel (2002, p. 718, footnote in the original amended), explains how "[b]y the end of the civil war[28] … 'Lebanon' had become almost synonymous with senseless destruction and 'tribal warfare,' and the neologism 'Beirutization' had joined 'Balkanization' in the lexicon of social disintegration." Hence, it is interesting to see how local discourses not only mirror 'balkanization' but reflect it back towards the West's colonial 'other' as per their needs, just as the colonial subject of the WWII/Colonial genealogical basic discourses reflected its own troubles into the (Western) Balkan subject using 'balkanization'.

[28] The Lebanese civil war (1975 to 1990/91) was a series of different conflicts which included clashes between Sunnis and Shias, Christians and Muslims, and the involvement of Syria, Israel, and the PLO.

What is crucial to deduce from this subsection, however, is noticing how the switch from one to another policy – from observation during the 1991 independence to intervention during the 2001 armed conflict –, which the West undertook towards (North) Macedonia, was initiated through invoking older articulations of the identity of the (Western) Balkan 'other' located in the Balkan Wars/WWI and WWII/Colonialism. That is, contemporary policies, supposedly based on contemporary assessments of the issues on the ground and with that also a contemporary (Western) Balkan subject, were instead argued through older pejorative conceptualizations on the (Western) Balkan 'other'. What this also means is that such policies were not only based on outdated assumptions, but also revitalized the same into the present. Such a discursive move was supported and continues to be by the local political elites in the (Western) Balkans, though ultimately, as the subsection below expands, it is best instrumentalized to reinvent and readjust the Western 'self' as united through juxtaposing it with the perpetually 'balkanizing' (Western) Balkan 'other'.

Western 'self': Leo-Pard

The rearticulations of identity of the (Western) Balkan 'other' and the continuous splits of the subject are important because they serve the goal of materializing themselves into policies for which the actors argue and hence remain in power through. Just as invoking Balkan Wars/WWI references during the independence of the country in 1991 served the materialization of the West's observationist policies which were necessary to retain the united Western 'self', invoking references to WWII/Colonial genealogical basic discourse during 2001 continues to serve that function even as (North) Macedonia would become the first country from the region to sign an SAA with the EU in 2001 which would enter into force in 2004 (see Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, of the other part, 2004). Switching from the Yugoslav Wars to the Stabilization basic discourse also means switching from one to another genealogical basic discourse of 'balkanization' – from observation as a policy to intervention – which yet again results with a more united Western 'self' and a further divided (Western) Balkan 'other'. This does not mean that the 'balkanization' of the (Western) Balkans leads, without any exception, to the unity of the Western 'self' – being that within the EU and NATO or between the two. What all key events reveal, however, is that throughout

the Yugoslav Wars, Stabilization, and later Europeanization, the (Western) Balkans continue to be an arena which accommodates triumphing announcements and assertations of transatlantic unity and harmony.

During 2001, the (Western) Balkans once again showed to be at the very least the testing ground of such unity and the trigger for exposing and then remedying any potential disarray within and between the EU and NATO. By 2001, internal conflicts within the Western 'self' were not as explicit as during the 1990s. The above-mentioned clashes between the Atlanticists and the Europeanists had famously toned down after the yet again perceived European failure to intervene in Kosovo to stop the conflict which in 1998 had brought the United Kingdom and France in a joint agreement that "the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action" as stated in the Saint-Malo declaration (Joint Declaration on European defence issued at the British-French Summit, 1998). With this, the traditionally hesitant United Kingdom had succumbed to the Europeanists request unifying once again beyond their historical disagreements. Nonetheless, for the United Kingdom, the close cooperation maintained with the United States had only come to the benefit of its position as a leading actor in the establishment of European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) in 1999 as the predecessor to the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) of the EU which the Treaty of Lisbon (2007) would introduce once entering into force in 2009. Between the two, the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) had in 1999 also introduced the figure of the High Representative for EU Foreign Policy. Though all these events had preceded the 2001 armed conflict in (North) Macedonia, their utility had yet to be tested – and (North) Macedonia provided. The armed conflict offered the perfect excuse for EU's first military operation which would take place later during 2003 as Operation "Concordia" (and later EUPOL Proxima) took over from NATO's "Allied Harmony". While Chapter 6 explores "Concordia" in more depth, at this point, it would suffice to say that it is generally regarded as a successful mission and a trophy of European effective joint action.

Events of the late 1990s in the (Western) Balkans, as well as the armed conflict of 2001, which are part of the Stabilization basic discourse, not only offered the opportunity of addressing the exposed incongruencies between the EU members from within, but also of addressing those between the EU and NATO which – though incorporate the development of a separate defense and security identity of the former – remain geared towards unity and

cooperation between the two. By 2001, the Bush administration was determined to keep NATO out of any other major interventionist operations in the region while giving the EU a chance to lead in (North) Macedonia. However, the United Sates continued to work in unison with the EU. So amalgamated was the work of their two representatives in (North) Macedonia, *Léo*tard and *Pard*ew, that they were referred to as "*Leo-Pard*" (Pardew, 2017, pp. 277-283). The Western discourse surrounding the armed conflict of 2001 in (North) Macedonia was filled with claims of "[w]e went in *together*, we will come out *together*" (NATO, 2001g). The U.K. Prime Minister, Tony Blair, had claimed that "Europe and America and Britain and America stand *together*…[w]e're doing so in the Balkans. We're doing so trying to sort out the problems of Macedonia" (The White House, 2001d), and they would continue to do so through the many other problems that the (Western) Balkans would offer the West to solve through its Euro-Atlantic policies.

The sorting out of the problems of (North) Macedonia was utilized to illustrate, as Robertson claims, how "[o]ur work together in the Balkans shows how much the 23 nations of NATO and the EU can achieve when we *combine our efforts*" (The White House, 2001a). Such joint achievements are essential for maintaining the Western 'self' united or stated differently – the united Western 'self' is essential for claiming such achievements which are particularly relevant for the reinvention of NATO as the embodiment of transatlantic unity, but also for the newly emerging ESDP of the EU. For NATO, whose raison d'être, as Robertson claims, was questioned "every four years" (NATO, 2001a), the (Western) Balkans would before and after 2001 be used as an example that "nobody is going to *split* the alliance". For the EU, Bush's Assistant for National security Affairs, Condoleezza Rice, had stated that the United States "welcome[s] this emerging identity so long as it is NATO-compatible and NATO-friendly" (The White House, 2001c), adding that "[w]e are prepared to welcome the EU as a foreign policy actor if it is prepared to take on real responsibilities. And we are demonstrating that we mean what we say in the Balkans". She added "that the Balkans in general is one of the first proving grounds for this new paradigm of NATO/EU cooperation" (The White House, 2001c). Similarly, Solana stated that "[t]he experience of the Balkans… provided us with an opportunity. It is a test of our commitment… to a mature common foreign and security policy" (European Commission, 2000a).

Therefore, it remains quite a contradictory statement the one of the former Prime Minister of Poland, Jan Krzysztof Bielecki, in front of NATO (2001l): "[T]he Balkan wars cast a dark shadow on European progress and the unification of the continent". On the contrary, the Balkan wars engrained in 'balkanization' seem to unify the EU, NATO, and their Western 'self', and cast a dark shadow on the (Western) Balkan 'other'. Such dark shadows remain intact for as long as contemporary policies of the EU and NATO towards the region remain grounded in older genealogical articulations of the identity of the (Western) Balkans. This also includes the Euro-Atlantic processes as born in a post-Yugoslav intervention rationale but preceded by observationist policies of the Yugoslav Crisis basic discourse of the early 1990s and proceeded by the integrationist policies of the Europeanization basic discourse of the 2000s. Led by the goal of uniting the 'self' as juxtapositional to the 'balkanizing' (Western) Balkan 'other', the Euro-Atlantic processes of the (Western) Balkans seem targeted at consolidating the Western united 'self' rather than rescuing and redeeming the 'balkanized' (Western) Balkans 'other' from their painful and shameful past. This misplaced focus is also what stands behind the blank spots of the discursive themes from above as it represents the 'turning a blind eye on' approach between the EU, NATO, and local leaders in the (Western) Balkans with the former also utilizing the historical pejorative conceptualizations of identity ingrained in the Euro-Atlantic processes of the (Western) Balkans to pursue their policies. Tony Karon (2001) asked "So why did NATO decide to turn Ahmeti from a 'terrorist' into a respectable citizen?" concluding that "[e]ssentially, because the alliance was never prepared to risk exposing its troops to danger in any confrontation with Albanian nationalists". Vangel Simev stated before the Macedonian Assembly "Europe is deceiving us all the time… here is your lollipop, so you lick this; when you lick it, we will give you another lollipop" (Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia, 2001c). The Euro-Atlantic processes of the (Western) Balkans as 'lollipops' for 'monsters' risk on keeping the 'monsters' of the past and those who carry them into the future alive and well-fed.

Conclusions

The two key events explored in this chapter stand for two contemporary basic discourses of 'balkanization' respectively – the Yugoslav Wars and Stabilization. The contemporary basic discourses, in turn, reveal links to two other genealogical basic discourses of 'balkanization'

respectively – the Balkan Wars/WWI and the WWII/Colonial. Having defined 'balkanization' as the discourse of the disintegrated (Western) Balkans 'other', the chapter further illustrated how 'balkanization' also stands for the discourse of the united Western 'self'. Both through the Yugoslav Wars and Stabilization, as the (Western) Balkans were 'balkanizing' and mutating from a Yugoslav subject into SEE, the EU and NATO continued to consolidate from within and in between – precisely through their response to events in (North) Macedonia and the region. Internal disagreements and misalignments within the EU and NATO were not only made apparent through the Yugoslav events of the 1990s and the armed conflict of 2001 in (North) Macedonia but were further addressed and consolidated. Events in the (Western) Balkans did not cause these misalignments anew – they were there, located in historical political battles between, for example, the United Kingdom and France, between the Europeanists and the Atlanticists, between the former and the United States, between the EU and NATO, and so on and so forth. The (Western) Balkans provided with the chance of fixing these misalignments.

Therefore, quite contrary to claims that the "idea that the nations of Western Europe belong together and should stay together, is jeopardized by the Balkan tragedies: Europe itself may be disintegrating over Yugoslavia" (Bradford W. , 2000, p. 17), the disintegration of the (Western) Balkan 'other' through its continuous discursive splits only made apparent such existing misalignments within the Western 'self' and, hence, opened the space for tackling them. This is also why the development of the security and defense identities of both the EU and NATO, which have requested the overcoming of many diverging views for unity to be established, are inherently connected to the 'balkanization' of the (Western) Balkans and tested on the (Western) Balkan subject. In a *Nova Makedonija* article, Ljube Profiloski (2001) wrote: "The international community likes to experiment with Macedonia… It treated us like guinea pigs… we have been viewed as an experiment and put through an endurance test". In another one for *Makedonija Denes*, Maja Anastasova (2001) wrote: "[a]nyway, we are in Macedonia. This is a piece of land on which the world's political and economic powers can take the liberty of experimenting and blackmailing". Both Profiloski (2001) and Anastasova (2001), among others, detected and were able to point out the real winners of 'balkanization'.

Naturally then, the research question would specify into – how does the discourse of the disintegrated (Western) Balkan 'other' *and the united Western 'self'* – 'balkanization' –

shape the Euro-Atlantic processes of the (Western) Balkans, and vice versa? Since 'balkanization' aims at containing dynamics of the (Western) Balkans 'other' as disintegrated, the Euro-Atlantic processes of the (Western) Balkans shape and are shaped by identity dynamics of the 'balkanized' (Western) Balkan 'other' and a united Western 'self'. Further, basic discourses such as the Yugoslav Crisis and Stabilization which maintain these dynamics, do so through genealogical references to the identity of the (Western) Balkans as 'balkanized' – being that versions of identity and layers of otherness can be located within the Balkan Wars/WWI or the WWII/Colonial genealogical basic discourses. For as long as this takes place, however, the Euro-Atlantic processes of the (Western) Balkans recycle older pejorative notions of the (Western) Balkans. This does not only work in favor of the unity of the Western 'self' and its perpetual reinvention, but also benefits the local political elites that switch from terrorists and nationalists into peacemakers and Euro-Atlantic enthusiasts. Of course, it does not work in favor of the (Western) Balkan people who risk on remaining at the margins of Europe and the West since even those processes, which are framed as intended to liberate them from their 'balkanized' and 'othered' past – such as their integration into the EU and NATO – , only reallocate them into recycled variations of their older identities and as such forward them into their future.

Following chapters further contextualize within other key events the development of these identity dynamics between the 'balkanized' (Western) Balkan 'other' and the united Western 'self' as shaping and in turn being shaped by the Euro-Atlantic processes of the (Western) Balkans and maintained by the political elites through genealogical references.

Chapter 4
(Socialist Yugoslav Republic of) Serbia: Once Upon a Time There Was One Country

The title of this chapter which is borrowed from Emir Kusturica's (1995) movie "Underground"[29] fits with the content presented below due to the temporal element that they both cover, and in which the (Western) Balkans are shown as trapped in periods of incessant transitions and ceaseless breakups. This chapter focuses on the early stages of the conversion of Yugoslavia – with a focus on Serbia – into a fraction of its former size; and how it came to inform EU's and NATO's policies towards the (Western) Balkans, and vice versa. It contextualizes the main research question – *How does 'balkanization' shape the Euro-Atlantic processes of the (Western) Balkans, and vice versa?* – within three key events: the war in BiH in 1995, the war in Kosovo in 1999, and the fall of Milošević in 2000. It captures the different rearticulations of the (Western) Balkan 'other' during these three key events through two main basic discourses – the Yugoslav Crisis and Stabilization through Table 5 below already seen before[30]. The Yugoslav Crisis is centered around the BiH war, while Stabilization covers the Kosovo war and the removal of Milošević from office. The two main sections are dedicated to the two basic discourses and their key events respectively.

Table 5. Contemporary Basic Discourses of 'Balkanization'

Basic Discourse	**Identity**		
	Layer of Otherness	**Temporality and Spatiality**	**Ethicality**
Yugoslav Crisis	*Yugoslavia*	*Regressive and distant*	*Observation*
Stabilization	*South East Europe*	*Backward in the backyard*	*Intervention*
Europeanization	Western Balkans	European and forward looking	Integration

In line with the other empirical chapters, here I argue that the Euro-Atlantic processes of the (Western) Balkans as a contemporary policy were born through genealogical references

[29]Kusturica is a highly controversial public figure. The former Bosnian Muslim and now Serbian Orthodox director has simultaneously been criticized and praised for Yugonostalgia and apologetic nationalism, often accused of reproducing Western stereotypes on the Balkans. In a critique towards Kusturica (1995) and "Underground*"* in particular, Žižek (2006, p. 186) blames him for providing "the libidinal economy of the ethnic slaughter in Bosnia", while others like Bjelić (2002, p. 15) argue that Kusturica's work should be looked at as "a genuine resistance and triumphant critique, rather than as an apology for nationalism". This chapter does not align with either position, rather it uses the subtitle of "Underground" – "Once Upon a Time There Was One Country" – as fitting to the content analyzed from the period covered in this chapter.

[30] Note that Table 5 is reinserted at the beginning of every empirical chapter henceforth to position the specific basic discourse(s) elaborated in the specific chapter in relation to other basic discourses, their temporal and spatial dimensions, and their policies.

to older historical articulations of the identity of the (Western) Balkans as 'balkanized' captured by genealogical basic discourses such as the Balkan Wars/WWI and WWII/Colonial. Such genealogical references which perpetually invoke images of the (Western) Balkans as 'balkanized' to justify contemporary policies best serve an image of the West as united. That is, the Euro-Atlantic processes of the (Western) Balkans ultimately benefit the Western 'self' rather than the (Western) Balkans, except from the (Western) Balkan political elites. This is not to say that the 'balkanization' of the (Western) Balkans unites the West – rather, as demonstrated throughout this thesis, that the Euro-Atlantic processes of the (Western) Balkans are utilized as a tool for converting the 'balkanization' of the (Western) Balkans into a perpetual chance for the reinvention of the West as united. This chapter contextualizes and specifies this argument by focusing on Serbia and the three key events explored below. The following chapters illustrate how these 'self'/'other' dynamics between the (Western) Balkans and the West continue to constitutively shape and be shaped by the Euro-Atlantic processes of the (Western) Balkans even during later basic discourses i.e. Europeanization.

Serbia during the Yugoslav Crisis: The 1995 war in BiH

This section investigates articulations of the identity of the (Western) Balkan subject in relation to the West during the war in BiH as a key event which lasted from 1992 to 1995. Exploring such articulations of identity which stand for discursive splits (see Table 8) – the 'balkanization' of the (Western) Balkan subject – is important for answering how the 'balkanization' of the (Western) Balkans has shaped the Euro-Atlantic prospects of the region, and vice versa. During the *Yugoslav Crisis* basic discourse, Serbia was officially still acting from under the 'wings' of the Yugoslav subject , and by 1995 Montenegro had continued to remain in the union though all the other republics had declared their independence. The discourse shows the *Yugoslav* subject as an 'other' that had yet to fully grasp the attention of the West and was yet to become a subject worthy of intervention. The approach which the EC (later the EU) and NATO adopted towards the (Western) Balkans, on the basis of a *regressive* and *distant* 'other', was *observation*. With this, the policy that the Yugoslav Crisis relied on is similar to the *Balkan Wars/WWI* genealogical basic discourse.

However, as the BiH war approached its end and the West transitioned from an observationist to an interventionist approach, links appeared to the WWII/Colonial

genealogical basic discourse. As is the case with (North) Macedonia (see Chapter 3), during the Yugoslav Crisis discussions for joining the EU and NATO were still not a possibility for the former Yugoslav republics, except for Slovenia (see Cooperation Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Republic of Slovenia, 1993).

Table 8. Serbia: Yugoslav Crisis Discursive Themes

Event	Discursive Themes	Rearticulated Identities	Policy	Actors
1995 War in BiH	Secession and National Unification	Splitting the 'Serbs' from the 'Bosniaks' and 'Croats' to connect to 'Serbia'	Homogenous Serbia	- Republika Srpska - Republic of Serbian Krajina
		Splitting the 'Croats' from the 'Bosniaks' and the 'Serbs' to connect with 'Croatia'	Homogenous Croatia or Bosnian-Croat federation	- Herzeg-Bosna - Croatia
	Impartiality and Neutrality	Splitting the 'Bosniak civilians' from the Serbian subject	Negotiations and "safe areas"	- EU - Contact Group
	Multiethnicity and Ethnic Cleansing	Splitting the Serbian subject into the 'Bosnian Serbs' and 'FRY'	Air strikes and the "Dayton Agreement"	- BiH - EU - NATO
	Peace and Economic Recovery	Splitting 'FRY' from the 'Bosniaks', 'Bosnian Serbs', and the 'Croats'	Three independent republics in a Union and supporting The Vance-Owen Plan	- FRY

The various rearticulated forms of identity that the (Western) Balkans underwent through the different key events studied not only in this chapter, but also the overall project are numerous. This section requires another methodological reminder about the Yugoslav Crisis discursive themes – or all discursive themes in general. Discursive themes rely on conceptual generalizations, and in this, nuances of different actors' positions and the policies they argue for based on specific rearticulated identities suffer loss. These nuances can be found, for example, within the EU as there were disagreements between countries like France and the United Kingdom on one hand that argued to keep the arms embargo on Yugoslavia brought by the UN Security Council (1991a) Resolution 713, and those like Germany on the other that argued for its lifting. Therefore, it is to be stated that the four discursive themes of the Yugoslav Crisis basic discourse – *Secession and National Unification*, *Impartiality and Neutrality*, *Multiethnicity and Ethnic Cleansing*, and *Peace and Economic Recovery* – although reductionist in nature, are analytical categories which help to 'sift' highly complex and long-

lasting events such as the war in BiH into the most prevailing dynamics between actors in the West and the (Western) Balkans.

(Western) Balkan 'other': Balkanized in UN 'safe areas'

What was the war in BiH about? Sabrina Ramet (2002, p. 203) starts with a good introduction as she says that "Muslims, Serbs, and Croats have lived in peace for most of the five hundred years they cohabited in Bosnia-Herzegovina". While "peace" would be perhaps an ambitious assumption, the quote well establishes the three main parties involved in the BiH war. The unusual mix with Muslims as a typically religious identity marker and Serbian and Croatian as rather ethnic, demands some further clarification. Muslims, as an ethnic group, was one of the six recognized constituent peoples of Yugoslavia; the other five being Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Macedonians, and Montenegrins, and it excluded Albanians, Turks, and Romani as non-Slavic Muslims. Constitutional rights of the constitutive peoples, nations or national minorities in Yugoslavia changed over time[31], but the 1991 census showed 44% of BiH's population as "ethnic Muslims", 31% as Serbs, 17% as Croats and the rest labelled as "Yugoslavs" (Zavod za statistiku Bosne i Hercegovine, 1991). The ethnic territorial spread of the then "ethnic Muslims" and hereafter Bosniaks[32], Serbs, and Croats living in the country, was far from being homogenous.

Between February 29 and March 1, 1992, the elected government of BiH (which had until then enjoyed the status of a constituent republic of Yugoslavia) headed by President Alija Izetbegović, called for a referendum and proclaimed its independence. The referendum had, however, been boycotted by the Bosnian Serbs who on January 9, 1992, had declared the independent Republic of the Serb people of Bosnia and Herzegovina (also known as Republika Srpska) and adopted its first constitution (Proslavljena slava Republike Srpske – Sveti arhiđakon Stefan, 2008) by February 29, 1992. Its president was Radovan Karadžić. Earlier, the Serbian minority in Croatia, following Croatia's independence on June 25, 1991, headed

[31] See for instance "The Constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia" (1974) which granted full equality for constitutive people and minorities and substantial autonomy to Kosovo and Vojvodina, the two constituent provinces.

[32] In 1993 the Bosniak Assembly ("*Bošnkaćki Sabor*" in Bosnian) adopted the ethnonym "Bosniak" ("*bošnjak*" in Bosnian) as an ethno-national signifier for Bosnian Muslims. During the BiH war the unreligious label became a common ethnonym to refer to Bosnian Muslims. I also use "Bosniaks" to refer to Bosnian Muslims.

by its President, Franjo Tuđman, had proclaimed their own independent Republic of Serbian Krajina on December 19, 1991, through the "Ustav Republike Srpske Krajine" [Constitution of the Republic of Serbian Krajina] (1991). To make matters even more complicated, in July 1992, the Croatian minority in BiH headed by Mate Boban had also formally declared its Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia (later known as the Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia). Therefore, by 1991/92, the dissolution of Yugoslavia scheme in its simplest format – excluding Slovenia and (North) Macedonia – further splits into at least three proto-states and three not so proto-armies shared among BiH, Croatia, and Serbia and Montenegro – the latter known as the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY)[33] until 2003.

Bosnian and Croatian Serbs in BiH argued from a theme of *Secession and National Unification*, and even if the policy they advocated was not framed as "Greater Serbia", it effectively argued for the unification of the Serbian people and the creation of a homogenous Serbian state. Among the strategic objectives of the Bosnian Serbs was also to "eliminate the Drina as a border separating Serbian States" (Assembly of the Serbian People in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1992); while the Serbian Krajina too pursued a policy of seceding from Croatia and uniting with FRY and Republika Srpska, visible through many of their documents (see Rupić & Ružić, 2010). That is, the policy of creating a *Homogenous Serbia* as advocated by the Bosnian Serbs and the Serbian Krajina requested a discursive split of the Serbs from the Bosniaks and Croats for uniting the same with FRY.

Alongside the campaign for creating a homogenous Serbia, the Croats of BiH were developing their own discursive theme of *Secession and National Unification*. The so-called Karađorđevo agreement between Milošević and Tuđman has been reported to have had the aim of "reestablish[ing] Bosnia-Herzegovina on ethnic lines, and then arrange for the Croat and Serb areas to be marched within Greater Croatia and Greater Serbia" (Bartrop, 2012, p. 43). Hrvoje Šarinić, an official in Tuđman's office present in the meeting, recalled in his memoir: "he [Tuđman] told him [Milošević] about the idea of Greater Serbia…. Then Milošević – that was very significant – said: 'I think that we surely can find a common language to solve those problems!'" (Lučić, 2003, p. 3). Croatia's and the BiH's Croat political

[33] Serbia and Montenegro established a new constitution in 1992 (Constitution of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 1992) and agreed to remain together in the new Yugoslav state. This was also the reason why the two continued to be referred to as "FRY". The acronym lasted until 2003 when the federal relationship between Serbia and Montenegro transitioned into one of confederacy.

elites during the war in BiH, often switched between alliances with BiH on one side and FRY on the other, and between plans for a *Bosnian-Croat federation* on one hand and a *Homogenous Croatia* on the other. The governments of BiH, Herzeg-Bosna, and Croatia initially joined their forces as Herzeg-Bosnia's military formation; and the Croatian Defense Council (HVO) was placed under the command of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (ARBiH) (Agreement on Friendship and Cooperation between the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republic of Croatia, 1992). However, the Constitutional Court of BiH had ruled the proclamation of Herzeg-Bosnia unconstitutional on September 14, 1992 (Prosecutor v. Jadranko Prlić et al, 2008). The end of 1992, therefore, brought an escalation to the Croat-Bosniak War which lasted until the "Washington Agreement" (Framework Agreement for the Federation, 1994) was reached, a ceasefire was called, and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina was founded.

The Washington Agreement of 1994, while being the only one successfully implemented, is also one among the several *negotiated* agreements between the parties involved in the BiH war such as "The Vance Plan" (1991), "The Vance-Owen Plan" (1993), "The Owen-Stoltenberg Plan" (1993), or the Contact Group[34] informal initiatives operating under the *Impartiality and Neutrality* discursive theme. However, the International Conference on Former Yugoslavia was quickly developing into a "photo opportunity" as William Bradford (2000, p. 43) calls it, especially after the failure of "The Vance-Owen Plan" (1993) which, though signed by Karadžić, was rejected by the Republika Srpska National Assembly. After the EC and the WEU failed in finding consensus on lifting the arms embargo or on calling for an intervention, all responsibility fell on UN's shoulders which, as its Secretary General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali said, was "first and foremost the mirror of the will of the international community" (United Nations, 1995). Guided by its humanitarian principles, impartiality and neutrality, the UN opted for a policy of six "*safe areas*" – Srebrenica, Sarajevo, Žepa, Goražde, Tuzla, and Bihać (UN Security Council, 1993b; UN Security Council, 1993) – placed under the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR), splitting the "innocent civilian

[34] Established in April 1994, the Contact Group was composed of diplomatic representatives of France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. They informally met, coordinating the position of the EU, Russia, and United States on the war in BiH.

population" from the "Bosnian Serb paramilitary units" and the FRY, which was supplying the units with "military arms, equipment and services" (UN Security Council, 1993b).

While Europe persisted in its observationist approach until the end of the war in 1995, a shift in policies became an imperative when UNPROFOR stood by frozen as more than 8,000[35] Bosniaks were executed by Serb forces in a genocide[36] conducted within one of the UN declared "safe areas". The fall of Srebrenica stripped away the UN from any integrity it had. Ervin Mujkanović (1995) writing for *AIM* asked "[i]n fact, who still trusts UNPROFOR after Srebrenica?", while Rusmir Spahić (1995b) referred to the "Golgotha of Srebrenica… by its real name - UN betrayal and complicity in crime". As the international community saw its "safe areas" turning into scenes of genocide, it was becoming rather clear that a policy of observation could not last for too long without the EU, NATO, and the UN – and with this the Western subject – facing major repercussions to their credibility.

Not much could be done under the Impartiality and Neutrality theme, but the *Multiethnicity and Ethnic Cleansing* discursive theme had well been established since the beginning of the war and offered a way out from the current policy of inaction. The UN Special Rapporteur, Tadeusz Mazowiecki's reports had from 1992 to 1995 – and especially the February 10, 1993, report (UN Commission on Human Rights, 1993) with an emphasis on BiH – repeatedly cited "ethnic cleansing". To this discursive theme, BiH's President Izetbegović also contributed by juxtaposing the Serbian campaign of "ethnic cleansing" with the "multinational and multi-party" (Bosno, 1995) system as the goal of their democratic and multiethnic state. To intervene in the BiH war meant to transition from an observationist policy under the Impartiality and Neutrality discursive theme, towards an acting one under the Multiethnicity and Ethnic Cleansing theme. This shift is easily observed in Bill Clinton's speeches as, though he reiterates that "America cannot and must not be the world's policeman"

[35] The exact number of the Srebrenica genocide victims varies in different sources: the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) refers to more than 8,000, whereas Remembering Srebrenica, a U.K. charitable initiative has posted "[t]he names of the 8,372 victims (mostly men and boys) who were killed in the Srebrenica genocide" (List of victims, 2019).

[36] It is worth noting that the UN itself, due to Russia vetoing a draft resolution, has still not recognized the Srebrenica genocide (UN Security Council, 2015). Russia's UN representative, Vitaly Churkin, said that "[t]he role of the Council was to strengthen international peace and security; let historians judge events and tribunals deliver verdicts" pointing to the impartiality discourse that the UN had earlier adopted during the BiH war. Other bodies like the European Parliament (2009) and the ICJ have recognized the genocide [see Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro) , 2007].

(The White House, 1995c), he also adds that "[w]e cannot stop all war for all time; but we can stop some wars. We cannot save all women and all children; but we can save many of them. We can't do everything; but we must do what we can".

The shift, however, points towards a discursive blank spot which is best examined in the subsection below, but it is worth mentioning here. It regards inconsistencies of, on one side, a hopeless (Western) Balkan subject under the 'spell' of ancient ethnic hatred through which the West argued for most part of the BiH war via the Impartiality and Neutrality theme; and, on the other, the (Western) Balkans as capable of change and, therefore, worthy of intervention as would the West argue just before and after the bombings. The Multiethnicity and Ethnic cleansing discursive theme is incompatible with the Balkan Wars/WWI genealogical basic discourse which most Western actors argued through until 1995 when they switched to an interventionist approach. This allows for inconsistencies to be exposed since a Balkan Wars/WWI hopeless Balkan subject could not account for a policy of intervention. To justify the sudden, overnight change of a subject now capable of a multiethnic peaceful coexistence, the West switched its references towards the WWII/Colonial basic discourse and initiated the *air strikes*. On August 30, 1995, after a mortar shell at the Sarajevo marketplace launched by the Serb forces, NATO began its operation "Deliberate Force" – NATO's first air bombing campaign. The operation lasted until September 1995 as the efforts to negotiate an agreement which resumed on November 1, 1995, succeeded in reaching the "*Dayton Agreement*" (or Accords) (see General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1995) between Izetbegović, Tuđman, and Milošević, with the latter negotiating on behalf of the Republika Srpska. The parties agreed to a single sovereign state – Bosnia and Herzegovina – composed of two parts – Republika Srpska and the Croat-Bosniak Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina consisting of ten cantons. The agreement also welcomed the NATO-led peace enforcement Implementation Force (IFOR) which was succeeded by the peacekeeping Stabilisation Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina (SFOR) in 1996, and the European Union Force Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR) in 2004.

For such an intervention to have taken place and for the Accords to be signed, the Multiethnicity and Ethnic Cleansing discursive theme – as all discursive themes that argue for a change in policy – split the Serbian subject into the Bosnian Serbs as the perpetrator who could not sit on the table of negotiations, and FRY's Milošević who represented them. It was,

however, well-known that Milošević had continuously supported the Bosnian Serbs. Vojislav Šešelj[37] who was active in paramilitary units during the Yugoslav wars responsible for some of the most brutal aspects of ethnic cleansing (UN Security Council, 1994; Prosecutor v. Vojislav Šešelj, 2008) in a *BBC* documentary said that "Serbia did everything for us" (Mitchell, 1995, 02:06:47). Despite Milošević's denial of any involvement in militarily supporting the Serbs in BiH, the famous "Scorpion video" shown during Milošević's ICTY trial (Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milošević, 2005) showed the Serbian Ministry of the Interior dispatching the Scorpions[38] paramilitary unit to BiH in support of the Republika Srpska police and the Army of Republika Srpska (VRS) with its supreme commander, general Ratko Mladić.

Milošević, especially during the later years of the war in BiH, had switched into arguing from a *Peace and Economic Recovery* discursive theme, splitting from the Bosniaks, Bosnian Serbs, and the Croats. He had many times declared that the whole country had "sincerely *supported* the principles of *"The Vance-Owen plan"* (1993), both the constitutional principles, and the military arrangement – that is, all those things that could bring about peace" (Komrakov, 1993), while claiming to be in favor of "*three truly independent republics* which will form the *union* of Bosnia-Hercegovina republics" (Jevdjovic, 1993). He had dissociated from the parties in the conflict, claiming that "it is also well known that we are not a party to that conflict" (Komrakov, 1993) and later even that he had "cut off all our relations with all of them" (Gaines, Prager, Calabresi, & Michaels, 1995). The fact that Milošević had declared Serbia's borders closed to arms traffic in BiH further granted him a discursive split from Karadžić and Mladić; and, most importantly, he had negotiated the release of the UNPROFOR hostages captured by the VRS in May 1995. This had enabled the EU and NATO to further split him from the Bosnian Serbs under the Multiethnicity and Ethnic Cleansing discursive theme, and grant Milošević a chair at the signing of the Dayton Accords which was necessary as Karadžić and Mladić were by then both wanted by the ICTY for war crimes and were, hence, ineligible negotiators and signatories. Milošević's figure and his signature on the Dayton

[37] Šešelj is the co-founder of the Serbian Renewal Movement (SPO) movement. Vuk Drašković had left the nationalist Serbian National Renewal (SNO) to form SPO with Šešelj. In June 1990, Šešelj organized the Serbian Chetnik Movement (SČP) which was not legally permitted official registration due to its Chetnik identification. In 1991, he formed the Serbian Radical Party (SRS) with Tomislav Nikolić.

[38] The Scorpions were a Serbian paramilitary unit engaged in the battle of Vukovar in Croatia, the Srebrenica genocide in BiH, and the Podujevo massacre in Kosovo.

Accords would set one of the earliest examples of the use of West's approaches towards the region for the furthering of the local politicians' own agendas.

Genealogical references: Savages, tribes, and world wars

The observationist policy of the EU and NATO during the Yugoslav Crisis was not applied exclusively to the war in BiH. Similar to the (North) Macedonia case of 1991 (see Chapter 3), the war in BiH for its most part was merely observed by the international community on the grounds of older genealogical articulations of the identity of the (Western) Balkans from the Balkan Wars/WWI basic discourse. The Western response was led predominantly by those genealogical articulations of the identity of the (Western) Balkans that led to an observationist approach towards events such as the 1995 war in BiH and the 1991 independence of (North) Macedonia. Even Clinton who had come to take power on a sharp critique of George W. Bush's passive policy towards the (Western) Balkans, during the BiH war had mostly followed what the former U.S. Ambassador to Yugoslavia, Lawrence Eagleburger, had stated:

> I have said this 38,000 times, and I have to say this to the people of this country as well. This tragedy is not something that can be settled from outside and it's about damn well time that everybody understood that. Until Bosnians, Serbs, and Croats decide to stop killing each other, there is nothing the outside world can do about it. (cited in Holbrooke, 1999, p. 23)

Clinton had spoken of "a war going on in Bosnia that was fueled by ancient, bloody divisions between Bosnian Serbs, Muslims and Croats" (The White House, 1995a), claiming that "[w]e must remember that the Balkans are a troubling area, and that it was trouble in the Balkans that sparked World War I". He later recalled that "[i]n 1914, a gunshot in Bosnia's capital, Sarajevo, launched the first of two world wars" (The White House, 1995b). Richard Holbrooke – the U.S. Envoy to Yugoslavia and one of the most crucial figures in facilitating the "Dayton Agreement" – likewise started his memoir with "[t]he first time I saw Sarajevo, I placed my feet for a moment in the cement footprints pressed into the sidewalk on the spot where Gavrilo Princip stood when he fired the bullet that killed Archduke Franz Ferdinand" (Holbrooke, 1999, p. xix).

Other invocations of the old Balkan Wars/WWI hopeless (Western) Balkan subject are also found through a series of EU, NATO, and UN documents. They all point to Mazowiecki's (cited in Uzelac, 1995) summarized predominant approach of the West towards the BiH war:

> [t]he opinion that "peace will be possible only after they all kill each other" is widely held and I am afraid that the view of the conflict as a private affair of the Balkans will become prevalent in the European public opinion. Such an attitude frightens me and I cannot agree with the attempt to treat a war in the heart of Europe as a typical Balkan problem.

Among the proponents of this opinion were the European Parliament (1995) that had condemned the "barbaric conflict in this country"; the UN Secretary General who had referred to "the savagery of the war in the Balkans" (UN Security Council, 1995x); and NATO's Jamie Shea who had retrospectively referred to the "killing and ethnic cleansing and savage violence" (NATO, 2003q) in the (Western) Balkans. Furthermore, along the lines of Western official policies, the Western press quoted Otto von Bismarck's insights on the (Western) Balkans as "not worth the bones of a single Pomeranian grenadier" (Walker, 1993). Martin Walker (1993) wrote how the (Western) Balkans have a tendency to "plunge back into tribal wars", and that "Europeans know they should never get involved in the Balkans". The local magazine *Vreme* pointed out how Western diplomatic sources described Robert Frasure, the U.S. Ambassador to the Contact Group, as "a top expert for wild tribal conflicts" (Expert on wild tribes, 1995), while *AIM* reported on UNPROFOR's perception of the (Western) Balkans as "a tribal war is being fought in Bosnia, everyone is massacring, and everyone is the same" (Krsmanović, 1995).

As the loss of credibility was becoming a real threat not just to the UN but also the EU and NATO, it became apparent that this approach could no longer be contained. Zbigniew Brzezinski (1995) highlighted that "[t]he suffering of hundreds of thousands of innocent civilians, and the murder of tens of thousands, can no longer be passively observed by the civilised and democratic world", and that "the pretence that the conflict in Bosnia is merely an extension of ancient ethnic feuds, justifying the world's moral indifference and political passivity" can no longer be maintained. For there to have been a switch from a policy to another – from an observationist to an interventionist in this case – the underlying articulations of identity needed to be challenged and replaced. Else, a new policy of intervention made no sense on a hopeless Balkan subject of the Balkan Wars/WWI basic discourse, making the Yugoslav Crisis also appear inconsistent. The switch from the Neutrality/Impartiality discursive theme and its observationist policy to Multiethnicity and Ethnic Cleansing and its

interventionist approach required a genealogical shift from the Balkan Wars/WWI to the WWII/Colonial basic discourse of 'balkanization'.

The West's interventionist approach towards the (Western) Balkans is best captured under the Stabilization discursive theme elaborated below, yet it is important to recall that these layers of otherness rather than being self-exclusionary are coinciding. Therefore, alongside WWI reference and a policy of inaction, the research material presents explicit references to WWII, invoked for NATO's interventions and the signing of the "Dayton Agreement". The war in BiH was in multiple occasions framed as "Europe's bloodiest conflict since the second World War" (Cornwell, 1995) or in the words of Clinton himself, as "the most serious conflict on the continent of Europe since World War II" (Deans, 1995). Holbrooke (1999, p. 41) later commented on the concentration camps in Banja Luka and Prijedor as "scenes straight of WWII – yet happening now". These references combined with how "Americans admire the courage that the Serbian people displayed in the Second World War" (Brzezinski, 1995) converted the (Western) Balkans into an area worth intervening.

Discursive blank spots, however, in which radically different appearances of the (Western) Balkan 'other' coexist and are argued by the same political actors make apparent the inconsistent and unstable nature of the overall basic discourses – the Yugoslav Crisis in this case, as the predominant one. For most part of the BiH war, but also in other previous events like (North) Macedonia's independence, the EC/EU and NATO argued from discursive themes namely Territorial Integrity or Impartiality/Neutrality. While supporting different policies, they were oriented towards an observationist approach which saw the (Western) Balkan subject as incapable to transform, and, hence, unworthy of intervention. At the same time, other discursive themes appeared such as the Human and Minority Rights in the case of (North) Macedonia, or Multiethnicity and Ethnic Cleansing in the case of Serbia, which were relying on a rather hopeful (Western) Balkan subject, worthy of West's attention and involvement. Their coexistence – that is, of discursive themes that argue for observationist policies and other who support intervention – stand for discursive blank spots, moments of ambiguity and blurriness, which point out how the Yugoslav Crisis as a basic discourse, but also show how Stabilization and Europeanization later, are inconsistent, reductionist basic discourses, and essentialized views on the (Western) Balkan 'other'.

These genealogical references are invoked to cover inconsistencies by supporting certain articulations of identity as stronger, historical, or natural. However, it is precisely genealogical references which, though invoked to strengthen the consistent appearance of basic discourses, expose them as contradictory. In the case of the BiH war, for example, references to the Balkan Wars/WWI basic discourses, indeed, were borrowed to support a policy of observation. Still, when the switch to intervention took place, then the Balkan Wars/WWI discourse for which the West had argued 'minutes ago' only further enhanced the absurdity of a (Western) Balkan subject historically incapable of change beyond ethnic conflicts, suddenly transforming into one capable of multiethnic coexistence. This is also why genealogical references function as 'blessing and a curse' for basic discourses.

A significant trend that discursive shifts and blank spots inspire is the reinvention of the political elites in the (Western) Balkans. Local leaders appealed to the West and their audiences either by bringing their own discursive themes as closely aligned to the EU and NATO, and/or by engaging themselves in genealogical references. Milošević's fully compatible position with the West's observationist approach towards the (Western) Balkans on how "the Yugoslav crisis must be solved by the Yugoslav people themselves" (Linden, 1991) was simultaneously compatible with the genealogical links to earlier WWI and WWII events. He had complained that "[i]n the First World War we lost almost half our population, and almost the same happened in the Second World War" (Linden, 1991), utilizing in this way the Serbian sentiments of deserving "special credit for the creation of Yugoslavia in 1918 and for its resurrection in 1945". The Serb nationalist supporters felt they never got credit, especially as the 1974 constitution had largely separated Kosovo and Vojvodina from Serbia. A famous example of such historical references is Milošević's (1989b) speech in Gazimestan during the 600th anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo ceremony, and which is moreover one of the earliest and most archetypical representation of the role that he played during the Yugoslav wars as both – the Serbian nationalist, and the West's peacekeeper. Regardless of Milošević arguing that his words were pulled out of context[39], he spoke simultaneously about the "[e]qual and harmonious relations among Yugoslav peoples" while referring to Serbia exclusively as the defender of "the European culture, religion, and European society in general" (Milošević

[39] During his ICTY trial, Milošević further argued that he "wouldn't change a single word in that speech even now, even today" (Milošević, Slobodan, 2002).

S. , 1989b). With the EU and NATO invoking older genealogical incentives from WWI and WWII, the Serbian leader would mirror them; while it continued to trap the (Western) Balkans into older variations of their identity, it made Milošević the man who was "working both sides of the street, offering himself as a peacemaker to the West while keeping his hand in the Bosnian war" (Serbia is said to be aiding war effort, 1995). This will also set the standards for his successors (see Chapter 5) who, similarly, to date switch back and forth roles of passionate nationalists and enthusiastic Europeanists.

Western 'self': Whose hour it is?

While genealogical references mediating between the identity of the (Western) Balkans and their integration into the EU and NATO keep the (Western) Balkans trapped as 'balkanized', they ultimately serve the unity of the Western 'self' – that is of the EU and NATO within and in between. As already mentioned, it is not the 'balkanization' of the (Western) Balkans that, by default, leads to a united Western 'self', rather the already existing disunity among members of the EU and NATO and between the two actors which it exposes. This has been the case with events that followed the BiH war and as the Euro-Atlantic processes of the region were given clearer prospects.

The fragmentation among members of the EC/EU which had become apparent already in the very beginning of the Yugoslav Crisis only gained further visibility during the BiH war. The divergencies between European states which Holbrooke (1999, p. 117) calls "minidramas", he claims "had relatively little to do with Bosnia but were a manifestation of the confusion within the European Union over how to forge a common foreign policy position". The 1992 TEU which had converted the EC into the EU and had also established EU's CFSP had a chance to prove during the Yugoslav crisis that, as Luxembourg's Foreign Minister, Jacques Poos, stated "[t]his is the hour of Europe. It is not the hour of the Americans" (Riding, 1991). However, as William Bradford (2000, p. 76) shows, "the optimistic Europeanist majority, busy crowing about Europe's 'finest hour,' miscalculated the degree of political *cohesion* required to shape the behavior of the recalcitrant actors in the Yugoslav crisis". In the aftermath of the conflict, the EU admitted that "we Europeans regret, that the European Union was not able or strong enough to have done the job *on its own*" (European Commission, 1995b). If once the violent conflict had ended, the historical divide within the

Europeanists and the Atlanticists had not been clear, by the end of the war in BiH it was unignorable.

NATO, on the other hand, had itself been wrestling with the reoccurring question of its usefulness in a post-Cold War era. With this, Holbrooke (1999) asserts also "America's post-World War II security role in Europe was at stake" (p. 67), while "by the spring of 1995 it had become commonplace to say that Washington's relations with our European allies were worse than at any time" (p. 361). What the war in BiH taught the two was that "Europe found that it could not do this without American support and involvement, while the United States learned that our interests still included stability and peace in Europe" (Holbrooke, 1999, p. 368). Therefore, as Bradford (2000, p. 53) affirms, "Dayton produced little more than a realpolitik cessation of hostilities that served principally to reduce *U.S.-EU tensions*" while further – one could argue – 'balkanizing' BiH into two political entities and ten cantons through the "Dayton Agreement".

The Bosnian war of 1995, while on one hand was a 'balkanizing' event for the (Western) Balkans, as most actors argued for some discursive split of the subject, it set the tone to a more united post-Cold War relationship between the EU and the United States embodied in NATO, whose global worthiness the conflict had reasserted. Its Secretary General, Willy Claes, was able to claim that

> the end of the Cold War led some critics to question whether NATO still had a future… hence the slogans directed at NATO, such as: "Out of Area or Out of Business", and "Bosnia Alive or NATO Dead". Well, I am here today to tell you that NATO is very much in business. (NATO, 1995)

In April of the same year, Sir Leon Brittan of the European Commission, speaking on the EU-US relations, echoed Newt Gingrich's remarks who was the Speaker of the U.S. House of Representative, and stated: "'we are not going to stay *together* out of nostalgia'. We need, as he [Gingrich] put it, 'to do things that are large enough that they knit us *together*'" (European Commission, 1995a). Predictions from the (Western) Balkans on the other hand, had foreseen even earlier a "Bosnia and Herzegovina [as] a complex testing ground for daily policies and diplomacy" of "the undefined true strategic goals of the strongest Western European countries, the United States and Russia" (Spahić, 1995a). The Euro-Atlantic processes of the (Western) Balkans, although truly became a prospect for the region during the Stabilization basic

discourse, were shaped to best serve and remedy the disunited Western subject already since the Yugoslav Crisis. They have their roots in policies whose discursive themes are based on older historical variations of the identity of the (Western) Balkans as 'balkanized' – even when those switch from the Balkan Wars/WWI to WWII/Colonial references. With this, they circulate and further perpetuate even older variations. Indeed, the BiH war mostly uncovered Western divergencies and fragmentations, but its usefulness relied precisely in doing that. A raised awareness on and acknowledgment of disagreements was the prerequisite to them being addressed, as illustrated below, during the war of 1999 in Kosovo.

Serbia during Stabilization: The 1999 Kosovo and the fall of Milošević in 2000

The foundations for the discursive shift from the Yugoslav Crisis to the Stabilization basic discourse had already been laid during the intervention in BiH but they gained momentum only with the war in Kosovo in 1999 and the fall of Milošević from his position as the President of FRY in 2000. These two key events so inextricably linked share four main discursive themes under the Stabilization basic discourse – *Independence*, *Ethnic Cleansing*, *Democracy*, and *Colonialism* (see Table 9) elaborated in this section.

Table 9. Serbia: Stabilization Discursive Themes

Event	Discursive Themes	Rearticulated Identities	Policy	Actors
1999 Kosovo War and the 2000 Fall of Milošević	Independence	Splitting the Kosovo Albanian subject from FRY	Non-violent resistance or war	- Kosovans led by LDK, KLA, and LBD
	Ethnic Cleansing	Splitting the Yugoslav subject into the progressive European Serbs and the nationalist Albanians	"Kosovo, the heart of Serbia" and return of Serbs and Montenegrins in Kosovo	- Governing coalition of Serbia led by SPS
	Democracy	Splitting the Serbian subject into the people and their leader	Strike and removal from office	- EU - NATO - The DOS alliance
	Colonialism	Splitting NATO and ICTY from the European subject	Retain Yugoslavia as a Balkan Federation	- Governing coalition of Serbia led by SPS - DSS

The Kosovo issue is vividly present throughout the 1995 research material as much as it is ignored. Mazowiecki had reported on the breach of human rights taking place in the then Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo which was part of Serbia (see UN Commission on Human Rights, 1993). When it became too apparent to be overlooked, the international community having learnt its lessons from the war in BiH took very little time to observe – it *intervened*. NATO bombed Serbia from March to June 1999. This signaled the start of a new basic discourse, *Stabilization*. To switch from an observationist to an interventionist policy, as mentioned, the genealogical references invoked for the identity of the (Western) Balkans also switch from an emphasis on the Balkan Wars/WWI to the *WWII/Colonial* genealogical basic discourse.

Stabilization opened the way for Serbia to climb in its accession aspirations, though only towards the EU due to the complicated tone of the relationship with NATO that the intervention in Kosovo set. The discourse inaugurated through tools and mechanism such as the SP (European Council, 1999) and the SAP (European Commission, 1999), both launched in 1999 as EU initiatives, as well as NATO's (1999h) SEEI and MAP (NATO, 1999f) set forth at the Washington Summit. Yet, it did not actually begin until Milošević was removed from office in 2000. Stabilization tools and mechanism rose from an interventionist rationale, and they were, among others, the result of the BiH war which had exposed the disunity of the West as a threat to the credibility of all major international actors – the EU, NATO, and the UN. This section illustrates how these Euro-Atlantic tools, while representing the start of the Euro-Atlantic processes of Serbia and the region, derive from a logic of remedying the lost credibility of major international actors like the EU and NATO and uniting the Western 'self' as the (Western) Balkan subject, on the other hand, 'balkanized'.

(Western) Balkan 'other': NATO bombing of Yugoslavia

The Kosovo issue had been expected to burst even before the outbreak in BiH. Its roots stretch far back in time, to a hundred of years old (in)famous Battle of Kosovo[40] of 1389. However, within a contemporary setting, the substantial autonomy that "The Constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia" (1974) had given to Kosovo by granting the status of a

[40] See Malcolm (1998, p. 58) for more on the Battle of Kosovo.

Socialist Autonomous Province within Serbia is a good place to start. The autonomy, stripped away fifteen years later through the 1989 changes of the Constitution of Serbia proposed by Milošević and the renaming as "Kosovo and Metohija", sparked protests by – at the time ethnic Albanians in Kosovo and now – the Kosovans[41] who constituted the overwhelming majority of the population. Albanian miners working in the Trepča Mines began their hunger strike in February 1989. It is also on the verge of these events that Ibrahim Rugova came to lead the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) in its non-violent resistance towards Serbia and its claim for Kosovo's independence. In 1992, Rugova was elected to serve as President in the shadow government of the parallel state of the Republic of Kosovo (Kushtetuta e Republikës së Kosovës, 1990).

The disappointment deriving from the Kosovo issue being ignored by the international community as the war in BiH was coming to an end, elicited divisions within the Albanians of Kosovo and provided with the impetus for the emergence of the guerrilla Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). Hashim Thaçi, the head of the Political Directorate of KLA claimed that "the internationals would not be interested at all about Kosovo if we do not move ourselves…and we created the reality for the internationals to get interested" (Richards, 2001, 28:20). Though the KLA made its first public appearance on November 28, 1997, at a teacher's funeral who was believed to have been killed by the Serbian forces, in December it engaged in a series of actions attacking the Serbian police and issuing a statement warning the international community that it "will be forced to *intervene* after a greater slaughter than in Bosnia-Herzegovina and after the flames of war have engulfed the entire Balkans" [reported in the Prishtina *Koha Ditore* (Agency reports on threats by 'Liberation Army', 1997)]. President Rugova was placed at odds with the KLA which had grown impatient of his pacifist resistance. Finally, the frustrated former members of Rugova's LDK joined another key political actor, the United Democratic Movement (LBD) which was formed in 1998 as a coalition of seven parties headed by the academic Rexhep Qosja. Though divergencies are found among these three actors with regards to the means of reaching their goal – *non-violent resistance* or *war*, they all share the commitment of splitting the Kosovo subject from the FRY and making

[41] When appropriate, I use "Kosovan" to denote Kosovo nationals as the most up to date form of legal relationship with their state. The word "Kosovan" also appears as an adjective in the "Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo" (2008). To better contextualize the key event of the Kosovo war in which ethnicity played a crucial role, I often use "Albanian(s) of Kosovo" or "Kosovo Albanian(s)" throughout the chapter.

Kosovo an independent state (despite later settling for substantial autonomy) under the *Independence* discursive theme.

This time, Milošević was unable to portray FRY as an external party in the conflict as he did during the war in BiH. Kosovo, holding a distinctive historical significance for the Serbs, had been one venue where his nationalist claims boosted his rise to power. In a visit of 1987 in Kosovo Polje, he had offered paternal reassurance to the Serbian minority living in Kosovo through his famous assertation: "No one is allowed to beat you!" (Milošević, 1987; see also Mitchell, 1995, 13:08). The phrase exemplifies the core of Milošević's political discursive theme of *Ethnic Cleansing* which had already in 1999 split the Yugoslav subject into the progressive and European Serbs and the nationalist and counterrevolutionary Albanians, with the latter conducting an ethnic cleansing of Serbs and Montenegrins in Kosovo. Milošević's (1989a, p. 143) book has substantive references to an "ethnically pure" Kosovo as "not in the interest of the Albanian people" since "such nationalism" resembles that of the communist leader of Albania, Enver Hoxha, whose policy "excluded a small Albanian people and an already very underdeveloped society from Europe". In many other instances he refers to a "very present belief that the demand for an ethnically pure Kosovo is justified and possible" (Milošević S. , 1989a, p. 142), accusing Kosovo Albanians for "raping children, burning down houses, beating people, desecrating graves, exterminating two peoples [Serbs and Montenegrins], liquidating an entire culture" (Milošević S. , 1989a, p. 269). On the basis of such discursive theme and split he had called for a process of "return of Serbs and Montenegrins in Kosovo" (Milošević S. , 1989a, p. 144). The "return to Kosovo" calls were, with no exception, throughout his governing, justified on the basis of *Kosovo* being "*the very heart of Serbia*" (Mitchell, 1995, 05:35).

The EU and NATO argued for their policy of *strike and removal of office* through the discursive theme of *Democracy* which split the Serbian people from Milošević as their illegitimate leader during and after the NATO bombing. A campaign took swift in which the leader was characterized as "the perfect dictator" (Maass, 1999). Already before the war in Kosovo, *The New York Times* had called on the United States and European powers to "Stop the Butcher of the Balkans" (1992), while other Western media described Milošević as a "tyrant" (Kratovac, 2000) with an "iron rule" (Graham, 2000). The Democracy discursive theme relied on rearticulating the Serbian discursive subject into one divided between the

demonized leader who was different from the West and 'the people' who the West could relate to and hence act for/on. This discursive split is also apparent in speeches and statements of all major international actors like the NATO Secretary General, Solana who stressed "to the Serbian people: our quarrel is not with you, it is with your leader" (NATO, 1999i), or the European Commission's (2000b) claims that "[t]he increasing policy of repression by the regime" is "running against the wishes of the Serbian people".

This differentiation between the people and their leader also enabled direct and explicit threats towards Milošević who by May 1999 had been charged with crimes against humanity by the ICTY[42] (Arbour, 1999). On March 23, 1999, Solana announced that he had "just directed [Supreme Allied Commander Europe] SACEUR, General Clark, to initiate air operations in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia" (NATO, 1999d) having not obtained the full permission of the UN Security Council – this being the first time in the history of NATO. On June 8, 1999, Milošević gave in to a proposal which recalled for "substantial autonomy and meaningful self-administration for Kosovo" (UN Security Council, 1999b). The agreement, adopted by the UN and known as Resolution 1244[43], authorized, among others, an international civil and military presence in FRY by establishing the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and authorizing an international peacekeeping mission led by NATO known as the Kosovo Force (KFOR).

After the bombings, Milošević and his coalition engaged in the *Colonialism* discursive theme by splitting the European subject – to which Serbia could relate to already from the Ethnic Cleansing discursive theme – from NATO and the ICTY as an illegitimate and illegal court. He advocated for retaining Yugoslavia alive through, among others, an "economic recovery plan for the three *Yugoslav federation* states that have been heavily damaged by NATO aggression" (Borchgrave, 1999). Allegedly, the retaining of Yugoslavia is what the West was not in favor of because "[t]he West wants to conquer the whole world" (Antic,

[42] Milošević faced charges of genocide in BiH and war crimes in Croatia (see Prosecutor V. Slobodan Milošević, 2005), while in total five Serb officials – Nikola Šainović, Nebojša Pavković, Sreten Lukić, Vladimir Lazarević and Dragoljub Ojdanić – were convicted of Kosovo crimes (Five Senior Serb Officials Convicted of Kosovo Crimes, One Acquitted, 2009). Milan Milutinović, the former President of Serbia, was acquitted, and Milošević died before the court reached a judgement.

[43] The UN Security Council had adopted several resolutions prior to Resolution 1244. See for example Resolution 1160 (UN Security Council, 1998a) which brought the embargo; Resolution 1199 (UN Security Council, 1998b) which called for a ceasefire; as well as Resolution 1203 (UN Security Council, 1998c) and Resolution 1239 (UN Security Council, 1999a) further calling on the parties to comply with the UN measures.

1999), argued Milošević who was once West's man in the (Western) Balkans. He claimed that "efforts have been underway for a whole decade to put the whole Balkan Peninsula under the control of certain Western powers" (Milošević S. , 2000b), aligning himself with those whose "love of their own country" obliges them "to defend it from the colonial status where foreign armies will march in" (Milošević S. , 2000a). Being faced with an opposition that was threatening to remove him from office, Milošević (2000a) asserted that "[t]here are several big city centres on Serbia, including Belgrade where the representatives of new colonialism, the proponents of interests of big powers – colonizers, are in power". His theme of *Colonialism*, as the subsection below demonstrates, only draws further striking similarities to the WWII/Colonial genealogical basic discourse of 'balkanization'.

Though the West had triumphed in its clash with Milošević on the Kosovo issue, it could not fully claim its triumph if Milošević kept representing the will of the people. Clinton had said it clearly to the people of Serbia: "As long as he remains in power, as long as your nation is ruled by an indicted war criminal, we will provide no support for the reconstruction of Serbia" (The White House, 1999b). Yet, the European Commission (2000c) had decided to run what it called "Energy for *Democracy* scheme in favour of Serb opposition controlled municipalities", while the European Parliament (1999a) had "call[ed] for creative ways of supporting the political forces seeking to bring Yugoslavia into the community of democratic nations". With this, the main local beneficiaries[44] of the Democracy discursive theme were the civic protest group, Otpor ("resistance" in Serbian), who eventually turned into a People's Movement, and the Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS) founded in January 2000 and bringing together nineteen political parties and other actors, including Otpor. At the September 24, 2000, general elections in FRY, DOS ran with its presidential candidate, Vojislav Koštunica, but the pro-Western, Zoran Đinđić, was its de facto leader. On October 5, 2000, the streets of Belgrade were filled by several hundred thousand protesters: the October Revolution and Milošević's overthrow, but also the triumph of the West as "democracy always wins out in the end" (European Commission, 2000d) had said Chris Patten.

[44] Paul B. McCarthy from the U.S. based National Endowment for Democracy (NED) later revealed that of the almost $3 million spent by NED in Serbia since September 1998, "Otpor was certainly the largest recipient" (Cohen, 2000), while "[a] sum of $30 million from U.S. sources went to the opposition in the pre-election period" claimed Gallagher (2005, p. 112), though these numbers remain disputed to date.

The Democracy discursive theme undertaken by the West ultimately contributed to an understanding that "Milosevic and peace in the Balkans are an incompatible mix" (Crawshaw, 1999) as *The Independent* concluded. In other words, should the West have maintained the figure of Milošević adhering to his people as done during the BiH war, while at the same time conducting a campaign of demonizing him as it did during the Kosovo war, then the logical inference would be that the leader reflects his people – the people, therefore, are not worth intervening. Should Milošević be taken out of the mix, then peace in the (Western) Balkans would stand a chance. The image of a (Western) Balkan subject capable of change and peaceful cohabitation was essential for a shift from the Yugoslav Crisis to Stabilization – that is, from a policy of observation to one of intervention, and the discursive split between the leader and the people had been used to support it. Else, how could intervention for/on the Serbian people make any sense had they been alike somebody such as Milošević? To strengthen this split, the EU and NATO had further relied on older variations of the identity of the (Western) Balkans dating from WWII, during which Serbia and the region had fought and won on the side of the Western Allies. The next subsection further expands on this, while the subsection after demonstrates how these references ultimately fed back to maintaining a united Western 'self'.

Genealogical references: WWII allies, fascists, and colonizers

If the initial years of the BiH war when the West argued for a policy of observation were framed through references to WWI, to argue for intervening in Kosovo – just as it was done during the final year of the BiH war and the 2001 conflict in (North) Macedonia –, a change in the genealogical references had to take place. On such basis, Clinton, for example, equated the Serbian people with the German people, asking U.S. veterans: "You think the Germans would have perpetrated the Holocaust on their own without Hitler?" (The White House, 1999a). On the basis of the Democracy discursive theme and the 'people' versus 'leader' discursive split, he claimed that it is "[p]olitical leaders [who] do this kind of thing" (The White House, 1999a) and that conversely, "[t]he Serbs fought bravely with the allies against fascist aggression in World War II". The same Clinton who had argued that "a war [was] going on in Bosnia that was fueled by ancient, bloody divisions" (The White House, 1995a), was now also arguing that "there is not some Balkan disease that has been there for centuries" and that "we do no favors to ourselves or to the rest of the world when we justify looking away from this kind of

slaughter by oversimplifying and conveniently, in our own way, demonizing the whole Balkans by saying that these people are simply incapable of civilized behavior" (The White House, 1999a). He – among others – switched to WWII references in which the West could no longer see the (Western) Balkans as no matter of concern and incapable of change, and could, hence, not afford to not intervene. This move is also analogically illustrated in one of NATO's Lord Robertson speeches after the NATO bombings: "In the 19th century, Bismarck could argue that the Balkans were 'not worth the healthy bones of one Pomeranian grenadier'; but NATO demonstrated that this notion was outdated" (NATO, 2000a) he said.

Similar WWII/Colonial genealogical references, invoked by the West to make Stabilization and its policy of intervention appear as stable, expose discursive blank spots in the line of argumentation. The discursive blank spot which emerges pertains to the inconsistency in the Western approach towards Milošević. On this, Stefanović (2000a) commented for *Vreme*: "At the very beginning of the conflict in the former SFRY, it was the international community that allowed national leaders with very dubious legitimacy to become respected partners in international negotiations, and later forwarded some of them to The Hague". Indeed, Milošević who had in 1999 become the illegitimate representative of the people, had also been operating in the capacity of a close Western ally for a while precisely in the capacity of a legitimate representative. To cover these inconsistencies, the EU and NATO turned to genealogical references on the (Western) Balkan subject with the purpose of enhancing some elements of this discursive theme – i.e. the (Western) Balkan subject as capable of peace and democracy – and overshadowing others – i.e. the illegitimate leader who had been legitimate enough to be amongst key representatives of, let alone Serbs from Serbia, but also Bosnian Serbs from BiH during the 1995 war. Hence, genealogical references were essential to portray Stabilization (and its policy of intervention) as a coherent basic discourse.

It is quite remarkable to see how Milošević utilized genealogical references to the WWII/Colonial basic discourse to argue for both discursive themes – Ethnic Cleansing and Colonialism – with the purpose of appealing to and blaming the West at the same time. The discursive split of the Yugoslav subject into the progressive European Serbs and nationalists Albanians through the Ethnic Cleansing discursive theme has its roots in the WWII/Colonial genealogical basic discourse of 'balkanization'. Milošević juxtaposed Serbs and Montenegrins as "a very old European people with a long tradition" and a "civilized nation" (Hatchet, 1999)

who had lived in Kosovo "before a single Albanian came down from the mountains". The discursive split dated back to the Battle of Kosovo in which "Serbia heroically defended itself in the field of Kosovo, but it also defended Europe" (Milošević S. , 1989b), and it was meant to enhance not just the European character of Serbs who had bravely fought against the Nazis during WWII, but also subscribe Nazi characteristics to the KLA. Milošević blamed the KLA for terrorizing "Albanians to join their underground and impose their idea of an ethnically pure state" (Borchgrave, 1999), describing the movement as "Nazi in its character". Though his addresses to the public were rare, when having the chance he confirmed that "ethnically pure Kosovo is an illustration of the Nazi character of the separatist movement of the Albanians" (Hatchet, 1999) claiming that the Western support for the KLA was "destroying everything we have built up in the five decades since World War II. And to add to the absurdity, we were allies in those wars". While the West was equalizing Milošević with the Nazis, Milošević was equalizing the KLA with the Nazis. By doing so, he was attempting to connect the Serbian people to Europe by splitting them from the Albanians through drawing common references to WWII, while effectively circulating genealogical variations of the identity of the (Western) Balkans as fragmented among themselves.

Compatibility in genealogical references with the EU and NATO, however, is not a guarantee for becoming or remaining a Western ally. This makes it harder for elites to collect political points at home for bringing the people into the EU and NATO on the basis of having the right friends in the West. The discourse is asymmetrical, and sharing genealogical references with the West might indeed grant the political elites some leverage, but one which always depends on the West as the more powerful actor in the relationship and as the generator of rules – "here is your lollipop" (Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia, 2001c), as Simev had put it (see Chapter 3). From a research perspective, this is a useful discursive move as it uncovers discursive blank spots within the local political discourses, and which become apparent in situations when leverage is not delivered. This is when local political elites tend to turn to genealogical references to unfriend allies whom they have built precisely through genealogical references.

Milošević's theme of Colonialism is just another example of this tendency. When realizing that he had most certainly lost his WWII allies, Milošević switched into arguing that "[t]he West wants to conquer the whole world" (Antic, 1999), but this time not with the purpose

of appealing to the West but blaming and denigrating it. Had not Serbia then, as per Milošević's own references to its European identity, been an ally to colonizers who had for five centuries dominated the Americas, Africa, and Asia? Calling unto a European friend but complaining of colonialism is a discursive blank spot which reveals inconsistency in his line of arguing.

The mentioned references to older articulations of the identity of the (Western) Balkans, more than the local political leaders of the (Western) Balkans, serve the unity of the Western 'self'. It becomes visible in how Milošević's genealogical references did not maintain him in power, but it is also seen in how those that instead came into power were the DOS, whose discursive theme aligned best with that of the West. This alignment in discursive themes mattered more than genealogical alignments with Milošević since it made possible the triumphing calls of the united Western 'self' that had intervened in Serbia in a joint transatlantic manner. It illustrates that despite the benefits of genealogical references for local political elites, they are unreliable and uncertain even for them. What is certain is their effect on perpetually invoking older articulations of the identity of the (Western) Balkans as 'balkanized' with the purpose of arguing for contemporary policies – including the Euro-Atlantic processes of the (Western) Balkans which rose as a response to events like the BiH and Kosovo war – that are oriented towards the retention of a united Western 'self'.

Western 'self': Golden anniversary of NATO and the return of the EU

The Yugoslav Crisis and Stabilization had only laid the foundations of a mission for which the Euro-Atlantic processes were the tool to set not just Serbia, but all the other (Western) Balkan countries on a "right track" (NATO, 1999j). However, the Euro-Atlantic processes of the region being born in a (post-)conflict rationale and encapsulating policies of the EU and NATO, argued through references to older variations of the identity of the (Western) Balkans 'other' as 'balkanized', seem to rather put the West on a "right track" while recirculating the mentioned older variations of the identity of the (Western) Balkans. By the end of the BiH and Kosovo wars, while the (Western) Balkan subject came out more 'balkanized', the EU and NATO reinvented themselves as united within the two and in between. This was particularly important as the lack of unity between members of both the EU and NATO and between the two as actors had already been exposed during the BiH war and had questioned their credibility.

While NATO, as the product of the Cold War, had been solving problems since 1949, the 1990s brought questions which doubted the purpose of the alliance itself since the Cold War was coming to an end. This is also why numerous NATO officials drew references to the Cold War as they were making a case for intervening in the (Western) Balkans or as they were proclaiming NATO's victory. Solana pointed out that "[n]ow that the Cold War is over, we are faced not with one single all-embracing threat but with a multitude of new risks and challenges. Many of them are here in the southern region of the Alliance, and particularly in the Balkans" (NATO, 1999b). The (Western) Balkans as a threat made but for a good case to prove that "history did not end in 1989" (NATO, 2000b), as Lord Robertson argued, and that "life begins at fifty!" (NATO, 1999c) as Solana had said on the occasion of NATO's 50th anniversary. The (Western) Balkans continued to be reminded of this role even as they made their way into approaching the EU and NATO in their Euro-Atlantic aspirations. On many occasions, they were framed as NATO's raison d'être and alibi for reinvention through other interventions in other places like Iraq and Afghanistan (see Chapters 5 and 6).

The perpetual reinvention of NATO is also the perpetual reinvention of the transatlantic and united Western 'self'. By the end of the Kosovo war, the 'balkanized' (Western) Balkans did not just produce a reason for the renewal, but also an impetus for the gradual integration of the European defense under the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) of the EU, which promoted greater European responsibility in defense matters that had strictly belonged to NATO until then. The Treaty of Amsterdam entered into force precisely during 1999, introducing the role of the High Representative for EU Foreign Policy. While not developing further EU's common defense, it fostered closer links with the WEU by transferring WEU's Petersberg Tasks set in 1992 (Council of Ministers of Western European Union, 1992) to the EU. The follow-up 1999 meeting of the European Council in Cologne was a key event for the development of the ESDP as it decided for the role of WEU to be incorporated within the EU, hence giving the latter the "necessary means and capabilities to assume its responsibilities regarding a *common* European policy on security and defence" (European Council, 1999).

Nonetheless, this unity would not have been possible without the preceding "Joint Declaration on European Defense issued at the British-French Summit" (1998), when the French and the British decided to overcome their historical divergencies on an Atlanticists or Europeanist future for the EU. The declaration rescued a united Europe and was a direct

response to the Kosovo war. Both the BiH and the Kosovo conflicts exposed internal disagreements within the EU and NATO members, while serving as a catalyst for positions to be aligned and closer links and cooperation – which were not there before the Yugoslav Crisis and Stabilization – to be developed. Therefore, indeed, the Yugoslav Crisis and Stabilization as basic discourses of 'balkanization', which mediate between the identity of the (Western) Balkans and their Euro-Atlantic processes, produced essential tools and mechanism crucial for these processes. These tools, however, stem from policies which are grounded in and recycle older genealogical variations of the identity of the 'balkanized' (Western) Balkans to serve – once again – as a "testing ground" (Ninčić, 1999b) for developing a more united Western 'self'.

With this, the BiH and the Kosovo wars converted the (Western) Balkans into a testing ground for the united Western 'self' long after the wars were ended. The new government in charge of Serbia might have not completely met the West's expectations since the new Yugoslav President, Koštunica, was known as one of the most persistent critics of the international community's behavior, but it did provide with the basis for uniting the Serbian people and their leaders with the other (Western) Balkan states under the SEE signifier, conditioning in this way a comprehensive regional approach towards them. An approach of this kind was required to keep enabling the international community's involvement, whose role might have, otherwise, been logically questioned once the one responsible for the mess – Milošević – was removed. The European Parliament (1999b) had stressed "with regard to the western Balkans that a lasting peace settlement for the Kosovo conflict will only be found within the framework of a regional concept that leads to a stability pact". NATO (1999e) too had recognized that "[t]he potential for wider instability underscores the need for a comprehensive approach to the stabilisation of the crisis region in South Eastern Europe". The practical steps that allowed the Stabilization basic discourse to really kick in were the Euro-Atlantic integration tools like EU's Stability Pact and the SAP, or NATO's SEEI and MAP. These tools were framed as needed for "put[ting] Southeastern Europe on the right track" (NATO, 1999j). While they seem to be serving the same function now, the BiH and the Kosovo wars explored in this chapter illustrate how they are also required to, among others, 'put the West on the right track'.

Conclusions

This chapter integrated insights derived from looking at Serbia through three key events – the BiH war, the Kosovo war, and the fall of Milošević – into answering the principal research question: How does 'balkanization' shape the Euro-Atlantic processes of the (Western) Balkans, and vice versa? First, the chapter deconstructed those different shapes and positions that Serbia as a constitutive part of Yugoslavia and SEE held in relation to the West. It did this by capturing this relationship during key events that have been crucial in determining those shapes. On an analytical level, constitutive links between identity – the (Western) Balkans and the West, and foreign policy – the Euro-Atlantic processes of the (Western) Balkans were reviewed. Examining them through the two basic discourses – Yugoslav Crisis and Stabilization – one crucial insight stands out: the Euro-Atlantic processes of the (Western) Balkans have risen from and included policies towards the (Western) Balkans. The latter rely on articulations of the identity of the (Western) Balkan 'other' as 'balkanized' and, as such, they have been utilized for reinventing the Western 'self' as united in moments of crisis when its appearance as a united subject has been uncertain. In the words of Solana as he spoke of how the (Western) Balkans show that NATO has been able to adapt to new challenges, "[n]either NATO nor the European Union exist, therefore, for their own sake. They are instruments that help us solve concrete problems" (NATO, 1999a).

The Euro-Atlantic processes of the (Western) Balkans have indeed been born from and continue to serve a logic of fixing the problems of the (Western) Balkans or the (Western) Balkans as a problem. Moreover, they are tools which have conditioned the existence of both the EU and NATO as we know them today. It would then, only be logical, to expect that the very problem-solving nature required problems to solve. As long as genealogical variations of the identity of the (Western) Balkans as 'balkanized' captured by the Balkan Wars/WWI and the WWII/Colonial basic discourses will continue to underpin contemporary policies of the West towards the region, then the EU and NATO will surely not be left without problems to fix and reasons to exist. 'Balkanization', therefore, shapes the Euro-Atlantic processes of the (Western) Balkans into processes that serve the unity of the Western 'self' at the expense of the fragmented (Western) Balkans 'other' captured in reoccurring patterns of its historical versions of identity; and with this then, the Euro-Atlantic processes of the (Western) Balkans further contribute to the identity of the (Western) Balkans as 'balkanized'.

Finally, the discursive themes of the Yugoslav Crisis and Stabilization – but also Europeanization (see Chapters 5 and 6) – show how the West is not alone in this endeavor and that the local political elites from the (Western) Balkans, driven by their political agendas, attempt to align to the Western perceptions of the (Western) Balkans as 'balkanized' as they too argue for their policies by invoking older variations of the identity of the (Western) Balkans. The most archetypical example is Milošević. However, as his fall is revealed, it is not genealogical consistencies between the (Western) Balkan political leaders and Western ones that determine the rewards that the former will receive. Being genealogically aligned with the EU and NATO only means further 'burying' the (Western) Balkans into older variations of their identity as 'balkanized', unless those genealogical references are captured into contemporary discursive themes aligned with the EU and NATO and contribute to the Western 'self'. As long as Milošević performed within this framework during the BiH war, he was the West's man in the (Western) Balkans. Once DOS's discursive theme was better tuned to that of the EU and NATO, Milošević was out of the picture. Same goes the other way around as once in positions of power or aiming to be, the local political elites align to the discursive themes of the West and are otherwise predominantly critical when they are deprived of their power. On the other hand, with both – (Western) Balkan and Western political elites – bringing their policies to life by rewinding repeatedly the old Balkan story of 'balkanization', the Euro-Atlantic processes of the (Western) Balkans, as the following chapters continue to demonstrate, capture the (Western) Balkans into the 'straitjacket' of their identity as fragmented and the West as united.

Chapter 5
Serbia Anew is Born: The Exodus of Montenegro and Kosovo

This chapter contextualizes the main research question through three key events taking place in Serbia. The year of 2003, when the first EU-Western Balkans Summit was hosted, is covered under the first section and witnesses for the shift from Stabilization to Europeanization (see Table 5). Europeanization emerges from the analysis of two key events: the Montenegrin independence in 2006, and the 2013 "Brussels Agreement". The main purpose of the analysis of these three key events is capturing the different and mutating articulations of the (Western) Balkans 'other' to show how those are used to construct the Western 'self' and shape the Euro-Atlantic processes of the (Western) Balkans during the post-2000s basic discourse of Europeanization, and vice versa – to show how the Euro-Atlantic processes of the (Western) Balkans shape the (Western) Balkan 'other' and the Western 'self'.

The chapter shows how, while Europeanization stands for a different basic discourse which solidifies the Euro-Atlantic promise made to the (Western) Balkans on the basis of their European identity, it continues to reinvent the 'balkanized' (Western) Balkan 'other'. This, I argue, further enables the perpetual reinvention of the united Western 'self' and the (Western) Balkan political elites, capturing the people of the (Western) Balkans in older genealogical articulations of their identity as 'balkanized'. Therefore, despite Serbia's new anthem, "God of Justice"[45] (from *"Bože pravde"* in Serbian) declaring that "Serbia anew is born" (Government of Serbia, 2011), the exodus of Montenegro and Kosovo only further traps the (Western) Balkans in anything but new discourse of 'balkanization' which awakens older articulations of their identity as 'balkanized' in the service of their political elites and the united Western 'self'.

Table 5. Contemporary Basic Discourses of 'Balkanization'

Basic Discourse	**Identity**		
	Layer of Otherness	**Temporality and Spatiality**	**Ethicality**
Yugoslav Crisis	Yugoslavia	Regressive and distant	Observation
Stabilization	South East Europe	Backward in the backyard	Intervention
Europeanization	*Western Balkans*	*European and forward looking*	*Integration*

[45] "God of Justice" was the state anthem of the Kingdom of Serbia until 1919 when Serbia became part of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes.

Serbia during the 2003 Discursive Shift

This section looks at the EU-Western Balkans Summit held in Thessaloniki on June 21, 2003, as a discursive shift from Stabilization to Europeanization and as another key event. The essentializing nature of basic discourses becomes more evident precisely in those moments in which it is apparent that they coincide. Discursive shifts present threats to the stability of basic discourses and the essentialized articulations of the 'other' that actors build with the purpose of arguing for their policies. To cover for discursive blank spots, as demonstrated in the preceding chapters, actors invoke genealogical references. Yet precisely the latter then expose the inconsistency of basic discourses. In a similar fashion, discursive shifts are attempts to cover up for the instability of new policies argued by new basic discourses by building a new layer of otherness based on different spatial and temporal parameters. However, in doing this, they reveal 'punctures' in the rationale of each basic discourse by showing how different articulations of identity and different policies coexist simultaneously. In other words, the radical and essentialized nature of basic discourses becomes explicit by looking at the not-so-radical shifts between the different basic discourses.

It is often more than one single event which carries the 'torch' from one to the other basic discourse. Two other such Serbia-specific events in 2003 are the assassination of its Prime Minster, Zoran Đinđić, and the transformation of the FRY to a political confederal union known as the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro. The first subsection focuses on these events, showing how it is the further 'balkanization' of the (Western) Balkan 'other' which shapes the promise of integration and the switch to the new basic discourse of Europeanization. The second subsection exposes the 2003 discursive shift as an attempt to introduce new spatial, temporal, and ethical dimensions of the (Western) Balkan 'other' to account for the integrationist policy of the West towards the region. An attempt which is nevertheless inconsistent for it coexists with older variationist of the identity of the (Western) Balkans that have been invoked to argue for interventionist and not integrationist policies. It is ultimately oriented towards the purpose of uniting the Western 'self' as illustrated in the two preceding chapters dedicated to the Yugoslav Crisis and Stabilization. Here and in Chapter 6, the endeavor is relevant in illustrating how this logic was transferred also into Europeanization as

the Euro-Atlantic integration processes of the (Western) Balkans were becoming a more established prospect.

(Western) Balkan 'other': Death of FYR, Đinđić, and the promise of integration

The assassination of Đinđić and the conversion of FRY into the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro which are tied to other issues such as Kosovo and cooperation with the ICTY explored in this subsection, reflect a 'balkanizing' identity of Serbia and the (Western) Balkans. At the same time, they stand for impetuses of the Euro-Atlantic processes of the region, further demonstrating how the promise of integration has risen as shaped by the 'balkanization' of the (Western) Balkan 'other', providing with an opportunity of uniting the Western 'self'. Since policies operate through a constitutive relationship with identities, it is not just disintegration of the identity of the (Western) Balkan 'other' which shapes the promise of integration, but it is also the very promise of integration itself which in turn disintegrates the identity of the (Western) Balkan 'other' and unites the Western 'self'.

The transformation of FRY to the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro on February 4, 2003, was the result of an EU brokered deal by its High Representative, Solana, in 2002 (see Agreement on Principles of Relations between Serbia and Montenegro within the State Union, 2002). The agreement foresaw the conversion of FRY from a federal republic to a political confederal union. While it was seemingly an attempt to retain any unity left from what was once Yugoslavia, it just as much set the stage for its further dissolution. "The Constitutional Charter of the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro" (2003) had already foreseen the possibility of "breaking away from the state union of Serbia and Montenegro", and it was not long before this option was materialized in 2006 when Montenegro declared its independence. While reservations with regards to this project were expressed even by Serbia's pro-Western Prime Minster, Đinđić, support was arranged and argued through it being a necessary step for the country's Euro-Atlantic integration processes. Therefore, though Đinđić would admit that "the proposed text is far from perfect" (Republic of Serbia National Assembly, 2003a), he also argued that its acceptance would "remove a serious obstacle in the way of our European integration".

Oppositional voices spoke of the State Union as an imposed solution to Serbia and Montenegro. Serbian MP, Toma Bušetić, claimed that it reflected the "dictates of the West" (Republic of Serbia National Assembly, 2003a). Miroljub Labus accused the government of being "exponents of Western politics… [who] accept all the dictates that are imposed on them" (Republic of Serbia National Assembly, 2003a), while Radojko Petrić asked: "isn't this going in the opposite direction from European integration?". The State Union was ridiculed by being called "Solanaland" (or "Solania") (Press reactions to the end of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 2003). Therefore, although it was framed as an improved chance for the integration of Serbia into the Euro-Atlantic structures, it was also seen as an opposing trend to integration.

The debate goes hand in hand with the Kosovo issue and cooperation with the ICTY. While discussing Montenegro, references were made to Holbrooke who took "pictures with Šiptar[46] terrorists" (Republic of Serbia National Assembly, 2003b). Since the UN Security Council (1999b) Resolution 1244 refers to Kosovo as part of the FRY, Serbian politicians feared that the change of name opened the way to Kosovo's independence since FRY would stop existing. As Bušetić said, "[a]fter all, the whole world knows that the charter is adopted only because the United States and the European Union want to postpone the secession of Montenegro, in order to create more favorable conditions for the final separation of Kosmet" (Republic of Serbia National Assembly, 2003a). Besides Kosovo, pressure for cooperation with the ICTY was not making matters easier. Lord Robertson stated that the extradition of Ratko Mladić to the Hague is "one of the critical preconditions for membership of the Partnership for Peace" (NATO, 2003d), and the EU reiterated "that full co-operation with the ICTY… is vital for further movement towards the EU" (European Council, 2003, p. 12). While such events were argued as increasing the Euro-Atlantic prospects of Serbia, they were also seen as imposed and threatening to further 'balkanize' the country.

Importantly, another 2003 key event which presented with a similar threat, was the assassination of Đinđić on 12 March. He was considered the new man of the West in the

[46] The derogatory term "Šiptar/i" or "Šiptarčina", previously a national descriptor for all Albanians in former Yugoslavia, is an ethnic slur used to disparage Albanians. The word appears throughout the Serbian assembly and media discourse. In 2018, the High Court in Belgrade issued a verdict against the word considering it to be "politically incorrect and… [with] an offensive meaning in the Serbian language for Albanians in Kosovo" (Robelli, 2018).

(Western) Balkans who "single-handedly personifies that march towards democracy" (Collins & Amanpour, 2003); acknowledged as the "symbol of a new Serbia" and a "new Balkan" (Government of Serbia, 2003b). Fearing that Đinđić's death would also condition the death of reforms in Serbia, the EU and NATO could not just urge for reforms to continue (Government of Serbia, 2003c); in addition, they offered a somewhat more tangible promise like reassurance of the (Western) Balkans' Euro-Atlantic integration prospects "at an accelerated pace" (European Commission, 2003d), and a "future of the Balkans… within the European Union" (European Commission, 2003e). Solana, and the EU External Relations Commissioner, Patten, arrived in Belgrade the day after Đinđić was killed to offer their support. Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly President, Peter Schieder, is also reported to have urged the Committee of Ministers to allow Serbia and Montenegro to become a full member of the Council of Europe, stating that he feels that "this is the *precise moment* in time that a positive signal from Europe would be of the utmost importance" (Government of Serbia, 2003a). Therefore, the Prime Minister's assassination, which coincided with the Thessaloniki Summit, is a turning point in how 'balkanization' shapes the Euro-Atlantic promise.

This is also where it becomes apparent how the promise of integration for the region has relied on (the threat of) its further 'balkanization'. While on one hand 'balkanizing' events such as the death of Đinđić served as an impetus for the Euro-Atlantic prospects of the country and the wider region, the State Union, the Kosovo issue, and the cooperation with the ICTY as preconditions for Euro-Atlantic prospects the EU and NATO were 'balkanizing' the country. That the integration processes of the region arise from its 'balkanization' and in turn further cause 'balkanization' becomes even more visible as the Thessaloniki Agenda united the (Western) Balkans under the euphemism of "Western Balkans". On the other hand, it disintegrated the (Western) Balkans by judging the countries individually in their accession aspirations. The European Commission (2003d) claimed "the pace of further movement of the Western Balkan countries towards the EU…will depend on each country's performance". NATO (2003e) also maintained the position that "the pace at which Western Balkan countries move towards Europe – and NATO – will depend fundamentally on each country's performance". Hence, the Thessaloniki Agenda was seen as something which "only completed the work that [the West] began in 1991, and that is the abolition of Yugoslavia and the creation

of more small states that will be the subject of agreement and the interests of the great powers" (Republic of Serbia National Assembly, 2003a).

To cover for such a discursive blank spot in which the Western promise of integration depends on projects which in many ways present some sort of a 'balkanizing' threat for the countries and the region, the EU and NATO – but also the (Western) Balkan political elites – framed such projects as a demonstration – a sacrifice – which the (Western) Balkans need to perform for the sake of their Euro-Atlantic future. Europeanization – different from the Yugoslav Crisis and Stabilization – portrays integration as an unavoidable prospect due to the European identity of the (Western) Balkans. However, discursive shifts such as the year of 2003 and key events which took place both in Serbia and (North) Macedonia (see Chapter 6), expose the new (Western) Balkan 'other' constructed by Europeanization as another coexisting reflection of preceding discourses rooted in older genealogical variations of the identity of the (Western) Balkans as 'balkanized'. The subsection below further elaborates on this coexistence and illustrates how the new discursive shift towards Europeanization follows the same logic of feeding back into the reinvention and the retention of the united Western 'self'.

Western 'self': Americans from Venus, Europeans from Mars, and the (Western) Balkans?

Preceding chapters have illustrated how genealogical references in the service of contemporary policies have been invoked to make basic discourses appear more stable and generate support for their policies. This has in turn been utilized to strengthen an image of the Western 'self' as united during critical times by bringing back images of the (Western) Balkan 'other' as 'balkanized'. The year 2003 presents with a similar situation only that now the discursive shift from one basic discourse to another – Stabilization to Europeanization, replaces the function of genealogical references. The discursive shift takes place in attempts of gathering support for new integrationist policies, but just as genealogical references expose the inconsistent and unstable character of basic discourses, so do moments of discursive shifts operate in support and to the determent of basic discourses. This subsection exposes the inconsistent and unstable character of the shift towards Europeanization during the 2003 events in Serbia, and how it had much to do with the Western 'self'.

If temporally Stabilization portrays the (Western) Balkans as backward and Europeanization portrays them as Europeans with an unavoidable Euro-Atlantic future, the

2003 discursive shift conjoins the two. This is visible in the unignorable invocations of references to the past and the future of the (Western) Balkans at once. For example, while the Thessaloniki Summit declaration of 2003 sees "[t]he future of the Balkans… within the European Union" (European Commission, 2003e; European Council, 2003), it also clearly remembers its past in the "Europe's bloody and chaotic Balkan backyard" (NATO, 2003p) and as Lord Robertson states, in "its long-standing image as Europe's 'powder keg'" (NATO, 2003g). Despite promising a "a common future" (NATO, 2003o) to the (Western) Balkans, Robertson and his EU counterparts such as the President of the European Commission, Romano Prodi, made sure to point out "the painful legacy of a recent tragic past" (European Commission, 2003a). Therefore, simultaneously to portraying the (Western) Balkans as on their way to a brighter Euro-Atlantic future, the year 2003 brims with references to their past. The Western press and media refer to the "long history of political murders" (Kaufman, 2003b) and the "long tradition of political assassinations" (Dobbs, 2003) in the region. *The New York Times* recalls the killing of Archduke Franz Ferdinand to claim that "in many assassinations in the Balkans, motives of vengeance and desires to *shift policie*s are interlaced" (Kaufman, 2003a). What the Western press was missing out on, though, was seeing how many assassinations in the (Western) Balkans and other 'balkanizing' events have in fact been utilized for shifts in policies by the West towards the (Western) Balkans, especially in moments when this has been essential for maintaining a united Western 'self'.

A shift from interventionist to integrationist policies was particularly needed as the year of 2003 shows another crisis of the reinvention of the Western 'self' exposed by the disagreements within the EU and between the EU and NATO on the military intervention in Iraq and Afghanistan. This sparked indicators on a split of the West into the EU and NATO. *The Guardian*, referring to the France, Germany, and Belgium vetoes to the U.S. request for NATO to protect Turkey if Saddam Hussein attacked, reported: "[f]urious US and British officials say Paris is the main culprit behind the current 16-3 split, which is threatening to render Nato irrelevant at precisely the moment it has been '*re-invented*' to meet post cold war challenges" (Black, 2003). Divergencies between the 'Blair' and the 'Chirac' view (referring to Tony Blair and Jacques Chirac) caused concerns about "one of the most serious *crises* ever faced by… NATO" (NATO, 2003a). France took a different position from the other 18 NATO allies by choosing not to participate in the integrated military structure and the Defense

Planning Committee[47] intended to provide Turkey with the requested defensive assistance. Therefore, "[t]here has been a lot of talk this year about Americans being from Venus and European from Mars" (NATO, 2003n) said Lord Robertson, admitting that "[a]t the moment, our institutions remain further *apart* than is good for them".

In a post 9/11 world where the EU and NATO were facing major threats to their 'selves'/'self', doubts on the role of NATO in Iraq and Afghanistan, which had sparked obvious divisions among the Europeans as well as between them and the United States, had to do with the usual Europeanist versus Atlanticist divide. The 2002 Prague Summit which had called for a change of NATO's military structure in attempts of successfully facing the challenges of the new millennium, was showing its first fruits through the formation of the Allied Command Transformation (ACT) and the NATO Response Force. However, the European defense integration had gained its own momentum after the Yugoslav wars and in March 2003 the EU deployed its first ESDP military mission in North Macedonia, EUFOR "Concordia", as well as adopted its own European Security Strategy (Council of the European Union, 2003b). On January 1, 2003, the EU also took over the UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH), as it launched the European Union Police Mission (EUPM) – its first civilian mission under the CSDP. This threatened the perceived Euro-Atlantic unity and also the united Western subject.

It also points out to a familiar disagreement between the two sides of the Atlantic which transcended the invasion of Iraq. The above-mentioned European defense integration culminating in the formulation of EU's own European Security Strategy and the emergence of the ESDP had sparked reemerging fears on the loss of NATO's unique transatlantic mission and hence its very purpose. In the words of Robertson himself, "[t]here is, quite clearly, nervousness in some Alliance circles about *competition* from a more assertive EU. But it is matched by nervousness in the EU about being *overshadowed* by NATO" (NATO, 2003n). To demonstrate to the sceptics that "NATO as an institution could change" (NATO, 2003p), the alliance needs "new missions, new capabilities and new partnerships" (NATO, 2003k) he claimed, because "if you are not relevant, you are out of business" (NATO, 2003p). The solution to this existential threat was found in expanding NATO's role in the East through its

[47] The Defense Planning Committee (DPC) was in June 2012 replaced by the North Atlantic Council (NAC) as the principal decision-making body of NATO.

invasion of Iraq and through taking the lead of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan on August 11, 2003. These missions would not only reassert the need for NATO, but also calm the Europeanist and Atlanticists divide, comforting both the EU and NATO that there is much for both to do and there is no need, therefore, to divide but rather unite forces for facing the many existing challenges.

The 1990s success story of (Western) Balkans assisted once again in the retention of a united Western subject by being utilized as a proof to legitimize NATO's expansion "out of area" and, hence, its reinvention. To do this, not only were the (Western) Balkans placed temporally between the past and the future, but also spatially between Iraq and Afghanistan on one hand, and Europe on the other; and ethically between intervention and integration. Robertson highlighted "[l]ike no other institution, the Alliance is able to translate the military and political potential of Europe and North America into concrete action", adding "[w]e have proved it in the Balkans, we are proving it in Afghanistan, and who can say we may well be called upon to prove it in Iraq as well" (NATO, 2003n). He explicitly stated that "[w]e should also reflect on the Balkan success when we look at the challenge of Afghanistan" (NATO, 2003r), in order to claim that "[w]e had the mettel to deal with Bosnia's murderous warlords. We had better find more iron in our soul to deal with Afghanistan's variety". The reinvention of NATO would equal the reinvention of the united Western 'self' as the embodiment of the Euro-Atlantic unity. For this, the 1990s interventionist stories in the (Western) Balkans are invoked even as 2003 policies speak of integration, and the (Western) Balkans are spatially placed within the further Eastern 'other' and the Western 'self'.

Like genealogical references, discursive shifts also serve not just in revitalizing NATO as an embodiment of transatlantic unity, but in reconciling any divergencies it might have with the EU. When it came to the (Western) Balkans, the EU and NATO were determined to convey a unanimous position evident through "[t]he EU and NATO *Concerted* Approach for the Western Balkans" (NATO, 2003f). Therefore, the analysis of 2003 events in this section only further testifies to the role that 'balkanization' plays in fueling the unification of the Western subject on its position towards the (Western) Balkans and other highly controversial matters. The (Western) Balkans continue to be portrayed as a success story of circumvented disasters which would have been apocalyptical had not the West intervened in a concerted and dialogical manner. As Lord Robertson asserted: "the common threat of Balkans instability forced us

[NATO and the EU] to work *together* on the ground" (NATO, 2003j). He also admitted that, ultimately, this unity helps preserve the West's political gains: "the United States led NATO's interventions to help end bloody civil war in Bosnia and Milosevic's brutal ethnic cleansing in Kosovo… were also excellent examples of enlightened *self*-interest" (NATO, 2003m). The 2003 promise of Euro-Atlantic integration, therefore, is another example of Western self-interest. Such a promise was particularly important in times of crisis for the Western 'self' since the conversion into the State Union and the assassination of Đinđić entailed the risk of instability and with this the threat of showing intervention as ineffective and Stabilization as an unstable discourse. The unstable discourse of stabilization would have in turn prevented both the EU and NATO to utilize the intervention of the (Western) Balkans for building on their security and defense identities as it would have made it difficult for the EU to develop further its ESDP and for NATO to reassert its worthiness by broadening up towards the East.

Despite some existing oppositional voices, Serbian official discourses mirror the function that 'balkanization' implies in arguing for certain changes such as the conversion into the State Union as necessary for the Euro-Atlantic integration processes of the country. Supporting certain discursive shifts as a sacrifice for the Euro-Atlantic future has to do with the rewarding attitude that the West showed towards these political elites. Đinđić, for example, had welcomed Western support to topple Milošević in 2000. Therefore, important political oppositional voices to the utilization of the (Western) Balkan 'other' for the unity of the Western 'self' as during Stabilization and the Yugoslav Crisis also during Europeanization showed as depending on the 'lollipops' the West could offer to the political elites. It maintained the (Western) Balkans 'balkanized' and trapped into a "[n]either 'barrel of gunpowder' nor Scandinavia" (Cukrov & Lopandić, 2003) position; between the hope of being seen "one day as fellow members" (European Commission, 2003c) of the EU and NATO and the threat of "return to the dark days of conflict" (NATO, 2003g), and it continues to do so in the present.

Serbia during Europeanization: Montenegro's independence and the "Brussels Agreement"

The third basic discourse, Europeanization, as preconditioned by the 2003 events discussed above, envisions the "*Western Balkans*" (which replaces the euphemism of "South East Europe") as an integral part of the EU and NATO due to their European identity – though at

some point in the future. To illustrate how this fuels back to the reinvention and retention of the Western 'self' and (Western) Balkan political elites, this section focuses on two key events: Montenegro's independence in 2006; and the 2013 "Brussels Agreement" through four discursive themes: *Referendum*, *Dis(Integration)*, *Reconciliation*, and *Unity* (see Table 10).

Table 10. Serbia: Europeanization Discursive Themes

Event	Discourse	Rearticulated Identities	Policy	Actors
2006 Montenegro Independence	Referendum	Splitting 'Serbia and Montenegro' into 'Serbia' and 'Montenegro'	Conditionality through the Charter of the State Union	- EU - NATO - Independentist Bloc
	(Dis)Integration	Unifying the Serbia and Montenegro subject with 'Europe'	Preservation of borders	- Governing coalition of Serbia led by the DSS - Unionist Bloc
2013 " Brussels Agreement"	Reconciliation	Splitting the Serbia subject from 'Kosovo'	Conditionality through the "Brussels Agreement"	- EU - NATO
	Unity	Unifying the Serbia subject with the 'Kosovo Serbs'	Autonomy through the Community of Serb Municipalities	- Governing coalition of Serbia led by the SNS

Different from Stabilization that shows SEE contained in EU's and NATO's backyard, Europeanization portrays a (Western) Balkan 'other' who is perpetually moving into its European future but is still outside the Western 'self'. The promise of integration solidifies, though only in appearance since Europeanization is not just a coexisting basic discourse with Stabilization and the Yugoslav Crisis, but its genealogical invocations connect it to Balkanism. Just as the latter considers the gap between the West and the (Western) Balkan to have been constructed and hence unnatural, Europeanization is solidified through calls of EU and NATO officials who claim that the (Western) Balkans perform in a European manner or have even always been European. The two sections below establish the identity dynamics of 'self'/'other' between the (Western) Balkans and the West as mediated by Europeanization and the Euro-Atlantic integration promises that the dynamics give rise to – as well as vice versa.

The 2006 Independence of Montenegro

The final divorce between Serbia and Montenegro was yet another 'balkanizing' event for the (Western) Balkan 'other'. This subsection explores both discursive themes through which it

was framed – *Referendum* and *Dis(Integration)* – with the purpose of illustrating how the promise of integration offered by Europeanization relies on the further 'balkanization' of the (Western) Balkan 'other', ultimately serving a more united Western 'self', especially as the EU was undergoing through an enlargement fatigue reflected into its relationship with NATO. Conversely, the Euro-Atlantic processes of the (Western) Balkans further disintegrate the (Western) Balkan 'other'. This becomes more visible through the discursive blank spot between the Referendum discursive theme which results with disintegration, and Europeanization's policy of integration. To cover for such discursive blank spots, the West once again relied on genealogical references to the identity of the (Western) Balkans as European. However, it is genealogical references which then in turn expose Europeanization's inconsistent nature for not only are such references incompatible with disintegration as the result of Referendum, but they moreover coexist with older invocations of the identity of the (Western) Balkans as 'balkanized'. This subsection also shows both Serbian and Montenegrin political elites instrumentalizing such discursive blank spots for their own political agendas, reinventing themselves as different from the nationalist radical actors they were when part of the Milošević political constellation of the 1990s.

(Western) Balkan 'other': Disintegrate to integrate

The EU, NATO, and the Montenegrin Independentist Bloc led predominantly by Đukanović's Democratic Party of Socialists (DPS) argued for splitting the Serbia and Montenegro subject through a democratic *referendum*. Though the EU had a vested interest in keeping the State Union alive for it had negotiated the Charter in 2003, it also showed an interest in making sure that 'balkanization' went well according to a European manner. That the West was not as determined in keeping Montenegro and Serbia united is also visible through the gate it had left open for breaking away from the Union through a referendum. In addition, it had secured its role when on April 7, 2005, the adopted Agreement amending the original Constitutional Charter stipulated that "[a] Member State organising the referendum shall cooperate with the European Union" (see Agreement Amending the Constitutional Charter, 2005). A peaceful ballot which would have sealed the divorce between Serbia and Montenegro – but what would, in effect, be a peaceful 'balkanization' – was once again framed as a *condition* for Serbia's and Montenegro's Euro-Atlantic prospects. After the voting, "[t]he European Union [had]

reconfirm[ed] the European perspective of the Western Balkans" (Council of the European Union, 2006b), while the PfP agreements with both Serbia and Montenegro were signed only after the latter's independence. Hence, 'balkanization' became once again an elicitor of the reaffirmed EU integration promise and of both Serbia's and Montenegro's improved relationship with NATO.

The conditionality clause employed by the West, inscribed in a continuum of events, pertained matters beyond Montenegro's independence. The SAA talks with Serbia and Montenegro which had begun on October 10, 2005, were late in comparison to the ones with other (Western) Balkan countries[48]. The reason for this was that Serbia did not fulfil the *condition* set by the Council Conclusion to fully cooperate with the ICTY, and therefore on May 3, 2006, the EU called the negotiations off. The NATO Secretary General made it "crystal clear" during the PfP program signing ceremony that "the obligation on full co-operation with the ICTY, with the Tribunal in The Hague, has not changed at all" (NATO, 2006b). Furthermore, the issue of cooperating with the ICTY cannot be seen as separate from Kosovo. The Vienna negotiations for the final status of Kosovo had begun in October 2005 with the endorsement of the UN Security Council under the auspices of UN's Secretary General Envoy, Martti Ahtisaari, but the same had not reached much progress by 2006. Therefore, the State Secretary for European and International Affairs of Austria, Hans Winkler, while addressing the European Parliament (2006a), called "on both Belgrade and Prishtina not to obstruct the introduction of the necessary standards in Kosovo" when being asked whether "Serbia's stance in negotiations on the final status of Kosovo will influence the negotiations on the Stability and Association Agreement". Conditionality rose as a policy of the overall integrationist approach of Europeanization, applied not only with regards to Montenegro but with regards to many other issues in the region.

Similarly, the Serbian discursive theme of *Dis(Integration)*, which argued for *preservation of borders*, also had to do with Kosovo. The Montenegrin Unionist Bloc and Serbia's political establishment led by the former Yugoslav President, Koštunica, in the role of a Prime Minister and that of the President of the Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS) argued

[48] By that time, Slovenia had already joined the EU in 2004, (North) Macedonia and Croatia had signed their SAAs already in 2001, BiH had started its SAA negotiations in November 2005, while Albania had started the negotiations in 2003 and signed its SAA by June 2006.

against the disintegration of the State Union and for rather integrating it such as it was into the Euro-Atlantic structures, particularly the EU. Koštunica repeatedly stated that "European and other standards and values imply that national minorities exercise their rights… through different levels of autonomy and different systems of minority rights, not by disintegrating the existing states" (Essential autonomy for Kosovo within existing borders of Serbia, 2006). He and others were using Montenegro's quest for independence to offer substantial autonomy for Kosovo, claiming that it would be "a European solution in the true sense of the word, being based on the European experience" (Essential autonomy for Kosovo within existing borders of Serbia, 2006). The assembly debate in Serbia during 2006 shows no sign of major disagreements with this position. Eventually, upon Montenegro's independence, the Assembly unanimously adopted the new (and current) draft of constitution on September 30, 2006, which the Serbian electorate approved through – also – a *referendum* held on October 28 and 29, 2006. The new constitution's preamble declared Kosovo an "integral part of the territory of Serbia" (Ustav Republike Srbije, 2006), while mentioning "European principles and values" (Ustav Republike Srbije, 2006) for the first time. While the Referendum discursive theme considered the democratic change of borders a performance of Europeanness, the Dis(Integration) theme claimed the preservation of existing borders as a European value.

The EU and NATO had reiterated their promise for integrating the (Western) Balkans into their structures, but their policy appeared incongruent with the support given to the Charter in 2003 and later Montenegro's independence, which were disintegrating rather than integrating events. This is also why Koštunica claimed that "[d]isintegration should not be the first step in the EU integration process through which Serbia is going" (Government of Serbia, 2006c). Gordana Pop-Lazić of the Serbian Radical Party (SRS) said "Serbia is, in fact, the only candidate today for the EU, which is required as a condition to disintegrate in order to integrate" (Republic of Serbia National Assembly, 2006a). Accepting the results enabled the political elites to instrumentalize the Western discursive blank spot between the Referendum discursive theme and Europeanization, while claim ownership over the confirmed "European perspective of the Western Balkans" (Council of the European Union, 2006b). Simultaneously, it allowed them to assign responsibility to the EU and NATO for, as *Vreme*'s Milan Milošević (2006) put it, the persisting "feeling that *Balkanization* continues" (Milošević M. , 2006).

The EU and NATO, as the section below illustrates, turned to genealogical references on the European identity of the (Western) Balkans to cover for the mentioned blank spot. Genealogical references are called to drift attention away from it and instead enhance the focus on the European identity of the (Western) Balkans and their inevitable integration. However, it is precisely such references to European (Western) Balkans whose future in the EU and NATO is repeatedly confirmed that expose Europeanization's inconsistency in 'balkanizing' for the sake of integration. This 'balkanization' might have been of a different kind – democratic, or European – but for some, "[i]t was the final, fatal blow" as Ilic (2006) wrote, for if "the limbs of Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and effectively Kosovo were violently severed some while ago, the rump of Serbia and Montenegro was divided, not by war, but by the ballot box". Europeanization became not an opposite but a variation of 'balkanization'.

Genealogical references: Heroes, moustaches, and Europeanness

Genealogical references to the Balkan Wars/WWI or the WWII/Colonial genealogical basic discourse illustrated in preceding chapters are different from genealogical references to Balkanism upon which Europeanization relies. Creating an analytical category out of Balkanism was, at the first place, an unusual analytical move (see Chapter 2). However, the identification of genealogical basic discourses in the present is rarely a straightforward process. Links between contemporary and genealogical basic discourses are most often implicit and they can be located not just through direct and literal references to, for example, specific events of the past – Balkan Wars, WWI, WII, etc. – but through implicit invocations of certain characteristics of the othered subject which a contemporary basic discourse – Europeanization – might share with a genealogical one – Balkanism. When it comes to Europeanization and Balkanism, it should be stated that the two are similar in that they further reduce the distance between the (Western) Balkan subject and the West. That is, they agree on the spatiality of the (Western) Balkan subject; temporally, they both claim to see the (Western) Balkan subject beyond their past; and ethically, just like Europeanization, Balkanism is in its core an integrationist approach for its endeavor ultimately feeds back into crumbling the 'walls' between the (Western) Balkans and the West. Conversely, they remain different in that Balkanism is an academic vocation built, among others, through a critique of official

discourses – though it too produces knowledge. Europeanization, on the other hand, is itself a reflection of official discourses which, as the time progresses, shows nuances of a self-reflecting/critical Western subject willing to consider amending its borders based on a (Western) Balkan subject acting in a European manner.

The analytical values in identifying links between Europeanization and Balkanism are conceptually the same as the values of locating links between Stabilization and the WWII/Colonial basic discourse or the Yugoslav Crisis and the Balkan Wars/WWI: not only illustrating how contemporary policies are grounded on older articulations of the identity of the (Western) Balkans, but also in exposing contemporary discourses as inconsistent through precisely the genealogical references which actors invoke to cover for discursive blank spots. The first, that is the value of illustrating how Europeanization argues for integration through sharing a similar articulation of the (Western) Balkan subject with Balkanism, might seem, in a way, as a progress for the Euro-Atlantic processes of the (Western) Balkans in that it decreases the gap between the region and the West. However, when analytically seeing how the articulation of the (Western) Balkan subject, which Europeanization shares with Balkanism, is invoked into the present to cover for discursive blank spots, it becomes clear how the gap persists. Europeanization – just as Balkanism – fails to bring down the barricades between the Western 'self' and the (Western) Balkan 'other', ultimately reinventing them into the present. The latter becomes particularly evident as Europeanization coexists with other basic discourses which rely on their own genealogical references to a 'balkanized' (Western) Balkan 'other' different from the West.

The discursive blank spot between Europeanization's integrationist approach and the disintegration of the State Union, supported by the Referendum discursive theme, is already visible from the subsection above. It portrays Europeanization and its policy of integration as inconsistent because, as the Serbian political elites denounced, there is an inherent contradiction in conditioning the Euro-Atlantic integration of the (Western) Balkans on disintegration. Since actors cover blank spots of contemporary basic discourses through genealogical references, the direct vote was portrayed as a proof of the European identity of Montenegro and Serbia, and more in general of the (Western) Balkans. NATO (2006c) referred to Montenegro as "far from being the youngest nation in Europe", while the President of the European Commission (2006), José Manuel Barroso, considered the area "this important part

of Europe" when visiting Belgrade. Enhancing the European identity of the (Western) Balkans as something which will inevitably lead to their integration into the EU and NATO was meant to overshadow the absurdity of them having to disintegrate to proof that they were European deserving of Euro-Atlantic integration. Moreover, they were requested to meet higher criteria than the West did for itself. The EU insisted that a winning majority comprises 55% of those voting in addition to the turnout exceeding 50%, and as *The Guardian*'s Timothy Garton Ash (2006) pointed out, "[y]ou may well ask by what right the EU, whose Maastricht treaty was passed by a majority of just 51% in a referendum in France, imposed this 55% hurdle on Montenegro". The answer to that is by the right of an asymmetrical discourse of othering in which the West, while reaffirming its commitment to integrating the (Western) Balkans, maintains the differential treatment intact.

In 2006, the Referendum discursive theme was bridging the gap between the (Western) Balkans and the West by tapping them on the back for behaving in a European manner. Paradoxically, it was widening up that same gap by clearly juxtaposing the European style of solving disagreements with the tragic Balkan way. Montenegro, especially, makes for a good example of this. While welcoming it as a UN member, the UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, said that "[i]n achieving its independence through a non-violent and democratic process… Montenegro showed the entire world … its political maturity" (United Nations, 2006), as he also made sure to point out that "[t]hese are especially important messages given the violent past in the Balkan region". Moreover, a wave of predominantly Western but also Montenegrin media news and articles romanticizing Montenegro by contrasting it to the (Western) Balkans supported these dynamics. For Montenegro to be solving a contradiction in such a European and civilized way – contrary to the rest of the (Western) Balkans – needed an explanation outside of the (Western) Balkans. In other words, the two could not coexist. One, therefore, finds references to "tiny Montenegro" in *The Daily Telegraph*, but "proud that their mountainous central region was the only part of the Balkans never conquered by the Ottoman Turks" (Rennie, 2006). Lord Byron was being cited, speaking of the Montenegrin coast as "the most beautiful encounter between the land and the sea" (Jansson, 2006), and so was W. E. Gladstone calling Montenegrins "a band of heroes such as the world has rarely seen" (Ash, 2006). *The Independent* wrote that the country "could become the *first corner of the Balkans*

to restore the old Tintin image, a land of fancy dress and comical spies, formidable mountains and floppy moustaches" (Popham & Zimonjic, 2006).

Unable to reconcile the (Western) Balkans with the West even when praising the former for its European-like attitude, the (Western) Balkans could not remain Balkan and yet vote peacefully in a referendum. Rather, they had to be undressed from their Balkan nature. This discursive move only further testifies to the inconsistency of Europeanization's integrationist policies which, to cover for its blank spot of disintegrating for the sake of integrating, invokes references to the European identity of the (Western) Balkans. A consistent integrationist approach, supported by Europeanization, however, would integrate the (Western) Balkans as Balkans with the West and would not need to first undress them from their 'Balkanness'. Namely, had the Western 'self' been, as Europeanization argues, willing to integrate its (Western) Balkan 'other' within its structures, it would not need to revive the (Western) Balkans first into a European subject different from the (Western) Balkans. The integrationist approach of Europeanization is integrating the West with its European 'self' rather the Western 'self' with its (Western) Balkan 'other'.

As with other preceding examples, the West is not alone in invoking genealogical references to cover for discursive blank spots in its policies. The political elites of the (Western) Balkans joined with genealogical references to the European identity of the (Western) Balkans in attempts of taking advantage of Western discursive blank spots. They set the rules in opposition by fatalistically accepting the results which narrowly passed under the justification of it being the right thing to do to improve the Euro-Atlantic integration prospects of Serbia, whilst defending their policy of borders preservation. President Boris Tadić's Democratic Party (DS) and Miroljub Labus's G17 Plus (G17+) – both part of the governing coalition – accepted the Montenegrin referendum results while at once framing it as "a sad reality" (Republic of Serbia National Assembly, 2006b). Even the opposition, constituted by Šešelj's SRS inherited by Tomislav Nikolić, as well as the Serbian Renewal Movement–New Serbia (SPO–NS) coalition led by Vuk Drašković, accepted the results although claiming that "[t]here is no place for glory here" (Republic of Serbia National Assembly, 2006b). However, the glory was seen in, as Koštunica had claimed, Serbia "show[ing] constructive and *European-like attitude* to the issue in question" (Government of Serbia, 2006a). De facto, Serbian political elites could simultaneously argue against disintegration under the reasoning that it was a

process contrary "to the general mood of EU integration" (Government of Serbia, 2006b), and, at the same time, declaring to act in a European manner and in accordance with the expectations of the West. The key point is that the Euro-Atlantic integration processes became a tool for harvesting political points and, together, for blaming the West and the promise of Euro-Atlantic prospects for 'balkanizing' of the country that the Serbian political elites were leaders of.

These dynamics are already familiar from the Yugoslav Crisis and Stabilization. Preceding chapters illustrate how (Western) Balkan political elites instrumentalize Western discursive blank spots in favor of their political platforms and their reinvention as Western allies whose aim is to bring the (Western) Balkans closer to the West. Koštunica, after all, was among those Western favorite democrats who toppled Miloševic in the October 5 Revolution. The West had also shown a rewarding attitude towards the separatist Montenegrin Prime Minister, Milo Đukanović, as "West's closest ally in its campaign to topple Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic" (Watson, 2000). He, who "was an ardent supporter and contractor of Slobodan Milosević in Montenegro" (Rudović, 2006b) as he was climbing towards his leadership position in the 1990s, had, reportedly, been predicted by Solana to have "a great political future at the head of European Montenegro" (Rudović, 2006a). Indeed, Đukanović earned the sobriquet of "Europe's longest serving-leader" (Savic, 2020) who "has been calling the shots in the tiny Adriatic state for almost 30 years" (Roberts, 2019). Both Koštunica and Đukanović are, among others, a reflection of the continuing trend of local political elites instrumentalizing inconsistent Western policies to reinvent themselves by switching between and playing both roles of nationalists and passionate Euro-Atlanticists on the back of a 'balkanizing' (Western) Balkan 'other' and in the service of a more united Western 'self'. The trend which started with the Yugoslav Crisis and developed with Stabilization, only emerged as more solid during Europeanization as the Euro-Atlantic promise of the (Western) Balkans also became more plausible.

Western 'self': Absorption capacity and the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty

Invoking genealogy in attempts of covering up discursive blank spots is meant to portray Western policies as consistent and stable, and consequently, a united Western 'self'. From this then, how do such genealogical references feed back into the Western 'self', is the next

question to answer. This further goes back to the point of (the threat of) 'balkanization' shaping the promise of Euro-Atlantic integration because a 'balkanized' (Western) Balkan 'other' results with a more united Western 'self'. The Euro-Atlantic integration processes of the (Western) Balkans, given the asymmetry of the discourse, are rather shaped by the Western 'self', and most importantly, by the different crises its unity might be facing – whether that is the EU, NATO, or the relationship between the two.

The year of 2006 seems to be particularly difficult for the EU. Considering that by that time 18 out of the 25 members of the EU were also NATO members, it goes without saying that any instability within the EU is inevitably reflected into its relationship with NATO. Between the Charter of 2003 and Montenegro's independence in 2006, the EU had in 2004 admitted ten new members, and soon after that it referred to the "'absorption capacity' of the Union in the context of future enlargements" as it admitted that "the Union is at present confronted with difficulties in honouring its commitments towards South-East European countries because its current institutional, financial and policy structure is unsuitable for further enlargements" (European Parliament, 2006c). In 2005, the French and the Dutch voted "no" in their referenda on the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe. The rejection reflected not just a fear of enlargement, which was seen as threatening the socio-economic wellbeing of French and Dutch citizens by acceding countries like those of Eastern Europe, but also manifesting a general discontent with EU governance (see Stefanova, 2006). Further, it exposed divergencies between the EU and individual member states. As Stefanova (2006, p. 254) states, "[f]or the first time in the history of the EU, the logic of *integration*… has been interrupted", while *The Economist* wrote that "rejection of the constitution signals that the dream of deeper political *integration* and, in the… famous phrase, 'ever closer union' is *over*" (The Europe that died, 2005). Paradoxically, the integration policy of Europeanization which the West was adopting towards the (Western) Balkans was internally inconsistent and trembled significantly before Montenegro's independence in 2006.

The Constitutional Treaty was unavoidably connected to NATO. The Commission on Review of Overseas Military Structure of the United States (as cited in Dempsey, 2005) noted that the rejection of the document "highlighted the continued political weakness of the Union and thus the importance of NATO to our relationship with Europe". Whilst in many ways a politically disintegrated EU has implied a chance for an assertive NATO, which in turn implied

a better chance for retaining a united transatlantic Western 'self', rarely has the very disintegration of the EU led to a more united Western 'self' for the historical tensions between the Atlanticists and Europeanists persist to date, even as the EU developed its own CSDP. Therefore, despite the negative result presented a better opportunity for the former, the EU and NATO remained disunited even after the Constitutional Treaty, as the relationship between the two required constant readjustment. Just months after the Montenegro referendum, the European Parliament (2006b, p. 22) confirmed that the bond between the two actors is "neither co-operation nor competition, but *dysfunction*".

Therefore, the refusal of the Constitutional Treaty, which in turn effected the EU's absorption capacity, also caused instability and uncertainty to the transatlantic Western 'self'. Judging by this, EU's policy of conditionality towards the (Western) Balkans was reasonably connected to a "Europe today [which], enlarged, much larger than in 2004, is going through [yet another] *crises*, searching for its identity" (Republic of Serbia National Assembly, 2006c). *Vreme* reiterated that the "EU is also in the process of defining its borders… so the question is heard more and more often: Will Europe want us?" (Evropska unija i javno mnjenje u Srbiji, 2006). During the Salzburg meeting in 2006, through a released joint statement, the EU reaffirmed its "full support for the agenda set out at the Thessaloniki summit in 2003" (Council of the European Union, 2006a) confirming again "that the future of the Western Balkans lies in the European Union". Yet Goran Svilanović interpreted it differently: "In Salzburg, the message was - when you [the (Western) Balkans] are ready, we will see if we [the EU] are ready for you. Because, in Salzburg, the absorption capacity of the EU is mentioned" (Evropska unija i javno mnjenje u Srbiji, 2006). EU's conditionality towards the (Western) Balkans and the promise of European integration depended on the Western 'self'.

This is also why the Euro-Atlantic integration promise was – and will continue to be, as other key events demonstrate – reiterated each time when a crisis threatening the united Western 'self' occurs and for which a 'balkanizing' (Western) Balkan 'other' is useful. In 2006, the split of Montenegro and Serbia was utilized by the EU to reiterate Europeanization and its policy of integration based on the European identity of the (Western) Balkan 'other'. The aim, however, was to cover up for West's own internal instability in performing Europeanness and integrating from within. Beyond the EU, as tradition has it, the 'balkanized' (Western) Balkans were called in to remind the West of how important it is to keep united. The "Riga Summit

Declaration" stated that "NATO and the EU share *common* values and strategic interests" since "[o]ur successful *cooperation* in the Western Balkans… is contributing to peace and security" (NATO, 2006a). BiH, Montenegro, and Serbia were invited to join the PfP in 2006. While NATO (2006a) reiterated that "[i]n the Western Balkans, Euro-Atlantic integration, based on solidarity and democratic values, remains necessary for long-term stability", the promises made to the 'balkanized' (Western) Balkan 'other' remains important just as much if not more for the stability of the united Western 'self' rather than that of the (Western) Balkan 'other' whose main utility to the West is its 'balkanization'.

The 2013 "Brussels Agreement"

Much like previous sections, the two main discursive themes of framing the "Brussels Agreement" between Prishtina and Belgrade are explored: *Reconciliation* as argued by the EU and NATO; and the *Unity* discursive theme of the Serbian political establishment. This section shows how the existing discursive loopholes shed light on the inconsistencies of the political elites which reinvent themselves as Serbia is effectively 'balkanizing'. 'Balkanization' comes once again handy as the unity of the Western subject is threatened with NATO complaining about uneven defense spending between Europe and the United States, and with the EU undergoing a financial crisis. Despite the "Brussels Agreement" being framed as a step forward for the (Western) Balkans in their Euro-Atlantic processes and a step closer to the Western 'self', which draws links to the genealogical basic discourse of Balkanism, it invokes older genealogical variations of the identity of the (Western) Balkans as fragmented noting in this way that Europeanization too – in spite of its integrationist policies – is underpinned by older articulations of the 'balkanized' (Western) Balkans 'other' and circulating the same in the present.

(Western) Balkan 'other': Normalizing the abnormal

On February 17, 2008, the assembly of Kosovo unanimously and unilaterally declared Kosovo an independent country. The 2013 "Brussels Agreement" between Prishtina and Belgrade was the result of the dialogue between the two launched in March 2011 and facilitated by the EU. It comprised of fifteen points that can be summarized into three main areas: the establishment

of the Association/Community of Serb majority municipalities in Kosovo, the agreement that the countries will not obstacle their respective EU paths, and the recognition of the power of Kosovo's police and courts over northern Kosovo which had been effectively under Serbia's control. In exchange, the northern Kosovo municipalities, unified under the Association/Community of Serb majority, were to retain control of areas such as economic development, education, health, urban and rural planning.

Reconciliation appears to be a dominant discursive theme through which the EU and NATO framed the "Brussels Agreement". The European Parliament (2013) welcomed "the meetings between the Serbian and Kosovo Prime Ministers, Ivica Dačić and Hashim Thaçi, as crucial steps towards a genuine reconciliation between Serbians and Kosovars and *normalisation* of relations". On behalf of the European Commission, the Director for Enlargement Policy and Strategy, Pierre Mirel, praised "the level of commitment shown by the Serbian government in the dialogue with Pristina… reflect[ing] the very essence of European integration for which 'reconciliation' was the key word" (Council of the European Union, 2013, p. 2). Though NATO 2013 research material shows less appearance of the term, the NATO Secretary General, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, claimed that "we consider it important to make our contribution to the implementation of the political agreement between Belgrade and Pristina" (NATO, 2013g), while the U.S. House of Representatives commented that "[r]econciliation is the goal of Serbia and Kosovo" (Kosovo and Serbia: A pathway to peace, 2013). Reconciliation, however, relied on a discursive split between 'Serbia' and 'Kosovo' for sitting the two at a negotiations table also implied their recognition as two separate subjects. Most EU and NATO members had vouched for this split since recognizing Kosovo as an independent state[49].

Knowing that recognizing Kosovo would cause an enormous political loss, Serbia's government oriented their discourse on the "Brussels Agreement" towards arguing for *Unity* and which – rather than dividing the Serbia and Kosovo discursive subjects – was unifying 'Serbia' with the 'Kosovo Serbs'. The Government of the Republic of Serbia (2013c) declared "all the major political entities and officials, concerned over the fate of the remaining Serbs

[49] EU states that do not recognize Kosovo's independence are Cyprus, Greece, Romania, Spain, and Slovakia. The country has also been the subject of Serbia's derecognition campaign targeted at influencing states to withdraw their recognitions of Kosovo (see Visoka, 2021).

and other non-Albanians in Kosovo-Metohija, have *united* around the idea of getting together, around the creation of the Community of Serbian municipalities in Kosovo-Metohija", adding that the Community of Serbs "would remain inextricably linked with our country". Ivan Mrkić, Serbian Minister of Foreign Affairs, reassured "they [the Kosovo Serbs] are an inseparable part of the fabric of Serbia" (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Serbia, 2013a). Dačić redundantly called for unity as he invited the MPs to "focus on how to create a good and solid foundation to save something, to *unite* the people in the fight for the goals we can achieve" and to "find a common denominator" (Republic of Serbia National Assembly, 2013a). Shifting the focus from the discursive split between Kosovo and Serbia towards the unity of the Serbian subject was strategically more beneficial for the Serbian political elites.

The policy that was argued through the Unity discursive theme was *autonomy* of the Kosovo Serbs. The Serbian Assembly adopted a platform and Resolution early in January 2013 ruling that "[t]he Republic of Serbia, in accordance with international law, the Constitution and the will of the citizens, does not recognize and will never recognize the unilaterally declared independence of Kosovo" (Republic of Serbia National Assembly, 2013b). The platform and the Resolution were advocated mainly by the governmental establishment that came to power through the 2012 parliamentary elections, led by Nikolić's and Aleksandar Vučić's Serbian Progressive Party (SNS)[50], Ivica Dačić's SPS and Mlađan Dinkić's United Regions of Serbia (URS). Though the text did not explicitly refer to autonomy, the platform claimed that the Republic of Serbia especially insists on "the establishment of the Autonomous Community of Serb Municipalities in Kosovo and Metohija" (Republic of Serbia National Assembly, 2013b). This incongruency between the platform and the Resolution sparked reactions from the Serbs in Kosovo who complained that "the resolution is not in line with the platform" (Kosovo Serbs denounce Serbian govt's resolution, 2013). Indeed, even if the "Brussels Agreement" confirms that there will be an Association/Community of Serb majority municipalities in Kosovo, it mentions no autonomy. Dačić who had spoken of the "establishment of an *autonomous* community of Serbian municipalities in Kosovo and Metohija" (Republic of Serbia National Assembly, 2013a), avoided the term when the post-

[50] The SNS was formed in 2008 as a split from the radical SRS due to the conflicts between Nikolić and Šešelj. Soon after Nikolić's exit from the SRS, the former SRS General Secretary, Vučić, joined the newly formed SNS as its Deputy Director. The SNS first came to power in May 2012 when the Serbian parliamentary elections took place, gaining the majority of Assembly seats.

"Brussels Agreement" report was adopted. Further, Vojvodina[51] MPs such as Bojan Kostreš, posed questions such as "how can we give autonomy in an autonomous province?" (Republic of Serbia National Assembly, 2013a) since Kosovo, after all, was still the "*Autonomous* Province of Kosovo and Metohija" (Ustav Republike Srbije, 2006).

This shows how discursive blank spots are not unique to Western discursive themes and actors. On the contrary, the genealogical invocations used by Western actors to cover for their discursive blank spots, and which are shared with (Western) Balkan political elites in the service of their political platforms, serve the same function covering for discursive blank spots, making policies appear as consistent, and reinventing actors. The utilization by political (Western) Balkan political actors is, among others, what enabled VMRO-DPMNE to vouch for (North) Macedonia's independence in 1991; what qualified the NLA as a legitimate political actor in 2002; what kept Milošević in power; what supported the DOS to overthrow him; and what entitled Koštunica and Đukanović to argue for integration while disintegrating. Examples are numerous, and the 2013 "Brussels Agreement" is only one among many.

Genealogical invocations were called in again to draw attention away from the inconsistency of the Serbian political discourse, which argued for the autonomy of a community living already within an autonomous province, and to also cover up for the discrepancy between reconciliation as part of the Europeanization's policy of integration. While reconciliation was framed as bringing closer and integrating the Serbian and the Kosovo subjects, it also recognized further Kosovo's independent status as separate from Serbia since to reconcile the two required treating them as independent subjects. Such discursive blank spots emerged as the U.S. House of Representatives spoke of reconciliation and "not partition" (Kosovo and Serbia: A pathway to peace, 2013) as the goal, or as the European Parliament (2013) reiterated that "ideas of partitioning Kosovo or any other country of the Western Balkans run counter to the spirit of European integration". Was not an independent Kosovo that both the EU and the United States recognized, after all, precisely the result of partitioning? The discursive inconsistency between the Europeanizing policy of integration and the support for 'balkanizing' events such as Kosovo's independence and the 2013 "Brussels Agreement"

[51] During the 2013 discussions of the Serbian Assembly on the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue and the "Brussels Agreement", political parties such as the League of Social Democrats of Vojvodina (LSV) and the Alliance of Vojvodina Hungarians (SVM) showed very engaged given the autonomous status of Vojvodina itself. The debate on Kosovo presented a good opportunity for the articulation of their own demands in Serbia.

rely once again, as demonstrated below, on genealogical invocations of the European identity of the (Western) Balkan 'other' and the implied Euro-Atlantic promise of integration. This pledge continued to be utilized by the (Western) Balkan political elites to reinvent themselves as Euro-Atlantic enthusiasts, and by the EU and NATO to reclaim a united 'self' on the basis of a 'balkanizing' (Western) Balkan 'other'.

Genealogical references: A (different) Balkan story of blood, barbarity, and war

Stressing genealogically on the European identity of the (Western) Balkans as a proof of their future in the EU and NATO is what allowed the framing of 'balkanizing' events such as the "Brussels Agreement" as necessary sacrifices. Genealogical references also deflected from the inconsistent policies of the EU, NATO, and the (Western) Balkan political elites because the Euro-Atlantic integration promise which relies on such a European identity overshadows discursive blank spots in their discursive themes. For the Euro-Atlantic integration promise to take precedence over discursive inconsistencies, big and monumental words were used to describe its milestones, like the "Brussels Agreement", as being "historic" (European Commission, 2013a; NATO, 2013c). The accord was deemed as "reflect[ing] a European spirit" (European Commission, 2013a) by both Western and the Serbian political elites. Mrkić asserted that "[p]raise [is] coming from all sides" (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Serbia, 2013b) and that "Serbia has been recognized by its future European family" (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Serbia, 2013c). The "Brussels Agreement" was another proof "of a country breaking with the past and embracing its European future" (European Commission, 2013b) to which it belonged.

However, references to the European identity of the (Western) Balkans only further exposed Europeanization's policy of integration. A truly integrationist European approach would not need to stigmatize its (Western) Balkan 'other' of the past. If the (Western) Balkans were European, then so was their past. Europeanization's most troubling discursive blank spot is its insistence on a European identity of the (Western) Balkans to which they always belonged to on one hand, and its insistence on differentiating the current identity of the (Western) Balkans from their Balkan past on the other. It is almost as if the (Western) Balkans just for a moment of their past postponed their Europeanness, then turned into Balkan, and are now

European again. Such reoccurring references to a shameful Balkan past appear throughout most recent events including the "Brussels Agreement", and they are a testimony to how Europeanization not only relies on older articulations of the identity of the (Western) Balkan 'other' as 'balkanized', but also recirculates those in the present.

Indeed, Europeanization portrays the (Western) Balkan 'other' as at least comparable to the West. Catherine Ashton (2013), the High Representative of the Union who facilitated the Agreement, considered the recent history of the (Western) Balkans as written in blood "[a]s much as anywhere in Europe", as did Herman Van Rompuy, the President of the European Council (2013b), comment on "the Union, itself born from the ashes of the Second World War, becomes now a place of reconciliation and encounter for the Balkan nations". Testimonies, however, continue to remind the (Western) Balkan 'other' as ingrained in its past and, hence, never fully capable of integrating with the Western 'self'. Ashton (2013) who titled her article for *The New York Times* "A Different *Balkan* Story", also wrote of "blood", "the battles and barbarity that followed the breakup of Yugoslavia" and the (Western) Balkans "as a cradle of war". The discursive themes of Reconciliation and Referendum illustrate how despite its successful performance of Europeanness through both – the 2006 Montenegro referendum and the historical "Brussels Agreement" of 2013 – the (Western) Balkan 'other' remains an *ab*normal subject. This abnormality is simply another articulation of the identity of the (Western) Balkan 'other' that 'balkanization' connects to the Euro-Atlantic processes, and which is then mirrored by the Serbian political elites. It is seen in Dačić's statements such as "our people deserve to live like all normal people" (Government of Serbia, 2013a) and "[w]e are solving the Kosovo issue to be able to live normally" (Government of Serbia, 2013b) as a European nation, while returning to the perpetual threat that the (Western) Balkans represent as an "inflamed appendix" (Republic of Serbia National Assembly, 2013c). With this "A different Balkan Story" (Ashton, 2013) might just as well be another familiar – the same? – Balkan story.

Further, the anthem singing "Serbia anew is born" might not be referring to a new Serbia after all. The three main Serbian names connected to the "Brussels Agreement" – Nikolić, Dačić, and Vučić – had all a radical nationalist past, some even connected to Milošević. Nikolič had acted as Vice President of SRS founded by Šešelj. Though Šešelj was found not guilty on all charges by the ICTY in 2016, *The Economist* noted that "Vojislav

Seselj's acquittal is a victory for advocates of ethnic cleansing" (2016). Nikolić has also been against Mladič's extradition to the Hague, which was interpreted as a proof that "although he [Nikolić] had changed his rhetoric, he had never abandoned the ideology of the [Serbian ultra-nationalist] Radical Party and his mentor, Vojislav Sešelj" (Ristic, 2012). Vučić who later joined SNS which Nikolić founded after leaving the SRS, has been the former SRS General Secretary. This prompted Latinka Perović to state for *Vreme* that:

> The party to which the president of the state [Nikolić] and the deputy prime minister [Vučić] belong today… has participated in everything that has happened in the last two decades… we must remember that among those in power today there are politicians who said three days after Srebrenica: "For one Serb, a hundred Muslims![52]" (Nikčević, 2013, footnote added)

Dačić left even less space for any doubt as he inherited Milošević's SPS as a whole. MP Jelena Trivan confronted him by saying "[y]ou cannot call yourself a European and celebrate the war and military victories of Slobodan Milošević" (Republic of Serbia National Assembly, 2013a).

While Ashton (2013) maintained that during the dialogue "over the past six months I have seen men from both Belgrade and Pristina evolve from politicians into peacemakers", Jovana Gligorijević (2013) from *Vreme* explained things differently:

> … today's structure of the Government, considering the coalition prehistory, actually comes down to a group of parties that find it difficult to unite on anything other than the desire to survive in power. Guided by the same desire, Milošević went from "the guarantor of peace and stability in the Balkans" to the "Balkan butcher", while today's rulers went the opposite way, so from supporting the Hague indictees, they came to be the ones who will bring Serbia to the door of the European Union.

That is, the three key political figures who have negotiated the "Brussels Agreement" and have shared with the EU and NATO references to the European identity of the (Western) Balkan 'other' as a guarantee for its Euro-Atlantic integration processes to cover up for inconsistencies in their discursive themes, successfully reinvented as the executioners of that guarantee. These references not only expose EU's and NATO's policy of integration as incoherent, but they coexist with and rearticulate an image of the (Western) Balkan 'other' as 'balkanized' which, as the next subsection depicts, is always helpful to the unity of the Western 'self' especially when threatened.

[52] Perović here refers to Vučić's infamous wartime address to the Serbian Assembly (Remember Srebrenica, 2015).

Western 'self': Eurozone crisis and inequalities in defense spending

Besides the reinvention of political elites in the (Western) Balkans, the "Brussels Agreement" further supported the reinvention of the united Western subject. This was especially relevant as the EU had since 2009 undergone a debt crisis. The EU commended its own 'self' and confirmed that "Cathy Ashton, played a key role" (European Council, 2013c). The *Financial Times* added that the Agreement "shows EU foreign policy can yield results" (A Kosovo Accord, 2013) and *The Monitor* claimed "[t]he original purpose of the European Union - to secure peace on a continent fed up with war - was demonstrated once again on Monday" (Europe's ideals win a Serbia-Kosovo pact, 2013). As *Financial Times* wrote, "[t]he accord makes clear that the eurozone crisis has not dimmed the EU's allure" (A Kosovo Accord, 2013), and the (Western) Balkans had once again proved useful for such clarifications.

While the EU was dealing with its financial crisis, NATO was under fire over Syria. This points towards another crisis of the united Western 'self' as it illustrated a gap in defense spending between Europe and its transatlantic partner, the United States. Rasmussen (2013) asserted "we must recognize that the transatlantic relationship remains the most important relationship we have", noting that "while total defence spending by the Allies in recent years has been going down, the defence spending of emerging powers has been going up" (NATO, 2013a). He was referring to 2012 when "for the first time ever, Asian defense spending exceeded that of Europe in nominal terms" (2013). Thus, "Europeans must do more" said Rasmussen (2013), "to ensure that Europe is a powerful global actor, not a global spectator" (NATO, 2013d). The year of 2013 shows him and NATO in general "concerned about the level of defence spending" (NATO, 2013b) and about the European defense industry which "remains too national and too fragmented" (NATO, 2013e), advocating for "reaffirm[ing] the bond between Europe and North America and rebalance our relationship" (NATO, 2013e).

Calls for transatlantic unity coming from NATO are seen throughout all key events examined in this thesis as they draw references to the (Western) Balkans as stories of success. The U.S. President, Barack Obama, considered "[t]o bring the analogy closer to home, the intervention in Kosovo – very unpopular; but ultimately I think it was the right thing to do" (The White House, 2013). Stavidris (2013) from the *New York Times* urged: "NATO must help Obama on Syria", citing Kosovo as a precedent. Rasmussen too turned to the (Western)

Balkans as the vessel of triumphant Western stories claiming that "NATO and the European Union have already shown how effectively we can work together to bring freedom and security to our continent. In Central and Eastern Europe. And in the Balkans", adding that "NATO's commitment to support the implementation of the [Brussels] agreement remains key for success" (NATO, 2013d). The "Brussels Agreement" of 2013 not only became the engine of the reinvention of the Serbian political elites and their continued significance, but it was also used by both the EU and NATO to reassert their relevance, proving that the unity between them is what keeps the Western subject alive and influential.

Therefore, even if the accord was framed as, again, a major success for the Euro-Atlantic processes of the (Western) Balkans, it rather was a 'balkanizing' event for the region and another demonstration of the importance of Western unity and its deliverables as seen in the (Western) Balkans. This is not to say that 'balkanization' does not elicit any rewards from the EU and NATO; quite the contrary. Serbia had formally applied for membership in the EU in 2009, but it was not until after the "Brussels Agreement" that the SAA entered into force (see Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Serbia, of the other part, 2013). In June 2013, the European Council (2013a) also authorized the opening of negations for an SAA between Kosovo and the EU. Though Serbia to date remains the only former Yugoslav state not seeking NATO membership, it engages in collaborative projects with NATO to which the "Brussels Agreement" served as an elicitor. Mrkić announced that "[t]he draft IPAP [Individual Partnership Action Plan] between Serbia and NATO, submitted by Serbia in May 2013, met with very positive reactions of Alliance Members" (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Serbia, 2013d). The Euro-Atlantic promise towards the (Western) Balkans does deliver, but deliverables often depend on crises of the Western 'self' during which the 'balkanized' (Western) Balkans serve as an 'other' for the West to build its unity upon. The Euro-Atlantic processes of the (Western) Balkans perpetually reinvent and recirculate the 'balkanized' (Western) Balkan 'other', its incoherent political elites, and the united Western 'self'.

Conclusions

The three basic discourses remain consistent in that they all point out to one persisting and dominant feature of the links between different articulations of the identity of the (Western) Balkan 'other' and the Euro-Atlantic processes of the (Western) Balkans: the 'balkanized' (Western) Balkans 'other' is used for the unity of the Western 'self'. Calls for unity rarely leave the (Western) Balkans unmentioned. They appear throughout the Yugoslav Crisis and Stabilization basic discourses of the 1990s that found Serbia shrinking, and through the 2000s Europeanization years that saw it 'balkanized' even more with the official exodus of Montenegro and Kosovo. All three key events elaborated above reveal the persistent practice of Western officials to refer to the (Western) Balkan as a success story of united transatlantic action and, as such, the biggest proof that the united Western subject must endure. Rasmussen said "the people of this region understand the value of defence and security. They understand why defence matters" (NATO, 2013f). This argument was brought forward through the Western position on Iraq, Afghanistan, and Syria. Through these (and others, such as Libya) NATO was in crisis to secure the transatlantic unity of the Western subject, the EU was facing an enlargement fatigue and a debt crisis, while the (Western) Balkans were utilized to maintain such subjects as global influential actors alive. The Euro-Atlantic promise makes these dynamics possible.

The victory, however, seems to belong not only to the united Western subject but also to the (Western) Balkans political elites that engage in a "turning a blind eye on" relationship with the West in bringing the (Western) Balkans "closer to Europe" – as Ashton (Bilefsky, 2019) says — but keeping them far enough to be its "inflamed appendix, which will either be cured or cut off" (Republic of Serbia National Assembly, 2013c) as Dačić exposed. Serbian leaders like Dačić, Vučić, and Nikolič are described as "rigid opponents of European integration [who] today are almost fanatical advocates of getting a date for the start of negotiations with the EU" (Nikčević, 2013). Their reinvention, as Vukadinović (2013) stated, "is a living and the best possible proof that it is not possible to come to power in Serbia without the support or at least the approval of the West". To date, Vučić is serving as Serbia's President, Dačić is the President of the National Assembly, Đukanović remains the President of Montenegro, and the former KLA Director, Thaçi, was serving as the President of Kosovo in November 2020 when he resigned to face war crime charges by the Kosovo Specialist

Chambers and Specialist Prosecutor's Office. These are the same key political actors and executioners of the Euro-Atlantic integration processes of the (Western) Balkans.

Ultimately, the consequences of such elites rotating among the roles of presidents, prime ministers, assembly presidents and the likes, are faced by the people of the (Western) Balkans. Kosovans, for example, are kept outside of EU's visa-free regime though having met all criteria for visa liberalization. *The Economist* observed that the "Brussels Agreement" "will do little to address the day-to-day concerns of ordinary Serbs, in Serbia proper or in Kosovo" (Serbia politics: The Kosovo agreement, normalisation and nationalism, 2013) though it would give a "boost to morale in the midst of the interminable economic crisis" to the West and relieve Serbian political elites from pressure from Brussels, enabling them to sell their success to their electorate as "another step on the road to EU membership". *Vreme's* Teofil Pančić (2013) reflected: "Maybe the 'new' Serbia is a pleasant surprise for someone on the outside, but the trouble is that it looks completely different on the inside". Indeed, simplistically the Europeanization basic discourse can be framed as a step closer to the West. However, the rather complex dynamics between the 'balkanized' identity of the (Western) Balkans 'other' and their utilization for the actualization of the Western 'self' show the Euro-Atlantic promise to be a tool for the reinvention of the political elites and the unity of the Western 'self' rather than a chance for relieving the (Western) Balkan people from older variations of their 'balkanized' identity.

Chapter 6
FYRO/(North) Macedonia: The Sun too is a Star

Contextualized in (North) Macedonia, this chapter illustrates how, though the Euro-Atlantic processes of the (Western) Balkans are generally framed as key for rescuing the (Western) Balkans from being pejoratively known as the troubling 'other' of the West, they instead perpetually recycle older genealogical articulations of the identity of the (Western) Balkans as 'balkanized'. Even as references to the European identity of the (Western) Balkans are invoked to cover up for Europeanization's discursive blank spot of promising integration while further disintegrating the Macedonian subject, they coexist with and reproduce articulations of the (Western) Balkans as 'balkanized'. It is because the Euro-Atlantic processes of the (Western) Balkans are rather concerned with the retention and the reinvention of the Western 'self' for which the (Western) Balkan fragmented 'other' is useful. The local political elites – (North) Macedonia in this case – mirror the Western discourse on the (Western) Balkan 'other'. The Euro-Atlantic processes of the region not only become a mechanism for the perpetual reinvention of the united Western 'self' but also an instrument for the collection of political points.

To illustrate this, I focus on Europeanization (see Table 5) as a basic discourse contextualized in (North) Macedonia through three key events: the 2003 Thessaloniki Summit, the 2009 visa liberalization for Macedonian citizens, and what is known as the "Prespa Agreement" which changed the country's name. The first section expands on the 2003 Thessaloniki Summit as a discursive shift from Stabilization to Europeanization in relation to EU's first ever military mission which took place in (North) Macedonia, mission "Concordia". The chapter then gives a summary of Europeanization as a basic discourse examined through two key events: the 2009 visa liberalization status for Macedonian citizens, and the 2018 country's change of name from "Macedonia" to "North Macedonia".

Table 5. Contemporary Basic Discourses of 'Balkanization'

Basic Discourse	**Identity**		
	Layer of Otherness	**Temporality and Spatiality**	**Ethicality**
Yugoslav Crisis	Yugoslavia	Regressive and distant	Observation
Stabilization	South East Europe	Backward in the backyard	Intervention
Europeanization	*Western Balkans*	*European and forward looking*	*Integration*

The title of the chapter, inspired by the slogan of a 2000s political campaign launched by the Social Democratic Union of Macedonia (SDSM) (see for more Jovanova, 2017), reflects not only the internally mirrored Western discourse of Europeanization, which different from the Yugoslav Crisis and Stabilization, portrays the (Western) Balkans as having always been European, but it also highlights the persisting expectation towards the (Western) Balkans to prove their Europeanness – for the Sun of the Macedonian flag to prove it is a star. The gap between the two remains intact and reproduced, while the Euro-Atlantic integration processes of the (Western) Balkans, which are supposed to bridge that gap, only further perpetuate it in the present. The Euro-Atlantic integration promise remains on paper, for its fulfilling would leave the Western 'self' without a 'balkanized' 'other' to build its unity on.

(North) Macedonia during the 2003 Discursive Shift

The 2003 discursive shift is a key event analyzed as shared by both Serbia and (North) Macedonia based on research material that captures what at the time was relevant to the countries specifically and to the region in general. As such, it engrains what these two countries have in common as part of the (Western) Balkans and their Euro-Atlantic processes. It, however, is also meant to illustrate how regardless of the specificity of different events in Serbia and (North) Macedonia, the two countries remain both captured within the same layer of otherness. Though in 2003 Serbia witnessed the assassination of Đinđić and the transformation of the FRY to the State Union, while (North) Macedonia signed its SAA with the EU already in 2001 and in 2003 it became the first country ever to welcome the EU military operation "Concordia", both were promised a future within the EU during the Thessaloniki Summit. This section, therefore, demonstrates how particular and specific events in the (Western) Balkans do not necessarily determine the countries' progress in their Euro-Atlantic aspirations. This progress rather depends on the Western formation of 'self' as united.

This section focuses on "Concordia", and it once again shows how (North) Macedonia's path of becoming an integral part of the EU and NATO has more to do with maintaining a united Europe and a transatlantic subject. As was the case with Serbia, the Euro-Atlantic promise for (North) Macedonia is shown as shaped by the threat of 'balkanization' of the (Western) Balkan 'other' which presents with an opportunity of retaining and reinventing the united Western 'self'. The 2003 spatial, temporal, and ethical in-betweenness of the

(Western) Balkans which is already elaborated in Chapter 5 is not reiterated here. The first subsection of this section, instead, explores "Concordia" as an event which is framed as important for containing the threat of destabilization brought by the armed conflict of 2001. The second subsection then turns towards the Western 'self' showing how the Euro-Atlantic promise given to (North) Macedonia and to all the (Western) Balkans in 2003 was relevant to the reconciliation and development of EU's and NATO's security and defense identities.

(Western) Balkan 'other': Concordia, goddess of peace and harmony

In 2003, (North) Macedonia welcomed EU's first ever military operation, "Concordia", which took over NATO's "Allied Harmony" on 31 March. "Concordia" was the first concrete implementation of the 2002 "Berlin Plus" arrangements made between NATO and the EU which put NATO's military assets at the disposal of EU's peacekeeping operations. The pathway to "Concordia" had been long and exhausting for the West, and it had required the overcoming of many divergent views both within the EU and NATO and between the two. The surmounting of such conflicting stances mainly between the Atlanticists and the Europeanists prior to 2003 are covered in detail in preceding chapters. Here it is worth mentioning that such key moments of cooperation are reflected in the "Joint Declaration on European Defense issued at the British-French Summit" (1998) and then also at the NATO (1999g) Washington Summit heads of states who had decided to develop the "Berlin Plus" arrangements. "Berlin Plus" was an amendment to the Berlin Agreement of 1996 (NATO, 1996) where NATO foreign ministers agreed for the first time to build up on the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) within NATO. "Concordia" was a chance for the EU to demonstrate that it could take charge of European matters, but also for the transatlantic Western 'self' to overcome its historical divergencies through an agreed division of labor and responsibilities.

For (North) Macedonia, however, "Concordia" was framed as yet another chance to get closer to the EU and NATO. President of the European Commission, Romano Prodi, said "As the European Union in Macedonia took over from NATO mission in former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia today, the long process of European *integration* has taken another step forward" (European Commission, 2003b). At the mission's launching ceremony, it was also praised that "[f]or us in the EU, operation 'Concordia' is a further sing of our strong commitment to this country [(North) Macedonia]" (NATO, 2003b). Internally as well, the

mission was referred to as a "a significant step on the road to our EU membership" (Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia, 2003a), and as an "[a]ffirmation of the country as a permanent part of the Western civilization circle". Overall, "Concordia" was another performance of Europeanness on which the Euro-Atlantic integration promise depended.

At the same time, the mission reflected the threat of 'balkanization'. This because it was, simply, meant to contain that threat and, therefore, communicating that it existed. The 2001-armed conflict between Albanians and Macedonians in the country echoed through 2003 and "Concordia" troops were deployed to provide security to the EU and OSCE in overseeing the implementation of the OFA. As such, "Concordia" is not just a reflection of Europeanization and the closer relationship of (North) Macedonia with the EU and NATO, but also of Stabilization as an interventionist mission deployed to contain the 'balkanizing' menace. The spatial, temporal, and ethical in-betweenness of the (Western) Balkans during the discursive shift of 2003 between Stabilization and Europeanization (see Chapter 5) shows how the European identity of the (Western) Balkans is invoked to shift attention from the inconsistency of Europeanization in arguing for an integrationist approach while at the same time recalling aspects of 'balkanization'. In the case of Serbia, the 2003 State of Union accepted the fragmentation for the sake of Euro-Atlantic prospects, while in the case of "Concordia" in (North) Macedonia, though the mission did not dismember the country territorially, it was backed by a logic of the threat of further 'balkanization'. The threat of 'balkanization' served as an impetus for "Concordia" and then "Concordia" in turn served as impetus for a solidified Euro-Atlantic promise. Similarly, the next subsection demonstrates how 'balkanization' was ultimately useful to the unity of the Western 'self'.

Therefore, though framing "Concordia" as a performance of Europeanness overshadows the inconsistency of the Euro-Atlantic integration promise relying on disintegration and 'balkanization', self-contradicting elements persist. The (Western) Balkans were praised for "moving closer to Euro-Atlantic structures" (NATO, 2003g), but also reminded by Carl Bildt[53] and others that "there remains the risk that the process of

[53] It is worth mentioning here the multiple references that Carl Bildt makes to 'balkanization', including an opinion piece for *The Washington Post* (Bildt, 2018), or the warning of the British 'balkanization' (Milne, 2014) in the *Financial Times* and through his personal Twitter account (Bildt, 2014). He is one among many who testifies to a continuous interest of not just keeping the word alive, but of recontextualizing it into other different situations and settings. This is especially important coming from someone with an extensive career in the (Western) Balkans as an envoy of both the EU and the UN.

Balkanisation will continue. And we must know by now that it is a process without any obvious end" (NATO, 2003i). The (Western) Balkans were European enough to be referred to as being "in the heart of Europe" (NATO, 2003q) by Jamie Shea, and sufficiently Balkan to be kept "on NATO's doorsteps" as "a startling reminder of how precarious peace can be" (NATO, 2003h). They continued to be told that "[t]he last thing this region needs is further Balkanization" (Simpson, 2003), since "[t]he final chapter of Balkanization is still to be written".

(North) Macedonia's performance of Europeanness through "Concordia" differed significantly from the 2003 events in Serbia which, among others, include the assassination of Đinđić. (North) Macedonia had also already signed the SAA with the EU in 2001 (see Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, of the other part, 2004) and in 2004 the SAA was ratified, while Serbia did not until 2013. Effectively, the Euro-Atlantic future of both countries was confirmed in the Thessaloniki Summit, proving that the performance of Europeanness depended on the Western 'self' rather than the (Western) Balkans themselves. That is, the European identity of the (Western) Balkans, which proponents of Europeanization invoke to argue for integrationist policies, feeds back into the united Western 'self', which depends on, among others, a 'balkanized' (Western) Balkan 'other'. This is also why Europeanization coexists with constant references to 'balkanization' for its promise of Euro-Atlantic integration relies on the fragmentation of the (Western) Balkan 'other' and the unity of the Western 'self'. Little attention was given to (North) Macedonia performing better than Serbia, since what mattered was the Western 'self'. The strong emphasis on the European identity of the (Western) Balkans which supports the discursive shift from Stabilization to Europeanization is meant to cover the irreconcilability of the two and their internal inconsistencies. However, as seen below, presenting basic discourses as more consistent translates into making the Western 'self' appear as such, and events of 2003 like the Thessaloniki Summit and "Concordia" are tools in this dynamic.

Western 'self': Singing in harmony, not in unison

As already demonstrated in Chapter 5, the 2003 invasion of Iraq and NATO taking the lead of the ISAF in Afghanistan, exposed a divided EU, NATO, and a more divided West. In an exchange of letters between Steve Larrabee and François Heisbourg, the former speaks of a

"European-US capabilities gap… [which] has entrenched a de facto *division* of labour, with the United States 'kicking in the doors' and the Europeans 'doing the dishes'" (Larrabee & Heisbourg, 2003). Such Euro-Atlantic disparities, as during pre-2003 events, exemplify first and foremost the clashing views within the EU. The question of "[w]ho speaks for Europe?" (2003) posed by *The Economist* uncovered ongoing conflicting positions between France and the United Kingdom. Though the two had managed to reconcile their historic divergencies when agreeing to develop a common European defense, including "Concordia", they continued to hold different stances when it came to Iraq, in particular.

However, "Concordia" became one of those success stories for the retention of the united Euro-Atlantic 'self'. Robertson refers to it as "the first concrete manifestation" (NATO, 2003g) of the EU-NATO *partnership*, adding elsewhere that "[w]hen we work *together*, we can be effective. We have seen this already in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia" (NATO, 2003l). EU's Solana also considered it "an important demonstration of our reinforced *partnership*" (NATO, 2003c). Therefore, despite "Concordia" being framed as an important step towards the Euro-Atlantic processes of (North) Macedonia, it is the utilization for claims of unity of the Western subject in the face of divisions on Iraq which gain the spotlight. The mission is an epitome of the successful circumvention of Western disagreements and divisions and the triumph of a united Western 'self'. For the EU and NATO, it was a significant milestone of a new era for European security, rather than just as a new stage in the relations between (North) Macedonia and the Union. Robertson's attempts to tone down internal disagreements within NATO through the repetition of "the Allies sing in *harmony*, not in unison" (NATO, 2003m) formula show how "Concordia", named after the Greek goddess of harmony and peace, was intended to bring tranquility to the Western 'self' rather than to the (Western) Balkan 'other'.

During Europeanization, the utilization of what is framed as progress or a new page in the Euro-Atlantic processes of (North) Macedonia for boosting up and maintaining the image of a united Western 'self' even implicitly admitted by the West. One comes across explicit statements such as those by Shea who admitted that "NATO's been good for the Balkans, but the Balkans have also been good for NATO. If we had not had to deal with that tragedy in the 1990s would today we'd be in Afghanistan or anywhere else outside Europe?" (NATO, 2003q). Lord Robertson acknowledged that NATO's intervention in the (Western) Balkans

was an "excellent examples of enlightened *self*-interest" (NATO, 2003m) just as this thesis maintains that the Euro-Atlantic processes of the (Western) Balkans as shaped by 'balkanization' are exactly the same – excellent examples of self-interest for the united Western 'self' on the basis of the disintegrated (Western) Balkans 'other'. For as long as the (Western) Balkans 'other' continues to 'balkanize', the Euro-Atlantic processes as a means of putting them back on track whether through observation, intervention, or integration, will continue to provide an excuse for the unification of the Western 'self'. Vice versa, the unity of the Western 'self' depends and relies on the continuous discursive splits – 'balkanization' – of the (Western) Balkans 'other', and, therefore, the Euro-Atlantic processes of the (Western) Balkans as shaped by 'balkanization', rather than assisting the 'balkanized' (Western) Balkans to reconcile and unite, assist the West.

As preceding chapters illustrate, these dynamics which 'balkanization' offers in mediating between an identity of the (Western) Balkans as fragmented and the West as united on one hand, and the Euro-Atlantic processes of the (Western) Balkans as a foreign policy on the other, is also instrumental for (Western) Balkan actors to reinvent themselves. Seen in instances in which political elites voiced support for the Euro-Atlantic processes of their countries and collected political points, they preserved the discourse of the (Western) Balkans 'other' as 'balkanized' alive. The status of "Concordia" in (North) Macedonia was unanimously approved by all present MPs of the Macedonian Assembly and embraced as a step forward in the Euro-Atlantic processes of the (Western) Balkans. Zoran Krstevski argued that "Macedonia is a kind of an experimental mouse of its own kind for Europe's new strategy on building a single security system" (Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia, 2003a), while Ljube Boškovski stressed that "Europe should support Macedonia… [but] not Macedonia as a country of experiments, not Macedonia as a country where new European and world models of the rule of law are being tested". Some leaders like Slobodan Danevski, MP in opposition, highlighted that "[a]ny request made by whether that is a world institution or organization is never resisted by either government or opposition. We're playing puppets" (Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia, 2003b).

Yet, both Krstevski and Boškovski as well as all others who fought fearlessly against "Concordia" also voted for it, regardless of declaring themselves aware that it would have converted (North) Macedonia, as *Makedonija Dene*s wrote, "into an experimental terrain"

(Macedonia: Commentary sees no essential change in EU replacing NATO mission, 2003). Opposing voices show to be guided by political interests and determined by whether they belonged to a governing or oppositional political party. In both cases, calling on the fragile nature of the 'balkanized' (Western) Balkans as puppets of world powers not only equals a chance for the Western subject to unite in saving the region through their Euro-Atlantic promise, but also an opportunity for the political actors in the (Western) Balkans to reinvent themselves as executioners of such promise and to evade responsibilities when it 'balkanizes'. Hence, the Euro-Atlantic processes of the (Western) Balkans, as shaped by 'balkanization', serve the retention and reinvention of the Western united 'self' and political elites, rather than EU's and NATO's proclaimed "vision for the future of the Western Balkans… leading to… European and Euro-Atlantic structures" (NATO, 2003f). This is the case with both the Yugoslav Crisis and Stabilization, and it continues throughout Europeanization as the section below illustrates.

(North) Macedonia during Europeanization: The 2009 visa liberalization and the 2018 "Prespa Agreement"

As already established in Chapter 5, the start of Europeanization is centered around the divorce between the West and the (Western) Balkans being officially declared over in 2003 at the EU-Western Balkans Summit in Thessaloniki, and around the return of the (Western) Balkans to their European identity. It portrays the (Western) Balkans on their way of return to Europe – where they had always belonged. Like Balkanism, which despite the academic endeavor remains integrationist since it critically addresses the historical differences between the West and the (Western) Balkans as constructed, Europeanization shows signs of a self-critical endeavor in recognizing the (Western) Balkans as not just European, but as important to the stability of the Western transatlantic 'self'. It becomes even more explicit as by 2018 the European Commission (2018) confirms that the (Western) Balkans "are part of Europe" with an "European perspective… clear and unambiguous".

The two key events explored in this section – the 2009 visa liberalization status for Macedonian citizens, and the 2018 country's change of name – through three discursive themes – *Freedom of Movement*, *Good Neighborly Relations*, and *Referendum* (see Table 11) – clarify how, as it is the case with the Yugoslav Crisis and Stabilization, Europeanization remains

grounded on and circulates older variations of the identity of the (Western) Balkans as 'balkanized' since it is built on and coexists with the same. The threat of 'balkanization' is what shaped the Euro-Atlantic promise and rewards, while they further reproduce the menace. Maintaining an image of the (Western) Balkan 'other' as 'balkanized' through the Euro-Atlantic integration processes was important for portraying the Western 'self' as united. These articulations of identity of the (Western) Balkans as 'balkanized' and the West as united were mirrored by the political elites in power in (North) Macedonia and more in general in the (Western) Balkans. The Euro-Atlantic achievements not only redeemed the elites from inconsistencies in their policies, but further enabled them to assign responsibility to the EU and NATO for the 'balkanizing' effects radiating on (North) Macedonia and the (Western) Balkans.

Table 11. (North) Macedonia: Europeanization Discursive Themes

Event	Discursive Theme	Rearticulated Identities	Policy	Actors
2009 Visa Liberalization	Freedom of Movement	Splitting the Macedonian subject from the 'Macedonian tourists' and the 'Macedonian asylum seeker'	Conditionality through visa liberalization criteria and suspension measures	- EU
		Unifying 'Macedonians' with 'Europe'	Reforms	- Governing coalition led by VMRO-DPMNE
2018 " Prespa Agreement"	Good Neighborly Relations	Unifying 'Macedonians' with Greece, the EU and NATO	Conditionality through the "Prespa Agreement"	- EU - NATO - Governing coalition led by SDSM
	Referendum	Splitting the Macedonian subject into 'pro-' and 'anti-EU and NATO'		

The 2009 Visa Liberalization

The year 2009 brought some significant Euro-Atlantic achievements to (North) Macedonia, the two most noteworthy of these being the implementation of the visa-free travel within the Schengen zone for Macedonian (also Montenegrin and Serbian) citizens, as well as the Commission's first recommendations to open the accession talks with the country. However, the year also highlighted a rather more fragmented EU threatened not just by the 2007-2008 global financial crisis, but also by the 2009 European debt crisis, and which then inevitably

risks fragmenting NATO. This section illustrates how Euro-Atlantic integration milestones of the (Western) Balkans, such as the visa liberalization decision inscribed in the Euro-Atlantic promise, continue to be shaped by the threat of 'balkanization' that the (Western) Balkan 'other' represents. This enables the utilization of these milestones for the retention and reinvention of the transatlantic Western subject as united. The Euro-Atlantic processes of the (Western) Balkans are influenced by crises posed to the unity of the Western 'self', but not only – shaped by identity articulations of the united Western 'self' and the disintegrated (Western) Balkans 'other', they are utilized for countering the risk of fragmentation that they pose to the Western 'self' through the 'balkanized' (Western) Balkan 'other'. In other words, it is events in the West which determine the Euro-Atlantic progress of (Western) Balkan countries, rather than the (Western) Balkans' own performances. One main discursive theme that captures those constitutive links between the Euro-Atlantic processes of the (Western) Balkans as a policy and the identity of the united Western 'self' and the disintegrated (Western) Balkans 'other' in 2009 is *Freedom of Movement* discussed in the next subsection.

(Western) Balkan 'other': I came, I saw, I left

On December 19, 2009, the visa-free travel within the Schengen zone for Macedonian, Montenegrin, and Serbian citizens came into effect (Council of the European Union, 2009). Holders of biometric passports were allowed to travel and *free to move* for a maximum of 90 days within a period of 180 days as tourists. It seemed a monumental year for the Euro-Atlantic progress of (North) Macedonia, especially since in October 2009, the Commission recommended the opening of accession negotiations (European Commission, 2009a). This is also how the Macedonian governing coalition led by VMRO-DPMNE and its partner, DUI, considered 2009. The visa liberalization decision was referred to as the fall of the "Schengen wall" (Petreski, 2009), while the Macedonian Prime Minister, Nikola Gruevski, described it as "a small step for the EU, but a giant leap for Macedonia" (Balkan EU visa deal hailed as 'giant step for Macedonia', 2009). This leap was so giant for it, as the Assembly President, Trajko Veljanovski, said it was the chance to show to "European friends that we too are European" (Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia, 2009d). The Macedonian governing coalition claimed that the lift of the Schengen restrictions would unify the Macedonian subject with the

European one, while Gruevski took credit on behalf of his government which "completed the ongoing *reforms*" (Nagrada za gradjanite na Makedonija, 2009).

However, what seems like a smooth climb to glory was followed by an alarming situation. Frieda Brepoels, member of the European Parliament, denounced an upsetting "figure of 150 000 Macedonians who have applied for asylum in an EU Member State in just three months" (European Parliament, 2010a). She referred to numbers reported by the Federal Agency for the Reception of Asylum-seekers (Fedasil) which revealed that "in January 2010 alone, there were already 60 [asylum] applications from Macedonians, putting Macedonia in eighth place in the Belgian rankings, just ahead of Serbia" (European Parliament, 2010a). It was not just Belgium; Sweden, Switzerland, Austria, Germany, and even France also rang the alarm. A wave of asylum seekers was taking over Europe, and panic was on the rise.

From EU's perspective, the Freedom of Movement discursive theme, which had already discursively split the Macedonian subject from the 'Macedonian tourist' allowed to visit and then return to (North) Macedonia, further divided it into the 'asylum seeker' who should not even consider coming to Europe. The Belgian Prime Minister and Integration Secretary visited (North) Macedonia to specifically send the message that "[t]here is no point in travelling to Belgium in order to apply for economic asylum" (No economic asylum in Belgium, 2010). Although not revoking its decision, the European Commission suggested "the establishment of a follow-up mechanism to the visa liberalisation process for the Western Balkan countries" (Council of the European Union, 2010). This mechanism opened the possibility for the Commission "if necessary [to] propose the *suspension* of visa-free travel" (Council of the European Union, 2010). While it did not happen, it constructed a (Western) Balkan subject whose march to Europe and whose Europeanness could, if Europe wanted, be at any time halted or deferred.

Freedom of movement was granted to Macedonian as well as Montenegrin and Serbian citizens upon on the completion of the *visa liberalization criteria*[54] as part of EU's

[54] The three criteria concern illegal immigration, public policy, and security, and they were set in 2001 by the Council regulation No 539/2001 (Council of the European Union, 2001). For the first time it formalized the conditions of entry for countries outside of the Schengen area. Each time a country is exempted from the requirement set in the regulation to cross the Schengen external borders the regulations are amended. It happened for Montenegro, (North) Macedonia, and Serbia in 2009 (Council of the European Union, 2009), and for Albania and BiH in 2010 (European Parliament and the Council of the European Union, 2010). For an overview of the nature of the regulations, its lack of clarity, and amendments, see Petrovic (2010, pp. 14-25).

conditionality towards the (Western) Balkans. The EU Enlargement Commissioner, Olli Rehn, framed this performance of Europeanness as a "a historic step in our relations with the Western Balkans" (EU set to scrap visa requirements for Serbia, Macedonia, Montenegro, 2009) and a demonstration of "further *Europeanization* of civil society in the Western Balkans". The decision, therefore, was argued through Europeanization's policy of integration and became a step forward to make that integration possible. Conversely, the discursive split of the Macedonian subject into the 'tourist' and the 'asylum seeker' speaks of yet another disintegrating discursive move. Moreover, on a regional level, the visa liberalization decision and the Freedom of Movement discursive theme further divided the (Western) Balkan subject into (North) Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia entitled to the freedom of movement on one hand, and Albania, BiH, and Kosovo on the other which were not. Once again, Europeanization appears inconsistent for it disintegrates to integrate. It is genealogical references which, though called to cover, ultimately exposed the contradictory nature of Europeanization since they raise questions such as: What kind of a European is one that cannot stay in Europe and of whom Europe is alarmed? A European that comes, sees, alarms, and leaves, uncovering Europeanization and its policy of integration as inconsistent. As the next two subsections illustrate, disintegration for the sake of integration keeps the (Western) Balkans 'balkanized'. Even if in a manner considered consistent to Western expectations, it continued to serve the unity of the Western 'self' without compromising its investment in the (Western) Balkans and its Euro-Atlantic promise.

Genealogical references: Mountain slopes, tanks, and the desire to travel

The European identity of Macedonians and of the (Western) Balkans was once again called in to cover up for Europeanization's inconsistency by trying to intensify attention to it as an indicator that an integrated future within the EU and NATO was inevitable. This is visible in Rehn's statement that "[t]oday's decision reflects the *clear* European perspective of the Western Balkans" (European Commission, 2009b). For what other perspective would there be for Europeans? The NATO Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, continued to refer to "*bring[ing]* Southeast Europe *back* into the European mainstream" (NATO, 2009a), suggesting that they might have wandered away for a while, but it was the European mainstream which they belonged to. Portraying the (Western) Balkans as European was meant

to support the rationale behind the visa liberalization by covering up for an image of the (Western) Balkans as non-European, which persisted during Europeanization. A non-European subject would have threatened the consistent appearance of Europeanization and undermined the EU and NATO as actors that were facing attacks to their unity, unable to sustain yet another (Western) Balkan crisis. What they could afford, instead, was to turn the threat into a possibility to unite, without compromising the work done.

Concerns on the stability of the (Western) Balkans, potentially jeopardizing the success of the transatlantic alliance, persisted through 2009. With regards to (North) Macedonia, they concerned the issue of its name which had been ghosting the country since its independence in 1991. Following Greece's request, both the EU and NATO subjected (North) Macedonia to the resolving of the name dispute as a categorical condition for the country's membership in their structures. Since (North) Macedonia was hoping on a date for the start of the negotiations following the Commission's positive recommendation in 2009, Greece objected the opening of the membership talks demanding that the country had to first change its name. (North) Macedonia left disappointed the NATO 2008 summit in Bucharest due to the unresolved name issue. Therefore, though the country had fulfilled all conditions to join NATO, it remained behind while both Albania and Croatia received their invitations. As (North) Macedonia's fatigue of being blocked in its Euro-Atlantic progress became evident, while internally the country grew more critical towards the VRMO-DPMNE led coalition as well as the West, the EU and NATO had indeed quite some reasons to be worried about its stabilizing investments in the country and the region.

Hence, the end of 2009 found the EU alarmed that the delay of the accession talks with (North) Macedonia would put to waist its stabilizing efforts. In its March 2009 resolution, the European Parliament (2010c) stated that it "regrets however that, three years after it [Macedonia] was granted the status of candidate for membership of the EU, accession negotiations have not yet started, which is an unsustainable situation having demotivating effects for the country, and risks *destabilisin*g the region". The Commission's recommendation since 2009 for the start of the accession talks were repeatedly rejected by the Council. The EU feared that the impeding integration processes of (North) Macedonia would not only jeopardize the full implementation of the OFA, but also encourage the "extremists in the region… to prey on Macedonia's delay in the accession process in an attempt to create *instability*" (European

Parliament, 2010b). The EU indeed stretched its visa-free regime to (North) Macedonia while framing this step as an important Euro-Atlantic milestone and a reflection of the good work the country had done after the armed conflict in 2001, but it never stopped being alarmed by who the country was and, hence, could become again.

That is why, even as the gates of Europe were being opened to the (Western) Balkans and a policy of integration was being advocated, Europeanization coexisted with Stabilization and the Yugoslav Crisis. An article in the Swiss *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* best illustrated this, as Andreas Ernst (2010) began it with:

> Whenever the snow melts on the mountain slopes in the Balkans, things happen. Years ago, it was the spring offensives when the guerrillas in the mountains and the tanks in the valley started moving again. Today it is more peaceful. When the meltwater gurgles and the birds chirp, many are gripped by the desire to travel.

The (Western) Balkan 'other' was never decoupled from its guerrilla attire, and it was, therefore, not its European identity which brought it closer to the EU and NATO. If anything, references to it exposed the incompatibility with the threat that the (Western) Balkan 'other' coming down from the mountains presented to a Europe alarmed by its arrival where it supposedly exactly belonged. At best, as 'tourists', the (Western) Balkans were temporarily European, and as asylum seekers they were not European at all.

An illustration of how the European identity of the (Western) Balkans did not uncloak them from the Balkan past is also the coexisting hope and threat that the subject represents in the internal political discourse in (North) Macedonia. In multiple occasions, Veljanovski, for example, claimed that it was the "European family" (Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia, 2009a) to which (North) Macedonia belonged to "geographically, historically, and culturally", adding that "[t]oday, the Balkans, are no longer a barrel of gunpowder" (Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia, 2009c). Along similar lines, DUI's MP, Xhevat Ademi, spoke of a "new vision of different Balkans" (Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia, 2009b), as he had also juxtaposed this vision with a region which everyone remembered "for borders and countries, for the wars that have been fought there, the blood that has been shed, the lives and families that have been extinguished". Ironically, the image of "traditionally troubled Balkans" (Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia, 2009b) that Ademi referred to, was also the product of DUI – the political party he was representing. In the shape of the NLA, DUI, which in 2001

had been described as "[a] band of armed thugs" (NATO, 2001e) by NATO's Robertson, was in 2009 a key political actor who claimed to be bringing the (Western) Balkan closer to the West. As with all other key events, the next subsection reveals how such genealogical references to the eternally destabilized (Western) Balkans, which persisted even as they walk towards the gates of Europe as Europeans, are invoked to serve the unity of the Western 'self' and the reinvention of Macedonian political elites. The liberalization of visas as an extension of the Euro-Atlantic promise is but a tool in these dynamics. Despite being portrayed as an achievement of the (Western) Balkan 'other', it additionally disintegrated the same and trapped it into older articulations of its identity as 'balkanized'.

Western 'self': Treaty of Lisbon, the future of the Euro and that of defense

The visa liberalization in 2009 is no exception to the trend of utilizing the Euro-Atlantic promise towards the (Western) Balkans for reconciling divergent views within the EU and NATO and between the two, especially during important periods of change or crisis. The year of 2009 can also be considered as one of those moments where questions of "divide or unite" were faced by the Western 'self'. The EU, which had grown to include 27 members, had in 2009 also ratified the new Treaty of Lisbon. After the Dutch and the French rejected the Constitutional Treaty, the Treaty of Lisbon was thought of as an alternative of bringing in several reforms that were suggested in the Constitutional Treaty through amending rather than replacing the existing treaties. The changes to the functioning of the Union that the Lisbon Treaty instituted were many. Among others, they reflected the continuous attempts of the EU to ensure greater coordination and consistency in its foreign policy by creating the post of a High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy in charge of the EEAS. It further introduced the present name of the CSDP and the solidarity or mutual defense clause.

NATO, on the other hand, which had in 2009 opened to Albania and Croatia, was undergoing its own reinvention. In their meetings in Strasbourg and Kehl in 2009, members issued a "Declaration on Alliance Security" (NATO, 2009b), calling for a new "Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization" (NATO, 2010) that followed. NATO's 2010 Strategic Concept was the first after the 9/11 terrorist attacks as one of the three distinct periods along which the NATO's

major strategic shift have evolved. The other two major shifts in concepts followed the Cold War period and the immediate post-Cold War years. This means that the transatlantic Western 'self' was experiencing another key moment of its development.

If considering the ongoing global financial crisis and the European dept crisis, such transformations that both the EU and NATO were facing in 2009 and that coincided with the visa liberalization of (North) Macedonia, speak of crises threatening the unity of the Western 'self' within the EU and NATO and between the two. A report of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, for example, spoke of the "uneven response by European policymakers to Europe's banking and sovereign debt crises… leading to doubts about the future of the euro and the greater European project itself. The crisis has accelerated the *fragmentation* of Europe" (Flanagan, et al., 2011, p. vi), because "[m]ost European governments are pursuing defense reforms and reductions on a purely national basis" (p. x). Another document by the European Parliament referred to the "inability for EU Member States to better coordinate their defence policies" (Directorate-General for External Policies, 2011, p. 9) and which "[f]or the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)… raises the question of how long member states will be willing and able to fund the gap between the political rhetoric of *joint action* and their *unilateral* practices" (p. 10). Since the risk of a fragmented Europe was inevitably going to be reflected unto NATO, Rasmussen later complained that "NATO Allies are starting the new decade further *apart* than ever before" (NATO, 2011). These threats to the united Western 'self', though became apparent in 2010 and 2011, were expected already in 2008 and 2009 as the financial crises ran their course.

The 'balkanized' (Western) Balkans were unsurprisingly called again to serve as an example of how important the retention of the united Western 'self' was. In a fashion similar to the Yugoslav Crisis and Stabilization, in their meetings in Strasbourg and Kehl, NATO (2009c) members once again turned to "[e]xperience in the Balkans and Afghanistan [which] demonstrates that today's security challenges require a comprehensive approach by the international community". NATO's strategic concept recalled the "lessons learned from NATO operations, in particular in Afghanistan and the Western Balkans" (NATO, 2010), confirming that "NATO and the EU can and should play *complementary* and *mutually reinforcing* roles". Rasmussen reminded everyone how the organization "brought ethnic cleansing to an end in the Balkans" (NATO, 2009d), while through this stressing the influence

it had in unifying and bringing "*together* likeminded democracies from North America and Europe". A decade after the intervention in Kosovo, 'balkanized' sceneries of the (Western) Balkans continued to be borrowed as testimonies for the utility of the united Western 'self', for as long as their Euro-Atlantic promise kept going on, there would always be something left to improve in the region, and a chance for the united Western 'self' to demonstrate itself as useful.

The 2009 visa liberalization decision for (North) Macedonia, therefore, rather than being the result of a new met benchmark in the country's future within the Euro-Atlantic structures, along the lines of other key events from the two countries, was another opportunity for triumphant pronouncements of the united Western subject. It clearly surfaces when considering the politics involved in the decision of granting visa-free status to (North) Macedonia. Studies argued that the country's legislation was not fully aligned with the EU directives on anti-discrimination (Kacarska, 2015). Minority rights are fundamental rights benchmarks in the visa liberalization process, which Kacarska (2015, p. 364) suggested "were only formally and not substantially the focus of the visa liberalisation dialogues and the post-visa liberalisation monitoring". This might explain why the "estimated 80% of all asylum seekers from Serbia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia were Roma" (Council of the European Union, 2011). Kacarska (2015) connected it to the informal nature of conditionality, which is to say a nature that disregards or extends beyond the formal technicality of the visa liberalization process into its politics. Along this argument, Milica Petrovic (2010, p. 28) noticed that "a certain vagueness remains inherent to the criteria established by the Commission". Moreover, the Commission refused to release the actual fulfillment criteria for the country's assessment. This fuzziness surrounding the issue made it easier to extend a reward to the (Western) Balkans, which then served as a demonstration of the Euro-Atlantic promise being fulfilled. Genealogical references from above, however, further expose that the (Western) Balkans were not ready to meet EU's standards – as well as that the EU was not prepared to meet the (Western) Balkans. It is the crisis of the united Western 'self' which once again determined this decision. Europeanization remains the discourse of the Western 'self' who fearing to lose its past investments in the region and its potential future benefits, offers to close an eye to an unmet benchmark.

Even at the beginning of 2009, Slobodanka Jovanovska (2009a) predicted in the daily *Utrinski vesnik* that "NATO would merely reiterate its position from Bucharest at the Strasbourg summit and the EU would compensate for our stalled progress by lifting the visa regime". These incentives for keeping the (Western) Balkans interested enough in their perpetual climb towards the EU and NATO ladders, are visible throughout the different key events elaborated in both countries, (North) Macedonia and Serbia. They are also evident in the 2009 statements like those by the European Commissioner for Enlargement, Štefan Füle, who confirmed that the visa liberalization was a way of showing that "the EU keeps its *promises*" (European Commission, 2010). The monitoring mechanism which the EU later argued for and which discursively split the Macedonian subject into the 'tourist' and 'asylum seeker', provided with the perfect tool for keeping (North) Macedonia interested in its Europeanizing path by granting some freedom of movement to its citizens and by showing that the Euro-Atlantic promise persisted, as the clock was ticking to send them back where they came from after 90 days. Füle claimed that "[r]eforms are not adopted to please Brussels but rather to bring benefits to the country" (European Commission, 2010). While it could have been true, events of 2009 in (North) Macedonia uncovered how they were more likely to please Brussels, especially if Euro-Atlantic rewards such as the visa liberalization status were the result of EU's concerns over losses suffered to stabilizing investments in the region from which a more united Union emerged. Therefore, Jovanovska (2009), on the day of the visa liberalization celebrations, claimed that the day of the liberalization of visas was rather "a historic day for *them* [the EU]".

As with all the other key events in which the (Western) Balkan subject was discursively split and fragmented being that by the EU, NATO, the local political elites or all precisely in the name of the Euro-Atlantic processes, those who advocated through and shared EU's and NATO's discursive themes in 2009 got to claim political points and achievements, reinventing themselves and retaining or reclaiming positions of power. Though as elaborated above, the visa-free offer was determened by much more politicized concerns rather than fulfillment of formal benchmarks, the VMRO-DPMNE's representative in the Assembly, Ilija Dimovski, insisted that: "the criteria for visa liberalization for the citizens of the Republic of Macedonia have been met. This is patriotism" (Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia, 2010). At least formally, the country did achieve such Euro-Atlantic milestones, additionally revealing how

the EU's encouraging rewards, despite the country's performance, which left much to desire for, strengthened such elites in power. As Jovanovska (2009b) noted, "no one has ever been driving the EU establishment mad as Prime Minister Nikola Gruevski, but he has recently received a visa-free regime and a recommendation as a reward for this". Gruevski, who was once a key executioner in the materialization of the Euro-Atlantic promise, is currently a political fugitive in Hungary, escaping jail under serious corruption charges. Prior to fleeing, he converted VMRO-DPMNE into one of the wealthiest political parties in Europe according to the Center for Investigative Journalism SCOOP-Macedonia (2016).

Keeping the (Western) Balkan 'other' interested in its path of Europeanization by using Euro-Atlantic incentives like the visa liberalization as rewards meant also enabling corrupted political elites to retain their positions of power through boosting for their Euro-Atlantic successes. This then also kept the (Western) Balkans 'other' further 'balkanized' and the threat of 'balkanization' alive as a reason for offering a Euro-Atlantic reward. It maintained (North) Macedonia and the (Western) Balkan 'other' engaged in their infinite attempts to Europeanize as they 'balkanize'. This, besides for the reinvention of the (Western) Balkan political elites, seemed more important for the West's perpetual and infinite reinvention of 'self' as united. For the sake of a united Western 'self', the Euro-Atlantic promise shaped and was in turn shaped by a (Western) Balkan 'other' who, though European, was not European enough to integrate because it was still unstable and 'balkanizing' – and as the constitutive vicious circle denotes, it was 'balkanizing' because it was not European enough to integrate. Rather than confirming (North) Macedonia's progression towards a truly brighter future within the EU and NATO as the Thessaloniki Agenda had promised, the visa liberalization of 2009 which rose as a reward against the threat of 'balkanization' only further 'balkanized' the country. The Euro-Atlantic processes of the (Western) Balkans continued to further be shaped by concerns of keeping the Western 'self' as united by aligning and reallocating it within and between the EU and NATO through the fragmented (Western) Balkan 'other', and they in turn shaped the Western 'self' as united and the (Western) Balkan 'other' as fragmented. The "Prespa Agreement" of 2018 discussed below further demonstrates this.

The 2018 "Prespa Agreement"

From all the contemporary events in (North) Macedonia considered most impactful in the Euro-Atlantic processes of the country, its change of name in 2018 can hardly be topped by any other. The event was framed through two main discursive themes: *Referendum* and *Good Neighborly Relations* (see Table 11 above). Such identity articulations of the (Western) Balkan 'other' as fragmented even as the (Western) Balkans are Europeanizing and seem to be getting closer to the West, can also – just as those during the Yugoslav Crisis and Stabilization – be traced back to older genealogical basic discourses such as Balkanism. Moreover, they are layers which coexist with contemporary discourses such as the Yugoslav Crisis and Stabilization and which both draw links to the Balkan War/WWI and WWII/Colonial as genealogical basic discourses. What these complex dynamics ultimately reveal, is that the Euro-Atlantic processes of the (Western) Balkans, rather than leading towards the unification of the (Western) Balkan subject from within and with the EU and NATO, remain processes led by the political elites of both the (Western) Balkans and the West in the service of the united Western subject which recycle and recirculate older variations of the disintegrated (Western) Balkan subject. Events of 2018 in (North) Macedonia and the West elaborated in this section are no exception to these dynamics.

Western Balkan 'other': What's in a name?

The name issue had accompanied the Euro-Atlantic processes of (North) Macedonia since it declared its independence from SFRY in 1991 (see Chapter 3). While "FYROM" as a provisional reference enabled the country to become a member of some regional organizations such as the Council of Europe and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), Greece, nevertheless, blocked Macedonia's accession to NATO and the EU. Except for the 2009 report of the European Commission and the visa liberalization decision, (North) Macedonia had not made any major progress in terms of its Euro-Atlantic integration milestones since then. Power shift took place as a mass wiretapping scandal[55] broke in 2015

[55] The then Macedonian opposition led by SDSM's Zoran Zaev on February 9, 2015, released the first of the many series of wiretapped conversations accusing the government and the Administration for Security and Counterintelligence (UBK) of surveilling the telephone conversations of 20,000 Macedonians.

and SDSM and its partners of coalition[56] took over from VMRO-DPMNE in 2017. The country's Europeanization swiftly resumed when an agreement solving the 27-year-old name dispute with Greece was reached. The "Prespa Agreement" signed on June 17, 2018, regulated the change of (North) Macedonian's constitutional name *erga omnes* into "North Macedonia".

The two main discursive themes which framed the name issue in 2018 and which were shared by the EU, NATO, and governing Macedonian political elites – *Referendum* and *Good Neighborly Relations* – also shared the same policy of *conditionality*. Those who argued for the Good Neighborly Relations also granted that the "Prespa Agreement" would unify the Macedonian subject with its southern neighbor, Greece, as the first step of its unification with the EU and NATO. The EU High Representative, Federica Mogherini, and the European Commissioner, Johannes Hahn, considered the accord as leading "to our common European future" (European Union External Action Service, 2018), while the NATO Secretary General, Jens Stoltenberg (2018), called for the government and political leaders to "seize this historic opportunity to bring the country into #NATO". Mirroring the Western discourse, the Prime Minister, Zoran Zaev, claimed "[t]he reform process that we have started, as well as the policies of good neighbourly relations, contribute to European and Atlantic integration" (Year to remember, 2018). The "Prespa Agreement" was framed as a condition for joining the EU and NATO as it demonstrated (North) Macedonia's capability of getting along with its neighbors. This ability had been disputed since the country's inception in 1991. Good neighborly relations had long been a prerequisite for the Euro-Atlantic processes of the (Western) Balkans. The difference was that in 2018, the governing coalition in (North) Macedonia headed by SDSM was interested in replicating the same discursive theme of the West, and with this also its policy of conditionality.

Conditionality is also connected to another dominant discursive theme which took swift as the agreement was put to vote in a *referendum* on September 30, 2018. To have changed its name, (North) Macedonia's constitution needed to be amended. This could have been done with a parliamentary vote. However, as per NATO's and EU's expectation, Zaev's government called for a consultative rather than legally binding referendum. So vivid was the policy of

[56] Other members of the coalitions were the New Social Democratic Party (NSDP), Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), Alliance for Albanians (AA), Party for the Full Emancipation of the Roma of Macedonia (PCERM), and the Party for the Movement of Turks in (North) Macedonia.

conditionality that the EU and NATO led and that the local governing coalition replicated with regards to the name issue, that even the question of the referendum stated: *Are you in favor of European Union and NATO membership by accepting the agreement between the Republic of Macedonia and the Republic of Greece?* The question suggested, among others, that accepting the "Prespa Agreement" was a prerequisite to being in favor of the EU and NATO. The Referendum discursive theme split the Macedonian subject between those who were for its integration into the EU and NATO, and those who were not. The option of being against the change of name but pro-EU and NATO was not offered.

After the referendum, the State Electoral Commission declared that "[t]he decision has not been adopted because more than half of the total number of citizens registered in the Voters' List did not vote" (Izveštaj za konečnite rezultati od glasanjeto na referendumot na državno nivo, 30 Septemvri 2018 godina, 2018, p. 12). From the low turnout of 36.91% of Macedonia's eligible voters, 91.46% of voters voted "yes", and 5.65% voted "no". While the results met one of the legal criteria for being considered as valid, since the majority of those who voted agreed with the question at the ballot, they failed to meet the quorum. The opposition headed by VMRO-DPMNE boycotted the Assembly prior and after the vote when changes to the constitution were being discussed. Nikola Micevski, the Coordinator of the parliamentary group of VMRO-DPMNE, denounced that "SDSM is erasing democracy in Republic of Macedonia through disrespecting the will of its citizens expressed in referendum" (Macedonia, 2018b, p. 11). Despite these controversial interpretations of the Agreement and the referendum (see Veliu, 2021), changes to the constitution were adopted on October 19, 2018.

Though (North) Macedonia's start of accession talks with the EU was not endorsed by the Council until March 2020 and continues to be problematic to date[57], the country became a full member of NATO on March 27, 2020. The Euro-Atlantic promise has been partially delivered. However, the "Prespa Agreement" and the referendum, among others, also 'balkanized' the country into those who were for the EU and NATO and those who were against. Therefore, the Good Neighborly Relations discursive theme which argued for

[57] After the Council endorsed the Commission's request for the start of accession talks with (North) Macedonia in March 2020, in November 2020 Bulgaria blocked them due to its identity concerns (see for more Tsolova, 2020).

integrating the Macedonian subject into the EU and NATO, did so on the premise of 'balkanizing' it at the same time. The Euro-Atlantic reward was once again shaped by the threat of 'balkanization' that the discursive split implied, and vice versa. The discursive blank spot of disintegration for the sake of integration once again exposed Europeanization as an inconsistent discourse. Demonstrated in the following subsection, genealogical references are invoked to cover up for this inconsistency by instead highlighting the European identity of Macedonians and the (Western) Balkans as a crucial aspect of their Euro-Atlantic processes and as evidence of how a future within the EU and NATO is unavoidable – and, hence, worth every sacrifice. The governing Macedonian political elites, therefore, recycled such references. However, the European identity of the (Western) Balkans explored below, and its coexistence with other non-European versions of the (Western) Balkan subject, only testify how the Euro-Atlantic promise delivers under the threat of 'balkanization' and in times when this also presents an opportunity for the retention and reinvention of the Western 'self'. The Euro-Atlantic promise delivers a 'balkanized' (Western) Balkan subject who is European enough to be at the heart of Europe, but also just dangerously Balkan enough to be left on its own.

Genealogical references: Dangerous, dramatic, and in the heart of Europe

Genealogically, though Europeanization tells a different success story of the (Western) Balkan 'other' than the Yugoslav Crisis or Stabilization do – a tale of not just of a (post-)conflict (Western) Balkans but one in which the (Western) Balkans belong and are returning to Europe –, it is built on and coexists with the two other basic discourses and the temporal and spatial identity of the (Western) Balkans that they convey. Along the lines of Balkanism, Europeanization is the discourse which speaks of integrating the (Western) Balkan 'other' with the West. Europeanization, in its most recent stages and more vivid than, say, during the 2013 "Brussels Agreement" between Kosovo and Serbia (see Chapter 5), shows nuances of self-critique. Multiple statements by Mogherini are particularly illustrative of this: "[s]ome say it is the backyard. *It is not the backyard: it is Europe*. And every time I hear people saying to our friends in the Balkans, 'your way towards Europe', I get very angry" (European Union External Action Service, 2017). She repeated elsewhere that "I always get very angry… when some, even colleagues of mine, say that we need to bring the Balkans inside Europe, or closer to Europe, because you are already not only Europe but the heart of European history, of

European geography, of European culture" (European Commission, 2019, 1:30). Europeanization also finds NATO positioned along the same lines as Stoltenberg claimed that "[t]he Western Balkans are the heart of Europe" (NATO, 2018a). These accounts are quite different from those of the Stabilization or the Yugoslav Crisis.

However, such references to the European identity of the (Western) Balkans, invoked to cover up for the discursive blank spots of Europeanization as a basic discourse which disintegrates to integrate, only further expose its internal inconsistencies. Quite like the Referendum discursive theme on Montenegro's independence in 2006 (see Chapter 5), the Referendum theme in the case of the 2018 "Prespa Agreement" is another request for a performance of Europeanness towards those that the discourse claims to be European. Stoltenberg, for example, stated that "we need the full ratification but also a *referendum*, and a yes vote in a referendum" (NATO, 2018c). These requested performances of Europeanness also juxtaposed the (Western) Balkans with their European identity. That is, in juxtaposing the (Western) Balkans' past from their European behavior in the present as a proof of the European future that they deserved, requested performances of Europeanness also further reproduced that contrast. A truly integrationist approach would be one in which the (Western) Balkans were accepted as Balkans *and* as European, and their past too was considered Balkan just as European. Instead, as Mogherini described "the diversity of the Balkans coming together and bringing light" she also said, "not drama, or suffering, which is giving a different image of the Balkans" (European Commission, 2019, 0:55). EU's 2018 enlargement perspective on the (Western) Balkans, for example, "re-affirmed the European future of the Western Balkans countries" (European Commission, 2018) on the condition of them "overcoming the legacy of the *past"*. Genealogical references to the European identity of the (Western) Balkans reproduced the same gap between the (Western) Balkans and the West – or more specifically, Europe – which they claimed to bridge by portraying the (Western) Balkans as having always been European but discrediting their Balkan past as non-European. This inconsistency is also vivid in Stoltenberg's 'Freudian slip' on how NATO did "expeditionary missions *outside* Europe. First in the Balkans…" (NATO, 2018b) and the immediately following correction through "… well *not outside* Europe".

Further, the language of Europeanization that the EU and NATO spoke through was mirrored by the government of (North) Macedonia. DUI's Artan Grubi, asserted that "the sun

for Albanians rises in the West" (Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia, 2018a). Zaev addressed the European Parliament (2018, 01:00) saying that he felt welcome "in the home of our European Family". On the other hand, the Defense Minister, Radmila Sekerinska, warned that "[t]he *status quo* is never an option for the Western Balkans. Either we go forward or going round in circles with the same problems" (Macedonia either joins EU or faces old problems - minister, 2018). She stated that "[w]e have shown that not only do we want to progress towards Europe, but also we have the capacity and the will to apply the European way of conduct in the Balkans" (Kosovo says Macedonia Nato entry to positively affect region, 2018), keeping open the gap between what a European way of conduct entails versus a Balkan one, and, hence, maintaining the (Western) Balkans inside just as outside of Europe.

The (Western) Balkan political elites shared genealogical references with the West and utilized discursive blank spots for claiming political points when possible and dissociating from responsibility when more useful. While in opposition, Zaev who later became the hero of changing his country's name, pledged: "[a]s long as I breathe, as long as I am breathing this Macedonian air, as long as I am aware that my grandfather, my father, all my ancestors, my son and daughter are Macedonians, born here in Macedonia, that [the change of name] *cannot* happen" (makedonija24, 2018). Once he took office, the change of name did occur. Marusic (2018c) wrote that "[w]hile the new government makes major strides in foreign policy, it appears to have forgotten the many pledges it made in 2016 about key domestic reforms". This, however, was not the first time that the Euro-Atlantic processes of (North) Macedonia were highjacked to gain political points and retaining positions of power even as internal matters would remain unaddressed. References to the European identity of the (Western) Balkans are on one hand utilized to bring closer the (Western) Balkans to the EU and NATO to which they anyways belong given their European identity. On the other hand, due to the gap between the (Western) Balkans and Europe that such references continued to perpetuate, they become instrumental in avoiding responsibility, when necessary, by making it possible to claim that it was the West that imposed the need for such sacrifices. To give but an example, Zaev affirmed that "[w]e don't change our name because we want to do it. We do it because of our future in the EU and NATO" (Delauneyuy, 2018). The political elites invoke references to the European identity of the (Western) Balkans to encourage popular support for reaching certain Euro-Atlantic milestones and increase consensus, but they then utilized Euro-Atlantic milestones to

account for changes which threaten to 'balkanize' the country or the region as out of their agency.

Ultimately, locating the (Western) Balkans within the heart of Europe coexists with congruently locating them outside of Europe for the Euro-Atlantic processes of the (Western) Balkans are centered around retaining or perpetually reinventing the unity of the Western 'self'. This because maintaining the unity of the Western 'self' has juxtapositionally relied on the 'balkanization' of the (Western) Balkan 'other'. Even as the (Western) Balkans might be Europeanized, their Europeanization is the result of and a coexisting process with Stabilization and the Yugoslav Crisis as well as the genealogical discourses they all can be traced historically to and during which they – the (Western) Balkans – have discursively split – 'balkanized' – as the West has overcome its internal fragmentations and successfully united in joint action towards the region. This is also why the President of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, advocated for admitting the (Western) Balkans into the EU "to avoid the risk of a new war there" (Macdonald, 2018), or why Stoltenberg warned of "tendencies we see to return our very strong nationalistic rhetoric… that can again, bring us back to situations we very much have to avoid going back into" (NATO, 2018f). This is also why Sweden's Ambassador to (North) Macedonia, Mats Staffansson, continued to refer to the "legacy of the Yugoslav and the Ottoman past" (Petruseva, 2018a) adding that "we cannot leave the Western Balkans on their own" because, as Stoltenberg recalled, "we have seen before how dangerous that can be" (2018a). Though in the heart of Europe, the (Western) Balkans remain a possibly dangerous subject as they have predominantly been portrayed.

Western 'self': The obsolete EU and the brain-dead NATO

The EU and NATO within each and between the two had much to be concerned about in 2018. The migrant or the refugee crisis characterized by high numbers of people arriving in the EU from across the Mediterranean Sea or overland through SEE was not over. A rise of authoritarian governments in Hungary and Poland was adding to the challenges that Russia had already posed to the liberal order by annexing Crimea in 2014. The Munich Security Report was warning of "global backdrop of rising nationalism and illiberalism" (Munich Security Conference, 2018) and a "*crack[ed]*" EU that might have not be able to face it all. The most pressing concern, however, was Br*exit*. The United Kingdom was seeking to leave

the EU since 2016 – and it did in 2020 –, being so far the only country to abandon the organization. Despite some historic achievements in its security and defense policy, especially through the initiation of the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) and the European Defence Fund (EDF) in 2017, as well as the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD) operating under the European Defence Agency (EDA), the EU was still facing major risks of fragmentation. Blockmans, Suzen, Coban, and Yilmaz (2018) denounced: "PESCO projects stop short of developing the defence capabilities that would endow the EU with the strategic autonomy aspired to", and which "raises the question of whether projecting *unity* was more important to the architects of PESCO than using up the single opportunity to activate a unique Treaty basis". This is reflected also in the calls of Juncker, for "a more *united*, stronger and more democratic Union" (European Commission, 2017).

Naturally and like with all the other key events, internal fragmentations within the EU were inevitably reflected in its relationship with NATO and, hence, the Western transatlantic sense of 'self'. An important factor here was the U.S. President, Donald Trump, who seemed not so inclined in preserving any transatlantic links for the sake of old Western friendships. He criticized NATO for being "obsolete" (Gordon & Chokshi, 2017) and he complained that "the U.S. is paying for 90% of NATO, with many countries nowhere close to their 2% commitment" (Nelson, 2018). On accounts of these statements and with the United Kingdom out of the picture, the old Atlanticist versus Europeanist divide regained visibility. The French President, Emmanuel Macron, declared in an interview for *The Economist* the "brain death of NATO" [Emmanuel Macron in his own words (English), 2019] and called for a reformed EU in which "some elements must *only* be *European*". This sparked reactions not just from Trump but also from Stoltenberg, though the two were well before Macron's 2019 interview aware of the increasing trend of Western fragmentation. In a commentary for the Macedonian daily *Nova Makedonija*, Biljana Vankovska (2018) called the NATO Summit of July 2018 "a fiasco (after the announcement that the United States could do it alone), and a drunk Juncker being pinnacle of the event". Though the Summit declaration had stated that "[t]he capabilities developed through the defence initiatives of the EU and NATO should remain coherent, complementary and interoperable" (NATO, 2018e), the Western 'self' was undergoing yet another risk of fragmentation.

In moments of crisis, as tradition has it, the 'balkanized' (Western) Balkan 'other' is summoned to 'heal' such fragmentations, while the Euro-Atlantic processes of the (Western) Balkans become the evidence of how overcoming divisions within the Western 'self' and acting in unity proved useful in the past and should continue in the present and future. The year of 2018, preceding again one of those key moments of NATO's seventieth anniversary in 2019, draws resemblance to the 1999 Stabilization declarations on the relevance of NATO. Two decades later as Europeanization already kicked in, such declarations, though rarer and softer in tone, persisted. NATO's Deputy Secretary General, Rose Gottemoeller envisioned that "[t]hese anniversaries will be an opportunity to cement in the eyes of our publics the urgent need for the NATO Alliance" (NATO, 2018g), as she added that "[w]e have had relative stability and calm in the Western Balkans for almost twenty years now" while referring specifically to the "[p]rogress on the name agreement between Skopje and Athens". In multiple occasions, as Stoltenberg demanded unity because "Europe and North America, we need each other, so we have to stand *together*" (NATO, 2018d), he made also sure to mention that "we are also working *together* in the Western Balkans, we have been working *together* there for many years".

Different from the Yugoslav Crisis and Stabilization, Europeanization brings in an explicit and refreshing acknowledgement on the role that the (Western) Balkans play as a space where the interests of both the EU and NATO intersected and where unification happens, and therefore quotes that explicitly acknowledge that enlargement was "beneficial not only for the Balkans but for all of us" (Mogherini: If Balkans don't join EU, we'll regret it in few years, 2019) appear in the research material. Yet, it is an occasional and perhaps delayed acknowledgement of the role that the (Western) Balkans have been playing even during the Yugoslav Crisis or Stabilization, that is being the triumphing story of a united EU, NATO, or both as the united West. The EU Ambassador in (North) Macedonia, Samuel Žbogar, admitted: "for the EU, we also want a success story" (Petruseva, 2018b). The "Prespa Agreement" was framed as a success story. As it most often happened, this success story belonged not as much to the (Western) Balkans as much as to the transatlantic 'self' who had acted jointly in the region for years before and continued to do so, and who – most importantly – had conditioned this story by not allowing (North) Macedonia to join its structures prior to it.

Therefore, as seen in 2003 and 2009 when (North) Macedonia's Euro-Atlantic successes rather than being the country's convincing meeting of benchmarks, were the result of a variety of events that had challenged the unity and prompted the reinvention of the Western 'self'. The 'two-faced games' of the Macedonian political elites in 2018 had worked – and they could only work – in a joint fashion with the EU and NATO. The local representatives would have not been able to show off the Euro-Atlantic achievements if the rewards had never come. Similarly, as the country was praised for its historical agreement that would have opened the gates to the EU and NATO, EU's 2018 enlargement strategy on the (Western) Balkans spoke of six flagship initiatives in the field of, among others, "serious corruption and organised crime" (European Commission, 2018). Andrew Gray (2018) pointed out how "Mogherini's upbeat tone" on bringing the (Western) Balkans within the EU "was in contrast to some stark language in the strategy itself, which sets out bluntly how far away all six countries are from EU goals". Staffansson, was asked "whether the EU has drawn any lessons from turning a blind eye to the authoritarian tendencies that resulted in what many call 'state capture' in Macedonia" (Petruseva, 2018a). With both the EU and NATO engaging in such identity dynamics, what they exposed is that once again in 2018, what determined (North) Macedonia's Euro-Atlantic progress were concerns related the EU and NATO themselves – that is, the Western 'self' – rather than a major shift in the country's performance against its benchmarks, despite the "Prespa Agreement". NATO's official benchmarks were met since 2008 and those of the EU left much to desire.

Conclusions

Since the beginning of the Euro-Atlantic prospects of the (Western) Balkan countries launched during the Yugoslav Crisis and solidified through Stabilization, such processes have been framed as necessary for solving certain crises caused by the 'balkanization' of the (Western) Balkans, bringing peace and betterment to the region through promises of a better European future. Officially, these processes should have depended on the performance of the (Western) Balkan countries and how well they performed against the EU and NATO benchmarks set by treaties and various other mechanisms. Therefore, they are officially framed as processes *of* the (Western) Balkans, meaning they belong *to* the region, are led *by* the region, and are *in the benefit of* the (Western) Balkans themselves. It continued to be the case even during

Europeanization as Hahn, for example, noted that the implementation of the name agreement between (North) Macedonia and Greece as a condition for the former's progress in its Euro-Atlantic integration track was "in the country's interest" (Marusic, 2018b). However, this chapter, in line with the preceding ones, demonstrates that the Euro-Atlantic integration processes of the (Western) Balkans depended and have been utilized for uniting the Western 'self' based on a balkanized (Western) Balkan 'other'. The Euro-Atlantic promise has not only been shaped by the threat of a 'balkanized' (Western) Balkan 'other' but has also reproduced the same for this has assisted in the retention and reinvention of the united Western 'self'.

Specifically, I have explored how the discursive splits – the 'balkanization' – of the (Western) Balkan subject exemplified through (North) Macedonia have shaped the Euro-Atlantic processes of the country and the region, as the basic discourse of Europeanization kicked in. However, as other chapters that explore both (North) Macedonia and Serbia through the other two basic discourses – the Yugoslav Crisis and Stabilization – show, the Euro-Atlantic processes of the (Western) Balkans being born and shaped as a response to 'balkanization' – that is, the discourse of the fragmented (Western) Balkans 'other' – inevitably originated from and were molded by the discourse of the united transatlantic Western 'self'. These processes, though officially framed as in the interest of the perpetually fragmenting (Western) Balkan 'other' and only lately recognized as also beneficial to the West, have historically contributed to the united Western 'self'. As the three key events above reveal, the progress of (North) Macedonia and of the (Western) Balkans towards the EU and NATO has quite often depended more on occurrences related to the unity and the risk of fragmentation of the West. This also means that the Euro-Atlantic processes of the (Western) Balkans as shaped by 'balkanization' rely on the fragmentation of the (Western) Balkan 'other', and since the unity of the Western 'self' is to be preserved, they have further discursively split and 'balkanized' the (Western) Balkans.

Residues of historical articulations of the identity of the (Western) Balkans are circulated in the present precisely through the Euro-Atlantic processes of the region, not only by the West, but also by the (Western) Balkan political elites. In other words, the (Western) Balkans 'other' is also the (Western) Balkan 'self'. The mirrored discourse of 'balkanization' reinvents the united Western 'self' and the local political elites at the expense of the fragmented (Western) Balkan 'other'. The Euro-Atlantic processes which are supposed to uproot the

(Western) Balkans from their pejorative past notions of identity, ironically become the engine of – with some contemporary adjustments – circulating the same in the present. As such, the (Western) Balkans risk remaining at a stage of "never… closer to EU membership" (PM says Macedonia has chance to close EU membership 'chapter', 2018) as Zaev claimed, but simultaneously always having been a natural part of Europe – even if they might one day join the EU or NATO, as Croatia and (North) Macedonia did respectively.

Conclusions

A Bosnian joke from the 1990s told of a Western scholar coming to Sarajevo, and when asked about the purpose of his visit replying: 'I am writing a book about Bosnia'. 'Oh, that is nice; and when did you arrive here?' 'Yesterday'. 'And when are you leaving?' 'Tomorrow'. 'And the title of your book will be . . .?' 'Bosnia Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow'.
Robert M. Hayden (2013, pp. xi-xii)

These conclusions offer a summarized overview on the overall identity dynamics between the (Western) Balkans and the West as constitutively linked to the Euro-Atlantic processes of the former. The first section elaborates on his. The second section expands on the trivium of Balkanism, Regionalism, and Europeanization, and it argues for broadening up conceptualizations of the identity of the (Western) Balkans as Europe's periphery to include with at least just as much attention the role of NATO. This, I argue, makes more explicit how the (Western) Balkans are not just invented, regionalized, or europeanized by the West, but they have historically played a role as 'balkanized' in the formation of EU's and NATO's 'selves' as separate and as united into a single Western subject by providing the space where the divergencies between the two have been exposed and addressed. The Euro-Atlantic processes of the (Western) Balkans as a foreign policy have historically shaped and been shaped by such identity dynamics, they maintain this dynamic in the present, and there is nothing to suggest that this will not happen in the future. The very final section provides with brief reflections on limitations of this thesis and interests for future research which could emerge from the same.

The United West through the Euro-Atlantic processes of 'Balkanized' (Western) Balkans

Answering – *How does 'balkanization' shape the Euro-Atlantic processes of the (Western) Balkans, and vice versa?* – through a poststructuralist theoretical and methodological framework involved answering two major sets of interconnected questions: a set of questions which deals with the 'self'/'other' identity dynamics between the (Western) Balkans and the West; and another set on the Euro-Atlantic process of the (Western) Balkans as a foreign policy. This dissertation has moved back-and-forth these two sets of questions in attempts of grasping their constitutive relationship. Further, the first set of questions referring to 'self'/'other' identity dynamics has also implied the necessity to move back-and-forth the 'selves' and 'others' of both the (Western) Balkans and the West. The analytical 'vessel' where

addressing these questions has taken place have been key events, while inferential observations have been summarized into discursive themes and basic discourses – all part of 'balkanization' as a discourse which mediates between identity constellations and Euro-Atlantic processes as a foreign policy. The analysis led to one main argument: the Euro-Atlantic processes of the (Western) Balkans as a foreign policy are conditioned by perceptions of the identity of the (Western) Balkan 'other' as fragmented and the Western 'self' as united. Constitutively, this means that the Euro-Atlantic processes of the (Western) Balkans as a foreign policy are not just conditioned by, but also condition – or are utilized for, serve, construct – perceptions of the identity of the (Western) Balkan 'other' as fragmented and the Western 'self' as united. The Euro-Atlantic integration processes of the (Western) Balkans are rather the Euro-Atlantic integration processes of the West – processes of the EU and NATO uniting and integrating from within and in between, and of the (Western) Balkans further 'balkanizing'.

These dynamics, however, though capturing the two subjects mainly within identity articulations of the (Western) Balkan 'other' as fragmented and the Western 'self' as united, are not static. They have involved a constant readjustment of layers of otherness which have brought the (Western) Balkan 'other' sometimes closer and sometimes further away from the Western 'self' – temporally and spatially, and these different layers of otherness are captured through the three main contemporary basic discourses – the *Yugoslav Crisis*, *Stabilization*, and *Europeanization*. First, the *Yugoslav Crisis* contemporary basic discourse is located around two key events – (North) Macedonia's independence in 1991, and the 1995 war in BiH; it constructs the (Western) Balkan subject as the regressive and distant Yugoslav 'other' which projects The Balkan 'other' of the Balkan Wars and WWI, ingrained in its ancient hatred and encapsulated far away from the West in its Balkan Peninsula; deserving at best of some attention and observation, but not worthy of involvement. (North) Macedonia's independence and the war in BiH which coincided with EC's and NATO's reinventions in a post-Cold War and post-Soviet era make apparent the initial stages of the unity in formation of the Western 'self' through the 'balkanization' of the (Western) Balkan 'other'.

The liberation of Kuwait and the Gulf War had already exposed a lack of unity within and in between the EC and NATO, but the Yugoslav Crisis really exposed the paralysis caused by the Europeanists versus Atlanticists divide. Though this divide has often been portrayed as consequential to events in the (Western) Balkans, tensions within and between the EU and

NATO have had to do rather with endeavors from both to develop and retain their own unique security and defense identities. The divide was already there and the (Western) Balkans did not cause it – the EU and NATO did, by fighting for their 'hours'. What the (Western) Balkans did, however, during the Yugoslav Crisis and after, was providing with the space where differences between the EU and NATO would be settled, where readjustments and negotiations of roles would take place, and where triumphant calls of sometimes one or the other, and sometimes both will be cried out. The 'balkanizing' (Western) Balkans were there to, in a way, say 'don't fight, there's plenty for both'. While the BiH war exposed the failure of the EU to reach a consensus and NATO's delayed reaction, it was precisely this exposure which served as an impetus to address internal inconsistencies within and between the EU and NATO through their policies towards the (Western) Balkans.

The Euro-Atlantic processes of the (Western) Balkans became a prospect during the *Stabilization* basic discourse which kicked in after events such as the 1999 Kosovo war, the fall of Milošević from power in 2000, and the armed conflict of 2001 in (North) Macedonia. Different from the Yugoslav Crisis, Stabilization converts the Yugoslav subject into SEE, located spatially in the West's backyard and temporally in the backward end of history. Its proximity to the Western subject, however, which draws references to the Balkan/Postcolonial subject of WWII, could no longer be ignored and it demanded an intervention. Policy shifts like the one from observation to intervention, and later integration, also demanded for a switch between layers of otherness. That is, for the EU and NATO to argue that the (Western) Balkans are worthy of their involvement they had to, of course, draw their 'other' closer to the 'self'. The result of this were tools such as the SP and the SAP as EU initiatives, as well as NATO's SEEI and MAP as some amongst the many mechanisms of the Euro-Atlantic processes of the (Western) Balkans.

These tools, however, which rose from a post-conflict and interventionist rationale towards the (Western) Balkans, also resulted with the realization that "[n]either NATO nor the European Union exist, therefore, for their own sake. They are instruments that help us solve concrete problems" (NATO, 1999a) – like the (Western) Balkans. That is, for as long as there are problems to solve, there are reasons to exist. The bombing in 1999 was not just a major success for NATO's reinvention and with this also the transatlantic unity which it embodies. It was also useful for the development of EU's own security and defense identity through the

establishment of ESDP in 1999 (the predecessor to CSDP) which was made possible only after the calming of the Europeanists versus Atlanticists divide. The OFA which followed the armed conflict of 2001 in (North) Macedonia was another manifestation of this unity as an agreement facilitated jointly by both the EU and the United States. Throughout Stabilization, therefore, from which the Euro-Atlantic integration prospects for the (Western) Balkans emerged, the (Western) Balkans did not integrate neither from within nor with the EU and NATO – the EU and NATO did, both from within and in between.

Europeanization offers a more vibrant account on the identity dynamics between the (Western) Balkans and the West and this not just due to the four key events it covers – the 2006 exodus of Montenegro, the visa liberalization for (North) Macedonia in 2009, the "Brussels Agreement" of 2013 between Kosovo and Serbia, and the 2018 "Prespa Agreement" on (North) Macedonia's change of name – but also due to what can essentially be framed as de-Europeanizing events such as Brexit. The (Western) Balkan subject was promised an integrated future within the EU and NATO during the Thessaloniki Summit of 2003 based on its European identity. Since then, the EU and NATO have emerged as enlarged actors with many new members, though they have encountered many crises such as terrorism, enlargement fatigue, global financial and European debt crisis, migrant and refugee crisis, that threatened to undermine their 'selves' and the united Western 'self'. The four key events covered under Europeanization show how during these existential crises the (Western) Balkans have been invoked to illustrate that the EU and NATO and their transatlantic unity are much needed. Europeanization shows seemingly a different approach towards the (Western) Balkans in that both the EU and NATO demonstrate a self-reflective and even critical acceptance on the role that the (Western) Balkans play on their stability as subjects, much like Balkanism. This gave rise to an integrationist approach towards the (Western) Balkans as a subject who is "not only Europe but the heart of European history, of European geography, of European culture" (European Commission, 2019, 1:30).

However, Europeanization remains essentially similar to the Yugoslav Crisis and Stabilization in the cynicism it reflects by portraying the Euro-Atlantic processes of the (Western) Balkans as predominantly in favor of the unity of the (Western) Balkan 'other' rather than the Western 'self'. The Euro-Atlantic processes of the (Western) Balkans might have been beneficial to the (Western) Balkans from many perspectives, but they have not been beneficial

from the perspective of retaining a united (Western) Balkan subject. They, instead, are beneficial to the unity of the EU and NATO, particularly in moments when the same is seriously threatened. This is also why Mogherini had relied on the (Western) Balkans to claim that "she was certain that, post-Brexit, the *EU's future* would not be about only 27 members because it would gain new member states" (Mogherini: EU to take in Balkan states after Brexit, 2017). Enlargement has had much more value for the future of the EU and the West from what is generally admitted, though it is the 'balkanized' (Western) Balkans who are predominantly seen as the main beneficiaries.

These perceptions of the identity of the (Western) Balkan 'other' as fragmented and the Western 'self' as united have their roots in older genealogical variations of 'balkanization' captured through three main older basic discourses – the *Balkan Wars/WW*I, the *WWII/Colonial*, and *Balkanism* – reflected on the contemporary ones. The relevance of locating them in contemporary configurations is not the identification of causal links between specific genealogical basic discourses and contemporary ones, but it is rather to serve an understanding – regardless of the simplicity this might convey – in which the present is influenced by the past and in which both influence the future. Current perceptions of the (Western) Balkans as fragmented – 'balkanized' – are not new and contemporary. They are old and have historically served perceptions of the Western subject as united. They currently shape real life policy decisions and foreign policies like the Euro-Atlantic processes of the (Western) Balkans, and the Euro-Atlantic processes of the (Western) Balkans further recirculate and revitalize older genealogical variations of the identity of the (Western) Balkans as fragmented. The big questions is, of course, the future and what it entails, particularly in the face of EU's de-Europeanization with the United Kingdom leaving, the rise of authoritarianism in countries like Hungary and Poland (Freedom House, 2021), NATO's political challenges over Crimea and Russia's invasion of Ukraine, China's investments in Europe that threaten to undermine transatlantic links (Belkin, 2021), and a more intense influence of non-Western actors such as Russia, China, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates in the (Western) Balkans (Bieber & Tzifakis, 2020).

What can be said from a theoretical perspective which relies on a non-linear progression of identity formation and foreign policies, is that older variations of identity always stand a chance to reappear in the future, while shaping and be shaped by similar foreign

policies. Should this happen with the (Western) Balkans and the West, then the two will perpetually be captured in the roles they have played to date, and with the major repercussions falling on the (Western) Balkan fragmented 'other'. Of course, such reappearances will never look exactly the same, but they will serve similar dynamics in which the (Western) Balkans 'balkanize' indefinitely as the West unites. It is also to be made clear here that the unity of the Western 'self', just like the layered nature of the (Western) Balkan 'other', is not static. That the West has utilized the Euro-Atlantic processes of the (Western) Balkans to unite on the back of the 'balkanized' (Western) Balkans means not that the West has only and always united. Neither does it mean that it is only the 'balkanized' (Western) Balkan 'other' that has served the unity of the Western 'self' – indeed, the West has many other 'others'. What it means, instead, is that the 'balkanized' (Western) Balkans and their image of a perpetually fragmenting 'other' has been used by the Western 'self' to proclaim, assert, or announce unity, and that the Euro-Atlantic processes as a foreign policy have relied on and also given rise to these everlasting identity dynamics – they could, moreover, do the same in the future. In the face of most pressing crises that the EU and NATO are currently challenged by, there is not much evidence to suggest that the (Western) Balkan 'other' will not be used to serve the overcoming of such challenges to develop united 'selves' within the EU and NATO and between the two. This since, in a way, keeping the (Western) Balkans out rather than in might continue to be more beneficial for maintain an image of the West as united.

This is also why Étienne Balibar's (2004, p. 6) invitation to Europe to "recognize in the Balkan situation not a monstrosity grafted to its breast, a pathological 'aftereffect'… but rather an image and effect of its own history'" which Europe should use "to put itself into question and transform itself" is insufficient. The (Western) Balkans have historically served the purpose of building and solidifying the West's sense of 'self', and this has often happened through compelling the Western subject to confront its own internal divisions which the (Western) Balkans have exposed. That is, the West has already put its 'self' into questions, and that is how it is who it came to be today. It is the (Western) Balkans on the other hand which tend to put their 'self' as the West's fragmented 'other' less into question. This takes us to the roles that the (Western) Balkan political elites have come to play in replicating and instrumentalizing the Western view on the (Western) Balkan 'other' through similar references to older genealogical variations of the identity of the (Western) Balkans as fragmented. Though

it is alignment in discursive themes rather than genealogical references with the EU and NATO which have proven beneficial to (Western) Balkan politicians, the discursive themes themselves operate from within contemporary basic discourses and which are reflections of the genealogical ones. The (Western) Balkan 'self' therefore is the Western 'other', and this, seems to me, is what should be converted into an invitation to the (Western) Balkans to recognize in their own situation "not a monstrosity grafted to its breast, a pathological 'aftereffect'… but rather an image and effect of" (Balibar, 2004, p. 6) West's written history which it should use "to put it*self* into question" – that is, to put its 'self' as the West's 'other' into question.

That the (Western) Balkans mirror the West's 'other' is far from being an eye-opener. Other more Lacanian psycho-analytical scholars like Alexander Kiossev (2002) have claimed this before. These accounts, however, seem to be aligned with conclusions such as that of Mishkova (2019, p. 2) who claim that "[a]fter all, knowledge as power is taken to be a natural consequence of the *inability* of the Orient (or the *Balkans*) to create its own self-representation". While the presence of power asymmetry at play between the Western formation of the (Western) Balkan 'other' and the (Western) Balkan formation of 'self' leaves no space for doubts, perceiving this asymmetry as "inability" seems to be also what leads Bebler (2008, p. 76) and others to conclude that "[t]he Balkan elites, if left alone, are simply *incapable* of transforming the region into a viable and peaceful community of nations even distantly comparable e.g. to Scandinavia".

Rather than incapable, this dissertation illustrated how that the (Western) Balkan political elites have predominantly been unwilling (Petrović, 2009; 2014; Bărbulescu & Troncotă, 2013; Milošević & Trošt, 2021; Gordy, 2021) to engage in shifting the power asymmetry between the (Western) Balkans and the West. Engaging in this shift which would request questioning the (Western) Balkan 'self' as the West's 'other' is not what in the short term would benefit the political elites whose positions of power and conversions from war figures to passionate Euro-Atlanticists have depended on the compatibility of their discursive themes with those of the EU and NATO. What has politically been beneficial instead is replicating and instrumentalizing the Western gaze unto the (Western) Balkan sense of 'self', and the Euro-Atlantic processes of the (Wester) Balkans as a foreign policy have been the tool which has enabled this. The lack of a (Western) Balkan self-representation therefore – a

representation which recognizes and questions the role that the West has played in the construction of the 'self' – is not the result of inability or missing agency of the (Western) Balkan political elites, but the instrumentalization of that asymmetrically allotted agency for narrow political benefits. Alas, those who question such asymmetry – and who do exist, as the academic and media discourses illustrate – have a limited influence (if any) in the crafting of policies which are built upon and further perpetuate the asymmetry itself.

A Posteriori Contributions: The Trivium of Balkanism, Regionalism, and Europeanization through the Trichotomy of the (Western) Balkans, EU, and NATO

The main research question of this dissertation raised queries that relate to both, the very fluid and discursive nature of identity, as well as the – what has often appeared like – technocratic nature of the Euro-Atlantic processes of the (Western) Balkans as a foreign policy. Literature that has covered the spectrum from questions of who/what are the (Western) Balkans and the West to if and how this determines the Euro-Atlantic prospects of the former is sizable. I, therefore, aim not capture it all here, particularly since this thesis is set out to make an empirical contribution to Balkan area studies by specifically answering the one main research question. However, though this dissertation remains loyal to the specific nature of its main research question, it can nevertheless be situated in a crossroad, or rather trivium, of some of these strands of literature – particularly Balkanism, Regionalism, and Europeanization – and offer a poststructuralist account (which I found surprisingly rare) to some of the questions that they aim to answer.

What seems common to these three different yet connected research traditions is the positioning of the (Western) Balkan subject as a carrier, receiver, and best-case scenario an active respondent to Western policies. Balkanism rose as predominantly concerned with how the West imagines the (Western) Balkans (e.g. Todorova, [1997] 2009); Regionalism with the influence of the Euro-Atlantic processes on regional cooperation in the (Western) Balkans (e.g. Bechev, 2011); and Europeanization, though with some more recent exceptions, remains predominantly concerned with the (lack of) success of EU conditionality on europeanizing the (Western) Balkans (e.g. Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2020). While this is understandable considering the asymmetrical relationship between the (Western) Balkans and the West, a poststructuralist account which relies on a constitutive relationship not just between identity

and foreign policy but also 'selves' and 'others', can extend and expand on current knowledge brought forward by these three strands of literature. It does so by asking questions on not just how the (Western) Balkans are shaped by the Euro-Atlantic processes, but also how they shape the West – the EU and NATO – through these processes. This dissertation equally exposed the role that the (Western) Balkan subject has played in the construction of the Western 'self'. In other words, the Euro-Atlantic processes of the (Western) Balkans were examined not just as processes which radiate from the Western 'self' unto the (Western) Balkan 'other', but also as processes which radiate from the (Western) Balkan 'other' unto the Western 'self'. Accounts which treat simultaneously the two dynamics not only that are rare, but moreover, they focus only on the transformative effects of the (Western) Balkans on the EU while ignoring its relationship with NATO.

The one main observation derived – that is, that the Euro-Atlantic processes of the (Western) Balkans have served the formation of the united Western 'self' through the fragmented (Western) Balkan 'other' – points out the importance of factoring in NATO and not just the EU in the analysis. For the vital role that the (Western) Balkans have played in the formation of the Western 'self' to be grasped eclectically, the focus that *Balkanism* has placed in analyzing the (Western) Balkans as Europe's "provincial part or *periphery*" (Todorova M. , [1997] 2009, p. 17) must expand to treat with just as much attention the transatlantic component through including NATO. An examination which looks at the Euro-Atlantic processes of the (Western) Balkans as separate between the EU and NATO – that is, the European processes on one side and the Atlantic processes on the other – might miss on the crucial role that the relationship between the EU and NATO itself plays in the progression of the (Western) Balkan countries in their Euro-Atlantic aspirations. Said differently, though one might focus on the position of the (Western) Balkans as Europe's periphery to examine their integration processes into the EU only, EU's own relationship with NATO – the competing and complementary roles that the two have undertaken between each other – has historically been influential on the progression of the (Western) Balkan countries towards the EU. Same goes also for NATO. Balkanism, therefore, might benefit from rising beyond the (Western) Balkans versus Europe dichotomy into a trichotomous relationship between the (Western) Balkans, the EU, and NATO. This dissertation might serve as an illustration of how if such a more inclusive conceptualization of the identity of the (Western) Balkans and the West is

adopted, then the role that the (Western) Balkans have played in the formation of the Western 'self' through serving as a mediator between the EU and NATO becomes more explicit. That is, the (Western) Balkans have not just been invented by the West – they have historically – though through being utilized – contributed to the Western invention of 'self' as united.

Balkanism's contributions to new approaches that recognize the discursively constituted nature of the (Western) Balkans as a region [also as a name, metaphor, and historical legacy (Todorova M. , 2015)], have been picked up by *Regionalism* – not in the broadest sense but rather in the sense of some more specific accounts of regional cooperation in the (Western) Balkans. Differentiating between primordialist, continualist, and constructivist conceptualizations of regional identity (with Todorova belonging to the latter), Bechev (2004, p. 84) aligns himself with the third approach, considering a region as "what people, politicians and states make out of it". He claims that what makes the (Western) Balkans a region is a "sense of belonging or 'we-ness' within the constructions of national identity in the region. Its common denominator is the notion of being on the *periphery of Europe*" (Bechev, 2011, p. 63). Furthermore, this sense of periphery, claims Bechev (2011, p. 154), is also what has "advanced and sustained political and even functional cooperation… [while] the pull of the EU has limited the extent, scope and depth of regional cooperation in wider South East Europe". Scholars have been critical of EU's imposed condition on the (Western) Balkans to get along, calling for regional cooperation as driven from within (Anastasakis & Bojicic-Dzelilovic, 2002; Anastasakis, 2002; Petritsch & Solioz, 2008; Solioz, 2017; Anastasakis & Bechev, 2003). However, whether imposed and/or internally driven, regional cooperation in the (Western) Balkans – a steppingstone towards accession in the EU since it launched its regional approach towards the (Western) Balkans in 1997 (European Council, 1997) – has been considered a transformative experience of the (Western) Balkans only. It has been studied predominantly as "a symbolic strategy to transform and… to 'rebrand', the conflict-prone and semi-European Balkans into part of Europe and the West" (Bechev, 2011, p. 11) and not necessarily to transform Europe and the West.

Regionalism, therefore, seems to first, neglect the role that the (Western) Balkans' sense as Europe's periphery has played in constructing Europe and the West in general, and not just the (Western) Balkans. Second, it somehow sees precisely that sense of periphery as fostering regional cooperation and unity in the (Western) Balkans. These claims can be

challenged if the role of NATO is factored in the relationship between Europe and the (Western) Balkans as its periphery. First, if the (Western) Balkans as a region are constructed, transformed, and kept together due to a sense of 'self' in which they belong to Europe's (and West's) periphery, then this also begs the question: How has the construction, transformation, and the maintenance of the (Western) Balkan 'self' as the West's periphery served the construction, transformation, and the maintenance of the Western 'self' as the center? Switching from a constructivist to a poststructuralist perspective requires seeing the (Western) Balkan regional identity as Europe's periphery as also the result and not just the factor driving regional cooperation. Indeed, regions are "what people, politicians and states make out of" (Bechev, 2004, p. 84) them, but so are people, politicians, states, and other actors what regions make out them. That is, while the (Western) Balkan positionality as Europe's periphery might have fostered regional cooperation, regional cooperation in turn has further deepened the (Western) Balkans' position in Europe's and West's margins. This peripheral position of the (Western) Balkans, as this thesis demonstrated, has not just empowered the institutions of the EU and other Western actors to demand for regional cooperation from the fragmented (Western) Balkan 'other', but also through this to foster unity within the Western 'self'. This becomes rather apparent when the role of NATO is factored in, and when the dichotomous relationship between the (Western) Balkan periphery and the European center converts into one of trichotomy inclusive of NATO.

Second, the (Western) Balkan self-identification as Europe's periphery has not only served the West, but it has hardly served the (Western) Balkan subject – it has rather 'balkanized' it. The claim that the (Western) Balkan self-identification as Europe's periphery has resulted with a more regionally cooperative – a more united – (Western) Balkans is disputable if we factor in the relationship between the EU and NATO in casting the (Western) Balkans as Europe's periphery. It is hard to see how the (Western) Balkan self-identification as peripheral has helped the (Western) Balkans unite. It has historically rather served the idea of a united Western 'self'. Most recent regional initiatives such as "Open Balkan"[58] which bring together Albania, (North) Macedonia, and Serbia, leave out countries such as BiH,

[58] Though older as an idea, "Open Balkan" (formerly unofficially referred to as the "Balkan Mini-Schengen") is an economic zone established by Albania, (North) Macedonia, and Serbia, with the purpose of improving cooperation in trade and bilateral relationship between the (Western) Balkan countries. One agreement and two memorandums were signed on July 29, 2021, in Skopje where the leaders of the three countries met.

Montenegro, and Kosovo. At this stage, "Open Balkan" is at least a project of 'balkanization' as much as it is one of regional cooperation. Indeed, the three countries that joined the initiative might have come together due to a shared sense of being Europe's periphery; three others, however, did not. Would this mean that BiH, Montenegro, and Kosovo feel less peripheral to Europe? While this is hard to say, a more united (Western) Balkan subject due to its historical peripheral position towards Europe and the West is hard to see. What it is rather visible is a historically 'balkanized' (Western) Balkan subject on whose fragmentation the unity of the EU and NATO within and in between has often found the chance to feed in and grow. Placing NATO between the (Western) Balkans' peripheral position and Europe makes this more explicit.

Improved regional cooperation is only one of Western demands towards the (Western) Balkans and only a part of EU's conditionality which has also inspired a research tradition of its own focused on *Europeanization* ["*EU*ropeanization" (Velikonja, 2005, p. 17) or "*Europeanunion*isation" (Gordy & Efendic, 2019, p. 9)]. This tradition initially rose with regards to EU member states, referring to Europeanization as

> [p]rocesses of (a) construction (b) diffusion and (c) institutionalization of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, 'ways of doing things' and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the making of EU decisions and then incorporated in the logic of domestic discourse, identities, political structures and public policies. (Radaelli, 2000, p. 3)

This was soon employed also on candidate countries (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2005; as revisited see Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2020). This literature which speaks to the one-directional transformative power of Europe inspired titles which attempt to address questions like: "Can the Western Balkans be Europeanized" (Jano, 2008) or "whether it is possible to weave the concept of Europeanization into the fabric of Balkan cultural domain" (Eriksen, 2015, p. 193). It places 'balkanization' – not just as fragmentation but rather the quality of being Balkan, of having or obtaining Balkan attributes – as juxtapositional to Europeanization; that is, to transform more into being European means to become less Balkan. This also explains titles such as "From 'Balkanization' toward 'West-Balkanization'" (Stojanovski, 2013), "From 'Balkanization' to 'Europeanization' of the Western Balkan Countries" (Radovanovik, 2012), or "Europeanization of the Balkans vs. Balkanization of Europe" (Gözübenli & Tekeshanoska,

2018). These question or attempt to improve the (Western) Balkans' ability to adopt EU's transformative power.

The other more critical trends of literature on Europeanization are also what opened the space for including the (Western) Balkan domestic capabilities in negotiating Europeanization. While many have pointed out the responsibility of the (Western) Balkan political elites in manipulating (Petrović, 2009; 2014; Bărbulescu & Troncotă, 2013; Milošević & Trošt, 2021) or discursively collaborating (Hammond, 2004) with the EU, some have also blaimed the EU for "creat[ing] institutional blockage and a democratic deficit" (Bărbulescu & Troncotă, 2013, p. 63), "constructing new divisions" (Lleshaj, 2013, p. 10), and "creat[ing] a shared 'reservoir' of discursive patterns for producing 'otherness'" (Petrović, 2011, p. 3) among others. By critiquing Europeanization as "a one-way, didactic, and patronizing process" (Anastasakis, 2005, p. 83), scholars have opened up the space where the "'transformative power of Europe' acts as a circular instead of a unidirectional force" (Sekulić, 2020, p. xxvi; Subotić, 2011; Elbasani, 2013). This literature is oriented towards accounting for current failures of EU conditionality by looking not just "at the transformative power of Europeanisation, but also at the transformation of Europeanisation" (Džankić, Keil, & Kmezić, 2019, p. 6; Vučković & Đorđević, 2019). Despite this different angle, however, Europeanization has predominantly been approached as (the lack of) transformation of the (Western) Balkans, and most ambitiously a process in which the (Western) Balkans are active agents in bargaining or performing (Musliu, 2021) their own Europeanness – hence, "the transformation of *Europeanisation*" (Džankić, Keil, & Kmezić, 2019, p. 6) and not the transformation of the EU, NATO, or the West.

What if, however, the (Western) Balkans did not negotiate only their own Europeanization but also that of the EU – or, the Westernization of the West in general? What if Europanization is not just the (Western) Balkans' transformation through the EU and NATO, but also the transformation of the EU and NATO through the (Western) Balkans? To my knowledge, studies that have explored the role that the (Western) Balkans have played in the construction of the Western 'self' – as constituted by the EU and NATO – specifically through their Euro-Atlantic processes are not only few, but at best they focus only on the EU while disregarding NATO (Petrović, 2011; 2014; Vukasović, 2018). This is also why Florian Bieber (2019, p. 241) claims that "[t]he current debate on Europeanisation is surprisingly ahistorical…

Europeanisation in Southeastern Europe has a far longer history. Even if this process has been described by other terms, such as 'modernization' or '*Westernization*'". He calls for "[g]iving Europeanisation greater historical depth and wider societal breadth" (Bieber, 2019, p. 245). Through adopting a poststructuralist framework, this dissertation not only provided with greater historical depth of Europenization due to its reliance on genealogy, but also examined the same as embedded in a wider societal depth of 'selves'/'others' not just between the (Western) Balkans and Europe but also NATO. The inclusion of NATO in the analysis is of an outmost importance as the Euro-Atlantic processes of the (Western) Balkans have often relied not on the (Western) Balkans' performance of Europeanness, but on the (lack of) unity between the EU and NATO.

This is also why, though Europeanization seems to have to do much with the relationship between the (Western) Balkans and Europe or the EU, it has as much to do with NATO and the United States. Analyzing Europeanization within a "greater historical depth and wider societal breadth" (Bieber, 2019, p. 245) demands first, that Europenization be conceptualized as not just a derivative but also a concomitant of Stabilization and the Yugoslav Crisis; and second, that it is examined in a wider transatlantic space where Europeanization is not just about the dichotomy of Europe versus other subjects it transforms. On the first, non-linear progression of identity formations and foreign policies is what revealed how Europeanization and what is understood by it today is built upon other layers of otherness captured by Stabilization and the Yugoslav Crisis. While Europeanization has been their antecedent, it is also an includer of the two – and many other identity and foreign policy patterned links which others might be able to identify as analytical constructs. As such, though showing self-critical signs which seem to acknowledge the Euro-Atlantic integration processes of the (Western) Balkans as beneficial not just to the (Western) Balkans but also the EU, Europeanization is an incessant process, one which keeps the (Western) Balkans trapped in an endless transformative loop. This is also why Petrović (2009, p. 25, italics in the original) claims that "new member states, that is, the former socialist countries that had to 'prove' their *Europeanness* before joining the EU, must continue to do so even as EU members". The integration of countries such as Slovenia and Croatia within the EU has not been sufficient to completely nullify at least some degree of differences in Europeanness, since, as Hammond (2006, p. 8) claims, "some countries' Europeaneity is a given, while others have to work for

it". What it further has contributed, however, has been the gap between the Europeanness of those such as Croatia and Slovenia who have joined the EU and other (Western) Balkan countries that have not – further fragmenting the region? Europeanization is 'balkanization' and not its opposite.

A deeper genealogical historical depth which illustrates this is also what might assist current literature to examine Europeanization beyond the (lack) of success of the EU in transforming the (Western) Balkans, and even beyond the (Western) Balkans' own agency in constructing their own Europeanness (Anastasakis, 2005; Subotić, 2011; Elbasani, 2013; Džankić, Keil, & Kmezić, 2019; Vučković & Đorđević, 2019; Sekulić, 2020; Musliu, 2021). Genealogical depth as an imperative for poststructuralist analysis led to an examination of Europeanization as the (Western) Balkans' agency in constructing Europe's own Europeanness, but which, once again, emerged as more explicit when considering the role that NATO plays in it. That the (Western) Balkans are not just mere receivers or even negotiators of their Europeanization but also important factors which – though utilized by the West – have given shape to the subjects that the EU and NATO are today, becomes more vivid if the (Western) Balkans are seen through the spectrum of the Europeanists versus Atlanticists divide which persists to date. This is when the role that the (Western) Balkans have historically played in offering the space for this divide to be exposed, challenged, and addressed, resulting quite often with a more united sense of 'self' of the EU, NATO, and the two conjoined as the West, is unignorable. This unity which, among others, has relied on the (Western) Balkan fragmented 'other' is also at the heart of Europeanization – or rather, Westernization; while the Euro-Atlantic processes of the (Western) Balkans are the foreign policy which has been shaped by and constitutively therefore continues to shape what might seem like new but what are only older genealogical variations of the identity of the (Western) Balkan 'other' as 'balkanized' and the West as united.

A genealogical account that has stretched back to the past to better explain the present and hopefully raise some awareness about the future, in conjunction with a further complexification of identity constellation of the (Western) Balkan 'other' beyond its position as Europe's periphery but rather right into the heart of the EU and NATO relationship – is what this dissertation offered. In these endeavors, I have hopefully not abashed my 'self' into an overly ambitious joke on "The (Western) Balkans Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow" such as

that on Bosnia which Hayden (2013, pp. xi-xii) narrates; but if I have, then at least it is just as much a joke on "The West Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow".

Limitations and Areas for Further research: Towards Racial and Gendered Perspectives

This dissertation comes with its own limitations. Two of which I believe need a specific exposure, are the missing dimensions of gender and race. The insights which emerged as most visible to me from analyzing the empirical material are those that also appear as visible in these pages. But as Foucault ([1975] 1995, p. 200) says, "visibility is a trap" and it comes with its own risks of ensuring "the automatic functioning of power" (p. 201). Tradition has it that a poststructuralist analysis must concern itself with "revealing and undermining power when it is most invisible and insidious" (Foucault, 1977, p. 208); and while the empirical chapters deconstruct the main research questions into as many variations as possible of identity constellations, I identify no discursive splits as a result of gendered or racialized dynamics. This, I am certain, is not due to these nuances missing, but rather due to my own epistemic blindness ensured by the automatic functioning of power which risks contributing to the same.

It is therefore imperative to draw the readers' attention towards the 'high politics' nature of most of the research material analyzed for this dissertation, and which is without a doubt an epitome of voices of men[59]. While the genealogical academic titles have exposed female figures such as Maria Todorova, Milica Bakić Hayden, Vesna Goldsworthy and others, the contemporary research material – which is where most insights derive from – is centralized around key male figures in positions of power from the (Western) Balkans and the West, except for figures such as Madeleine Albright, Catherine Ashton, or Federica Mogherini. I will not pretend to be familiar here with literature on gender in the (Western) Balkans or the West – I am sure it is vast. However, it is no surprise that such an asymmetrical representation of other genders – as in all spheres of life – is also part of my research material. I, therefore, must stress that, within the frames of this dissertation, 'balkanization' as the discourse of the Western 'self' and the (Western) Balkan 'other' stands also for the discourse of predominately the male Western 'self' and the male (Western) Balkan 'other'.

[59] As Todorova (2010, p. 175) says: "after all, the burden of Balkan political culture, which up to now has suffered (often justly) a very bad name, should not be shouldered by women. At least women have not performed it".

Since theoretically it is established that 'self'/'other' dynamics between the (Western) Balkans and the West reside in a constitutive relationship with the Euro-Atlantic processes as a foreign policy, an interesting venue to further explore would be a genealogical investigation of asymmetrical gendered dynamics between the (Western) Balkans and the West as not just informing but also being informed by the Euro-Atlantic processes of the (Western) Balkans. Gender inequality has long been an important concern of the (Western) Balkans with regards to their accession to the EU, particularly when in deteriorating circumstances (European Parliament, 2021). Accession in the EU is considered an impetus to improving gender equality as a fundamental right and a common value recognized by the EU. Considering the role that the (Western) Balkans have played on the formation of the Western 'self' which has given shape to who the EU and NATO are today, would it not be interesting to examine the possible implications of the role of the (Western) Balkans in a more gendered balanced West? This might also support the possibility of examining another scenario: could the united and the more gendered balanced West who has benefited from the (Western) Balkans' 'balkanization' in many perspectives have played a role in the current gender inequality in the (Western) Balkans? This would, after all, be just another 'balkanization' along gendered lines. Hansen (2006) for e.g., touches upon this component by illustrating how the switch to a policy of intervention in BiH took place, among others, by discursively splitting the (Western) Balkan men as the perpetrators from their women and children as victims. The Euro-Atlantic processes of the (Western) Balkans are also shaped by certain images of the (Western) Balkan men and women, and with this so are certain images of the (Western) Balkan men and women which are shaped by the Euro-Atlantic processes of the (Western) Balkans worth exploring.

Finally, as this thesis has demonstrated, the Europe versus (Western) Balkans dichotomy is insufficient for grasping wider historical and societal dimensions involved in the formation of the (Western) Balkan subject and the role it has played in constructing the West. Though this has also been confirmed by most recent work on race in the Balkans (Baker, 2018), it has already previously been raised by others (see Imre, 2005; Todorova M. S., 2006; Bjelić, 2009; Kilibarda, 2010). As Baker (2018, pp. 170-171) says,

> critical race scholarship adds a further meaning of 'Europe' to balkanism's 'Europe'/'Balkan' binary. If 'Europeanness' also, at some deep-rooted level, entails a notion of the collective 'self' being ready to rule over racialised Others, aspirations towards 'Europe', however unconsciously, might involve identification with such readiness. This both reframes the

> balkanism paradigm and destabilises the Yugoslav region's typical position in categories of coloniser/colonized.

The much narrower epistemological treatment which race has been given in the study of the (Western) Balkans in comparison to ethnicity and religion, is "itself a transnational production, circulating between the region's academic and cultural institutions and foreign universities which are products of colonial legacies and sites of racial struggle" according to Baker (2018, p. 167). This dissertation, therefore, remains guilty of being yet another such production in which a more extensive treatment was not given to race.

At least two instances where this could have been the case is in the intraregional usage of the racial slur "Šiptar/i" or "Šiptarčina" (see footnote 46) as disparaging to Albanians; and the second is the adoption of "lebanonization" or "beirutization" which have come up in the research material and have been acknowledged in the text above though from a postcolonial – and not a critical race – perspective which would stretch beyond the (Western) Balkans' "typical position in categories of coloniser/colonized" (Baker, 2018, pp. 170-171). These choices were also made due to the very intentionality of the research question to focus on the identity constellations between the (Western) Balkans and the West only, and the Euro-Atlantic processes as a foreign policy. It would be interesting to broaden the identity constellations between the (Wester) Balkans and the West and include not only postcolonial 'others', but also racialized 'others' involved in the dynamics between the (Western) Balkans and the West in order to see the influence that they might have in shaping the relationship between the two, and vice versa. The (Western) Balkans are part of a racialized world, and there are insights to be drawn from this if recognized as such. Else, their epistemological treatment as a subject to be made sense of only through ethnicity, nationhood, or religion, risks on detaching and marginalizing them from growing with and becoming a part of a racially aware scholarship.

Recognizing these limitations means also recognizing that what might make this dissertation worth a reading is, among others, precisely its shortcomings. Much like Louis Althusser's comments on their own papers on Marx's *Capital*, I too believe that I "could have tried to make a finished work out of" the observations derived from this dissertation, but "rather than pretending they are what they should have been, [I] prefer to present them for what they are: precisely, incomplete texts, the mere beginnings of a reading" (Althusser, Establet, Ranciere, & Macherey, [1965] 2016, p. 1) – or readings, I should say.

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Note. All online sources were last accessed September 30, 2021.

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Appendix A
(North) Macedonia: Expanded Timeline of Key Events

Note. The timeline includes regional (Western) Balkan events and key events in the West with a focus on (North) Macedonia. It is meant to assist the reader in further zooming in and out of the key events explored in the dissertation, as well as contextualizing them within a wider regional and global setting. For acronyms and abbreviations seen here refer to the "List of Acronyms and Abbreviations" on pg. v.

Date	Event
November 29, 1945	SFRY was proclaimed and the "Socialist Republic of Macedonia" becomes one of its constituent republics.
February 1, 1990	Ethnic Albanians demonstrated in the district of Tetovo against treatment by the Macedonian majority. Protesters also demanded independence for regions in western Macedonia where ethnic Albanian are a majority.
August 2, 1990	Iraq invaded and annexed Kuwait. The UN Security Council passes Resolution 660.
August 25, 1990	Nevzat Halili is elected chairman of the ethnic Albanian Party PDP. Halili Founded the PDP in 1990.
November 11, 1990	The first free multiparty elections were conducted in (North) Macedonia since 1938. No clear winner emerged.
January 17, 1991	The United States and its coalition of allies launched a campaign of air and missile attacks on targets in Iraq and Kuwait.
January 25, 1991	Assembly issued "Declaration of Sovereignty".
January 27, 1991	Kiro Gligorov was formally elected President of the Republic.
February 17, 1991	Assembly changed the name "Socialist Republic of Macedonia" to "Republic of Macedonia".
February 26, 1991	Saddam Hussein announced that Iraq will withdraw from Kuwait.
February 27, 1991	The United States and allied forces enter Kuwait City. George H.W. Bush declared the suspension of offensive combat operations against Iraq.
March 29, 1991	The Assembly deputies concluded that the country should be led by a politically unaffiliated cabinet. The ruling cabinet was headed by economist Nikola Kljušev.
June 26, 1991	War broke out in Slovenia and Croatia.
July 5, 1991	The European Community issued "Declaration on the Situation in Yugoslavia". Imposed an embargo on sales of arms and military equipment.
July 8, 1991	The Brioni Agreement is signed by representatives of Slovenia, Croatia, and Yugoslavia under the sponsorship of the EC. Forms the foundation of European Community Monitor Mission (ECMM)
August 17, 1991	The European Community resolved to establish a peace conference on Yugoslavia. Badinter Arbitration Committee was set up.
September 5, 1991	Bulgarian President, Zhelyu Zhelev, declared that his country intends to recognize the "Republic of Macedonia" under its constitutional name, but that it does not accept the existence of a "Macedonian" nation.

September 8, 1991	Referendum on the future status of (North) Macedonia took place. (North) Macedonia seceded from Yugoslavia. Majority of voters support independence in referendum.
September 17, 1991	Referendum results confirmed by the Assembly.
September 25, 1991	First resolution that concerned the breakup of Yugoslavia, Resolution 713, was adopted.
October 21, 1991	The EU Council reached an agreement on the establishment of the European EEA.
November 13, 1991	The Greek government spokesman claimed that Greece does not intend to recognize "Macedonia".
November 17, 1991	The constitution of (North) Macedonia was adopted.
December 16, 1991	The European Community declares that it accepted the disintegration of Yugoslavia as a *fait accompli.* Decided to recognize the independence of former Yugoslav republics subject to terms.
December 19, 1991	(North) Macedonia sent out declaration to be internationally recognized as a sovereign state.
December 20, 1991	NACC was established as a forum for dialogue and cooperation with NATO's former Warsaw Pact adversaries.
January 11, 1992	A referendum on autonomy was organized by ethnic Albanians throughout (North) Macedonia, and 99% of the voters were in favor of autonomy. Macedonian government refused to hold as valid.
February 7, 1992	Treaty of Maastricht as signed.
March 31, 1992	Ethnic Albanians demonstrated in Skopje. They demand that the Macedonian nation remains unrecognized by the international community until the State grants ethnic Albanian the right to autonomy.
June 1992	Macedonian police reportedly found a cache of guns, ammunition, and uniforms with the Albanian emblem of a black two headed eagle. It raised fears that ethnic Albanian separatists could organize a militia.
September 1992	A new government was formed to replace the ineffective "government of experts". The new government is led by a coalition of parties that includes the PDP-NDP, SDUM (formerly the League of Communists), and Reformist Forces of Macedonia-Liberal Party (RFM-LM).
September 30, 1992	Nevzat Halili addressed an Albanian emigre group (Balli Kombëtar) at a Chicago mosque. His departing entourage came under gun fire. Two of his bodyguards were killed.
November 1992	(North) Macedonia's interior Minister, Ljubomir Frčkoski, claimed Muslim nations were supporting ethnic Albanian separatists. Albanian religious leaders denied.
November 6, 1992	Clashes between Macedonian police and ethnic Albanian in Bit Pazar in Skopje. Gunfire was also exchanged.
November 8, 1992	The Interior Ministry seized leaflets calling on ethnic Albanian to wage war for the right to self-determination. They were signed by the "Ilirida Albanian youth Movement".

November 10, 1992	The Assembly approved a new citizenship law which allows ethnic Macedonians from abroad and those born in (North) Macedonia to receive citizen status automatically. This could have a negative impact on ethnic Albanians.
December 11, 1992	The Security Council authorized the establishment of UNPROFOR's presence in FYROM as "UNPROFOR's Macedonia Command".
April 8, 1993	(North) Macedonia is admitted into the UN (FYROM). The PDP-NDP boycotted the session in which the Assembly voted to accept the temporary name.
June 9, 1993	The Pact for Stability in Europe was proposed by French Prime Minister, Edouard Balladur.
June 22, 1993	The EU Copenhagen Council declared the countries of Central and Eastern Europe eligible for membership and adopts entry criteria.
December 4, 1993	Nevzat Halili resigns due to disagreements among ethnic Albanians.
December 16, 1993	Germany, Denmark, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom announced that they had initiated the process to grant (North) Macedonia recognition. Other EU members followed.
January 10, 1994	NATO's Brussels Summit initiated PfP.
February 12, 1994	PDP officially splintered into two factions: a moderate faction, led by the old leaders, vouching for compromise; the radical faction, led by Arbën Xhaferi and Menduh Thaçi.
February 17, 1994	Greece imposed a trade embargo on (North) Macedonia. Coincided with the UN embargo on FRY.
June 3, 1994	Albanian President, Sali Berisha, met with the visiting Macedonian Assembly Speaker, Stojan Andov. Berisha declared that all ethnic problems must be dealt with peacefully and constructively.
November 14, 1994	Census showed that ethnic Albanian account for 22.9% of the country's population. Albanians claimed that the census was "irregular".
December 17, 1994	The Macedonian government blocks the opening of an Albanian-language university in Tetovo declaring it illegal.
February 1995	The 1994 U.S. Department of State Report on Human Rights in (North) Macedonia reported on forms of discrimination against ethnic Albanian in (North) Macedonia.
February 15, 1995	Albanians gathered for the opening of (North) Macedonia's first but illegal Albanian-language university. Police close the university within a day.
March 20, 1995	The EU inaugurated the Pact on Stability in Europe.
September 13, 1995	Greece and (North) Macedonia signed an interim agreement normalizing relations. Greece recognizes FYROM's independence. It lifted embargo.
November 9, 1995	Macedonia joined the Council of Europe.
November 19, 1995	Macedonia joined NATO PfP initiative.
December 13, 1995	All neighbors of ex-Yugoslavia signed the Royaumont declaration on good neighborly relations.
December 14, 1995	Dayton accords signed end the war in BiH.

February 26, 1996	EU Council inaugurated the Regional Approach towards the (Western) Balkans.
March 21, 1996	(Western) Balkan defense ministers established SEDM in Tirana.
July 6, 1996	SEECP was launched. The SECI was the main US multilateral scheme in the region.
April 29, 1997	EU adopted a Regional Approach towards five countries of south-eastern Europe: Albania, BiH, Croatia, FRY, and (North) Macedonia.
May 21, 1997	Constitutional Court and Assembly forbade use of Albanian flag. Tensions rised.
July 9, 1997	The mayor of Gostivar, Rufi Osmani, and mayor of Tetovo, Alajdin Demiri, displayed the Albanian national flag on municipality buildings. The government sent in special forces to take down the Albanian, Turkish, and Macedonian national flags flying outside Gostivar's town hall. Police shot dead two young ethnic Albanian.
October 3, 1997	Second SEDM ministerial in Sofia.
November 3, 1997	The first-ever all-regional summit of heads of state and government in (Western) Balkan history. Symbolic. SEECP is inaugurated.
May 29, 1998	Additional UN peacekeeping troops deployed to stabilize (North) Macedonia's border.
July 22, 1998	The UN Security Council voted unanimously to add troops to the UN UNPREDEM in (North) Macedonia and to extend its mandate.
July 22, 1998	Three explosions shook Macedonia. Javier Solana, NATO secretary-general, visits.
October 13, 1998	SEECP Summit in Antalya supports Kosovo autonomy within FR Yugoslavia
November 1, 1998	VMRO-DPMNE won majority of seats in the general elections. Negotiated to form a coalition government with DPA, among others.
December 4, 1998	The Saint-Malo declaration was signed by Tony Blair and Jacques Chirac.
February 5, 1999	Xhaferi said that he supported Kosovo achieving independence by political means.
February 26, 1999	A veto by China prevented the Security Council from authorizing an extension of UNPREDEP in (North) Macedonia.
April 19, 1999	Macedonia signed the MAP with NATO.
April 22, 1999	Macedonian Prime Minister, Ljubčo Georgievski, warned that the influx of ethnic Albanian refugees from Kosovo was threatening the demographic balance of (North) Macedonia.
April 24, 1999	NATO's SEEI established at the Washington Summit. It aims to foster fostering regional cooperation.
May 6, 1999	Albanian parties in (North)Macedonia, PDP and NDP, issued a joint statement calling on Kosovo political forces to continue working for Kosovo's independence.
May 13, 1999	Xhaferi openly supported the KLA. At his meeting with German Foreign Minister, Joschka Fischer, asked that the international community does the same.

June 9, 1999	The group of G-8 approved in Cologne, Germany the UN draft resolution on ending the war in Kosovo.
June 10, 1999	UN Resolution 1244 adopted.
June 10, 1999	The Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe was established.
November 17, 1999	Boris Trajkovski won the presidential elections with the electoral support of the ethnic Albanians.
February 12, 2000	SEECP Charter on Good-Neighborly Relations, Stability and Cooperation adopted.
April 5, 2000	Start of negotiations between the EU and (North) Macedonia to conclude an SAA.
October 7, 2000	Vojslav Koštunica became the newly elected Yugoslav president.
October 20, 2000	SEEGROUP was launched
October 25, 2000	Extraordinary summit in Skopje welcomeed Serbia back into SEECP.
October 26, 2000	State leaders of all (Western) Balkan countries and representatives of the EU met in (North) Macedonia for their first summit since the fall of Miloševic.
November 2, 2000	FRY rejoined the UN after eight years.
November 24, 2000	First EU-Western Balkans Summit in Zagreb.
December 15, 2000	EU CARDS program for the (Western) Balkans was activated.
January 25, 2001	Albanian guerrillas claimed responsibility for a rocket attack on a police station in (North) Macedonia.
January 26, 2001	British troops patrolling the Kosovo-Yugoslav border came under fire. Suspected were Albanian gunmen.
February 19, 2001	Ethnic Albanians clashed with a military patrol in (North) Macedonia. The ethnic Albanian insurgents wore the insignia of the NLA.
February 25, 2001	Gorgi Trendafilov, a spokesman for the Macedonian Ministry of Defense criticized NATO peacekeepers in Kosovo for not controlling the border. Trajkovski asked for more action from the Kosovo-based peacekeepers.
February 28, 2001	At a meeting of NATO foreign ministers, U.S. Secretary of State, Colin Powell, reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to the (Western) Balkans.
March 10, 2001	Ethnic Albanian rebels launched separate attacks on the Macedonian and the Yugoslav forces.
March 11, 2001	A new Albanian ethnic party, the National Democratic Party, was founded in (North) Macedonia. It was expected to serve as the political wing of NLA.
March 15, 2001	Clashes between Macedonian authorities and ethnic Albanians reached Tetovo.
March 18, 2001	The NLA announced that it had appointed its representative for talks with the Macedonian authorities.
March 19, 2001	EU foreign ministers and Javier Solana met with Macedonian Foreign Minister, Srgjan Kerim.
March 21, 2001	The Macedonian government issued an ultimatum calling on the Albanian insurgents to disband and leave the country within 24 hours.

March 21, 2001	Albanian insurgents declared cease-fire three hours before the ultimatum.
March 22, 2001	The EU envoys Chris Patten and Javier Solana visited Pristina, Kosovo where they had extensive talks with the chief of the UN administration in Kosovo and the leaders of the Kosovan Albanians, Ibrahim Rugova, Hacim Thaçi and Ramush Haradinaj.
March 23, 2001	Kosovan parties, Ibrahim Rugova, Hashim Thaçi, and Ramush Haradinaj, called on the Albanian insurgents in (North) Macedonia to stop fighting.
March 24, 2001	The EU condemned the Albanian extremists in (North) Macedonia and declared their solidarity with Macedonian authorities.
March 24, 2001	Powell recommended the Macedonian government to consider constitutional changes to accommodate to Albanian requests.
March 25, 2001	Macedonian security forces undertook attack with tanks and helicopters against the NLA in Tetovo.
March 31, 2001	(North) Macedonia announced an end of its offensive against the Albanian separatists.
April 2, 2001	Solana, now EU's foreign policy chief, arrived in Skopje. Brussels offered the SAA as a first step toward EU membership.
April 3, 2001	Kosovan leader, Ibrahim Rugova, recommended that the Macedonian government talk with representatives of the NLA.
April 4, 2001	NATO Secretary General, Lord Robertson, warned that parties supporting the NLA would be isolated
April 13, 2001	Powell's first trip to the (Western) Balkans began with a visit to Skopje, Macedonia.
April 19, 2001	Javier Solana, now in the role of EU's foreign policy chief, arrived in Skopje.
May 29, 2001	SEECAP was endorsed.
June 28, 2001	Arrival of EU's Special Representative, François Leotard, in Skopje.
July 5, 2001	The Macedonian government announced a ceasefire.
September 11, 2001	The September 11 attacks against the United States took place.
September 16, 2001	U.S. President, George W. Bush, used for the first time the phrase "war on terror".
October 29, 2001	The new EU Special Representatives, Alain Le Roy, arrived.
November 16, 2001	Assembly approved new constitution incorporating reforms required by OFA.
September 15, 2002	Parliamentary elections were held in (North) Macedonia. Social Democrats under Branko Crvenkovski take over.
November 21, 2002	Bulgaria, Romania, and Slovenia were invited to join NATO at the Prague Summit.
February 1, 2003	The Treaty of Nice enters into force.
March 19, 2003	President George W. Bush launched operation "Iraqi Freedom".
March 26, 2003	Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia joined NATO.
March 31, 2003	From NATO's operation "Allied Harmony" to EU's "Concordia". NATO formally handed over to the EU.

April 9, 2003	Saddam Hussein lost control over Baghdad.
April 16, 2003	The Treaty of Accession was signed between the EU and Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia.
May 1, 2003	President Bush appeared declaring victory on Iraq.
May 2, 2003	The Adriatic Charter was signed. An association formed by Albania, Croatia, (North) Macedonia and the United States for the purpose of aiding their attempts to join NATO is formed.
June 21, 2003	The EU-Western Balkans Summit was held in Thessaloniki.
July 23, 2003	EU and NATO adopt concerted approach for the (Western) Balkans.
August 11, 2003	NATO took command of Kabul-based peacekeeping in Afghanistan, its first deployment outside Europe or North America.
December 13, 2003	Saddam Hussein was captured.
December 15, 2003	"Concordia" was replaced by EU Police Mission, "EUPOL Proxima".
February 26, 2004	President Boris Trajkovski was killed in a plane crash.
March 22, 2004	(North) Macedonia submitted the application for membership in the EU.
April 1, 2004	SAA with (North) Macedonia entered into force.
August 11, 2004	As per the OFA, Macedonian Assembly approved legislation plans to redraw municipal borders and give minority ethnic Albanians more power.
September 14, 2004	First meeting between the EU Stabilization and Association Council and (North) Macedonia took place.
October 29, 2004	Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe was signed. Rejection by French and Dutch brought its ratification to an end.
July 7, 2005	Assembly passed a law giving Albanians the right to fly the Albanian flag in districts where they form the majority.
March 11, 2006	EU-Western Balkans ministerial conference at Salzburg.
December 19, 2006	(North) Macedonia signed the CEFTA
January 1, 2007	EU launched the IPA.
January 28, 2008	EU launched structured dialogue on visa liberalization with Albania, (North) Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia.
February 17, 2008	Kosovo declared independence.
February 18, 2008	EU adopted the new Accession Partnership for the (North) Macedonia. It updated the previous European Partnership agreement.
February 27, 2008	SEECP adopted the RCC.
April 2, 2008	At the NATO summit in Bucharest, Greece blocked a NATO invitation for (North) Macedonia over objections the name issue.
October 9, 2008	(North) Macedonia recognized Kosovo.
April 1, 2009	Albania and Croatia join NATO
April 4, 2009	In their meeting in Strasbourg and Kehl in 2009, NATO members called for a new strategic concept.
April 5, 2009	Gjorge Ivanov won the Macedonian presidential elections.
October 14, 2009	First EU Commission recommendation to open accession negotiations with (North) Macedonia.

December 1, 2009	Treaty of Lisbon entered into force.
December 19, 2009	The visa-free travel within the Schengen zone for Macedonian citizens.
February 2010	Macedonian government headed by VMRO-DPMNE announced through a video simulation "Skopje 2014". The nation-building project promoting a Macedonian identity linked to Antiquity was deemed controversial. It deteriorated relations with Greece.
February 10, 2010	European Parliament passed a resolution on (North) Macedonia. Said it regrets that three years after it was granted the status of candidate for membership of the EU, accession negotiations have not yet started.
March 4, 2010	Fireda Brepoels asked for accountability from the EU citing the federal agency for the reception of asylum-seekers (Fedasil) on an alarming increase of asylum seekers from the (Western) Balkans.
March 10, 2010	The Belgian Prime Minister and Integration Secretary visited (North) Macedonia to specifically send the message that they should not go to Belgium to apply for economic asylum.
November 8, 2010	The Commission emphasized that each Western Balkan country had to continue implementing measures set out in its visa roadmap. It established a post-visa liberalization monitoring mechanism.
June 21, 2011	(North) Macedonia erected "Alexander the Great" statue in Skopje. Athens saw this as a provocation.
December 5, 2011	The ICJ ruled that Greece was wrong to block (North) Macedonia's bid to join the EU and NATO. ICJ did not grant (North) Macedonia's request that it instruct Greece to refrain from similar actions in the future.
February 9, 2015	Zoran Zaev, leader of the opposition, accused the country's prime minister, Nikola Gruevski, of orchestrating a wiretapping program to spy on people across the country. Zaev started a series of leaked conversations allegedly recorded by the program.
May 9, 2015	Clashes erupted during a raid between Macedonian police and an armed group identifying itself as the NLA.
July 15, 2015	Pržino agreement between the main political parties in (North) Macedonia was reached with the help of the EU. It ended the Macedonian political and institutional caused by the wiretapping scandal.
September 18, 2015	Katica Janeva was appointed as the new prosecutor in charge of probing the illegal wiretapping claims.
January 14, 2016	Prime Minister Gruevski stepped down as part of the Pržino Agreement.
January 17, 2016	Emil Dimitriev (interim Prime Minister) was elected as president on a technical government which will lead (North) Macedonia into the early general elections.
April 12, 2016	Protests (referred to as "Colorful Revolution") started in Skopje after the controversial decision by President Ivanov to stop the investigation against former Prime Minister, Nikola Gruevski.

June 23, 2016	In a UK-referendum, the majority voted in favor of leaving the EU.
December 2016	Skopje airport was renamed "Alexander the Great".
December 11, 2016	Parliamentary elections took place. VMRO-DPMNE won and attempted to form a coalition with BDI. Talks broke down in late January 2017. SDSM pursued informal coalition talks with the BDI.
March 29, 2017	The United Kingdom formally informed the EU of its intention to leave.
April 27, 2017	Macedonian nationalists stormed the Macedonian Assembly in reaction to the election of DUI's Talat Xhaferi as speaker of the Assembly.
May 17, 2017	(North) Macedonia's President, Ivanov, allowed the opposition party to form a government five months after the election.
June 27, 2017	The EU approved the start of accession talks with (North) Macedonia.
June 29, 2017	Zoran Zaev formed a coalition with ethnic-Albanian groups.
August 1, 2017	A Treaty on Good Neighborly Relations with Bulgaria was signed. This was expected to boost (North) Macedonia's chanced to join the EU.
February 24, 2018	"Alexander the Great" Skopje airport was renamed to "Skopje International" airport and highway "Alexander of Macedonia" leading to the Greek border is renamed to "Friendship Highway".
February 27, 2018	A rally was planned in Skopje by right-wing and diaspora organizations against deal with Greece.
March 30, 2018	Macedonian Foreign Minister, Nikola Dimitrov, and Greek counterpart, Nikos Kotzias, met in Vienna with UN mediator, Matthew Nimetz, to discuss name issue.
June 12, 2018	Greek Prime Minister, Alexis Tsipras, announced that deal was reached with (North) Macedonia.
June 13, 2018	UN Secretary-General, António Guterres, welcomed the agreement between (North) Macedonia and Greece.
June 13, 2018	Macedonian President, Ivanov, declined to sign the agreement. Called it "disastrous".
June 13, 2018	Zaev said that (North) Macedonia is changing the license plates of its vehicles from MK to NMK reflecting the country's new name.
June 17, 2018	The Prespa Agreement was signed.
June 20, 2018	Prespa Agreement was ratified by Macedonian Assembly. Ivanov did not accept to sign.
June 25, 2018	Greek Foreign Ministry informed the EU and NATO that Greece is no longer objecting to Macedonia's Euro-Atlantic accession processes.
June 27, 2018	The EU approved the start of accession talks with (North) Macedonia.
July 5, 2018	Prespa agreement was ratified again by the Macedonian Assembly.
July 11, 2018	NATO formally invited (North) Macedonia to begin accession talks to join NATO.
September 30, 2018	Referendum to change country's name to "North Macedonia" declared invalid due to low turnout.

October 18, 2018	France blocked accession negotiations with (North) Macedonia. French President, Emmanuel Macron, said the EU enlargement process needs restructuring.
October 19, 2018	Assembly voted to initiate the process of constitutional amendment in order to implement the provisions laid down in the Prespa Agreement.
October 30, 2018	Skopje Public Prosecutor's Office opened a case against Ivanov for his refusal to fulfill his constitutional obligations and sign the Prespa Agreement.
November 13, 2018	Gruevski announced through his Facebook account that he had fled to Hungary, where he applied for political asylum.
January 11, 2019	Assembly completed the legal implementation of the Prespa Agreement.
January 25, 2019	Greece's Parliament approved the Prespa Agreement.
February 12, 2019	Ratified by both countries, the Prespa Agreements entered into force.
February 12, 2019	The UN confirmed that it has been officially informed by the Macedonian government on the country's new name.
June 2019	EU Council postponed decision to start accession negotiations with (North) Macedonia due to objections from countries like the Netherlands and France.
October 9, 2019	Bulgarian Parliament unanimously adopted a Framework and a declaration of its Assembly with a long list of conditions to be implemented by (North) Macedonia for Bulgaria to support the start of the EU pre-accession negotiations with the country.
January 31, 2020	The United Kingdom left the EU.
February 5, 2020	"New methodology" came into effect. The European Commission launched a Communication with a proposal for "Enhancing the accession process - a credible EU perspective for the Western Balkans".
March 19, 2020	(North) Macedonia joined NATO.
March 25, 2020	The Council of the EU endorsed the "new methodology".
March 25, 2020	Council of the EU decided to open accession negotiations with (North) Macedonia after "new methodology" was adopted.
July 2020	The European Commission prepared draft General EU Position and Negotiation Framework with (North) Macedonia and handed over to the German Presidency. Due to requirements by Bulgaria, the text could not be agreed upon.
November 17, 2020	Bulgaria blocked EU membership talks with (North) Macedonia.
June 8, 2021	The President of the United States, Joseph Biden, signed Executive Order 14033 for imposing economic sanctions and travel bans to any individuals who may try to undermine the Prespa Agreement.

Appendix B
Serbia: Expanded Timeline of Key Events

Note. The timeline includes regional (Western) Balkan events and key events in the West with a focus on Serbia. It is meant to assist the reader in further zooming in and out of the key events explored in the dissertation, as well as contextualizing them within a wider regional and global setting. For acronyms and abbreviations seen here refer to the "List of Acronyms and Abbreviations" on pg. v.

Date	Event
November 29, 1945	SFRY was proclaimed and Serbia becomes one of its constituent republics known as the "Socialist Republic of Serbia".
April 24, 1987	Slobodan Milošević visited Kosovo. Told Serbs that no-one would ever be allowed to beat them.
March 23, 1989	Milošević changed the Serbian constitution. Vastly reduced the 1974 provincial autonomy of Kosovo. Kosovo Albanians protest.
May 8, 1989	Milošević becomes President of Serbia.
February 15, 1991	Milo Đukanović began serving as prime minister of Montenegro.
February 29, 1992	Bosniaks and Croats of BiH voted for independence in referendum. Serbs boycotted.
April 6, 1992	War broke out in BiH. Same day, the United States and the EC recognized BiH.
April 27, 1992	The FRY made of Serbia and Montenegro was proclaimed in Belgrade.
May 3, 1992	Alija Izetbegović, taken hostage by Yugoslav troops on return from peace talks in Lisbon. Freed following day.
May 30, 1992	UN sanctions imposed on Serbia for backing Serbs in BiH and Croatia through adopting Resolution 757.
August 26, 1992	International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia was established at The London International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia.
September 19, 1992	UN Security Council dropped Yugoslavia from General Assembly.
January 2, 1993	International mediators Cyrus Vance and Lord Owen introduced plan to divide BiH into ten provinces, along ethnic lines.
January 8, 1993	Bosnian Deputy Prime Minister, Hakija Turajlić, killed by Serb soldier in UN armored vehicle near Sarajevo airport
March 25, 1993	Izetbegović signed Vance-Owen peace plan.
May 2, 1993	BiH Serb leader, Radovan Karadžić, signed Vance-Owen plan. His assembly rejected it.
May 6, 1993	UN extended its "safe areas" from Srebrenica to include Sarajevo, Žepa, Goražde, Tuzla, and Bihać.
May 15, 1993	Bosnian Serbs overwhelmingly rejected Vance-Owen plan.
November 9, 1993	Croat shelling destroyed centuries-old bridge at Mostar.
December 19, 1993	Early parliamentary elections in Serbia called by Milošević left his socialists party as the largest.
February 5, 1994	Mortar shell slamed into downtown marketplace in Sarajevo.
March 18, 1994	Washington Agreement ended war between Bosniaks and Croats, created the Federation of BiH.

May 13, 1994	The five-nation Contact Group announced new peace plan, including a four-month cease-fire and eventual partition of Bosnia.
July 20, 1994	Serbs refused the Contact Group plan.
August 4, 1994	Miloševic cut ties with Bosnian Serbs for rejecting the Contact Group plan.
March 8, 1995	Radovan Karadžić ordered that Srebrenica and Žepa not be approaches by aid convoys.
July 9, 1995	Karadžić ordered to capture Srebrenica.
July 11, 1995	Bosnian Serbs, under the command of General Ratko Mladić, captured Srebrenica. They killed more than 8,000 Muslims.
July 11, 1995	Serbs overran Srebrenica ‘‘safe area’’.
August 28, 1995	Bosnian Serbs fired shell into a busy Sarajevo market area.
August 30, 1995	NATO planes, supported by ground troops of the UN rapid reaction force, launched massive airstrikes to silence Serb guns around Sarajevo. Serbs shelled Sarajevo in response.
October 5, 1995	Warring Bosnian parties agreed to a 60-day cease-fire
November 16, 1995	Karadžić and Mladić indicted for war crimes for their alleged roles in Srebrenica massacres.
December 14, 1995	Dayton Accords signed.
July 15, 1997	Milošević became Yugoslav president.
October 19, 1997	Đukanović beat pro-Milošević Momir Bulatović for the Montenegrin presidency.
November 28, 1997	KLA made its first public appearance.
January 13, 1998	Renewed crisis in Iraq. Saddam Hussein banned weapons team led by the United States.
January 14, 1998	Montenegro police clashed with protestors who attacked government buildings the day before the inauguration of the pro-separatist Đukanović.
January 17, 1998	Monica Lewinsky scandal appeared in the press. Clinton denied affair.
February 23, 1998	Robert Gelbard, the U.S. special envoy to BiH, called KLA “without any question a terrorist group.”
February 28, 1998	Kosovo war starts.
March 7, 1998	Prekazi massacre. Serb security forces massacre over 50 members of the Jashari family in the village of Prekaz.
March 7, 1998	In Rome, Madeleine Albright: “We are not going to stand by and watch the Serbian authorities do in Kosovo what they can no longer get away with doing in Bosnia.”
March 23, 1998	Ibrahim Rugova re-elected as President of Kosovo with 99% of vote.
March 31, 1998	UN Security Council Resolution 1160 imposed an arms embargo and economic sanctions on FRY.
April 23, 1998	In a referendum, 95% of Serbian voters rejected outside mediation to help solve the crisis in Kosovo.
May 15, 1998	First-ever meeting between Rugova and Milošević. Dialogue broke down.

May 29, 1998	In Washington, Rugova seeked Clinton's support for the Kosovo Albanians' cause.
May 31, 1998	Coalition led by Đukanović won national elections.
June 1, 1998	Rugova met Kofi Annan in New York. Requested UN/NATO intervention.
June 16, 1998	Milošević and Boris Yeltsin, President of Russia, met in Moscow. They issued joint statement, approving diplomatic observers in Kosovo.
June 23, 1998	Richard Holbrooke met with Milošević. Traveled to Kosovo and talked directly with KLA commanders.
July 6, 1998	KDOM began monitoring.
August 17, 1998	Clinton admitted his "inappropriate relationship" with Monica Lewinsky.
August 20, 1998	United States launched missile attack against Bin Laden's terrorist training camps in Afghanistan and against a pharmaceutical plant in Sudan.
September 9, 1998	Serb police pull bodies of Kosovan Albanians and Serbs from a canal near Glodjane. KLA was the suspect.
September 23, 1998	UN Security Council approved Resolution 1199.
September 30, 1998	At principals committee meeting, Albright pushed for airstrikes against Serbia.
October 5, 1998	UN Secretary General, Annan, reported FRY violations of Resolution 1199.
October 5, 1998	House Judiciary Committee voted to recommend Clinton impeachment inquiry.
October 12, 1998	NATO authorized preparations for a limited bombing campaign.
October 13, 1998	Holbrooke secured the "October Agreement". Miloševic agreed to allow OSCE monitors and the Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM) into Kosovo.
October 27, 1998	Serbia withdrew thousands of Serb security forces from Kosovo. Thousands of Kosovo Albanians returned to avoid cold winter in the hills.
October 31, 1998	Iraq suspended all cooperation with UN arms inspection team.
November 1998	KVM monitors under William Walker begun deploying in Kosovo.
November 13, 1998	Serbia warned (North) Macedonia against allowing NATO's troops on its territory.
December 4, 1998	The Saint-Malo Declaration was signed.
December 17, 1998	The United States and the United Kingdom began limited airstrikes against Iraq.
December 19, 1998	President Clinton was impeached.
January 14, 1999	Senate trial phase of impeachment began.
January 15, 1999	The Račak Massacre. Serb security forces killed 45 Kosovo Albanians. KVM's Walker arrived on scene and blamed Serbia.
January 18, 1999	Milošević expelled Walker out of the country. He withdrew order under international pressure.

January 27, 1999	Joint statement by Albright and Russia's Foreign Minister, Igor Ivanov. They expressed concerns on the deterioration in Kosovo.
January 29, 1999	Contact Group issued ultimatum to Kosovo Albanians and Serbs to begin peace talks at Rambouillet, France.
February 6, 1999	Rambouillet peace talks began, Milošević refused to attend.
February 12, 1999	Impeachment effort failed. The Senate acquitted President Clinton.
February 13, 1999	Clinton called Congressional leaders to discuss Rambouillet and the role of the United States in NATO-led Kosovo force.
February 20, 1999	Albright arrived in France for last days of Rambouillet peace talks.
February 23, 1999	Rambouillet talks paused. Albanian delegation returned home for consultations.
March 8, 1999	U.S. Senator, Bob Dole, returned to (North) Macedonia to lobby KLA to sign Rambouillet agreement.
March 10, 1999	Holbrooke and Ambassador Christopher Hill met with Milośević to urge him to accept NATO settlement.
March 12, 1999	KLA declared ready to sign the Rambouillet Agreement. Hill reported there is "zero point zero percent" chance of a deal with Milošević.
March 15, 1999	Peace talks begun at Rambouillet reconvened at Avenue Kléber conference center in Paris.
March 20, 1999	KVM left Kosovo. Serbian forces quickly moved in and began new offensives.
March 22, 1999	Holbrooke was sent to Serbia to deliver a final unsuccessful ultimatum.
March 24, 1999	AT 19:00 UTC NATO started the bombing campaign against FRY.
March 27, 1999	Russia condemned NATO attack.
March 29, 1999	Đukanović pleaded for an end to NATO attacks on FRY.
April 6, 1999	NATO missiles hit the residential neighborhood of Aleksinac, killing civilians.
April 6, 1999	NATO conducted airstrikes against the military airfield in Podgorica where the Yugoslav air force was believed to have regrouped aircraft.
April 10, 1999	NATO approved "Allied Harbor" deployment of 8,000 men in Albania to aid humanitarian and refugee efforts. "Allied Harbor" was NATO's first humanitarian operation.
April 22, 1999	NATO celebrated its 50th anniversary in Washington.
April 23, 1999	NATO attacked Serbian television in Belgrade.
April 29, 1999	The FRY filed suit against NATO at the ICJ.
May 3, 1999	Russia's special representative in Yugoslavia, Viktor Chernomyrdin, met with Clinton and advisers. Endorsed Finnish President, Martti Ahtisaari to assist with negotiations.
May 7, 1999	NATO planes mistakenly targeted Chinese Embassy in Belgrade.
May 10, 1999	Milošević announced end to attacks on KLA.
May 25, 1999	NATO voted to increase ground forces in (North) Macedonia to 48,000.

June 1, 1999	Final round of talks between U.S. Deputy Secretary of State, Strobe Talbott, Chernomyrdin, and Ahtisaari began.
June 9, 1999	NATO and FRY officials initialed a Military Technical Agreement to govern the Serb withdrawal.
June 10, 1999	Resolution 1244 was adopted.
June 12, 1999	Russian troops left BiH and entered Kosovo before NATO, taking control of the Prishtina airport.
June 18, 1999	U.S. and Russia reached preliminary agreement over Russian participation in Kosovo peacekeeping force.
June 20, 1999	Serbs completed withdrawal from Kosovo. Javier Solana formally ended NATO's bombing campaign.
August 5, 1999	Montenegro proposed changes to its relationship with Serbia and FRY.
September 20, 1999	KFOR accepted KLA's certification that the KLA had completed its demilitarization.
June 25, 2000	Montenegro informed the UN that it no longer wants to be represented by FRY.
July 6, 2000	Milošević changed the constitution to allow himself to run for re-election.
July 27, 2000	Miloševic announced that federal parliamentary and presidential elections would be held.
September 24, 2000	Voting took place. The Federal Electoral Committee required a second round between Vojisav Koštunica and Milošević. Demonstrations intensified.
October 5, 2000	The October 5 Revolution. Protesters storm parliament, took over the State television station and Tanjung.
October 6, 2000	Miloševic surrendered power.
October 7, 2000	Koštunica was sworn in as president.
November 4, 2000	New cabinet was sworn in. Zoran Đinđić would become Serbian Prime Minister.
November 10, 2000	Đukanović called for international recognition as an independent state from Serbia. He threatened with a referendum on seceding FRY.
November 24, 2000	FRY joined the SAA Process at the "Zagreb Summit".
April 1, 2001	Milošević was detained by Serbian police.
May 14, 2001	FRY joined UN.
June 2001	Đinđić overruled Constitutional Court and authorized extradition of Miloševic to the ICTY. Koštunica disagreed.
June 29, 2001	Milošević was transferred to the ICTY.
August 2001	Koštunica pulled out of Serbian government due to disagreements with Đinđić.
February 12, 2002	Trial of Milošević on charges of genocide and war crimes began in The Hague.
March 4, 2002	Ibrahim Rugova became President of Kosovo.
March 14, 2002	Montenegrin and Serbian leaders signed EU mediated accord to set up the State Union.

January 20, 2003	Milan Milutinović surrendered to the ICTY.
February 4, 2003	Constitutional Charter of the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro came into force.
February 15, 2003	London marched in opposition to military action in Iraq, part of a worldwide weekend of protest.
February 25, 2003	At the UN, the United States and the United Kingdom claimed that Iraq has missed its "final opportunity" to disarm peacefully. France, Russia, and Germany disagreed.
March 10, 2003	France and Russia announced that they will veto a UN Security Council resolution which gives Iraq seven days to disarm.
March 12, 2003	Đinđić assassinated in Belgrade. He was supposed to meet Foreign Minister of Sweden, Anna Lindh. Lindh was also assassinated months later.
March 19, 2003	President Bush launched Operation "Iraqi Freedom".
April 3, 2003	Serbia and Montenegro became a member of the Council of Europe.
April 9, 2003	Saddam Hussein lost control over Iraq's capital Baghdad.
May 1, 2003	In California, President Bush appeared declaring victory.
June 21, 2003	The EU-Western Balkans Summit was held in Thessaloniki.
July 2003	The first meeting of the "Enhanced Permanent Dialogue" was held in the form of a tripartite approach – Serbia, Montenegro, EU Commission.
July 23, 2003	EU and NATO adopted concerted approach for the (Western) Balkans.
August 19, 2003	A bombing at the UN headquarters in Baghdad took place. The UN envoy, Sergio Vieira de Mello, was killed. The withdrawal of hundreds of UN workers followed.
November 13, 2003	Serbia dissolved its parliament and announced early elections.
December 13, 2003	U.S. forces captured Saddam Hussein.
December 28, 2003	Parliamentary elections were held. Tomislav Nikolić led.
March 4, 2004	Koštunica became Prime Minister of Serbia.
July 11, 2004	Boris Tadić became Serbian president.
October 11, 2004	The European Union adopted the "twin-track approach". Serbia and Montenegro would separately negotiate the part of the SAA related to trade. State Union as a single state would negotiate the political part of the SAA.
February 22, 2005	Montenegro's President, Filip Vujanović, and Đukanović suggested that Serbia and Montenegro recognize each other as sovereign states.
February 23, 2005	Serbia rejected Montenegro's proposal for a final split of FRY.
April 12, 2005	An EU feasibility study deemed Serbia and Montenegro worthy to start accession talks.
November 7, 2005	The negotiations for the signing of the SAA commenced between the EU and the State Union.
January 21, 2006	Kosovo's President Ibrahim Rugova died. He was succeeded by Fatmir Sejdiu.

February 16, 2006	Serbia rejected EU's guidelines for an independence vote in Montenegro.
March 11, 2006	Milošević found dead in his cell in The Hague.
March 12, 2006	In the Salzburg meeting, through a released joint statement, the EU reaffirmed its full support for the agenda set out at the 2003 Thessaloniki summit.
May 3, 2006	EU called off talks on closer ties because of Belgrade's to cooperate with the ICTY.
May 21, 2006	Montenegro seceded FRY.
May 23, 2006	Tadić said he recognized the results of the independence vote in Montenegro.
May 23, 2006	European perspective towards the (Western) Balkans confirmed during the Declaration by the Presidency on behalf of the EU regarding the referendum in Montenegro.
June 15, 2006	The Serbian government recognized newly independent Montenegro.
June 22, 2006	The UN Security Council unanimously recommended that newly independent Montenegro become the 192nd member of the United Nations.
June 28, 2006	The UN General Assembly unanimously admitted Montenegro as its member.
September 10, 2006	Montenegrins voted in the first parliamentary elections since the tiny state split from Serbia.
September 12, 2006	Montenegro's election authorities said Đukanović won.
October 28, 2006	Serbian voters in a referendum approved a new constitution. It declared that Kosovo is an integral part of the country.
November 5, 2006	Saddam Hussein, was found guilty of crimes against humanity and sentenced to death by hanging.
November 29, 2006	Riga Summit Declaration. NATO and the EU are said to share common values and strategic interests.
November 29, 2006	NATO leaders invited Serbia, Montenegro, and BiH to join a program considered a first step toward eventual membership. Urged cooperation with the ICTY.
December 14, 2006	NATO admitted Serbia to its PfP program
December 30, 2006	Saddam Hussein was executed.
January 21, 2007	First Serbian parliamentary election since the break-up of the union with Montenegro.
February 2, 2007	UN envoy Martti Ahtisaari unveiled a plan to set Kosovo on a path to independence.
June 13, 2007	Negotiations on the SAA with Serbia were resumed following the positive assessment of the cooperation with the ICTY.
October 15, 2007	Montenegro signed its SAA with the EU.
March 2008	Tadić accepted Koštunica's request for early elections.
April 6, 2008	Montenegrins voted in first presidential election since split from Serbia. Vujanović won re-election.
April 29, 2008	The SAA between the EU and Serbia was signed in Luxembourg.

July 21, 2008	Radovan Karadžić was arrested.
October 9, 2008	Montenegro and (North) Macedonia recognized Kosovo's independence.
December 9, 2008	EULEX took over from the UN.
November 30, 2009	The EU abolished visa requirements for citizens of the (North) Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia for travelling within the Schengen area.
December 7, 2009	The EU decided to start the implementation of the ITA with Serbia.
December 19, 2009	Visa-free travel within EU's Schengen area came into effect for Serbian citizens.
December 22, 2009	Serbia applied for EU membership.
February 1, 2010	The ITA between the EU and Serbia entered into force
March 30, 2010	Serbian parliament passed resolution apologizing for 1995 massacre of thousands of Muslims in Srebrenica.
June 14, 2010	The Council of the EU decided to initiate the ratification process for the SAA with Serbia.
July 22, 2010	The ICJ ruled that Kosovo's 2008 proclamation of independence was legal.
January 19, 2011	The European Parliament ratified the SAA with Serbia.
March 8, 2011	Serbia and Kosovo began direct talks to try to end dispute.
May 26, 2011	Serbian authorities arrested Ratko Mladić.
July 20, 2011	Serbian authorities arrested Goran Hadžić, the last fugitive sought by the ICTY.
October 12, 2011	European Commission recommended Serbia for EU candidate status.
March 1, 2012	The European Union granted Serbia candidate member status.
January 12, 2013	Resolution and platform were adopted by the National Assembly of Serbia, claiming that Serbia does not recognize and will never recognize the unilaterally declared independence of Kosovo.
January 13, 2013	Serbian parliament approved support for minority Serb rights within Kosovo. EU mediated talks with Kosovo resumed.
April 9, 2013	A spree shooting occurred in the Serbian village of Velika Ivanča by a Serb veteran of the Croatian War of Independence.
April 18, 2013	The European Parliament welcomed the meeting of Dačić and Thaçi.
April 19, 2013	The Brussels Agreement, formally the First Agreement of Principles Governing the Normalization of Relations, signed.
April 22, 2013	The European Commission recommended to the Council the opening of accession negotiations with Serbia.
April 25, 2013	Nikolić apologized for all "crimes" committed by Serbs during the break-up of Yugoslavia, including Srebrenica. Refuses to call Srebrenica a genocide.
May 20, 2013	Edward Snowden flew to Hong Kong, where he was staying when the initial articles based on the leaked documents were published.
May 22, 2013	U.S. Senate panel backed arming Syrian rebels.

June 14, 2013	U.S. Government confirmed that government forces used chemical weapons in Syria. Announced increased "military support" to rebels.
June 28, 2013	The Council of the European Union decided to open accession negotiations with Serbia.
August 29, 2013	British Parliament had decided not to act in Syria, though British Prime Minister, David Cameron, had supported military actions.
August 31, 2013	President of the United States, Barack Obama, gave a speech in the White House rose garden. He claimed it was necessary to intervene.
September 1, 2013	The SAA between the Republic of Serbia and the EU entered into force.
September 2013	The Serbian parliament in early September ended the process of the government reshuffle, 13 months after the cabinet of Prime Minister, Ivica Dačić, was originally put together.
September 4, 2013	In response to the speech given by President Obama, the United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations approved the Authorization for the Use of Military Force Against the Government of Syria to Respond to Use of Chemical Weapons.
October 20, 2013	Wife of Tito, Jovanka Broz, dies.
December 20, 2013	The European Council decided that the accession negotiations with Serbia be opened.
January 21, 2014	Serbia's EU membership talks begin.
August 28, 2014	The Conference on the (Western) Balkans took place in Berlin. The main intention was to show commitment for process of Future enlargement of the EU.
October 23, 2014	Kosovan Foreign Minister, Enver Hoxhaj, visited Belgrade for regional ministerial meeting. The first minister from Kosovo to pay an official visit to Serbia since Kosovo's independence in 2008.
October 28, 2014	An informal meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the (Western) Balkans, organized by the European Commission and the Government of Serbia, took place.
November 11, 2014	Albanian Prime Minister, Edi Rama, visited Belgrade. This was seen as a historic visit and a chance progress towards the EU. Caused troubles with Kosovo.
January 15, 2015	First IPAP of Serbia with NATO entered into force.
January 16, 2015	In Montenegro, Serb nationalists demonstrated against a visit by Kosovo Foreign Minister, Hashim Thaçi, chanting "Kill! Kill!".
March 25, 2015	All EU acquis screenings were completed.
December 2, 2015	NATO invited Montenegro to start accession talks to become its member.
March 24, 2016	ICTY found Karadžić guilty of genocide and war crimes. Sentenced him to 40 years in prison.
March 31, 2016	ICTY found Serbian ultra nationalist, Vojislav Šešelj not guilty of crimes against humanity.
April 13, 2017	Montenegro's special prosecutor indicted two Russians and 12 other people for plotting the coup.

April 28, 2017	Montenegro's parliament ratified the country's membership agreement with NATO.
May 31, 2017	Aleksandar Vučić took office as Serbia's President.
June 29, 2017	Ana Brnabić took office as Serbia's first female and first openly gay prime minister.
August 2, 2017	U. S Vice President, Mike Pence, spoke in Montenegro at the opening of a summit of top (Western) Balkan officials. He pledged the United States commitment to the area.
August 26, 2017	In Albania, (Western) Balkan leaders agreed on a road map to deepen their regional economic cooperation as part of the process for joining the EU.
February 6, 2018	The EU warned (Western) Balkan countries hoping to join that none will do this until they have resolved all disputes with their neighbors.
February 16, 2018	Kosovo and Montenegro announced they had reached a deal on a 2015 border agreement between the two countries.
November 6, 2018	Representatives from BiH, Croatia, Kosovo, Montenegro, and Serbia signed an agreement to identify victims of the 1990s wars.
June 18, 2019	General Affairs Council adopted conclusions on enlargement and stabilization and association process, covering Serbia.
November 7, 2019	Serbia adopted second IPAP with NATO for the period 2019 to 2021.
February 5, 2020	"New methodology" came into effect. The European Commission launched a Communication with a proposal for "Enhancing the accession process - a credible EU perspective for the Western Balkans", based on Non-paper suggested by France.
March 25, 2020	The Council of the EU endorsed the "new methodology".
July 10, 2020	Serbia accepted the new methodology for its EU accession talks.
May 11, 2021	Council agreed on the application of the new methodology to Montenegro and Serbia.

Appendix C
List of Historical and Contemporary Political Figures

Note. The list focuses only on key genealogical historical figures and political actors that appear in the text and in Appendices A and B. It does not include journalist, academics, or writers that are mentioned in the dissertation. For acronyms and abbreviations seen here refer to the "List of Acronyms and Abbreviations" on pg. v.

Surname	Name	Role
Ademi	Xhevat	MP of the LDP in the Assembly of (North) Macedonia in 2009.
Ahmeti	Ali	Political Director of the NLA during 2001. Incumbent leader of DUI.
Ahtisaari	Martti	UN Special Envoy to Kosovo from 2005 to 2007. President of Finland from 1994 to 2000.
Albright	Madeleine	U.S. Secretary of State from 1997 to 2001.
Andov	Stojan	First President of the Assembly of (North) Macedonia from 1993 to 1997.
Andriessen	Frans	European Commissioner from 1981 to 1993.
Annan	Kofi	Secretary-General of the UN from 1997 to 2006.
Arafat	Yasser	Chairman of the PLO from 1969 to 2004.
Ashton	Catherine	EU Mediator in the Belgrade-Prishtina dialogue. Helped brokered the 2013 Brussels Agreement. High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy from 2009 to 2014. First Vice President of the European Commission from 2010 to 2014.
Badinter	Robert	Served as French Minister of Justice under François Mitterrand. Badinter Arbitration Committee was named in his honor.
Balladur	Edouard	French Prime Minister from 1993 to 1995.
Bangemann	Martin	European Commissioner from 1989 to 1999.
Barroso	José Manuel	President of the European Commission from 2004 to 2014.
Berisha	Sali	First non-Communist President of Albania from 1992 to 1997.
Biden	Joseph	Incumbent President of the United States. Took office in 2021.
Bildt	Carl	EC co-chairman of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia from 1995 to 1996. Co-chairman of the Dayton Peace Conference in 1995. High Representative for BiH from 1995 to 1997. UN Special Envoy for the (Western) Balkans from 1999 to 2001. First foreign minister to officially visit Kosovo after it declared its independence. Prime Minister of Sweden from 1991 to 1994.
Bin Laden	Osama	Founder of al-Qaeda.

Bin Talal	Hassan	Crown Prince of Jordan from 1965 to 1999.
Blair	Tony	Prime Minister of the United Kingdom from 1997 to 2007.
Boban	Mate	Co-founder of the Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia. President of Herzeg-Bosnia from 1991 to 1994.
Boškovski	Ljube	Interior Minister of (North) Macedonia from 1998 to 2002.
Boutros-Ghali	Boutros	Secretary-General of the UN from 1992 to 1996.
Brepoels	Frieda	Member of the European Parliament from 2004 to 2013.
Brittan	Leon	European Commissioner from 1989 to 1999.
Brnabić	Ana	Incumbent Prime Minister of Serbia since 2017.
Broz	Jovanka	Wife of Yugoslav leader Josip Broz Tito.
Bulatović	Momir	First President of Montenegro from 1990 to 1998. Prime Minister of the FRY from 1998 to 2000. Co-founder of DPS.
Bušetić	Toma	MP of SPS in the Assembly of Serbia in 2003.
Bush	George W.	President of the United States from 2001 to 2009.
Bush	George H. W.	President of the United States 1989 to 1993.
Calovski	Naste	Permanent Representative of SFRY to the UN from 1991 to 1992. Permanent Representative of (North) Macedonia to the UN during 2001.
Cameron	David	Prime Minister of the United Kingdom from 2010 to 2016.
Carington	Peter	EC's Envoy of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia from 1991 to 1992.
Chernomyrdin	Viktor	Special representative of Russia in FRY during 1999.
Chirac	Jacques	President of France from 1995 to 2007.
Churkin	Vitaly	Russia's Permanent Representative to the UN from 2006 to 2017.
Claes	Willy	Secretary General of NATO from 1994 to 1995.
Clinton	Bill	President of the United States from 1993 to 2001.
Crvenkovski	Branko	Prime Minister of (North) Macedonia from 1992 to 1998.
Dačić	Ivica	Incumbent president of the National Assembly of Serbia since 2020. Minister of Internal Affairs of Serbia from 2008 to April 2014. Prime Minister of Serbia from 2012 to 2014. Minister of Foreign Affairs from 2014 to October 2020. Spokesman of SPS from 1992 to 2000.
Danevski	Slobodan	MP of the LDP in the Assembly of (North) Macedonia in 2003.
De Constant	Paul Henri Benjamin Balluet d'Estournelles	French diplomat and politician. Winner of the 1909 Nobel Prize for Peace. Write introduction to the 1914 report by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace on the Balkan Wars.

De Hoop Scheffer	Jaap	Secretary General of NATO from 2004 to 2009.
De Mello	Sergio Vieira	Special UN Envoy in Kosovo in 1999. Special UN Envoy in Iraq in 2003.
Delors	Jacques	President of the European Commission from 1985 to 1995.
Demiri	Alajdin	Mayor of Tetovo, (North) Macedonia from 1997 to 1998.
Deva	Nirj	Member of the European Parliament from 1999 to 2019.
Dimitriev	Emil	Interim Prime Minister of (North) Macedonia from 2016 to 2017.
Dimitrov	Nikola	Minister of Foreign Affairs of (North) Macedonia 2017 to 2020.
Dimovska	Dosta	MP of VRMO-DPMNE in the Assembly of (North) Macedonia from 1991 to 1995. Vice President of Macedonian Government from 1998 to 1999.
Dimovski	Ilija	MP of VMRO-DPMNE in the Assembly of (North) Macedonia from 2006 to 2020. Spokesperson of VMRO-DPMNE.
Đinđić	Zoran	Prime Minister of Serbia from 2001 to 2003. Co-founder of the liberal DS.
Dinkić	Mlađan	Minister of Finance and Economy of Serbia from 2012 to 2013. Founder of the URS.
Dole	Bob	U.S. Senator for Kansas from 1996 to 1996. Lobbyist for Kosovo's independence.
Drašković	Vuk	Minister of Foreign Affairs of Serbia and Montenegro from 2004 to 2007. Deputy Prime Minister of FRY in 1999. Co-founder of the SNO and the SPO.
Du Bois	William Edward Burghardt	Well-known Pan-Africanist. Co-founder of the Niagara Movement in 1905 and the NAACP in 1909.
Đukanović	Milo	Prime Minister of Montenegro from 1991 to 1998, from 2003 to 2006, from 2008 to 2010, and from 2012 to 2016. President of Montenegro from 1998 to 2002. Co-founder of the DPS. Incumbent President of Montenegro. Took office in 2018.
Eagleburger	Lawrence	U.S. Ambassador to Yugoslavia from 1977 to 1981. U.S. Secretary of State from 1992 to 1993.
Ferdinand	Franz	Archduke of Austria-Este and the presumptive to the throne of Austria-Hungary.
Fischer	Joseph Martin "Joschka"	Foreign Minister and Vice-Chancellor of Germany from 1998 to 2005.
Fleischer	Ari	U.S. Press Secretary from 2001 to 2003.
Fogh Rasmussen	Anders	Secretary General of NATO from 2009 to 2014.

Frasure	Robert	U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State in the Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs and Ambassador to the Contact Group on BiH from 1994 to 1995.
Frčkoski	Ljubomir	Second Interior Minister of (North) Macedonia from 1992 to 1992
Füle	Štefan	European Commissioner for Enlargement and European Neighborhood Policy from 2010 until 2014.
Gelbard	Robert	U.S. Special Representative of the President and the Secretary of State for Implementation of the Dayton Peace Accords from 1997 to 1999.
Georgievski	Ljubčo	Vice-President of (North) Macedonia during 1991. Founder of VMRO-DPMNE.
Georgievski	Ljubiša	Ambassador of (North) Macedonia to Bulgaria in 2001. Speaker of the Assembly from 2006 to 2008.
Gingrich	Newt	Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives from 1995 to 1999.
Gligorov	Kiro	First President of (North) Macedonia from 1991 to 1999.
Gošev	Petar	First leader of the LDP. MP of LDP in the Assembly of (North) Macedonia in 2001.
Gottemoeller	Rose	Deputy Secretary General of NATO from 2016 to 2019.
Grubi	Artan	MP of DUI in the Assembly of (North) Macedonia from 2016 to 2020.
Gruevski	Nikola	Prime Minister of (North) Macedonia from 2006 to 2016
Guterres	António	Incumbent UN Secretary General. Took office in 2017.
Hahn	Johannes	European Commissioner for European Neighborhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations from 2014 to 2019.
Halili	Nevzat	First Chairman of PDP. Minister without portfolio in (North) Macedonia from 1994 to 1998.
Haradinaj	Ramush	Officer and leader of the KLA. Prime Minster of Kosovo from 2004 to 2005.
Hawkins	Robert	Chairman of California Local Government Reform Task Force in 1977.
Hill	Christopher	U.S. Ambassador to (North) Macedonia from 1996 to 1999. Special Envoy to Kosovo in 1998 and 1999.
Holbrooke	Richard	Architect of the Dayton Accords. U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs from 1994 to 1996. U.S. Special Envoy to the (Western) Balkans from 1996 to 1999.
Hoxhaj	Enver	Minister for Foreign Affairs of Kosovo from 2016 to 2017.
Hussein	Saddam	Fifth president of Iraq from 1979 until 2003.
Imeri	Imer	Leader of PDP from 2000 to 2003. Co-signer of the OFA in 2001.
Ivanov	Gjorge	President of (North) Macedonia from 2009 to 2019.
Ivanov	Igor	Foreign Minister of Russia from 1998 to 2004.

Izetbegović	Alija	President of the Presidency of the Republic of BiH from 1990 to 1996. Chairman of the Presidency of BiH from 1996 to 2000. Founder of the SDA.
Janeva	Katica	Chief Special Prosecutor of (North) Macedonia's Special Prosecution Office from 2015 to 2019
Johnson	Ralph R.	Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the United States for European and Canadian Affairs from 1985 to 1986 and from 1991 to 1993.
Juncker	Jean-Claude	President of the European Commission from 2014 to 2019.
Karadžić	Radovan	First President of the Republika Srpska from 1992 to 1996. Co-founder of the SDS.
Kennan	George Frost	U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union in 1952. U.S. Ambassador to Yugoslavia from 1961 to 1963.
Kerim	Srgjan	President of the UN General Assembly from 2007 to 2008 [(North) Macedonia].
Kleczka	Jerry	Member of the U.S. House of Representatives from Wisconsin from 1984 to 2005.
Kljušev	Nikola	First Prime Minister of (North) Macedonia from 1991 to 1992
Kostreš	Bojan	MP of LSV in the Assembly of Serbia in 2006. Incumbent Vice President of LSV. President of the Assembly of Vojvodina between 2004 and 2008.
Koštunica	Vojslav	Last president of FRR from 2000 to 2003. Prime minister of Serbia in two terms from 2004 to 2008.
Kotzias	Nikos	Greek Foreign Minister from 2015 until 2018.
Krstevski	Zoran	MP of the LDP in the Assembly of (North) Macedonia in 2003.
Kučan	Milan	Frist President of Slovenia from 1991 to 2002. President of the Presidency of Slovenia from 1990 to 1991.
Labus	Miroljav	Deputy Prime Minister of FRY from 2000 to 2003. Deputy Prime Minister of Serbia from 2004 to 2006. Founder of G17+.
Le Roy	Alain	EU Special Representative in (North) Macedonia from 2001 to 2002.
Léotard	François	EU Envoy to (North) Macedonia in 2001.
Macron	Emmanuel	Incumbent President of France. Took office in 2017
Marković	Ante	Last Prime Minister of SFRY from 1989 to 1991.
Mazowiecki	Tadeusz	UN Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia from 1991 to 1995.
Micevski	Trajan	MP in the Assembly of (North) Macedonia in 1991.
Micevski	Nikola	MP of VMRO-DPMNE in the Assembly of (North) Macedonia from 2016 to 2020.

Milošević	Slobodan	President of Serbia from 1989 to 1992 during SFRY. President of FRY from 1992 to 1997. Founder of the SPS.
Milutinović	Milan	President of Serbia from 1997 to 2002.
Mladić	Ratko	Commander of the VRS in BiH from 1992 to 1995.
Mogherini	Federica	High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the European Commission from 2014 to 2019.
Mowrer	Paul Scott	Press correspondent during the First Balkan War and WWI. He was awarded the first Pulitzer Prize for Correspondence while at the Chicago Daily News.
Mrkić	Ivan	Minister of Foreign Affairs of Serbia from 2012 to 2014.
Nikolić	Tomislav	President of Serbia from 2012 to 2017. Co-founder of SRS and SNS.
Nimetz	Matthew	UN Special Representative for the naming dispute between Greece and (North) Macedonia.
Nkrumah	Kwame	Led Ghana to its independence from Britain. First Prime Minister of Ghana from 1952 to 1957. First President of Ghana from 1990 to 1996. Chairperson of the OAU from 1965 to 1966.
Nyerere	Julius Kambarage	Tanzanian anti-colonial activist. Prime Minister of Tanganyika (Tanzania) from 1961 to 1962. President of Tanganyika from 1963 to 1964. President of Tanzania from 1964 to 1985.
Obama	Barack	President of the United States from 2009 to 2017.
Ojukwu	Emeka	First President of Biafra from 1967 to 1970.
Osmani	Rufi	Mayor of Gostivar, (North) Macedonia from 1994 to 1998
Owen	David	EC co-chairman of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia from 1992 to 1995.
Papoulias	George D.	Ambassador of Greece to the United Kingdom from 1990 to 1993. Foreign Minister of Greece in 1989 and 1990.
Pardew	James	U.S. Envoy to North Macedonia during the 2001 armed conflict.
Patten	Chris	European Commissioner for External Relations from 1999 to 2004.
Petrić	Radojko	Independent MP in the Assembly of Serbia in 2003.
Poos	Jacques	Foreign minister of Luxembourg from 1984 to 1999. President of the Council of the European Union for three half-year terms in 1985, 1991, and 1997.
Pop-Lazić	Gordana	MP of SRS in the Assembly of Serbia in 2006.
Powell	Colin	U.S. Secretary of State from 2001 to 2005.
Princip	Gavrilo	A Bosnian Serb who assassinated Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria in 1914.

Prodi	Romano	President of the European Commission from 1999 to 2004.
Qosja	Rexhep	Founder of LBD and its leader from 1998 to 2000. Director of the Albanological Institute of Prishtina from 1972 to 1981.
Rama	Edi	Incumbent Prime Minister of Albania since 2013.
Rathenau	Walther	German Foreign Minister of the Weimar Republic in 1992.
Rehn	Olli	European Commissioner for Enlargement from 2004 to 2010. European Commissioner for Economic and Monetary Affairs and the Euro from 2010 to 2014.
Rice	Condoleezza	U.S. National Security Advisor from 2001 to 2005. U.S. Secretary of State from 2005 to 2009.
Robertson	George	Secretary General of NATO from 1999 to 2004.
Rugova	Ibrahim	First President of Kosovo from 1992 to 2000. Founder of LDK.
Šarinić	Hrvoje	Chief of Staff of the Office of Tuđman from 1996 to 1998. Prime Minister of Croatia from 1992 to 1993.
Sartawi	Isam	Adviser to Yasir Arafat and a senior member of the PLO.
Schieder	Peter	President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe from 2002 to 2005.
Sejdiu	Fatmir	President of Kosovo from 2006 to 2010.
Sekerinska	Radmila	Incumbent Defense minister of (North) Macedonia since 2017.
Sekyi	Kobina	Ghanaian nationalist, pan-Africanist, philosopher, lawyer, and writer born in the 'Gold Coast' (Ghana). President of the ARPS.
Senghor	Léopold Sédar	First President of Senegal from 1960 to 1980.
Šešelj	Vojislav	Founder of SPO, SČP, and SRS. Deputy prime minister of Serbia from 1998 to 2000.
Shea	Jamie	Spokesman of NATO and Deputy Director of Information and Press from 1993 to 2000.
Simev	Vangel	MP of VMRO-DPMNE in the Assembly of (North) Macedonia in 2001.
Snowden	Edward	Employee of CIA who leaked highly classified information from the NSA in 2013.
Solana	Javier	Secretary General of NATO from 1995 to 1999. EU's High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy from 1999 to 2009.
Staffansson	Mats	Sweden's ambassador to (North) Macedonia from 2014 to 2020.
Stoltenberg	Jens	Incumbent Secretary General of NATO since 2014.
Tadić	Boris	President of Serbia from 2004 to 2012.
Talbott	Strobe	U.S. Deputy Secretary of State from 1994 to 2001.

Thaçi	Menduh	First Vice-President of DPA. Incumbent leader of DPA since 2007.
Thaçi	Hashim	Political Director of KLA from 1994 to 1999. First Prime Minister of Kosovo from 2008 to 2014.
Tito	Josip Broz	President of Yugoslavia from 1953 to 1980.
Touré	Sékou	Led Guinea to its independence. First Prime Minister of Guinea from 1956 to 1972. First President of Guinea from 1958 to 1984.
Trajkovski	Boris	President of (North) Macedonia from 1999 to 2004.
Trendafilov	Gorgi	Spokesman for the Macedonian Ministry of Defense from 1999 to 2001.
Trivan	Jelena	MP of DS in the Assembly of Serbia from 2007 to 2013.
Trotsky	Leon	Marxist revolutionary, political theorist and politician. In 1912 is Kievskaya Mysl's war correspondent on the two Balkan Wars.
Trump	Donald	President of the United States from 2017 to 2021.
Tsipras	Alexis	Prime Minister of Greece from 2015 to 2019.
Tuđman	Franjo	First President of Croatia from 1990 to 1999. President of the Presidency of Croatia in 1990.
Turajlić	Hakija	Prime Minister of BiH from 1992 to 1993.
Tutwiler	Margaret	Spokesperson for the United States Department of State from 1989 to 1992.
Van Rompuy	Herman	First permanent President of the European Council from 2009 to 2014.
Vance	Cyrus	U.S. Secretary of State from 1977 to 1980 and UN co-chairman of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia from 1992 to 1993.
Veliu	Fazli	Co-founder of the NLA and one of its leaders in 2001.
Veljanovski	Trajko	President of the Assembly of North Macedonia from 2008 to 2017.
Von Bismarck	Otto	Chancellor of the German Reich from 1871 to 1890.
Von Däniken	Franz	State Secretary of Switzerland from 1999 to 2005.
Vučić	Aleksandar	Incumbent President of Serbia since 2017. Co-founder of SNS. Prime Minister of Serbia from 2014 to 2017. Deputy Prime Minister of Serbia from 2012 to 2014. Minister of Defense of Serbia from 2012 to 2013. Minister of Information of Serbia from 1998 to 2000.
Vujanović	Filip	President of Montenegro from 2003 to 2018.
Walker	William	Head of the Kosovo Verification Mission from 1998 to 1999.
Winkler	Hand	State Secretary for European and International Affairs of Austria from 2005 to 2008 during Austrian presidency of the Council in the first half of 2006.
Xhaferi	Arbën	First Chairman of DPA. Co-signer of the OFA in 2001.

Xhaferi	Talat	Incumbent President of the Assembly of (North) Macedonia. Took office in 2017.
Zaev	Zoran	Incumbent Prime Minister of (North) Macedonia. Took office in 2020.
Žbogar	Samuel	EU Special Representative in (North) Macedonia from 2016 to 2020.
Zhelev	Zhelyu	First non-Communist President of Bulgaria from 1990 to 1997.