NIGERIAN POSTCOLONIAL THOUGHT AND THE PEACE PROCESS IN NORTHERN NIGERIA

by

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ABSTRACT

Nigerian Postcolonial Thought and Peace Process in Northern Nigeria

Nigerian postcolonial thought has emerged as an important resource in addressing the conflicts in Northern Nigeria. It offers perspectives on the cultural articulations of people who were ravaged and transformed by the accounts of the colonial legacy of domination and distortion, in addition to religion, education and language. The emergence of postcolonialism as a creative literature became a resistance discourse that challenged the views held or constructed by the colonisers about the colonised. Through postcolonial literature, theorists and practitioners began rereading some canonical Western works that had misrepresented facts about Africa and African literature. They drew attention to the way the colonial powers had constructed an African narrative and then acted as if that narrative existed. They questioned and challenged colonial discourses and, in the same vein, mounted a strong defence of African identity. The aim of post-colonialism is to fight the lingering effects of colonialism on cultures and identity. It is also concerned with how we can move beyond colonial judgement and move towards a platform of mutual respect. However, critics of post-colonialism know that many of the assumptions that reinforced the concept of colonialism are still alive today as the new crop of leaders that emerged from anti-colonialism are now oppressors. This thesis explores Nigerian postcolonial thought and the peace process in Northern Nigeria and argues that Nigerian postcolonial writers provide the opportunity to dissect the causes of the dilemmas and provide a way forward. Northern Nigeria has been at the centre of ethno-religious violence and has seen an upsurge in religious fanaticism. Given the threat posed by religious extremism and its capacity to carry out violence across the Northern region, this research employs an interdisciplinary, postcolonial methodology which predominantly draws upon Nigerian postcolonial thinkers.

DECLARATION

I hereby certify that this material, which I now submit for assessment on the programme of study leading to the award of PhD degree is entirely my own work, that I have exercised reasonable care to ensure that the work is original, and does not to the best of my knowledge breach any law of copyright, and has not been taken from the work of others save and to the extent that such work has been cited and acknowledged within the text of my work.

Signed: MARCELLINUS AZUKAOMA UCHE OSAKWE (Candidate) ID No: 11121106

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DEDICATION

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Part 1: Introduction, Research Methodology, and Historical Overview

Chapter 1: Research Methodology

1.1 Research Aim

The aim of postcolonialism is to fight the lingering effects of colonialism on cultures and identity. It is concerned with how we can move beyond colonial judgement and move towards a platform of mutual respect. However, critics of postcolonialism know that many of the assumptions that reinforced the concept of colonialism are still alive today as the new crop of leaders that emerged from anti-colonialism are now oppressors. The main objective of this thesis is to examine Nigerian Postcolonialism and the Peace Process in Northern Nigeria. I shall also investigate some secondary objectives, namely:

- To explore key postcolonial scholars, especially Frantz Fanon.
- To examine Nigerian postcolonial thinkers and how their literature shaped the peace process in Northern Nigeria.
- To examine the factors responsible for the breakdown of law and disharmony in Northern Nigeria; and
- Finally, to make recommendations on how peace can be achieved in Northern Nigeria.

1.2 Research Problem

Nigerian Postcolonial Thought has emerged as an important work in addressing the conflicts in Northern Nigeria.

- It offers perspective on the cultural articulations of people that were ravaged and transformed by the accounts of the colonial legacy of domination and distortion, in

addition to religion, education, and language. The emergence of postcolonialism as a creative literature became a resistance discourse that challenged the views held or constructed by the colonisers about the colonised.

- Through postcolonial literature, theorists and practitioners began rereading some canonical Western works that had misrepresented facts about Africa and African literature.
- They drew attention to the way the colonial powers had constructed an African narrative and then acted as if that narrative existed.
- They questioned and challenged colonial discourses and, in the same vein, mounted a strong defence of African identity.

1.3 Significance of the Research

This research is aimed at exploring Nigerian postcolonial thought and peace processes in Northern Nigeria as a methodology to address factors responsible for the breakdown of law and harmony in Northern Nigeria.

This is significant as it addresses the breakdown of peace processes in Northern Nigeria by emphasising the need for interreligious dialogue between the two main religions, Christianity and Islam, as a key factor in establishing lasting peace and unity in Northern Nigeria. Tied with postcolonial theory, this thesis also utilizes and promotes a rich interdisciplinary approach as discussed further below.

1.4 Rational of the Research

The rational of this research was to explore the need for solutions that would address the conflict in Northern Nigeria caused by ethno-religious conflict, religious extremism,

poverty, the rivalry between indigenes and settlers and rivalry and antagonism between the two main religious faiths. As argued below, both religious and non-religious factors contributed to the conflict in Northern Nigeria.

1.5 Central Research Question

This research seeks to answer the central research question defined as: Why have peace processes failed in Northern Nigeria while to a lesser degree or not at all in Southern Nigeria?

1.6 Research Hypothesis

The major hypothesis contends that religious factors accelerate religious conflicts but also equally contribute to national and regional progress. The following are factors which may speed up this violence:

1. Religious distribution; overlapped religious, ethnic, and social particularity.
2. Religious institutions/organisations.
3. Religious/theological thoughts.
4. The actions of religious leaders, religious revivalism, gender, interfaith groups' rivalry, marginalisation, and discrimination, as well as those in non-religious settings such as ethnicity, social division and political transition which is embedded in political or socio-economic problems.

1.7 Methodology

1.7.1 General

This thesis employs an interdisciplinary research method using qualitative resources principally involving Nigerian postcolonial thought to solve the Nigerian peace process (and

so engages in interreligious dialogue). In this chapter I focus on and explain my research methodology. This will help reflect on and evaluate what is examined in the General Introduction and analyse some emerging themes from the chapters that follow.

In this thesis, I have generated and collated qualitative data from published works, literature and other documentary sources to ascertain the breakdown of peace and harmony in Northern Nigeria. Such literature includes books, articles from journals, magazines, and newspapers, and conference papers, the works of clergy, church documents, and Hadith, Qur'an and Bible declarations. Other resources I turned to in order to further strengthen a platform for the peace process in the region is the efforts of Muslim-Christian Interfaith Mediation Centre, the Programme for Christian–Muslim Relations in Africa (PROCMURA), Centre for Interfaith Relations and Cross-Cultural Outreach, Justice, Peace and Reconciliation Movement, Bridge Builders, and Nigeria Interreligious Council (NIREC), and the work of Ashafa and Wuye, the imam and pastor respectively. Equally, I had an interview with Isa Nurudeen, Chief Imam of Ojo, Lagos state, Nigeria which sharpened my understanding of the Christian-Muslim relationship in Nigeria. I also had a fruitful telephone conversation with Reverend Father Cornelius Omonokhua, the secretary of Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN), which also preached on the need for dialogue for Christians–Muslims understanding of divisive issues and interfaith learning.

1.7.2 Research Methodology

To evaluate the peace process in Northern Nigeria, I turn to Nigerian postcolonial thought as a theoretical framework. Nigerian postcolonial thought uses a variety of methodologies and a wide range of accompanying methods, which include Nigerian postcolonial writers and postcolonial theorists. My thesis also employs an interdisciplinary focus as it engages in sociology, history, theology, politics, and theoretical framework.

analysis. It is sociological because the study deals with social relationship between ethno-religious groups and the people. This method helps determine the socio-economic and political effects of conflicts in the region. Again, it addresses the factors responsible for the breakdown of law and harmony in the region. In addition, employing an interfaith theological approach will address the rivalry between the two main religions in Northern Nigeria, Christianity and Islam, by emphasising the need for interreligious dialogue. In its historical approach, this study requires an extensive understanding of how colonial and postcolonial actions of politicians affected the socio-economic, political, and religious settings in the region. Finally, a political approach is essential because of inconsistency in governmental policies, constitutional issues, justice, and rule of law, which all are shaped by the political process.

According to Robert Frodeman "interdisciplinarity is typically defined epistemologically, in terms of the 'blending' or 'integrating' of different types of disciplinary knowledge."[1] Frodeman points out that interdisciplinarity is envisaged as the answer for what aids research and education. He adduces that the interdisciplinary paradigm has become a common route to show one's reformist orientation. He posits that an interdisciplinary approach has become a broad way of analysis across all disciplines. He notes that interdisciplinary methods to research and education can be useful in areas as distinct as poverty, public health, and leisure.[2] Since my study intersects across disciplines, the interdisciplinary approach is necessary and fruitful.

[1] Robert Frodeman, *Sustainable Knowledge: A Theory of Interdisciplinarity* (UK: Palgrave Macmillian, 2014), 35.
[2] Ibid., 38-9.

1.7.3 Qualitative Analysis

Within this Nigerian postcolonial framework, theoretical and descriptive analysis is employed to answer the central research questions to seek answers to the conflict in Northern Nigeria. As noted, the study examines qualitative research generated and collated from published literature (books, articles from journals, magazines, and newspapers, and conference papers), and interviews. Based on these readings, the research was designed to answer the central research question: Why have peace processes failed in Northern Nigeria while to a lesser degree or not at all in Southern Nigeria?

1.7.4 Analysis of the Sources

Source analysis begins with recognising the research aim, problems, and data gathering resources. The analysis technique employed is theoretical, analytical, and interdisciplinary, drawing especially upon Nigerian postcolonial thought and peace studies. It uses a descriptive technique of analysis. In this study the researcher employed qualitative techniques to gather data and synthesise the data to produce the best plan for a solution to the Northern Nigeria conflict. As previously stated, these were characterised thematically concerning the research objectives.

1.7.5 Research Limitations

Few studies have been carried out on the peace process in Northern Nigeria. One is by Kieran E. Uchehara titled "Peace Talks Initiatives between the Boko Haram and Nigerian Government,"[3] though it does not use the application of instrumentalist or constructivist models (as noted below in 1.7.6 – Theoretical Perspective). To date in Northern Nigeria, no

[3] Kieran E. Uchehara, "Peace Talks Initiatives between the Boko Haram and Nigerian Government." *International Journal of Business and Social Science* 5, no.6 (May 2014).

other research on Nigerian postcolonial thought and the peace process in Northern Nigeria has been carried to address the peace challenges in the region. This study does not set out to investigate all the wide-raging issues of religious and non-religious tension in Northern Nigeria. It is neither an in-depth analysis of all the religious and non-religious issues nor a theatrical account of all incidents of religious and non-religious violence in Northern Nigeria. It does not cover all the religious and non-religious conflict in Northern Nigeria. It focuses on religious and non-religious issues that occurred from 1990 to 2019. Another limitation is that there are no face-to-face interviews with victims and perpetrators to further evaluate religious and non-religious issues in Northern Nigeria.

1.7.6 Theoretical Perspective

Nigerian Postcolonial thought is the framework that informs and guides this study. Nigerian postcolonial thought offers perspectives on the cultural articulations of people who were ravaged and transformed by the accounts of the colonial legacy of domination and distortion, in addition to colonial religion, education and language. The emergence of postcolonialism as a creative literature became a resistance discourse that challenged the views held or constructed by the colonisers about the colonised. Through postcolonial literature, theorists and practitioners began rereading some canonical Western works that had misrepresented facts about Africa and African literature. They drew attention to the way the colonial powers had constructed an African narrative and then acted as if that narrative existed. Nigerian postcolonial theorists and activists questioned and challenged colonial discourses and, in the same vein, mounted a strong defence of African identity. The aim of post-colonialism is to fight the lingering effects of colonialism on cultures and identity. It is also concerned with how we can move beyond colonial judgement and move towards a platform of mutual respect.

As applied to this study, these theoretical frameworks serve as lenses to inform and guide the examination of the Nigerian postcolonial thought and peace process in Northern Nigeria, including its weaknesses, strengths, and its influence on postcolonial Northern Nigeria. Hence, from a postcolonial standpoint, there is evidence that Northern Nigeria has been influenced by colonial legacies such as education, religion, and language, which have played a major role in the identity formation of the diverse people of Northern Nigeria. The history of colonialism according to Ngugi wa Thiong'o centres on colonialism. He said:

> In the history of colonialism, the coloniser not only imposes his language, but he denigrates and represses the language of the colonised. So, the condition of learning English was the unlearning of our language, which continued into the postcolonial era.[4]

Postcolonial studies as a discourse theory equally have a strong literary origin. The contribution of non-western scholars like Edward Said, Homi Bhabha, Gayatri Spivak, Frantz Fanon, Walter Rodney, Ngugi wa Thiong'O, Chinua Achebe, Chimamanda Adichie, and Wole Soyinka on the progress and growth of postcolonial criticism has been no less important. The political and ethical platforms conveyed in postcolonial literature highlight the effects of slavery, colonialism, decolonisation, postcolonial nationalism, culture, identities, languages, and gender formation within Nigeria. Such themes have always been a constant and influential source of inspiration for all the postcolonial critics. For most theorists working within postcolonial studies, the scholars above are important not only because they "incorporate, transgress, and redesign the forms, aesthetic conventions, and cognitive resources of the Western traditions" but also because their works equally draw from "traditional narrative forms and idioms."[5]

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[4] Rohit Inani, "Language is a 'War Zone': A Conversation with Ngugi wa Thiong'o." *The Nation* (New York), April 2, 2018. https://www.thenation.com.
[5] Miguel Mellino, "Postcolonialism." (Italy: University of Naples): 2.

Perhaps, I could have chosen instead to employ instrumentalist or constructivist models developed among ethnic conflict theorists as my theoretical framework, but I choose Nigerian postcolonial thinkers such as Chinua Achebe because they are known for their political activism in eradication of all forms of colonialism, imperialism, neo-colonialism, and criticism against Nigerian postcolonial states. Achebe puts it succinctly:

> It calls on all thoughtful Nigerians to rise up today and reject those habits which cripple our aspiration and inhibit our chances of becoming a modern and attractive country. Nigeria has many thoughtful men and women of conscience, a large number of talented people. Why is it then that all these patriots make no little impacts on the life on the nation? Why is it our corruption, gross iniquities, our noisy vulgarity, our selfishness, our ineptitude seem so much stronger than the good influence at work in our society? Why do the good among us seem so helpless while the worst are full of vile energy?[6]

Instrumentalism sees ethnic connections in "social, political, and economic competitions." Furthermore, instrumentalism sees ethnicity as a means for a political class to define and regulate group memberships. Ethnic elites occasionally employ ethnic differences to influence hostility from inequality and power disparity within their communities to the elites of other groups. While instrumentalism recognises blood ties, it places significance to relationships of other kinds. This kind of relationship is based on national consciousness, not intimacy but the need to protection of common interest.[7]

On the other hand, constructivism "perceives ethnic identity as a socially constructed and fluid entity that can be formed through various means including conquest colonisation or

[6] Chinua Achebe, *The Trouble with Nigeria* (London: Penguin Books, 1977), 23-4.
[7] Shyamal Kataria, "Explaining Ethnicity: Primordialism vs. Instrumentalism." *Advances in Social in Social Sciences Research Journal* 5, no. 4 (April 2018): 133. See Iro-Cunningham, 26.

immigration."[8] Ethnic groups are known to be social constructions with "identified origins and histories of expansion and contraction, amalgamation and division."[9] Its thrust on the group's identity differs because of its useful essence. As a result, it places more importance on the structures of societal institutions in guaranteeing ethnic peace. The key justification of constructivism is that ethnicity is made rather than hereditary. With regards to societies that experienced colonialism, constructivism contends that ethnic cleavages are an idea of colonial power enforced through the enormous authority of colonial masters and that its partitions have sustained and will last for a long time.[10] For instance, consider Middle Belt apprehensions as Nigerian independence drew nearer. There was a palpable fear of minorities in Northern Nigeria, and this anxiety hinges on the place of the people of the area in the hands of Hausa/Fulani hegemony. Thus:

> Middle Belt elites were searching for their place in the politics of an emerging Nigerian state and now understood the agenda of Hausa-Fulani Muslims to be a threat to their aspirations. Their prevalent fear, however, exaggerated, was that if the British left the North as one political bloc at the time of national independence, the political fate of the Middle Belt would be sealed as a fief of an emerging political caliphate.[11]

This thinking transformed the people and played a part in the ethno-religious divide and conflict between the Hausa-Fulani and the minority groups in Northern Nigeria. As Ochonu noted:

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[8] Dodeye U. Williams, "How Useful are the Main Existing Theories of Ethnic Conflict?" *Academic Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies* 4, no. 1 (March 2015): 149.
[9] Ibid.
[10] Cecilia Iro-Cunninggham, *Identity, Power and Conflict: Inter-Ethnic Perspective of Northern Nigerian Religious Violence* (UK: PublishNation LLC, 2016), 28.
[11] Moses E. Ochonu, *Colonialism by Proxy: Hausa Imperial Agents and Middle Belt Consciousness in Nigeria* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2014), 179.

> There was a new militancy to the vernacular of this phase of the old, fragmented struggle for Middle Belt autonomy in Northern Nigeria. Nonetheless, many of the old platitudes remained a mainstay of the struggle, reemerging in a new language of entitlement and victimhood, and recalibrated to serve new, more urgent political ends. For instance, the new regional struggle for a separate Middle Belt political identity reached back to the familiar premises of precolonial caliphate oppressions, the British investment in caliphate administrative control, and Hausa-Fulani abuse of colonial power, but it also invoked and mobilized political anxieties with novel anchors in present politics and expectations for the future.[12]

Since Islam was the "seminal social marker of the caliphate, and Hausa was its functional lingua franca, anyone possessing these traits was immediately associated with the might and privileges of the caliphate. In the Middle Belt, these attributes functioned as a metaphor for the Sokoto Caliphate and its emirate system."[13] He further stated political battles were being fought in terms of familiar historical binaries in several parts of Northern Nigeria where the caliphate-Middle Belt divide was now a discernible factor of political favours. Due to the intense political situation of the time, even local disagreements and political discourse swiftly took on the familiar "emirate versus Middle Belt, Muslim versus non-Muslim, character."[14] With the concentration of power to Hausa-Fulani, middle Belt elites struggled to exert themselves politically and this elicited hatred and antagonism against the dominant power, Hausa-Fulani. That suspicion and antagonism continues till today.

In addition, it is necessary to understand that Northern Nigeria is the most populous region in Nigeria. It is also notable for solid mineral deposits, beef, and agriculture. Northern

[12] Ochonu, *Colonialism by Proxy: Hausa Imperial Agents and Middle Belt Consciousness in Nigeria*, 179.
[13] Ibid., 27.
[14] Ibid., 180.

Nigeria is diverse in both ethnic and religious composition. So, whatever affects Northern Nigeria will spill over to other neighbouring states such as Chad, Niger, Cameroon, as well as Southern Nigeria. Therefore, the importance of this study goes beyond Northern Nigerian borders. It can help other regions in sub-Saharan Africa to embrace peaceful coexistence among diverse groups in their regions and it will help government, non-governmental organisations, and religious groups to evaluate conflict resolution mechanisms in resolving historical and future conflicts in the regions.

Again, my choice of these postcolonial theorists and interdisciplinary methodology is strengthened by how the postcolonial thinkers reread some canonical Western works that had misrepresented facts about Africa and African literature. They drew attention to the way the colonial powers had constructed an African narrative and then acted as if that narrative existed. They questioned and challenged colonial discourses and, in the same vein, mounted a strong defence of African identity. That is why I find these theorists germane to my work.

1.8 The Structure of the Dissertation

The dissertation is divided into three main sections. The first part is an introduction, the reasons for my methodology, and a brief historical overview of Northern Nigeria. Part Two deals with the texts and key thinkers of postcolonial thought, and especially postcolonial Nigerian thought. Using the input and analysis of Nigerian postcolonial thinkers from Part Two, the Third Part provides detailed diagnosis and solutions for a peaceful and harmonious society in Northern Nigeria and makes recommendations.

Following this introductory chapter, Chapter 2 examines the historical background of Northern Nigeria. It also looks at precolonial Northern Nigeria and examines the impact of the Sokoto Caliphate, colonial and postcolonial epoch in the region. The chapter also discusses the impact of military, Second/Third/Fourth Republic and how it shapes the socio-

economic and political direction of the region. It ends discussing the peace process in Northern Nigeria.

Chapter 3 is a survey of postcolonial thought, especially its main aims, role development, relevance, and criticism.

Chapter 4 of this research surveys classic postcolonial thought and explores the works of Frantz Fanon. This theorist focused on the exploitation of the colonised, the inhumanity of man to man, and the evil of colonialism and neo-colonialism. It emphasises how post colonialism emerged as an attempt to reject colonial rule, cultural domination and misrepresentation of the colonised. The key argument in this chapter is the rejection of imposed colonial rule, culture, education, religion and language by the colonised; and the emergence of postcolonial literature questioning the import of alien culture and other forms of colonial legacies. Fanon used his works to deconstruct the colonial legacy through postcolonial analysis and employed his works to rebuild postcolonial identity. Through his literature, Fanon addressed the assumptions and perceptions of colonial help by Western nations. He wants us to reject the colonial mentality that everything Western is superior. He wants us to see the world as being equal, where all countries stand at the same level. He equally rejects the stereotyping of Africa as lazy, uncivilised, promiscuous, barbaric and immoral. He concludes that Africans should be allowed to make their own judgements and determine what they want and how to speak for themselves instead of someone speaking on their behalf.

Chapter 5 looks at the contributions of Nigerian postcolonial thinkers, Chinua Achebe and Ahmadu Bello, and how their works shaped the socio-economic and political directions of the country. It also examines how their works formed Nigerian policy, as well as their contributions to the peace process in Northern Nigeria. These Nigerian postcolonial writers

were motivated to narrate their stories because of the negative image and caricatures the British colonial power had painted of Nigerians as savages. The British colonial power constructed the idea that Nigeria was backward, ignorant, primitive and barbaric. The Nigerian postcolonial thinkers challenged this, saying that on the contrary, the country has a unique culture, tradition, and cherished history. Their works have vastly contributed to the shaping of Nigeria national identity, peace, consciousness, and national pride.

My aim in Chapter 5 is to signify the richness and importance of Nigerian postcolonial literature to identify the right position with the right kind of character, education, and wisdom, for a leader who would understand what it takes to unify the people without fear or favour and would understand what is at stake and what is needed to do in Northern Nigeria especially regarding ethno-religious sentiments.

Part III has two chapters. The thrust of chapter 6 is the diagnosis of the conflict in Northern Nigeria. It builds on previous chapters that explored postcolonial thinkers. It continues to examine Nigerian postcolonial thinkers and how their works shaped the peace process in Northern Nigeria. The postcolonial thinkers discuss the failings of both colonial and postcolonial leadership and make a case for addressing the crisis in Northern Nigeria and how peace can be restored in the region. The chapter establishes that there is a mutual exclusiveness that exists between many believers of Islam and Christianity in the northern region even though they have lived alongside each other for centuries.

This chapter also identifies the problems that are inherent in Northern Nigeria such as handling disagreement and misunderstanding, misinterpretation of sacred texts, ignorance and lack of information on what both Prophet Mohammed and Jesus Christ stand for, and other non-religious issues which includes the distribution of scare resources, land, and the marginalisation of the minority by the majority in the region.

This chapter contends that resolving the conflict in Northern Nigeria requires an understanding of the complexities of the region and applying conflict mechanisms, such as robust community engagement, rehabilitation programmes, creating an enabling environment supportive of self-sustaining, durable peace, integrate civil society, rule of law, as well as the political will of the key various actors in resolving the crisis. These mechanisms can help to end both the religious and non-religious issues in the northern region.

Chapter 7 offers solutions to help bring about a peaceful coexistence between the two main religions of Nigeria, Islam and Christianity. This chapter will similarly address national sovereign conferences as part of the conflict mechanism in resolving issues like the indigene-ship and settler-ship conundrum which have fuelled conflict in the region. The national sovereign conference advocates the restructuring of the country in line with true federalism, derivation, federal character principle and rule of law where all citizens are free to live in any part of Nigeria without discrimination, marginalisation or being treated as a second-class citizen because of their cultural or religious background.

To solve the problems posed by religious and non-religious issues, which include socio-economic needs, aggressive competition for land, resource control, competition for political and economic space, and fierce campaigns by Christians and Muslims to win converts, the following solutions are offered: National Sovereign Conference, Interreligious Dialogue, Reconciliation, Reconstruction and Rehabilitation, Relief for Victims, Pursuit of Justice, and Peacebuilding.

The final chapter (8) analyses the developed themes made by the findings, their suggestions and general argument, most importantly contending that both religious and non-religious issues are the causes of the breakdown of law and order in Northern Nigeria.

In this chapter, recommendations are further evaluated in terms of how Northern Nigeria can be a peaceful and harmonious entity where peace and unity flourish between various ethnic groups and the two main religions – Christianity and Islam. As of this writing in May 2021, there remain much violence and injustice in Nigeria, but with peace and coexistence in the region, prosperity, progress, and development can proceed.

Chapter 2: Historical Background of Northern Nigeria

2.1 Overview

In examining the peace process in Northern Nigeria, this chapter is concerned with the background history of Northern Nigeria before the advent of British colonialism, and the role of postcolonialism in the region. Equally, the role played by Sokoto Caliphate in shaping economic, political, socio-cultural influence in the region will also be discussed.

Northern Nigeria is grouped into three geopolitical zones namely, zones: North East, North West, and North Central. Each of these three geopolitical zones have a unique history and shares of conflict.

The North East consists of six states: Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Taraba, and Yobe. This geopolitical zone has been the most severely affected by conflict of any zone in Nigeria over the last decade. Conflict and violence in the North East are principally attributed to Boko Haram, the terrorist group responsible for killing, kidnapping, maiming and gross human rights abuses across Northern Nigeria, Chad, Cameroon, and Niger Republic. The violent radicalisation of the Boko Haram members and the resulting military actions have reportedly affected nearly fifteen million people since 2009. This conflict has caused a serious humanitarian and forced displacement crisis, with devastating social and economic effects on the population, hence heightening underdevelopment and regional inequalities. The most affected states are the Borno, Adamawa and Yobe. The most affected groups are women, children, and youth. Boko Haram's tactics have involved multiple modes of attack, including suicide bombings, seizure, and destruction of entire villages, forced displacement, abductions, sexual violence aiming at women, and forced recruitment of men. Even though Boko Haram-held territory has reduced in size over the last few years, the

group continues to carry out constant attacks in the North East zone.[15] However, Abubakar Shekau, Boko Haram leader has died after detonating explosives to avoid being captured by Islamic State's West Africa Province (ISWAP) fighters when they stormed his stronghold in Sambisa forest.[16]

The North West comprises seven states: Kaduna, Katsina, Kano, Kebbi, Sokoto, Jigawa, and Zamfara. Nigeria's arid North West is plagued by violence between herders and farmers, which has been heightened by an upsurge in criminal activity and infiltration by jihadist groups into the region. The activities of these groups have seen thousands of people killed and hundreds of thousands dislodged, with many fleeing into Nigeria's neighbour, Niger Republic.[17]

The causes of violence in the North West are complicated and inter-related. At its origin, is the long-running competition over land and water resources between mainly Fulani herders and mostly Hausa farmers, both of whom have over time mobilised armed groups (referred to as "bandits" and "vigilantes") for security. Climate change-related environmental degradation and high population growth have deepened this struggle. Amidst a thriving business in the trade of small arms and light weapons in the region, organised gangs operating from uncurbed forests have flourished, engaging in cattle rustling, kidnapping for ransom and armed robbery, including of miners and traders in the basically

[15] Abul Azad, Emily Crawford, and Heidi Kaila, "Conflict and Violence in Nigeria Results from the North East, North Central, and South South Zones: Preliminary Draft Report." *The World Bank and National Bureau of Statistics* (Nigeria), 2018.
[16] Drew Hinshaw and Joe Parkinson, "Boko Haram Leader, Responsible for Chibok Schoolgirl Kidnappings Dies." *The Wall Street Journal* (New York), May 21, 2021, https://www.wsj.com/articules/boko.haram-leader-responsible-for-chibok-schoolgirl-kidnappings-dies-11621608392 See Jason Burke, "US jokes about a $7m reward as Boko Haram leader 'killed' by Isis-linked group." *The Irish Times* (Dublin), May 21, 2021, https://www.irishtimes.com/news/world/africa/us-jokes-about-7m-reward-as-boko-haram-leader-killed-by-isis-linked-group-1.4571848
[17] International Crisis Group, "Violence in Nigeria's North West: Rolling Back the Mayhem." *International Crisis Group*, Report no. 288 (Brussels), May 18, 2020. https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/nigeria/288-violence-nigerias-north-west-rolling-back-mayhem.

loose gold mining sector, as well as loot of communities. Having started in Zamfara state, gang violence has since spread to five other neighbouring states.[18]

North Central is comprised of the states of Benue, Kogi, Kwara, Nasarawa, Niger, and Plateau, as well as the Federal Capital Territory (FCT), Abuja. In recent years, conflict in the North Central zone has both intensified and increased as tensions between farmers and herders have risen. This conflict is multi-faceted and complex. The conflict centres around agricultural households and nomadic cattle-herding groups who come into conflict over land access. As the population in North Central surges, the amount of land used for farming also grows, often into areas that have traditionally served as cattle grazing fields. On the other hand, climate change and the Boko Haram insurgency cut the amount of land fit for grazing in North East, thereby forcing herding communities to expand their routes into increasingly North Central and Southern zones. This competition over land and resources is compounded by religion and ethnicity. The herders are mainly members of the minority Fulani ethnic group and are mostly Muslim. Farmer-herder conflicts often consist of attacks by one group and ensuing retaliation from the other community leading to loss of lives, property, and displacement of men, women, and children.[19] Deaths arising from this type of conflict are clustered in the North central geopolitical zone, with the highest concentration of conflicts in Benue, Taraba and Nasarawa states. Plateau is another state where these conflicts have been tensed such as indigenes verse settlers over resource control and state patronage, though land conflict deaths are less. This growing conflict has led to the death of a significant number of people.[20]

[18] Ibid.
[19] Azad, Crawford, and Kaila, "Conflict and Violence in Nigeria Results from the North East, North Central, and South South Zones: Preliminary Draft Report."
[20] John Chiwuzulum Odozi and Ruth Uwaifo Oyelere, "Violent Conflict Exposure in Nigeria and Economic Welfare," Discussion Paper Series. *Institute of Labor Economics* (Bonn), August 2019.

This work draws from Northern Nigeria's voices such as Sir Ahmadu Bello, Ismaila Tsiga, Isah Shehu Mohammed, Ahmed Aliyu Aisha, Moses Ochonu, Thaddeus Byimui Umaru, Muktar Umar Bunza, Abubakar Adam Ibrahim, Helon Habila, and Omar Farouk Ibrahim. Their writings and voices are important as they are in a vintage position to tell the story of their people.

This chapter discusses historical failings between the Hausa/Fulani who are predominantly Muslim, and non-Muslims in Northern Nigeria who are mainly Christians. All seek to take over the architectural design and construction of Northern Nigeria. In most cases, they turned the area into a theatre of war, bloodshed and unnecessary destruction of life and property. We equally discussed the emergence of the Muslim Sufi order, Qadiriyya, Tijaniyya, and Izala seen by some Muslim as an anti-sufi order, and the role of Shia in the struggle for relevance in the Northern region.

This chapter equally analyses the return to democratic dispensation in the Fourth Republic. Politics is no longer based on what the politicians can do for the people but what the people can do for their selfish agenda. Most northern politicians are only interested in themselves, putting self before service. Equally, the introduction of sharia by governors of twelve states in the Northern Nigeria became a source of concern among other non-Muslims in the region which led to religious clashes between adherents of Islam and Christianity.

Again, lots of northern political leaders have employed the unique power of religion to legitimise their policies and to mobilise people towards their own constructed ends. Although the main reasons and issues of conflict may not be of a religious character, religion plays an important role at times of conflict where different religious systems encounter one another. In most cases, political leaders do not hesitate to resort to religious myths and sacred documents of their religion to justify their acts and policies. The political leaders achieve

their aims by mobilising the uneducated youths and unemployed men and women for their own political ends.

This chapter notes that the Christians and Moslems in Northern Nigeria should realise that there are other religions in the region such as traditional religions. Again, the atavistic and aggressive campaign to win souls by all means is responsible for the upswing in violence. There is a need for the two main religious groups in the region to respect the sanctity of life, the constitution, and to embrace dialogue.

2.2 Introduction

Religion has made an important contribution in shaping the spiritual, political, and socio-economic lives of people in Northern Nigeria. In the fifteenth century, Islam made its way into the region and was established as the religion of the people. Centuries later, Christianity made inroads in some parts of Northern Nigeria with social and political consequences, in most cases leading to misunderstanding, conflict of interests and violence. Historical antecedents in Northern Nigeria such as missionary evangelism, British colonial rule, the political decolonisation of Nigeria in 1960, and subsequent manipulation of ethnicity and religion for political reasons have continued to hinder harmonious coexistence and peace between Muslims and Christians for years.[21]

Consequently, there is the need to acknowledge and sustain a healthy religious pluralism in Northern Nigeria for harmony and peace to reign. Encounters between Christianity and Islam have been marked by painful and inconsistent experiences for centuries. These historical and current events have left profound feelings of resentment, misgiving, and suspicion and have led to violence among its adherents.[22]

[21] Thaddeus Byimui Umaru, *Christian – Muslim Dialogue in Northern Nigeria* (UK: Xlibris LLC, 2013), 13.
[22] Ibid.

Carl A. LeVan and Patrick Ukata argue that for over two millennia, Northern Nigeria has been politically, commercially and intellectually on the outer fringes of the Mediterranean and the Middle East. They noted the routes through the Sahara Desert connecting Coptic-Speaking Egypt, Phoenician Carthage, and the Roman Empire to peoples around Lake Chad and on the Great Plains to the west and east of the lake. Once the dromedary (single-humped) camel became available, transport across the desert became easier, with more goods to sell and more provisions to enable travel between oases. By the eleventh century, the language of trades and literature had become Arabic, replacing Coptic. The Arab script used was the form of Qairouan, and by c.1392 the sophisticated epistolary style used in letter writing. Most Muslims were Sunni (though possibly some Shi'a refuges came from Egypt to Kanem) and Islamic law used came from the Maliki school. There may have been outside links into Borno from the Judeo-Himyaritic regime, in Yemen perhaps. The other new styles in matters such as water, taxation or brick making suggest routes in from the Nile Valley. The Ibadi movement from central/Southern Algeria also influenced both trade and, it appears, the architecture of the new minarets during Islamisation.[23]

According to Charles Lindsay Temple, the region of Northern Nigeria comprises an area of about 255,000 square miles. The area may be divided into three distinct zones: the southern forest belt, the hill regions in the neighbourhood of Bauchi, Zaria, and the Benue, and the northern plains. Probably 80,000 square miles are covered with forest; 14,000 square miles have an elevation of from 2000 to 6000 feet, while the northern plains, with an average

[23] Carl A. LeVan and Patrick Ukata, "Introduction," in *The Oxford Handbook of Nigerian Politics*, ed. Carl Levan and Patrick Ukata (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018), 19. See also Isah Shehu Mohammed and Ahmed Aliyu Aisha, *Federalism: An Overview of the Nigerian Perspective* (Mauritius: Lap Lambert Academic Publishing, 2020), 176-177.

altitude of about 1000 feet, extend over 150,000 square miles. The remaining 90,000 square miles lie at an altitude between the plains and hills.[24]

The landscape of Northern Nigeria may be divided into the following classifications: to the north, from the neighbourhood of Lake Chad to Sokoto, there occur endless wind-swept sandy plains covered with scanty and thorny bushes, mainly acacias, though the soil produces during the rainy season with large crops of millet and little tilling. To the south there is a belt of rich argillaceous loam, and here we find the population heaviest. South of this again occur great ranges of granite hills, often weathered into most fantastic shapes. Some of these rises to a height of 6500 feet. Between these are found fertile valleys and elevated plateau. Further south descends into the plains of the Benue and Niger, where forests begin to appear, and the air is moist and damp. The character of the strata is changed, and in place of granite peaks and turtle backs, flat-topped hills composed of sedimentary rock-sandstones and grit are found. The fossiliferous cretaceous limestones have been found in the bend of the Gongola, Sokoto and in Muri province.[25]

The principal watersheds which govern the dispersion of water in the rivers and streams of the region are located at 1300 miles from each other: one is near Falaba in the hinterland of Sierra Leone, where rises the Niger; the other is on the Bauchi plateau. On the latter rise, within a few miles of each other, streams which flow via Gombe and the Gongola to the Benue, via Katagum and the Komadugu, to Lake Chad, and via the Kaduna and Zungeru to the Niger.[26] Though the northern plains are sometimes liable to drought, overall, the territory is well watered. The rainfall is nowhere less than 16 inches annualy. The volume of water

[24] Charles Lindsay Temple, "Northern Nigeria." *The Geographical Journal* 40, no. 2 (August 1912):151.
[25] Ibid., 151-52
[26] Ibid., 152.

passing down the Niger at Baro is probably about one and a half million cubic feet per second.[27]

The land is, overall, fertile, even in the northern portion where the soil might strike the casual observer as being too sandy and light to bear heavy crops, and to require extensive periods of rest, we find in the neighbourhood of Sokoto and Kano large populations of about half a million people living at an average of 300 per square mile and obtaining all the food required to keep them in robust health from the soil. South of Lokoja and the Benue the staple foods are roots, mainly the yam, and to the north cereals, chiefly Guinea corn and gero, both species of millet.[28] In the neighbourhood of Kano, intensive cultivation and irrigation are frequently employed, with onions, peppers, cassava, sweet potatoes, and other crops being cultivated to a large extent.[29]

John B. Appleton and Wilma Belden state that the Royal Niger Company, one of the largest British chartered trading companies, was established in 1886, and run for thirteen years. From the start, the company understood the greater prospects posed by the northern territory. As it happened, though, the flow of commodities from the north was more tough to sustain, such as Indigo, cotton, and tobacco, which involved the employment of routine labour in their production. Native products of the palm oil belt did not. Likewise, the political and social circumstances were anything but favourable either to manufacture or trade. Appleton and Belden noted that slave-raiding, intertribal wars, and the long-established Mohammedan monopoly all limited the European merchant. As a private firm the corporation was in a tight position because it was obliged to carry on the fight for the expansion of British interests competing both with the French, who surrounded the territory,

[27] Ibid.
[28] Ibid., 152.
[29] Ibid., 153.

and with the native rulers. The consequence, the charter of the Royal Niger Company was void in 1899 and Northern Nigeria was established as a Protectorate, its boundaries defined, and Sir Frederick Lugard appointed High Commissioner. The Royal Niger Company had held little control over the country beyond the limitations available from the Niger and Benue Rivers. Its dealings had been commercial rather than political. Transportation facilities were extremely limited and the Niger itself could only be navigated during the flood season.

Frederick D. Lugard provided reasons why he overthrew the Sokoto Caliphate in a lecture he delivered to The Royal Geographical Society, an Institute of British Geographers. He describes the Fulani system of rule as one copied from the Habe dynasty which predates them and revised by the Koranic law.[30]

Lugard asserts that the alkalis (judges) were mostly men of much learning in "Mohanmmedan" (Islamic) law, and they believed that their courts were no respecters of persons. Summonses were consistently observed, and the sentences of the court applied; estates of deceased persons were administered, and a regular system of court fees obtained. The system of taxation was very complete, though very difficult. The title to all land appears to have been entrusted in the emir as feudal lord, while the chief officers of the state were fief-holders, usually resident at the capital. The emir received 50 per cent of the taxes, and the fief-holders 25 per cent. His principal retainer as well lived in the capital and collected half of the remaining 25 per cent. The other half was again split up between the Fulani tax-gatherer in the district and the local headman. "Mohammedans" (Musims) appear to have paid a tithe, while pagans were indiscriminately evaluated, and the taxes twice in case of revolt. Besides this land tax, every form of handicraft (weavers, dyers, blacksmiths, etc.)

[30] Frederick D. Lugard, "Northern Nigeria." *The Geographical Journal* 23, no. 1 (January 1904): 7.

paid a tax; caravans, canoe-owners, sellers in the market, and collectors of sylvan produce similarly paid, while a complete system of death duties was, I believe, enforced.[31]

Lugard argues that it is the goal of the British administration to control the prevalence of this taxation, and, while freeing the peasantry from harsh levies, to administer equal payment of a fair and just taxation, of which possibly the Government may itself have a stake. He noted that intrinsic to the system was the incessant raiding for slaves, both for use by the rulers and for payment of the tribute to the Sokoto Caliphate. Lugard claims that this has led to the low population of these areas because of the activities of slave raiders. He said:

> The country was thus rapidly depopulated, since the numbers captured, vast as they were, were but a small proportion to those killed or left to die of starvation. These raids were made against independent pagan tribes.

He observes that the Fulani had never completely defeated the country and had only partly overpowered the cities of the plains, where their horsemen were efficient. Substantial regions were still dominated by autonomous tribes even in the plains, while the hill countryside was completely pagan. Raids were as well made upon the subject peoples on the pretext of revolt, or on no excuse at all. He said, "where a Fulani army passed it left a depopulated desert."[32]

Lugard contends that the rise of luxury and large harems, the growth of the large class of idle princes, officeholders, and armed retainers, had "so vitiated the system of rule, that when the transfer took place in 1900, it was already a chaos in the southern states." He attributes the fall to the coming of Europeans. He said, "its collapse had been hastened by

[31] Ibid.
[32] Lugard, "Northern Nigeria," 7.

the advent of Europeans, and especially by the overthrow of the Nupe power by the company. The ancient regime had been discredited and broken, and nothing substituted for it." He points out that there was a prevalence of bribery and corruption and there was absence of justice in the system as judges are corrupts. He contended that taxation had slipped into the nastiest forms of persecution, associated with brutality and atrocity, so that no one's life was secure. Equally, Lugard noted that trade was slowed down because of coercion, and by the insecurity of the roads, for on every side the subject peoples were in revolt, and the tax-gatherers were effectively removed from several areas. Lugard avers that the peasantry and slaves of Nupe were running by the thousands to the south bank of the Niger, there to lead a life of homelessness or relative laziness. He said the company's treaties of relationship with Sokoto had been put aside by the war against Nupe.[33]

Lugard contended that the reasons he articulated were responsible for British intervention in Northern Nigeria. He argues that their intervention was necessary to restore trade, justice, security and stop suppression of others by Fulani oligarchy. He said, "it was in these circumstances that the present Government wrested the suzerainty from the Fulani, an alien race detested for their misrule. What they won by conquest they lost by defeat, and Government now claims those rights – the right of legislation and taxation, the right to appoint rulers, and the ultimate title to land."[34]

Lugard adduces that the position of the Fulani, was very distinct from that of the Yoruba chiefs of Lagos, who had ruled for years over peoples of their own race with a well-established system of communal land tenure. Lugard claimed that the British conquest of

[33] Lugard, "Northern Nigeria," 7.
[34] Ibid.

this huge region has been almost orderly, for most of the people were not against the deposition of the Fulani. Lugard writes:

> The problem is what should now be done with the Fulani. Their misrule has compelled interference; their over-weening self-confidence has rendered conciliatory overtures abortive. Throughout the length and breadth of Northern Nigeria, therefore, they have now been conquered.[35]

The question is whether what Lugard articulated in his address as a reason for British colonial rule was shared by the people of that region. I believe that majority of the people were opposed to British invasion. They saw the invasion as destroying their sacred religion, system and lifestyle which is different from what the British colonial rule brought to them. The people's resistance showed in the war waged by the people against the British rule; for instance, the Satiru revolts of 1906 after the deposition of Sultan Attahiru, the twelfth Caliph of Sokoto and Sarkin Musulumi and his death in the hand of British soldiers.

Appleton and Belden noted that Lugard justified that the use of force was necessary to make British occupation successful. Lugard claimed that the conquest was achieved with less bloodshed, and once the power of the Government was asserted, the indigenous people according to the editors were treated with kindness and discretion. Note that on January 1, 1914, the Colony and Protectorate of Southern Nigeria was amalgamated with the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria, with Sir Frederick Lugard the first Governor General.[36]

[35] Lugard, Northern Nigeria." 8-9.
[36] John B. Appleton and Wilma Belden, "Northern Nigeria – A Study in Political Geography." *Economic Geography* 12, no. 4 (October 1936): 334-5.

The claim by Lugard that the overthrown of Sokoto Caliphate was almost bloodless was dismissed by Max Siollum as not true. In his book, *What Britain Did to Nigeria: A Short History of Conquest and Rule*, he wrote:

> How he came to this conclusion is a source of great mystery. During the second battle of Burmi alone, the WAFF fired an astonishing 32,710 rounds from small arms and piles of 700-1000 native corpses littered the town. Attahiru's corpse lay with those of two of his sons among hundreds of others who chose to die trying to protect him rather than escape and live.[37]

Siollum gave a graphic description of how the British soilders beheaded some of the ringleaders' bodies, snapped their removed heads and then paraded them all over the region to show the people that the resistance has beed defeated.[38]

Appleton and Belden point out that Lugard and his staff, faced with many problems of administration, introduced "Indirect Rule" which promised to be one of the most successful experiments in the government of backward peoples." It is based upon the principle that "all races prefer local self-rule, relatively inefficient though it may be, to direct alien rule, however just and benevolent." The most spectacular feature of the new form of government derives from the use of the existing native institutions as the basis on which the colonial administration is superimposed. Lugard acknowledges that the Emirs, the native courts, and the existing legal codes represented a natural growth which was an expression of the interacting geographical, social, and political conditions of the people and of the nation.[39]

[37] Max Siollum, *What Britain Did to Nigeria: A Short History of Conquest and Rule* (London: Hurst and Company, 2021),174.
[38] Ibid.
[39] Appleton and Belden, "Northern Nigeria – A Study in Political Geography," 335.

Appleton and Belden maintain that the native administrative machinery was left intact, such as Emirs, district headsmen, and village chieftains, and into this hierarchy was woven a similar one of British Officials, Residents, District Officers, and Assistant District Officers. The Governor is the supreme authority and holds office, usually, for a term of six years. Under him, the Lieutenant Governor is responsible for the management of the entire administrative apparatus. The real administration is carried on by "Residents," each of whom oversees a province, approximating 16,000 square miles. They oversee all public services throughout the province. The members of the Resident's staff act as the commissioners of the Provincial Court, of which he is a judge, and it is through them that he can keep in touch with and advise the indigenous rulers. Every province is divided into three or four divisions each under a District Officer, whose primary duties are the supervision of the local native courts and the assessment of taxes, during which he is brought into close contact with the people and can gain a close knowledge of current economic and social conditions. Since Northern Nigeria has no seaboard and cannot, thus, get revenue from customs duties, it seemed only fair that some share of Southern Nigerian customs be allocated to the northern provinces. This subsidy, initially $170,000, and later $375,000 showed to be totally insufficient to cover the cost of the administration. The deficit was met by a grant-in-aid from the Imperial Treasury which averaged $2,500,000 annually.[40]

Appleton and Belden noted that taxation as initially levied by the "Mohammedan" (Muslim) victors enforced a much heavier burden upon the defeated "pagans" than on those of the Muslim faith. With increased luxury and wealth, the tendency had been for the rich and powerful to avoid the tax while the peasantry was imperilled to much heavier burdens. Under the reform of the British administration, though, many of the old taxes, though

[40] Appleton and Belden, "Northern Nigeria – A Study in Political Geography," 335.

maintained, were restructured and the evaluation through native agencies supervised by the District Officers. The general tax, known as the "*Haraj*," in "Mohammedan" (Muslim) districts and as the Government Tax in others, is based mainly upon the evaluated wealth of the village as a group and the amount to be paid by everyone is decided by the village headman. The "*Jangali*" is levied on the owners of livestock. The taxes, received by the native administrations, are split so that 30 to 50 percent goes to the Government and the balance to the Native Treasuries. The latter provide for the specific salaries of the Emir and his subordinates, and for the maintenance of public buildings, roads, and other civic projects.[41]

Appleton and Belden contend that land lease has also been modified and all land is held in trust for the natives. The Governor is the sole authority of its disposition, and his consent must be obtained before any title can turn over or conveyance of land to non-natives take place.[42]

Appleton and Belden aver that it was unavoidable from the beginning that the application of the principles of Indirect Rule would differ in the various provinces according to local circumstances. In the Emirates where the native system of administration was old-established and long-accepted, it was only crucial for the Residents to give advice and develop.[43]

Appleton and Belden noted that by far the most important mineral deposit of Northern Nigeria is the tin found in the Bauchi Plateau. As early as 1884, it was found that the tin used by the natives, instead of being transported across the desert as had hitherto been believed, was being produced in the plateau region. Because of the belligerent attitude of

[41] Appleton and Wilma Belden, "Northern Nigeria – A Study in Political Geography," 335-36.
[42] Ibid., 336.
[43] Ibid.

the "pagans," little was done to verify or discover the sources of the metal until after the British Government assumed control. In 1902-1903, the Niger Company organized three expeditions into the area and discovered that tin was widely distributed throughout the region. The rugged character of the plateau, and the lack of transportation facilities made it very difficult to reach the richer deposits and deterred mining development. With the extension of the railroad to Bukuru in 1915, however, the tin fields were opened, and brought within a two days' journey of the coast.[44] Appleton and Belden assert, "the British Government has been able to establish in Northern Nigeria a successful system of colonial government based upon the use of indigenous institutions which have been evolved over a long period of time and are closely adapted to environmental conditions."[45]

Anthony I. Nwabughuogu echoes Appleton and Belden that Lugard introduced indirect rule[46] in the Northern Nigeria as a short-term measure. "The Fulani rule" Lugard wrote to the Colonial Office in 1901, "has been maintained as an experiment, for I am anxious to prove to this people that we have no hostility towards them." But the opponents of Indirect rule argue that there were indications, though, that Lugard would, in the future, replace the emirs with a one man's rule if it becomes necessary. In short, his action had already showed when he removed the emirs of Kotangora and Bida and was carrying out such a systematic obliteration of their institutions that the Earl of Onslow, the under-secretary of state for the colonies, was forced to warn him that "There is no desire on the

[44] Ibid., 338.
[45] Ibid., 339.
[46] "Indirect Rule" is referred to the system of native administration developed by Lord Lugard in Northern Nigeria, extended to some part of Southern Nigeria in the second decade of the twentieth century, and to all parts of Nigeria in the 1920s – a system of administration in which the authority of the native emirs and chiefs was the fundamental element in government" (Anthony I. Nwabughuogu, 65).

part of His Majesty's Government to destroy the existing forms of administration or to govern the country otherwise than through its own rulers."[47]

But before 1906, Lugard had begun to boost the powers of the emirs at the expense of everything else. And from this time onward, Lugard's actions and writings began to lay stress on the "indispensable" role of the emirs and chiefs in the administration of Nigeria. Lugard points out that "civilization" of the African became unattainable without paramount chiefs." It is this fascination for chiefs and emirs' power climaxed in the publication of Lugard's *Political Memoranda in 1906* in which he set out a program for re-establishing and sustaining the authority of his standard chief. The emirs and chiefs, Lugard noted, were to be "supported in every way and their authority upheld." He points out that they were to be sole Native Authorities in their respective districts, with powers to enforce "Native law and custom," to make new laws subject only to the authorisation of the governor and to control all natives living in their areas. They were to have power over land and the only right to collect taxes or tributes.[48]

Nwabughuogu states that to ensure that this policy worked, the agents of social and economic change – the Christian missionaries, the European traders, and the coastal traders were to be limited. For example, Lugard gave little support to the missionaries arguing that "it was unwise and unjust to force missions upon the Mohamedan population" and "a breach of the promise I made to them." Lugard forbids the coastal trader because of their "fondness for litigation," and gave little support to European traders, contending that their "aim is purely dollars, but they talk with an excess of unctuous righteousness." Lugard went on to introduce the payment of tolls by all "non-native" that is, non-Northern Nigerian traders

[47] Anthony I. Nwabughuogu, "The Role of Propaganda in the Development of Indirect Rule in Nigeria, 1890-1929." *The International Journal of African Historical Studies* 14, no. 1 (1981):76-7
[48] Ibid.,77.

entering the region – a policy which was "strongly objected to by the Commerce and the High Commissioner of Lagos" as presenting "a real impediment to trade."[49]

Nwabughuogu states that from 1905, Lugard mounted up a powerful publicity drive designed at persuading British public opinion that he alone had the ideal system to rule Africans. In Lugard's Annual Reports, sent to the Colonial Office, letters to the press, and above all his *Political Memoranda*, were the methods with which he carried out his campaign. He argues that what Africans required was peace before progress and that only his system of administration through the emirs and chiefs offered that order. Lugard criticised the administration of the South for making use of institutions designed on a European system for a people who were still in the low stage of development.[50]

Nwabughuogu noted that Lugard's own publicity was so strong that it made critics even among those in the Colonial Office who earlier had been harsh to his policies. In 1905, for instance, Winston Churchill, then the under-secretary of state for the colonies, defined the system of administration Lugard had entrenched in the Northern Nigeria as an "elaborate structure of civilised government already in existence." And in 1906, following Lugard

[49] Ibid., 77-78.

[50] Nwabughuogu, "The Role of Propaganda in the Development of Indirect Rule in Nigeria, 1890-1929," 79-80

report that the defeat of the "Satiru Rebellion"[51] had been due not so much to British firepower but to the allegiance and assistance of the emirs and chiefs.[52]

Nwabughuogu noted that Lugard argued that any attempt to abolish indirect rule and bring the north to accept the "civilizing" pressures from the south would amount to wooing an uprising of the majority Muslim population of the north. The only way to avert the explosion of a Muslim revolt in Northern Nigeria was not only to keep indirect rule as a system of administration but also that he should be personally familiarised with the political circumstances of Northern Nigeria.[53]

Nwabughuogu contends that the British people were not ready to cause another Muslim rebellion in their colonies. British experience at the hands of the Mahdi in Egyptian Sudan, which claimed the life of Charles George Gordon in 1885, had taught them lesions. With such arguments, almost bordering on blackmail, appologists of indirect rule succeeded in convincing the bureaucrats at the Colonial Office to the view that indirect rule remained the best system of government in Northern Nigeria.[54]

Nwabughuogu contends that the appointment of Lugard as the first governor-general of amalgamated Southern and Northern Nigeria marked the victory of the Northern Nigerian

[51] R.A. Adeleye asserts that the "Satiru rebellion" of February to March 1906 is anti-colonial resistance in Northern Nigeria and a result to the latent but underlying threat which it posed to the establishment of British administration in Northern Nigeria as well as to its tragic consequences both for the government and the rebels. Satiru is also a testament to the British conquest of the Sokoto Caliphate from 1900-03. The rebellion proves the predicament of a colonial administration which see itself as a "Messianic", a champion of "humanism and enlightenment," pitched against the resentment of a conquered people with a hardy political culture, a world view and form of relationships of which the colonial administrators were largely uninformed. Following the defeat of the forces of the Caliph Attahiru Ahmad at Burmi on 27th July 1903, the British military's conquest of the Sokoto Caliphate had become a certainty. The opposition against British colonial rule in Northern Nigeria were led by local Mallams who secretly organised to confront the British colonial army. These Mallams command large followings, having declared themselves Mahdi or precursor with a mission to deliver Dãr al Islãm from the yoke of White infidels (R.A. Adelẹkẹ, "Madist and British Revenge in Northern Nigeria: Satiru 1906." *Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria* 6, no. 2 (June 1972):193-4).

[52] Nwabughuogu, "The Role of Propaganda in the Development of Indirect Rule in Nigeria, 1890-1929," 82.

[53] Ibid., 84-5.

[54] Nwabughuogu, "The Role of Propaganda in the Development of Indirect Rule in Nigeria, 1890-1929," 85.

system of administration. The old methods of assessing "colonies-administrative efficiency" and "economic development" are derelict. He points out that new methods were now created entailing the degree of depth and permanence of "native chiefs" and their loyalty to Britain. Consequently, the criteria for the selection of candidates for positions as colonial administrators, at least for Nigeria, had changed. The policy of selecting a man who could carry out the development of the region and its people at a lowest cost, while at the same time advancing British commerce, was now outdated. The person who knew how to control "native chiefs" was to be chosen. Nwabughuogu avers that Indirect rule had become a doctrine of colonial administration in Nigeria.[55]

Nwabughuogu asserts that both in the Amalgamation Proposal which he submitted in 1913, and in the Annual Reports of that era, Lugard contended that political institutions embodied on the British way were too sophisticated for African indigenous people and that attempts to operate them had not only been ineffective but had likewise bred tyranny and exploitation of the many by the privileged few and had stimulated laziness by failing to introduce direct taxation. The Southern administration was also accused of neglecting native policy by making it difficult for the "chief" to "take effective part in the administration." Lugard then proposed sweeping changes in the administration of Southern Nigeria that would bring it into line with the Northern Nigeria system. This would include a division of the territory into nine provinces, the setting up of "purely native courts" and the abolition of the Legislative Council.[56]

Nwabughuogu asserts that in September 1913, Lord Harcourt, the colonial secretary, gave endorsement to Lugard's proposal: "I approve the proposed division of Southern Nigeria into nine provinces, and the reorganisation of the system of administration on the general

[55] Ibid., 86.
[56] Nwabughuogu, "The Role of Propaganda in the Development of Indirect Rule in Nigeria, 1890-1929," 86-7.

lines of that obtaining in Northern Nigeria as explained in paragraphs 42-45 of your report." Once again, Lugard's publicity had won. Armed with this endorsement, Lugard merged the two territories on the 1st of January 1914. From then on, he started to enact laws which sought to put his plans into results. However, by the Native Courts Ordinance of 1914, a uniform system of native courts was founded for the whole of Nigeria based on the Northern Nigeria pattern. And the Native Authorities Ordinance of 1916 established sole Native Authorities in the south as in the north.[57]

Nwabughuogu asserts that Lugard carried out a methodical defence of indirect rule from 1919. With his three major works, the revised *Political Memoranda* (1919), the final Report of the *Amalgamation of Northern and Southern Nigeria* (1920), and the *Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa* (1922), and through the numerous articles published during this era, he contends that Lugard puts up a strong defense of the British colonial system in Africa. Lugard argues that Africa was naturally committed to change, but this change must come through the gradual evolution of familiar institutions. Lugard claimed that the "primitive" peoples of Africa were inept at leading themselves effectively through this process without British assistance. They had to be educated to develop their own system. Such was the purpose of indirect rule.[58] But what Lugard failed to understand is that before the establishment of British colonial rule in Nigeria, the various groups have a well-established system of government. So, it is unfair by Lugard to say that they have to educate the people to develop their own system when he met a well organised Sokoto emirate system.

[57] Ibid.
[58] Ibid., 89.

2. 3 Constitutional Development in Nigeria, 1922 -1960

However, driven by this zeal, colonial administrators in Nigeria started to step up the expansion of indirect rule principles in all regions of Nigeria. Hugh Clifford, who succeeded Lugard in 1919 as governor of Nigeria, left his personal belief that the Lugardian system of indirect rule should be limited to the north and other places which had political institutions that could be utilised for that aim, which he first voiced in 1920 and repeated in 1922. By the end of 1922, Clifford found himself supporting the introduction of direct taxation, the very principle which Lugard saw as the most vital in the success of indirect rule into the provinces of Warri, Ogoja, Onitsha, Owerri, and Calabar. These were areas which in Clifford's own words had "no strong native authority capable of governing" and where the "policy is not to force the pace in regard to social evolution purely for the convenience of administration…"[59]

The methods used by Sir Hugh Clifford and his successor in 1925, Sir Graeme Thomson, to extend the principles of indirect rule into these provinces have been ably recounted by scholars who show that Lugardian concepts as enunciated in the *Political Memoranda* and the *Dual Mandate* were followed to the full. The policy embodying these principles was sent to the Colonial Office in 1926 for approval. The Colonial Office displayed its total conversion to this universalist application of indirect rule in 1927 when it sanctioned the introduction of direct taxation to the Southeastern Nigeria territories. Direct taxation was introduced in those provinces in 1928. The result was the outbreak of the "Aba Women's Riots" in 1929.[60]

[59] Nwabughuogu, "The Role of Propaganda in the Development of Indirect Rule in Nigeria, 1890-1929," 90.
[60] Ibid., 90-91.

Huge Clifford succeeded Lugard as Governor-General of Nigeria and was a critic of Lugard's amalgamation. He criticised Lugard for lack of an attempt to bring them into a single whole. He said:

> Did not provide for the "amalgamation" of these three units in any sense in which that term is ordinarily used, for "amalgamation" would normally imply some attempt to merge them into a single whole. No such attempt was, in fact, made, and indeed the basic idea of the scheme appears to have been the maintenance of the colony and the two protectorates as three separate and fully equipped Administrators, bound together principally, if not solely, by the fact that each of these three Administrations was to be immediately responsible to the Governor-General instead of the Secretary of State.

Clifford drew attention to the South – North division increased by preserving mutually exclusive secretariats for the two regions. He equally complained of an absence of a central secretariat and consequently the absence of a mechanism for the management of the three administrative units (Lagos, South, and North), pointing out that "if the ideal at which we should aim is, as I hold it should be, the eventual evolution not only of an 'amalgamated' but of a united Nigeria it is essential that the coordination of administrative work, political and non-political alike, should be directed from a single centre." The 1922 constitution abolished the Nigerian council created by Lugard. Instead, Clifford created a Legislative Council. This paved the way for a single political unit for fiscal and budgetary purposes for the Southern and Northern Provinces. Clifford contends that all laws coming from the Legislative Council and pertaining to custom and excise duties as well as criminal law were made applicable to the North.[61] Though he barred the Legislative Council for discussing bills that relate to the North without his consent, what it means is that only the Governor can

[61] Ebere Nwaubani, "Constitution-making and the Nigerian Identity, 1914-1960." In *The Transformation of Nigeria: Essays in Honor of Toyin Falola*, ed. Adebayo Oyebade (Trenton: Africa World Press, 2002), 78-9.

legislate for the Northern Provinces whose only representatives are lieutenant-governor, the senior residents, and a pair of European businessmen from the Kano Chamber of Commerce and the Jos Chamber of Mines. The implication is that though amalgamated as one, they remain a separate entity with the exception of the British and the businessmen. This long exclusion of Northern Nigerians from the Legislative Council was a serious omission.[62]

Richmond Palmer, the lieutenant governor of the North (1925-1930), helped to widen the gulf between the North and the South. He insisted that both the North and South are a separate entity and should be treated as so. He regarded the decision made by the Legislative Council as not binding on the North even though they are members. He called it "interference from Lagos in Northern Affairs."[63]

In June 1931 there was a change of guard. David Cameroon became the governor of Nigeria. Under his leadership, the Southern and Northern departments were unified. Cameroon observed that Northern Nigeria is being treated as a separate entity by his predecesors instead of the Northern Nigerian Province. He decided to do away with it and treat them as one Nigeria since the idea of the amalgamation would be defeated.

Cameroon considered this idea untenable since the development of the North as a separate political unit would be a return to a state of affairs that amalgamation was specifically designed to terminante. Second, Cameroon was convinced that for geographical reasons, Northern Nigeria could not develop as a self-contained political and economic unit because it must depend on the coast as well as the railways and ports of the South for its international trade.[64]

[62] Ibid.
[63] Ibid., 82.
[64] Nwaubani, "Constitution-making and the Nigerian Identity, 1914-1960," 83.

To deal with the friction Cameroon identified that the cause of the friction is bureaucracy between Northern and Southern Nigeria. He noted that the manner in which indirect rule or native administration was designed and applied in the Northern Province was different. He contends that: "The root of the evil lies in the conception that a native administration is designed ultimately to administer all the affairs of all the people in a geographical unit." Cameroon deviced a plan to deal with the issues and introduced a radical change. He asked C.W. Alexander, the lieutenant governor of the North, that henceforth the residence of the governor in Kaduna which used to be called as "Government House" should cease to be so. He said there will be only one Government House in Nigeria, and both emirs and chiefs were not to be regarded as "rulers."[65]

In 1933, Cameroon introduced the Native Authority Ordinance which declared that native authorities were local government agents and not a semi-independent authority. Cameroon published *The Principles of Native Administration and Their Application* in 1934, in which he infers that there will be a "great dander" in the absence of any "governing policy as to the political development of the country as a whole." He canvassed for a future political direction for Nigeria. He argues that the idea of separate entity is unrealisable considering the geographical and economic reasons which hamper such a move.[66]

However, Bernard Bourdillion succeeded Cameroon as Governor of Nigeria. He argues that the native authorities are "not autonomous bodies," but rather a vital part of the apparatus of the government. He made changes in the British Administrative Service by pruning down its functions. He tasked the Native Administrations to take the functions of the British Administrative Service. He advised that educated Afriacans should seek

[65] Ibid., 83-4.
[66] Ibid., 84.

employment and perform some of the functions.[67] But Bourdillion noted that despite all their efforts, Northern Nigeria based officials were reluctant to embrace the authority in Lagos. However, Burdillion in 1939 split the Southern Nigeria into two: Eastern and Western Provinces.[68]

The Richards Constitution of 1946 divided Nigeria into three regions, with each region headed by a chief commissioner, with a House of Assembly, while the North has a House of Chiefs. Richard expanded the membership of the Legistalive Council to include indigenous northerners. He also links the native administration in the north to the native administration in Lagos. The Richards Constitution made regions as the centre of political activities, though the constitution created a unitary system of government in Nigeria. It equally made provision for one Legislature, that is the Legislative Council and one executive, that is the Executive Council, to both be in Lagos and to legislate for and govern the country. Although, the constitution made a provision for a regional House of Assembly, their functions were advisory. They could only propose a legislation concerning their region and make recommendations to the Legislative Council. Also, the regional assemblies served as an electoral college for the Legislative Council and approved the region's budget.[69]

The Richards Constitution was criticised by Nigerian nationalists for its administrative devolution instead of political devolution. For instance, Nnamdi Azikiwe, the leader of the National Convention of Nigeria and Cameroons (NCNC) established in 1944, canvassed for the rejection of the Richards Constitution. He embarked on nationwide campaign and even sent delegates to London to stop the implementation of the constitution. But one of the nationalists and member of the northern representatives to the Legislative Council Abubakar

[67] Ibid., 84-5
[68] Ibid., 86.
[69] Nwaubani, "Constitution-making and the Nigerian Identity, 1914-1960," 87.

Tafawa Belewa opposed Azikiwe's action. He regarded it as hostility against the north. He said: "let the South know…. that we will never cooperate with that gang of agitators who are not sure of what they are doing."[70] Other nationalists joined in the debate such as Samuel Ladoke Akintola and Obafemi Awolowo who all had different views. Akintola criticised the actions of NCNC and Nigerian Youth Movement. For Awolowo, Nigeria is not a nation. It is a mere "geographical expression." He reminded the British government that Nigeria is a composition of diverse ethnic groups with their distinct cultures. He believed that the British government should treat them as a different entity rather than as a unity. The criticism of the Richards constitution was its inability to seek a Nigerian opinion,[71] though there were extensive debates on the shape of another constitutional amendments, from rural areas to district and provincial levels in 1948-1949. All proposals made at the provincial levels were debated at regional conferences. As of October 1949, all regions and colonies had concluded their conferences. They recommended a federal system based on the three existing regions and were in consensus that some aspect of financial and legislative powers of the central legislature should be delegated to the regional legislatures. Again, the Eastern, Western, and Lagos conferences preferred a full-fledged cabinet or ministrial system consisting mostly of Nigerians who would have executive responsibility over their departments. On the other hand, the Northern regional conference preferred to maintain the current central Executive Council whose function was primarily to advise the governor on matters of general policy and on government bills presented to the central legislature. Also, at the central level, the North wanted the chief commissioner to exercise "original executive powers" in all matters on which the regional legislature had legislative competence. Equally, they recommended that the chief commissioner should be advised by a "Regional Executive

[70] Ibid., 88.
[71] Ibid., 89.

Council" of officials and unofficials selected by him at his preference, and that the council should be advisory, but the chief commissioner is not bound to accept its advice.[72]

The difference of opinions by both the North and South emerged after their conferences. The South preferred full decentralisation of power to the people, but the North was more comfortable with the status quo, that is, British keeping the power. The same differences emerged in the Ibadan conference of 9-28 January 1950, such as: the formula for regional representation in the central legislature, the basis of the franchise (direct or indirect; if indirect, how many levels of electoral colleges; universal or not), the principle of revenue allocation, ministerial responsibility, an increase in the number of regions, the advisability of a commission on boundary changes, and whether or not to merge Lagos with the Western Region.[73] Another contentious issue between the North and South was regional representation in the planned central legislature. The Drafting Committee suggested a membership ration of 30:22:22 for North, the East, and the West. But the East and the West wanted equal representation for all regions and resigned themselves to this ration.[74] Other proposals by the committee included a bicameral central legislature, the composition of the lower house was to be based on population while the regions were to have equal representation in the upper chamber. However, the Legistative Council, in September 1950 agreed that a unicameral central legislature should be earmarked to the North.[75]

The Macpherson Constitution of 1951, otherwise called the "Nigeria Constitution Order in Council 1951", established a single-chamber central legislature, known as the House of Representatives, and a central executive (the governor advised by a Council of Ministers). It also established a legislature and an executive for each region. In the Northern and

[72] Nwaubani, "Constitution-making and the Nigerian Identity, 1914-1960," 90.
[73] Ibid.
[74] Ibid., 90-91
[75] Ibid., 91-2.

Western Regions, the legislatures comprised two chambers, a House of Chiefs and a House of Assembly, only the East had a House of Assembly. In each of the regions, the executive was the lieutenant governor advised by an Executive Council.[76]

One of the merits of the Macpherson Constitution of 1951 was it enhanced the powers and status of the regions. It also is a quasi-federal system with provisions for a strong central government. The 1951 Constitution made provision for the centre to override the decisions of the regional bodies and force the regions to accept central government decisions, both matters on legislative and executive functions.[77]

Furthermore, the 1951 Constitution was a remarkable one in that it offered Nigerians a clear prospect of power in the colonial government for the first time in term of legislative powers and ministrial positions at both the centre and the regional level. The 1951 Constitution induced the birth of the Action Group (AG) led by Obafemi Awolowo, and the Northern Peoples' Congress (NPC) led by Ahmadu Bello. The problem is both AG and NPC were inspired by regional and ethnic chauvinism. The NPC was a political expression of northern interests, especially Hausa-Fulani, while AG was an offshoot of Egbe Omo Oduduwa, a Yoruba socio-cultural formation, and so of Yoruba interests.

The 1951 elections showed victories for regional forces and ethnic nationalists. AG led by Awolowo won overwhelmingly in the West while the NPC secured victory in the North. However, elected from Lagos into the Western House of Assembly was Nnamdi Azikiwe, an Igbo and the leaders of NCNC. Azikiwe won to go to the House of Representatives. But he was denied the opportunity because he is not a Yoruba. Again, because the regional

[76] Nwaubani, "Constitution-making and the Nigerian Identity, 1914-1960," 92.
[77] Ibid.

assemblies serve as electoral colleges to the House, AG dominated the Western House and they voted against Azikiwe.[78]

Instead of unifying the country as one which Lugard's amalgation tended to solve, the 1951 Macpherson constitution sped up the drift of the country towards ethnic and regional nationalism. For instance, the political parties were established along regional lines with each drawing its main supporters from their ethnic groups. National politics in this situation became tantamount with the competing major interests.[79]

The final nail to the 1951 constitution was the motion in the House of Representatives by Anthony Enahoro on 31 March 1953. He said: this House accepts as a primary political objective the attainment of self-government for Nigeria in 1956." Bello offered an amendment, substituting "as soon as practicable." Ibrahim Imam, a member of the House and a northern representative, moved motion for an adjournment of the debate on Enahoro's motion to enable regional legislatures to discuss it first. Both Western and Eastern members of the House walked away in protest to the motion. However, the disagreement and subsequent treatment of northern politicians in the hands of local urchins at Iddo train station was received in the north with anti-southern feelings. On 16 May 1953, it took a violent turn in Kano, and eventually it was the day an AG team was on tour of Northern Nigeria. From 16 to 19 May, both southerners and northerners living in Kano attacked each other, burning, and destroying each other's property, dismembering bodies of victims, and committing the most heinous atrocities on one another in the mass panic which took over the city of Kano.[80]

[78] Nwaubani, "Constitution-making and the Nigerian Identity, 1914-1960," 95.
[79] Ibid., 96.
[80] Ibid., 100.

This resulted to the state of emergency on the Northern Region and suspension of all political campaigns until normalcy was returned.[81]

In the aftermath of the mayhem in Kano, on 21May 1953, Oliver Lyttleton, the Secretary of State for the colonies said, "recent events have shown that it is not possible for the three regions in Nigeria to work together effectively in a federation so closely knit as that provided by the present constitution." He promised changes in the constitution to make room for greater regional autonomy and remove the power of intervention from the centre.[82]

However, on 29 July 1953, a conference of all political parties with their representatives stayed in London to draw a new constitution within the broad structure prepared by Lyttleton. The British government, though, rejected the idea to fix a date for self-government for Nigeria especially since the north refused to accept the 1956 date proposed by Enahoro. However, the British government argued that any region who so desired in 1956 to attain self-governing in the matters of regional competence can do so. The conference agreed on federal elections to the House of Representatives, separate from those of the regional Houses of Assembly which so far served as electoral colleges for the central legislature. It equally agreed that the Council of Ministers would comprise of nine ministers drawn from the House of Representatives, three from each region, but without the prior approval of the regional legislatures as under the 1951 constitution. Again, the status of Lagos was another contention by the political parties. The AG wanted Lagos merged as part of the Western region while NCNC and NPC wanted it to be a neutral federal terroritory. Also, AG threatened secession of the West, but backed down when the British government describes his action as an act force, which the British will resist. However, both AG and

[81] *Mohammed Shehu Isah and Aisha Aliyu Ahmed, Federalism: An Overview of the Nigerian Perspective* (Mauritius: LAP Lambert Academic Publishing, 2020), 74.
[82] Nwaubani, "Constitution-making and the Nigerian Identity, 1914-1960," 100.

NPC unsuccessfully wanted to introduce a clause providing for succession in the constitution.[83]

Some of the issues were not resolved in the London conference but moved to the Lagos conference of 1954. The outcome of the report was published a month later and makes provision for a federation comprising Eastern, Northern, and Western Regions, as well as the Federal Territory of Lagos. It also created a new House of Representatives, whose membership included 184, 92 from the Northern Region, 42 from the Eastern Region, 42 from Western Region, 6 from the Southern Cameroons, and 2 from Lagos. The governor of Nigeria was renamed "governor-general," while the lieutenant governors of the regions became governors.[84]

The aftermath of both the London and Lagos conferences formed the basis of the Nigeria Constitution Amendment Order in Council which came into effect on 1 October 1954, otherwise called the Oliver Lyttelton Constitution. It removed the centralising features of the 1951 constitution. The amendment provided a list of concurrent lists on which both the federal and regional legislatures could legislate with equal force, while all others were wholly reserved to the regions. Equally, High Courts were created for each region and empowered by law to interpret all laws enacted by the regional legislature. Also, the federal Supreme Court was established and given the duties of interpreting the constitution and hearing appeals from the regional High Courts, with each region having its public service. Beginning from 1954, regions became the real centre of power.[85] Rotimi Suberu summarises

[83] Ibid., 100-101.
[84] Nwaubani, "Constitution-making and the Nigerian Identity, 1914-1960," 102.
[85] Ibid., 102-103.

the Lyttelton constitution as a complete federal system, with specific powers to the central government, and a residual power to the three regions.[86]

The Constitution of the Federation of Nigeria, 1960 provides for independent Federal Parliamentary democracy of the British Commonwealth.[87] The independent constitution was in many ways a reaffirmation of the essential principles of the 1954 constitution. The Willink Commission for the creation of a new region was rejected. There were issues of the British Cameroon's Trust Territories pending outcome of the UN – supervised referenda.[88] Olakunle A. Lawal argues that the leadership bestowed to Nigeria was not only moderate but was really one that favoured pro-British positions in Nigeria. He contended that it did not come to many Nigerians as a surprise because at the end of the 1958 Conference in London, the main political leaders all praised how good Britain had conducted the decolonisation exercise in Nigeria. For example, Nnamdi Azikiwe said that the independence of Nigeria was a perfect job done by the British and Nigerian leaders together while Chief Awolowo stated that the future of Nigeria was dependent on Nigerians themselves, but that Nigeria could always count on Britain as a source of motivation and support. Ahmadu Bello on the other hand declared an unwavering allegiance to the British Crown and continued dependence on the assistance of Her Majesty's Overseas Civil Service. On his part, Abubakar Tafawa Balewa stated that there was a common intent to remain in the Commonwealth and that Nigerian politicians were appreciative to Britain for all she had done.[89]

[86] Rotimi Suberu, "Nigeria's Permanent Constitutional Transition: Military Rule Civilian Instability and 'True Federalism' in a Deeply Divided Society." *Forum of Federations*, Occasional Paper Series, No. 34 (2019): 4.
[87] Ibid.
[88] Anthony Kirk-Greene, "The Remedial Imperatives of the Nigerian Constitution, 1922 – 1992." In *Transition Without End: Nigerian Politics and Civil Society Under Babangida*, ed. Larry Diamond, Anthony Kirk-Greene and Oyeleye Oyediran (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1997), 40.
[89] Olakunle A. Lawal, "From Colonial Reforms to Decolonization: Britain and the Transfer of Power in Nigeria, 1947 – 1960." *Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria* 19 (2000): 54-5

Lawal argues that at the height of the campaign for the independence elections in 1959, the AG made Nigeria's post-colonial foreign policy a campaign issue. In fact, the Northern Peoples' Congress (NPC) and the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC) had paid not much attention to this. In January 1959, Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, the NPC federal Prime Minister asked S.J.G. Finland to draft for him, on a personal basis, a note on the foreign policy of an independent Nigeria. By inference, this provided an opportunity for the Colonial Office to influence the thinking of the Prime Minister on foreign Affairs on the eve of independence. An official observed, considerably, that the invitation would provide Britain a most rare prospect to wield influence on the minds of Nigerian Ministers in foreign policy matters in the first few years of independence. It is vital to note that the Colonial Office exploited this chance to the full by making a comprehensive outline of Nigeria's foreign policy for the Prime Minister which became the guiding principles of Balewa's foreign policy in the first six years of Nigeria's independence.[90]

The constitution of Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1963 made room for Nigerian president as a ceremonial Head of State and replaced the Queen and it ended Nigeria judicial appeals to United Kingdom.[91] The Republican Constitution of 1963 came into existence with the creation of Mid-West Region. It made changes to 1960 Constitution which operated on three regions. What that means is Nigeria became a federation of four regions.[92]

Until the first cycle of state creation in 1967, this area was officially designated the Northern region. However, the history of Nigeria's regions and states is sensitive and complex, and therefore the current classification of 19 of the 36 federal states as 'northern,'

[90] Lawal, "From Colonial Reforms to Decolonization: Britain and the Transfer of Power in Nigeria, 1947 -1960," 53.
[91] Suberu, "Nigeria's Permanent Constitutional Transition: Military Rule Civilian Instability and 'True Federalism' in a Deeply Divided Society," 4.
[92] Kirk-Greene, "The Remedial Imperatives of the Nigerian Constitution, 1922 – 1992," 40.

specifically those lying in the middle of the country, is not without contention. The inclusion of the region's southernmost parts under the label 'the north' has periodically been resisted by the mostly non-Hausa communities living there. There is a preference for the term 'Middle-Belt' to describe the area that runs from Kwara, through the federal capital, Abuja, and down to Benue state.[93]

The Northern region is the most diverse and intricate among the Nigerian region, for it encompasses over 160 small ethnic groups of whom sundry were Christian and traditional religionists. Most are mainly concentrated in the Northern region with Adamawa state (from the North-Eastern Nigeria) alone, having over 100 of such ethnic and language minority groups. Northern Nigeria is the most contentious amongst the regions due to diversity of its ethno-cultural background, socio-political and ethnic-religious contexts, its prominence and dominance in Nigeria's politics and governance, and its unique and diverse position and worldview.[94]

Moses Ochonu aptly asserts that the legacies of colonial delineation have been tragic for the postcolonial state, inspiring the building of oppositional, unreconcilable, and at times, forcefully policied ethnic identities. Ochonu noted that as far back as 1958, the divide-and-rule tenet of indirect rule "compartmentalised" the "diverse elements" of the emerging Nigerian nation, making national unity grim. He argues that indirect rule "reinforced ethnic division." Ochonu contended that the structure of British colonial administration and the drawing of capricious demarcating ethnic boundaries restricted the development of a national consciousness within the wide vastness of Nigeria's borders.[95]

[93] Leena Koni Hoffmann, "Who Speaks for the North? Politics and Influence in Northern Nigeria." Chatham House, *The Royal Institute of International Affairs*, London (2014): 2.
[94] Mohammed and Aisha, *Federalism: An Overview of the Nigerian Perspective*, 177-178.
[95] Moses Ochonu, *Colonialism by Proxy: Hausa Imperial Agents and Middle Belt Consciousness in Nigeria* (Indiana: Indiana University Press, 2014), 7.

Ochonu contends that the appearance of primeval ethnicity to locate colonial experiments with ethnic differences fails to account for colonial situations; for instance, in Northern Nigeria, where real ethno-linguistic, cultural, and religious heterogeneity needed, not to be strengthened, but to be overcome in the interest of effective, uniform administration. Again, in Northern Nigeria, an essentially existing cultural and religious divide sustained a narrative of dissimilarity and difference and enabled British colonisers to allude to Muslim-Fulani officials as "natural" overloads over non-Muslim Middle-Belt communities. Again, a "calculus" of cultural beliefs and desires shaped the colonial social hierarchy. He contended that the British sat upon their pyramid of socio-political style and power. He avers that the Hausa-Fulani inheritors of the caliphate's heritage sat below them and were expected to assimilate the ways of British as much as their so-called native character allowed. The non-Muslim Middle-Belt, described in both caliphate and British discussion as ignorant tribesmen, sat on the lowest rung. They, in turn, were expected to grasp the ways of their supposedly Hausa-Fulani Muslim superiors through the instrumental apprenticeship of Hausa subcolonial agents, caliphate-derived institutions, and the cultural contamination of resident Hausa chiefs and scribes.[96]

Ochonu argues that the recurrent postcolonial ethno-religious crises in the Nigerian Middle Belt called for a separate set of thoughts on the links between colonisation and postcolonial political ethnicity. He avers that the crises have many attributes. First, there is a resource-access element to them, in which Fulani nomads battle for space and pasture with autochthonous farmers. Second, there is a political aspect. The Hausa-Fulani migrants and settlers in the Middle Belt believe the Middle Belt their home and scowl upon being denied political recognitions and rights. On the other hand, Autochthomous Middle Belt ethnic

[96] Ibid., 7-8.

groups, begrudge the forceful political demands of their "guests." They point to the unresolved national constitutional questions of indigene/settler dichotomies and to the unanswered issue of what role, if any, residency and migration should play in establishing the rights and privileges of national citizenship. Then there is a clear law and order aspect to the crises as armed citizens clasp on these tensions as hubs for criminal violence.[97]

Ochonu noted that the crisis in Northern Nigeria is the recurring crisis in the region, Middle-Belt autochthons and Hausa-Fulani migrants alike invoke colonial and colonial-era texts to support their dueling claims. Middle Belt peoples recall historical injuries inflicted on their cultures, languages, and religions by Anglo-Caliphate colonials seeking to extend their influence and power.[98]

[99] B. J. O. Dudley argues that Hausa is the most common and widely spoken language. The Hausa speaking peoples, the Hausa-Fulani, makeup 45.0% of the total population, followed next in size by the Kanuri with 17.0% and the Tiv with about 8.6% of the total. These three groups consequently comprise just under three quarters of the whole peoples of the North. Similar to this ethnic-linguistic diversity is the religious differences. The followers of Islam, the main religion, constitute about 60% of the population, the remaining 40% being divided unevenly between those of Christianity, and those who still hold various forms of traditional beliefs. However, if we accept some sort of a religious duality between the Muslim and the non-Muslim, a difficult and complete correlation will be found to arise in the North to form a model. Hence, the Hausa-Fulani-Kanuri are found to be mainly Muslim, and the non-Fulani-Hausa-Kanuri peoples are non-Muslims. The former inhabits the "far" North, the provinces of Sokoto, Katsina, Kano, Bornu and Zaria, the latter, the "lower" North, the

[97] Ochonu, *Colonialism by Proxy: Hausa Imperial Agents and Middle Belt Consciousness in Nigeria*, 216-7.
[98] Ibid., 217.
[99] Ibid, 179.

provinces of Niger, Kabba, Benue, Plateau, Bauchi and llorín. Parallel to this geographic-ethnic-religious division is another – a political duality. Though in the far northern societies there are centralised political systems, and the power of political decision-making is centred in the person of the Emir and his kin-group, in the lower North, power is spread and distributed amongst lineage segments which are almost co-equal. In the former, political roles are detailed and separated, in the latter bonded and identical.[100]

However, among the six geopolitical zones in Nigeria, the Northern region is perceived to be the biggest, approximately 281,225 sq. miles, rich and varied.[101] Yet, as Hoffmann opines, Northern Nigeria has many of the tools required for it to direct its way out of poverty and insecurity. It is comprised of enormous agricultural potential, mineral resources, unexploited oil deposits and human resources. Before crude oil was found in the Niger Delta, Nigeria derived much of its national revenue from agriculture, the northern region's utmost asset.[102]

M. H. A. Bolaji argues that Islam came to what is now known as Northern Nigeria through nomads of Berber people who were mainly Muslims. They conquered the Negro communities around the Chad Basin and the Hausa states in the 8th century and 10th century, respectively. Three factors contributed to it, namely, trade, Muslim scholars, and the Islamic revolution, which radically strengthened the Islamisation of the occupied peoples. It is necessary to say that by the end of the 15th century, Islam had become a visible presence in the Bornu empire and the Hausa states. While Shari'ah might have inspired the conduct and shaped the identity of the native converts on an individual level, Shari'ah came to the public attention in Northern Nigeria through two main ways. First, through Muslim

[100] B.J.O. Dudley, "Traditionalism and Politics: A Case Study of Northern Nigeria." *Government and Opposition* 2, no. 4 (July-October 1967): 511.
[101] Ibid, 178.
[102] Hoffmann, "Who Speaks for the North? Politics and Influence in Northern Nigeria," 19.

thinkers who were effective in converting and islamising the ideology of the ruling class in the Bornu empire. The conversion of the ruling elites significantly aided the political and social mobilization of the people and helped in the extension of Shari'ah to the public arena through non-violent means. Second, the institutionalization of Shari'ah in the public domain in the Hausa states which was mostly through violence. In what started in the Gobir state, the Muslim scholars under Sheikh Usman Dan Fodio capitalized on a political terrain that had seen syncretism and corruption and launched the Sokoto Jihad of 1804. From the change came a theocracy that saw to the institutionalisation of Shari'ah in the public domain of the Hausa states.[103]

Ismaila A. Tsiga states that "Northern Nigeria has often inspired a peculiar consciousness among its people, largely owing to the region's ancient history and transcending social values, in contemporary times."[104] He posits that much of this consciousness is passed through entrenched social institutions and norms. Tsiga contends northerners "perceive their membership within the prism of certain shared values, as well as through the silent affirmation of such perception in their thoughts and regular interactions."[105]

On the other hand, Ahmadu Bello, Sarduana of Sokoto, the then premier of the Northern region, articulated the vision of the people of the region under one umbrella in these words "Our aims were quite simple. To develop the country to the fullest extent in the shortest time; to preserve the peace, good order, and friendly relations between all our different

[103] M.H.A. Bolaji, "Shari'ah in Northern Nigeria in the Light of Asymmetrical Federalism." *Publius*, Vol. 40, no. 1 (2010): 118-119.
[104] Ismaila A. Tsiga, "Traversing the Worlds of Literature, History and Identity: Life Writing in Northern Nigeria," In *Literature, History and Identity in Northern Nigeria,* Ismaila A. Tsiga and M. O. Bhadmus, ed. (Ibadan: Safari Books Ltd, 2015),14-15.
[105] Ibid.

people; to conduct an efficient and impartial administration; to ensure for all; freedom of thought and religion, to do good to all men."[106] He further stated that:

The Northern Region, as it is today, is the product of three main factors: Geography, History and Character of the people…these three factors have produced a real feeling of unity amongst the people who inhabit our region. We have divergences in custom, religion, and language. But we have emerged and progressed out of the stage in the life of the people where such differences constitute a barrier to unity. We have sought for unity, not uniformity.[107]

However, the Northern region is not homogenous. Bello recognised that when he said that obstacle to the unity of the northern region is diversity of the region. He promised to bring all the people together through the "northernisation" policy[108] which critics like Moses E. Ochonu see as a political move by the Hausa-Fulani political establishment to dominate the Middle Belt. He said:

Hausa-Fulani subcolonialism was a colonial template of Anglo-caliphate rule. It took shape against the backdrop of a canon of colonial and caliphate knowledge that viewed the cultures, religions, and political traditions of the Middle Belt as obstacles to be

[106] Ahmadu Bello, My Life, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1962), 86.
[107] Tsiga and Bhadmus, *Literature, History and Identity in Northern Nigeria,* 15.
[108] The Northernisation Policy by Bello remains one of the most popular, unpopular, and controversial programmes by his government. It was popular among the northerners for it frees them from the domination of the southerners and gave the powers to determine their own regional affairs. To some critics it was an attempt by Hausa/Fulani to dominate the non-Hausa-Fulani and non-Muslim minority. This was followed by the statement from Premier Northern Region Sir Ahmadu Bello that: "we shall need now more than ever before to draw on our patience and respect for ways of life different from our own…as we march from strength to strength so must we further our intercourse with men of other tribes and other faiths…I know we have our differences, but such differences should not be the occasion for disagreements, but merely a variation which adds colour to a picture. We must ensure that if we differ it is only in the means we follow in pursuing a single purpose of making this nation great. We can then benefit by the greater variety of ideas that can result from differing viewpoints," Mohammed and Aisha (2020, 78). However, Chinua Achebe criticises "idea of Northernisation Policy" as dangerous and capable of eroding the coexistence of the nation. He said: Get the achievers out and replace them with less qualified individuals from desired ethnic background to gain access to the resources of the state. This bizarre government strategy transformed the federal civil service, corporations, and universities into centres of ethnic bigotry and petty squabbles," Achebe (2012, 77-78).

> overcome in the interest of cheap, uniform colonial rule in Northern Nigeria. The idea of supplanting Middle Belt cultures and institutions as a way of preparing the non-Muslim peoples of the region for indirect rule through the instrumentality of Hausa-caliphate ideas, institutions, cultures, and personnel was a logical outgrowth of this prior ideological ferment.[109]

Ochonu blames the colonial administrators for creating the division and resentment in the region. First, they refused to recognise the different groups that constitute the region. They turned blind eyes on the political marginalisation of the minority under the caliphate rule, and finally they merged and placed Middle Belt and other minorities under the tutelage of the Caliphate hegemony. The colonial administrators failed to recognise the histories and identity of the non-Muslim people living in the region. He states further:

> British rule in the Middle Belt, although encased in the belief that "backward" Middle Belt people should embrace the political and cultural attributes associated with the caliphate zone, was aimed at achieving socio-political uniformity for its own sake. Rather, this was a pragmatic administrative project informed by the practical and fiscal impossibility of implementing multiple colonial administrative systems in Northern Nigeria.[110]

Ochonu contends that to justify the Middle Belt subjugation in the hand of Hausa-Fulani rule, the colonial administrators created the indirect rule[111] that favours the caliphate. He

[109] Moses E. Ochonu, *Colonialism by Proxy: Hausa Imperial Agents and Middle Belt Consciousness in Nigeria* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2014), 22-23.
[110] Ibid.
[111] According to Ochonu there are two fundamental prerequisites of indirect rule – ethnic difference and pre-existing centralized system of rule which necessitated the creation of both difference and politico-cultural sameness across Northern Nigeria, using the colonially favoured Hausa-caliphate model as a reference. He noted that the exercise was carried out through the coalescing, over a long period, of caliphate narratives and claims about itself and its "others" on the one hand and "British imperial sociological and historical writings on the other," Ochonu, 23.

said, "pragmatism dictated Hausa-Fulani subcolonial rule. The system needed quasi-intellectual justification. It also needed an invented narrative of Hausa-Fulani supremacy and Middle Belt inferiority."[112]

2.4 Precolonial Northern Nigeria

Northern Nigeria is home to many ethnic groups and two main religions, Christianity, and Islam. The region is mostly rural and contains historically important ancient centres such as Kano and Zaria. These ancient cities are renowned for its centres of learning in the Islamic world for centuries. The major groups in the region are Hausa, Fulani, and Kanuri, but there are equally about 160 smaller groups. The Hausa,[113] Fulani and Kanuri are largely Muslim, while the minority of the smaller groups are Christian or animist. States such as Kaduna are more mixed. The advent of British colonisation in the early 1900s crystallised

[112] Ibid., 23.

[113] Bayajidda is generally referred as the "mythical" ancestor of the Hausa people. He was attributed to have migrated from Baghdad in the 9th and 10th century to the Kanem-Bornu Empire, where he settled and subsequently married a princess. While Bayajidda was living there, he has unresolved issues with his father-in-law, prompting him to run away without his wife and kid. His journey brought him to Daura. While in Duara, he waged war with the mysterious snake that had prevented the people from fetching water from the well. As a reward for his bravery, he was given the Queen of Daura as a wife, who bore him a male child called Bawo. Consequently, Bawo founded the city of Biram. Bawo had six sons and later became the king of other Hausa city-states [Anne Adams. "An Introduction to Nigeria's Hausa People." Cultural trip (blog), May 14, 2018. https://theculturetrip.com/africa/nigeria/articules/an-introduction-to-nigerias-hausa-people/]. Hausaland is derived from the Hausa term Kasar hausa, meaning the 'country of the Hausa language.' However, the term Hausa was used around the 16th Century CE. Hausaland was in the Sahel region between the Niger River and Lake Chad, between the Sahara Desert in the north and the Savannah grassland to the south. It also stretched from the air mountains (north) to the Jos Plateau (south) and from Borno (east) to the Niger Valley (west). Hausaland witnessed development of towns by the Hausa-speaking people from 1000 to 1300 CE. Furthermore, by the 15th century CE many small Hausa chiefdoms had come together to create various walled cities which protected their respective surroundings nationwide. This city states are: Biram, Daura, Gobir, Kano, Katsina, Rano, and Zaria (Zazzau). For control and for peace to reign among the people, each city had their own ruler called the *sarkin kasa* which constitutes nine members who equally select the next king in line. The officials were appointed by the king and the officials are tasked to collect taxes, custom duties, conduct men to war, maintenance of security and look after the agriculture produce. In addition, there are other smaller chiefdoms or villages, and each is ruled by a chief or *sarkin gari*. The third tier in the line of political arrangement was the family clan or *gida*, many of them constitute an individual village [Mark Cartwright, "Hausaland." Ancient *History Encyclopedia*, May 9, 2019. https://www.ancient.eu/Hausaland/]. Furthermore, Hausa as people has a unique culture. A good number of them are Muslims practicing Islam with the exception of *Maguzaya* who as traditional worshippers are called *bori* or *iskoki*. Hausa language is widely spoken by the people including English and Arabic. Hausa people can be found in the northwest geopolitical zone in Nigeria and in neighbouring countries of West Africa. The people were also involved in slave trade across the Sahara Desert and natural resources as they compete with other nationalities. However, in the 19th century the region was conquered through jihad (holy war). It paved the way for the unification of the region, and it came to be known as Hausaland. The British arrived and colonised the people in around 1900 [Adams, 2018].

what are normally referred to as "majority" and "minorities" groups, which were further complicated by the influx of considerable numbers of largely Christian immigrants from Nigeria's south.[114]

Across the northern region, particularly the northeast, where the Kanuri is in the majority, the Hausa and Fulani are the minority groups. However, neither the Hausa nor the Fulani is a stiff lineage group – one can become Hausa or Fulani by embracing or converting to Islam, although in doing so one enters at the lowest rung of an extremely stratified society. Hence, islamised ethnic groups meticulously linked with the nineteenth century Sokoto Caliphate, the Hausa and Fulani are often seen as foremost in the region and grouped together as a single Hausa/Fulani group. This is stimulated by Nigeria's politics of shared rivalry and to some degree echoes their own political tactics. Hausa and Fulani[115] are distinct in terms of names and languages and see themselves different, while almost all Fulani in the region speak Hausa, the region's lingua franca, not all Hausa speak Fulani.[116]

The Fulani, Fulbe or Fula, are interchangeably used to refer to them. They are one of the largest ethnolinguistic groups in West Africa with the population of about 40 million people. The Fula people are a mixture of both sub-Saharan and North African living in the Sahel area. They are pastoral nomads in nature. They can be found in various countries in sub-Saharan Africa such as Mauritania, Senegal, Guinea, Gambia, Mali, Sierra Leone, Benin, Burkina Faso, Guinea Bissau, Cameroon, Cote d'Ivoire, Niger, Chad, Togo, Democratic Republic of Congo, South Sudan, Central African Republic, Liberia, and Nigeria. With the exception of Guinea where the Fula constitute the majority in a pluralist nation, they still

[114] International Crisis Group, "Northern Nigeria: Background to Conflict." International Crisis Group, Africa Report, no. 168 (December 2010): 2. https://www.refworld.org/docid/4d104b7c2.html.
[115] Hence,
[116] International Crisis Group, "Northern Nigeria: Background to Conflict." *International Crisis Group*, Africa Report, no. 168 (December 2010): 2.3. https://www.refworld.org/docid/4d104b7c2.html.

command 40 percent of the population. In most regions they are mainly minorities. Another peculiar thing about the Fulani is that they speak the language of the dominant ethnic group they find themselves in, making many Fulani bilingual or even trilingual in nature. In Northern Nigeria, the language they speak is Hausa. They equally speak Arabic.[117] In addition, the Fulani of 18th century represented a sizable minority in the Hausa states, as well as in the empires of Borno and Jukun. Apart from being herders, there are Islamic intellectuals and artisans among them. They work in the court of Hausa kings and helped to maintain social order. They prefer to conserve the Islamic beliefs. It was this pariah status that led to the activation of Islam in the 18th century.[118] This activation was led by Usman dan Fodio who lived in the Hausa state of Gobir (northeast of Sokoto) quarrelled with its ruler over corruption and pagan practices. Dan Fodio declared Holy War against the polluters of the faith. So, in 1804, he attacked the chief of Gobir whom he described as the chief culprits. The war raged until Gobir was destroyed and collapsed. To achieve his aim of enthroning purity in the system, he enlisted the Hausa commoners and Fulani pastoralists to revolt against the oppressive rulership of Hausa kings. The revolution through jihad was massive. It overthrew the Hausa rule, and subsequently appointed victorious generals among them, mainly Fulani as rulers over Hausa. Hence, two-thirds of the current northern region came directly under the control of Shehu and his son Bello. But those who did not come under the control of Fulani rule were Bornu Provinces, Plateau Province, Jukon, Tiv, Idoma (south of Benue), and small parts of Kabba and Ilorin Provinces. To administer effectively he divided the areas into two. One was based on the ancient town of Gwandu, and was given to Abdullahi, the Shehu's brother, as the first Emir of Gwandu. Again, the

[117] Babagana Abubakar, "The Perception of the Fulani Nomads on Land Ownership in the sub-Saharan African Region: Case Study of Nigeria, Chad, Cameroon, Niger and Benin Republics." *UNITAR*-Geneva, November 2017.
[118] Agbegbedia Oghenevwoke Anthony, "Historical Analysis of the Migration, Penetration and Diffusion of the Fulani into the Middle Belt Region of Nigeria." *Journal of Humanities and Social Science* 19, Issue 10 (October 2014): 54.

Western Empire was created. It extended down the Niger and consisted of the Nupe Kingdom, and Ilorin. In addition, the Eastern Empire was based on Sokoto, the seat of power and established the "Caliphate" and consisted of great Hausa-city states to Benue, Nasarawa, Muri, and Yola. Ahmadu Bello noted that "both Empires were liquidated when the British entered Sokoto, and the Emirates of Sokoto and Gwandu were confined to their home territories."[119]

J.C. Moughfin argues that Hausa Bokwoi are a group of seven related city states of Daura, Biram, Kano, Zaria, Gobir, Katsina and Rano. The origin of Hausa states was traced to 100-1200 AD. Island was introduced to Hausaland in the fifteenth century by merchants from Mali.[120]

A. Mischlich, J. Lippert and M.H. Werner aver that Hausa migrated to their present abode, Damaerghia. They also lived further north in the oases of Air or Asben between Niger and Bornu boundary on the one hand, and the Benue and the Sahara on the other hand about 1000AD. By the middle of the 14th century, they had settled down in the present place.[121]

Sa'ad Abubakar argues that the pre-nineteenth century Hausa states were concentrated around the *birane* (cities or urban centres). As a nucleus of a state, the *birni* (city) had military, economic and religious importance. Hausa states are marked by walls, *ganuwai* (city walls), the *birane* became the state capitals since they were fortified which afforded protection to immigrants and equally serving as support for operations constructed

[119] Bello, *My Life*, 10-11; see Encyclopaedia Britannica. "Fulani Empire" *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, Inc., July 1998.
[120] J.C. Moughfin, "The Traditional Settlements of the Hausa People." The Town Planning Review 35, no. 1 (April 1964): 21-2. See A.J.N. Tremearne, "Notes on the Origin of the Hausas." *Journal of the Royal Society of Arts* 58, no. 3007 (July 8, 1910):767.
[121] A. Mischlich, J. Lippert and M.H. Werner, "Contributions to the History of the Hausa States." *Journal of the Royal African Society* 4, no. 16 (July 1905): 458-59

not only to bring the *kasa* (land) under control but also to protect the peasants. Abubakar contends that some of the *birane*, such as Katsina, Kano, and Zaria, evolved as commercial centres where interstate and inter-regional trade routes met. Hence, the *birane* were as well sources of wealth of the Hausa states.[122]

Abubakar noted that while Hausa state was concentrated around the *birni*, the government was concentrated around the *sarki* (king). The *sarakuna* (kings), though, were not the sole administrators of the *kasa*, nor were they autocrats. The *sarakuna* were supported in governing by a set of officials called the *masu-sarauta* (office holders) whose structure differed from one Hausa state to another. Although in all states, the functions of the *masu-sàrauta* were military and civil. Abubakar asserts that in Abuja, a Hausa state that survived the nineteenth century jihad, the most senior official in the hierarchy of the *masu-sarauta* was the *Madawaki*. He was the head of both the civil officials, the Galadima, Wambai, Dalhatu, Sarkin Fada and the military such as the Barde and Jarmai. Hence, the Madawaki was the *Sarki Yaki* (commander of the army). Abubakar points out that the *masu-sarauta* included the *Yan Sarki* (princes) who in some Hausa states held the posts of Chiroma or Galadima, generally the heir apparent; the *Fadawa* (courtiers) under the *Sarkin Fada* (chief courtier), also included women such as the *Mai-daki* in Kano and *Boroka* in Abuja. Other members of the *masu-sarauta* were drawn from domestic slaves of the *sarakuna*, such as *Dan Rimi*, *sata*, *Wagu*, and *Bakon Borno* in Abuja. Hence, the *masu-sarauta* in the *Kasashen* Hausa was made up of free-born citizens, slaves and eunuchs. The free-born citizens usually attained *sarauta* (office) as reward for services performed to the *Sarki* usually in wars.[123]

[122] Sa'ad Abubakar, "The Emirate-Type Government in the Sokoto Caliphate." *Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria*, 7, no. 2 (June 1974): 212.
[123] Ibid., 212.

Abubakar contends that the pre-Jihad regimes of the Hausa states were indeed highly detailed. The continuity of the *Sarki* in office and his exercise of full power is contingent on his capability to maintain the stability of the political system. This as well is contingent on whether the *Sarki* was able to meet the needs of his main followers, from the wealth under his control. He noted that succession to the office of *Sarki* was not according to birthright, it was agreed by choice conferred in a special category of the *masu-sarauta*, the kingmakers (*Sarakunam karaga*). He contended that the successor was often derived by the locus of fame and power. On the other hand, Abubakar avers that a prince who could rally the support of the leading *bayin sarki* (palace slaves) and the *Fadawa* (courtiers) could assume the *sauta*. He could then use the wealth of the *kasa*, put in his hands, to promote his fame among the *masu-sauta* to continue in office and to safeguard the succession of his children.[124]

Additionally, Abubakar noted that the *masu-sarauta* was contingent upon the *Sarki* who had the authority to remove any official and hire any man of his choice. The allegiance of the *masu-sarauta* was consequently fairly driven by their wish to continue in office and to strengthen the position of their families in their separate offices. He contends that at the start of the Hausa dynasties, the *sarautu* (offices) were not hereditary, later they became so, each lineage with its own office. But the system was not very strict. The families of the *masu-sarauta* became usually very large with various collaterals. The *sarakuna*, in choosing an official, had the chance to select a qualified candidate from several arms of the family that customarily held the office.[125]

Abubakar points out that another important factor in the pre-nineteenth century Hausa governments was the autonomy of the *sarakuna*. Several Hausa states include Daura, Katsina, Rano, Kano, Zaria, Zamfara and Gobir, which were all autonomous. These Hausa

[124] Abubakar, "The Emirate-Type Government in the Sokoto Caliphate," 212.
[125] Ibid., 212-213.

states neither recognised any one of their number as superior, nor did they recognise an outside authority as independent. Abubakar noted that *sarki* was one by virtue of inheritance and the support of the *masu-sarauta* who could remove him if need be. Once a *sarki* had been chosen, he immediately became the sovereign, and his selection needed no outside ratification.[126]

Moughfin contends that before the British occupation of Hausaland, the Hausa states had a well developed pre-capitalistic economy, a complicated administration and a varied technology which included many craft.[127]

Abubakar asserts that the Jihad in Hausaland at the start of the nineteenth century has been in part due to the manner the Hausa governments behaved. For instance, in the state of Gobir relationships between the Muslim community and the *sarakuna* was very tense during the last quarter of the eighteenth century. Again, the succession of Yunfa in 1802 consequently worsened the tense situations. He noted that the Muslim community was at that period inadequately coordinated. The Muslims were poorly put together for their defence.[128]

Isam Ghanem argues that not only is this impasse because of the poor state of Hausa states, but the people are tired about the despotic rule by Hausa rulers. He noted that Usman dan Fodio took the advantages and waged holy war in 1804 against the rulers of Hausa states. Dan Fodio was a learned jurist and itinerant preacher, and his teachings attracted various segment of the society. Before the jihad, he was made tutor by Sarkin of Gobir to his sons. But Sarkin of Gobir was a pagan and became wary about the growing influence of Islam over his subjects. He moved to oppress Muslims especially the Fulani tribes. In 1801,

[126] Abubakar, "The Emirate-Type Government in the Sokoto Caliphate," 213-214.
[127] Moughfin, "The Traditional Settlements of the Hausa People," 22.
[128] Abubakar, "The Emirate-Type Government in the Sokoto Caliphate," 214.

Sarkin Gobir Bau Nafata proclaimed that nobody should preach apart from dan Fodio, and that nobody would be a Muslim unless his father had been a Muslim. In 1802, he had a disagreement with Sarkin of Gobir over the brutality of Muslims. In 1804 he waged a holy war against the successor of Nafata, his son Yunif who was more draconian than his father.[129]

On the other hand, the Kanuri people came from the Kanem Empire which arose by the ninth century in what is now south-western Chad. Internal discord forced them westward across Lake Chad. Appeasing the local people, they created the Borno Kingdom, distinct from the Hausa states, in around the eleventh century. Acclimatized and inter-marrying with local ethnic groups, they became the largest ethnic group in the north-east.[130]

As pointed out earlier, the Fulani migrated from present-day Senegal, through the Mali and Songhai empires, to Hausaland in the thirteenth century and Borno in the fifteenth. Although generally nomadic herdsmen, the intellectuals among them found employments in Hausa royal houses, as advisers, scribes, judges and tax collectors, and steadily gained great influence among Hausa nobles.[131]

However, outside migrations and early settlements, the early interactions were equally formed by wars, slavery, commerce, and the spread of Islam. Various states launched wars to expand territorial claims and acquire slaves for working feudal plantations or export to North Africa. The Hausa states allied occasionally though intermittently fought each other; they equally suffered invasions, especially by the Borno king, Idris Alooma, in the late sixteenth century.[132]

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[129] Isam Ghanem, "The Causes and Motives of the Jihad in Northern Nigeria." *Man* 10, no. 4 (December 1975): 623.
[130] Ibid.
[131] Ibid.
[132] Ibid.

Also, commercial transactions formed other connections. For example, as Hausa merchants travelled southward, they constructed mid-way centres that in the future became permanent Hausa settlements among other peoples. This led to the construction of Hausa towns that habitually became the pivotal points of economic, political, and administrative life in their own zones. Furthermore, as the capitals of the Hausa states and of the Borno Empire were major southern entrepots of trans-Saharan trade, they served as channels for spreading North African and Arab ideas and culture in the northern region.[133]

The most important relations, though, were forged by the spread of Islam, which happened in two main stages. Between the eleventh and seventeenth centuries, Islam was introduced peacefully, by clerics and merchants who were often the same individuals from North Africa and the Arab world, and from across West Africa. The rulers of the Borno Empire were the first to convert to Islam, in the eleventh century. With the coming of Wangarawa traders and scholars from Mali at the end of the fourteenth century and increase in trade with the Songhai Empire in the fifteenth, Hausa kings followed the same pattern. Before the fourteenth century, Muslim scholars from Mali occupied vital administrative positions in the Hausa city-states.[134]

The second phase began as a revivalist revolution at the dawn of the nineteenth century led by Fulani preacher, Shehu Usman dan Fodio who led a jihad mainly intended at liberating Islamic practices in the region and eventually at appointing a new worthy leadership. With support from the pastoral Fulani and downtrodden Hausa peasants, who had agonised under the authoritarian and corrupt practices of the Hausa kings, dan Fodio waged jihad. They captured the then fourteen Hausa states between 1804 and 1808 and

[133] *International Crisis Group*, "Northern Nigeria: Background to Conflict."
[134] Ibid.

replaced their kings with Fulani emirs. Borno, who was occupied for a limited period (1808-1812), was never entirely overcome by the Sokoto Caliphate.[135]

2.5 The Sokoto Caliphate

The Sokoto Caliphate plays an important role in Northern Nigeria's structure and cultural influence.[136]

Hamza Muhammad Maishanu and Isa Muhammad Maishanu assert that the founder of the Sokoto Jihad Movement was Shehu Usmanu dan Fodio. He was born in Maratta in 1754 before his family moved to Degel in Gobir which became his base until his *hijrah* to Gudu in 1804. He had his early Islamic education under his father Muhammad Fodio and following the itinerant tradition of Islamic learning prevalent in the region at the time, dan Fodio started to move from one master to another to gain advanced knowledge in the Islamic knowledge. This took him to various areas including Agades. Some of his tutors was 'Uthman Bidduri after whom it was said that dan Fodio moulded himself "enjoining the right and forbidding the wrong." Others were Muhammad Sambo, Muhammad Rajl, Hashimu al-Zamfarl and Shaykh Jibrll ibn 'Umar, the man whom it was said had a major influence on dan Fodio and impacted as much by his being a motivation as by his knowledge.

Maishanu and Maishanu noted that by his unbending attitude and his attack on local practices, Shaykh Jibril prepared the way for dan Fodio. He began his teaching and preaching career in 1774 at the age of 20, while at the same time he was involved in further studies. His preaching tours, apart from within Gobir, his country, took him to the neighbouring states of Kebbi and Zamfara and as far as Illo across the River Niger.

[135] Ibid.
[136] Bolaji, "Shari'ah in Northern Nigeria in the Light of Asymmetrical Federalism," 118.

However, at the early stage, dan Fodio limited his teaching and preaching to the common men that is the peasantry and anyone who cared to attend his preaching. However, as his adherents and followers grew big, he found it necessary to invite the ruling class to his preaching. It was under this respect that he visited Sarkin Gobir Bawa and made clear to him the true Islam, and told him to respect it, and to create justice in his land. This gave dan Fodio the chance to preach freely to the people without any interference and, as put by his brother, Abd Allah ibn Fodio, subsequent upon this event, dan Fodio "was enabled thereby to summon (people) to religion, because it came about that those who did not fear God, feared to deny his (dan Fodio) order for the reason of his connection with the Sultan."[137]

Maishanu and Maishanu assert that in 1788 while dan Fodio was in Zamfara teaching and preaching, he and other "*ulama*" residing in Gobir were invited by Sarkin Gobir Bawa to Magami where he was living to celebrate the 'Id al-Kabir. After the 'Id al-Kabir prayer, gifts of various assortments were given to the "*ulama*." However, dan Fodio refused his own and rather demanded for the following privileges that:

1. He should be allowed to preach to people throughout the lands of Gobir.
2. None should be stopped from responding to his call.
3. Anyone wearing a turban or a veil should be treated with respect.
4. All political prisoners be freed and that the peasantry should not be burdened with taxation.[138]

All dan Fodio's requests were consented to by Sarkin Gobir Bawa. However, in this meeting dan Fodio won the hearts of several people present. The majority of the 'ulama' present

[137] Hamza Muhammad Maishanu and Isa Muhammad Maishanu, "The Jihad and the Formation of the Sokoto Caliphate." *Islamic Studies* 38, no. 1 (Spring 1999): 124.
[138] Ibid., 125.

during the 'Id al-Kabir festival joined the "rank and file" of his followers. This in addition boosted his reputation throughout the vicinity, and subsequently was to set the step for future struggle with succeeding rulers of Gobir. However, the privileges accorded to him by Sarkin Gobir Bawa were clear signs of the political element which the dan Fodio's movement was steadily believing. Though the call by dan Fodio for the freeing of political prisoners and the elimination of "uncanonical" taxes were both social and political matters, the wearing of turbans and veils were symptomatic of the uniqueness of dan Fodio's supporters, the *Jama'ah* who were slowly developing into a distinct and self-confident community.[139]

Maishanu and Maishanu noted that dan Fodio's status soared, and his supporters blossomed, as they instituted themselves into a nation within a nation. This troubled Gobir's leadership to the end. This was articulated by 'Abd Allah, "when Shehu Usmanu saw the greatness of the community, and their desire to break away from the unbelievers, and commence Holy war he began to incite them to carry arms, saying to them: "verily to make ready weapons is *sunna*" This was in 1794/95 and corresponded with the death of Sarkin Gobir Yakubu and the swearing in of a new Sarkin Gobir, Nafata.[140]

Maishanu and Maishanu adduce that the increase in the impact of dan Fodio and the expansion of his community was frightening to the Gobir's administration. The editors noted that Sarkin Gobir Nafata did everything he could to subdue the situation. However, to reduce the growing effect and fame of dan Fodio and the growing of the community, Nafata made a pronouncement which was publicised throughout the region of Gobir to the effect that from now on no-one apart from dan Fodio would be permitted to preach to the citizens. Again, Nafata said that those who were not born Muslims should reject Islam and go back

[139] Maishanu and Maishanu, "The Jihad and the Formation of the Sokoto Caliphate," 125.
[140] Ibid.

to observance of their former religion; and that no man should anymore wear a turban and no woman should wear a veil.[141]

Maishanu and Maishanu noted that the measures rolled out by Nafata did not go down well with dan Fodio and his followers. Dan Fodio and his followers feared that if these measures are implemented, they will affect the expansion of his crusade. dan Fodio sees it as anntagonism by the Nafata and the stage is set for open confrontation between dan Fodio's supporters and Nafata's followers. However, the battle between the two opposing groups did not materialise but happened in the reign of Nafata's son and successor, Sarkin Gobir Yunfa. It was then that the smouldering dispute exploded.[142]

Maishanu and Maishanu contend that the Gimbana crisis was the breaking point between the two groups and had its basis in the rulership of Sarkin Gobir Nafata. Such punitive actions taken against the dan Fodio's community, the *Jama'ah*, were so stringent that a devotee of dan Fodio by the name of 'Abd al-Salam was coerced to move out of Gobir together with his supporters and camped in a village near the Zamfara river.[143]

Maishanu and Maishanu stated that when Yunfa became Sarkin Gobir, he asked 'Abd al-Salam to return to Gobir, a request which 'Abd al-Salam disregarded. This rejection by al-Salam was viewed by Sarkin Gobir Yunfa as insulting and an affront. Yunfa, therefore organised a trip to make a good example out of 'Abd al-Salam's dwelling Gimbana. Hence, Yunfa's army attacked Gimbana and several of 'Abd al-Salam's adherents were murdered, and others were captured. The triumphant Gobir army on its way back to Alkalawa passed through Degel where dan Fodio was residing with many of his disciples. Dan Fodio and his followers saw it as an affront by Yunfa's army. The Yunfa's army was taken by surprise

[141] Ibid.
[142] Maishanu and Maishanu, "The Jihad and the Formation of the Sokoto Caliphate," 125-26.
[143] Ibid., 126.

and the prisoners were let go by dan Fodio's supporters. This act enraged Yunfa and as a result instructed dan Fodio and his family to leave Degel before a reciprocal action was taken against his supporters. However, instead of ditching his supporters, dan Fodio countered that he would be eager to leave Degel together with all those willing to go with him. Hence, commenced the famous *hijah* embarked upon by dan Fodio and his disciples.[144]

Maishanu and Maishanu noted that the hostilities between the two have reached a point where dan Fodio was ready and was preparing the minds of his supporters for war. In the last six years, dan Fodio had started to encourage his disciples to arm themselves in self-defence and in 1802 he wrote the famed *al Masa'il al-Muhimmah* which was extensively distributed. In this work *Masa il' Muhimmah,* dan Fodio outlines his five points agenda:

1. That the foundation of the religion of Islam is the application of the *Shariah* law.
2. That it is incumbent upon Muslims to follow an Imam, or a Caliph.
3. That the Hijrah (Immigration) from the land of unbelief (*balad al-kufr*) to the land of Islam (*balad al-Islam*) is obligatory.
4. That those who support the unbelievers should be regarded as themselves unbelievers.
5. That the jihad against the unbelievers as well as the apostates (*Murtaddun*) is obligatory.[145]

Maishanu and Maishanu point out that it is evident from the atmosphere in Gobir and generally in Hausaland at that period to assume that in the *Masa' il Muhimmah* dan Fodio was conveying matters of paramount significance to his people. As noted previously, the

[144] Ibid.
[145] Maishanu and Maishanu, "The Jihad and the Formation of the Sokoto Caliphate," 126-27.

conditions in Hausaland were something else but un-islamic, the leaders had turned into tyrants, justice was perverted and the Shariah law in most instances ridiculed. In dan Fodio's earlier works like *Nur al-Albab,* he indicted Hausa leaders of paganism. Hence, when the aggression of Sarkin Gobir Yunfa became so obvious, dan Fodio did what was necessary upon him and that was the *hijrah*.[146]

Therefore, on 21st of February 1804 Shehu Usmanu Danfodiyo commenced his famed *hijrah* to Gudu. Sarkin Gobir Yunfa's reactions to the *hijrah* was a pronouncement of war on dan Fodio and his followers. First, Yunfa asked those travelling to join dan Fodio should be arrested. In this respect several of dan Fodio's followers lost either their lives or properties or both. This was followed by a military operation aimed against Gudu. As argued by 'Abd Allah Fodiyo, "then the affair came to the point where they were sending armies against us, and we gathered when that became serious, and appointed the Shaykh, who had previously been our Imam and our Amir, as our commander, in order that he might put our affairs in order."[147]

Maishanu and Maishanu aver that the choice of Shehu Usmanu as the *Amir al-Mu 'mimn* was the decisive act that broke all formal friendship with the powers in Alkalawa. The *Mujahidun* had now proclaimed themselves autonomous of Gobir or any other power. The Gobirawa pushed hard upon dan Fodio and his community at Gudu, and there were numerous confrontations until the *Mujahidun* took the lead, capturing Matankari, a town whose citizens had on various times been ransacked by dan Fodio's community, as well as Birnin Kwanni. However, it was when the *Mujahidun* were in Kwanni that they had news that Sarkin Gobir Yunfa, at the head of a large army, was on his way to attack Gudu. Hence, the *Mujahidun* swiftly went back to guard Gudu. It was then that the war of Tafkin Kwatto

[146] Ibid.
[147] Ibid.

happened.[148]

Maishanu and Maishanu adduce that the war of Tafkin Kwatto was the most important military conflict between the two bellicose groups. The Gobir army was commanded by Sarkin Gobir Yunfa while ‘Abd Allah Fodiyo was the commander of the *Mujahidun*. Though, the *Mujahidun* were far exceeded and untrained, they were able to defeat the Gobir army. The *Mujahidun,* despite their deficiency, still managed to beat the Gobir army and Yunfa bolted. This significant victory was a morale booster to the *Mujahidun*. After the war of Tafkin Kwatto, dan Fodio wrote the *Wathiqat Ahl al-Sudan* which was widely circulated throughout Hausaland and beyond.[149]

Maishanu and Maishanu contended that the *Wathiqat Ahl al-Suddn*, dan Fodio wrote constituted the formal announcement of *jihad* by dan Fodiyo. The work represented all the key issues raised in *al-Masa’il al-Muhimmah*. In this work, he points out that the reputation of a nation is that of its leaders. If he is a Muslim, his state or town is a Muslim’s nation and if he is not so similarly is his state or region. He stated that it is improper for Muslims to live in a non-Muslim nation. That *Jihad* against non-Muslims comprising apostates is obligatory and the removal of government from them is permitted. All these and other related matters raised in the *Wathiqat Ahl al-Suddn* leads serious stirring in the mind of most people throughout the length and breadth of Hausaland.[150]

Maishanu and Maishanu argue that the victory at Tafkin Kwatto together with the impacts of the *Wathiqat Ahl al-Siiddn* increased support for the Shehu and convinced many not only of his sincerity but also certainty of success. Most of the people who were not supporting neither side now made up their minds to join forces with dan Fodio’s disciples. The people

[148] Ibid.
[149] Maishanu and Maishanu, “The Jihad and the Formation of the Sokoto Caliphate,” 127.
[150] Ibid., 128.

both young or old trooped to dan Fodio's sides and it immediately increased his army. Others came to obtain consent and permission to carry on with the *Jihad* in their own areas. However, leaders of the main Hausa states in the region, acting in harmony with, and by the guidance of Sarkin Gobir Yunfa put up pressure against dan Fodio's groups and soon the whole of Hausaland was immersed in *jihad*. First, to fall was Birnin Kebbi, the new capital of Kebbi, to the Jihddists in 1805, then followed Katsina in 1807, both Daura and Kano were seized by the Jihddists, Alkalawain in 1808, the capital of Gobir was seized and Sarkin Gobir Yunfa killed. With all these, the centuries old Hausa dynasties were ruined, and, in their places, new ones came into existence. Hence, the various Hausa states morphed into emirates paying fidelity to Sokoto, the new capital of the Sokoto Caliphate.[151]

The Fulani rulers rooted Islamic values and practices in most of the region. Though this was occasionally met with passive struggle from units of the population, it was vital to nurturing a shared culture that surpassed ethnicity and held the caliphate together. Sharia was applied "more widely, and in some respects more rigidly ... than anywhere else outside Saudi Arabia,"[152] and indigenous religious practices, such as traditional Hausa ceremonies (Bori), were repressed, or almost became less noticeable. Though the Fulani rulers similarly adapted several elements of Hausa culture, thus fashioning the foundation for what some see as a progressively same Hausa/Fulani identity,[153] Muktar Bunza observes that the caliphate also promoted a culture of "knowledge and intellectualism", such that "education became the yardstick for all opportunities in the state and knowledge a ladder for climbing heights of respect and dignity."[154]

[151] Ibid., 128.
[152] Muktar Umar Bunza, "The Sokoto Caliphate after 200 years: A Reflection" (Conference Paper, Usman dan Fodio University, Sokoto, 2004).
[153] Ibid.
[154] Ibid.

2.6 Sufi and Anti-Sufism Order in Northern Nigeria

2.6.1 Overview

Woodward, Umar, Rohmanujah and Yahya affirm that there are differences between Salafism and Sufism in Sunni Islam. However, both acknowledge the Quranic teaching of the Unity of God (monotheism) and take for granted the view that Islam is submission to God. They also understand these teachings in a different way. For instance, Salafism is "behaviourally oriented." For Salafis, Islam is principally the act of rituals defined by Sharia as compulsory, and the control of social behaviour. Although not all Sufis share these opinions, however, some are bothered with the development of spiritual states and the cultivation of an existential relationship with God. Again, not all Sufis speak to God through the mediation of religious leaders and saints. But Salafis hold that nothing should stand between people and God. These distinctions are hardly reconcilable. Therefore, both Sufism and Salafism are distinct traditions with deep roots in Islamic scripture and history.[155]

Salisu Bala affirms that the *Tijjaniyyah* Sufi order is one of the most influential Islamic movements in the world. He points out that the Sufi order emerged in the 19th century in the Maghrib (Algeria and Morocco) with its founder, Sheikh Sharif Ahmad Tijjani (RTA). It later expanded and scattered to other parts of the world including West Africa. Bala stated that the *Tijjaniyyah* order is the last among the (333) three hundred and thirty-three Sufi orders. He asserts that the source of the 333 Sufi paths could be tracked back to Madina during the lifetime of Prophet Muhammad (SAW). Bala adduces that the main purpose of these movements is the decontamination of the human heart through some specific religious observance, with the singular objective of having a society free from moral relapse and

[155] Mark Woodward, Muhammad Sani Umar, Inayah Rohmanujah and Mariani Yahya, "Salafi Violence and Sufi Tolerance? Rethinking Conventional Wisdom." *Perspective on Terrorism* 17, no. 6 (December 2013): 60.

social vices. He argues that the movement is non-violent which wants to work towards the advancement of Islam and learning through teaching, preaching and spiritual guidance. Again, the *Tijjaniyyah* as a Sufi order has for more than two centuries been fashioning the rapport between devout believing Muslims and their Supreme creator and ensuring the unity of the Muslims throughout the world as well as the production of rich Islamic works. A few instances of Sufi orders that thrived before the coming of *Tijjaniyyah* are: *Qadiriyyah, Naqshabandiyyah, Rufaiyyah, Sunusiyyah* etc.[156]

Patrick J. Ryan asserts that Al-Haij 'Umar Taal (d. 1864), was the architect of the third of the three great Fulbe empires in West Africa in the nineteenth century. 'Umar Taal not only spread *Tijaniyyah* in Senegal, Gambia, Guinea, and Mali but equally established the order in Northern Nigeria. Ghanem contends that many of his adherents were Torodbe, the members of the Fulbe caste of religious intellectuals, which had much to do with their early appeal to the order.[157]

Ryan noted that *Tijaniyyah* spread throughout West Africa from Senegal (their original homeland) to Cameroon, a diverse caste of the Fulbe otherwise called Peulh, Fula, Fulani and Tokolor. They are primarily a herding people strongly connected with and controlled by a sub-group of religious intellectuals called the Torodbe (mendicants). Ghanem points out that all the Fulbe castes liken to the Tutsi of Lacustrine in East Africa, who see themselves as superior to their neighbours, same as the Mauritanian's Idaw. They reinforced their religious intellectual position and their claim to a noble ancestry from the Prophet Muhammad. They also take on *Tijaniyyah* membership, same with the *Tijaniyyah's* loyalty of al-Hajj 'Umar. Their adherents to the Torodbe caste allowed them to distinguish

[156] Salisu Bala, "History of Origin, Spread and Development of Tijjaniyya Sufi Order in Hausaland: The Case of Zaria City, Circa, 1831-1933." *Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria* 20 (2011): 202.
[157] Patrick J. Ryan, The Mystical Theology of Tijani Sufism and Its Social Significance in West Africa." *Journal of Religion in Africa* 30, no. 2 (May 2000): 215.

themselves and hold themselves separately from other Muslim ethnic groups in West Africa whose knowledge and practice of Islam they found deficient. Also, when the Torodbe's religious and leadership of the older Fulbe empires of diverse mystical loyalty (Sokoto in what is now north-west Nigeria and Hamdullahi in what is now Mali) refused induction into the *Tijaniyyah*, al-Haj 'Umar felt compelled in looking down on the Sokoto Caliphate and attacked Hamdullahi and defeated her in 1862.[158]

Ryan noted that in Northern Nigeria, the Fulbe's Torodbe in the Sokoto Caliphate, "secure in what they conceived to be their superior Qadiri mystical allegiance."[159] Again, for the most part they refused al-Haij 'Umar's invitation to be a *Tijani* member when al-Haij 'Umar invited them while in their midst in the 1820s and 1830s. However, those outside the inner circle of the Sokoto ruling class responded, particularly in the twentieth century. According to Ryan this was attributed to the influence of the Senegalese *Tijanm muqaddam*, Shaykh Ibrahim Niasse (1900-1975), whose influence in 1950s Northern Nigeria contributed massively to the development of *Tijaniyyah* in a place previously thought to be an exclusive area for *Qadiriyyah* followers in the traditional sphere of Uthman dan Fodio (1754-1817), founder of the Sokoto empire.[160]

Mark Woodward, Muhammad Sani Umar, Inayah Rohmanujah and Mariani Yahya contend that al-Hajj Umar Taal puts into effect the doctrines of the *Tijaniyya tariqa* in his verbalisation of the doctrinal core of jihad. In his magnum opus *Kitab rimah hizb al-rahim 'ala nuhur hizb al-rajim* ("The Book of the Lances of the Party of Allah the Merciful against the Necks of the Party of Satan the Accursed"), 'Umar Taal engaged the sectarian Tijani discourse of spiritual election to justify his military and political plans. This discussion

[158] Ibid., 215-26.
[159] Ibid., 218.
[160] Ibid.

declares that the *Tijaniyya* surpasses all other Sufi orders because of the exclusive guarantee of salvation. The editors noted that its founder, Ahmad al-Tijani, received from the Prophet Muhammad for himself and his adherents. Umar Taal likewise engaged the *Tijani* doctrine of *inkar* that demonises all who refuse the *Tijani* doctrine of spiritual election to repudiate his adversaries.[161]

The editors contend that the *Tijani* demonisation of other Sufi jihadis is a good example of the manners in which Sufi doctrine can be employed in contentious discussion about the contrasting validity of jihadi movements and theocracies. This debate similarly figured remarkable in the competition between leaders of the Sokoto Caliphate and the Borno Empire. Again, thought provoking theological discussions between them started in the nineteenth century and have persisted till the present, traversing pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial eras in Northern Nigeria history.[162]

Colonial rule from 1880s -1990s put an end to the succession of jihads. The colonial masters also incorporated Western African Sufi theocracies into their scheme. Though Sufi order undergo various reform. Their legacy and expression and theological teachings, background and beliefs were key to their anticolonial stands. Again, some members of the Sufi order prefer different means of criticising colonial government. The movement created an avenue through which members of the Sufi order can interact among themselves outside the government knowledge. At the dawn of independence in 1960, they regained their militant posture as a pacifist and as a "jihad empire builder."[163]

[161] Mark Woodward, Muhammad Sani Umar, Inayah Rohmanujah and Mariani Yahya, "Salafi Violence and Sufi Tolerance? Rethinking Conventional Wisdom." *Perspective on Terrorism* 17, no. 6 (December 2013): 219.
[162] Ibid., 71-72.
[163] Woodward, Umar, Rohmanujah and Yahya, "Salafi Violence and Sufi Tolerance? Rethinking Conventional Wisdom." *Perspective on Terrorism* 17, no. 6 (December 2013): 72.

The editors noted, however, that the Sufi radicalism was transfigured but not totally discarded. This is especially true of the *Tijaniyya* order. Exclusivist debates of spiritual election and the demonisation of others remain incessant sources of conflict between *Tijanis* and other Muslims. The *Qadiriyya* order has employed this exclusivist debate by building an alternative discussion of spiritual election. Given the high stakes in the intra-*Sufi* debates and counter-debates (i.e., spiritual salvation, religious authority, control of mosques, generating and controlling mass followings) there have been cases of intra-Sufi hostility. Skirmishes between various *Tijaniyya* sections were similarly rife during the 1950s and 1960s. Equally, intra *Sufi* friction and differences stopped only after the *Salafi* threat against all Sufis became clear during the 1970s.[164]

Therefore, *Sufi* fanaticism refocused itself to counter the admonition of Sufism as "totally un-Islamic" in *Salafi takfiri* debate. Contemporary *Sufi* fanaticism takes the form of more ostentatious celebration of the very rituals: reverence for saints, visiting their shrines, celebrating their birthdays. These rituals were denounced as un-Islamic by the *Salafis*. The editors noted that with salvation threatened, validity of the worshipped questioned, and religious communal identity castigated, the risks are strong enough for the conflict between Sufis and Salafis to explode into bloodshed. Whatever the modernisation or change Sufi order may claim to be, Sufi fanatism in West Africa continues, though finds new methods in adjusting environments, just as *Salafi* fanaticism does.[165]

Ryan contends that in Northern Nigeria in the 1950s *Tijaniyyah* membership mainly appealed to those prevented from the inner circle of Fulbe leadership in the Sokoto Caliphate as an alternative form of superiority. What may be considered at least partly as a revenge of the Sokoto leadership against *Tijanis* played a part in the politics of Nigeria's first Republic,

[164] Ibid.
[165] Ibid.

1960-1966, when the *Tijani* Emir of Kano, Muhammad Sanusi, was deposed from office by Sir Ahmadu Bello, the Sardauna of Sokoto, the then Premier of the Northern Region and Leader of the Northern Peoples' Congress. The power tussle between *Qadiris* based in Sokoto and *Tijanis* with a strong membership in Kano in the 1960s has given way over the last two decades to a much more intense clashes between *Tijanis* and *Wahhabis*, followers of the major anti-Sufi "orthopraxy" of Saudi Arabia.[166]

In the late nineteenth century, the British government established its control of Southern Nigeria as a protectorate (with Lagos as a colony). In 1900, it began extending its holding northward, proclaiming that region equally a protectorate. Frederick Lugard, appointed High Commissioner of Northern Nigeria, gradually negotiated with the emirs to agree on colonial rule. The majority were coerced; their kingdoms had been weakened by internal discord. Those who refused were conquered, from Bida in 1901 to Sokoto in 1903. The assassination of the escaping Caliph Attahiru I, in July 1903, resulted in the end of the caliphate as a sovereign political establishment.[167]

The Sokoto Caliphate occupies a central, but ambivalent, place in the consciousness of Muslims in Northern Nigeria. Its past is a source of pride, and its legacy gives a sense of community and unity. After dan Fodio and his lieutenants conquered Hausaland they adopted the Hausa language as its lingua franca. It has also left behind a structure of traditional governance, centred on the caliphate emirs and their successors. This pride is strengthened by the fact the caliph did not yield to British rule but fought to the death.[168]

Nevertheless, that very conquest was hurtful for the region. The Caliphate's continuous existence under British authority for nearly 60 years has given its heritage much

[166] Ryan, "The Mystical Theology of Tijani Sufism and Its Social Significance in West Africa," 218-219.
[167] *International Crisis Group*, "Northern Nigeria: Background to Conflict," 4.
[168] Ibid.

ambivalence. Similarly, attitudes to the caliphate and its heritage vary significantly in various areas, following the "centre-periphery" structure of the unit itself. Over the years, it has become, in the lens of many, the centre of a northern Muslim "establishment" that is susceptible to charges of selling out to non-Muslim outside powers and, more largely, of moral or material corruption.[169]

2.7 The Colonial Epoch

Toyin Falola notes that the fifteenth century marked the European interaction with Africa. The Nigerian state served as a testing ground for religious evangelization, as a source of slaves and an important region to be guzzled up by the atavistic imperial expansion of the late nineteenth century. He states that among all the European dealings with Nigeria, the most pivotal effect on the evolution of the contemporary Nigerian state was the imposition of British colonial rule in the late nineteenth century. By 1860, the British established a strong hold in Lagos, and subsequently, began to interfere in the affairs of other regions.[170]

Ehiedu E.G. Iweriebor argues that colonial rule was instituted in Nigeria in 1900. The colonial state had two tiers of government. At the central level a single colonial authority was introduced on the country. The central colonial authority was made up of the Governor, the advisory council and later a legislative council, the bureaucracy, the judiciary, the police, and the military.[171]

Iweriebor noted that the second tier of government was the provincial (or regional) level. It was made up of the lieutenant-Governor, the regional bureaucracy, the regional judiciary

[169] Ibid., 4.
[170] Toyin Falola, *Violence in Nigeria: The Crisis of Religious Politics and Secular Ideologies*. (NY: University of Rochester Press, 1998), 50-51. See Emmanuel Oladipo Ojo, "Nigeria, 1914 – 2014: From Creation to Cremation." *Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria* 23 (2014): 67-91.
[171] Ehiedu E.G. Iweriebor, "State Systems in Pre-Colonial, Colonial and Post-Colonial Nigeria: An Overview." *Africa: Rivista trimestrale di studi e documentazione dell'Istituto italiano per l'Africa* 37, no. 4 (December 1982): 509.

and a "native" police force and the all-important and powerful provincial residents who oversee the administration of the provinces which were supposedly still under their "traditional" rulers. The system of governance at the provincial level was referred to as the "Indirect Rule" system because the colonial authorities govern these regions indirectly through the pre-existing political institutions and leaders.[172]

The British established an administrative system that combined a new bureaucracy with some control over indigenes. Chiefs were appointed as tax collectors and other locals who serve British interests. Also, Chiefs were held accountable to colonial administrators, and were responsible to administer British core values to their own people. While many suffered cutbacks in independent power from what they were before, some were upgraded in status and exercised more power than they were before the arrival of British colonial masters.[173]

From the colonial declaration of 1900 to independence in 1960, the British ruled Nigeria through indirect rule.[174] This method, already well tried in other parts of the empire, involved restructuring local traditional authorities and deposing those office holders who refused to comply to British interests.[175]

Olalekan Ishaq Balogun captured how British colonial policy was used to dispose erring kings who dare challenged or questioned the authority of the colonial administrators. For instance, Sultan Attahiru, the twelfth Caliph of Sokoto and the Sarkin Musulumi was

[172] Ibid.
[173] Ibid.
[174] As a high commissioner to Northern Nigeria (1900-1906), Lord Frederick Lugard introduced the system of "indirect rule" which was later extended to the south (1912-1918). Indirect rule looked to have been suitable to the Caliphate and such very centralised areas such as Borno. The system of emirates that had been established by Shehu Usuman dan Fodio's jihad was taken and only marginally altered to suit the colonial administration. The emir continued to exercise their administrative power as they had done earlier, though they are now under the control of British administrators. The judiciary authority of the emirs was reduced to stop them from acting arbitrarily and by imposing the death penalty. The system of tax was changed to enable more money on the British treasurer, Falola, (1998),50-51.
[175] Olalekan Ishaq Balogun, "Theatre and Resistance in the Age of Colonial Imperialism: Ahmed Yerima's Attahiru and Ameh Oboni: The Great as Paradigm." In *Literature, History and Identity in Northern Nigeria*, edited by Ismaila A. Tsiga and M.O. Badmus, (Ibadan: Safari Books Ltd, 2015), 77.

removed and killed because of his resistance against the colonial interference in local affairs, just like others before him including Ijebuland (1892), Brass (1895), Ilorin and Bida (1897), Benin (1897), and Arochukwu (1901-02).[176] Balogun notes the new leader Attahiru was worried on the threat posed by British colonialism when he said this:

> I am becoming the Caliph at a time when the history of our lives is at a delicate balance. At a time when the white man is determined to upset the peace of our lives. But it is too early to dare the enemies, or to look for one. I shall wait for their moves. But let us pray to Allah's hand in the matter. Let us pray for peace. Let us pray for our children. Let us pray for the growth of our lives and position in the Islamic world.[177]

He expresses dissatisfaction on British meddling in domestic affairs and pitching brothers against brothers. Sultan Attahiru describes it as unacceptable. Attahiru was visibly annoyed when he learns that British colonial administrators had removed his representatives, the Emirs of Bida and Kontagora from office, whom British colonial officers accused of insubordination. Attahiru further accused the High Commissioner of Northern Nigeria of undermining his power. He notes that the directives given by the High Commissioner, Frederick Lugard, that he should choose new Emirs to replace the deposed ones, the problem was not to replace the new Emirs but that the replacement must pass through colonial vetting. He said, "Lugard ridicules the Islamic religion further by referring to the deposed emirs as scoundrels and infidels. A kafir!"[178]

Administratively, the defeat of the caliph and establishment of Kaduna as the region's new capital after the colonial capital at Lokoja and Zungeru irrespectively, weakened the power and influence of the Sultan of Sokoto. Though he retained spiritual leadership of all

[176] Balogun, "Theatre and Resistance in the Age of Colonial Imperialism: Ahmed Yerima's Attahiru and Ameh Oboni: The Great as Paradigm," 77.
[177] Ibid.
[178] Ibid., 77-78.

Muslims in the region, "a partial transfer of power from the aristocracy to a new political class had begun."[179] During the preparation for Nigerian independence, the colonial administration, looking to detach judicial from traditional powers, introduced changes that further weakened the influence of traditional authorities. In 1959, for instance, the British governor proclaimed that the Sultan and the Emirs would henceforth be subjected to ministerial pronouncements. They were consequently stripped of the authority to employ and discipline Islamic judges.[180]

Whereas colonial policy cut down the powers of the emirs, it illogically depended on them for indirect rule. This had serious costs. Indirect rule worked in the emirates that already had well-established administrative systems, but not so successfully in other places where emirate administration had never penetrated efficiently, mainly due to resistance by minority groups. While indirect rule in some ways reinforced emirate administration, many minority areas were additionally subordinated to the emirate power with no respect for their own distinct identities.[181] Ochonu states:

> By constructing the first known British map of the Sokoto Caliphate based on the information provided by Mohammed Bello, Clapperton initiated the tradition of equating the Sokoto Caliphate and its frontiers with what he called "Houssa [Hausa] Territory." This cartographic and descriptive convention seems to have impacted subsequently British travel writing on the caliphate as travellers relied on the pioneering work of Clapperton and the Lander brothers. The British were subtly investing the Middle Belt with a Hausa-emirate imaginary, connecting the Middle Belt to the caliphate as its culturally inferior subordinate.[182]

[179] International Crisis Group, "Northern Nigeria: Background to Conflict."
[180] Ibid.
[181] Ochonu, *Colonialism by Proxy: Hausa Imperial Agents and Middle Belt Consciousness in Nigeria,* 31.
[182] Ibid.

Ochonu notes with dissatisfaction the attitude of the British explorer Dr William Baikie, whose observations about the indigenes of the Middle Belt, he believes convey serious political implications. According to Ochonu:

> Baikie in 1854 described the Tiv ethnic group who, along with the Idoma, Bassa, Jukun, Igala, and other groups, occupied the lower Benue Valley, as an "unfortunate tribe [whose] being against everyone, and everyone against it, has rendered it extremely suspicious of any visitors, their crude minds being unable to comprehend anything beyond war and raping….The Mitshis as far as we could judge, are wilder and less intelligent than any of the African races with whom we had intercourse except Baibai and Djukuns.[183]

Ochonu argues that Baikie's depictions of the people of the Middle Belt as crude, as well as his negative narrative of the indigenes of the Benue Valley and Niger-Benue confluence region as bad.[184] He believes that it was based on the negative categorisation of the Middle Belt people that subsequent British travellers relied upon to subject the people of the Middle Belt under the control of Sokoto Caliphate. This action was done without regards to the sensibilities of the people of the Middle Belt. He asserts, "this comparative conflation carried immense political import. The reification of growing nation of precolonial Hausa-Caliphate hegemony was important for the subsequent prevalence of the Hausa as a viable sociolinguistic category of colonial rule in Northern Nigeria."[185]

Again, converting to Christianity, often in response to the seeming power of the emirate administration, were prevalent among the minority (i.e., non-Hausa-Fulani) groups. These minority groups voiced fears of control in a post-colonial Nigeria, but a 1958 commission

[183] Ibid.
[184] Ibid.
[185] Ibid.

of inquiry equally dismissed their apprehensions. Nonetheless, colonial rule smoothed the authority of Hausa and Fulani elites, particularly in areas that minority groups had historically seen as their exclusive spheres and planted the seeds for differing rights to political space, economic rights and societal values.[186]

According to Tijjani Muhammad Naniya, the Maliki books of *shari'a* introduced into Hausaland along with Islam had their legitimacy accepted and came into general use as legal interpretations. Among the most universally used works were *al-Mudawwana al-Kubra* by 'Abd al-Salam b. Sa'id Sahnun al-Tanukh, *al-Risala* by 'Abd Allah b. Abu Zayd al-Qayrawa Mukhtasar, and *al-Mukhtasar* by Khalil b. Isahaq. On the other hand, the jihadists wrote their own interpretations on serious points of law. In his *Sirat al-Imam al- 'adil*, for instance, Muhammad Bello clarified the terms for deciding whether or not cases of theft fell into the classification of *hadd* (serious crime):

> Punishment for theft (*hadd al-saraqah*) is not to be inflicted if the value of the stolen property is less than the minimum fixed by the law, which is ten dirhams according to the Hanafi school, although the Shafi'i, Hanbali and Maliki schools maintain that the minimum value should be three dirhams. Another condition is that the stolen property must be in a safe place (*hirz*). If all the conditions are met, the thief's right hand should be amputated at the wrist.[187]

Nor did the conduct of *alkalai* (Judges) evade the interest of the jihadists. In fact, it was to control judicial oversight that Abdullahi dan Fodio wrote *Diya' al-Hukkam*, his influential source for the management of the *shari'a* in the Sokoto Caliphate.[188]

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[186] Ibid., 4-5.
[187] Tijjani Mohammad Naniya, "The Impact of the British Conquest on the Interpretation and Application of the Shari'a." *Paideuma: Mitteilun gen zur Kulturkunde* 40 (1994): 164.
[188] Ibid.

Naniya contended that to guarantee the proper application of the *shari'a*, a hierarchy of courts was established. At the top of the pecking order stand the caliphal court in Sokoto, where appeals from the emirate courts are heard. The Caliph could dispose of such appeals by referring the case back to the emirate involved for retrial, transferring the case to the *alkali* of Sokoto for fresh trial, or by trying the case in his own court. Below the caliphal court stand the judicial councils of the emirates, each consisting of the emir and some of the emirate's foremost *Ulama*. The emir's judicial council was the highest court of appeal in each emirate. Its main functions were to hear appeals from the lower courts of the emirate and to arbitrate cases concerning land and homicide. The tradition of referring such cases to the highest authority in the *ummah* (Muslim Community) was age-old, having begun with the second orthodox Caliph Umar b. al-Kattab (634-644 A.D.). Again, land cases were perhaps transferred to the emir's judicial council in order to protect the security of the land and to forestall social turmoil, since most such cases raised the possibly volatile matters of occupation, settlement, resettlement and immigration.[189]

Naniya affirms that below the emir's judicial council were found the courts of the *babban alkali* (the emirate's Chief Justice) which were founded in the capital city of each emirate. These courts were authorised to try cases emanating in any part of the emirate. They similarly heard appeals from the emirate's lower courts. The lowest courts in the hierarchy were the town courts which were found in the emirate's larger towns. These courts dealt with minor cases originating in the town and its surrounding villages and hamlets. In districts to which no *alkali* was appointed, *jakadu* or representatives of fief holders and village heads acted as arbitrators, though their powers were restricted to settling the parties to the dispute.

[189] Ibid., 164.

However, Muslim scholars similarly play a role in resolving disputes according to the principle of *sulh* (arbitration).[190]

Naniya noted that in cases concerning Muslims, the *alkali* refers to the *shari'a* to arrive at a verdict. When Maguzawa (non-Muslim Hausa) were implicated, an *alkali* usually suggests to the parties the alternative of using either the *shari'a* or traditional law. If the parties opted to have their case heard according to the provisions of traditional law, the *alkali* calls the traditional leaders of the Maguzawa involved to sit with him as advisors, and they passed a ruling together.[191]

Naniya contends that despite the status of the *shari'a* as the basic law of the realm, traditional law similarly functions on a controlled level. It was usually applied where customary practices are in operation, especially in some cases associated to landholding. For instance, in Kano, women were not allowed to inherit farmland on the reasons that their husbands or brothers were liable for their care and well-being. At the period, family unity was still very solid, and the spirit of *gandu* had not yet been discarded. This customary rule endured even the *jihad* and was accommodated by the *shari'a*, though under the principle of '*urf* (traditional practice). It was only in the 1950s that extended family system had been seriously undermined, and a Native Authority by-law made room for the stringent application of the *shari'a* to the inheritance of land by women.[192]

However, in the final days of colonial rule, in 1959, the British expunged Sharia content on the ground that some of its provisions were incompatible with the rights of all citizens in a religiously secular state Under demand from the colonial government, and in a framework where the Alkali had become to some degree condemned by playing an increasingly political

[190] Naniya, "The Impact of the British Conquest on the Interpretation and Application of the Shari'a," 164.
[191] Ibid., 164-65.
[192] Ibid., 165.

role against the new pro-independence parties, the Northern Region's government agreed to a negotiated code (called the "Penal Code") that set-up a Sharia court of appeal with power only for Muslim personal law. The majority of northern Muslim leaders saw those changes as promoting Christian jurisprudence over their own Islamic judicial tradition.[193]

In addition, according to Falola "for many years, northern Islam has been prone to fundamentalism and Mahdism, both of which contribute to the radicalisation of the religion and of politics."[194] He argues that the northern Islamic elite is opposed to the spread of Christianity in the region. He noted that in contemporary Northern Nigeria, each religion presents itself as the better substitute.[195] Falola has this to say about the division in the Nigerian Muslim community which in most cases lead to violence in Northern Nigeria:

> Occurrences of religious violence in Nigeria set Muslims against Christians or religious groups against the state, attention must be called to the many instances of violence among the divided Muslim community itself. Differences among members of the same religion are often expressed through violence: one faction will seize places of worship in order to prevent others from using them; power struggles over the appointments of leaders are divisive and can end in physical combat; consensus over theological matters is not always easy or possible; changes result in prolonged quarrels; and the state even sometimes sets one faction against another in order to promote general instability when it is politically expedient.[196]

Falola further argues that whilst Nigeria Muslim wants to present a common front and want Nigerians to believe that there are no sects in Islam, the truth is that there is clear evidence that there are big gulfs and divisions existing among them. He posits that the belief

[193] Falola, *Violence in Violence: The Crisis of Religious Politics and Secular Ideologies*, 39.
[194] Ibid., 37.
[195] Ibid.
[196] Ibid., 227.

that Islam is culturally and theologically monolithic, an opinion held by Christians, were not true. He noted that there are various factions, sects, movements, and Sufi brotherhoods known as tariqa, generally categorised by deep doctrinal variances.[197]

[197] According to Ramzi Ben Amara, *Jama'at 'Izalat al-Bid'a wa-Iqamat al-Sunna* (Association for the removal of innovation and the establishment of the Sunna), simply known as *Izala*, was founded in 1978 in Jos, Plateau State, Nigeria by Sheikh Ismaila Idris b. Zakariyya. *Izala* is often linked with the charismatic personality of Sheikh Abu Bakr Mahmoud Gumi (1922-1992), the "father" of a reformist Islam with explicitly anti-Sufi tones in post-colonial Northern Nigeria. Amara points out that Sheikh Ismaila Idris was the founder and architect of the *Izala* Movement (Ramzi Ben Amara, "Shaykh Ismaila Idris (1937-2000), the Founder of the *Izala* Movement." *Annual Review of Islam in Africa* 11 (2012): 74). The Izala Movement is against the practices of the tariqua like "the coronation of the individuals as a saint, the elaborate initiation rites, and the observance of special prayers and chants determined by the individual." The traditional Sufi Orders, Qadiriyya and Tijjaniyya see it as a serious attack, Coupled with Izala's growing influence, this heightened the competition between it and the tariquas, leading to frequent deadly fracas in many cities in the north (Sakah Saidu Mahmud, "Nigeria." *African Studies Review* 47, no.2 (September 2004):86-87. Falola avers that there are number of counter attacks and incidences in Northern Nigeria that led to violent clashes between the two opposed movements leading to death and destruction of properties. For instance, there are twelve recorded incidents in 1978. In 1980s there were over seventy outbreaks that took place in northern cities and towns. Izala frowns at the imprudent overenthusiastic praise of Tijjaniyya leader Niass and claimed that its adherents' practice "cult of personality." Also, they accused Sufis of not treating Islam with proper importance. The anti-Sufis, Izala called them names and described them as apostates, pagans, and infidels. They went further to describe them as acting like Christians [Falola, 227-228, 237]. Sheik Abubakar Gumi, formerly Grand Kadi of the Shari'a Court of Appeal of the Northern region and mufti, a position he was appointed to by General Murtala Mohammed in 1975. The movement seeks to both revive and reform Nigerian Islam. Izala leaders aim at returning to orthodoxy and denounced Sufi thought as deviating from holy texts. Gumi argues that Sufi orders are "inconsistent with true Islam." He adduces that "Sufis teach withdrawal from this world, practice mystical rites, canonise certain rulers, recognise saints, and organise the ummah into hierarchical, competing structures, all of which are unauthorised innovations to the Qur'an and the Prophetic tradition" [Olufemi Vaughan, 135]. The process of change in Northern Nigeria is seen from the lens of religious terms, leading to the emergence of the *Izala* to challenge the perception held by most of the people. The challenge and clamour for reform by *Izala* led to its popularity, power, and influence. In most cases *Izala* faithful occupied mosques to press home their demands. Again, it is alleged that becoming a member of *Izala* meant breaking with the status quo, including parents, and rejecting all perceived "un-Islamic" ways and social customs like bride price, intemperate mourning and praying in some Sufi style ritual. In addition, *Izala* movements argue against some of the practices that have gained currency in Northern Nigeria but are in the forefront of other changes; for instance, they advocated for building of modern Islamic schools in both urban and rural areas and allow women's participation in political and religious affairs in the region. They equally offer Muslim women, youth, and urban western educated Muslims another progressive route not practiced by Sufi establishments. Besides their innovation and radical departure from conservative lining of other brotherhoods, *Izala* radical preaching and ideology attracted and appealed to many Muslims and subsequently attracted huge adherents. This attraction and popularity created anxiety and tension leading to violent confrontation from other Islamic sects and even from its members who disagreed with their own brand of preaching and practices. It was based on this disagreement among the members that led to the emerging of a split into two factions: *Izala* A and *Izala* B, based in Kaduna and Jos, respectively. *Izala* has been viewed by Muslims in Northern Nigeria as the largest movement with harmonious voices in the region. Leading credence to this assertion was the introduction of Shari'a in the 2000s which they spearheaded in the northern region, giving acceptance to this assertion. Izala gained currency among educated professionals in both private and public sectors, particularly in the metropolitan cities of Kaduna and Jos. Izala hinges on strict interpretations of religious texts, particularly the Qur'an and Hadith, along with the widespread availability of the texts in Hausa language. Critics have criticised Gumi for his role in establishing Izala. For Gumi, the founding of Izala has become a necessity in the face of rampaging corruption among Emirs. He claimed that "They have brought back to life all the corrupt practices against which Sheikh dan Fodio went to war with the former Hausa rulers. They had become kings with big places full of servants and courtiers and required other people to bow down before them. They kept concubines and did not really fear God's anger." Gumi adduces that the Izala movement was born on the same manner and preached by Usman dan Fodio and his followers during the famous jihad. Going by these statements of Gumi, Izala draws its moral authority to inscribe sharia into the

Culturally, the colonial administration usually dissuades Western modernisations. It permitted Christian missionaries and their schools only in the non-Muslim borders of the non-existent caliphate. Even though it brought in Roman script to take the place of "ajami" for writing the Hausa language and introduced a European-style education system together with the Islamic system, this put at risk much pre-existing scholarship and weakened the position of clerics and others uneducated in English. With time, these educational and cultural rules sharpened the older rift between Muslim Hausa and Fulani and minority groups.[198]

However, Colonial expansions equally changed the region's economy and demography. The construction of railway lines from Lagos to Kano, between 1898 and 1912, and the amalgamation of the Northern and Southern Nigeria protectorates, in 1914, attracted a flood

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Northern Nigeria politico-religious project. Hence, Izala criticised Hausa-Fulani Muslim rulers and chastised Islamic preachers who claimed to have direct connection to the Prophet. Gumi's statements drew angry response from other Sufi brotherhoods, and it blew up a full-fledged crisis among Muslim faithful in the north. Attempts to reconcile them by Second Republic President Shehu Shagari failed in 1979 and 1983. Again, despite the ambivalence expressed by the emirate establishment towards the movement, Hausa-Fulani youths embraced its teachings. In 1987 Gumi was bestowed the King Faisal Award by Saudi Arabia for his service to Islam. The award did not go down well with Christians in Nigeria who believe that Saudi Arabia are interfering in domestic affairs of Nigeria. On the other hand, the Emirs criticised the Saudi Arabian government for the award on Gumi and believe that Saudi Arabia supports Gumi's brand of preaching. Despite the criticism by two main Sufi orders against Izala, the movement continues to wax stronger and strong among its supporters [Vaughan, 134. See Alexander Thurston, 65].

Another group worth mentioning here is the Shia who are commonly called the Islamic Movement or the Muslim Brothers Movement. This organisation started in the 1980s when many Nigerian university students in the northern region were persuaded by the ideological morality of the 1979 Iranian Revolution. They argued that the Western imposition of value and culture should be rejected. They argued further that pious Muslims should lead, and Islamic Shari'a should be the law of the land. The consequences where Northern Nigeria was flooded with ideological literature from Iran. Subsequently, Muslim students travelled to Iran to study and gain knowledge by interacting with Iranian mullahs. In this fold was Ibraheem Yaqoub Zakzaky, presently called Sheikh Ibraheem El Zakzaky. He is currently the leader of the Shia in Nigeria. The Shia claimed that only God-fearing Muslims can rule. Again, Shia Muslims reject the Nigerian Constitution and laws because they claimed that it was derived from illegal sources. They equally called for the establishment of the Islamic State of Nigeria, with its constitution derived from the Qur'an and Hadith. They also reject democracy as it is being practiced and exists in Nigeria. Furthermore, the Shia do not sing the national anthem or say the national pledge and do not respect the Nigerian flag. In addition, they denounced the Shari'a programme introduced in the twelve northern states as illusory, because it was introduced by a non-Islamic government. Again, they see other Muslim groups who act inappropriately as apostates and unbelievers (*kafir*). However, the majority of Muslims in Northern Nigeria reject the Islamic Movement or the Muslim Brother Movement's ideology. Because their views are anti-establishment and state, the Shia are under security surveillance all the time. They are considered a minority among established Muslim groups in the northern region (Umaru, *Christian – Muslim Dialogue in Northern Nigeria: A Social-Political and Theological Consideration*, 40-42. See also Thurston, *Boko Haram: The History of An African Jihadist Movement*, 64-66).

[198] *International Crisis Group,* 5.

of southern migrants responding to the emerging economic prospects in Kano, Kaduna and Zaria. In many respects, contact between the resultant plurality of ethnic groups has been productive and peaceful. The railway, for instance, gave a great lift to agriculture, particularly the production of cash crops, though this migration did not lead to better interethnic integration in all situations. This was partly because the ruling aristocracies from the caliphate epoch were territorial and not eager to let "strangers" into their zones. It was also partially as consequence of the British policy of safeguarding the north's Islamic identity and preventing likely inter-group conflict. Hence, the British discouraged the movement of non-Muslim migrants into the core Muslim areas of some of the region's cities, forcing them rather into the *Sabon gari* (strangers' quarters).[199] Though Bello called the amalgamation a mistake which should not have been made in the first place, "the mistake of 1914 has come to light and I should like to go no further. I was referring to the amalgamation that took place in the year before the old independent governments of Northern and Southern Nigeria."[200]

Over the years, the differentiation between locals ("indigenes") and strangers developed as a crucial feature of Nigerian social and political life. These manifold and overlying systems of communal identification, or "associational ethnicity," offer ways of connections that are particularly vital for new immigrants. However, mixed with discrimination, they have sharpened ethno-religious identities and strengthened unfair practices that continue to effect relations between the Hausa and the Fulani and other minority inhabitants.[201]

The time leading to independence saw the early sizable cases of inter-ethnic violence. For example, in 1953, the Hausa and Igbo migrants fought in Kano over the bid by southern

[199] Ibid., 6.
[200] Bello, *My Life*, 133.
[201] Ibid.

parties to stage anti-colonial and pro-independence demonstrations. That upheaval, which formally left at least 36 people dead (21 Igbo) and more than 200 injured, echoed the opposition to independence of northern politicians, who were nervous that an end to British rule would mean suppression of the north by the more progressive south. It also expected recognised local resentment of Igbo economic control, for instance in petty commerce.[202] The crisis in both Lagos and Kaduna gave Bello sleepless nights, which prompted him to say:

> The Lagos politicians had certainly gone out of their way to stir up trouble for us. We found that it was by no means over when we pulled out of Iddo station. Whenever the train stopped, we were surrounded by angry crowds of demonstrators. Even when we slowed down by village crossings, we were assailed by boos…. We were not only angry at our treatment, but indignant that people who were so full of fine phrases about the unity of Nigeria should have set their people against chosen representatives of another region while passing through their territory and even in our own. What kind of trouble had we let ourselves in for by associating with such people?[203]

The perception of Bello about Nigeria was it should have been separate than bringing together ethnic groups that are distinct from them. It is surprising he keeps referring to them as "passing through their territory." Bello was not alone on this perception of Nigeria. Other politicians from Southern Nigeria do the same. Again, Bello points out that the amalgamation was not popular among them, and the people of the north detested it: "Lord Lugard and his Amalgamation were far from popular amongst us at that time. There were

[202] International Crisis Group, 6.
[203] Bello, *My Life*, 134-135.

agitations in favour of succession; we should set up on our own; we should cease to have anything more to do with the Southern people; we should take our own way."[204]

Though Bello and his lieutenants believed that they could do without the south, after all, they have the resources and manpower to run a new government on their own, he asserts, "I must say it looked very tempting. We were certainly 'viable,' to use the current phrase; we could run our own show; the Centre would have to hand over to us our share of Nigeria's accumulated sterling assets. We had the men and production and minerals and the will to act."[205]

Furthermore, the colonial epoch was similarly characterised by religious upheaval, even conflicts. In the thinking of the establishments, the highest menace came from "Mahdism," a trans-Saharan, Muslim-based anti-colonial movement that begun in a messianic doctrine, according to which, a Mahdi would arise at the turn of each century, with the authority to charm huge followers, reinforce Islam and make justice victor. Whereas Mahdists undeniably had an anti-colonial influence, and skirmishes happened, their status was often embellished by scared colonial administrators.[206]

Again, the key to understanding Islam in the Northern region is to recognise the salient position of the Sokoto Caliphate which acts as the wheel or model for exerting a rigid Islamic cultural influence in the region and sub-region. The nineteenth and twenty centuries witnessed the emergence of two influential Islamic Sufi brotherhoods: the Qadiriyya[207] and

[204] Ibid.
[205] Ibid.
[206] International Crisis Group, "Northern Nigeria: Background to Conflict," 6.
[207] The Qadiriyya was established by Abd -al Qadir (AD 1077-1166) in Baghdad [Umaru, 39]. Qadiriyya is (known in the northern region as the Sadulu) and the Tijaniyya are known in the northern region as the Kabulu. Usman dan Fodio was the leader of the Qadiriyya in Nigeria and it is linked to the Sokoto Caliphate. The joint chairman of the Nigerian Interreligious Council (NIREC) is the Sultan of Sokoto, Muhammadu Sa'ad Abubakar. He equally doubles as the head of Jama'atu Nasril Islam (Society for the Support of Islam, JNI), and President-General of the Nigerian National Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs (NSCIA). These organisations have championed the campaign for peacebuilding between religious communities in a sustained process of interreligious dialogue in Nigeria. Qadiriyya believes in mysticism and the *khalifa*, a doctrine of asceticism and

Tijaniyya.[208] As the ruling aristocracy in Sokoto are mainly Qadiriyya allied with the colonial rulers, its members were to a large extent charged with collusion, accumulating power and wealth and approving immoral Western habits. In a backlash, leaders in various areas of the region began to ally with Tijaniyya, fascinated by the brotherhood's seeming anti-colonial and anti-Western posture. At first the skirmishes between the two orders were restricted to scholars and the political elite.

Roman Loimeier contends that Ibrahim Niass' acceptance by the mainstream of the malamai of the *Tijaniyya* initially in Kano and later in Nigeria was not because of an almost revolutionary "realignment" in a relatively short period, but a blend and interface of various factors over a period spanning fourteen years (1937-51). The successes of Niass among the traders and scholars in Kano are as follows:

1. The situation of competition between the two great networks of the Tijaniyya in Kano itself. Niass was not affiliated with one of these groups and could therefore act as an intermediary.

commitment to prayers, reading, and spiritual exercises. The followers acknowledge an allegiance to a spiritual leader, the *muqaddam*, who acts as the local representative of the *khalifa*, the keeper of the tomb of Abd-al Qadir in Baghdad. It is believed that Abd-al Qadir's name conjures blessings, and he is expected to intercede on behalf of his adherents on the Day of Resurrection. The followers must equally accept Sufi ethics and recite the devotional formulae of the order (*lazim* and *wazifah*) during prayers and other set time [Falola, 229].

[208] The other Sufi order is called the Tijaniyya brotherhood, established in the eighteenth century by Sheikh Ahmad Tijani of Algeria, which then spread to western Sudan. It spread to Kano, Nigeria in the 1930s when the leader of Tijaniyya in West Africa, Sheikh Ibrahim Niass of Senegal, met Emir of Kano, Abdullahi Bayero and he (Bayero) joined the movement and influenced other Muslims to join the movement. Sheikh Niass was known by his adherents as "Khalifa of the Order," The Great Leader," or "The Reformer of the Age." He was said to have lifted the status of the Tijaniyya with his charisma, scholarship, mysticism, and wisdom. The movement under Niass made a claim to universalism. Again, Tijaniyya is not against accumulation of wealth through legitimate means. They help themselves in business and do not believe that women should be isolated and believe they should be allowed to earn a living. Tijaniyya does not impose educational attainment but a member should meet the Order's obligations by attending the Friday *hailala* midday prayer and reciting the *wazifa* and *lazimi* every day. The brotherhood promises its adherents salvation if they perform all the taxing litanies. Tijaniyya equally believe that non-Muslim parents can be saved through the devotion of their children. The brotherhood also believes in saints, charms, folk medicines, and imitating the lifestyle of Prophet Muhammad. Furthermore, members of Tijaniyya receive *tarbiya*, that is, spiritual instruction, and intuitive and deep knowledge of God from the local *muqaddam* or sheikh. Again, successful brotherhood come to know the secret power of religion and the exalted names of God. Receiving *tarbiya* is one of the leading aspirations of Sufism, and the tradition strengthens the identification between the leader and his adherents. To receive *tarbiya* is to reach the upper echelon of the hierarchy. Tijaniyya are known not to retreat to isolation or solitude [Folala, 229-230].

2. Both networks tried to use Niass's prestige and salasil for their own aims. They needed him and could therefore be subtly manipulated and played off against each other by Niass.
3. Niass, through his visits to Morrocco and Hijaz and on the basis of his being acknowledged by Ahmad Sukairij as Khalifa of the Tijaniyya, was in possession of the necessary direct links to some external centres of authority of the Tijaniyya.
4. The alliance with Niass proved beneficial to the religious and political ambitions of the Emir of Kano. He could stress his independence from Sokoto as a spiritual centre of the Tijaniyya and as a counterweight to Sokoto.
5. Niass's teachings proved highly attractive to less sophisticated Muslims as a result of his specific interpretation of tarbiya.
6. Niass and his Jamaat al-faida (the community of grace) distinquished themselves by emphasizing the practice of qabd.[209]

Loimeier noted that the economic successes of most members of the *Tijaniyya – Ibrahimiyya* was used by the opponents of the tariqa especially followers of Qadiriyya to criticise the spiritual claims of the *Tijaniyya*. Hence, in the 1950s the Wazirin Sokoto, Junaidu criticised Niass's love of money, while other members of *Qadiriyya* chastise him.[210]

Loimeier points out that various factors contributed to the transformation of Tijaniyya as mentioned earlier from scholars' tariqa to a religious mass movement. Having won over the "trader-scholar" networks in Kano in the 1940s, the dissemination of the Tijaniyya among

[209] Roman Loimeier, *Islamic Reform and Political Change in Northern Nigeria* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1997), 44.
[210] Ibid., 46.

the Muslims was the commencement in early 1950s by Niass, Sidi b. 'Umar, and Muhammad al-Hadi.[211]

Loimeier asserts that it was in 1954 that Muhammad Sanusi, a close friend of Niass, followed Abdullahi Bayero, the Emir of Kano, the *Tijaniyya – Ibrahimiyya* in Northern Nigeria which then experienced a transformation and achieved progress. In the period of nine years Bayero promoted the Tijaniyya-Ibrahimiyya in Kano as a dominating religious force and saw himself as its leader by the grace of Niass. Another factor which boasted the popularity of the Tijaniyya-Ibrahimiyya in the 1950s was the link with the populist opposition party, the Northern Elements Progressive Union (NEPU), under the leadership of Aminu Kano and Sa'd Zungur. Loimeier noted the increasing politicisation of the public life in the late 1940s that attracted younger followers of Tijaniyya to NEPU. Other factor was the leader of NEPU, Aminu Kano, idolized the Egyptian President, Jama 'Abd an-Nasir who at that period had an established contact with Niass. Loimeier avers that Niass has won a reputation in the 1950s not only as a leader of the most powerful religious mass movement in West Africa but equally as leading representative of an Islamic policy of tajdid in Senegal. Niass was equally linked to the Union Culturelle Musulmane (UCM), a modern Islamic organisation strongly influenced by Salafi doctrines.[212]

Loimeier noted that the leader of the ruling party, NPC, Ahmadu Bello, as well as member of the conservative malamai of the Qadiriyya and the Tijaniyya, were worried about the increasing radicalisation of young Tijanis as a serious threat to the progress and peace of the north. Loimeier points to an incident that happened in 1956 during an occasion of public tafsir (interpretation and exegesis of the Qur'an), when Nasiru Kabara forbade his followers to join the NEPU, with some members of the "malamai" of the Tijaniyya such as

[211] Ibid., 47.
[212] *Loimeier, Islamic Reform and Political Change in Northern Nigeria*, 47.

Tijani Usman, Muhammad Sani Katanga, and Uba Ringim, all belonging to the Salgawa network. Though Ahmadu Bello supported this faction within Tijaniyya, in 1956, Bello suspended the ban on the public performance of the Wazifa by the Tijanis. However, these actions did not deter young Tijani's connection with NEPU, and instead they cut off their links with the factions of malamai of the Tijaniyya.[213]

Loimeier contends that an official political alliance transpired between the NEPU and the Tijaniyya – Ibrahimiyya was nonetheless materialised only after the removal of Muhammad Sanusi in 1963. Sanusi had until then been one of the prominent politicians of the NPC. In protest, his supporters established in 1963 a regional party called the Kano People's Party (KPP) which recruited its supporters such as the Tijani followers of Sanusi.[214]

Loimeier noted that the politicisation of the Tijaniyya arose from the petition written by some malamai of the Salgawa network in the 1950s to British colonial administrators for permission to establish *Jam'iyyar Tijaniyya* (Congress of the Tijaniyya) as a model after *Jam 'iyyar Mutanen Arewa*, the Northern peoples' Congress. This shows an indication that some religious scholars were using their networks as an instrument of political moblisation. However, in Sokoto the hostilities between the *turuq* had assumed a violent character and was marked by a number of skirmishes such as in the districts of Isa and Zurmi in 1956 where four persons were killed. Infighting in Kano between *Tijaniyya* and *Qadiriyya* over a supremacy tussle because of the Sultan of Sokoto membership of *Qadiriyya* should also be noted, while in Kano, Emir Abdullahi Bello, as well as his successor, Muhammad Sanusi were devotee of Ibrahim Niass. The dual sympathy towards the *Tijaniyya* can be

[213] Ibid., 47-8.
[214] Ibid.

interpretated to mean an indication of their attempts to achieve political and spiritual autonomy from Sokoto.[215]

Again, the 1951 election significantly amplified the political position of both orders, as two political parties, the Northern Elements Progressive Union (NEPU) and the Northern People's Congress (NPC), vied for their allegiance. As the negotiating of power of the orders grew, religious authority began to carry further political consequences. In Sokoto, where the Qadiriyya felt especially questioned by what they saw as a hostile Tijaniyya presence, the two fought numerous times in the mid-1950s. Despite these developments, caliphate influence remained solid. Leading to independence, the main political party, the NPC, was mostly conservative Hausa-Fulani elite led by Alhaji Ahmadu Bello, the Sardauna of Sokoto, a descendant of Usman dan Fodio.[216]

However, as in many countries in Africa, colonial rule in Northern Nigeria led to population movements, new cities, and new economic prospects. It strengthened some prevailing identities while motivating new ones, in some extent setting the stage for long-term and vicious identity conflicts. Associations within the wider Islamic community were robustly strengthened. In the northern region, with its conservative tradition of religiously acquainted public authority, there continued to be a strong feeling that colonial rule was a distant power that rattled the region's legal, political, and cultural values.[217]

In short, the conflicting views among Muslims regarding public authority is seen in the cynicism in its relationships with secular or Christian's "others" (external powers, neighbours, or compatriots) maintained after independence. The experience of non-Muslims under colonial rule was likewise mixed and conflicting, mixed with the indigenous Christian

[215] Loimeier, *Islamic Reform and Political Change in Northern Nigeria*, 75.
[216] Ibid.
[217] International Crissi Group, Northern Nigeria: Background to Conflict, 6.

groups and immigrants from the south. Few took the opportunity of educational advantages, often to the annoyance of the Muslim majority, while others agonised from what they alleged as the strengthened powers of the Sokoto hegemony.[218]

2.8 The Postcolonial Epoch

The dawn of the decolonisation process and the momentum of political change in the Northern Nigeria was led by Ahmadu Bello, a great-great grandson of Usman dan Fodio. His popular appeal was based not only on his charisma but equally on his birth in the Sokoto Caliphate aristocracy. Though a direct descendant offspring of Usman dan Fodio, he drew on his religious legitimacy to stake a claim for political leadership. As a leader of the Northern People's Congress (NPC), he prefers to remain in the northern enclave as premier than to go to Lagos to be a prime minister. It was not surprising when he allowed his party deputy leader Sir Abubakar Tafawa Belewa to become the prime minister. As Vaughan opines, "calling Abubakar Tafawa Belewa, the NPC deputy leader and soon-to-be prime minister, his "able lieutenant," the sardunna felt that the rough-and-tumble of national politics in Lagos was below his stature and left others to carry out what the *Times of London* referred to as work not fit for a Muslim nobleman out of another century."[219] Again, Vaughan observes that Bello's appeal across the broad spectrum of people drew him to the people and increased his popularity and credibility, "this sense of his destiny would only increase when he became premier of the Northern Region in 1954."[220] Besides, as a leader of NPC and premier of the Northern Region, Bello was also instrumental to the modernisation of the Hausa-Fulani emirate without active participation of the caliphate aristocracy under the leadership of someone with the Bello's status.[221]

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[218] Ibid.
[219] Olufemi Vaughan, *Religion and the Making of Nigeria* (Durham: Duke University, 2016), 91.
[220] Ibid.
[221] Ibid.

Furthermore, Bello's influence spread across borders of Northern Nigeria such as Niger, Guinea, Senegal, Gambia, Morocco, Algeria, Libya, and Tunisia. Bello also pursued diplomatic ties to the broader Muslim world, particularly Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Iran, Lebanon, Yemen, Iraq, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirate, and Jordan. He equally constructed mosques in the region and positioned himself as the leader of Nigerian Muslims. While promoting his Hausa-Fulani's identity to an Islamisation policy, Bello also constructed a harmonious relationship with Christian minorities in the northern region, especially in Middle Belt communities.[222] However, there is resentment against Bello's politico-religious doctrine from which he draws his legitimacy. Non-Muslims in the zone reluctantly acknowledged his leadership. Vaughan writes, "it appeared as though the ancient prophesy, that the Fulani would dip the Holy Koran in the sea, would come to pass."[223]

Besides Bello, there are other notable northerners that shaped and contributed to the growth of the northern region. Aminu Kano was the leader of Northern Elements Peoples Union (NEPU). Aminu Kano was seen by many northerners as representing the *talakawa*, that is the progressive elements in a predominantly conservative society. During the march to decolonisation, he advocated for a strong centre and weak region, against the position held by NPC's strong region and weak centre. Though Bello's NPC campaign for a political scheme was acceptable to the Northern Muslim aristocracy, Kano's NEPU integrates egalitarian doctrines in Islam with socialist thought to promote social developments for *talakawa*, the masses of Hausa commoners. Equally, Kano was a strong believer in Shari'a law because of his training in Islamic law and he was equally fluent in Arabic. Also, Kano believes in the advancement of women's rights and equally is an advocate of egalitarian society. He is equally mindful on Usman dan Fodio's strong advocacy of Islamic doctrines

[222] Ibid., 92.
[223] Bello, *My Life*, 16.

on social justice. Hence, his party blamed Hausa-Fulani Muslims rulership for complicity with British colonial masters and claimed maladministration by the *sarakuna*, the Hausa-Fulani aristocracy. Illustrating his religious lineage from the anti-elitist Tijaniyya order in opposition to the Qadiriyya order that reigned supreme with NPC's predominated Sokoto Caliphate, NEPU leadership criticised emirate structures as a feudalistic system that had betrayed the Islamic piety of Usman dan Fodio's jihad. Despite NEPU's lofty ideas to introduce radical changes to the emirate system which they claimed was corrupt and its along with strong opposition to British rule, they had negligible representatives in the northern region's government to introduce the radical reform they wanted.[224]

Though both NPC and NEPU shared cultural ties at the beginning of the formation of Jam'iyyar Mutanen Arewa, the influential regional socio-political umbrella emerged in the heyday of decolonisation. However, it was NPC that came out on top as the official northern party because it won a majority seats in the Northern regional election and with a strong link to the Sokoto Caliphate. NPC used its influence and its socio-religious webs in the emirate system to influence British administrators, and the party cemented the power structure of class ascendency that developed from the caliphate. This emergent Hausa-Fulani power structure of emirs and politicians clinched both "traditional" and "modern" rudiments of governance.[225]

The First Republic was defined by wrangling and bitter rivalry between regions, and between political parties. The northern politicians desired to boost their presence in comparative to the more advanced southern politicians. The northern politicians equally want to safeguard their religious and cultural identity, rooted in the caliphate system, but interrupted by colonial rule. Hence, Bello's NPC intended both to unite the peoples of the

[224] Vaughan, *Religion and the Making of Nigeria*, 93.
[225] Ibid.

region as one bloc that would play an important role on national affairs and in addition, to asserts the north's religious heritage and cultural identity. In declaring the principle "One North, One Destiny,"[226] Bello seeks a "northernisation" policy that support northerners (of all different religious persuasions) in employment both in regional and local governments. This policy, dated to 1954, was formed because of fears that migrants from the south, with the advantage of Western education, would take over the place of northerners both in civil service and the economy. For Bello, "it worked to replace non-northern employees in the regional and provincial civil services with northerners." To fill these positions, Bello brought in crash training programs to prepare northern civil servants with the knowledge to undertake larger control of their government, at regional and federal levels.[227]

Bello's northernisation policy was fashioned to promote unity among all peoples across the region. However, the mainly Christian minority profited from the northernisation policy owing to their high level of western education. It gave them a sense of belonging. Many northerners see the 1960s as an era of greater northern unity, when religious tolerance was

[226] According to Bello Northern Peoples Congress "grew out of a purely cultural society of that name," called Jam'iyyar Mutanen Arewa in 1948. Bello said that the aim at that time was to fight against three evils, corruption, laziness, and ignorance. However, the socio-cultural organisation was transformed into a political party, because "due to unforeseen circumstances, it has to engage itself in politics." He said NPC was not only a cultural organisation that transformed into a political party. The Yoruba cultural organisation, Egbe Omo Oduduwa equally metamorphosed into a political party, Action Group. Bello said that they preferred the name Northern because "we wanted to unite the northern people and at that time was not looking much beyond our own borders." Bello said the aim of the party was: To develop the country to the fullest extent in the shortest time; to preserve the peace, good order, and friendly relations between all our different peoples; to conduct an efficient and impartial administration; to ensure for all, freedom of thought and religion, to do good to all men" [Bello 139,85-6). Echoing the sentiment expressed by Bello, Remi Chukwudi Okeke avers that NPC attempted to reconcile traditional authority in all parts of that culturally diverse region, with the desires of modern government; entrenched in the Muslim emirates, the party was never intended to promote a specifically ethnic interest. NPC policies were generally true to the non-sectarian principle of the party's regionalist motto: "One North One Destiny," irrespective of religion, status or ethnicity" [Remi Chukwu Okeke. "Nigerian Political Parties, the National Question and the Scorecard of Discontinuities." *Asian Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences* 3, Issue 3 (December 2015): 58]. On the other, Nnoli asserts that when the NPC was established, the emphasis was on the region rather than any ethnic group. It was consequently designed for northerners, by northerners and for the pursuit of goals limited to the north and northerners. And in fact, the setup, concisely articulates an inclination towards regionalisation, as different from ethnicization. This is useful because within the North, there were diverse ethnic groups that the NPC's policy did not ignore [Okwudiba Nnoli, *Ethnic Politics in Nigeria*. Enugu: Fourth Dimension Publishers, 1978], 157.

[227] *International Crisis Group,* "Northern Nigeria: Background to Conflict." 7.

respected. However, critics observe that Bello did not embark on any radical administrative reforms to allay the fears of the minorities in the region, nor the minority agitation for autonomy and non-interference from emirate control. Rather, the minority groups complained of meddlesome interference and clampdown of the opposition parties that form as assembly points for the minority groups, such as the Middle Zone League (MZL) and afterward the United Middle Belt Congress (UMBC). The NPC accused the opposition party of weakening the wisdom of regional harmony that the ruling party and aristocracies were seeking to promote.[228]

However, the challenge posed by ethno-religious identities to Nigeria's nascent independent state was instantly apparent after the 1959 federal election that ushered in independence on October 1, 1960. After the elections, officials of the United Middle Belt (UMBC), the mainstream party that represents the Middle Belt ethno-religious interests, accused NPC of intimidation and victimisation against its supporters in the federal election through state coercion. For instance, as Tiv communities were UMBC's stronghold, the party alleged that NPC-controlled native authorities used suppressive measure to repress their supporters not to turn out to vote during the 1959 federal election. In the same vein, party officials of UMBC alleged that NPC used the same tactics to intimidate their supporters by imposing punitive taxes, illegal imprisonment based on frivolous charges and denying access to employment.[229]

C.S. Whitaker Jr., noted that in the vast Northern Nigeria, the majority Hausa-Fulani people sustain Islam-influenced social institutions, including political structures that are deeply hierarchical, authority-centred, bureaucratic, and ascriptive. Their degree of

[228] Ibid.
[229] Vaughan, *Religion and the Making of Nigeria*, 112-113.

assimilation of the colonially induced "civilisation was highly limited, ironically, in part by colonial intent, that is, by the principle of indirect rule.[230]

C.B.N. Ogbogbo avers that the 1946 Constitution provides for a legislative council whose jurisdiction covered the entire country. Membership was also drawn from the whole country. For the first time representatives from Northern and Southern Nigeria came under one legislative umbrella. It recognised the three regions as administrative units and regional legislative assemblies were created. This widened the electoral scope. For Northern Nigeria, it was the first time that elective principle of representation will be introduced in the region. Though members of the regional assemblies were nominated, they constituted an electoral college for the election of members of the House of Representatives.[231]

The 1951 Constitution provides for a unicameral central legislature called the House of Representatives. It had a membership of 148 persons. 136 of them were elected and responsible to the regional legislatures. Of this number, the Northern House of Assembly had 68 seats while the Eastern and Western House were allotted 34 seats each. The distribution of electoral seats was based on population. Again, franchise became less restrictive and more elective seats were provided. It was no longer required for an elector to possess an income of 50 pounds per annum. It was acceptable to pay your tax for one year. However, universal adult suffrage was allowed all over Southern Nigeria with expection of Northern Nigeria where women are not allowed to vote. Despite the changes made in electoral laws, the principle of normination remained in the north. The Northern region's

[230] C.S. Whitaker Jr., "Second Beginnings: The New Political Framework." *Issue: A Journal of Opinion* 11, no. 1/2 (Spring – Summer, 1981): 3.
[231] C.B.N. Ogbogbo, "Historicizing the Legal Framework for Elections in Nigeria." *Journal of the Historical of Nigeria* 18 (2009): 44.

election into the House of Representative was through electoral college unlike the Eastern and Western regions where it was through direct ballot box.[232]

E. O. Awa echoes the same sentiment that franchise was initially on a tax-paying qualification though women were excluded in the north. Members into the House of Representatives were elected through electoral college. However, by 1954 the electoral college was abolished in the East and West with the exception of the North especially for the purpose of federal election. Awa noted that by 1959 all the obstacles on the path of democracy had been removed except that the north continues to disenfranchise women. As a result, the north has more nominated members to the House of Representative than combined East and West. The north has 174 seats, East 73, West 62, and Lagos (the capital territory) with 3.[233]

The charges levied against NPC by UMBC over flagrant abuse of state power show tensions between Hausa-Fulani Muslim rulers and gradually forceful ethno-religious minority groups in the Middle Belt at the start of decolonisation process in the early 1950s. These frequent conflicts partly can be drawn to the hasty conversion of ethnic animists in the Northern Nigerian Protectorate to Christianity and the upsurge on migration of Southern Christians to the region during both the colonial and postcolonial era.[234]

The Hausa-Fulani Muslim rulers reaffirmed their hegemony over these communities through the NPC-controlled regional government. During decolonisation, these ethno-religious groups formed political associations to proclaim their self-rule as early as 1950s. As tensions escalated between Hausa-Fulani Muslims and non-Muslim minorities, the

[232] Ibid., 46-7.
[233] E.O. Awa, "Federal Elections in Nigeria, 1959." The Indian Journal of Political Science 21, no. 2 (Apri – June 1960): 102.
[234] Ochonu, *Colonialism by Proxy: Hausa Imperial Agents and Middle Belt Consciousness in Nigeria*, 202.

build-up of anger and tension developed rapidly after independence. NPC stalwarts further utilised state patronage to bribe some opposition leaders. They equally employed state instruments of coercion to intimidate some opposition who refused to toe NPC's carrot and stick policy. Hence, Nigeria's first democratic government, from 1960 to 1966, otherwise called the First Republic, and intersecting religious, ethnic, and regional identities, escalated to fuel communal conflicts in Middle Belt communities.[235]

Again, the agenda of Bello's NPC and northern elite was to promote Islam, both as a uniting tool and as a way of conserving the region's cultural identity. In 1962, Bello set up Jama'atu Nasril Islam (JNI, "Victory for Islam") as an organisation to unify the Muslim sects, spread Islam and offer an ideological base for the NPC. In terms of uniting Muslim harmony, his efforts attained limited outcomes. Violent hostilities between adherents of rival Sufi orders persist.[236]

Bello's efforts to unify the northern region was born out of fear of domination from the southern region rather than a genuine intention to promote the groups' identity and autonomy. The fear of the Middle Belt against Bello's policy hinged on bitter memory of suppression and oppression suffered under Caliphate control. As Ochonu posits, "Ahmadu Bello's model of Northern empowerment was largely blind to religion and ethnic identity."[237] He points out that some Middle Belt educated men believed that Bello helped them on their careers. For example, Zamani Lekwot, retired general of the Nigeria army, and Adamu Mbaka, a retired air vice marshal of the Nigerian Air Force, respectively, and from Southern Kaduna, praised Ahmadu Bello and described him as "a broad-minded champion of Northern interests who constantly overruled his own close caliphate's

[235] Ibid., 204.
[236] International Crisis Group, 7.
[237] Ochonu, *Colonialism by Proxy: Hausa Imperial Agents and Middle Belt Consciousness in Nigeria*, 204.

associates' efforts to enforce a second-class status on non-Muslim Northerners, and as a dynamic leader who forged a diverse region into a fairly unified political entity."[238]

Ochonu, however, contends that the treatment of the people of the Middle Belt during the colonial era and caliphate led regional government was brutal and repressive. He notes, "yet he, like many young men from frontier communities, had as a young child observed a lot of the [emirate] oppression – how the Zazzau NA police dealt with our parents, and had witnessed and experienced discrimination outside the mitigating influence of Ahmadu Bello."[239] He points out that the likes of Lekwot may have forgotten the injustice and oppression the people of Middle Belt suffered in the hands of Hausa-Fulani rules, but the memory of those days still linger in the minds of the people.[240]

Ochonu said, "It took military discipline and relative absence of overt discrimination in the armed forces to erase these memories and to reassure Middle Belt young men like Lekwot of the oneness of the North, a favourite mantra of the NPC."[241]

Again, there was a campaign designed to proselyte "pagan" minority communities to Islam. Reinforced by state resources and occasionally led by Bello, such initiatives led to the conversion of over 100,000 non-Muslims, especially in Zaria and Niger areas. Bello was equally a regular participant in cooperative pilgrimages to Mecca and used his links with the region's Sufi orders to strengthen his influence. His unwavering campaign to advance the dar aIslam (House of Islam) in all the nooks and crannies of Northern Nigeria drew solid support from the Muslim majority; but among non-Muslim minorities and Christian migrants from the south, Bello's crusade and later his appointment as vice president of the World Muslim League in 1963 further exacerbated minorities' fear and anxiety about

[238] Ibid.
[239] Ibid.
[240] Ibid., 204.
[241] Ibid.

Bello's intention to Islamize the region. This apprehension, whether authentic or overblown, damaged communal relationships and was partly responsible for the first military coup against the Northern Region-controlled federal government on January 15, 1966.[242]

2.9 The Military Epoch/Second/Third Republic: 1966 – 1999

The January 15, 1966, coup d'état was carried out by five majors led by Chukwuma Nzeogwu in which Ahmadu Bello, Abubakar Balewa and several northern political and military leaders were murdered. Including southern politicians and military officers such as Premier of Western Region Samuel Ladoke Akintola, Finance Minister, Festus Okotie Eboh, Col. Ralph Shodeinde, Lt. Col. Arthur Unegbe etc. lost their lives. It was alleged to be in part a rebellion against the apparent religious and political agenda of the ruling NPC.[243] Achebe puts it in this perspective:

> But by killing Sir Ahmadu Bello, Nzeogwu and other coup plotters had put themselves on a collision course with the religious, ethnic and political ramifications of such an action, something they had clearly not thought through sufficiently. Superficially it was understandable to conclude that this was indeed an "Igbo coup."[244]

The act provokes varied responses across the northern region. It was obviously an impediment for the northern elite, as it suddenly ended the work of Bello's dream to fashion a better northern harmony and re-establish the legacy of the Sokoto caliphate. Non-Muslim minorities were in part pleased at what at first seemed to grant freedom from the NPC's domination, and there were reports of jubilation in some minority zones; but that respite

[242] International Crisis Group, 7. See Achebe, *There Was A Country: A Personal History of Biafra* (London: Allen Lane, 2012), 79-81.
[243] Iro-Cunningham, *Identity, Power, and Conflict: Inter-ethnic Perspective of Northern Nigeria Religious Violence*. (Milton Keynes: PublishNation LLC, 2016), 16.
[244] Achebe, *There Was A Country: A Personal History of Biafra*, 79.

soon gave way to anger, following disclosures that their own senior military officers were similarly killed.[245]

The collective rage over the death and the shared anxiety of southern control led to an uncommon end of division between the Hausa, Fulani, and minorities; their officers together carried out a countercoup in July 1966. The appointment of Lieutenant Colonel Yakubu Gowon, a Christian from the Middle Belt (then still part of the Northern Region), as Nigeria's head of state, was partly of a concession by Muslim leaders to keep the unity of the non-Muslim minorities in a unified Northern Region.[246]

The consequences of the January 15, 1966 assassinations of both prominent civilians and military officers of northerners strengthened the suspicion held by northern Muslims about southern migrants as agents of occupation was further solidified by the coup. Prominent northern elite, like Sheikh Abubakar Gumi believe the coup as having uncovered "the deep-seated hostility held by people in the south against the north."[247]

Although the January 15 coup, called "Operation Damisa ('Leopard'), cost the lives of Tafawa Balewa, two regional premiers including the powerful northern leader Ahmadu Bello, and a federal minister."[248] These killings were interpreted by both the religious and politicians in the northern region as a means to subject the northerners to the dictates and control of the southerners. It was fear of the domination and control that lead to the killing of Igbo in the northern region. Between July and October 1966, northern mobs killed thousands of southerners, mainly Igbos, across the region, forcing hundreds of thousands to flee back to the south. However, in response to those murders, the Igbo-controlled Eastern

[245] International Crisis Group, 8.
[246] Iro-Cunningham, *Identity, Power, and Conflict: Inter-ethnic Perspective of Northern Nigeria Religious Violence*, 16.
[247] Ibid.
[248] Karl Maier, *This House Has Fallen: Nigeria in Crisis* (Oxford: Westview Press, 2000), 13.

Region seceded from Nigeria on 30 May 1967, announcing itself as the Republic of Biafra.[249]

John Campbell writes, "the 1966 string of bloody military coups, starting with that of January 15 by "junior officers" (mostly majors) in Nigeria still effects the country today. It was against a civilian, ostensibly democratic government widely regarded as corrupt."[250] Campbell further stated that there was a countercoup of July 1966 and massacres of Christian Igbos in the Muslim north. Igbo efforts to secede from Nigeria and set up an independent nationhood, Republic of Biafra, led to the 1967-70 civil war in which it was estimated that at least one million people died, mostly from starvation and disease, before Biafra was defeated, and prompting Gowon to declare no victor, no vanquished.[251]

The Gowon government's attempt to stop this declaration led to civil war from 1967 to 1970. As Gowon adduces, "that is why when the war ended, we did not glorify the victory over defeated people…. No Victor, No Vanquished."[252] However, it was fought far away in the southeast, and it had serious effects on inter-group relationships. The number of northern youths recruited in the army increased from 10,000 in 1967 to 250,000 in 1970. This strengthened the belief in the south that the military serves as a way for continuing the north's domination in the federation, especially as many recruits and new officers often were from the northern minority zones. Two decades later, many had become very senior officers. On retirement from active service, many of the retirees, searching for new importance and

[249] Iro-Cunningham, *Identity, Power, and Conflict: Inter-ethnic Perspective of Northern Nigeria Religious Violence*, 16.
[250] John Cambell, "The Fiftieth Anniversary of Nigeria's First Military Coup." (blog). *Council on Foreign Relations*, January 15, 2016, https://www.cfr.org/blog/fiftieth-anniversary-nigerias-first-military-coup
[251] Ibid.
[252] Kabir Yusuf, "I never believed military coup was possible in Nigeria." *Premium Times* (Lagos), November 5, 2019. https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/top-news/361119-i-never-believed-military-coup-was-possible-in-nigeria-gowon.html.

relevance, were no longer receptive or tolerant to Hausa-Fulani control, and became leaders of their ethno-religious groups.[253]

Politically, the enlargement of the federal administrative sectors by successive military governments, from 3 regions to 4 regions in 1960s to 36 states by 1996, changed relationships between the majority and minority groups all over the nation, specifically by breaking the regional arena of the main ethnic groups and thus wearing down their control over minority groups. The division of the northern region, at first into six states (of twelve countrywide) in 1967 and finally into nineteen (of 36) in 1996, weakened the Hausa-Fulani dream of regional union. However, state creation led to the rise of new elites from both majority and minority groups.[254]

For most of the era of military rule, the federal government was controlled by northerners, whose historic clout in the army was a means of balancing for their shortcomings in Western education. The population of the north, however, very well mindful that it was seeing few of the benefits of federal power. The sharing of federal jobs caused hostilities, as northern minority groups and Christian communities believed that they were losing out in the distribution of jobs to well-linked but less well-educated Hausa-Fulani. Furthermore, political disagreements and ineptly executed policies heightened communal conflict. In most cases this involved international matters, for example, the deep religious division generated by the controversial Nigerian membership of the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) in 1986, and the 1992 resolution to recognise Israel, and rows over donations for pilgrimages.[255] The Christian opposition to Nigeria's membership of the

[253] Iro-Cunningham, *Identity, Power, and Conflict: Inter-ethnic Perspective of Northern Nigeria Religious Violence.*
[254] Iro-Cunningham, *Identity, Power, and Conflict: Inter-ethnic Perspective of Northern Nigeria Religious Violence*.
[255] J 'Bayo Adekanye, "The Military." In Larry Diamond, Anthony Kirk-Greene, and Oyediran (ed.) *Transition Without End: Nigerian Politics and Civil Society Under Babangida* (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers,1997), 68.

OIC hinges on the fear that it would legitimise a Muslim monopoly of strategic and sensitive political positions in government.[256]

2.10 The Fourth Republic (1999- 2021)

Nigeria was under military dictatorship from 1966 to 1979, and from 1983 to 1979. The first civilian leader, Abubakar Tafawa Belewa lasted for six years. the second elected civilian President Shehu Shagari lasted in the office for four years.[257] There was also the brief military government of Major-General Mohammadu Buhari from January 1984 to August 1985, which in turn affirmed up the power base of the northern Muslim political class. Buhari's government introduced stern and dictatorial policies that restricted civil liberties to both professional and civic organisations.[258] Buhari in turn was overthrown by General Ibrahim Babaginda in a palace coup in August 1985. The only time the military juntas allowed a presidential election was on June 12 1993, but the military government of General Ibrahim Babaginda annulled the election perceived to have been won by M.K.O Abiola under the umbrella of the Social Democratic Party (SDP), in an election "declared the freest election in Nigerian history."[259] He was arrested and left in prison for five years until he died in the prison.[260] It was alleged that Babangida's reasons for the annulment was to prevent any "shifted regional control over federal government from the Hausa-Fulani Muslim North to the South."[261]

Strong opposition from Nigerians forced the military government of Babangida to step down. Ernest Shonekan, a Yoruba, was appointed first head of the transitional council on January 2, 1993 and on August 26, 1993 he was appointed the head of the Interim National

[256] Ibid., 407.
[257] Karl Maier, *This House Has Fallen: Nigeria In Crisis*. (Cambridge: Westview Press, 2000), 23.
[258] Vaughan, *Religion and the Making of Nigeria*, 127.
[259] Ibid, 137.
[260] Maier, *This House Has Fallen: Nigeria in Crisis*, 23.
[261] Vaughan, *Religion and the Making of Nigeria*, 137.

Government.[262] On November 1993 General Sani Abacha staged a bloodless coup and toppled Shonekan. Abacha's dictatorial rule was characterised by "state brutality unknown in postcolonial Nigerian history."[263] Political dissidents and prodemocracy activists, including former military head of state Olusegun Obasanjo, were jailed on trumped-up charges of sedition for opposing the regime. And in 1995, Abacha ordered the execution of human rights activists and Ogoni environmental campaigner Ken Saro Wiwa. He equally deposed Ibrahim Dasuki as the Sultan of Sokoto. Abacha's relationship with the northern Muslims and the political elites were strained because of his extreme suppression and authoritarianism, which the northern elites described as having "shattered the equilibrium between the Northern Muslim political class and the political classes of other geopolitical zones in the country, effectively undermining the strategic political advantage of the emirate political class."[264] However, Abacha died suddenly in 1998, amid speculation of foul play.[265]

Karl Maier summaries the death of Abacha as follows "it began on June 8, 1998, when Abacha, on his customary nightly excursion into the pleasures of the flesh, expired while in the arms of a pair of Indian prostitutes. The official cause of death was a heart attack, although unsubstantiated rumours abounded concerning his demise. Everyone had a pet theory. Some said he was murdered with an untraceable poison by army officers who realized that he was steering Nigeria toward an upheaval that would consume them all."[266]

After the demise of Abacha, General Abdulsalami Abubakar assumed the mantle of leadership and quickly announced a transition to civil rule. He reinstated political freedoms,

[262] Paul Adams, "Nigeria's Interim Leadership Threatened by National Strikes." *The Christian Science Monitor* (Boston), August 30, 1993. https://www.csmonitor.com/1993/0830/30031.html.
[263] Ibid.
[264] Ibid.
[265] Ibid.
[266] Maier, *This House Has Fallen: Nigeria in Crisis*, 4.

released political dissidents such as Obasanjo, Zakzaky, and Dasuki. He also inaugurated the Constitutional Drafting Committee. He conducted elections in 1999 which Olusegun Obasanjo of the People Democratic Party (PDP) won. This ushered in the Fourth Republic.[267]

The return of a democratically elected civilian in 1999 was welcomed in southern Nigeria, although it was a different experience for some in the northern region. For the first time since 1979, and notwithstanding President Olusegun Obasanjo's closeness to the northern political elite, the region was not happy that they had lost control of political power at the centre and were confronted with the choice of fashioning new tactics for a regional presence in the centre. It was within this setting that the Zamfara state governor began the movement for a revival of Sharia.[268]

Nigeria's return to democratic rule had more transformative impacts on the region. The new democratic system has formed a new breed of political elites all over the nation. In northern Nigeria, there are 19 (out of a national total of 36) very influential state governors, 57 senators (of 108 nationally), 134 (of 365 nationally) members of the House of Representatives and hundreds of state-level legislators, as well as local government chairs and councillors. There are now many more people with government administration in the region, representing sizable financial resources. These new breeds may not relish the loyalty that the traditional rulers and religious establishments once had, but their control of resources has challenged and reduced traditional rulers' power and amplified the tiers of bureaucracy that common people have to come in contact (and often receive kickbacks) on a daily basis. The benefits conferred by connection to the state apparatus and its funds have also formed new rifts between ethnic and religious groups. The increasing awareness,

[267] Maier, *This House Has Fallen: Nigeria in Crisis*, 7. See Vaughan, *Religion and the Making of Nigeria*, 138.
[268] International Crisis Group, 9.

particularly among the youth, is that politics now offers the primary avenue for higher social mobility.[269]

By the end of the 1990s, the northern region had become politically divided. Split by the construction of new states, the Hausa-Fulani bloc found itself questioned by increasingly aggressive minorities. Divided by arguments over the region's religious identity, there was an upsurge in hostilities between Muslims and Christians. Economic despair, mounting corruption in government, the debauchery and weakening of social institutions and the increase of criminality all formed a sense of disenchantment.[270]

The democratic system has had different outcomes in several areas. It has lessened hostilities by tolerating open speech, even as competition for scarce resources has, if anything intensified. Ways of doing things varies between community and community. In some northern communities, they have succeeded to run a sense of inclusion for all groups in the new democratic system, for some, while others think they are secluded. Again, there is a radical upsurge in religious movements towards the region's Islamic revival, as religious leaders, and more commonly, religious scholars' bicker over partisan politics and its impact over their adherents. Muslim clerics are unlikely and less discreet to speak out on political matters, offering an array of opinions, from pushing people to vote, or advising calm in the light of electoral deception. In some circumstances, clerics have become participants in party politics and clearly taken sides.[271]

The return to democracy in 1999 opened public space and undeniably created likelihoods for conflict prevention and peacebuilding. Nonetheless, Nigeria continues to suffer from a devastating communal division, and politicians and the media are all too willing to intensify

[269] Ibid.
[270] Ibid.
[271] Ibid.

social tensions into a risky game of them and us. The democratic system is still rather new, though, and it remains to be seen how dividend of democracy will impact the north in the longer term.

Again, the return to democratic rule in Nigeria rejuvenated people's desire for a better standard of living, but their hopes were soon silenced by parochial ethno-cultural and religious identities. The reawakening of democracy opened the space for numerous dynamics of social and political crises in that diverse ethnic and religious militias arose to seek for social and political space and importance, individual and collective rights, as well as ethnic and social equality etc.[272]

For instance, when president Yar'adua took ill and later died after a protracted health condition, it caused a lot of political debacles. Before now members representing various constituencies in the National Assembly contested that they wanted to be in the picture of the president's health situation. Admits the power games that went on at the national level, the military were understudying the political scenario surrounding the contestations of president's health condition. The National Assembly in its wisdom under the leadership of Senator David Mark in 2010, created the space for the Vice President, Goodluck Jonathan, to act in the capacity of the president to remedy the gap inherent in the constitution, which did not forsee the emergence of an acting president.[273]

Consequently, the incumbent president, Goodluck Jonathan later indicated interest to run the 2011 presidential election. This caused major controversy within the PDP. Northern elites in the party, dominantly Hausa-Fulani Muslims, resorted to the party constitution to make claims for the retention of the presidential zoning in Northern Nigeria. Within the

[272] Nsemba Edward Lenshie, "Ties that Bind and Differences that Divide:' Exploring the Resurgence of Ethno-Cultural Identities in Nigeria." *African Development* 39, no. 2 (2014): 155.
[273] Ibid., 183.

Northern Nigeria, some of them contended that power should be retained in the north-west, the zone of the late president; some other politicians from the north-east within the premise of political marginalisation, countered the proposal and insisted that the region had had enough and should give room for others. The Christian minorities in Northern Nigeria equally claimed that if Northern Nigeria must retain the position, then the party candidate should be a Christian. Somehow, the PDP zoning principle was jettison, and Goodluck Jonathan's candidature was approved within the party.[274]

After beating the former Vice President of Nigeria, Atiku Abubakar in the PDP's party primaries and going on to win the April 2011 presidential election, the presidential candidate of Congress for Progressive Change, General Mohammadu Buhari, voiced his displeasure with the way the election was conducted and challenged the result of the election, alleging large-scale rigging by Goodluck Jonathan's People's Democratic Party. Soon, the followers of Buhari took to the street to unleash destruction, wrecking lives and property of innocent people.[275]

In 2015, Nigerians went to the polls to cast their votes in national and state elections. These elections were the fifth round of general elections since the country's democratic restoration in 1999, in which constitutional rule was returned after a military dictatorship that lasted for 15 straight years. The strong apprehension that led the 2015 elections, the global interest they created, and the change of power which the presidential vote provoked, all come together to make the election a revolution in the volatile political history of Nigeria.[276]

[274] Lenshie, "Ties that Bind and Differences that Divide:' Exploring the Resurgence of Ethno-Cultural Identities in Nigeria," 183.
[275] Ibid., 184.
[276] Mojeed Adekunle Animashaun, Nigeria 2015 Presidential Election: The Votes, The Fears and The Regime Change." *Journal of African Election* 14, no. 2 (2015): 186-87.

Through the elections, Nigerians had the chance either to choose 'continuity,' as represented by the incumbent President Dr Goodluck Jonathan and his ruling People's Democratic Party (PDP), or to embrace 'change,' as represented by the opposition candidate, General Muhammadu Buhari of the All Progressives Congress (APC). These two top candidates in the 2015 contest had similarly met each other at the ballot in the 2011 presidential contest, though at that time General Buhari was running on the ticket of the defunct Congress for Progressive Change (CPC).[277]

Experts in Nigeria politics believe that the peaceful, transparent, and credible way the elections were conducted, and the regime change which the presidential election produced, have led Nigeria onto the path of democratic nations. The winner of the presidential election, General Muhammadu Buhari, has taken the task of national rebuilding, a task entrusted on him by the remarkable mandate he secured at the historic election. Nigerians expect him to chart an entirely new course for the nation that will usher in a new beginning in the nation's troubled postcolonial state.[278]

Umaru Musa Yar'Adua was inaugurated as the 13th President of Nigeria on May 29, 2007. In November 2009, he travelled to Saudi Arabia for treatment for heart and kidney problems. While away on medical treatment, on February 9, 2010, the National Assembly voted to have Yar'Adua's Vice President Goodluck Ebele Jonathan assume full power in the capacity as acting president until Yar'Adua was able to resume his duties. On February 24, 2010, Yar'Adua returned to Nigeria to recuperate. However, Yar'Adua never recovered from his

[277] Ibid.
[278] Ibid., 187.

illness and he died on May 5, 2010. Jonathan succeeded him as executive president of Nigeria.[279]

As an incumbent president, Jonathan contested under PDP and won. Jonathan polled 22.5 million votes to defeat his closest challenger, CPC candidate Muhammadu Buhari who won12 million votes.[280]

The 2011 presidential election threatened to reignite Nigeria's ethnic and religious tensions with most voters in the predominantly Muslim north voting for Buhari, while the largely Christian south voted Jonathan.[281] When Jonathan's victory was pronounced by the Chairman of the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), Attahiru Mohammed Jega, he had garnered 25 percent of the votes in two-thirds of the 36 states which represents 59 percent of the total votes cast. The announcement immediately sparked off rioting and violence in Kano and Kaduna. Buhari's core supporters, who were mainly youths vent their anger on some northern elites whom they accused of supporting a Christian in the south (Jonathan) instead of their brother Buhari, a Muslim from the north. They also claimed that the election was rigged against Buhari.[282] In his reconciliatory tone, President Jonathan asked the youths to shun violence. He said:

[279] LaRay Denzer, "Umaru Musa Yar'Adua." *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, August 12, 2020. https://www.britannica.com/biography/Umaru-Musa-YarAdua.
[280] Scott Stearns, "Jonathan Declared Winner of Nigeria's Presidential Election." *VOA* (Washington), April 17, 2011. https://www.voanews.com/africa/jonathan-declared-winner-nigerias-presidential-election.
[281] BBC, "Nigeria Election: Muhammadu Buhari's CPC goes to Court." *BBC News* (London), May 9, 2011. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13331202.
[282] John Campbell, "Nigeria's Election in 2011 and 2015." Africa in Transition (blog). *Council on Foreign Relations*, January 21, 2015. https://www.cfr.org/blog/nigerias-elections-2011-and-2015. See BBC. 2011. "Nigeria Election: Riots over Goodluck Jonathan Win." BBC News (London), April 18, 2011. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13107867.

> I enjoin our political and religious leaders in their usual sense of patriotism to call on their followers to eschew all acts of bitterness and violence…nobody's political ambition is worth the blood of any Nigerian.[283]

President Jonathan was aware of the volatile nature of Northern Nigeria and the need to underplay the election victory. Jonathan further stated that there is "no victor, no vanquished." Jonathan stated, "by this election, we have found our unity as a nation under God, have reiterated our faith in democracy and underscored our determination to fully join the free world where only the will of the people is the foundation of governance."[284]

As noted, Northern Nigeria has been torn apart by ethno-religious, inter-religious and communal crises. The causes of these conflicts have been traced to the inability of the government to provide socio-economic needs of the people resulting in poverty, unemployment and marginalisation of some ethnic and religious groups.[285] There is almost no state in Northern Nigeria that has not witnessed conflicts since independence. Religious and ethnic violence has continued through 2020[286] along with mounting doubt among

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[283] Ibid.
[284] Stearns, "Jonathan Declared Winner of Nigeria's Presidential Election."
[285] Abiodun Fatai, "Refflections on Conflict and National Security: The Militarization of Civilian Groups in Nigeria." *International Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities Reviews*, 6, no. 4 (2016).
[286] Campbell, "Conflict in Nigeria Is More Complicated Than 'Christians VS. Muslims." (blog). *Council on Foreign Relations*, May 1, 2019. https://www.cfr.org/blog/conflict-nigeria-more-complicated-christians-vs-muslims. See Akubor Emmanuel Osewe, "In Defence of God and Religion. A Historical Analysis of Killings in God's Name in Nigeria since 1980s." *Journal of Philosophy, Culture and Religion* (2016): 20. The lists of ethno-religious conflicts are: Maitatsine crisis in Kano (1980), Ballum-Kutu (1982), Maiduguri (1982), Yola (1984), Ilorin (1984), Birnin Kebbi (1990), Katsina (1991), Tafawa Belewa (1991, 2000), Kano (1991, 2001), Jalingo (1992), Kaduna Polytechnic (1992), Kasuwar Magani in Kaduna (1994), Gure Kahugu (1978), Kafanchan (1987, 1999), Kaduna (2000), Jos (2001, 2002,2004, 2008).Others are:Zangon-Kataf (1992), Tiv versus Jukun, Jukun versus Kuteb, Chamba versus Kuteb in Taraba State, Tiv versus other ethnic groups in Azara in Nasarawa State (2001), Hausa/Fulani versus Anaguta, Afizere and Berom in Jos North Local Government Area of Plateau State (2001), Tarok versus Hausa/Fulani in Wase Local Government Area (2004), Goemai versus Hausa/Fulani in Shendam Local Government Area of Plateau State (2002), religious violence in Maiduguri in Borno State (2005), Quan versus Pan in Quan'Pan Local Government Area of Plateau State (2006), Hausa/Fulani versus Anaguta, Afizere and Berom in Jos North Local Government Area of Plateau State (2008), Boko Haram uprising in Northeast (2009), Christmas Eve bomb attacks in Jos (2010), Damaturu (2011), Suicide bomb attack on United Nations headquarters in Abuja (2011), Boko Haram co-ordinated bombing in Kano and the directive by Boko Haram quit notice to Southern Christians to leave north (2012), Abuja (2013), Yobe, Borno and Adamawa (2013), kidnapped Chibok schoolgirls in Borno state (2014), Southern Kaduna (1980, 1992, 2000, 2002, 2011, 2016), Benue and Taraba (2017), Agatu in Benue state between farmers and Fulani herdsmen (2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017), Six Benue Communities: Tom-Atar, Umenge and Akor villages in Guma local Government

citizens in the northern political leadership, lack of infrastructure, growing unemployment among youths, widespread poverty, diseases, corruption, and the disenchantment in the execution of "Sharia penal codes"[287] by the twelve states in Northern Nigeria.

The debate on Sharia in Nigeria did not start in 2000 but went as far back as 1976. The Supreme Military Council (S.M.C.) led by General Olusegun Obasanjo appointed a Constitutional Drafting Committee, and its Draft was discussed by the Constituent Assembly, which included elected members from all States, as well as a number selected by the S.M.C. The Draft, along with the changes proposed by the Constituent Assembly, were presented in September I978 to the S.M.C. which made further alterations. That Constitution provided the basis for the subsequent elections of July and August 1979, and the formal unveiling of the Second Republic on 1st October 1979.[288]

However, of all matters discussed relating to the Constitution, the question of the role of a Federal Sharia Court of Appeal (F.S.C.A.) generated the most anxiety and controversy.

Area; Ayilamo, Turan and Ngambe-Tiev in Logo Local Government Area(2018). See Fatai. "Reflections on Conflict and National Security: The Militarization of Civilian Groups in Nigeria." *International Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities Reviews*, 6, no. 4 (2016). See also Adesoji Abimbola. "The Boko Haram and Islamic Revivalism in Nigeria." *Africa Spectrum*, 45, no. 2 (2010). See *BBC News*, "Nigeria profile – Timeline." BBC News, February 18, 2019. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-13951696. See also Hussaini Abdu, n. d. "Ethnic and Religious Crisis in Northern Nigeria: Issues in Informer Repression." Department of Political Science and Defence Studies, *National Defence Academy*, Kaduna. https://www.academics.edu/24024206/Ethnoreligious_Crisis_in_Northern_Nigeria. See Leena Koni Hoffmann, "Violence in Southern Kaduna Threatens to Undermine Nigeria's Democratic Stability." (blog). *The Royal Institute of International Affairs*. February 15, 2017. https://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/violence-southern-kaduna-threatens-undermine-nigeria-s-democratic-stability. See *Statista*, Number of Civilians Killed in Boko Haram's attacks in Nigeria from February 2020 to April 2021." https://www.statista.com/statistics/1198292/civilians-killed-in-boko-haram-s-attacks-in-nigeria/ See also Amnesty International, "Nigeria: Further Information: No Justice for Killing of #ENDSARS Protestors." April 1, 2021, https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/afr44/3850/2021/en/

[287] Mahmud, Sakah Saidu, "Nigeria." *African Studies Review*, 47, no. 2 (2004). The full Shari'a legal code was first enacted in Zamfara state which came into force in January 2000 and enacted into law by eleven other states of Northern Nigeria in 2002 making it twelve states: Borno, Gombe, Jigawa, Kaduna, Kano, Katsina, Kebbi, Niger, Sokoto, Yobe and Zamfara. See Crisis Group, 2010. "Northern Nigeria: Background to Conflict." *Africa Report*, 168. Saidu explains that Shari'a criminal law contained Qur'anic offenses with fixed punishments. They are unlawful sexual intercourse between persons who are not married, for which punishment is stoning to death; theft, punishable by amputation; robbery, punishable by death or amputation; drinking alcohol, and false accusation, punishable by lashing. See Thurston, 300. See also Adeyemi J. Ademowo. "Secularism, Secularisation and the Secular Nigeria." *ResearchGate* (2014), https://www.researchgate.net/publication/28175086.

[288] David D. Laitin, "The Sharia Debate and the Origins of Nigeria's Second Republic." *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 20, no. 3 (September 1982): 411.

The matter was straightforward. The British colonial rule, following the introduction of "indirect rule," had backed and aided the Islamic court system in the Northern Provinces of Nigeria from 1933 onwards. Some appeal procedures were permissible, and finally a "Muslim Court of Appeal" was established. Just before independence in 1960, this was rechristened the "Sharia Court of Appeal" by the Northern House of Assembly. The premier of Northern Region, Sir Ahmadu Bello, Sardauna of Sokoto consequently sent a group of experts in Islamic law on an international mission to re-examine the relation between Sharia law and the contemporary state. The experts' report led Bello to replace the entire Sharia criminal law with a secular and thorough criminal code, and the Court of Appeal became limited to civil cases between Muslim litigation.[289]

With the break-up of the Northern Region into several States in 1967, a legal glitch became apparent. All the Northern states created their own Sharia Courts of Appeal. But there was no longer, as there had been when the North was a region, a final Court of Appeal for matters relating to Sharia law. To have created an appeals court for the former Northern States alone would have been to accept the continued political existence of a Northern Region, an idea which the military government attempted to allay. It was in reaction to this legal variance, and to northern interests in favour of a formal recognition of the role of Sharia in the Second Republic, that the Constitutional Drafting Committee recommended a Federal Sharia Court of Appeal.[290]

The Draft Constitution of I976 included the recommendation of the Sub-Committee on the Judicial System that "There shall be a Federal Sharia Court of Appeal which shall be an intermediate court of appeal between the States' Sharia Courts' of Appeal and the Supreme Court of Nigeria." Although some members of the Constitutional Drafting Committee

[289] Ibid.
[290] Ibid., 411-12

attempted to persuade the Nigerian public that the issue was only of negligible importance, the requirements of technical procedures meant that the F.S.C.A. was introduced to in different paragraphs of the Draft Constitution, which while attempting to limit the scope of the new Court, gave the presence of widening it.[291]

The re-introduction of Sharia in the twelve states of Northern Nigeria signified the permanent demand of Islamic rule in certain segments of the Muslim community as a base not only for a peaceful society, but for social and political rebirth. When Sharia was passed into law in 2000,[292] some Muslims projected this as an answer for the multifaceted and chaotic glitches of social injustice, poverty, unemployment, and political corruption. The amplification of Sharia and the indifferent conditions of many who had celebrated its adoption, led to even more irritation and disillusionment towards the state governments that approved the penal codes. The disappointment over the implementation of Sharia law opened the region's social space for the breeding of fundamentalist faith ideologies and the revival of radical Islamism.[293] It was on these failed promises that Boko Haram was born.

Boko Haram emerged in the Northeast Nigerian city of Maiduguri, Borno state, in the early 2000s. Initially it was a mosque-based community than a tightly organised movement.[294] Boko Haram revolves around a Salafi cleric, Muhammad Yusuf (1970-2009), whose teachings centred on the core doctrine of religious exclusivism.[295] He offered his preaching by various means to different categories of listeners, which helped him amass

[291] Ibid.
[292] Steven Pierce notes that Zamfara state was the first to introduce the Shari'a penal code in Northern Nigeria. The introduction of Shari'a led to tensions between Christians and Muslims in Nigeria especially in Northern Nigeria. Pierce, "Identity, Performance, and Secrecy: Gendered Life and the 'Modern' in Northern Nigeria." *Feminist Studies*, 33, no. 3 (Fall 2007): 340. https://www.jstor.org/stable/20459161.
[293] Hoffmann, "Who Speaks for the North? Politics and Influence in Northern Nigeria." (blog). *The Royal Institute of International Affairs*, July 7, 2014. https://www.chathamhouse.org/publication/who-speaks-north-politics-and-influence-northern-nigeria.
[294] Ibid.
[295] Thurston, *Boko Haram: The History of An African Jihadist Movement*, 83.

large numbers of followers. In addition, Yusuf was a malleable political actor with the readiness to agree with secular democracy and an eagerness for armed struggle to achieve his aims. His messages over time toughened him in three areas: pressure from hardliners around him, quarrels with mainstream Salafis, and conflict with his political allies.[296]

Boko Haram frowns on the following institutions which it claims are not compatible with the ways of Islam: Western-style education, multiparty democracy, secular government, and man-made laws. The sect argues that these institutions are un-Islamic and anti-Islamic.[297] Boko Haram emerged to fill the space left by the federal and state governments through the provision of social and financial support to underprivileged and poor Muslim families. Boko Haram became transformed into the most brutal and violent organisation in the history of Northern Nigeria, like another deadly group, Maitatsine, led by Mohammed Marwa, based in Kano. Between 1980 and 1982, the intra-Muslim riot unleased a three-day riot in Kano which killed 4200 people mostly Muslims. Also, in October 1982 the sect caused the deaths of 400 people in Maiduguri and destroyed much property across the Northern region.[298]

Many Muslim denounced Maitatsine's preaching as heretical. Equally, the Grand Khadi of the Northern Region in the First Republic, Alhaji Abubukar Gumi, claimed that "Maitatsine was no Muslim."[299] Gumi further describes Maitatsine as "a trail of one-track minded Mallams versed only in the recitation of the Quran by heart, and not fully comprehending what it contained."[300] Maitatsine migrated from Cameroon and claimed to be a prophet. His teaching was "deeply heterodox." Maitatsine's popularity developed because he would say in faltering Hausa "*Wanda bata yarda ba Allah ta Tchine*," translated

[296] Ibid., 83.
[297] Ibid, 2.
[298] Boer, *Nigeria's Decades of Blood*, 39.
[299] Ibid.
[300] Elizabeth Isichei, "The Maitatsine Risings in Nigeria 1980-85: A Revolt of the Disinherited." *Journal of Religion in Africa,* 17, no. 3 (October 1987): 195.

to "May Allah curse the one who disagrees with his version."[301] Maitatsine claims that "any Muslim who reads any book beside the Koran is a pagan." He equally believed that "any Muslim who includes "Allah akbar" in his prayer, reads the Tahita, or says "Atahiyat Rak Atahiyat Rak Ataine" after prayer" is also an infidel. Another strand in his teaching is his denunciation of affluence, western materialism, and western technology. Maitatsine claimed that "anyone wearing a watch, or riding a bicycle, or driving a car, or sending his child to the normal State schools was an infidel."[302] This made his followers walk for long distances rather than travel by bus or car. He told his followers to regard the non-sect members as infidels (*Kafirai*), and equally told his adherents to shun "earthly possessions of luxuries" and to see rich Muslims "with extreme abhorrence and contempt." His preaching was seen by the government as confrontational and as incitement against the state. When his beloved son Tijani died in a controversial circumstance, he was emotionally wrecked. His attitude changed and he asked his followers to resist arrest and fight the police.[303]

It all happened on December 18, 1980 when four policemen were sent to Shahauci playground, an open space near Maitatsine's headquarters to apprehend some preachers. However, the policemen were ambushed and killed. The followers armed with hatchets, bows and arrows, swords, clubs, dane-guns, and daggers moved into other parts of Kano and declared war against the government and non-sect members. Houses, traders' stalls, abattoirs, cinemas, and vehicles were destroyed. In other to curtail the activities of the sect and the danger they posed to the state, the federal government sent a detachment of the army and air force to restore peace and order. When the army and air force operation ended, over

[301] Ibid., 194.
[302] Ibid., 196.
[303] Isichei, "The Maitatsine Risings in Nigeria 1980-85: A Revolt of the Disinherited," 196-97.

4, 177 people lost their lives. Eventually, Maitatsine lost his life because of injuries he sustained during a confrontation with police.[304]

The death of Boko Haram leader, Muhammad Yusuf, in the hands of the security forces, and the extra-judicial killing of Boko Haram's members during clashes between the security forces and the sects in July 2009 resulted in the deaths of thousands of people and the destruction of property. Boko Haram has defended the fundamental principle of its message, "exclusivism." It has sought to lay claim not only to the Qur'an and the Sunna (model) of the Prophet Muhammad, but to benefit from previous crises in Northern Nigeria.[305]

Boko Haram has occasionally changed its game plan, methods, and survival tactics. Firstly, the organisation's early history, spanning from the 1970s to the 1990s, shows that the founders emerged into an environment surrounded by political ambiguity, distracting city expansion, interreligious war, and general discourse about the connection between Islam and politics. Secondly, the period 2001-2009, was a time of open proselytization. The group's modus operandi, though, changed between 2003-2004, when Boko Haram attacked local authorities. The movement became violent in 2009 when it started a rebellion involving a considerable number of states in Northern Nigeria. The uprising was quelled by the Nigerian police and the sect's founder, Muhammad Yusuf, was killed.[306]

Another phase in the sect's activities began during 2010-2013, when Boko Haram became a full-blown terrorist group led by Muhammad Yusuf's cohort, Abubakar Shekau. The sect blew up key targets, which included some in the Nigerian capital, Abuja. Another phase lasted from 2013-2015, when Boko Haram controlled most states in Northeast Nigeria. It offered the people an unambiguous choice: accept Boko Haram's type of Islam

[304] Ibid.
[305] Thurston, *Boko Haram: The History of An African Jihadist Movement*, 12.
[306] Ibid, 2.

or face death. It was at this stage that 276 schoolgirls of a government secondary school, Chibok, were kidnapped on April 14, 2014. Finally, the Boko Haram sect fell into the hands of the combined militaries of Nigeria, Chad, Cameroon, and Niger called the Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNJTF) established in 2014 and commissioned on January 29, 2015. In June 2016, MNJTF carried an operation against Boko Haram called "Rawan Kada," to rout the sects.

As of 2020, Boko Haram has remained deadly and dangerous, and has intensified its modus operandi.[307] As part of its new image, the sect declared its affiliation to other radical jihadist Islamic states, Islamic State of Iraq (ISIS) and Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL), in March 2015 and to Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. The kidnapping of the Chibok schoolgirls in April 2014, exposed the government of President Goodluck Jonathan as incompetent, lacking in empathy, weak, and as evidence of the growing gulf between the masses and the government. Initially, the government of Dr Jonathan (who, as noted was elected in 2011, despite opposition from the Northern oligarchical elite) downplayed the kidnapping as a hoax.[308]

President Goodluck believed it was the handiwork of his political opponents who concocted the kidnapping story to sabotage the hosting of The World Economic Forum in May 2014 which was intended to showcase Nigeria's economic accomplishments.[309] President Goodluck never took the activities of the jihadist sect seriously because he saw it

[307] Jacob Zenn, "Chronicling the Boko Haram Decade in Nigeria (2010-2020): Distinguishing factions through Videographic Analysis." *Small Wars and Insurgencies* 31, Issues 6 (August 7, 2020). See Eromo Egbejule, "Death, anguish and flickers of hope: 10 years of Boko Haram." *Al Jazeera News* (Doha), July 30, 2019. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/07/death-anguish-flickers-hope-10-years-boko-haram-190729161220796.html

[308] Helon Habila, *The Chibok Girls: The Boko Haram Kidnappings and Islamist Militancy in Nigeria* (New York: Columbia Global Reports, 2016), 96. See Egbejule, "Death, anguish and flickers of hope: 10 years of Boko Haram." *Al Jazeera News* (Doha), July 30, 2019, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/07/death-anguish-flickers-hope-10-years-boko-haram-190729161220796.html

[309] Habila, *The Chibok Girls: The Boko Haram Kidnappings and Islamist Militancy in Nigeria*, 97.

as a distraction. The problem of Northern Nigeria was used by the Northern elite and oligarchy to create insecurity in the country and make him look unfit for office. But when he saw the local and international reactions over the kidnapping of the Chibok schoolgirls with both celebrities and politicians involved, including notable personalities such as American First Lady Michelle Obama, the government was galvanised into action to bring back the 270 kidnapped schoolgirls, with the hash tag #BringBackOurGirls.[310] However, President Goodluck did a U-turn when he saw that he was likely to lose the presidential election scheduled for February 14, 2015. He promptly postponed it to March 28, 2015, citing insecurity in Northeast Nigeria, to enable his government to have more time to fight Boko Haram and create an atmosphere of security so that people of the region could freely exercise their franchise. For the first time in Nigerian history an incumbent candidate Jonathan lost to a challenger,[311] General Muhammadu Buhari, who promised during his election campaign to eradicate corruption and root out Boko Haram. He was sworn in as president of Nigeria on May 29, 2015.[312] It was suggested that Dr Goodluck lost the election owing to his poor handling of Boko Haram and the kidnapping affair.

Max Siollum agrees to these assertions "when Boko Haram kidnapped more than 270 schoolgirls from the town of Chibok in Northern Nigeria, Jonathan failed to realise how much this would capture the public's attention, both locally and internationally." Siollum argues that the failure by Jonathan to speak about the kidnapped girls for quite a few weeks portrayed him as uncaring. Again, Siollum notes that Jonathan's apparent laid-back insensitivity to the suffering of his people was worsened when he was photographed

[310] Ibid., 96-97.
[311] Ibid.
[312] Ibid.

celebrating his niece's plush wedding just few days after Boko Haram had killed 2,000 people in the town of Baga.[313]

Beside the apparent accusations that he was indifferent in handling Boko Haram, Jonathan was accused of bad management of his immediate godfathers and party members who helped him climbed to power. Siollum writes:

> Jonathan's relations with party members at times resembled a football coach antagonising his star players into leaving for rival teams. His tendency to fall out with colleagues simultaneously weakened his party and strengthened the opposition. He quarrelled with one after another; leading several of them to leave the party in frustration and join the opposition All Progressive Congress (APC). The alliance between these and the opposition shoved Jonathan out of power.[314]

On December 24, 2016, President Buhari stated that Boko Haram had been defeated. The sect, however, continues to launch successful attacks in North-East Nigeria. Boko Haram has killed more than 30, 000 people and has left 2 million people homeless without food and shelter since September 2020.[315] On October 13, 2016, the Nigerian government announced the release of 21 Chibok girls after negotiation with Boko Haram. On 5 January 2017, the Nigerian army stated that they had found one of the schoolgirls wandering in the bush near the Boko Haram's stronghold, Sambisa Forest. On May 6, 2017, the Nigerian

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[313] Max Siollum, "How Goodluck Lost the Nigerian Election." *The Guardian* (London), April 1, 2015. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/apri/01/nigeria-election-goodluck-jonathan-lost

[314] Damian Zane, "Nigeria's Goodluck Jonathan: Five Reasons Why He Lost." *BBC News* (London), March 31, 2015. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-32136295. See also Nicholas Ibekwe. "Real Reasons I Lost 2015 Election – Goodluck Jonathan." *Premium Times* (Abuja), November 20, 2018. https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/296673-real-reasons-i-lost-2015-presidential-election-goodluck-jonathan.htmi.

[315] Aljazeera, "Several Killed in attack on security convoy in northeast Nigeria." Aljazeera (Doha), September 26, 2020. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/9/26/several-killed-in-attack-on-security-convoy-in-northeast-nigeria

government announced the release of 83 more schoolgirls.[316] The remaining 172 Chibok schoolgirls are still at large.[317] However, despite entreaties by the government of President Buhari, the jihadist movement, Boko Haram remains recalcitrant and poisonous.[318]

Another hostile group that has caused untold violence and destruction in North-Central and North-East Nigeria are the Fulani herdsmen. The conflict between Fulani herdsmen and the farming communities is a chronic problem, but it has deepened since the election of President Mohammed Buhari, a Muslim and a Fulani. The skirmishes occur when Fulani herdsmen move their livestock for grazing into farms belonging to non-Fulani, which leads to the devastation of crops. In retaliation, the farmers kill the herds or poison the grazing field; in counter response, the herders wage a war against the farming communities.[319]

The clash between the Fulani herdsmen and farmers has caused untold hardship to the farming communities and has resulted in thousands being murdered; many people have lost their homes and property. It is estimated that from July 22, 2019 at least 127, 713 people were rendered homeless in Kaduna, Benue, and Plateau states as a result of communal clashes and herdsmen attack. In the same period of July 22, 2019 an estimated 110,389 people were displaced in Zamfara, Katsina and Kano states as triggered by banditry and

[316] Mercy Abang, "22,000 Nigerians missing since Boko Haram crisis began: Red Cross" Aljazeera (Doha), September 12, 2019. https://www.aljazeera.com. See *The Guardian*, "Nigeria: Boko Haram releases dozens of kidnapped Chibok schoolgirls." *The Guardian* (London), May 6, 2017. https://www.tyheguardian.com/world/2017/may/boko-haram-schoolgirls-released-3376846-may2017/. See also thejournal.ie. "82 girls kidnapped by Boko Haram in 2014 have been released." (Dublin), May 7, 2017. www.thejornal.ie/boko-haram-schoolgirls-released-3376846-may2017/.

[317] *Africanews*, February 19, 2018. www.africanews.com/2017/07/27/1200-days-chibok-girls-still-in-boko-haram-captivity/. See Fidelis Mbah. "Nigeria's Chibok schoolgirls: Five years on, 112 still missing." *Aljazeera* (Doha), April 14, 2019. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/04/nigeria-chibok-school-girls-years-112-missing-190413192517739.html.

[318] Thurston, 3. See Caroline Varin, 2019. "Boko Haram: The History of an African Jihadist Movement." *International Affairs*, 95, no. 1.

[319] Okeke Okechukwu Edward, "Conflicts between Fulani herders and Farmers in Central and Southern Nigeria: Discourse on Proposed Establishment of Grazing Routes and Reserves." *An International Journal of Arts and Humanities*, 3, no.1 (January 2014): 66-84.

communal clashes.[320] Also, in January 2019, the clashes between cattle herders and farmers have left more than 10,000 people killed.[321] The economy of these states has been badly hit by the conflicts. According to a study carried out, the Federal Government was losing $14 billion (5.04 trillion Naira) in revenue yearly owing to herdsmen and farmers clashes in Benue, Kaduna, Nasarawa and Plateau states.[322] It also discovered that these states lost 47 per cent of their locally generated revenues, prompting the Executive Governor of Benue state, Samuel Ortom, to claim that the attacks by the Fulani herdsmen have caused Benue state 95billion Naira (about $634 million) between 2012 and 2014.[323] These conflicts have created a volatile political and religious situation. It was alleged that the attacks were part of the Fulani scheme to dislodge the indigenous people and take over their land, especially parts occupied by Christian communities. These communities saw the Fulani attacks as another jihad. This suspicion led the prelate of the Methodist Church of Nigeria, Samuel Uche, to claim: "we are aware there is a game plan to Islamise Nigeria, and they are using the Fulani herdsmen to initiate it."[324]

The Biafra separatist movement in the South-East geopolitical zone also labelled the attacks on the farms and people as another way to forcefully convert the Southerners to

[320] Displacement Tracking Matric, n.d. "Flash Report: Displacement in North Central and North West State.". https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Nigeria%20-%20Displacement%20in%20North%20Central%20and%20North%20West%20States%20Flash%20Report.
[321] Udo Jude Ilo, ler Jonathan-lchaver, and Yemi Adamolekun, "The Deadliest Conflict You've Never Heard of: Nigeria's Cattle Herders and Farmers Wage a Resource War." *Foreign Affairs* (NY), January 23, 2019. https://www.foreignaffairs.com. See *World Watch Monitor*. "Nigeria: Violence continues but government in denial, church leaders say." (Washington DC), July 25, 2019). https://www.worldwatchmonitor.org.
[322] Thematic Report, 2018. "Farmer-Herder Conflicts: A Renewed Threat to Human Security in Ghana and Nigeria." Thematic Report, 2 (January - June), https://www.wanep.org/wanep/files/2018/Oct/Final_Thematic_Report_Farmer_Herder_Conflict.pdf.
[323] International Crisis Group, "Herders against Farmers: Nigeria's Expanding Deadly Conflict." Crisis Group Africa Report, no. 252 (Brussels), September 19, 2017. See Comboni Missionaries Ireland, "Nigeria: Violence between Fulani Herdsmen and Farmers," February 19, 2018. https://www.combonimissionaries.ie/2018/02/2018/Nigeria-violence-between-fulani-herdsmen-and-farmers/. See also *Watch Dog Reporters*, n.d. "Rampaging Fulani Herdsmen a Threat to Nigeria's Unity," February 19, 2019. https://www.watchdogreporters.net/rampaging-fulani-herds-threat-nigeria-unity/. See Katrin Gänsler, "Nigeria: The politicized herders and farmers conflict." *Deutsche Welle Akademie* (Bonn), July 16, 2019. https://www.dw.com/en/nigeria-the-politicized-herders-and-farmers-conflict/a-49598457.
[324] Ibid.

Islam. This speculation has led some prominent Southerners, like the President of the Christian Association of Nigeria, Reverend Olasupo Ayokunle, to state: "If the government fails to stop the provocation by the Fulani herdsmen, they should be prepared for war. No ethnic group has a monopoly of violence and no ethnic group should be a monster to others."[325]

While some critics accuse President Buhari of purposely failing to halt the Fulani herdsmen violence, because of his conflict of interest, his pastoral Fulani background and as a life patron of the Cattle Breeders' Association otherwise called Miyetti – Allah Cattle Breeders Association of Nigeria (MACBAN,)[326] the back-and-forth attacks of Fulani herdsmen, killing, raping and destruction of properties of farming communities and the provocative ranting by ethnic and Christian leaders in Southern and Northern Nigeria could trigger war, considering the complexity of the Nigerian ethnic and religious environment. It is projected that nearly 2, 500 people have been killed in 2016[327] and 110 girls abducted in Government Girls Secondary School, Dapchi, Yobe State in 2018.[328] The Fulani herdsmen are aggressive, and their activities have prompted the Global Terrorism Index 2015 to classify Fulani militants as the world's fourth-deadliest terror group;[329] in 2016 the Global

[325] International Crisis Group, "Herders against Farmers: Nigeria's Expanding Deadly Conflict." *Crisis Group Africa* Report, no. 252 (Brussels), September 19, 2017. See Katrin Gänsler, "Nigeria: The politicized herders and farmers conflict," *Deutsche Welle Akademie* (Bonn), July 16, 2019. https://www.dw.com/en/nigeria-the-politicized-herders-and-farmers-conflict/a-49598457.

[326] Agro Nigeria, n. d. "*Tag:* Miyetti-Allah Cattle Breeders Association of Nigeria*,"* January 23, 2018. https://agronigeria.com.ng/tag/miyetti-allah-cattle-breeders-association-of-nigeria-macban/. See SaharaReporters, "Miyetti Allah Is A Privileged Terrorist Organisation Rights Activist Slams Buhari Over Handling of Fulani Herdsmen Killings." Editorial, January 18, 2018. https://www.saharareporters.com/2018/01/18/miyetti-allah-privileged-terrorist-organisation-rights-activist-slams-buhari-over/. See also Punch Newspaper, "Herdsmen Killings: Miyetti Allah, Afenifere, Ohanaeze reject Osinbajo panel." Editorial, January 21, 2018. https://punchng.com/herdsmen-miyetti-allah-afenifere-ohanaeze-reject-osinbajo-panel/.

[327] International Crisis Group, "Herders against Farmers: Nigeria's Expanding Deadly Conflict," *Crisis Group Africa* Report, no. 252 (2018).

[328] International Crisis Group, "Nigeria." March 2018. https://www.crisisgroup.org/crisiswatch/february-2018#nigeria.

[329] Sola Tayo Fulan Nasrullah, "Nigeria's Government Must Ensure a Balanced Response to the Pastoralist-Settler Crisis." (blog). *The Royal Institute of International Affairs*, May 6, 2016.

Terrorism Index pointed out that 466 incidents occurred in Nigeria with 1,832 deaths, and in 2017 the Global Terrorism Index ranked Nigeria third out of 163 countries.[330] So far, these conflicts have been attributed to inherited colonial structures and the inability of the post-colonial Nigerian government to cultivate a strong national identity.

Furthermore, Northern Nigeria is a multi-religious, multi-ethnic, multi-cultural, multi-national and multi-linguistic society. While these features are not only peculiar to Northern Nigeria, but to several regions in African countries, the problem of managing these hostilities has proved difficult and has invariably thrown up multifarious conflicts, with religious hostility and extremism being the most common and destructive of all. Although there are political and economic problems, this situation is worsened by corruption, military rule, election rigging, policy reversals and poor policy execution. This all hinders the people's confidence in the government and so question its legitimacy to rule effectively and efficiently. The ethno-religious conflict in Northern Nigeria has remained the single most pervasive problem and threat to the national unity, peace, and stability of one Nigeria.[331]

2.9 Understanding the Peace Process in Northern Nigeria

Peace processes in Northern Nigeria are vital as it involves measures taken by postcolonial thinkers to end violent conflict in Northern Nigeria and build a harmonious coexistence among diverse ethnic groups in the region.[332] This measure involves how

[330] Institute for Economics and Peace, n.d. "Global Terrorism Index 2017," March 19, 2018. https://www.globalterrorismindex.org. See "Global Peace Index 2019: Measuring Peace in a Complex World." August 28, 2019, http://visionofhumanity.org/reports.

[331] Eme, Okechukwu I., Ekekwe Ezinwanne, and Okonkwo Chigozie Ifekwe, "*Resolving Indigene-Settler Conflicts in Nigeria*." *International Journal of Innovative Social Science and Humanities Research*, 7, no. 2 (2019).

[332] According to Luc Reychler, sustainable peace is referred to as "a situation characterised by the absence of physical violence; the elimination of unacceptable political, economic, and cultural forms of discrimination; a high level of internal and external legitimacy or support; self-sustainability; and a propensity to enhance the constructive transformation of conflicts." Reychler listed four requirements for the creation of sustainable peace. 1. Effective communication, consultation, and negotiation at different levels. He said that the precondition for establishing a sustainable peace is the presence of an effective communication, consultation, and negotiation system at different levels and between the major stakeholders. Effective negotiations can be distinguished from

negotiation can be designed and reinforced, and disagreements resolved, the trade-offs involving Christian-Muslim and Indigenes and settler conundrums resolved.[333]

According to Luc Reychler, there are different ways people can get hurt in conflict, the most visible being armed conflict. He points out that armed violence is aimed to deter, coerce, wound, and even kill people. The second means Reychler noted is through psychological violence. It is directed to the minds and hearts and tries to weaken the sentimental power of people. He adduces that psychological violence is most often aimed to produce mental suffering or spread fear and hate. In addition, structural violence is different from both armed and psychological violence. Here violence is built into social structure and less seen than physical or psychological violence. An example of structural violence was the apartheid South Africa, and the caste system in India.[334] In Nigeria, such examples abound such as the Osu caste in Igbo, non-indigenes in northern region. Another instrument Reychler mentioned is cultural violence, which he refers to as those aspect of culture that authorise the manipulation of the instruments of violence. We see this in violence in the name of revolution, in the name of religious fanatism, and in the name of political ideologies.

To arrest any form of violence in Northern Nigeria, either in the name of religious extremism or in the name of extreme political ideologies, Northern Nigeria needs a

less effective negotiations by looking at the process, outcome, and implementation. 2. Peace-enhancing structures is vital for the establishment of a sustainable peace in the establishment of series of peace-enhancing structures. The first is of a political nature: it is the establishment of a consolidated democracy. The second structure necessary for the establishment of a sustainable peace is an effective, legitimate, and restorative justice system. The third structure that needs to be built is a social, free market system. The fourth structure that needs attention is education, information, and communication system, etc. (Luc Reychler, "From Conflict to Sustainable Peacebuilding: Concepts and Analytical Tools." In *Peacebuilding: A Field Guide*, ed. Luc Reychler and Thania Paffenholz (Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2001), 12-13.

[333] United States Institute of Peace, "Peace Processes." *United States Institute of Peace*. https://www.usip.org/index.php/index.php/issue-areas/peace-processes

[334] Luc Reychler, "From Conflict to Sustainable Peacebuilding: Concepts and Analytical Tools." In *Peacebuilding: A Field Guide*, ed. Luc Reychler and Thania Paffenholz (Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2001), 5.

sustainable peace. Peace as Reychler argues requires more than the absence of armed violence. The truth as he stated is "the absence of armed violence may mask all sorts of frustrations and even a potential for armed violence."

The question is what is the peace process? Collins Dictionary defines a peace process as "consisting of all meetings, agreements, and negotiations in which people such as politicians are involved when they are trying to arrange peace between countries or groups that are fighting with each other."[335]

In addition, Harold Saunders defines a peace process as "a political process in which conflicts are resolved by peaceful means." They include "mixture of politics, diplomacy, changing relationships, negotiation, mediation, and dialogue both official and unofficial arenas."[336]

Another definition was given by Tim Sisk as "step-by-step reciprocal moves to build confidence, resolve gnarly issues such as disarmament, and carefully define the future through the design of new political institutions. In other terms, a peace process is an intricate dance of steps choreographed by third party mediators among parties in the conflict that help to gradually exchange war for peace.[337]

In understanding how a peace process works, Nicole Ball divides peace processes into two stages and each of these into two phases. The first stage of the peace process is cessation of violent conflict. She then breaks it up into two phases: negotiation and cessation of hostilities. The second stage is peacebuilding which moves from a transition phase to a consolidation phase. An advocate of peacebuilding, John Paul Lederach, notes that getting

[335] Collins Dictionary, "Peace Process." HarperCollins Publishers (2020). https://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/peace-process.
[336] Heidi Burgess, "Peace Processes." In *Beyond Intractability*, ed. Guys Burgess and Heidi Burgess (Boulder: University of Colorado, 2004).
[337] Ibid.

out of a conflict takes as long as getting into it. Therefore, if a conflict has been building and breeding for long periods of time, Lederach counsels "it will take that long to get over it."[338]

Violent conflict in Northern Nigeria has taken enormous cost towards both human and material resources. The cost of these conflicts is enormous and has thrown back the region's development efforts. Among them are human costs, peacekeeping, and humanitarian costs, commercial and reconstruction costs, and political costs. As Manuela Leonhardt reminds us, human suffering witnessed in countries like Rwanda and Bosnia-Herzegovina was unprecedented. She noted that in 1994, the Rwanda genocide saw an estimated 800,000 persons killed and around 2 million Rwanda were forced to flee from their homes. The economic consequences were that Rwanda exports dropped by 60 percent because of internal volatility. In the same vein, the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina claimed the life of 145,000 people and injured 174,000 people, and 2.5 million people were rendered homeless. As a result, Bosnian gross domestic product nosedived from an estimated $10 billion to $2 billion between 1990 and 1996, while the costs of reconstructing Bosnia were estimated at several billion dollars. Leonhardt notes that the rising number of conflict-related humanitarian emergencies equally diverts scarce resources from long-term development to humanitarian assistance.[339]

As stated earlier, violent conflict in Northern Nigeria, especially the Northeast geopolitical zone, has witnessed loss of lives and economic stagnation. Yemi Osinbajo, Vice-president of Nigeria lamented the extent of human carnage witnessed in the Northeast zone of Nigeria as unprecedented. He traces the insecurity from 2020 in which over 20,000

[338] Ibid.
[339] Manuela Leonhardt, "Relief and Development Cooperation." In *Peacebuilding: A Field Guide*, ed. Luc Reychler and Thania Paffenholz (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2001), 238.

lives have been lost and over 2 million people displaced from their homes. He points out that the region's economic livelihoods have been destroyed, including homes, public buildings, and infrastructure. He notes that in this Northeast zone, 80 per cent of the people rely on agriculture for their subsistence. But because of the conflict in the area such as the activities of Boko Haram and bandits, scores of people have been killed along with livestock. He adduces that returning people to their homes has been exceedingly difficult because of landmines and other remnants of war laid in this zone. Osinbajo posits that the states that bore the direct brunt of the conflict are Borno, Adamawa and Yobe, while the three states of Gombe, Taraba and Bauchi were indirectly affected as the scores of internally displaced people flee to these states for safety, and as a result, these neighbouring states' economic resources, social services and infrastructure are overstressed.[340]

According to Human Rights Watch, its 2018 World Report said that the ongoing conflict in Northern Nigeria has resulted in the deaths of over 20,000 people and created a large-scale humanitarian disaster. The editors noted that about 2.1 million people have been dislodged from their homes, while 7 million people need humanitarian assistance. Boko Haram insurgences alone have killed and maimed thousands of people and contributed to humanitarian disaster in the region. The Christian-Muslim conflicts is ongoing, another internal crisis that bedevils Northern Nigeria from as political, ethnic, and communal groups clash over political hegemony, marginalisation, discrimination, land, and competition over resource control.[341] There is equally inter-communal violence between Fulani nomadic and farming communities in North-Central of Nigeria. For instance, hundreds of people were killed, and thousands dislodged from their homes because of the clashes between Fulani

[340] Yemi Osinbajo, "Forward." In North-East Nigeria Recovery and Peace Building Assessment Synthesis Report, Vol. 1, *The World Bank* (2015). http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/nigeria.
[341] Sunday Iduh, "The Key Challenges to Peace in Nigeria." *International Journal of Vocational and Technical Education* 3, no.8 (November 2011), 127.

herdsmen and farmers in Kajuru village an outskirt of Kaduna, Kaduna state. Similarly, in Jos, Plateau state similar clashes were witnessed in the area leaving scores of people dead and properties destroyed.[342]

These conflicts in Northern Nigeria have led to humanitarian disaster and exorbitant economic costs and reconstruction. This has prompted the United Nation Humanitarian Agency to appeal for $700 million needed to address the humanitarian crisis in the Lake Chad Basin in northeast.[343]

The question is how can sustainable peace be achieved in regions prone to non-religious and religious conflicts? Like Leonhardt argues, development aid cannot promote peace on its own though it should be part of the incentives. She listed three main pieces which will help bring peace to conflict areas: relief, rehabilitation, and development aid. She argues that these three terms can play a positive role in promoting peace, long-term conflict prevention, supporting peace processes, and addressing localised violence.[344]

Leonhardt notes that aid is likely to address the structural conditions or remote causes that produce violent conflict, like social exclusion, lack of political participation, unaccountable public institutions, and lack of personal security. It can equally support people in fashioning institutions for the peaceful resolution of social conflict and allow them to be fully involved in conflict prevention. She avers that in post-conflict situations, aid can help prepare the ground for sustainable peace. She stated that experience has shown that political negotiations are uncertain to lead to a lasting peace agreement, if they are not supported by a peace process that goes down to the grassroots. Leonhardt points out that the social groundwork for peace is based on the three-way relationship of participation, material

[342] Human Rights Watch, "World Report 2018: Nigeria." *Human Rights Watch*, June 6, 2018, https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2018/country-chapters/nigeria.
[343] Ibid.
[344] Leonhardt, "Relief and Development Cooperation," 240.

benefit, and security. She notes that in the early stages of the peace process, aid can support citizens in fashioning social spaces for dialogue, generating public pressure for peace, and formulating a people-focused peace agenda.[345] Also, governments should be transparent and accountable to the people. As Larry Diamond posits Nigeria's economic and political woes have been attributed to the culture of corruption. He notes that in Nigeria there is a "prebendal" culture in Nigeria, in which the "systematic abuse of state office and resources for individual and group gain is expected and rewarded in the interactions of clients and patrons, politicians and constituencies, even while it is condemned rhetorically in the aggregate and abstract."[346] Diamond argues that there is inconsistency in the behaviour of social and polititical leaders in what they advocate while as a candidate for a position, who as political outsiders condemn incubents, civilian or military, for their greediness and sleaze but then jump at the chances for corrupt enrichment and respond to the expectations for dispensation of patronage when they become political insiders.[347]

In the same sentiment, Farooq A. Kperogi attributes the lack of development, insecurity and mass unemployment in Nigeria to corruption. He argues that the prevalence of corruption in Nigeria was as result of lack of leadership. He observes that corruption in Nigeria has become a way of life. He points out that in the last five years of President Muhammadu Buhari's government's corruption has become rife. Kperogi further states that there is no one in Buhari's government that is not tainted as corrupt. He wonders how the majority of Buhari's officers are living a lavish life, while the majority of Nigerians are

[345] Ibid.
[346] Larry Diamond, "Postscript and Postmortem." In *Transition Without End: Nigerian Politics and Civil Society Under Babangida,* ed. Larry Diamond, Anthony Kirk-Greene, and Oyeleye Oyediran (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1997), 471.
[347] Ibid.

living in abject poverty. The most disturbing trend in Buhari's government is accusations and counteraccusations of officers pointing fingers to one another. Kperogi says:

> An emergent – and increasingly defining – feature of the regime is that its honchos entertain the country with whirlingly blinding accusations and counter accusations of eye watering corruption against each other. Abubakar Malami says Ibrahim Magu is an unconscionable "relooter" of recovered loot, and Magu says Malami is a worse crook than he is, and that in addition to his crookedness, he abuses his position to feather beds his friends.[348]

Kperogi gives a graphic description of how money meant for developmental purposes and welfare of Nigerians were embezzled by government officers. He said:

> From the Ministry of Power to the Ministry of Works, from the Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs to the Ministry of Finance, from the NSITF to the NDDC, from the North-East Development Commission (where N 100 billion "vanished in one year") to everything in between, corruption is prowling menacingly unchallenged.[349]

Kperogi bemoans the state of corruption in Buhari's government as alarming. He reminds Nigerians how Buhari rode to power through his stand on corruption. He points out that Buhari in the past told Nigerians that his government will have zero tolerance on corruption and that it will not be "business as usual." However, the high-profile cases of corruption among his officers have shown that Buhari was merely playing politics to get elected as president. Kperogi argues that when the history of Nigeria is written, Buhari's government will go down as the most corrupt government. He avers:

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[348] Farooq A. Kperogi, "Corruption is Thriving Not in Spite of Buhari But Because of Him." Notes from Atlanta (blog). July 25, 2020, https://www.farooqkperogi.com/2020/07/corruption-is-thriving-not-in-spite-of.html
[349] Kperogi, "Corruption is Thriving Not in Spite of Buhari But Because of Him."

> Everyone has concluded that the Buhari regime will go down in the records as the most malodorous manure of corruption in Nigeria. Most people think it is ironic that corruption is thriving profusely in the government of a man who likes to superfluously draw attention to his putative intolerance of corruption who claim to embody "integrity" and who promised to make Nigeria's governmental soil infertile for graft.[350]

Nigeria cannot progress without tackling corruption, Kperogi noted. He believes corruption retards development and progress. He advises the government of Buhari to live up to his promise to Nigerians that his government will adopt zero corruption.

Again, Leonhardt counsels that during negotiations peacebuilders, mediators, and witnesses can be strengthened, while later participation in the process of reconciliation and building structures to sustain peace is crucial. In addition, she notes that aid for post-conflict rehabilitation and reconstruction can help build faith in the peace process by offering real material enhancements to people like businesses or employment prospects and making sure the "peace dividend" is spread equally among the populace. She also points out that change from a culture of violence to a culture of peace entails people can trust in their personal security and institution of justice.[351]

In addressing localised violence, Leonhardt avers that development aid can support communities in dealing with all forms of localised violence. Such violence can range from cattle rustling to gang related violence in areas like Kenya and urban Latin America, respectively. This kind of violence is because of unemployed youths, the availability of small arms, and deep contempt for the value of human life. In these situations, aid can help people to develop community-based security systems, it can address the material

[350] Ibid.
[351] Leonhardt, "Relief and Development Cooperation," 241.

preconditions of violence and support local mediation efforts. Traditional means of conflict resolution, when supported, can be highly effective in these circumstances and should be explored and reinforced.[352]

Kieran E. Uchehara, moreover, enumerates several peace initiatives by prominent northerners and statesmen in the region including the past head of states on the need for dialogue with Boko Haram. Such prominent leaders are the former Nigerian military head of state, General Abdulsalami Abubakar, who called on the government to engage in dialogues with the group to end the insecurity and violence in the northern regions. As the chairman of the Governing Council of the Institution for Peace and Sustainable Development Studies (GCIPSDS), he urged them to strive and excel in ensuring transparency and accountability toward sustainable peace and development. Abubakar believes that dialogue between the government and Boko Haram was the only way to solve the present security challenges in the northern region.[353]

Also contributing to the peace overture and dialogue with the Boko Haram sect was Governor Gabriel Suswan of the Benue state, who called for dialogues between the Boko Haram and the Federal Government to resolve the security challenges in the northern region. For him, the crisis has led to the grinding of the economic activities in the region. He believes that both the political leaders and spiritual leaders in the northern region should work in synergy to address the crisis to forestall imminent disaster, in addition he further described it as a grave catastrophe that requires the support of all northerners to tackle.[354]

Also, former President of Nigeria, Olusegun Obasanjo, had also expressed a similar sentiment and prescribed a "carrot-and-stick approach," with the carrot being a call for

[352] Kperogi, "Corruption is Thriving Not in Spite of Buhari But Because of Him."
[353] Uchehara, "Peace Talks Initiatives between the Boko Haram and Nigerian Government." *International Journal of Business and Social Science* 5, no.6 (May 2014).
[354] Ibid.

dialogue. Obasanjo welcomed the peace initiative and took the initiative to Boko Haram's base in Maiduguri, Borno state in 2011. To negotiate peace, Obasanjo met with an in-law of the late leader, Muhammed Yusuf, whom he believed could be of help in guaranteeing the success of the peace process. However, Obasanjo's initiatives turned out to be a disaster as the sect passed a death sentence on Obasanjo's host. The sect extrajudicially killed the man and some members of his household. The unpleasant incident was a strong signal that the feared sect was not, in any way, ready to enter dialogue with the government of Nigeria.[355]

Adding voice to the dialogue with the sect is another former Head of State, Chief Ernest Shonekan. He called for dialogue with leaders of those responsible for the spate of insecurity in the northern region. Shonekan believes dialogue was needed to establish why the Boko Haram are involved in violent acts, and to find means to end the crisis. He points out that there could not be any sustainable socio-economic and political transformation in the region where there is no assurance for life and property. To emphasise the importance given by both the government and concern citizens to the peace option and the instrument of dialogue, Ahmed Datti was appointed as the mediator between the government and members of the Boko Haram group. Though the Datti-led initiative was the first key move by the government to reach out to the sect, the peace initiative appeared intended to fail right from the start. Some members of the Boko Haram sect opposed the peace initiative as they alleged that the committee were a political tool designed by the government to weaken the sect.[356]

Lending his support to the call for peace, the Shehu of Borno, Alhaji Abubakar ibn Garbai, whose area had been violently affected by the Boko Haram menace, renewed his appeal to the sect to embrace dialogue and end its violent campaign. Taking an exception to

[355] Ibid.
[356] Uchehara, "Peace Talks Initiatives between the Boko Haram and Nigerian Government."

those who were against the dialogue route, the traditional ruler tasked the Borno elders to come up with recommendations on how to end the Boko Haram rebellion, which he argues had paralysed both economic and social activities in the state. On the other hand, the Borno State governor, Alhaji Kashim Shettima, equally called for dialogue and similarly urged the Boko Haram's leadership to cease hostilities.[357]

Yet, despite the peaceful initiative for dialogue, the belligerent Boko Haram sect stuck to their violent campaign to kill, maim, kidnap, and cause untold hardship to the people of Northern Nigeria.[358]

In chapters 6 and 7, I identify both the diagnosis and solutions to the conflicts in the Northern Nigeria peace process. I equally make recommendation on how the peace process in Northern Nigeria can lead to a durable and sustainable peace in the region. I also explore interreligious dialogue between Christians and Muslims was. The contributions of NGOs are also equally explored, along with various federal government initiatives. All these instruments of conflict mechanism are explored with the aim of reaching harmonious coexistence among all the various groups in Northern Nigeria.

2.12 Conclusion

Northern Nigeria's experience has been largely defined by a colonial legacy that manifested in different forms. The colonial imposition of indirect rule and the segregation policy practiced in some parts of the northern region continue to be a source of division between the majority Hausa-Fulani Muslim and the minority Christians of Middle Belt.

Furthermore, our background analysis of Northern Nigeria reveals the mutually exclusive influence of Christianity and Islam in the region. This exclusively draws from the fact that

[357] Ibid.
[358] Uchehara, "Peace Talks Initiatives between the Boko Haram and Nigerian Government."

each of the traditions aim at proselytising and in doing so, pitch the two main religions into conflict with one another. The two worldviews are strongly rooted as parallel traditions that command the allegiance of their followers to claim superiority over one another. Thus, even the state of deprivation and inequality is not enough to build a bridge across the divide. Rather the people split further between Christians and Muslims, as we witness in the ethno-religious violence in the region.

Another major issue that can be derived from the analysis of Northern Nigeria includes the problem of corruption, fierce competition for scarce resources, marginalisation, and inept political leadership. Since politics is no longer based on what the politicians can do for the community but what the community can do for their own selfish agenda, the politicians are only interested in themselves. They too often put self before service and are also an agent of occupation. There is no more catching fish for God but rather, stealing from God.

Equally, the Hausa-Fulani ruling class has been built and moulded in Islamic tradition as dictated by the Sokoto Caliphate. The result is that claiming the fear of God, being a *Bawan Allah* (God's servant) and having trust in *Ikon Allah* (the will of God), are the conditions and important parts of political and economic survival of the ruling class.[359]

Again, the Boko Haram uprising in the North East not only challenged the legitimacy of the state but also promoted Islamic revivalism.[360]

Therefore, many of political leaders have used the unique power of religion to legitimise their policies and to mobilise people towards their own constructed ends. Although the main

[359] Matthew Kukah, *Religion, Politics and Power in Northern Nigeria* (Ibadan: Spectrum Books Limited, 1993), x.
[360] Abimbola Adesoji, "The Boko Haram Uprising and Islamic Revivalism in Nigeria." *Africa Spectrum* 45, no.2 (2010): 96-7.

reasons and issues of conflict may not be of a religious character, religion plays an important role at times of conflict where religious system encounter one another. In such cases, political leaders do not hesitate to resort to religious myths and sacred documents of their religion to justify their acts and policies. By doing this, they try to get support of their communities and reinforce their power.[361] The political class achieves their aims by mobilising the uneducated youths and unemployed men and women for their own political ends.

Equally, the ascendency of the Hausa-Fulani influence coincided with isolation and side-lining by non-Muslims and Christians in the region. Hence, the Christians in the wake of their continued isolation and side-lining by the Hausa-Fulani ruling class, came to the conclusion that since religion is a major determinant of staying in power, it has become vital for Christians to employ religion to achieve their own socio-political and economic place in the Northern Nigeria polity.[362] Such leads to aggressive competition for space for religious converts and economic determinism in the region.

[361] S. Ayse Kadayici-Orellana, *Religion, Violence and the Islamic Tradition of Non-Violence.* In Turkish Yearbook Vol. XXXIV (Florida: University Press of Florida, 2003).
[362] Kukah, *Religion, Politics and Power in Northern Nigeria*, X.

PART II. Survey of Postcolonial Thought

Chapter 3: On Postcolonial Theory

3.1 Introduction

The failure of colonial rule in Nigeria was the inability of the colonial master to understand and fully comprehend the diverse ethnic compositions and identities, culture, languages, boundaries, social, political, and economic system of the natives. The colonial legacy was foisted on the people without considering the different ethnic makeup which are independent to one another.

Karen Eileen Overbey infers that from the late nineteenth century until the 1970s, the term "postcolonial," (usually hyphenated post-colonial) was a near synonym for postindependence. She avers that "post-colonial" denoted a linear chronology of the condition of a "former colony…occurring or existing after the end of colonial rule." She noted that starting in the late 1970s, with the growing critical study of European and British imperialism, the "post" in postcolonial has been understood politically, as an ideological rather than a temporal aftermath. She points out that the postcolonial exists from the first contact; it is the condition produced in the encounter of imperial and natives. Overbey contends that the binary, chronological boundary between "colonial" and "post-" erases the various ways that colonisers and colonised continue to affect each other after political independence. She maintains that it reifies the distinction between indigenous/settler/invaders. She posits that the "postcolonial" without hyphen, that is, as a critical rather than descriptive term, indicates the social conditions and subjectivities that exist within and during colonial rule and occupation, after independence.[363]

[363] Karen Eileen Overbey, "Postcolonial." *Studies in Iconography* 33 (2012): 145.

Overbey contends that postcolonialism as a critical practice entail bearing witness to the lopsided and asymmetrical forces of cultural representation concerned with the contest of political and social authority in the contemporary world order. She notes that witnessing is the work of both postcolonial material culture as in the fiction and memoirs (such as, I would contend, Fanon, Chinua Achebe etc). Overbey points out that postcolonialism serves to dislodge subjectivities and seeks to reassess both the moments and scope of history by rewriting from another viewpoint. However, in postcolonial studies, dislocation is the effect of physical and social occupation of the natives by the imperial powers.[364]

Pramod K. Nayar argues that postcolonialism as a theory and a critique arose from within anti-colonial activism and political movements in Asia, Africa and South America to probe colonial practices and legacy.[365] Bill Ashcroft, Gareth Griffiths and Helen Tiffin argue that the term post-colonial is resonant with all the uncertainty and intricacy of the many diverse cultural experiences. It also addresses all aspects of the colonial process from the start of colonial contact. The editors noted that all post-colonial societies are still subject in one way or another to explicit or indirect forms of neo-colonial control, and autonomy has not resolved this dilemma. The editors posit that the development of new leaders within autonomous societies, often bolstered by neo-colonial institutions; the development of internal divisions based on racial, linguistic or religious discriminations; the continuing unequal treatment of indigenous peoples in settler/invader societies, attests to the fact that post-colonialism is a continuing process of resistance and reform.[366]

[364] Ibid.
[365] Pramod K. Nayar, *Postcolonialism: A Guide for the Perplexed* (London: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2010), 1.
[366] Bill Ashcroft, Gareth Griffiths and Helen Tiffin, "Introduction." In *The Post-Colonial Studies Reader*, ed. Second Edition (London: Rouledge, 1995),1-2.

Vijay Mishra and Bob Hodge believe that one should confront these colonial legacies and institutions erected by colonial powers by dismantling the hegemonic boundaries and the causes that create unequal relations based on binary oppositions such as "us" and "them," "first world and third world," "white and black," coloniser and colonised."[367]

Robert Young argues that postcolonialism is not just a disciplinary field, nor is it a theory which has or has not come to an end. Rather, its goals have always concerned a wide-ranging political strategy to reconstruct Western knowledge formations, reorient ethical norms, turn the power structures of the world upside down, and refashion the world from below. Young maintains that the postcolonial has always been interested with questioning the interconnected histories of violence, domination, inequality, and injustice, with addressing the fact that, and the reasons why, millions of people in this world still live without things that most of those in the West take for granted.[368]

Post-colonialism emerged as an attempt to reject colonial rule, cultural domination and misrepresentation through the form of colonialism. R.S. Sugirtharajah, in his book, *The Postcolonial Biblical Reader*, states that post-colonialism emerged as "…an expression of a moral rejection of imperialism, taking the form of resistant creative writing."[369]

The European powers created artificial boundaries that later became permanent boundaries that have contributed internecine conflicts and bloodshed to Africa's traditional system and as a result has led to chains of conflict in postcolonial states.[370] For example, there are boundary disputes between Congo and Rwanda, Southern Sudan and Sudan over Darfur, Ethiopia and Eritrea, Rwanda and Burundi, and Nigeria and Cameroon over the

[367] Vijay Mishra and Bob Hodge, "What Was Postcolonialism?" *New Literary History* 36, no. 3 (Summer 2005): 2.
[368] Robert JC Young, "Postcolonialism Remains." *New Literary History* 43, no. 1 (Winter 2012): 20.
[369] R.S. Sugirtharajah, *The Postcolonial Biblical Reader* (UK: Blackwell, Publishing Ltd., 2006), 5.
[370] Achebe, *There Was A Country: A Personal History of Biafra* (London: Allen Lane an imprint of Penguin Books, 2012), 1.

Bakassi peninsula. These disputes over boundaries have led to war and as a result have created economic and political instability and social upheaval.[371] European powers were interested in the expansion and exploitation of the continent without recourse to the wishes of the people; the imperial powers-imposed alien rule, culture, education, religion and language, which resulted in defiance and resistance by the people of the continent of Africa.

Postcolonial literature came to light because of this clash between colonial culture and the intricate, native, cultural traditions. As the colonised nations had cause to question the import of alien culture and other forms of colonial legacies, postcolonial theory came to life. Therefore, the phrase "postcolonial" echoes all the uncertainties and intricacies of the several different cultural practices it alludes to and deals with all kinds of colonial courses of action from the first contact with the colonised people.[372]

However, while colonialism may have ended, postcolonial nations are still being controlled in the form of neo-colonialism and imperialism, and indigenous self-rule has not resolved the dilemma. The emergence of new postcolonial leaders aided by capitalist establishments, divided by racial, linguistic and religious favouritism, and the problem of indigenous people, shows that post-colonialism is an ongoing process of struggle and

[371] Wole Soyinka, *Of Africa* (London: Yale University Press, 2012), 10, 12. Soyinka questions the wisdom behind the amalgamations of states and creation of boundaries without consultation or looking at the histories of the nations, culture, and language. Soyinka noted that the Rwanda genocide would not have occurred; again, the crisis in Darfur was as a result of amalgamations by European powers. He said "it is contingent upon and will surely lead to a re-examination of the problem of exclusivity. In considering what the imperial powers chose to include within or exclude from the artificial nations that were created, African leaders may come to ask why. Why was the distinct nationality, and not that other, included in or excluded from a current nation space? Soyinka argues that the answers to the question would not be interesting because the advance party who came entered into agreement with local chiefs, whilst the other party came for exploration and later settled down in what he called "planting of an imperial flag" he believed that all this action was geared towards exploitation of the peoples' resources for the benefit of the imperial powers (pp. 12-13). See Ashcroft, Griffiths and Tiffin, *The Postcolonial Studies Reader*, 1. The editors argue with the same sarcasm that European imperialism employed different tactics to win the African people, first through trading and bargaining and proceeded with meticulous planning and inert desires to take over the land by force through instrumentality of coercion "the immensely prestigious and powerful imperial culture" was imposed on the people through subjugation.

[372] Bill Ashcroft, Gareth Griffiths and Helen Tiffin, *The Postcolonial Studies Reader*, 2nd Edition (New York: Routledge, 2006), 1.

modernisation. It does not mean that postcolonial ways are faultless and uniformed but shows the impracticality of confronting every aspect of colonial practices without examining the implications and end results.

The indigenous people that were discriminated against, were often forced to do certain jobs against their wishes. For instance, Frederick Lugard was the High Commissioner of the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria (1900-1906). Lugard was appointed joint governorship of both the Lagos Colony and Protectorate of Southern Nigeria and Protectorate of Northern Nigeria. He drew up a proposal for the amalgamation of both separate entities. Based on those proposals, the two protectorates thereafter known as pronvinces and the Colony of Lagos were amalgamated on 1st January 1914 to form the Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria. The Southern Provinces were headquartered in Enugu, and the Northern Province in Kaduna.[373] The amalgamation was purely done for commercial interests and economic purposes. These groups were forced together, irrespective of their diverse cultures, socio-economic, political and religious differences, all of which have made integration in Nigeria difficult. This situation has brought about the negative and haphazard nature of development in Nigeria. The British colonial empire was more interested in what they would than by "civilising" Nigeria. One of the colonial administrators, Miss Flora Shaw, who later became the wife of the Governor-General, Lugard, and who coined the name 'Nigeria', remarked in 1904: "Having conquered, we are obliged to administer and the hope that lies before us is to develop from small beginnings."[374] Because of this amalgamation by the British colonial empire, the system of indirect rule and the politics of divide and rule were presented

[373] Ebere Nwaubani, "Constitution-Making and the Nigerian Identity, 1914-1960." In *The Transformation of Nigeria: Essay in Honor of Toyin Falola* (Trento, NJ: Africa World Press, Inc., 2002), 75-76.
[374] Olaopa Olawale Rafiu, Akinola Owolabi and Salaam Najeem Folasayo, "The Nigerian State, political assassination and democratic consolidation: A historical exploration." *Africa Journal of Political Science and International Relations* 3, no. 2 (2009): 157.

in Richard's constitution of 1946, which consolidated Bernard Bourdillon of three-region structure.[375]

On gaining independence in 1960, the Nigerian state was divided along ethnic and religious faultlines. The transition from colonial rule to indigenous rule was calamitous. The colonial power, the British, bequeathed to the country a divided nation, but independence presented the political elite with the opportunity to redress and address this problem and to chart a direction for the postcolonial state. However, this opportunity was misused by the elite. Instead of moving the country forward, the elite were busy manipulating religious division, identity and ethnicity. The in-fighting among the political elite deepened and, as a result, the country could not make any headway in its economic and political development. This political instability paved the way for the military coup and the subsequent Nigerian Civil War.[376]

Three decades of military rule left Nigeria more divided, fragmented and militarised by the citizens. In comparison, the colonisers and military rulers treated Nigerians as their subjects. Both the colonisers and the military used brutality to contain the masses and the rule of law was virtually absent.[377] The military, in collaboration with their elite, well-connected civilian counterparts, embezzled public funds, corrupted virtually all institutions, and produced a nest of millionaires and multi-millionaires. They waged an economic war against the people through the looting of the treasury and the plundering of national resources which were hidden away in Swiss Banks, while at the same time the people were

[375] Ibid.
[376] Shola J. Omotola, "From Importer to Exporter: The Changing Role of Nigeria in Promoting Democratic Values in Nigeria." *Political Perspectives* 2, No. 1 (2008): 4. See Adekunle Olowonmi, "The Writer and the Quest for Democratic Governance in Nigeria: Transcending Post-Independence Disillusionment." *The Journal of Pan African Studies* 2, no. 3 (2008): 56. Also see Alka Jauhari, "Colonial and Post-Colonial Human Rights Violations in Nigeria." *International Journal of Humanities and Social Science* 1, no. 5 (2011): 53. See *The Fund for Peace, Fragile States Index Annual Report 2019*. The Fund for Peace, Washington, D.C., p. 7, www.fundforpeace.org
[377] Jauhari, "Colonial and Post-Colonial Human Rights Violations in Nigeria," 54.

impoverished, and lived in squalor and abject poverty.[378] Consequently, the annual survey undertaken by the Berlin-based organisation Transparency International ranked Nigeria 134th in 2010 and 143rd in 2011 on its Corruption Perceptions Index,[379] in 2012 (139), in 2013 (144), in 2014 (136), in 2015 (136),in 2016 (136), in 2017 (148),[380] and in 2018 (144),[381] 2019,[382] 2020[383], while Nigeria's domestic debt stood at $45 billion and external debt at $15 billion as at June 2017,[384] and the external debts estimated to an increase by about 46 percent to stand at $20.6 billion by the end of 2018,[385]and as at August, 2019, Nigeria external debt stood at 25609.63 million USD.[386] Again Nigeria's total public debt increases to N32.2 trillion ($84.57 billion) as at September 2020.[387]

This summary of the postcolonial Nigerian state, as indeed as most underdeveloped/developing countries, is characterised by political and economic disequilibrium. Nigeria, which had been a by-product of colonialism, became a theatre of violence, conflict, and division that the Nigerian political class inherited. As a result, politics

[378] Olowonmi, "The Writer and the Quest for Democratic Governance in Nigeria: Transcending Post-Independence Disillusionment," 57. See *World Poverty Clock*, "The Percentage of Nigerians living in Extreme Poverty Could Increase By 2030." https://www.worldpoverty.io/blog/index.php?r=12
See World Economic Forum, "Three Things Nigeria must do to end extreme poverty," March 21, 2019. https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2019/03/90-million-nigerians-live-in-extreme-poverty-here-are-3-ways-to-bring-them-out/

[379] Olukorede Yishau, "Transparency International Ranks Nigeria 143rd On Corruption Index." *The Nation Newspaper* (Lagos). www.thenationonlineng.net/2011/index.php/news/28348-transparency-international-ranks-nigeria-143th-on-corruption-index.html

[380] Transparency International, "Corruption Perception Index." https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption_perceptions_index_2017

[381] Transitional International, "Corruption Perceptions Index 2018," https://www.transparency.org/cpi2018

[382] Transparency International, "Corruption Perception Index 2019," https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2019/index/nga

[383] Transparency International, "Corruption Perception Index 2020," https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2020/index/nga

[384] Henry Boyo, "Still on Nigeria's debt profile." https://www.vanguardngr.com/2017/10/still-nigerias-debt-profile/

[385] Obinna Chima, "Nigeria's External Debt May Hit N6.31 Trillion in 2018." https://allafrica.com/stories/201708300734.html

[386] *Trading Economics*, "Nigeria Public External Debt." August 2019, https://tradingeconomics.com/nigeria/external-debt

[387] Samuel Oyekanmi, "Nigeria's total Public Debt Rises to N32.2 trillion ($84.57 billion) as at September 2020," https://nairametrics.com/2021/01/14/nigerias-total-public-debt-rises-to-n32-2-trillion-84-57-billion-as-at-september-2020/

is treated as an avenue to make money instead of a way to give selfless service to the community.[388]

Reasons have been adduced as to why African states failed to advance technologically and industrially. Among other reasons were that Africans were seen as lazy, lacking imagination, innovation and inept in developing on their own. However, Mueni wa Mueni differs in his reasoning; he places the blame on the doorstep of the colonisers, who appropriated productive land and left the natives without any. Wa Mueni points out that fertile land, meant to cultivate food for the people, was instead used for the cultivation of flowers, tea, pineapples, cocoa, coffee, and peanuts, for the benefit of the colonial powers. Another example of this appropriation was in Kenya, where enormous spaces of land were given over for "game parks" instead of food production.[389]

Also, critics argue that Lugard's amalgamation viewed from any standpoint – political, economic, demographic etc. - was completely ineffective, poorly constructed and improperly implemented. For example, "instead of administering things and developing 'service,' Lugard was preoccupied with the widespread extension of rule over people."[390] Again, while the amalgamation had its pains; it also had it gains. Apart from making the start of modern Nigeria and politically merged northerners and southerners together thereby creating the single largest geo-polity in Sub-Saharan Africa, it animated the political scene and propelled the country towards constitutionalism. Regrettably, anytime the interests of

[388] Rafiu, Owolabi and Folasayo, "The Nigerian State, Political Assassination and democratic Consolidation: A Historical Exploration,"156.

[389] Mueni wa Muin, "Civilisation" On Trial: The Colonial and Postcolonial State in Africa." *Journal of Third World Studies* XXV, no. 1 (2008):88.

[390] Emmanuel Oladipo Ojo, "Nigeria, 1914 – 2014: From Creation to Creation?" *Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria* 23 (2014): 74.

any of the three main ethnic groups appeared threatened or circumvented, references were made to the amalgamation in a manner depicting it as a mistake.[391]

Equally, colonialism was not just about economic control, but about the power to wrest control of the local economy from indigenous rulers. Improving the production methods or bolstering the economy was not essential. Colonialism in Africa was not on a mission to save the continent as it alleged, but rather on a mission to disrupt its political, economic and social institutions.[392] The colonialists insisted that their mission was to bring sanity and modernity to the colonial empire, however, they were invariably taking African art, masks, carvings and jewellery as loot for Europe. The stolen artefacts which are displayed in European museums to this day show the darker side of the European colonialists.[393] They did not create these artefacts themselves but gained them by defrauding the continent of valuable artefacts.[394]

Walter Rodney notes that Africa has unique cultural differences to other continents. Rodney mentions the African way of life regarding what to eat, where and how to talk, the treatment of dead relatives and new-born babies, and music and dance. He further envisions Africa as a continent of drums and percussion and that people achieve their potential through those means. Rodney stresses a linkage between African dance and art with African religion. He observes that African traditional religious practices exist in great variety and that it should remember that both Islam and Christianity found homes on African soil the moment

[391] Ibid.
[392] Muiu wa Muiu, "Colonial and Postcolonial State and Development in Africa." *Search Research* 77, no. 4 (2010):1316.
[393] Ashcroft, Griffiths and Tiffin, *The Post-Colonial Studies Reader*, ed. Second Edition (1995), 129-130.
[394] Peter Hitchcock, "Postcolonial Africa? Problems of Theory." *Women's Studies Quarterly* 25, no. ¾ (1997).

they set their feet on the African continent. He notes that traditional African religions help to set African cultures apart from other religions in other continents.[395]

African underdevelopment and backwardness are the products of many decades of exploitation and pillage of the African resources by imperialists and neo-colonialists. Colonial legacies as well as African entry into the international capitalist system and legal system, constructed by Western countries without the input of Africa, were a drawback and an obstacle to the development of Africa. African development should be in the hands of Africans and to achieve sound economic development, they need a radical transformation, good governance, zero corruption, infrastructural development, and sound planning that will benefit the entire population.

Jack Paine observes that the crisis in Africa after decolonisation can be attributed to the different pattern of political parties' formation. Most of the political parties that emerged in the 1960s were built on ethnoreligious identities. For instance, post 1945, Britain, France and Belgium organised constitutional reforms and elections. In most cases they identified the political groupings that are loyal to them and when they were departing. They make sure that political power is handed over to them, notwithstanding if the party won a free and fair election. The colonial administrators manipulated the census and elections to favour the ethnic group that are subservient to them. Some of these new political parties were constructed around nationalist ideals, other mirrored ethnic splits. In Nigeria the Northern People's Congress (NPC) were constructed along ethnic and religious lines. The NPC's platform puts emphasis on the "integrity of the north and its tradition."[396]

[395] Walter Rodney, *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa* (Cape Town: Pambazuka Press, an imprint of Fahamu, 1972, 2012), 49-50.
[396] Jack Paine, "Ethnic Violence in Africa: Destructive Legacies of Pre-Colonial States." *International Organisation* 73, Issue 3 (2018): 645.

Paine maintains that since 1960s until today, the violent political events that have beset African States such as civil wars and coups d'état were the consequences of colonial legacy. Most of this violence has often organised around ethnic identity, religious superiority, artificial boundaries and creation by colonial master's settlers and the indigenes conundrum.[397]

Angela Thompsell notes that after the decolonisation of Africa, the artificial boundaries and colonial names imposed on the people continue to possess problems. Any attempt to change or adjust the boundaries have led to war.[398] Tim Hyde summaries the plight of African states in the 21st Century as "pathetic" and "sad." He contends the rising violence, banditry, jihadism, and incursion of Islamic State militants and civil wars in Burundi, Niger, Mali, Nigeria and Central African Republic were a result of the partition of the continent by European diplomats. These artificial borders were not drawn with much thoughtfulness or consideration to the people living on this land. These indiscriminate partitions set African states on a path to war, hatred and violence.[399] This work focuses on about Northern Nigeria and includes other regions in Nigeria and other countries in sub-Saharan Africa.

3.2 Defining Postcolonial Studies

Ashcroft, Griffiths, and Tiffin write: "we use the term post-colonial to cover all cultures affected by the imperial process from the moment of the colonisation to the present day."[400] The reaction to this description was crucial and critics believe that this defined almost everything as postcolonial, since imperialism and neocolonialism are rife. Consequently, post-colonial studies is based in the 'historical fact' of European colonialism and the distinct

[397] Ibid.
[398] Angela Thompsell, "The Colonial Names of African States: Modern African Nations Compared with their Colonial Names," (2019). https://www.thoughtco.com/colonial-names-of-african-states-43755
[399] Tim Hyde, "Are Colonial-Era Borders Drawn by Europeans Holding Africa Back?" *American Economic Association* (2016). https://www.aeaweb.org/research/are-colonial-era-borders-holding-africa-back
[400] Ashcroft, Griffiths, and Tiffin, "General Introduction." In *The Post-Colonial Studies Reader*, 2.

material effects to which this phenomenon gave rise. It involves conversation about experiences of various kinds: migration, slavery, suppression, resistance, representation, difference, race, gender, place, and responses to the influential master discourses of imperial Europe such as history, philosophy and linguistics, and the fundamental experiences of speaking and writing by which all these come into being.[401] Again, post-colonial theory is rooted in the colonial mindset. Postcolonial theory is not only concerned in providing the point of view of the colonised, but in how the experience of colonialism has led to ways of thinking. In a nutshell, it deals with Eurocentric points of views in 'methodological' processes and in the way power is understood.[402]

Ashcroft, Griffiths, and Tiffin note that we use the term 'post-colonial' to represent the continuing process of imperial suppressions and exchanges throughout the different kind of societies, in their institutions and their informal practices. Because the imperial process works through as well as upon individuals and societies, 'post-colonial' theory rejects the awful categorisation of 'First' and 'Third' World and challenges the persistent misconception that the post-colonial is one way or another identical with the economically 'underdeveloped.'[403]

J. Daniel Elam defines postcolonial theory as "a body of thought primarily concerned with accounting for the political, aesthetic, economic, historical, and social impact of European colonial rule." Elam argues that postcolonial theory shares a fundamental claim that the world we live in is impossible to comprehend except in the relationship to the history of imperialism and colonial rule.[404]

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[401] Ibid.
[402] Ibid.
[403] Ibid., 3
[404] J. Daniel Elam, "Postcolonial Theory." *Oxford Bibliographies* (2019). https://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780190221911/obo-9780190221911-0069.xml

Sugirtharajah defined the field of "post-colonial" as "indicating the historical period aftermath of colonialism… a reactive resistance discourse of (the) colonised who critically interrogate dominant knowledge systems in order to recover the past from the Western slander and misinformation of the colonial period and continues to interrogate neo-colonising tendencies after the declaration of independence."[405] Nigeria's post-independence policy is still mirrored in the colonial legacy. The people have yet to come to terms with the many years of colonial legacy which are still visible on the minds of postcolonial writers. The postcolonial writers tend to challenge the negative image painted by the colonial master that African culture is primitive and want to inform the rest of the world that such stereotypes of the indigenous cultures are wrong.

In this context, post-colonialism should not be viewed as a continuation of colonialism, but as an academic field to tackle the problems that arose during European colonialism. By employing post-colonialism as a paradigm, it helps us to understand and critically look at "the continuation of colonialism through new relationships of power embedded in the control and production of dependency knowledge systems."[406] For instance, cash crops were introduced in some parts of Africa without taking into consideration the needs of the locals, the farmers and the impact of such cash crops on the "environment." One example of this is

[405] R.S. Sugirtharajah, *The Postcolonial Biblical Reader* (UK: Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2006), 8. See Robert Clarke, "Towards a Genealogy of Postcolonial Travel Writing." In Robert Clarke, *The Cambridge Companion to Postcolonial Travel Writing* ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018). He cited the definition by Quayson as "the sign of a critical orientation towards colonialism and its legacies, post-colonial literature designates the representation of experiences of various kinds including those of slavery, migration, operation and resistance, difference, race, gender, space and place, and the responses to the discourses of much a reflection on conditions under imperialism and colonialism proper as about conditions coming after the historical end of empires," 5-6.

[406] Afred Ndi, "*What happened to post-imperial development in Africa during the last fifty years? Re-thinking the post-colonial turn in creative art,* 'social writings' and films." *Journal of African Studies and Development* 3, no. 6 (2011).

the pineapple crops which was introduced in Thika in Central Kenya for Kenya Canners – the multinational company called Del Monte.[407]

Ashcroft, Griffiths, Tiffin, authors of *The Post-Colonial Studies Reader* argue that "post-colonialism (or often post-colonialism) deals with the effects of colonialism in culture and society."[408] This refers to literature that has emerged from former colonial states such as Africa, Asia, Latin America, and Caribbean states. These countries are united in their condemnation of colonial legacies and their excesses. Sophia Wan-Ahmad believes the rallying ground that brought these geographically different people together was that "they emerged in their present form out of the experience of colonisation and asserted themselves by foregrounding the tension with the imperial power and by emphasising their difference."[409] The editors of *The Post-Colonial Studies Reader* refer to the postcolonial response as "writing back" as a way of deconstructing the colonial legacies which were distorted and heavily-laden with lies.[410]

In the same vein, what is fundamental to this assessment is the assumption that the colonial empire believed that they were on a mission to civilise the primitive people and bring civilisation to them.[411] As such, they saw them as heathens, morally impotent, culturally backward and socially insolent. The sheer domination of colonisation, the heavy

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[407] Mueni wa Muiu, "Colonial and Postcolonial State and Development in Africa." *Search Research* 77, no. 4 (2010): 1314.
[408] Ashcroft, Griffiths, and Tiffin, *The Post-Colonial Studies Reader*, ed. (New York: Routledge, 1995), 168.
[409] Wan-Ahmad, Sharifah Sophia, Culture, Power and Resistance: Post-Colonialism, Autobiography and Malaysian Independence. Durham Theses, Durham University. Durham E-Theses Online (2010). http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/176/
[410] Ashcroft, Griffiths, and Tiffin, *The Post-Colonial Studies Reader*, 91. See Meagher Kumar, "Trading on faith: Religious Movements and Informal Economic Governance in Nigeria." *Journal of Modern African Studies* 47, no. 3 (2009): 82. She argues that postcolonialism was conventionally seen as "a period of history initialising the 'handing over' of colonised states by what were classified as supreme powers to rulers born and bred in the colonies themselves." In this context, Kumar agrees that some of the literature that emerged from these countries focused generally on analysing the definitions regarding dealings with historical and postcolonial markers at both a general and theoretical level. They viewed the "definitions" in terms of group conduct and the hegemonic limitations "superimposed" by one power upon another.
[411] V.Y. Mudimbe, *The Invention of Africa: Gnosis, Philosophy, and the Order of Knowledge* (UK: James Currey, 1988), 100.

burden of the colonial legacy and the European conquest and intimidation of the natives who were forcefully removed from their lands, and their own people and cultures remain the central features of postcolonial theory.

Nayar aasserts that Postcolonial theory deals with:

1. How the First/Western world represented the non-European native/world.
2. How colonial histories, anthropology, area studies, and cartography were rooted in a racial discourse.
3. How the native was feminised, dehumanised and marginalised in both representations and real life in the period of colonialism.
4. The psychological effects of colonialism on the coloniser and colonised.
5. The instruments of colonial domination: English literature, historiography, art and architecture.[412]

3.3 Post-colonialism as a Literary Theory

Gregory, Johnston, Pratt, Watts, Whatmore editors of *The Dictionary of Human Geography* puts forward the perspective that post-colonialism is an intellectual movement drawn from literary and cultural studies that are interested in the varied, unfair and contested forcing of colonialism upon the culture of the indigenous people in a way that relations, practices and representations were fashioned or distorted between the past and the present, as well as between the "heart" and the "margins" of the empire and its after-effects.[413] The editors state that "post-colonialism as a form of 'critical analysis of colonialism and its

[412] Pramod K. Nayar, *Postcolonialism: A Guide for the Perplexed* (London: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2010), 4.
[413] Derek Gregory, Ron Johnston, Geraldine Pratt, Michael Watts, and Serah Whatmore, *The Dictionary of Human Geography* (ed.) 5th Edition (United Kingdom: Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2009), 561.

successor projects' takes as axiomatic": One, a "close and critical reading of colonial discourse"; and two, an understanding of "the complicated and fractured histories through which colonialism passed from into the present."[414]

Therefore, post-colonialism focuses on indigenous expression and identity in social, demographic, political, cultural, and spatial forms, and the styles and identities in the once-colonial societies of the periphery.[415]

Throwing more light about "post-coloniality", Kwaku Larbi Korang emphasises three themes: temporal, spatial, and ethico-cultural. According to Korang the first two, postcolonial time and space, are meant as descriptions of the general outlines of a past and present global condition and configuration. The third postcolonial(ity) in the ethico-cultural sense, designates an assortment of future-oriented projects of critique and a revision attempt to get beyond questionable past (colonial) legacies that are "sedimented" in present international and intranational relations and exchanges.[416] On the other hand, Lewis states that postcolonial theories are involved in "unlocking unspoken, unheard or silenced pasts

[414] Ibid.
[415] Ibid.
[416] Kwaku L. Korang, "Where is Africa? When Is the West's Other? Literary Postcoloniality in a Comparative Anthropology." *Diacritics* 34, no. 2 (2004): 38. He went on to say that in the "temporal" sense, "postcolonial(ity)" is the historical period after the variegated encounters – inaugurated in the fifteenth century and continuing long thereafter – between societies of the European West (the encountering societies) and those of the non-European/non-Western world (the encountered societies, usually referred to as "the Rest"). Further to that, Korang stated that "the encountering West's imperial and colonial dominance, as well as cultural hegemony, over the encountered non-West, has more or less been, in the past as in the present, a salient world-historical, geopolitical, and geocultural feature of the encounters' aftermath (hence the reference, in historical usage, to "the colonial encounter[s]"). In the spatial sense, Korang alludes to "postcolonial(ity)" as "the configuration of the 'postencounter' world after its more or less successful restructuring along the lines of a hierarchy determined by the West's material, political, and cultural power. Hence the world after the encounters discloses a spatial relationship between 'superordinate' Western (imperial) centers and their subordinate (colonial and/or neo-colonial) peripheries; between dominating (First World) metropoles and dominated (Third World) margins" (Korang. "Where Is Africa? When Is the West's Other? Literary Postcoloniality in a Comparative Anthropology," 38-9.

(of individuals, communities, genders, nations)", thus intensifying the level of options available for culturally and politically workable presents and futures.[417]

The same point was made by Robert Young in tracing the history of postcolonial theory. He showed how postcolonial theory is a product of what the West saw as anti-slavery activism and anti-colonialism. As a body of knowledge, Young notes the "attempts to shift the dominant ways in which the relations between Western and non-Western people and their worlds are viewed". In other words, "it means turning the world upside down…looking from the other side of the photograph, experiencing how differently things look when you live in Baghdad or Benin Republic rather than Berlin or Boston, and understanding why."[418] In this context, Young argues that the perception of Western countries of non-Western people reflects themselves as well. He states that the opportunity available to see post-colonialism is as an avenue to branch out, since it offers them the possible means of seeing things differently.

Rukundwa, van Aarde editors of *The Formation of Postcolonial Theory* argued that postcolonial theory was built from the colonial experiences of people who engaged in liberation struggles around the world. The editors claim that it bears witness to constant cultural forces for representation. It allows people emerging from socio-political and economic domination to reclaim their negotiating space for equity. In a dislocated culture, postcolonial theory does not declare war on the past, but challenges the consequences of the past that are unfair.[419] Postcolonial writers use their work to deconstruct the colonial legacy through postcolonial analysis and use their texts to rebuild postcolonial identity. Through

[417] Alexander Lewis, "*Postcolonial Literatures and the Ongoing Process of 'Writing Back*." *Journal of African Literature and Culture* (2006).
[418] Robert Young, *Postcolonialism: A Very Short Introduction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 2.
[419] Lazare S. Rukundwa and Andries G. van Aarde, "The formation of postcolonial theory." *Theological Studies* 63, no. 3 (2007).

their work, they address the assumptions and perceptions of colonialism held by Western countries.

Postcolonial theory emerged mainly from experiences of oppression and struggles for freedom from Africa, Asia and Latin America in the first half of the 20th century.[420] As a field of knowledge within the humanities, postcolonial studies expanded in the mid-1980s.[421] Post-colonialism not only emerged during the period of decolonisation; it also emerged as a way of engaging with the "textual", "historical", and "cultural articulations" of societies troubled and distorted by the historical truth of the legacy of colonialism.[422]

As Fred Dallmayr reminds us, Gandhi's critiques against colonialism and imperialism are well documented. Dallmayr points out that Gandhi's condemnation centred on the Indian experience in the hand of colonialists before achieving independence, which Gandhi described as "thorny." Gandhi's book, *Hind Swaraj,* narrated the Indian struggle for independence. His text not only galvanised Indian independence, but inspired generations of anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist nationalists across the globe, most especially in Africa.[423] In addition, Gandhi's works and influence helped to strengthen postcolonial theory literary analysis.

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[420] J. Daniel Elam, "Postcolonial Theory." *Oxford Bibliographies* (2019). https://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/documents/obo-9780190221911/obo-9780190221911-0069.xml.

[421] Filip DeBoeck, n.d. "The Last Post: Congo and Postcolonial Theory." *Institute for Anthropological Research in Africa* (IARA), Faculty of Social Science, Catholic University of Leuven. See also Sugirtharajah, *The Postcolonial Biblical Reader*, 7.

[422] Neil Lazurus, *The Cambridge Companion to Postcolonial Literary Studies,* ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 5. See Sugirtharajah, *The Postcolonial Biblical Reader*, 7. See also S. Abraham, "Achieving a Better Understanding of our Differences: Interreligious Cooperation in Nigeria." In A. Schwartz et al. *Religion and Interreligious Dialogue: The Role of Religion in German African Futures*. *JointMag* 19 (2011): 5.

[423] Fred Dallmayr, *Being in the World: Dialogue and Cosmopolis* (Kentucky: University Press of Kentucky, 2013), 53. Mohandas Gandhi's radical thought and his visions are articulated in his book Hind Swaraj. For instance, he addressed the issue of self-rule as a way of freeing India from British rule and replacing it with indigenous rule. But the problem is whether the people understand the implication or merely accept it as a change of one administration to another with the same character of colonial attitude. Gandhi was opposed to the way British rule imposed foreign values on the indigenous people, regardless of the effect it had on them.

It was in this context that Kenzo Mabiala argues that post-colonialism has moved further than the precincts of both history (as a temporal marker) and literature (as a substitute for Third World literature) to become a complete theory. He notes that postcolonial theory drew from the work of the French philosopher, Michel Foucault. He observes that Foucault's thoughts contributed to positioning postcolonial studies.[424]

In summary, as a literary theory it takes into cognisance the literature of colonised writers who make of the portrayal of colonised citizens their subject matter. It equally describes the identity of the colonised people and deals with the enormous task of building a broad identity following a negative experience and how the postcolonial thinkers write about and celebrate regaining their identity and maintaining strong connections with the colonisers. Through creative literature the postcolonial writers tell their own stories that discusses their cultural identity and denounce the changes that happened during colonisation and decolonisation.[425]

In Nigeria, for example, British colonial rule was one characterised by paranoia.[426] They introduced segregation, racism and religious superiority. The "binary" approach led to the rejection of indigenous culture and tradition because it did not support British core values. The British rejected the indigenous knowledge because they did not believe it would contribute anything to the attainment of the core principle of civilising the heathens. So, the

[424] M. Kenzo, www.amahoro-africa.org/files/what-is-postcolonialism.pdf

[425] Cheriet Asma, "Postcolonial African Literature and Identity Question – A Special Reference to Ngugi wa Thiong'o's Ideological Pronouncements." Memoirs submitted as a partial fulfilment for the magister degree. Department of Letters and Languages, Mohamed Khider University, Biskra, Algeria (2015). See Nasrullah Nasrullah Mambrol, "Postcolonial Novels and Novelists." *Literary Theory and Criticism* (2019). https://www.literariness.org/2019/03/08/postcolonial-novels-and-novelists/. Mambrol argues that geographically "postcolonial" is a global term. He contends that postcolonial studies are not limited by geography or time. Mambrol maintains that postcolonial treat a broad arrange of issues such as: "the functioning of different empires during the colonial period, varying administrative systems left as legacies to the former colonies, the specific conditions under which independence was gained in each case, cultural, economic, and linguistic imperialism that persists after independence, and the local concerns of education, government, citizenship, and identity."

[426] Steven Pierce contends that colonialism in Nigeria was characterised by divide-and-rule. He argues that the present situation in Nigeria was a result of British colonial policy. He said, "contemporary antagonisms between ethnic and religious groups all have roots in colonialism" (Pierce. "Pointing to Property: Colonialism and Knowledge About Land Tenure in Northern Nigeria." *Journal of the International African Institute* 83, no. 1 (2013): 142).

colonial power, the British, believed that by introducing British values and knowledge to the indigenous people, they were providing a selfless service for the people, which required the natives to appreciate and commend them. The British did not take into cognisance that they had destroyed the values and culture of other people through their imposition of alien values.[427]

When the British colonised Nigeria, they had the might of their armed forces and the support of their population. They also governed Nigeria by luring some of the natives to their side to support the system and policies. The British colonial power introduced three tools to aid them in installing British core values in the natives. These tools were the propagation of Christianity, establishing the British Curriculum, and the English Language.[428] The natives who embraced this system were rewarded and those who rejected it were disadvantaged. Through this system of "divide and rule", the British sowed seeds of discord among the people. The people (i.e., natives) were unable to band together to fight the colonial rule, as some of their brothers and sisters were on the side of the British.[429]

W.B. Yeats illustrated this in "The Second Coming," cited by Chinua Achebe in his canonical novel, *Things Fall Apart*:

"Turning and turning in the widening gyre.

The falcon cannot hear the falconer.

Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold…"[430]

[427] Michael James, *A Postmodern and Postcolonial Analysis of Nigerian Literature*. Thesis Submitted in Partial fulfilment of the requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts, Integrated Studies, Alberts (2010):7-8.
[428] Ibid.
[429] Ibid.
[430] Achebe, *Things Fall Apart* (New York: William Heinemann Ltd, 1958).

Due to the division among the natives, it became very easy for the British to introduce their indirect system and divide-and-rule tactics.[431] Chinua Achebe's use of Umuofia as a village setting corresponds to Yeats' memory of a precolonial, "mythological" Ireland of "heroes" and "heroines". On a different level, the binary or hybrid identity was exactly what the postcolonial condition brought into life formation.[432]

African studies, together with other academic field examines development in Africa and associated with decolonisation and the struggle against Western dominance, helped to de-emphasise and remove the "modernist mentalities" and "methodology". Africa witnessed the destruction of their land by the Europeans. In response, African writers channelled their energy and talent - into the deconstruction of Western supremacy based on "political, economic, epistemic and paradigmatic" factors.[433] The most important social and intellectual aim of African writers was to overturn the colonial legacies in Africa and to replace it with a more humane African culture.

3.4 Why Post-Colonial Theory?

Every culture is unique, same as Nigerian culture. The colonial powers came, tagged African culture as being primitive and immoral, forcibly intimidated the people, and

[431] The British officers introduced indirect rule - meaning different rule to different major ethnic groups in Nigeria: East, West, and North. According to Osaghae and Suberu, the British colonial power pursued a "divide-and-rule system that entrenched systems of ethnic segregation and polarisation." The authors contested that the system they created fostered disunity and imbalance in recruitment into the army and the police force. For instance, the colonial officers excluded the Christians and Southerners from interacting with the Muslims of the core north and instead created "strangers' quarters" which became the fatal legacy inherited from British colonial legacy in Nigeria (Osaghae and Suberu, 2005, 27). A.F. Usman stated that Sabon gari in Northern Nigeria was founded by the colonial state in the early part of the 20th century. He stated that Sabon gari dates to 1913 (A.F. Usman, "Implications of Colonial Settlements on Inter Ethnic Relations: Case Study of Sabon Gari Kano." *International Journal of Humanities and Social Science* 5, no. 10, October 2015): 164. Anthony I. Nwabughuogu, however, contends that until 1900 when the indirect rule became the method of administration in Nigeria, British administrative policy was pragmatic. British administrators used educated Africans as local agents in dealing with the indigenous people. He noted that by 1900, the educated Africans were relegated to the background and replaced by the "native chiefs" who became the major local agents of colonial rule until the 1940s (Anthony I. Nwabughuogu, "The Role of Propaganda in the Development of Indirect Rule in Nigeria, 1890-1929." *The International Journal of African Historical Studies* 14, no. 1, 1981): 69.

[432] E.P. Barry, *Postcolonial Criticism* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1995), 195.

[433] Zeleza, "The Trouble Encounter Between Postcolonialism and African History," 98-99.

imposed their own culture and traditions. They selected a few Africans, indoctrinated them and armed them against their own people. Through their divide-and-rule policies, the colonial powers pitted the people against one another through brainwashing and by bribery. Again, who embraced the imported culture were rewarded with white-collar jobs and those who refused were punished or killed. The imposition of the alien culture became a source of conflict in the post-colonial state. The people were faced with either replacing this borrowed culture with their own or continuing to live with the foreign culture. However, many African people want the restoration of their own culture – for them it serves as a moral right, so as to restore their self-confidence.

Having considered a different number of theories, I opted to apply postcolonial theory. The main reason for my preference is that post-colonialism brings home the fact that no person(s), individual(s) or group(s) have the exclusive knowledge to appropriate themselves as being more important than indigenous people. The legacy left for Africa by the imposition of the colonial power's cultural, political and economic system is one of intra and inter-ethnic conflict and hatred among ethnic groups.

3.5 Why is this relevant to Nigeria?

Postcolonial theory is relevant to Nigeria as a nation state because it helps people to rediscover their cherished identity, voice, culture and self-esteem, all of which were taken away from them by the colonial power, Britain. Through post-colonialism, Nigerian postcolonial literature brought to the world's attention the indigenous identity and culture which the British colonial power had destroyed, seeing it contemptuously as primitive, immoral and ungodly. Postcolonial literature brought to the knowledge of the world community the people of Nigeria had a culture, identity, language and religion on par with

Europeans. The portrayal of Nigerian culture as barbaric and primitive was a fictional creation by the British colonial power.

Furthermore, the Nigerian people, through their own written literature, wanted to tell their own stories as to how it is and how it should be. The writers wanted the Western world to stop thinking itself superior, and more civilised than the rest of the world. Through their work, the postcolonial writers aimed at reshaping the indigenous people's way of thinking and to reassure them that they should have confidence in their culture and tradition.

3.6 Criticism of Post-colonialism

Some scholars see postcolonialism as no longer relevant and called for trans-nationalism.[434] E.P Barry asserts that post-colonial criticism emerges in the 1990s by underming the timeless significance of literature produced by liberal humanist critics. Barry argued, "If we claim that great literature has a timeless and universal significance we thereby demote or disregard cultural, social, regional, and national differences in experience

[434] Encyclopaedia.com defines transnationalism as the "movement of ideas, people, and capital across national borders in the modern global era." The term emerged and became popular in the 1990s especially in academic circles, as a means to explain and theorise the intercontinental displacements, economic relations, cultural forms, identities, and communities that characterise the contemporary epoch. As a theory, its emergence goes hand in hand with the philosophy of globalisation and the technologies, processes, and networks that construct an increasingly interdependent and connected world. Transnationalism indicates various kinds of analytical lenses that emphasise the connections and flows between different nation-states, territories, and regions in the world. According to International Organisation for Migration, transnationalism constructs a greater degree of connection between individuals, communities and societies across borders, bringing about transformation in the social, cultural, economic and political landscapes of societies of origin and destination. The challenge for policymakers is to see beyond national borders in analysing the scope, purpose and impact of their policies. Cross-border connections between societies resulting from migration necessitate the formulation and implementation of appropriate policy interventions by states. The reason for this, firstly, is that migration policies in a transnational context are likely to produce an impact outside the domestic sphere for which they are primarily intended. Secondly, the success or failure of those same policies will also be determined, to varying extents, by realities that lie beyond a single country's border. A transnational perspective on migration is increasingly relevant due to the forces of globalisation and their effect on mobility. It is now easier than before to connect two or more nations across national boundaries. This is due to improvements in communication, transport, trade and information networks through globalisation. As a consequence of these transformations, migrants may receive education, work and raise children in another country. Every migrant can be an agent as well as a subject of transnationalism, engaging in transnational activities and practices to a greater or lesser degree (Encyclopaedia, "Transnationalism." *Encyclopedia.com*, December 3, 2019, https://www.encyclopedia.com/social-sciences/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/maps/transnationalism; IOM, "Migration and Transnationalism: Opportunities and Challenges." International Organisation for Migration, March 2010, 1-2). See Edward Powell, "Postcolonial Theory, The Year's Work in Critical and Cultural Theory." *Oxford Academic* 27, Issue 1 (2019): 43-44, 50-51.

and outlook, preferring instead to judge all literature by a single, supposedly 'Universal' standard." Barry noted that this universal claim by the "West" has been rejected by postcolonial criticism. He observed further that "whenever a universal signification was claimed for a work, then, white, Eurocentric norms and practices were being practiced by a sleight of hand to this elevated status, and all others correspondingly relegated to subsidiary, marginalised roles."[435]

According to Robert Young, postcolonial theory cannot be a theory in the scientific sense, because it does not follow the scientific method of inquiry that can predict a precise answer to a given set of phenomena. He noted that instead it preoccupies itself with other disciplines and activities. Consequently, postcolonial theory tries to "intervene, to force its alternative knowledge into power structures of the West as well as (the) non-West, so as to change the way people think, behave, to produce a more just and equitable relation between different peoples of the world." According to Young this methodological approach was rejected by some people, who believed that postcolonial approaches rearranged the universal order, and threatened "privilege" and supremacy.[436]

One of the cardinals aims of postcolonial theory is the demand of fairness, economic equality, and social justice for all. Many in the West believe this will destroy the spirit of capitalism and create socialism throughout the world. The present economic inequality between the First, Second, and Third nations has widened the gulf between the developing countries and the developed. For instance, Africa was forcefully ushered into the capitalist economy, which loosened Africa's economic system, based on the "Ujamaa"[437] model.

[435] E. P. Barry, *Postcolonial Criticism* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1995),193.
[436] Young, *Postcolonialism: A Very Short Introduction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 6-7.
[437] "Ujamaa" is the Swahili word for "family-hood". It was developed by the former President of Tanzania, Julius Kambarage Nyerere (1964-1985). Ujamaa is centred on collective agriculture, under the system called "villagisation" – the system called for the nationalisation of banks and industries, and an increased level of self-reliance at both an individual and a national level. However, the system collapsed because of inherent anomalies

Walter Rodney, in his epic book *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*, argued that the African developmental crisis should be blamed on Western economic policies. He says, "African society was developing independently until they were taken over directly or indirectly by the capitalist powers,"[438] Africa has been struggling economically, politically, developmentally and found it difficult to compete with the rest of the world and has become a beggar continent to the IMF and the World Bank. Walter Rodney further emphasised that, "African development is possible only based on a radical break from the International Capitalist grip which is the backbone of the underdevelopment of Africa."[439]

The African nations continue to experience economic hardship, debt burden, high migration to Europe and underdevelopment; the same issues Walter Rodney highlights in his epic work, *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*.[440] Also, Frederick Coopper echoes the same sentiment in his seminal work, *Africa Since 1940: The Past of the Present*.[441] In addition to economic and political uncertainties in sub-Saharan Africa, there is new form of slavery thriving on African soil. In Libya, tens of thousands of optimistic sub-Saharan African migrants are locked up in unsanitary rooms as they try to board few rickety boats across the hazardous Mediterranean Sea to the promise-land of Europe. Sadly, many of them who dreamed of good life in Europe saw their dreams turned to nightmares. Some ended up in the hands of unscrupulous men who abuse, rape and maim them. The most shocking of it

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and contradictions in the capitalist system, coupled with despotism, and the corruption of the government of Nyerere. Boddy-Evans, Alistair, "What was Ujamaa? Nyerere's Social and Economic policy in Tanzania." https://www.africahistory.about.com/od/Tanzania/a/What-Was-Ujamaa.htm. See Alistair Boddy-Evans, "What was Ujamaa and How Did It Affect Tanzania? Nyerere's Social and Economic Policy in 1960s and 1970s Tanzania," (2019). https://www.thoughtco.com/what-was-ujamaa-44589.

[438] Walter Rodney, *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa* (Cape Town: Pambazuka Press, an imprint of Fahamu, 1973, 2012).

[439] Ibid.

[440] Ibid.

[441] Frederick Cooper, *Africa Since 1940: The Past of the* Present (New York: NY Cambridge University Press, 2019).

all was the slave auction that took place in 2017 on African soil in Libya, with bid and counterbids of Africans at a bargain price of $1,200 to $400 per person.[442]

According to Anthony Chennells, the people of Africa and Asia were assigned roles and given meanings in Western scholarship and post-colonialists were in part anxious as to the cost of those roles and meanings. Chennells noted that:

> The dominant discourse of an empire, which is the metropolitan discourse, has the capacity to create its own realities. Whether or not what was claimed to be real simply served some purpose for the West's sense of its own identity, the West wrote and indeed ruled as though these constructions constituted the African reality with which colonialism must engage.[443]

The West's construction of Africa and assigning of meanings to it according to Western tradition and standard are wrong. Looking at Africa through the lens of a Western angle will invariably result in a misjudgement of the people. It was this stereotyping and prejudice that prompted African literature to question the manners and ways in which the Western empires constructed the people and made it look as though Africans were what they claimed they were – uncivilised and barbaric.[444]

Rukundwa, van Aarde the editors of *The Formation of Postcolonial Theory* argued that postcolonial theory places too much emphasis on postmodernism and post-structuralism and tends to dwell on cultural gaps as well as the social inequality, distortion and brutality that were meted out to the African people by the European empire. Others believed that post-

[442] *New African Magazine,* "The Shame of Africa's New Slave Trade." *New African Magazine* (London), February 2018, Issue 580 (London).
[443] Anthony Chennells, "Essential Diversity: Post-Colonial Theory and African Literature." *Sbornik Praci Filozoficke Fakulty Brnenske University – Brno Studies in English* 25 (1999): 112.
[444] Ibid.

colonialism lacked clarity, was ambiguous, ironic, superstitious with a lack of consensus about it.[445]

Sugirtharajah wondered why postcolonial studies dwelled on "too much theory-chasing and too much enchantment". Instead of placing too much emphasis on theorising, it should rather concentrate on detecting repression, exposing distortion, preaching social justice and advancing a fairer world.[446]

In defence of postcolonial theory, Wole Soyinka, the Nobel Laureate in literature, referred to the African experience at the hands of European powers as the "burden of memories." He notes that the African colonial trauma and experience coupled with the barbarities of the Atlantic slave trade and colonialism, not to forget the postcolonial tyranny, were too much to forget.[447]

In the same vein, Paul Tiyambe Zeleza argued that he is critical of postcolonialism because it recentres colonialism in African history and has a propensity to void this history of movement and meaning outside the colonial moment. Zeleza contends that "postcolonialism does not provide us with the methodological or theoretical tools to explore African history, the longest in the world, before the colonial interlude."[448]

Sugirtharajah's observation, however, true not only for the colonised but for the coloniser. He emphasises that as much as the West wanted the issue brushed aside, he believes will not be an issue that can be "airbrushed" out of the history book because it did not sound good or interesting to the West. He wonders, "If history books rhapsodise

[445] Rukundwa and van Aarde, "The formation of postcolonial theory."
[446] Sugirtharajah, *The Postcolonial Biblical Reader*, 27.
[447] Soyinka, *Burden of Memory, The Muse of Forgiveness* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999). Also see Zeleza, "*The Trouble Encounter Between Postcolonialism and African History*," 119.
[448] Paul Tiyambe Zeleza, "The Trouble Encounter Between Postcolonialism and African History." *Journal of the Canadian Historical Association* 17, no. 2 (2006): 120.

Victorian achievements, then it would be reasonable also to recount colonial genocides which resulted in the killings of 60 million Asians, Latin Americans, and Africans."[449]

Achille Mbembe, furthermore, questions the Western assumptions of Africa as postulated and proclaimed by Western scholars, and branding them as misleading and inaccurate. He remarks that "contemporary European thinkers, as with its historical antecedents in Hegel and elsewhere in modern philosophy, continued to position Africa as the repository for the bestial and the negative, via the trope of the animal."[450] He labels this ridiculous. Before the coming of the Europeans, various ethnic groups across African political systems, according to J. Cameron Monroe, are entrenched in "kin-based power transformed into centralised bureaucratic states." Monroe noted that states across Africa were identified by the "intensification of social hierarchy, territorial expansion and integration, economic specialisation, control over labour, long distance exchange, and the promulgation of state ideologies."[451] Monroe noted that the basic unit in Akan social political structure is the matrilineal clan or *abusua*. The *abusua* observes collective responsibility, owns land in common and participates as a group in religious ritual.[452]

In addition, Axel Harneit-Sievers describes Igbo society as prototypically as 'stateless,' 'acephalous,' or 'segmentary.' It consists of independent villages and age groups ruled by 'diffused' authority without formalised, permanent, or hereditary kings.[453] Again, there were different grades, comprised of *Ozo* titleholders (elders with the highest title), *Umuada*

[449] Sugirtharajah, *The Postcolonial Biblical Reader*, 25.
[450] Mabiala Robert Kenzo, n.d. (www.amahoro-africa.org/files/what-is-postcolonialism.pdf. Kenzo is Professor of Systematic Theology at Ambrose Seminary. His current research includes Philosophical Hermeneutics, Postmodernism, Postcolonialism and Christology. His recent publication is The Dialectic of Creativity and Innovation.
[451] J. Cameron Monroe, "Power and Agency in Postcolonial African States." *Annual Review of Anthropology* 42 (2013): 21.
[452] Ibid., 70.
[453] Axel Harneit-Sievers, "Igbo 'Traditional Rulers': Chieftaincy and the State in Southeastern Nigeria." *African Spectrum* 33, no. 1 (1998): 59.

(i.e., women married outside the kindred), *Ndi-Okpara* (i.e., adult male, usually the first son in the family), *Umuokorobia* and *Umuagbobia* (youths – both girls and boys). These groups played an important part in the political, economic and social progress of the community. They were part and parcel of the community and their roles were important in the peace and unity of the community.

Paul Zeleza suggests that the challenge before the continent as they embarked on the ideological grilling of the texts, images and discourse laid emphasis on how to: "Re-centre African history by deepening and globalizing it in its temporal scope and spatial scale, taking seriously the place of Africa in world history or what some called ecumenical world history… Lest we forget, Africa has always been central, and will remain so, to its peoples and to humanity, whose cradle this ancient continent is, and where much of its history on this remarkable planet resides."[454]

[454] Zeleza, "The Troubled Encounter Between Postcolonialism and African History," 129.

Chapter 4: The Postcolonial Discourse: An Overview of Frantz Fanon

4.1 Overview of Postcolonial Thought

After a further overview of postcolonial discourse, this chapter focuses on Frantz Fanon. Postcolonial thinkers raised concern about the continuing effect of the colonial legacy in Latin America, Asia, and Africa where the political, economic, and socio-cultural direction of the people were determined by the imperial powers. The imperial powers designed the system to cater to the needs of the Western hemisphere rather than that of the developing nations. The postcolonial school of thought that emerged was articulated by four key theoreticians – Edward Said in *Orientalism* (1978), Homi Bhabha in *The Location of Culture* (1990), Gayatri Spivak in "*Can the Subaltern Speak*?" (1988), and Frantz Fanon in *Black Skin, White Masks* (1952), and *The Wretched of the Earth* (1961).

Through their iconic works, the field of postcolonial literature was brought to the forefront of the international arena, which cemented the position of postcolonial discourse as an academic inquiry. They were of the opinion that the people should be allowed to tell their own stories as they are and how they should be, rather than the outsiders constructing stories and images of the continents that are distorted and full of misinformation. They advised us to instead assert our cultural identity and pride in ourselves, and though it will take time, it is a task that in the long run will place this cultural and linguistic heritage in its proper worldview.

The common idea of engaging in postcolonial criticism is to open a space where the lingering effects of colonialism can be tackled. It is not an issue of restoring pre-colonial cultures, but rather "invokes ideas of social justice, emancipation and democracy in order

to oppose oppressive structures of racism, discrimination and exploitation."[455] Thinkers, like Edward Said through their works, began to force academics in the Western world to "re-think the relationship between the Occident and Orient."[456] The postcolonial critics' works became the subject of debate between "colonial discourse theory"[457] as seen in the literary works of Edward Said[458], Gyatri Chakravorty Spivak,[459] Homi Bhabha,[460] and for our discussion, Franz Fanon.[461]

Kehinde Ayobami argues that the horrible era of colonialism in Africa altered the people's language, education, religion, artistic feelings, and prevalent culture. African postcolonial texts have hence become authentic tools to deconstruct the supremacy thesis and the causes that fashion the uneven relationship of power, constructed on "binary" antagonisms such as "Us" and "Them," "First World" and "Third World," "White" and "Black," "Coloniser" and "Colonised." It is thus right to say that the main interest of most postcolonial African writers is to reclaim the culture of their people that colonialism has

[455] Pramod, K. Nayar, *Postcolonialism A Guide for the Perplexed* (London: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2010), 4.
[456] Ashcroft, Griffiths, and Tiffin, *The Post-Colonial Studies Reader*, 10.
[457] Colonial discourse theory is defined by Pramod K. Nayar as "…the construction of the native, usually in stereotypical ways in European narratives, images and representations in a variety of modes and genres such as the arts, literature, the law, science, writing and administrative reports. The native is constructed as primitive, depraved, pagan, criminal, immoral, vulnerable and effeminate in colonial discourse." He further states that such a discourse then "constructs a reality where future European administrators would not only see the native through the lens of this discourse, but also enact policies or initiate political-administrative measures because they believe in the truth – claims of the discourse. Therefore, discourse becomes, in other words, the mode of perceiving judging and acting upon the non-Europeans [Nayar, *Postcolonialism: A Guide for the Perplexed*, 2]. For Homi Bhabha, "The construction of colonial discourse is then a complex articulation of the tropes of fetishism – metaphor and metonymy – and the forms of narcissistic and aggressive identification available to the Imaginary." He goes on to add that "stereotypical racial discourse is a four-term strategy. There is a tie-up between the metaphoric or masking function of the fetish and the narcissistic object-choice and an opposing alliance between the metonymic figuring of lack and the aggressive phase of the imaginary." The four-term strategy Bhabha talks about is the stereotypes in colonial discourse, the problem of discrimination as a political effect of such discourse, and it is important as it relates to the issues of 'race' and 'skin'. He believes that the colonial discourse paints natives in a bad light and presents them in a caricature form but with the arguments that the natives accept the Western prescriptions of value and knowledge [Homi K. Bhabha, *The Location of Culture*. New York: Routledge, 1994,110-111].
[458] Edward Said, *Orientalism* (London: Penguin Group, 1978).
[459] Gyatri Chakravorty Spivak, "Can the Subaltern Speak?" In Rosalind C. Morris (ed.) *Reflections on the History of Idea: Can the Subaltern Speak*? (Columbia University Press, New York, 2010).
[460] Homi Bhabha, *The Location of Culture* (Routledge, London, 1994).
[461] Ashcroft, Griffiths, and Tiffin, *The Post-Colonial Studies Reader*, 10.

destroyed. Ayobami further argues that African writers' critique colonial depictions of the African culture and her people. Rising in part from the past of effective opposition to colonialism, the African texts have been "crossing boundaries and assaulting walls imposed by history upon the continent whose aspirations it has been striving to articulate."[462] Most African writers react to the necessity and irrevocability of this historic objective and want to "put the record straight and illuminate the threshold between past and present, thought and action, self and other, and Africa and the world."[463]

Postcolonial thinkers like Fanon question the role of the western literary canon and western narratives as a prevailing and acceptable form of knowledge. As John Marx noted:

First, postcolonial writing is held to repudiate the cannon. Accordingly, readers have become well practiced in treating work from Europe's former colonies as the antithesis of canonical writing and as an instrumental component in efforts to recover oral and print traditions that imperialism threatened to obliterate. Second, postcolonial literature has been shown to revise canonical texts and concepts. Readers have learned to approach postcolonial literature as a critique of Western tradition involving the rewriting of specific works (*The Tempest*[464] and *Heart of Darkness*[465], for instance) and the appropriation of entire genres (the *Bildungsroman*, example, or the domestic romance).[466]

Marx further stated, "whether valued for its difference from the canon or for its reconstruction of canonical texts and concepts, postcolonial writing may also be credited

[462] Kehinde Ayobami, "Postcolonial African Literature as Counter-discourse: J.M. Coetzee's Foe and the Reworking of the Canon." *Ufahamu: A Journal of African Studies* 32, no.3 (2006): 94.
[463] Ibid.
[464] Wordsworth Editions, *The Tempest*. In *The Complete Works of William Shakespeare*. (Hertfordshire: Wordsworth Editions Limited, 1996).
[465] Joseph Conrad, *Heart of Darkness and other Stories*. (Hertfordshire: Wordsworth Editions Limited, 1995).
[466] John Marx, "Postcolonial Literature and the Western Literary Canon." In *The Cambridge to Postcolonial Literary Studies*, ed. Neil Lazarus (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 83.

with fundamentally altering how literature in general is thought of and how it is taught."[467] He further points out that it is not hard to pinpoint texts that distinguish themselves from the Western canon and their acceptance of its methods. For instance, Marx observed how Chinua Achebe's *Arrow of God*, embodies both connections. Achebe's style was based on Igbo storytelling. He told the story of complex political, economic, and social struggles within and among the six villages of Umuaro. It was a text that represent the voice and the culture of the people that colonialism tried to eliminate.[468]

Looking at Said, Spivak, Bhabha, and Fanon, we can note Said is concerned with the Western stereotyping of the Orient. He is a humanistic and social critic whose works strengthen the importance of how human history creates further discourses. Spivak's essay questions the notion of the colonial (and Western) "subject." She contends that Western intellectuals have assumed that they know the "other" and can place it in the context of the narrative of the persecuted.[469] Spivak questions whether the subaltern can speak for themselves, or whether they are condemned only to be known, represented, and spoken for themselves in a distorted fashion by others, particularly by those who exploited them.[470] Spivak represents the voices of the marginalised women whose voice were suppressed by chauvinistic males. Homi Bhabha, in contrast to Said and Fanon, does not believe in the binary relations between colonisers and colonised. One of Bhabha's main interests is how cultures connect or disconnect, to either become a greater culture, or to distance themselves from each other. Therefore, Bhabha brings postcolonial perspectives of exclusion into the study, and in collaboration with the other theorists, produces a broad, but different

[467] Ibid.
[468] Marx, "Postcolonial Literature and the Western Literary Canon," 83.
[469] J. Maggio, "Can the Subaltern Be Heard?": Political Theory, Translation, Representation, and Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak." *Alternative: Global, Local, Political* 32, no. 4 (October – December 2007):419-20.
[470] Bart Moore-Gilbert, "Spivak and Bhabha," In *A Companion to Postcolonial Studies*, ed. Henry Schwartz and Sangeeta Ray (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2000), 452.

theoretical field.[471] Frantz Fanon represents a militant view and an anti-colonial way of thinking. As will be discussed, he has a background in the field of psychology, which helps us to understand the phases of decolonisation and the stereotyping of the black man.[472] Fanon's work echoes or critiques colonialism and brought about a radical approach to anti-colonial sentiments.

Like Said, Spivak, and Fanon acused the western elite of complicity and assuming to know better than the indigenous people without regard to their culture, identity, language and religion. Most of the inherited institutions were imposed on the people and they still exist until today. These inherited structures have posed problems to both peace and coexistence as there is mutual suspicion between the majority Muslims and non-Muslims over marginalisation and political patronage. For instance, in Northern Nigeria, the Sokoto Caliphate occupied an important position in the sensibility of the Muslims. The people are proud of its history and tradition with a strong political and economic structure. Hence the refusal to surrender to British rule led to Sultan Muhammadu Attahiru I's death. He was the twelfth Caliph of Sokoto and the Sarkin Musulumi. He was against British imposition of alien rule which he believed disorganised the peace and unity they enjoyed in the region. The Sultan of Sokoto ruled in conjunction with other autonomous emirates each with its own emir and the centralised system of administration. The Sultan of Sokoto doubled as both political and spiritual leader. The Sokoto empire witnessed economic prosperity, political stability, trade and peaceful co-exitence with non-Muslims. Prior to British colonial rule, Southern Nigeria was a protectorate with Lagos as a colony. By 1900 the British extended its control northward and proclaimed it a protectorate. Frederick Luguard, the High

[471] Ibid.
[472] Esben Als-Andersson, Laura Virginia Castillo Figueroa, Maja-Cæcilie Friis Glavind, Anna Johanne Duelund Hansen, Maria Birk Nielsen, Xander Calasahan Pallesen and Luna Holst Pedersen, "Postcolonial identity in Nigeria." (*International Basic Studies in Humanities*, 2014): 8.

Commissioner of Northern Nigeria, forced the emirs to accept colonial rule. Some agreed to colonial rule while some refused, though at that time, the Sokoto empire had been weakened because of internal and external factors, especially the end of the once profitable Atlantic slave trade. However, those who refused to accept the British rule were defeated by force from Bida in 1901 and Sokoto in 1906. This act by Great Britain created a crisis of confidence, division and suspicion among the people.

These theorists come from different cultures. They have a critical approach towards postcolonial effects, and accordingly take different positions. But their contributions enable us to a better understanding of postcolonialism and allow us to comprehend the different approaches toward culture and identity.[473] This chapter as noted, focus on Fanon's impact on colonialism and colonialism's impacts on the colonised people. I will focus on Fanon because:

First, Fanon was critical of the institutions of colonialism but was also a critic of postcolonial governments in Africa which failed to live up to expectation and achieve political and economic freedom from the colonial legacy and create a national consciousness for the indigenous people.

Second, Fanon was a theorist who imagined a future rooted in a humanist practice that itself depended on the highest anticolonial and revolutionary ideals.

Third, Fanon was a revolutionary who saw the possibilities for a new kind of humanism and worked for a more just and progressive social and political order.

Fourth, Fanon's political legacy for Africa draws on his long history, and with a firm voice, he focuses on the treachery of postcolonial African leaders who collided with Western

[473]Ibid.

imperialism and neo-colonialism to rob their people of democratic ingredients rather than pursue more independent paths towards full liberation for African states.

Fifth, Fanon's thoughts compelled Africans to take a stand on socio-economic and political issues that define us.

Sixth, Fanon was adamant in advocating those intellectuals and leaders who put their skills to use in the benefit of the people rather than for the leaders' selfishness and aggrandisement.

Seventh, Fanon was incisive and accurate in his observations and writings regarding the colonial system and its destabilising effects on the culture and identity of the people.[474]

4.2 Biography of Frantz Fanon

Frantz Fanon was born on 20th July 1925 in the island of Martinique of an upper middle-class black father and a mixed-race mother. He died in 1961.[475] Following his study of psychiatry in France, he worked for a short period in colonial Algeria where he enlisted in the Algerian freedom fighters in their revolt against French colonialism. Fanon was a psychiatrist, social philosopher, journalist, diplomat, and political activist. His books deal with national liberation, social reconstruction, and self-reconstitution. Fanon's persuasive justification of violence by indigenous peoples in the battle for national liberation galvanised African nationalists. Fanon's argument includes a psychological strand suggesting that violence would result in a "collective catharsis" that would free the persecuted from their inferiority complexes and humiliation. The arguments that followed on violence

[474] Daynali Flores-Rodriguez, and Joseph Jordan, "Introduction: The Continuing Relevance of Fanon Thought: Remembering the Life and Work of Frantz Fanon." The Black Scholar 42, no. 3-4 (2012): 3-7.
[475] Adam, M. Hussein, "Frantz Fanon as a Democratic Theorist." *African Affairs* 92, no. 369 (October 1993): 499-518. See Emmanuel, Hansen, "Freedom and Revolution in the Thought of Frantz Fanon." *Africa Development* 2, no. 1 (1977): 17-41. See also Richard C. Keller, "Clinician and Revolutionary: Frantz Fanon, Biography, and the History of Colonial Medicine." *Bulletin of the History of Medicine* 81, no. 4 (Winter 2007): 823-841.

overshadowed Fanon's thoughts on several other significant strands such as democratising, development, promoting national cultures or facilitating the emancipation of women.[476]

Fanon was brought up in a society known for its strict social structure and social relations. Status depended mostly on colour. Like other Black families, Fanon's descended from slaves transported to the island in the 17th century. While free at the time of the French Revolution, the Martinicans were, though, controlled in all facets of social, political and economic life by the offspring of the slave masters who were the foremost property owners on the island. As in all colonialist territories, education created ready instruments for the system. Hence, in the island of Martinique, Black children were forced to learn French education and they were to absorb into French culture but remain of subservient status.[477]

According to Emmanuel Hansen, the French assimilation policy played a role in Fanon's life and thoughts; first, the demands of assimilation, strongly run by the school; second, the impact of Aimé Césaire, who was Fanon's teacher at the lycée and an advocate of the philosophy of the Negritude. However, for most middle class Martinicans at the time, this was a surprise. Consequently, while the impact of the family and the school were turning the young Fanon to the path of assimilation, Césaire's path was pushing him into the direction of self-sufficiency, in the direction of authentic self-expression. Thus, various factors shaped Fanon's thoughts and turned him into a political activist. Again, Fanon was dogged during much of his life by the pressures of assimilation and the necessity for self-rule, and the need to be his authentic self. Fanon exemplified within himself these two conflicting views.[478]

[476] Hussein, "Frantz Fanon as a Democratic Theorist."
[477] Hansen, "Freedom and Revolution in the Thought of Frantz Fanon." See Keller, "Clinician and Revolutionary: Frantz Fanon, Biography, and the History of Medicine," 826.
[478] Ibid., 18-19.

Fanon's education was interrupted by World War II. He joined the Allies to get rid of the Vichy regime. He also fought in North Africa with the Free France Forces. His involvement in the two wars had an adverse effect on his life. During the war, he suffered racial discrimination. To his chagrin while serving as a member of the French army, he observed that the French government has a different policy for Black French people despite the declamatory of "égalité, fraternité and liberté."[479] Equally Fanon was praised for his valour in the army and was decorated with the rank of a corporal while in the army. Paradoxically, the award of bravery he received was presented to him by Colonel Raoul Salan, who subsequently became the head of Organisation de I'Armee Secrete, a group of army officers that opposed the granting of self-government to Algeria and were ready to use force to stop Algiers from achieving independence.[480]

After the war Fanon went back to college in Lyon to study Medicine, with a speciality in psychiatry. According to Richard Keller, his qualification as a psychiatrist placed him in a privileged position and so in a "liminal" spot between coloniser and colonised. This position enabled him to comprehend what he later called the colonies' "Manichaean world" and the operation of social knowledge about race as a tool of marginalisation and depersonalisation."[481] According to Hansen, while at the college in Lyon, his teachers observed that Fanon has become "withdrawn, introspective and serious." Hansen believes the change in mood may be because of his experiences in the army and the war.[482]

However, while at medical school he read other books for inspiration, especially the works of existentialist philosophers such as Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger, and Karl Theodor Jaspers. Fanon equally read the works of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Karl

[479] Ibid., 19.
[480] Hansen, "Freedom and Revolution in the Thought of Frantz Fanon," 19.
[481] Keller, "Clinician and Revolutionary: Frantz Fanon, Biography, and the History of Medicine," 826-27.
[482] Hansen, "Freedom and Revolution in the Thought of Frantz Fanon," 19.

Marx, and Vladimir Lenin. He was deeply inspired by work of Jean Paul Sartre, particularly the *Critique de la Raison Dialectique*. By 1951 Fanon had completed his medical studies specializing in psychiatry. After his graduation, he returned to the Island of Martinique to do his residency under the tutelage of Professor François Tosquelles who was conducting research in sociotherapy. His job in Algeria and Tunisia clearly showed the influence of his involvement with Professor Tosquelles[483] that manifested and shaped his political activism.

While in Lyon, France in 1951, Fanon wrote his first book, *Black Skin, White Masks*, a piece on black identity as constructed in a cauldron of racism and its psychological strains on the colonised. Though some critics see this book as separate from his profession as a psychiatrist, Fanon disagreed. He saw it as a key component of his work. Fanon claimed that while in France practising as a psychiatrist, he was confronted with what he describes as "medical racism," which he noted in his 1952 piece, "The North African Syndrome."[484] Fanon describes a 'precursor' to what psychiatrists called "culture-bound syndromes," observing with consternation his tutors' persistent reference to an imprecise, theorised sickness that they saw as rife among North African immigrants, which was seen to be a make-believe disease of malingering symptoms rather than signs of a true ailment. Fanon argued instead that the illness was a bodily demonstration of psychological strains put on a marginalised populace.[485]

Fanon wrote *The Wretched of the Earth*, the work on which his fame rests, in Accra, Ghana in 1961.[486] Fanon analyses the social and political malaise of Africa and the Third World. He argues that there has not been an effective decolonisation in Africa because colonial economic, political, and social structures are still intact. What transpired at

[483] Ibid.
[484] Keller, "Clinician and Revolutionary: Frantz Fanon, Biography, and the History of Colonial Medicine," 827.
[485] Ibid.
[486] Edmund Burke III, "Frantz Fanon's *The Wretched of the Earth*." *Daedalus* 105, no. 1 (Winter 1976): 129.

independence was the "Africanisation" of colonialism. Fanon contended that there cannot be real decolonisation and freedom so long as the colonial structures are intact. Therefore, to achieve effective freedom, Fanon proposes revolutionary decolonisation, which will not only end the colonial structures but likewise free the colonised.[487]

Thomas K. Ranuga contends that Fanon was concerned and genuinely worried by one major legacy of colonialism and imperialism, "the paralyzing inferiority complex of blacks and their abject idolization of whites as their role models."[488] Fanon's works were steered primarily at stimulating the "physically and mentally" colonised people of the Third World to grow up and reclaim their self-respect, pride and liberty and hence take their lawful position as acceptable members of the World community. Fanon's main analytic emphasis was "the mind or consciousness as the repository of crippling fears and debilitating complexes."[489] Fanon contends that Blacks had to grasp that the apprehension of whites and the resultant inferiority complex were direct effects of racial superiority and socioeconomic power whites had gained during the colonial era.[490] The colonialists created a system that favoured them by erecting barriers that put fears and terror on the indigenous people. By so doing, the colonialists will continue to exploit the indigenous people and at the same justified their practices of denigrating the indigenous people as unfit for leadership. Hence, the colonialists continue to enjoy their privileged status.

Though most critics failed to comprehend Fanon's ideas of revolution based on "freedom for concrete human beings," Hansen notes that for Fanon "man and freedom are synonymous." Hansen contends that Fanon's revolutionary zeal was his appetite for human

[487] Hansen, "Freedom and Revolution in the Thought of Frantz Fanon," 19.
[488] Thomas K. Ranuga, "Frantz Fanon and Black Consciousness in Azania (South Africa)." *Phylon* 47, no. 3 (3rd Quarter 1986): 182-191.
[489] Ibid.
[490] Thomas K. Ranuga, "Frantz Fanon and Black Consciousness in Azania (South Africa)." *Phylon* 47, no. 3 (3rd Quarter 1986): 182-191.

dignity and was responsible for his defence for human dignity: "It was in the name of man that he rose against oppression; it was in the name of the man that he fought degradation; it was in the name of man that he affirmed the dignity of man."[491]

Hansen also contends that critics failed to grasp Fanon's calls for revolution as not an end, but a means to attain a more fundamental end of man, namely freedom. Fanon's life and thought are closely interlinked.[492]

Furthermore, the Algerian war of independence with France afforded Fanon the opportunity to conclude that colonialism was evil. His reasoning was because of both sides using torture as an instrument of war against their victims. He named the instruments used by the torturers as electricity.[493] He stated that on examination, he observed that the patients were suffering from:

1. Localized or generalized cenesthopathies which entails the patients to feel 'pins and needles' throughout their bodies; their hands seemed to be torn off, their heads seemed to be bursting, and their tongues felt as if they were being swallowed.

2. Apathy, aboulia, and a lack of interest – seven cases. These were patients who were inert, who could not make plans, who had no resources in living from day to day.

3. Electricity phobia. Fear of touching a switch, of turning on the radio, fear of the telephone. Completely impossible for the doctor to even mention the eventual possibility of electric shock treatment.[494]

[491] Hansen, "Freedom and Revolution in the Thought of Frantz Fanon," 17.
[492] Ibid., 17.
[493] Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, 228.
[494] Ibid.

Fanon was appalled by what he saw. He became disillusioned with the French approach to the civil war and in 1956 he resigned his post with the French government and promptly shifted his loyalty to the Algerian side and fought with them and joined the Algerian resistance group, *Front de Liberation Nationale* (FLN).[495] Fanon said:

> The white man was wrong, I was not a primitive, not even a half-man, I belonged to a race that had already been working in gold and silver two thousand years ago. And too there was something else, something else that the white man could not understand. Their customs were pleasing, built on unity, kindness, respect for age. Gentlemen, polite, considerate, unquestionably superior to those who tortured them – that collection of adventurers who slashed and violated and spat on Africa to make the stripping of her easier. The men they took away knew how to build houses, govern empires, erect cities, cultivate fields, mine for metal, weave cotton, forge steel. Their religion had its own beauty, based on mystical connections with the founder of the city.[496]

In this telling passage, Fanon underlines the serious damage colonialism did to African nations. He bemoans the distortion and misinformation written in some western literature that depicts Africa as uncivilised people. He points out that such impression was preposterous, and that he is proud of who he is. He also denounces the insinuation that Africans are lazy. He points out that before the advent of colonialism in Africa, Africans have been mining gold. He marshals out some of the serious consequences of colonialism in African soils such as erosion of family values, culture, identity, and religion. Fanon equally bemoans how the colonialists painted negative narratives of Africans as a pretence

[495] Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, 48.
[496] Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks (London: Pluto Press, 1952, 1967), 99.

to colonise her. He praises the Africans for their propriety, love, and respect for elderly and communal living which form bonds between the people and community.

Fanon laments how this harmonious bond among the people was disrupted by the imposition of foreign rule and institutions. It then manifested into the destruction of African brotherhood and communalism and fuels present-day internecine war and conflict. As we will see in the subsequent chapter on Chinua Achebe's *Things Fall Apart*, it was these large-scale fundamental changes that affected African society, though, colonial legacies impacted both positively and negatively on Africa.

Fanon was especially inspired by Aimé Césaire's essay, "Discourse on Colonialism" (1950), which Fanon quotes at the beginning of his book, *Black Skin, White Masks*. Fanon, in addition, cites significantly from Césaire's *Notebook of a Return to the Native Land* (1939), which looks at Césaire's relationship to Martinique and which is one of the most critical texts in the Négritude movement.[497] Césaire's book opposes the ideology of colonialism by advancing a language that rejects assimilation to prevailing cultural norms, with a language that teaches defiance and freedom.

Césaire's fervent criticism of colonial racism was a catalyst that changed the thinking of Fanon. Dramatic events in world history also altered Fanon's worldview. First, in the West at the start of the 20th century, Victorian social norms had given way to more progressive and new forms of behaviour, for example, it was an era characterised by "a class-based society, a growing number of people able to vote, and a growing state and economy."[498] This social shift is firmly related to the arrival of psychoanalysis, which arose in the 19th century and increased in popularity during the early 20th century. Pioneering psychoanalytic

[497] Seresin Indiana, "Black Skin, White Masks." LitCharts LLC, November 13, 2017. https://litcharts.com/lit/black-skin-white-masks.
[498] Susie Steinbach, "Victorian Era: Historical Period, United Kingdom." The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica, November 19, 2020. https://www.britannica.com/topic/sexuality.

theorists such as Sigmund Freud and Carl Jung stimulated people to think in a different way about subjects such as sex, the family, morality, and what constitutes "normal" behaviour, opening the way for authors like Fanon to use psychoanalytic theory to study broader social phenomena. The First and Second World Wars later caused global disruption. The enormous human suffering it produced, linked with advancement in science, led a lot of people to lose their religious faith and turn to methods such as psychoanalysis to analyse human behaviour as an alternative. These wars were equally important in weakening the European empires that had for so long been oppressing the colonialists through the practice of colonialism. Equally, France's occupation by the fascist Vichy regime brought the issues of racism and colonialism into focus, and in 1946, Martinique was officially made a "department" of France rather than a colony, giving Martinique a more independent status while still preserving an important level of economic and political dependence on France.[499]

Fanon's *Black Skin, White Masks* was written during an upsurge of anti-imperialist writing enthused by radical swings in global politics. Other key anti-racist and anti-colonial works from this era include W.E.B. Du Bois' *Black Reconstruction in America* (1935), C.L.R. James' *The Black Jacobins* (1938), and Albert Memmi's *The Colonizer and the Colonized* (1957).

Fanon's *Black Skin, White Masks* examines the psychological effects of colonial racism on the black people. He exposed the psychological damage caused by colonial rule and the consequences of colonialism on the psyches of colonised people. Again, Fanon is anxious about both the psychological and material (i.e., physical and economic) elements of colonialism. He begins the introduction of his subject matter in the book by asking two central issues that are crucial to understanding the world: "what does man want?" and what

[499] Fanon (1952), vii-viii.

does the black man want?"[500] He stresses that there are two camps: the white and the black. He states that "the black who wants to turn his race white is miserable as he who preaches hatred for the whites."[501] Fanon contends that the separation of these two investigations stress his claims that black people are omitted from the world of humanity, and equally suggests that there are key differences between the aspirations of White people and needs of black people.[502] He writes, "White men consider themselves superior to black men. Black men want to prove to white men, at all costs, the richness of their thought, the equal value of their intellect."[503] Fanon further argues that to comprehend racism, we must ask what "man" needs and what "the black man" needs. Fanon seeks to know the relationship between white and black people and contends that both groups are caught within their own racial identities. He contends that psychoanalysis is a valuable tool for knowing the black experience, and that, through study, it is feasible to "destroy" the immense psychological complex that has arisen because of colonialism. He stresses that it is hard to comprehend the true nature of black experience because white society has invented so many damaging myths about black people.[504] The remaining part of this chapter will focus on his two major works, *Black Skin, White Masks*, and *The Wretched of the Earth*.

4.3 Overview of Black Skin, White Masks

In the introduction of Fanon's *Black Skin, White Masks*, he points out the reasons why he wrote the book. He argues that for us to comprehend racism, we have to understand "color prejudice." He asks an important question: "Where am I to be classified? Or, if you prefer, tucked away?"[505] He writes:

[500] Fanon, *Black Skin, White Masks*, 1.
[501] Ibid., 3.
[502] Ibid., 1-3.
[503] Ibid., 2.
[504] Ibid.
[505] Fanon, *Black Skin, White Masks*, 85.

> When the black man comes into contact with the white world he goes through an experience of sensitization. His ego collapses. His self-esteem evaporates. He ceases to be a self-motivated person. The entire purpose of his behaviour is to emulate the white man, to become like him, and thus hope to be accepted as a man.[506]

It is this behaviour of a black man's inferiority complex that worries Fanon. He attributes it to colonialism. Again, Fanon wants to understand the relationship between black and white people, though Fanon believes that the two groups are imprisoned within their own racial identities. He points out psychoanalysis is an important instrument for comprehending the Black man's experience, that through the model it is likely to eradicate the massive psychological complex that has developed because of colonialism. He concludes the chapter by noting that it will be extremely hard to comprehend the real nature of a black man's experience due to the white worldview constructed with the negative narrative about the black man. He writes, "western history not only writes cannibalism in the very chromosomes of the non-West, but it also writes off the history of the non-West. History, both history of the West and history as perceived by the West, is transformed into the mighty river into which all other histories flow and merge as mere minor and irrelevant tributaries."[507] He lamented the erosion of black man's culture and denigration of her identity and histories as primitive and inconsequential. He concludes by stating that "One is white as one is rich, as one is beautiful, as one is intelligent."[508]

4.4 Colonial View of the Colonised

African countries came under colonial rule via the Berlin Conference of 1884 without consultation or invitation; the imperial powers partitioned the African states to their own

[506] Ibid., xiii.
[507] Fanon, *Black Skin, White Masks*, xv-xvi.
[508] Ibid.

commercial interest and subsequently subjected them to alien rule. The imperial powers imposed their cultures, values, education, language and religion that are different from the people of Africa. The people were exploited and abused. Those who ventured to challenge the imperial powers were imprisoned or assassinated for daring to ask for freedom and their lands. It took a bitter war of struggle and sometimes at the loss of lives by nationalists across African countries to free their countries from oppressive and draconian rule from imperial powers.

Olalekan Ishaq Balogun argues that the colonial rule not only destabilised the sociopolitical reality of the people, but also undermined indigenous cultural and religious values.[509] This can be seen in the rejection of colonial rule by Sultan Muhammadu Attahiru of the Sokoto Caliphate because of his suspicioons that colonial rule will destroy their cherished tradition and religion.[510]

Fanon summed up the consequences of colonial rule that "colonialism is not a thinking machine, not a body endowed with reasoning faculties. It is violence in its natural state, and it will only yield when confronted with greater violence."[511] This violence, as Fanon noted in his statement above, led to the dislocation of the existing sociopolitical structure through violence and its substitution by alien control through procedures that were at once deceitful and devastating in their effect. Colonial attitudes towards the indigenous natives were nothing but denigration of their identity, religion, tradition and values, an attitude that was carried over by the indigenous elite.[512]

[509] Olalekan Ishaq Balogun, "Theatre and Resistance in the Age of Colonial Imperialism: Ahmed Yerima's Attahiru and Ameh Oboni: The Great as Paradigm." In *Literature, History and Identity in Northern Nigeria*, ed. Ismaila A. Tsiga and M. O. Bhadmus (Ibadan: Safari Books Ltd, 2015), 73.
[510] Ibid., 76.
[511] Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, 48.
[512] Balogun, "Theatre and Resistance in the Age of Colonial Imperialism," 74.

Chinua Achebe said, "a man who does not know where the rain began to beat him cannot say where he dried his body."[513] He explains that the plight of Africans began from the discovery of Africa by European powers, first through the transatlantic slave trade and second the Berlin Conference of 1885 which led to the partition of the continent. Achebe said:

> That controversial gathering of the world's leading European powers precipitated what we now call the scramble of Africa, which created new boundaries that did violence to Africa's ancient societies and resulted in tension-prone modern state. It took place without African consultation or representation, to say the least.[514]

Achebe points out that the infamous "scramble" for Africa involved deep "cultural imperialism" and the unnecessary geo-political division of Africa which invariably destroyed African society.[515]

Fanon bemoans the superiority claims by the colonisers against the people. The imposition was done to denigrate and humiliate the people. He pointed out that the colonisers placed their history, culture, language, customs and beliefs as an acceptable civilisation above the indigenous culture and customs. Colonialism was a weapon employed by the colonisers to dehumanise the indigenous people as being a second-class and inferior people. As indigenous people assimilate these foreign ideas, it led to crises of confidence and identity, as well as alienation, as the native people were denied their voice and representation and forced to abandon their values and beliefs.[516]

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[513] Chinua Achebe, *There Was a Country: A Personal History of Biafra* (England: The Penguin Group, 2012), 1.
[514] Ibid.
[515] Ibid.
[516] Fanon, "The Fact of Blackness." In *The Post-Colonial Studies Reader*, Second Edition, Bill Ashcroft, Gareth Griffiths, and Helen Tiffin, ed. (London: Routledge, 1995), 291-93.

The imposition of colonial rule in Northern Nigeria had a devastating consequence for the socio-economic and political development of the region. The nationalists, traditional rulers, and freedom fighters rose to challenge the alien rule and the imposition of alien culture on the people,[517] as seen at the action of Sultan Attahiru when he rejected Fredrick Lugard's overtures to accept colonial rule. Great Britain prefered violence against the people instead of dialogue. Sultan Attahiru commented:

> I am becoming the caliph at a time when the history of our lives is at a delicate balance. At a time when the white man is determined to upset the peace of our lives. But it is too early to dare enemies, or to look for one. I shall await their moves. But let us pray to Allah's hand in the matter. Let us pray for peace. Let us pray for our children. Let us pray for the growth of our lives and position in the Islamic world.[518]

The above statement by Attahiru shows his fear and anxiety about the consequences of the alien rule. He believes that alien values will not only destroy the culture, religious practices and identity they chesrished most, but will create division and mistrust among the people. His fear manifested when the British colonial administrator Lugard swiftly installed Prince Muhammad al-Tahir Aliyu as the new sultan, a move meant to divide and undermine the age long harmony and the traditional institution.[519]

The colonial empires had groomed puppets and collaborators through the special privileges of education, language, and the indoctrination of their values, and so handed the baton to selected elites who introduced western ideologies and philosophies.[520] These western notions denigrated the local beliefs and practices. This was exemplified by the

[517] J.D. Ingange-wa-Ingange, "The African Human Rights System: Challenges and Prospects." Thesis subjected in accordance with the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Laws (LLD), in the Department of Constitutional, International and Indigenous Law, University of South Africa, 2010:8.
[518] Balogun, "Theatre and Resistance in the Age of Colonial Imperialism, 77.
[519] Ibid., 80.
[520] Olowonmi, 2008, 56.

enthronement of Prince Muhammad al-Tahir Aliyu because he collobrated with the colonial adminstrators to undermine the peaceful transfer of power in the emirate. Fanon analyses a crisis of leadership and failure of indigenous elite to enthrone popular policies that will benefit the people. Instead, the political elite introduced policies such as divide-and-rule to divide the people against themselves. The violence used by Great Britain continued to be employed by the political elite to quell simple disagreement which ordinarily would have been by dialogue. As noted above, Northern Nigeria is home to diverse culture and people. Beside the majority Hausa-Fulani population, there are other smaller 160 autonomous communities. But the colonisation of the region in the early 1900s divided into majority and minority,[521] indigenes and settlers. These divisions have led to suspicion and at the same time led to superiority claims of one religion over another. This disagreement has led to religious strife and violence by adherents of the two main religions.

4.5 Overview of Fanon's Black Skin, White Masks

In Chapter One, Fanon tells the story of black Antilleans who reside in France and become "whiter" by adapting into the colonial culture and language. Fanon states that when these Antilleans came back to their country, they regarded themselves as superior, which made them act in an arrogant way:

> The black man has two dimensions. One with his fellows, the other with the white man. A Negro behaves differently with a white man and with another Negro. That this self-division is a direct result of colonialist subjugation is beyond question…No one would dream of doubting that its major artery is fed from the heart of those various theories that have tried to prove that the Negro is a stage in the slow evolution of monkey into man.[522]

[521] Balogun, "Theatre and Resistance in the Age of Colonial Imperialism, 75.
[522] Ibid., 8.

Again, Fanon points out how blacks had to work hard to demonstrate their intelligence to whites, but Fanon bemoans this attitude as meaningless, claiming that intelligence or subservient attitude alone is not enough. He also gave an example of Senegalese regiments in the French army who serve as interpreters. Their responsibilities, Fanon noted was to convey their bosses' orders to their fellow black men. This made them so special, above their fellow black men.[523] Fanon summaries this attitude by blacks as a sign of an inferiority complex. He said:

> Every colonized people – in other words, every people in whose soul an inferiority complex has been created by the death and burial of its local cultural originality – find itself face to face with the language of the civilising nation; this is, with the culture of the mother country.[524]

In Chapter Two, Fanon tells a story of Martinican woman, Mayotte Capécia's autobiographical novel *Je suis Martiniquaise.* This is a story of a black woman fixated with marrying a white man even though she knows that white men will still see her as inferior to them. Capécia said, "I should have liked to be married, but to a white man. A woman of colour is never altogether respected in a white man's eyes. Even when he loves her. I knew that."[525] However, Fanon condemns such an act as "vast delusion, prods one's brain."[526] Fanon points out that in colonial culture, whiteness is linked to morality and splendour, and Martinican women like Mayotte have been made to believe that by association with whites she will regain her dignity and respect.[527]

[523] Ibid., 9.
[524] Fanon, *Black Skin, White Masks*, 9.
[525] Ibid., 29.
[526] Ibid.
[527] Ibid., 28-29.

Mayotte Capécia further states how she loves a white man to whom she submits in everything. To her the white man is "her lord." She also said she needs nothing from the man but just to be a bit of "whiteness in her life." She further said: "All I know is that he had a blue eye, blond hair, and a light skin, and that I love him."[528] Fanon links this attitude not only to an inferiority complex but to economic issues. She thinks by having a white man in her life it will open the world of opportunities to her. She is aware that being black limits her opportunities and traps her in a low social stratum. This is not what Mayotte wants in life. Fanon posits, "she is looked at with distaste. Things begin their usual course…it is because she is a woman of colour that she is not accepted in the society. Her resentment feeds on her own artificiality."[529] Fanon points out that there are many Mayottes who have been brainwashed that everything about being white is better. He frowns on the distortion and disinformation colonialism created in the minds of black men and women. For instance, Fanon describes Paul Morand's *Magie noire.* In this work, he paints a picture of a black man as primitive and not refined in character: "I do not like the Negro because he is savage. Not savage in a cannibal way but lacking in refinement."[530] Fanon describes such statements as an "abstract point of view."[531] But he argues that such statements feed into the gullible blacks and tempt them to abandon their culture and identity and cling to a White man's identity instead because they believe that by so doing, they will be accepted in the society.

Fanon suggests that a way out of this quagmire is to reclaim themselves and their identity by rejecting the colonial imposition and cultural imperialism. By doing so, it will help Nigerians as a people to pursue their new identity without losing touch of who they are,

[528] Ibid.
[529] Ibid., 29-30.
[530] Ibid., 41.
[531] Ibid.

especially as they navigate postcolonial statehood.[532] As noted, he began the process of psychoanalytic deconstruction which was inherent in colonialism.

In Chapter Three, Fanon talks about how the black man wants to sleep with a white woman. He employs René Maran's autobiographical novel *Je suis Martiniquaise* and *Nini*, a black Antillean called Jean Veneuse who lives in Bordeaux. He is confused on which sides of the divide he wants to belong. He is eager to prove himself to the white folks that he is ready to assimilate their culture and values. Though he is in love with a white woman, however, he has white friends who accepted him in their fold but with the condition he renounces his blackness. Fanon writes:

> Jean Veneuse believed in that culture and set himself to love this new world he had discovered for his own use. What a blunder he had made! Arriving at maturity and going off to serve his adopted country in the land of his ancestors was enough to make him wonder whether he was not being betrayed by everything about him, for the white race accepts him as one of its own and blacks virtually repudiated him.[533]

Jean cannot accomplish his dream of having a white woman without permission from the white folks. Since he is black, he does not fit into the same level with white people. He must go through psychological torture. As Fanon contends, "Andrée Marielle has written to him that she loves him, but Jean Veneuse needs authorization. It is essential that some white man say to him, "Take my sister."[534]

Fanon laments Jean's behaviour as one suffering from mental slavery. He wants to prove to others that he is a man, yet he could not understand his subjugation and his self-

[532] Fanon, "National Culture." In *The Post-Colonial Studies Reader*, Second Edition. Bill Ashcroft, Gareth Griffiths, and Helen Tiffin, ed. (London: Routledge, 2006), 191.
[533] Fanon, *White Skin, White Masks*, 48.
[534] Ibid., 49.

imprisonment. Fanon argues that Jean is suffering from abandonment which Germaine Guex describes as "putting oneself to the proof in order to prove something."[535] Fanon believes that Jean's anxiety is different from what a white person would experience. Fanon argues that the institutional structures erected by white people makes it impossible for a black man to achieve his dream, unless he dismantles those obstacles and construct his own world. Fanon concludes:

> In no way should my colour be regarded as a flaw. From the moment the Negro accepts the separation imposed by the Europeans he has no further respite, and "is it not understandable that thenceforward he will try to elevate himself to the white man's level? To elevate himself in the range of colours to which he attributes a kind of hierarchy?"[536]

In this way Fanon reminds the black man to be proud of his colour, race, and identity and not try to copy the white man or work hard only to see himself as a white man.

In Chapter Four, Fanon examines Octve Mannoni's book *Prospero and Caliban: Psychology of Colonisation*, its psychological impact and relations between the coloniser and the colonised. Fanon notes that despite Mannoni's book devoting 225 pages examining colonialism, Mannoni's analysis fails short of understanding the effect of colonialism on black people. Fanon contends, "the problem of colonialism includes not only the interrelations of objective historical conditions but also human attitudes toward these conditions."[537] Fanon disagrees with Mannoni that any inferiority complex of black was inherent, rather Fanon argues that it was because of colonialism. Fanon writes:

> In Martinique there are two hundred whites who consider themselves superior to 300,000 people of colour. In South Africa there are two million whites against almost thirteen

[535] Fanon, *Black Skin, White Masks*, 55.
[536] Ibid., 59-60.
[537] Ibid., 62.

million native people, and it never occurred to a single black to consider himself superior to a member of the white minority.[538]

Fanon contends that blacks are meant to feel inferior and to see the white as superior to them. Fanon argues the construction of the white world was at the heart of the black man's inferiority complex. He contends that the system was constructed to maintain the power structure of white superiority. He disagreed with Mannoni's assertions that European colonialism was not responsible for the black man's complex. Fanon rebukes Mannoni for exonerating the Europeans from the evil of colonialism. They created the monster. Fanon equally dismissed Mannoni's claims that the people of Malagasy did not feel any sense of identity prior to colonisation. Fanon argues how the colonial legacy destroyed the culture and values of the Malagasy people. Fanon calls it "dependency behaviour." The Malagasy people have no choice "save between inferiority and dependence."[539] Fanon writes:

> If he is a Malagasy, it is because the white man has come, and if at a certain stage he has been led to ask himself whether he is indeed a man, it is because his reality as a man has been challenged. In other words, I begin to suffer from not being a white man to the degree that the white man imposes discrimination on me, makes me a colonised native, robs me of all worth, all individuality, tells me that I am a parasite on the world, that I bring myself as quickly as possible into step with the white world, "that I am a brute beast, that my people and I are like a walking dung-heap that disgustingly fertilizes sweet sugar cane and silky cotton, that I have no use in the world."[540]

Fanon concludes that European colonisers were ignorant of the people's culture and have no idea how the people of Malagasy were structured or the institutions that operate there.

[538] Ibid., 68-9.
[539] Fanon, *Black Skin, White Masks*, 69.
[540] Ibid., 73.

Instead of studying the Malagasy's culture and religion, they imposed their will and rule. The consequence was destruction of the people's identity and value. Fanon warns that for the people of Malagasy to regain their cherished culture and identity, they must reclaim it through liberating themselves from the clutches of colonialism.

In Chapter Five, Fanon narrates his encounter with a white child who in a fearful tone, exclaimed: "Mama, see the Negro! I'm frightened!" Frightened! Frightened![541] Fanon argues that the fault was not of the child, but the construction erected by white world "racism." The black man is depicted as an evil, mean and despicable being. Fanon writes:

> The Negro is an animal, the Negro is bad, the Negro is mean, the Negro is ugly; look, a nigger, it's cold, the nigger is shivering, the nigger is shivering because he is cold, the little boy is trembling because he is afraid of the nigger, the nigger is shivering with cold, that cold that goes through your bones.[542]

Fanon describes this incident as hurtful to a black man. He points out how racism created a feeling of alienation against the black man. Comparing blacks to Jews, he notes that while Jewish people can renounce their Jewishness, though not in Nazi Germany, the same cannot be said of the black people: "The Jew is disliked from the moment he is tracked down. But in my case, everything takes a new guise. I am given no chance. I am overdetermined from without. I am the slave not of the 'idea' that others have of me but of my own experience."[543] Fanon turns to science which often was reluctant to acknowledge that a black man is after all human being.[544]

[541] Fanon, *Black Skin, White Masks*, 84.
[542] Ibid.
[543] Ibid., 87.
[544] Ibid., 90.

Fanon adduces that science was at the heart of racism which gave the white world apparent justification to maltreat black people. He was equally critical of the Négritude movement that aims to protest French colonial rule and the policy of assimilation. Négritude was equally critical of Western values and sought to re-evaluate African culture. Fanon argues that Négritude cannot help black people out of their mystery. But blacks should unite in driving out colonialism. He warns the black man to stop feeling inferior to any white man: "A feeling of inferiority? No, a feeling of nonexistence. Sin is Negro as virtue is white."[545]

In Chapter 6 he examines whether the psychoanalytic model can be helpfully employed to the black child's experience with the white child. He argues that the lives of a black child and that of a white child fair differently under the psychoanalytic model. Fanon contends the psychoanalytic model developed by Europeans does not hold true for a black child. Fanon believes their different experiences are because of racism and colonialism. He writes:

> In Europe, the family represents in effect a certain fashion in which the world presents itself to the child. There are close connections between the structure of the family and the structure of the nation. Militarization and the centralization of authority of the father. In Europe and in every country characterised as civilized or civilizing, the family is a miniature of the nation. As the child emerges from the shadow of his parents, he finds himself once more among the same laws, the same principles, the same values. A normal child that has grown up in a normal family will be a normal man. There is no disproportion between the life of the family and the life of the nation.[546]

Contrasting this reality with a black child, Fanon said, will give you a different person. He argues that the problem is that a black child grew up under colonialism and racism. He

[545] Ibid., 106.
[546] Fanon, *Black Skin, White Masks*, 109-10.

was not allowed to have a normal life like the white child. He writes, "Conversely, when one examines a closed society – that is, a society that has been protected from the flood of civilization…. we observe the opposite in the man of colour. A normal Negro child, having grown up within a normal family, will become abnormal on the slightest contact with the white world."[547]

Fanon criticises Father Trilles' book *L'ame du Pygmée d'Afrique,* that supports the Christianisation of some section of the society that Trilles considers as heathen and primitive. Fanon quotes Trilles' statement that "every word one is aware of the need to Christianize the savage Negro soul."[548] Fanon bemoans such statements as ignorant of the black race. Fanon again argues on the contrary that before European colonialism, black people had their own culture and religion, an identity they were proud of. Fanon asserts the presence of a "collective unconsciousness"[549] of the black race and contends that the only path for black race to be cured from the mental damage of colonialism is through "collective catharsis."[550]

He laments the literature written by Europeans paints a picture of black men as evil. He points out characters in the books like the Tarzan Stories, the sagas of twelve-year-old explorers, the adventurers of Mickey Mouse, and other comic books serve as mirrors of collective aggression against the black race. Fanon contends that some of these magazines were written by white men for white men and the readership is targeted to white kids. In most of these magazines "the Wolf, the Devil, the Evil spirit, the Bad man, the Savage are always symbolized by Negroes or Indians; since as easily as the little white boy, becomes

[547] Ibid., 110-11.
[548] Ibid.,110.
[549] Fanon, *Black Skin, White Masks*, 112.
[550] Ibid.

an explorer, an adventurer, a missionary "who faces the danger of being eaten by wicked Negroes."[551]

Fanon blames colonialism and deems racist views on the black race as deplorable. He wonders why everything that is bad is linked to the black race. For instance, in Europe Fanon noted the false conclusion that the black race has nothing to offer humanity. Fanon writes:

> In Europe, the black man is the symbol of Evil. One must move softly, I know, but it is not easy. The torturer is the black man, Satan is black, one talks of shadows, when one is dirty one is black – whether one is thinking of physical dirtiness or moral dirtiness…. the black man stands for the bad side of the character.[552]

Fanon concludes that the black emancipation is in black hands. He agrees that cultural imposition was a serious problem having been in bondage for many decades. He is equally worried that the black race entrapped themselves through internal colonisers, thereby replacing one system with another. Fanon said, "The black Antillean is the slave of this cultural imposition. After having been the slave of the white man, he enslaves himself. The Negro is in every sense of the word a victim of white civilization."[553]

In Chapter Seven, Fanon examines the work of Psychoanalyst Alfred Adler which centres on the Antillean Negro. Alder said, "the whole picture of the neurosis, as well as all its symptoms, emerges as under the influence of some final goal, indeed as projections of this goal."[554] Fanon agreed with Alder's proposition that "Antilleans have no inherent values of their own, they are always contingent on the presence of The Other,"[555] though he notes that Alder's point of view is based on individual terms, without pondering social issues like

[551] Ibid., 113.
[552] Ibid., 146.
[553] Fanon, *Black Skin, White Masks,* 148.
[554] Ibid., 163.
[555] Ibid., 163.

racism. Fanon contends that the entire people of the Antilles is a phobic society because of colonialism. Fanon ponders the way the mental construction of the master and slave relationship remains today, even after the slave trade had ended. Fanon said, "The Negro is a slave who has been allowed to eat at his table. One day a good white master who had influence said to his friends, "Let's be nice to the nigger…."[556] Fanon wonders why the black man is always at the mercy of the white man. He tells him when to eat, when to think as a human, and when to be free. He believes that the black man should take his destiny at hand rather than waiting for "white liberty and white justice."[557]

In Chapter Eight, the concluding chapter of this book, Fanon writes, "Insofar, as he conceives of European culture as a means of stripping himself of his race, he becomes alienated. In the second case, it is a question of a victim of a system based on the exploitation of a given race by another, on the contempt in which a given branch of humanity is held by a form of civilisation that pretends to superiority.[558]

Fanon argues that different countries with different system of colonialism must identify problems encountered because of colonialism. He points out that appealing to sentiments cannot solve the problem created by colonialism but rather collective action by the countries involved. He warns the coloniser countries not to be complacent but vigilant. Again, they should not dwell on the past or the legacy of colonialism but look at methods to eradicate all structures of colonialism. That is the only way they can be free as a people, free as a country and chart their own destiny to fight. Fanon writes, "I do not carry innocence to the point of believing that appeals to reason or to respect for human dignity can alter reality. For the Negro who works on a sugar plantation in Le Robert, there is one solution to fight….

[556] Ibid., 171.
[557] Fanon, *Black Skin, White Masks*, 173.
[558] Ibid., 174.

because he cannot conceive of life otherwise than in the form of a battle against exploitation, misery, and hunger."[559]

Fanon concludes his argument by stating that it is wrong for any race to imprison another race in pretence that he wants to civilise him. He said, "no attempt must be made to encase man, for it is his destiny to be set free."[560] He appeals to the white race to deemphasise on the superiority/inferiority divide, and to see one another as equal, built on respect. He concludes by saying, "I want the world to recognize, with me, the open door of every consciousness." As for his "final prayer," Fanon said, "O my body, make of me always a man who questions!"[561]

Fanon is not saying he has the full solution to the problem of the black race, but his view will help the black race to move beyond colonial judgement and set himself on how to move forward. Again, he wants to see the world where a black man will have a sense of belonging, where there is a level playing ground irrespective of whether he is white or black. He rejects the idea of a white world which ascribes everything to them. He equally wants his contemporaries not to see themselves as slaves as their forefathers saw themselves. He does not want them to stick to the what the white world has constructed about them, but to carve their own identity. Fanon's concluding line is not only provocative but emotional. He notes that there is a certain degree that the people should let off their pains and anger against the colonial legacy and move on.

4.6 Analysis of Fanon's *Black Skin, White Masks*

Fanon's classic study of the impact of colonialism on the continent of Africa helped to transform the thinking of many Africans on the evil of colonialism. Fanon's work, *Black*

[559] Ibid., 174.
[560] Ibid., 180.
[561] Fanon, *Black Skin, White Skins*, 181.

Skin, White Masks centred on the search for black identity, and the struggle against colonialism and decolonisation. He argues that the superiority claims that the colonisers made against the people were false, and that this was done to destroy and humiliate the people and burden them with an inferiority complex.[562] He pointed out that the colonisers positioned their history, culture, language, customs and beliefs as those of an acceptable civilisation above the indigenous culture and customs. Colonialism was a weapon employed by the colonisers to brand the indigenous people as being second-class and inferior people, and then forced the people to accept their values, education, and languages without any question. As the people assimilated these foreign ideas, it led to crises of confidence and identity, as well as alienation, as the indigenous people were denied their voice and representation and forced to abandon their values and beliefs.[563]

Fanon opines, "the black man has two dimensions. One with his fellows, the other with the white man. A Negro behaves differently with a white man and with another Negro. That this self-division is a direct result of colonialist subjugation is beyond question."[564]

Fanon demonstrates this assumption when he claims that the white race sees themselves as God's representative and image on earth: "Indeed, even the Merciful God is White, with a bushy beard and bright pink cheeks."[565]

Fanon's central argument centres on the legacy of colonialism dispossessing Africans of their uniqueness through the imposition of an alien culture. However, through self-rule, the process of regaining their distinctiveness and poise has begun. It is a period to reflect on but equally to attend to self-determination. To rise above the drama painted by the colonialist, Fanon believes that it is the responsibility of the people of the continent of Africa who

[562] Ibid., x.
[563] Ibid, 9.
[564] Fanon, *Black Skin, White Masks*, 8.
[565] Ibid., xiii.

should reject the notions that they are primitive by reaching out to the world, rather than taking these notions upon themselves.

In the same vein, he criticises the natives who opted to imitate the foreigners as being worse than the colonialists. He is appalled by their self-regard and their depiction of the black race as representing darkness, ugliness, naivety and wickedness, hence the construction of the people of Africa as not being a real people with real history but rather an image.[566] Instead the Europeans saw themselves as superior, intelligent, clever and a civilised race.

Frantz Fanon's contribution to the field of post-colonialism is particularly important; however, it is necessary to draw one's attention to some obvious shortcomings of Fanon's texts.

Derek Hook accuses Fanon of sexism in his texts. Hook contends that Fanon's texts, despite presenting cases against race-based repression, include to some extent sexist words, especially in *Black Skin White Masks*, and contains the issue of "sexual desire" transversely in the line of race. Hook's arguments are that Fanon exhibited a double standard instead of being neutral in his analysis. He accused Fanon of supporting an act performed by a black man as good but seeing similar acts performed by a white man as wrong. For instance, a black woman's desire to marry a white man is "unauthentic, a destable example of negative self-deprecating identity." At the same time, "a black male subject's desire for a female subject is portrayed in very different terms, as containing an almost redemptive political value."[567] Hook took issues with what Fanon said: "I marry white culture, white beauty, white whiteness. When my restless hands caress those white breasts, they grasp white

[566] Ibid, xiii-xiv.
[567] Derek Hook, "Frantz Fanon, Steve Biko, 'psycopolitics' and critical psychology." *LSE Research Online*, London (2004): 109.

civilisation and dignity and make them mine."[568] Hook also believes that an important work like *Black Skin, White Masks* should have devoted more time to analysing the extent and actions of colonial/racist domination than it does to the prospect of resistance. For Hook, Fanon found himself in "essentialist and static categories" such as "the black," "the white," "the colonised," "the coloniser." Hook contends that Fanon appears to make generalised statements without providing a clear prove of evidence.[569]

Furthermore, B. Marie Perinbam accused Fanon of "methodological delinquency" and that in most of his works, sociological firmness was deficient. Preinbam contends that Fanon's judgment was defective, and his inconsistencies are common. Fanon rarely differentiated between "the peasants,' 'the masses,' or 'the people.' However, Fanon's theatrical answers and assertiveness have more than "a germ of truth," though deficient in data or convincing arguments. Preinbam demonstrates further that since Fanon affirmed that Third World peasants should or have to take part in a final revolutionary role, Fanon exposed himself to misconception and criticism.[570]

In addition, Henry Bienen demonstrates that Fanon identified groups with possible revolutionary characters, for example, the lumpenproletariat, and the women in Algeria. Bienen notes that Fanon did not examine their detailed contributions. Bienen also observed there is vagueness in Fanon's analysis of the role of women in the struggle of Algeria independence.[571]

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[568] Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks, 45.
[569] Derek Hook, "Frantz Fanon, Steve Biko, 'psycopolitics' and critical psychology." *LSE Research Online*, London (2004): 111.
[570] B. Marie Perinbam, "Fanon and the Revolutionary Peasantry – The Algerian Case." *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 11, no. 3 (Cambridge 1973): 427-28.
[571] Henry Bienen, "State and Revolution: The Work of Amilcar Cabral." *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 15, no. 4 (Cambridge 1977): 566-67.

Hanson Emmanuel, moreover, also criticises Fanon for his failure to explain more intelligibly the composition of the peasantry without detailed and precise distinguishing of rich and poor peasants and without gauging the revolutionary credibility of each group. Emmanuel also notes Fanon's arguments about the proletariat and the lumpen proletariat was not clear enough. Emmanuel further notes Fanon was not satisfied with "presenting us with a model of revolutionary decolonization." Again, Emmanuel observes that Fanon presented to us a perfect society in which the colonised would articulate and continue his freedom movements through revolutionary decolonisation. Emmanuel criticised Fanon for not providing a comprehensive account of his perfect nation.[572]

G. K. Grohs contends that Fanon's nationalism is ambivalent because he sees it as a way of liberation, but equally hopes that it will exceed its borders so that all people may co-operate in 'racialism'. Again, For Fanon, Grohs notes, race was no classification; he understood only human beings as a unit rising above all races. Grohs adduces that Fanon's theory is populist, because for him 'the people' has the final authority, not the government, the party, or the elite.[573]

Grohs argues that other weaknesses of Fanon's theory on development lies in Fanon's propositions for the development of an independent Africa. He notes that Fanon chooses a socialist economy against a 'bureaucratised and centralised dictatorship.' He claims that Fanon wants a moderate federal state which does not break up in regionalism. Grohs contends that Fanon does not demonstrate how a socialist economy can avoid bureaucracy, and how the federation can prevent breaking up into its constituent units.[574]

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[572] Hanson Emmanuel, "Freedom and Revolution in the Thought of Frantz Fanon." *Ufahamu: A Journal of African Studies* 7, no. 1 (Cambridge 1976): 138-39.
[573] G.K. Grohs, "Frantz Fanon and the African Revolution." *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 6, no. 4 (December 1968): 554.
[574] Ibid.

Grohs also contends that one may interrogates Fanon's application of violence, although Grohs points out that there is proof that violence may be required in African countries controlled by white settler's groups, such as Algeria, Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe), Apartheid South Africa, and Portuguese territory of Angola. However, such cannot be said in some Anglophone West Africa countries such as Ghana, Sierra Leone, and Nigeria, and some East Africa countries like Tanzania where nationalists applied non-violence means in achieving independence and transformed their colonial economy into an indigenous capitalist economy. However, Grohs contended that despite these and other failings, Fanon's study has demonstrated valve in the following directions:

(a) His proposal to relate the urbanised elites to the masses in the countryside was put into practice in Cuba, and to a certain extent also in the struggle for independence in Southern and Northern Rhodesia and remains a strategic problem of the first order.

(b) His warning that the existing bourgeoisie has a strong tendency to become parasitical, and that something must be done to encourage it to become productive, has been acknowledged by many African leaders, from Senghor to Sekou Toure, Chinua Achebe etc.

(c) The strong interest of capitalist countries, especially the former colonial powers, in influencing and, if possible, dominating the economy of the newly independent countries is seen clearly by Fanon, with all its international consequences.[575]

Grohs believes that it is then not astonishing that Fanon's books have had an increasing influence on the anti-colonial and anti-imperialist movements of the Third World, not least in Africa, where several leading politicians and political thinkers have showered praises to him and his works. Fanon can only be sufficiently understood, though, if his claims are

[575] Grohs, "Frantz Fanon and the African Revolution," 555-56.

seriously reviewed and the results are analysed in the light of his fundamental objectives i.e., the liberation of man, inhumanity of man to man, injustice, and the exploitation of masses by other men.[576]

For George J. Sefa Dei and Marlon Simmons echo similar arguments put forward by Grohs. The editors noted that Fanon's contributions in the field of postcolonialism in which he developed his philosophy and thoughts on how events consequently came to shape anti-colonial theory and practices, the limits and possibilities, of political ideologies, as well as the theorisation of imperialism and 'spiritual dis-embodiment,' especially in the Third World. The editors also praise Fanon's explanation of violence, nationalism and the politics of identity, national liberation, and resistance, the "dialectic of experience," the psychiatry of racism and the psychology of oppression, the limits of revolutionary class politics and the power of "dramaturgical vocabulary." They contend, Fanon's thoughts continue to make him one of the leading scholars in postcolonial theory. The editors conclude that "those who dismiss his works do so in the spirit of intellectual arrogance."[577]

4.6 Analysis

Derek Hook in his criticism of Fanon's *Black Skin, White Masks* claims Fanon should have devoted more time to analysing the extent and actions of the colonial/racist domination than he does to the prospect of resistance. I disagree. Fanon's work examines the deep effects of colonial policy on the indigenous people such as racism and the unequal relationship between the colonised and colonialists. He rebuked the unhealthy relationship between master and servant. In *Black Skin, White Masks,* Fanon noted how a black man is afraid to see himself as black because of negative attachment attributed to blackness: "I wish

[576] Ibid.
[577] George J. Sefa Dei and Marlon Simmons, "The Padagogy of Fanon: An Introduction." *Counterpoints* 368 (2010): XVI-XVII, XIV

to be acknowledged not as black but a white."[578] He points out that a black man's behaviour was because of how the colonialists treated him as though he were nothing, thus perpetuating racism: "The feeling of inferiority. Let us have the courage to say it outright: It is the racist who creates his inferior."[579] Fanon wonders why blackness should represent anything evil. He believes that it was a colonialists' misinformation and denigration of the indigenous people that this myth was seen by the white race as valid: "In Europe, the black man is the symbol of Evil. The torturer is the black man, Satan is black, one talks of shadows, when one is dirty one is black…. the black man stands for the bad side of the character."[580] Fanon condemned such negative streotypying of a black man as erroneous and not correct. It was an assumption and inability for the colonialists to respect and appreciate another's culture and tradition.

On the other hand, Grohs avers that "Fanon's theory is populist, because for him 'the people' has the final authority, not the government, the party, or the elite."[581] I agree with Grohs' analysis. In any democratic government, power belongs to the people. It is the people who have the final say in who govern them. In advanced democracy, power belongs to the people. The case is different in most post-colonial African states, where the dawn of independence was celebrated by the people but turned out as a ruse. In the First Republic of Nigeria, the political elite fragmented the country into regional war. The Northern region does not see anything good about the Eastern or Western region. It was ethnic nationalism at play rather than national cohension and unity. That same division still exists today. In the Fourth Republic where many geo-polical zones suffer marginalisation or threat of succession, some extremist religious groups like Boko Haram called for an Islamic state

[578] Fanon, *Black Skin, White Masks*, 45
[579] Ibid., 69.
[580] Fanon, *Black Skin, White Masks,* 145-146.
[581] Grohs, "*Frantz Fanon and the African Revolution*," 555-56.

and strict Sharia law. Again, in Northern Nigeria the ingredients of democracy since the return to democracy in 1999 has not been beneficial to the average masses. The votes by the people do not count and the politicians' promise more but deliver nothing. Fanon noted in *The Wretched of the Earth*: "What are the forces which in the colonial period open up new outlets and engender new aims for the violence of colonised people? In the first place there are the political parties and the intellectual or commercial *élites*."[582] Fanon accused postcolonial leaders of not living up to their promises.

Though some accused Fanon of supporting violence, it is wrong to say he supports violence without looking at the circumstances behind his action. Fanon's actions were motivated by his experience in Algeria, as he articulated in *The Wretched of the Earth*. He believes that liberation can only be achieved through violence: "When the people have taken a violent part in the national liberation, they will allow no one to set themselves up as "liberators."[583] While working in Algeria as a psychiatrist, he concluded that the mental disorder of some of his black patients should be attributed to French colonialism. He decried the inhuman treatment of Algerians and the dehumanisation of the indigenous people because of colonialism. He describes the colonial world in Algeria as "Manichean": "A world divided into compartments, a motionless, Manichaeistic world, a world of statues."[584] The colonialists created a different world between the superior white race and inferior black race. Fanon was also moved by the suffering of the Algiers because of the colonial exploitation which left the people of Algiers in abject poverty. He wants to see an indigenous people capable of taken their destiny on their own hands rather than placing their future on outsiders.

[582] Ibid., 46.
[583] Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, 74.
[584] Ibid., 40.

4.8 Fanon's *The Wretched of the Earth*

Not so long ago, the earth numbered two thousand million inhabitants: five hundred million men, and one thousand five hundred natives. The former had the Word; the others had the use of it. Between the two there were hired kinglets, overlords and a bourgeoisie, sham from beginning to end, which served as go-betweens. In the colonies the truth stood naked, but the citizens of the mother country preferred it with clothes on the native had to love them, something in the way mothers are loved. The European elite undertook to manufacture a native elite. They picked out promising adolescents; they branded them, as with a red-hot iron, with the principles of western culture; they stuffed their mouths full of high-sounding phrases, grand glutinous words that stuck to the teeth. After a short stay in the mother country, they were sent home, white-washed. These walking lies had nothing to say to their brothers; they only echoed. From Paris, from London, from Amsterdam we would utter the words 'Parthenon! Brotherhood!' and somewhere in Africa or Asia lips would open '…thenon!' It was the golden age![585]

This statement was from Jean Paul Sartre who wrote the preface of the book. The above quote attracted me as it explains the contradiction and anomalies inherent in colonialism, especially the inequality and injustice created by colonialism. It shows how much of the people had the land, but others use it for them. Again, after colonialism ended, it multiplies into different branches, neo-colonialism and neo-imperialism could be more severe than colonialism. Africa may have gained independence, but the economic and cultural control through military might continue until today.

Fanon begins his epic book *The Wretched of the Earth* by explanation of colonial violence against the natives. Fanon argues that the act of decolonisation will always involve

[585] Jean-Paul Sartre, "Preface." In Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, 7.

violence. He further states that decolonisation cannot happen merely by agreement as colonialism itself is immersed in violence. The colonialist invaded the land of the natives through violent means. Fanon writes, "The colonial world is a world cut in two. The dividing line, the frontiers are shown by barracks and police stations. In the colonies it is the policeman and the soldier who are the official, instituted go-betweens, the spokesmen of the settler and his rule of oppression."[586]

The colonial world created the gulf between the colonialist and the colonised, the privileged and the less privileged classes. Fanon refers to the colonial world as a "Manichaean"[587] world that is both bad and good, in which the white colonial world is seen as good, while the black colonised are seen as bad and a symbol of evil. The white colonial world keeps the black colonised world constantly in fear. The colonial world knows that the only way the black indigenous people can achieve decolonisation is through violence.

African nations especially in East Africa and South Africa achieved their independence through revolutionary violence, most of the nationalists waged war of violence to eject the white settlers from their land. Violence was not used here to kill white settlers, but to reclaim what belongs to them, a kind of self-defence. The land belongs to the indigenous Africans which the colonialists forcefully took from them. While the native people were lamenting the loss of their land, their prime possession, their identity, language and religion were also taken from them. When the native people want to assert their own rule, the white setters refused to allow them, instead they chose violence to suppress the indigenous people. The native people have no means to fight for what belong to them. To decolonise their land,

[586] Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, 29.
[587] Ibid., 31.

Fanon contends they turn to violence to achieve self-rule because it is only the language the colonialists understand.

Furthermore, Fanon contends that development is characterised by capitalist ventures. The European capitalist ropes in the natives into the capitalist world, even when they know they may remain neutral in the East and West divide. Colonialism was a conduit where the resources of the colonised were exploited by the colonialist. Fanon equally states how the colonialists recruited some natives and indoctrinated them to work against their people. Fanon writes, "The capitalist bourgeoisie, in its narcissistic dialogue, expounded by the members of its universities, had in fact deeply implanted in the minds of the colonized intellectual that the essential qualities remain eternal in spite of all the blunders men may make: the essential qualities of the West, of course."[588]

In the newly independent states, the nation's bourgeoisie took over political and economic control. Instead of putting in place the people, they prefer to continue with the departed colonialists. The elected officer became the master, and the people became the servant. Under this system the people continue to suffer. The promise of the nationalists that they will bring development to the people dissipates as hope turned to anger. Fanon believes that the only way that the nation can develop is by violent revolution in which the masses and the peasants will be in charge. He notes that the political elite has compromised and argues that the nation cannot move forward unless the political class is toppled.

Fanon points out that after independence had been gained, the political class fought for their national culture and argued for its existence. The culture, thoughts had been destroyed

[588] Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, 36.

by the colonialists. During the colonial period, the native culture was denigrated and rubbished by the colonialists as primitive. Fanon writes:

> The past is given back its value. Culture, extracted from the past to be displayed in all its splendour, is not necessarily that of his own country. Colonialism, which has not bothered to put too fine a point on its efforts, has never ceased to maintain that the Negro is a savage; and for the colonist, the Negro was neither an Angolan nor a Nigerian, for he simply spoke of 'the Negro.' For colonialism, this vast continent was the hunt of savages, a country riddled with superstitions and fanaticism, destined for contempt, weighed down by the curse of God, a country of cannibals.[589]

Fanon advocates a united Africa where there will be nothing like name of any country but a continent of Africa that will be united and speak with one voice. There will be no artificial boundary created by colonialists. It will be a continent of African people with no distinction from Nigeria, Togo, Zambia etc. but people proud of their African identity and culture; not the kind of artificial boundaries created by European adventurers, geographers, and missionaries.

In support of this United Africa advocated by Fanon, Albert Memmi said Fanon was incensed when he discovered that he was West Indian and Black. Initially he had believed himself French and white. Hence, Fanon decides that he would neither be French nor West Indian, but Algerian. It was in this situation that Fanon decides to advocate for a United Africa, where the colour of the skin and cultural bias would no longer matter and where even a black Indian would belong.[590]

[589] Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, 170.
[590] Ibid.

Fanon argues that having relegated the native culture to the ground by the colonialists, the colonised elite try to reclaim their lost culture and identity through writing and policies. The postcolonial writers try to prove through their writing that their culture is not primitive showing ignorance and racism of the colonialists. Fanon argues also that culture is local not Nigeria. He notes that the black culture can be reclaimed through developing a national consciousness. He argues that the people should deemphasise the idea that their culture is primitive and their religion barbaric. They need to stand together to reclaim their identity. Fanon writes, "Colonialism has made the same effort in these regions to plant deep in the minds of the native population the idea that before the advent of colonialism their history was one which was dominated by barbarism."[591]

Fanon states that the colonialist oppression and racism led to violent agitation for liberation by the colonised people. As a practicing psychiatrist, Fanon references various cases he handled during the Algeria War of independence with France. He compares notes from the wounded from Algeria and France respectively and was alarmed on how colonial policies have had an adverse effect on the mental health of the people. He describes his cases ranging from anxiety, depression, and anorexia to key psychotic breaks and homicidal[592] predispositions all coming from the colonial policies and war. Fanon also looks at the psychosomatic effect of protracted conditioning and too much torture, through electrocution.[593] Fanon argues that the situation in Algeria during the war of independence is similar to all black nations, as colonialism created instability in the colonised society.

Fanon ends his book by calling for action. He writes, "Come, then, comrades; it would be as well to decide at once to change our ways. We must shake off the heavy darkness in

[591] Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, 171.
[592] Ibid., 227-8, 230-232.
[593] Ibid., 232.

which we were plunged and leave it behind. The new day, which is already at hand must find us firm, prudent and resolute."[594]

Fanon urges the colonised nations to work hard towards ending all forms of neo-colonialism and imperialism and warns the newly independent nations not to rely on Europeans but to find their own means on how to move forward: "Come, then, the European game has finally ended; we must find something different. We today can do everything. So long as we do not imitate Europe, so long as we are not obsessed by the desire to catch up with Europe."[595]

Fanon's warning is as cogent today as it was then. African political leaders abandon their culture and identity and instead prefer European taste, food, and values. Toady many African states are dependent on western economic handouts as the political class has corruptly enriched themselves, while the poor masses suffer. He notes that we must put the past behind us and look favourably to the present. True independence can only be achieved through charting a new direction for the emancipation of all the black race. But we must not leave our fate in the hands of foreigners. If we do, we will live to regret it, Fanon warns. He concludes the book with this quote, "humanity is awaiting for something other from us than such imitation, which would be almost an obscene caricature…but if we want humanity to advance a step farther, if we want to bring it up to a different level than that which Europe has shown it, then we must invent and we must make discoveries."[596]

Fanon calls for unity among the people and appeals to the black's sentiments by telling the political class to live up to the expectations anticipated of them by the people. He warns

[594] Ibid., 251.
[595] Ibid., 251-2.
[596] Ibid., 254.

the political elite not to rely on European countries, but to seek new friendships outside Europe. Then colonialism will be defeated.

4.9 Analysis of Fanon's *The Wretched of the Earth*

Fanon's *The Wretched of the Earth* is hailed by some commentators as the beginning of postcolonial criticism.[597] James D. Le Sueur, however, contends that Fanon's *The Wretched of the Earth* has "lived and continues to live, not in the world that he imagined into existence during the decolonisation of Algeria…. while Fanon correctly and courageously diagnosed many of the ills of modern Algerian society, he misunderstood important aspects of Algerian culture, particularly the place of Islam and the peasantry, and that this led to a considerable misreading of Algeria's history, future, and the revolution itself."[598]

Rebuking his advocacy of violence, Vittorio Bufacchi and Jools Gilson adduce that "violence starts as an act, but it does not end when the action terminates. For those at the receiving end of the violence, the experience is indeterminate."[599]

For Shaul Magid, violence is a "tool to facilitate systemic and structural change such that the system we create does not tolerate the subjugation of some over others."[600]

Michael Sonnleiter contends that Fanon examines how the violence of colonialism provoked violence in the native. He notes that the 'Manichean' structure occurs through the constant preservation of the notion that there is good and bad in the world. Sonneleiter points out that structural violence is the innate inclination to revolt and is further heightened by the

[597] David Macey, *The Penguin Dictionary of Critical Theory* (London: Penguin Books, 2000), 122.
[598] James D. Le Sueur, "Beyond Decolonization? The Legacy of the Algerian Conflict and the Transformation of Identity in Contemporary France." *Historical Reflections* 28, no. 2 (Summer 2002):280.
[599] Vittorio Bufacchi and Jools Gilson, "The Ripples of Violence." *Feminist Review* 112 (2016): 36.
[600] Shaul Magid, "Anti-semitism as colonialism: Meir Kahane's "Ethics of Violence." *Journal of Jewish Ethics* 1, no. 2 (2015):206.

realised inclinations of the oppressor encouraged by the fear of losing jobs and housing and facing the socio-economic effects of poverty.[601]

Laleh Khalili argues that Fanon's justification of 'evolutionary' violence came from Algeria. He also argues that the colonial domination was based on a "Manichaean" worldview in which the coloniser was the repository of all virtues while the colonised was characterised as a 'bestial' native who required the domination of the colonialist. Khalili contends that colonial violence would spark the revolutionary violence that would overthrow it. Hence the native people had to use violence to overthrow colonialism because it was the only weapon the colonial government can recognise.[602]

According to Tirop Simatei, the Algerian situation and the consequences of the colonial oppression of the Algerians were responsible for Fanon's subtle use of violence to rid colonialism from Algeria. Simatei notes that Fanon loathed colonialism's onslaught on the humanity of the colonised and how the "Manichean" categorisation of the colonised world creates the expression of violence and can only be pull down or tackled using the same methods.[603]

Gerald E. Tucker argues that Fanon, writing in the twentieth century with its deep psychological insights and knowledge, developed a more detailed existential argument in which action changes the consciousness of the repressed peoples of the Third World. Additionally, the action demanded by Fanon would come from the masses, particularly the

[601] Michael W. Sonnleitner, "Of Logic and Liberation: Frantz Fanon on Terrorism." *Journal of Black Studies* 17, no. 3 (March 1987): 289.
[602] Laleh Khalili, "Thinking About Violence." *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 45, no. 4 (November 2013):1180.
[603] Tirop Simatei, "Colonial Violence, Postcolonial Violations: Violence, Landscape, and memory in Kenyan Fiction." *Research in African Literatures* 36, no. 2 (Summer 2005): 85-94.

peasants, upon whom entrusted the duty of reclaiming their freedom from the European conqueror.[604]

Edmund Burke III argues that Fanon's *The Wretched of the Earth* is persuasive in its language, its denunciation of colonialism and its support for armed resistance against colonial rule. He points out that the book resonates hopes and fears of its era, and it did so with an 'idealism' that is difficult to envisage. Burke III describes Fanon's *The Wretched of the Earth* as a political manifesto.[605]

Burke further states that the reason for Fanon's *The Wretched of the Earth*'s appeal is liken to a classic which is viewed and interpreted from different angles. He notes that the book's appeal has influenced many from African nationalists, Palestinian commandos, to the Bangladesh guerrillas of 1971-72. It equally enjoyed rave among black militants in the United States of America. The Black Panthers saw it as their "Bible." The anti-colonial movements see it as being sympathetic to their suffering, pains, reasons for their struggles, and motivation to overcome oppression and dehumanisation.[606]

For L. Adele Jinadu, Fanon's denunciation of a one-party system in Africa was particularly important. Fanon sees the one-party system as a perpetuation of tyranny by the indigenous bourgeoisie. "The single party is the modern form of the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie, unmasked, unpainted, unscrupulous and cynical."[607] Jinadu further asserts that Fanon's influence on the 'historiography' of African politics has been both to pioneer a new

[604] Gerald E. Tucker, "Machiavelli and Fanon: Ethics, Violence, and Action." The Journal of Modern African Studies 16, no. 3 (September 1978): 399.
[605] Edmund Burke III, "Frantz Fanon's *The Wretched of the Earth*." *Daedalus* 105, no. 1 (Winter 1976): 128.
[606] Ibid., 130.
[607] L. Adele Jinadu, "Some Comments on Frantz Fanon and the Historiography of African Politics." *The Journal of Developing Areas* 7, no. 2 (January 1973): 165.

paradigm of the African nationalism and to inspire efforts to provide a historical reference for it.[608]

I believe that one-party system in most African nations, which was in vogue in the 1960s, 70s, 80s, and early 90s, were attempts by the political elite to perpetuate sit-tight rule, and so advocating or accepting misappropriation of funds, corruption, gross human right abuses, political violence, and mismanagement of the economy. Most opposition were arrested and jailed, some even killed or disappeared. One-party system encourages nepotism, favouritism and denounces democratic rules., though in some countries one-party system is encouraged and institutionalised for instance, in Tanzania.[609] In Togo it is characterised by dictatorship, misrule, clientelism and patrimonialism. In a country like Kenya, one-party system was introduced by leading political parties in the country to ensure peace and unity reign among ethnic groups in the country and to ensure even development. Finally, Senegal is a

[608] Ibid., 291.

[609] Tanzania has had a one-party political system since 1965, The Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) being the sole political party for mainland Tanzania (Tanganyika) and the Afro- Shirazi Party (ASP) the only one in Zanzibar. In Tanganyika, a Presidential Commission on a one-party state, set up in January 1964, recommended the establishment of a democratic one-party state, which took effect after the general elections of October 1965. Although there had been multi-party elections in 1958-59, 1960 and 1962, TANU had regularly won almost all the parliamentary seats. In the 1960 election TANU won all the seats except one, which went to a TANU member running as an independent. Hence the elections had made Tanganyika a de facto one-party state and the recommendations of the presidential commission provided the de jure basis for the new political system (Juma Ngasongwa, "Tanzania Introduces a Multi-Party System." *Review of African Political Economy*, no. 54 (July 1992): 112). Again, the 1965 Interim Union Constitution provided for the existence of the two parties, TANU on the mainland and ASP on the islands. Over the years, certain measures gave effect to party supremacy, especially in Tanganyika. In 1975 the Tanzanian constitution was formally amended to enshrine party supremacy so that "all political activities in Tanzania shall be carried out by, or under the auspices of the party (TANU or ASP) and that the function of all organs of the state of the United Republic shall be performed under the aegis of the Party." The essential element of this supremacy was the superiority of party organs and decisions over those of the government and parliament. Parliament became a committee of the party's National Conference (Ngasongwa, 112). Ngasongwa points out that peace, stability and national harmony are the cardinal aims of the party. The CCM affirmed that Tanzania had enjoyed peace, political stability and national harmony because the Party and its government had sought policies which created an appropriate environment for them. Despite the NEC agreement with the majority who wanted the one-party system to continue, it believed that the one-party system alone could not guarantee their continuation (Ngasongwa, 112). William Tordoff avers that the experience of Ghana and a few other African one-party states indicates that the single-party form of government does not in itself ensure political stability. That Tanzania is now one of the most stable of all African states cannot thus be justified merely in terms of its single-party system. Other considerations must be considered. These include the homogeneous nature of Tanzania's primarily rural society, the democratic character of the single party, and the quality of President Nyerere's leadership (William Tordoff, "Tanzania: Democracy and the One-party State." *Government and Opposition* 2, no. 4 (July – October 1967): 600).

multiparty state but tilled towards one-party system under Leopold Senghor. Most of the people prefer multiparty system because of the diverse nature of the society. However, the party in government Leopold Senghor's Senegalese Progressive Union (UPS) preferred one-party system. This led to economic woes, human rights abuses, and civil society participation. Most opposition were arrested and jailed, some even killed or disappeared. One-party system encourages nepotism, favouritism and denounces democratic rules.

Margaret Monyan argues that a one-party system was a characteristic of various African countries immediately after they gained sovereignty and more widespread in the era between 1960s to the 1980s. Many commentators have ascribed this to various factors including the fact that democracy was considered as foreign to Africa. For example, apologists of the one-party regime such as Julius Mwalimu Nyerere claimed that African traditional societies were akin to a one-party system. Others like Kwame Nkrumah argued that democracy or multi party regimes were conflict-ridden hence unsuitable for the newly independent African nations which required a united strength and passion to move forward.[610]

Monyan maintains that most of the leaders that gained power at that time did so through the huge support of rural peasants who were primarily subsistence farmers. Consequently, to have control over the electorate, socialism was preferred while capitalism was rejected. The expectation was the post-independence administrative structure would mirror the model of the colonial master's home country. For example, in the British colonies it was likely that those who lost in an election would form the opposition party in the parliament. But this did not happen spontaneously as several African states particularly Kenya, Ghana, Zambia, Mali, Senegal and Tanzania embraced the one-party system. Usually, the main party in the

[610] Margaret Monyan, "One Party State: Is it Good or Bad for Governance? *E-International Relations,* May 25, 2018, https://www.e-ir.info/2018/05/25/one-party-state-is-it-good-or-bad-for-governance/

country and the charismatic leaders who played the lead role in the fight against colonialism assumed the mantle of leadership of such parties.[611]

Like *Black Skin, White Masks,* Fanon again rebukes the colonial legacy in Africa and advocates for "cultural resistance" against colonial rule. He argues that the colonial people should first and foremost find their voice and identity in reclaiming their past. Fanon notes that:

> For centuries, the European colonising power will have devalued the nation's past, seeing its pre-colonial era as a pre-civilised limbo, or even as a historical void. Children, both black and white, will have been taught to see history, culture, and progress as beginning with the arrival of the Europeans. If the first step towards a postcolonial perspective is to reclaim one's own past, then the second is to begin to erode the colonialist ideology by which that past had been devalued.[612]

As noted, European powers came to Africa as a civilising force. They claimed to have come to civilise the Africans whom they claimed were primitive and heathen. But what they failed to understand is that before the coming of European powers in Africa, Africa had their own indigenous system that works for them. It may not be perfect, but it serves the purpose for them. But when the colonial masters altered the system, it altered indigenous rule, values, norms, culture and religion of the people. As Chinua Achebe aptly stated in his novel *Things Fall Apart*, the bond between brothers and brother were severed and the centre cannot hold, and things fall apart. It was this breakdown of relationship that led to anarchy, strife and mistrust.

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[611] Ibid.
[612] E.P. Barry, *Postcolonial Criticism* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1995), 192.

Fanon also affirms the idea of African solidarity as the tools to fight colonialism, but the success of dismantling colonialism and its structures can be achieved only when it is the collective will of the people. He cautions that allowing the fight by the elite will prove counterproductive in the long run as it will be replacing one thing with another of the same kind. He demonstrates the behaviour of colonialists as not contented but refining and reengineering themselves to another way of domination and brainwashing:

> Colonialism is not satisfied merely with holding a people in its grip and emptying the native's brain of all form and content. By a kind of perverted logic, it turns to the past of the oppressed people and distorts, disfigures, and destroys it. This work of devaluing pre-colonial history takes on a dialectical significance today.[613]

Fanon lays bare that colonialism is evil right from its inception; it is flawed and contradictory. The system was flawed because the colonialists did not appreciate the native culture and regarded the natives as primitive. As a result, this bred racism, stereotypes, division, and hatred. The system was contradictory because the European construction of Africa and the assigning of meanings to them in the name of eradicating barbaric cultures of the natives and replacing them with Western traditions and standards was wrong. They claimed this was done to bring development to the people, but their actions were geared towards domination and exploitation. They made colonialism look as if it was in the interests of the people, and that the colonialists had come on a rescue mission to save them from barbarism. They made it look that if they failed to carry out the mission of civilising the people the natives would fall back into the acts of "barbarism", "degradation" and "bestiality."[614]

[613] Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, 169.
[614] Ibid.

On the other hand, colonialism was not seen by natives as being gentle as was claimed by the colonialists, or like a "loving mother" who protects her child from unfriendly surroundings, but rather as a "mother" who unendingly restrains her deeply wicked children from managing to commit suicide and from giving free "rein" to their wickedness.[615] Nonetheless: "The colonial mother protects her child from itself, from its ego, and from its physiology, its biology and its own unhappiness which is its very essence. In such a situation the claims of the native intellectual are no luxury but a necessity in any coherent programme. The native intellectual who takes up arms to defend his nation's legitimacy and who wants to bring proofs to bear out that legitimacy, who is willing to strip himself naked to study the history of his body, is obliged to dissect the heart of his people."[616]

Fanon believes it was correct of the people to protect and defend their culture from colonialism. The claims of the colonialists to be working in the interests of the natives was flawed, since they believed that *the* "Negro is a savage… this vast continent was a hunt of savages, a country riddled with superstitions and fanaticism, destined for contempt, weighed down by the curse of God, a country of cannibals."[617]

For Fanon, this ironical assumption is despicable and unacceptable. Fanon argues is that "the contention by colonialism that the darkest night of humanity lay over pre-colonial history concerns the whole of the African continent. The efforts of the native to habilitate himself and escape from the claws of colonialism are logically inscribed from the same point of view as that of colonialism."[618] Fanon challenges the natives to rise to the defence of their culture and to defend their cherished traditions and civilisation, and to ignore the colonialists' distortion and defamation of their identity. It was a psychological war waged

[615] Ibid, 169-170.
[616] Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, 170.
[617] Ibid.
[618] Ibid.

against the natives as a way of demanding their culture and afterwards introducing the religion of the colonialists as being the most suitable for the people.

Fanon further argues that the indigenous people, ravaged by colonialism, should embark on the reconstruction and reclaiming of their identity as a way of building a viable statehood rather than building new states based on inherited, distorted and imposed structures which in the long run will not lead the people anywhere – rather, it will create crisis upon crisis in the postcolonial state. Fanon writes, "Colonialism does not simply state the existence of tribes; it also reinforces it and separates them. The colonial system encourages chieftaincies and keeps alive the old 'Marabout' confraternities."[619]

Thus, Europe has multiplied divisions and opposing groups, has fashioned classes and sometimes even racial prejudices, and has endeavoured by every means to bring about and intensify the stratification of colonised societies[620] through imperialism and neo-colonialism, the divide and rule policy, the European quarters and the natives, school for the white and school for the black, the rejection of indigenous names in favour of European names, racism and segregation. The natives saw their land taken away and they became tenants in their own land, brushed aside and despondent, their pride battered. Fanon writes:

[619] Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, 74. According to Federico Settler, Fanon's doubt about religion and particularly his concern with the more visceral and mystical expressions of religion becomes particularly apparent when he encounters Islam during his work in Algeria. In his meeting with Muslim communities during his time there, Fanon wants to draw a contrast between the 'formalism' of Islam in urban centres and the more 'organic' and 'mystical Islam that was more common in the rural areas. In *The Wretched of the Earth*, Fanon refers expressly to the mystical worship of holy men or saints among rural Algerians as maraboutic cults. Fanon's ambivalence concerning religion was clearly not restricted to Catholicism or Christianity in general. He voices similar concerns and doubts about Islam, both in his encounters with Muslims in the French metropole and later in Algeria [Federico Settler, "Frantz Fanon's Ambivalence Towards Religion" *Journal for the Study of Religion* 25, no. 2, 2012]: 13.

[620] Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, 10.

> The colonial world is a world cut in two. The dividing line, the frontiers are shown by barracks and police stations. In the colonies it is the policeman and soldier who are the official, instituted go-betweens, the spokesmen of the settler and his rule of oppression.[621]

Through the institutionalisation of barriers between the colonisers and the colonised, suspicion and bitterness deepened, and the natives felt victimised. There was no justice; no fairness and respect from the coloniser for the colonised as the coloniser assumed an impossible, superior and unreachable position in relation to the natives. They gathered themselves to teach the natives the ways of the Europeans rather than learning anything from the natives. They intimidated the natives through iron rules and various laws that perpetuated their superiority. Fanon aptly asserts:

> I had soon to change my tune. Only momentarily at a loss, the white man explained to me that, genetically, I represented a stage of development: "Your properties have been exhausted by us. We have had earth mystics such as you will never approach. Study our history and you will see how far this fusion has gone." Then I had the feeling that I was repeating a circle. My originality had been torn out of me. I wept a long time, and then I began to live again. But I was haunted by a galaxy of erosive stereotypes.[622]

For Fanon, our experience with colonialism was a mixed blessing: "the first experience was defined by violence and the existence of the colonist and the native was like a gun and bullet – that is to say that the exploitation of the native by the colonist was carried out via a great display of "bayonets" and the "cannon".[623]

[621] Ibid., 29.
[622] Fanon, *Black Skin, White Mask*, 98-99.
[623] Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, 28.

For Fanon, decolonisation is the replacing of one "species of men" with another "species of men" without a proper handover, training, and orientation.[624] As a result the new states were not prepared for the building of an enormous state, governance, and management of the human and natural resources. The consequences were an explosion of extreme nationalism, religious fundamentalism, autocratic leadership, and a dependent economy. Fanon writes:

> The naked truth of decolonization evokes for us the searing bullets and bloodstained knives which emanate from it… You do not turn any society, however primitive it may be, upside-down with such a programme if you have not decided from the very beginning, that is to say from the actual formation of that programme, to overcome all the obstacles that you will come across in so doing.[625]

Fanon believes that to achieve self-reliance and proper national integration, the people must work together in the development of the nation, but that must be done through moving away from nationalism to a national consciousness. Independence had been won back in most African states, but the effects of colonialism has left African countries fragmented, undeveloped, with bitterness and division among ethnic groups, especially in Nigeria.

4.10 Frantz Fanon and Violence

While Fanon's *Wretched of the Earth* explores the psychology of the colonised people and their pathway to freedom, he argues that decolonisation cannot occur through a "gentleman's agreement" but through violence.[626] He claims it is through violence that indigenous people can affect change. He equally condemns the dual threats of post-independence colonial politics, the marginalisation of the masses by the political elite, and

[624] Ibid., 27.
[625] Ibid., 28-29.
[626] Seresin Indiana, "Black Skin, White Masks."

the interethnic and religious antagonisms. He argues for social reform for emerging postcolonial leadership.[627]

On Fanon's advocacy of violence as a pathway to indigenous freedom, Emmanuel Hansen contends that it is an oversight of some critics to downplay Fanon's humanist element of his thought and to misunderstand the relationship between freedom and revolution and so portraying Fanon as a "glorifier of violence, apostle of violence and prisoner of hate."[628] Hansen notes that some of his critics fail to comprehend that Fanon's calls for revolution are "not an end in itself, but a means to achieve a more basic end of man, in other words freedom."[629]

According to Josh Pallas, Fanon's thesis on violence and its impacts on the indigenous people is distinctively driven by his lived experience. He further states that Fanon was born and raised as a colonial subject in the Antilles. He notes that Fanon outlines both the potentialities and negative aspects of violence. He stresses that Fanon's most controversial remarks are those around the cathartic and reifying affect that violence can have on a colonial subject. Pallas contends that Fanon's statements are taken out of context because he is not an advocate of unnecessary violence. Pallas stresses that the potentiality of violence derives from the colonial context which the violent act is seeking to uproot.[630] Fanon, applying Algeria as an instance, urges the Algiers to take their country back through force. It is only the language the colonialists understand.

Decolonisation is the meeting of two forces, opposed to each other by their very nature…their first encounter was marked by violence and their existence together – that is

[627] Ibid.
[628] Hansen, "Freedom and Revolution in the Thought of Frantz Fanon," 17.
[629] Ibid.
[630] Jose Pallas, "Fanon on Violence and the Person." *Critical Legal Thinking* (2016). https://criticallegalthinking.com/2016/01/20/fanon-on-violence-and-the-person/

to say the exploitation of the native by the settler – was carried on by dint of a great arrays of bayonets and cannons…the naked truth of decolonization evokes for us the searing bullets and bloodstained knives which emanate from it. For if the last shall be first, this will only come to pass after a murderous and decisive struggle between the two protagonists.[631]

Pallas argues that the colonial rule is supported through violence and authoritarianism.[632] Fanon accentuates that "colonialism is not a thinking machine, nor a body endowed with reasoning faculties. It is violence in its natural state, and it will only yield when confronted with greater violence."[633] Pallas points out that the coloniser often branded the colonised subject with the views of being primitive and a lack of compassion and reasoning.[634] The colonial subject is degenerated by colonialism to such an extent that "it turns him into an animal."[635]

Pallas avers that it then becomes normal for the coloniser to adopt violence in the colonial context because it denigrates the colonial subject's will not to respond to anything else. So, for the colonial subject liberating themselves of colonialism through violence can be a cathartic experience. He notes that for Fanon the word "cathartic" is inextricable from the colonised subject's experience of viciously ridding themselves of colonial rule. He argues further that the violence is the prevailing experience which can remove their feelings of self-loathing which have been adopted after relentless reiteration from the colonial power. So, for the Algerians violence is cathartic insofar as it allows them to rebuild the sense of self which was wrecked by colonialism. It was this cathartic violence that also allows a person to regain their humanity.[636]

[631] Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, 27-8.
[632] Pallas, "Fanon on Violence and the Person."
[633] Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, 48.
[634] Pallas, "Fanon on Violence and the Person."
[635] Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, 32.
[636] Pallas, "Fanon on Violence and the Person."

Beatrice Omwomo contends that Fanon's reason for advocating violence during colonialism was to show a stand for revolution and to bring about meaningful historical change to free the "wretched" and enable them to decolonise. According to Omwomo, Fanon interrogates both the "immediacies" and the future of freedom, advising against national elites' likely collusion with the former coloniser in suppression of the masses. She notes that, for Fanon decolonisation is not merely emerging out of the colonies but the starting process that could bring the colonised to the level of the coloniser.[637]

Omwomo argues that Fanon wants to end the "Manichaean" structure through decolonisation, seen in his vision into the future of Africa, especially relative to the present forms of control through capitalistic economics and political systems of developing countries. Omwomo notes that for Fanon, violence becomes the only way through which the colonised can voice anti-colonial consciousness. Omwomo contends that it was Sartre who justified violence while Fanon analysed it. She points out that Fanon did not promote violence as an end but a necessity in achieving freedom. Omwomo notes that Fanon's accounts of the colonised condition were not just that of a chronicler but he himself was keenly involved in fashioning history, first as a psychiatrist who examined the psychological effect of colonial violence on Algerians; then as a revolutionary militant in Front de Liberation Nationale (FLN). He was motivated by his contact with revolutionary fighters in emotional and political distress.[638]

Immanuel Wallerstein also does not see anything wrong in Fanon proposing violence to the colonial subject as a means of freeing themselves from colonial bondage. Wallerstein contends that "if nationalists were forced to such brutal ways of defending their heritage,

[637] Beatrice O. Omwomo, "Revisiting Frantz Fanon in the era of Globalization." A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of Miami University in partial fulfilment of Master of Arts (2011).
[638] Ibid.

the fault was not theirs." The idea that Fanon approved all violence because it stemmed in some way in a radicalisation of the persecuted is simply untrue. Wallerstein avers that Fanon was in fact successful in his goal of liberating especially through his writing. He was influential by his books and by the articles he contributed to the FLN's journal of opinion and war, and *El Moudjahid*,[639] in clarifying "us" to "them." Wallerstein affirmed that several members of the European left were swayed by the lucidity of his arguments.[640]

Wallerstein further contends that Fanon sees decolonization as a phenomenon that was always violent in its core. Fanon believes that the standard form was one in which the "leadership" of the movements, the urban bourgeois with an urban clientele, were forced grudgingly into their nationalist militance. But the colonisers are the real cause; the poor had little choice. The peasantry had really nothing to lose but their chains. The peasantry was unconstrained and impulsive and thus could act, which was good.[641]

Wallerstein contends the way was apparent for the betrayal of the revolution, in an understanding prepared between the colonial authorities and the indigenous urban elite. The agreement includes granting independence and handing over power to these indigenous elites. In return, the latter kept their country's participation in the imperial economic system and kept a strict rein on internal peasant forces. For Fanon, this was a bogus independence, and the single-party system was a "dictatorship of the bourgeoisie."[642]

On the other hand, Omwomo avers that Fanon notes that the coloniser's power derives from his control of the means of violence that the coloniser likens with law. The power

[639] *El-Moudjahid* is an Algerian News Daily formed in June 1956. It was published in two editions, French and Arabic. It served as mouthpiece for Algeria's National Liberation Front (FLN). Frantz Fanon wrote for the newspaper [Andrea L. Stanton, "The Changing face of *El Moudjahid* During the Algerian War of Independence." *The Journal of North African Studies* 16, no. 1 (March 2011)]: 59-76.
[640] Immanuel Wallerstein, "Frantz Fanon: Reason and Violence." *Berkeley Journal of Sociology* 15 (1970): 222-231.
[641] Ibid.
[642] Ibid.

paradigms that were established in the colonial epoch continue to bolster power relations that are manifest between the north and the south. Hence, the argument that colonialism is the thing of the past needs to be reconsidered. Omwomo quotes Robert Young as saying:

> To sweep colonialism under the carpet of modernity, however, is too convenient a deflection. To begin with, its history was extraordinary in its global dimension, not only in the relation to the comprehensiveness of colonisation by the time of the high imperial power in the late nineteenth century, but also because the effect of the globalisation of the western imperial power was to fuse many societies with different historical traditions into a history which, apart from the period of centrally controlled common economies, obliged them to follow the same general economic path.[643]

The effect of globalisation undermines the indigenous peoples' ability to compete against multinational companies. The native countries became a dumping ground for foreign goods thereby undermining the indigenous manufacturing. The effects is loss of revenue, employment and capital flight.

Pramod Nayar argues that Fanon's main contribution is to "locate African mental illness within the exploitative and cruel conditions of colonial dominations."[644] Fanon stresses that the build-up of this sense of inadequacy in the native's psyche, results in violence as a form of asserting indigenous rights. Nayar contends that when the natives discover that they cannot hope to become whites, or even expel the whites, his violence becomes a channel for aggression and frustration:[645] "violence represents the absolute line of action…The colonized man finds his freedom in and through violence."[646] Again, Nayar contends that Fanon sees tribal wars as an example of such violence where the "wretched" natives turn

[643] Omwomo, "Revisiting Frantz Fanon in the era of Globalization."
[644] Nayar, *Postcolonialism*, 9.
[645] Ibid.
[646] Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, 67-8.

upon each other because they are hunted by their failure to turn against the colonial master. As noted, Fanon infamously characterised "violence as a cleansing force. It frees the native from his inferiority complex and from his despair and inaction; it makes him fearless and restores his self-respect.[647] Nayar further contends that Fanon claims that violence creates a new social consciousness and fosters relationship against the colonial masters, even attributing "therapeutic properties to it."[648] As Fanon remarks:

> During the colonial period, the people are called upon to fight against oppression; after national liberation, they are called upon to fight against poverty, illiteracy and under development. The struggle, they say, goes on. The people realize that life is an unending contest. We have said that the native's violence unifies the people.[649]

Fanon recognises the importance of cultural nationalism when he advocated the concept of a "national literature" and "national culture" in *The Wretched of the Earth* heading to a "national consciousness." Fanon believes that "national culture" had to be a greater pan-African feeling and not just a thin sectarian-tribal one.[650]

Edmund Burke III believes it is typical of Fanon's thinking that the people should choose culture rather than material conditions in realising the African revolution. Burke notes that Fanon believes in the new order that promotes African consciousness that will be supported by an authentic peoples' culture rather than a culture imposed on the people by outsiders. He points out that Fanon explains two types of culture that may emerge after African revolution: the "pseudo-national" culture which most African leaders have embraced. Fanon

[647] Ibid., 74.
[648] Nayar, *Postcolonialism*, 10.
[649] Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, 74.
[650] Nayar, *Postcolonialism*, 10.

advocates a way out of the dilemma, namely, evolving a national consciousness which can go beyond narrow nationalism.[651]

Michael W. Sonnleitner, moreover, states that there are three primary goals important to Fanon's liberation: first, promoting individual self-respect, second, realising political independence and third, creating a new humanity. Sonnleitner links the three together as Fanon's reason for violence. As mentioned above, it was in his position as a psychiatrist that Fanon formulated his consternation for promoting individual self-respect.[652] Fanon argues that he wants to "help the black man free himself of the arsenal of complexes that have been developed by the colonial environment."[653] Fanon affirmed that the rejection of individual self-respect is shown in a colonised people in whom the "black man is inherently inferior to the white, or that he comes from a different stock."[654] Sonnleitner asserts that this complex entails the accepting of views that the colonisers find handy as they obtain and promote their political and economic dominance. Fanon, himself a black Martiniquean, showed how the internalised inferiority complex leads the oppressed to see themselves as lesser beings with an inferior culture representing "no culture, no civilization, no "long historical past."[655] Obliterating the myths linked with one's inferiority complex was crucial to the promotion of a new self-respect.[656]

For Sonnleitner, Fanon argued that violence is the last resort of the natives due to the colonial situation. He notes that the non-white natives of Algeria were forced to adopt white French culture and still, when they subjectively succeeded, they were not recognised as

[651] Edmund Burke III, "Frantz Fanon's *The Wretched of the Earth*." *Daedulus* 105, no. 1 (Winter 1976): 127-135.
[652] Michael W. Sonnleitner, "Of Logic and Liberation: Frantz Fanon on Terrorism." *Journal of Black Studies* 17, no. 3 (March 1987): 287-304.
[653] Fanon, *Black Skin, White Masks*, 19.
[654] Ibid., 18.
[655] Ibid., 21.
[656] Sonnleitner, "Of Logic and Liberation: Frantz Fanon on Terrorism," 289.

equals by the whites within that culture.[657] Sonnleitner states that the colonial settler in Algeria thus became responsible for establishing a dichotomous world of settler and native, oppressor and oppressed. Such colonial institutions reinforced the myth of inferiority.[658] To show the totalitarian character of colonial exploitation, the settler paints the native as a sort of quintessence of evil as Fanon wrote.[659]

4.11 Frantz Fanon's Critics and Supporters on Violence

Sonnleitner, Tony Martin, and Chuan-Rong Yeh all note that Fanon's experience as a psychiatrist working in an Algerian hospital where patients he examined suffered from: "agitated nervous depressions, loss of appetite arising from mental causes, motor instability torture by electricity…. brainwashing, verbal stereotype, inhibition"[660] fuelled his decision that violence was a necessary means. Sonnleitner insists that it was also in his position as a revolutionary that Fanon advocated political violence. Fanon feels that the natives were exploited by a "colonialist, capitalist society that is only accidentally white." Sonnleiter notes that Fanon puts forward a mechanism for replacing colonial powers. As an alternative, Fanon advances a "decentralization in the extreme," where the persecuted become capable of fundamentally changing society.[661] Additionally, Sonnleitner reminds us that Fanon was a psychiatrist turned revolutionary and maintained that "decolonization is the veritable creation of new men." A new humanity, Fanon believed, will emerge from the class conflict in which the capitalist colonialist is beaten, and a new cultural identity is formed within which every person shall be their own master.[662]

[657] Ibid.
[658] Ibid.
[659] Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, 32.
[660] Ibid., 227-228, 230.
[661] Sonnleitner, "Of Logic and Liberation: Frantz Fanon on Terrorism," 292.
[662] Ibid., 294.

For Tony Martin, however, Fanon's violence should be taken literally. Martin observes that Fanon admires Sékou Touré. Fanon's admiration stems from Touré's mobilising a revolutionary intellectual elite in communion with the populace. By taking a step against imperialism and neocolonialism, Martin stresses that Fanon seems to be saying here that once you have showed your resolve for a fight, and colonisers retract without a violent confrontation, then there is no need to pursue the receding adversary and pick a fight just for the sake of shedding blood.[663] Must there are limits to any violent act.

For Chuan-Rong Yeh, Fanon has incorporated the safest violence theory with the deepest empathy. Yeh said that Fanon "integrated the firmest violence theory with the most profound humanitarian compassion; he resorted to the simplest and the most direct means of violence to resolve black people's spiritual experience of the most implicit taboo."[664] Yeh points out that Fanon employed the simplest and advocated as little violence as possible for the most affect, the most direct means of violence to solve black people's quest for freedom.[665] Here Yeh agrees with Fanon in his application of violence. Fanon's intention was purely to free the indigenous people from the clutches of colonialism and decolonise their areas.

Neil Roberts also shows how violence becomes an important factor in Fanon's idea of anti-colonial self-determination. Roberts argues that Fanon's stances on violence is intrinsically valuable in the anti-colonial struggle for liberty. Similar critics such as Sonnleiter and Martin concurred: Fanon wrote that it is only through violence that the colonised can achieve freedom. He observes that Fanon's application for violent means was for anti-colonial struggle. Fanon wrote *The Wretched of the Earth* on behalf of the colonised

[663] Tony Martin, "Rescuing Fanon from the Critics." *African Studies Review* 13, no. 3 (1970): 381-399.
[664] Chuan-Rong Yeh, "Existential Thoughts in Fanon's Post-colonialism Discourse." *Policy Futures in Education* 11, no. 2 (2013): 211.
[665] Ibid.

people through the Algerian experience. Fanon, he remarks, posed a salient question: how does a colonised subject manage to fulfil its mission of achieving independence and decolonisation in the wake of colonial terror and violence?[666] According to Roberts, Fanon's answer was simply revolutionary violence:

> National liberation, national renaissance, the restoration of nationhood to the people, commonwealth: whatever may be the headings used or the new formulas introduced, decolonization is always a violent phenomenon. At whatever level we study it – relationships between individuals, new names for sports clubs, the human admixture at cocktail parties, in the police, on the directing boards of national or private banks – decolonization is quite simply the replacing of a certain species of men by another 'species' of men.[667]

Roberts avers that revolutionary violence in the anti-colonial context places the colonised people in a position of scapegoats. He states that the phenomenological crisis of western civilisation refers to the amalgamation of the indigenous people of Africa by resorting to violence to achieve freedom. This freedom, according to Roberts, has two phases of the theory of liberation proposed by Fanon. First, calling into question the status quo. Fanon realises that the colonised grasp that their difficulty in a modern capitalist society is psychologically, economically, and politically unfair. Second, he links stage one of the theories of liberation to the violent violation of the coloniser and to cleanse the entire being of the colonised. The final moment, according to Fanon, was the link to the second phase of liberatory mediation. This is necessary for the coloniser to build upon more organised forms

[666] Neil Roberts, "Fanon, Sartre, Violence, and Freedom." *Sartre Studies International* 10, no. 2 (2004): 139-160.
[667] Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, 1.

of violence, turn over a new leaf, develop a socialist political system, work out new concepts, and try to set a new humanism.[668]

Sehar Shaheryar also supports Fanon's justifications for the application of violence. He said that Fanon sets out a compelling reason for why decolonisation and violence go hand in hand, but rather rejects non-violent resistance as the preservation of the capitalist and colonial state. Shaheryar adduces Fanon's rationalisations for violence that "violence is the language spoken by colonialists and that violence is the only way to respond to an inherently violent system, the way in which non-violence only seeks to empower elites and the idea of violence as a cleansing for colonised people."[669] Shaheryar contends that Fanon sees violence as a vital phenomenon because it functions as a cleansing force. Shaheryar states that it is an inclusive act that restores the native's self-respect.[670]

On the other hand, critics such as B.K. Jha, Hannah Arendt and Oladipo Fashina argue that Fanon's use of violence cannot be justified. B.K. Jha argues that Fanon is wrong in regarding violence as a cause of colonial schism. He notes that Fanon does not say in what exact way violence causes the hostility of the native. Jha states that for example, in the colonised culture like Algeria the violence of the coloniser was not the only form of violence and that the colonised were equally violent. Jha queries how can we be sure that a certain alienation voiced by a certain group is not the consequence of native's own violence, separate from the violence of the colonial system?[671]

Hannah Arendt criticised Fanon's violent approach to decolonisation as very wrong. Arendt noted that Fanon glorifying violence as a legitimate tool in achieving independence

[668] Roberts, "Fanon, Sartre, Violence, and Freedom," 142-143.
[669] Sehar Shaheryar, "Is Decolonisation always a Violent Phenomeno." E-International Relations, May 9, 2020. https://www.e-ir-info/2020/05/09/is-decolonisation-always-a-violent-phenomenon/
[670] Ibid.
[671] Ibid., 363

as lacking in morals: "Violence is not a legitimate tool to achieve political ends because of its inherent unpredictability, and because it is just as likely to engender a more violent world as to achieve the ends."[672]

Oladipo Fashina argues Fanon's claims for anti-colonial violence did not appeal to common humanity. To start with, we might assume that appeal to humanity could lead to the avoidance of a violent hostility in one of these ways: it may cause in the coloniser a disposition or provide for him a convincing reason to recognise that, like him, the colonised is a human being and so ought to be treated with equal concern and equal respect. Or, as an appeal to the colonised, it might be a call to shun violence because this would cause everyone, including the colonised themselves, to lose respect for human life; in short, violence would dehumanise the colonised as well.[673]

4.12 My Position on Frantz Fanon's Use of Violence

I am critical of Fanon's prescription of violence as a legitimate means available to nationalists fighting to liberate their countries. It is not the right approach to take, though the events in the 1950s and 1960s at the heat of the struggle for the independent nationalists' movement had to result in anti-colonial movements to free Africa from colonial rule. Violence sometimes seemed necessary. For instance, in Kenya, the activities of Mau Mau freedom fighters.

Mwangi Wa-Githumo states that between World War I and World War II, Kenyans developed deep sentiment within the hierarchy of some of Kenya's proto nationalists and that the political, economic and educational desires of the indigenous people could never be accomplished without an organised armed rebellion. Wa-Githumo observes that between

[672] Erin L. McCoy, "Frantz Fanon's Call to Anti-Colonial Violence." *ProQuest Discovery Quides* (2011): 4, 10.
[673] Oladipo Fashina, "Frantz Fanon and the Ethical Justification of Anti-Colonial Violence." *Social Theory and Practice* 15, no. 2 (Summer 1989): 185.

1946 and 1952, this consciousness was transformed into the formation of a movement, known as the Mau Mau. The chronicle of the Mau Mau movement is, thus, primarily the history of the struggle for the return of all lands that had been commandeered from Kenya's agrarian and pastoral communities by European settlers and commercial companies. This movement seeks the workers and peasants' support in an organised manner against the colonial government. The Mau Mau movement was strengthened in its early stages by a series of political and religious stirrings through oath-taking as well as nationalistic songs, which the colonial establishments characterised as subversive. The Mau Mau freedom fighters' stances toward Britain was motivated by the colonial "draconian land ordinances" which the Mau Mau movement viewed as repressive and discriminatory. These freedom fighters assumed, and many Kenyans shared their beliefs, that the colonial land and labour policies and their attendant legislations were abhorrent peppered with pretence, cruelty and racism.[674]

Ultimately, I believe in Gandhi's non-violent approach. His propagation and practice of non-violence as a fundamental belief of his political philosophy is the antithesis to Fanon's violent approach to national liberation struggle. Gandhi denounces violent revolution and prefers to use non-violent means of affecting social change. Gandhi's philosophy and personal examples serve as a major source of inspiration to many nationalists' movement all over the world.[675] For instance, Nigerian nationalists led by Dr Nnamdi Azikiwe, Ahmadu Bello and Obafemi Awolowo prefer dialogue, engagements with the colonial powers, namely Britain, rather than engaging in violence. Azikiwe achieves these through a series of conferences both in London and Lagos which gave birth to 1960 Nigerian

[674] Mwangi Wa-Githumo, "The Truth About the Mau Mau Movement: The Most Popular Uprising in Kenya." *Transafrican Journal of History* 20 (1991): 1.
[675] Harish Trivedi, "Revolutionary Non-Violence: Gandhi in Postcolonial and Subaltern Discourse." *Interventions, International Journal of Postcolonial Studies* 13, no. 4 (2011): 522.

independence. Again, Fanon's violent advocacy will not find room in my Nigeria case scenario. I agree with his arguments against colonialism but disagree with his stand on violence.

For more than a half-century, some Africans had pressed for the lifting of colonial rule largely through nonviolent resistance using a wide range of action methods. These ranged from the most basic petitions to demonstrations and marches, to sophisticated forms of economic non-cooperation, such as boycotts, strikes, and *hijra*.[676] According to Desmond George-Williams, the earliest reported strike may have been in 1890 among railway workers on the Dakar–Saint Louis line, in West Africa. Women from Dahomey who were employed in Cameroon went on strike in 1891. Strike actions also took place in Dahomey itself. The historian Basil Davidson describes a labourers' strike in Lagos in 1897 as "the first major colonial strike."[677] For instance, in colonial Nigeria, the Aba Women's riot was a reminder of nonviolent means to press home their grievances against the colonial policy of taxation and imposition of the Warrant Chiefs in Igboland. They began nonviolent protests in November 1929 and continued them for more than a month. The women chose singing and dancing as their action methods, at times composing songs ridiculing their opponents or articulating their grievances. On occasion they occupied the compounds of the targets of their protests. The women not only demanded that they not be taxed, but they also insisted on the resignation of warrant chiefs as the symbols of colonial authority who had become the objects of their protests and the abolition of their offices.[678]

Chika Kelechi Ubaka, Anyalewaechi Chikezie Emeh and Nkiru Chinenye Anyikwe state that the Zikist movement emerged in February 1946 to demand reforms from colonial

[676] Desmond George-Williams, '*Bite Not One Another' Selected Accounts of Nonviolent Struggle in Africa* (Addis Ababa: University of Peace, 2016), 33.
[677] Ibid., 32.
[678] Ibid., 82-3.

master Britain. The Zikist movement aimed to achieve this through a more positive and radical action. The Zikist movement "sought to undermine and destroy the administration through strike, demonstrations, leaflets, and boycotts". Leaflets were secretly published and considered seditious by colonial administrators but circulated by the movement among its members and the public. The movement engineered demonstrations and protest in the Southeast region. An archetypal example was the riot that broke out in several parts of the country such as Aba, Port Harcourt, Onitsha, and Calabar, following the confrontation in Enugu in November 1949 where the police shot down peaceful and unarmed striking miners. In addition, the movement urged workers to refuse to pay taxes. It not only advocated a fight against bias in the salary and working conditions of white and black workers, but likewise fought against prejudice in social interaction. In fact, the outcomes connected with the activities of the Zikists made it possible for Nigeria to escape from racial discrimination. Following the bad experiences gathered from its radical activities, the colonial government agreed to reforms. This change brought about the successive constitutional reforms witnessed during that era.[679]

George-Williams states that the independence struggles in Africa took different forms, depending on local traditions and conditions, the colonial authorities and their reaction to the petitioning for independence, and the determination and willpower of Africans themselves. In British West Africa, the struggle was largely nonviolent and involved petitions, mass rallies, media campaigns, strikes, boycotts, and appeals to the international community.[680] For instance, Nkrumah launched a campaign of 'positive action' to involve workers and persons from all walks of life in nationwide boycotts and strikes. In the

[679] Chika Kelechi Ubaka, Anyalewaechi Chikezie Emeh and Nkiru Chinenye Anyikwe, "Impact of Nationalist Movement on the Actualisation of Nigerian Independence, 1914-1960." *International Journal of History and Philosophical Research* 2, no. 1 (March 2014): 63.
[680] George-Williams, '*Bite Not One Another' Selected Accounts of Nonviolent Struggle in Africa*, 36.

pamphlet 'What I Mean by Positive Action,' Nkrumah describes positive action as "a civil disobedience campaign of agitation, propaganda and as a last resort, the constitutional application of strikes, boycotts, and non-cooperation based on the principles of absolute nonviolence." The aim was, among other pursuits, to force the colonial government to summon a constituent assembly that would eventually lead to full self-government for the country. When Nkrumah announced 5 January 1950 as the start of positive action, the populace had by that time been prepared for it through newspapers and public meetings and rallies.[681]

In postcolonial Nigeria, labour strike and boycotts were equally employed. They initiated strike actions and boycotts as nonviolent economic and political methods to demand redress for their complaints. For instance, by July 1994, a series of oil workers' strikes had begun, increasing the pain of the government and triggering financial setbacks for the oil extracting companies. NUPENG and PENGASSAN, unions of junior and senior staff workers, went on strike on 4 and 12 July, respectively. The workers' demands ranged from government dialogue with communities in which oil was produced to the declaration of the winner of the annulled 1993 presidential elections. The economic effect of the strike on the oil-industry became apparent with the statements by three major oil companies of a loss of more than $200 million in 1993.[682]

Again, the the method of strategic planning is apparent in the nonviolent struggle of the Ogoni people. The formation of MOSOP and the publication of the Ogoni Bill of Rights suggest preliminary assessment and analysis as well as a degree of strategic development. Bringing together several organisations and individuals, such as chiefs, women, and youths, under the supervision of MOSOP showed Saro-Wiwa's solid grasp of the situation. The

[681] Ibid., 45.
[682] George-Williams, 'Bite Not One Another' Selected Accounts of Nonviolent Struggle in Africa, 72-73.

gradual sensitisation of the people, education for eventual self-determination, and campaign of mass nonviolent action also underline intentional strategic planning.[683] The sensitisation through nonviolent means and campaign against environment pollution and marginalisation of Ogoniland attracted sympathy of international communities, news medias, and civil societies to put pressure on the government and major oil companies operating in the Ogoniland.

To create an enabling environment for a prosperous and unified country, Nigeria, for example, initiated a national youth's programme to promote diversity and exchange of culture. In 1973 the government of Nigeria created the National Youth Service Corps (NYSC); the aim of which was to help bring a greater United Nigeria through integration and cooperation, irrespective of nationalities and religions.

The NYSC was never an instrument for a non-violent approach nor has any semblance to Gandhi's non-violence approaches. NYSC was established as a part of nation building by the youths of Nigeria. According to Otwin Marenin, Decree No. 24 which established the National Youth Service Corps (N.Y.S.C.) was published on 23 May I973. The National Directorate was launched the following month, with Professor Adebayo Adedeji as Chairman and Lieutenant Colonel A. Ali as Director. The first students were enlisted in early July and sent to their orientation camps in the States to which they had been allocated. In his inaugural address to the youths, the Head of State, Generla Yakubu Gowon asks the youths to be "good emissaries to the various parts of the Federation." He tasks them "to behave and to learn, and to take an active interest in the local people hereby contributing their essential quota to the realisation of our national objective of building a strong, united

[683] Ibid., 74.

and self-reliant nation.[684] Another way to aid national consciousness and enlightenment among Africans is to bring together the masses and the intellectuals and, through movements like Pan Africanism and Negritude, help reclaim black pride, cultures, and histories.[685]

4.11 Conclusion

As noted, Fanon, in his canonical work *Black Skin, White Masks, write,* that colonialism is concerned with dispossessing Africans of their pride and identity. In *The Wretched of the Earth,* he points out the reasons behind colonialism and the ruin it brought to the native mores. The colonial power's plan was to wipe away African culture and to turn Africa into a continent without identity and traditions.

Consequently, *Black Skin, White Masks* is a message of appeal to the natives against complacency. He believes that the people should show no sign of weakness in the face of colonialism and should always be alert against European incursion and should not believe whatever they tell them or promise them.

Fanon's argument underlines the colonial aptitude to devise another means of colonisation. He asks the people to be careful and to work towards their own development instead of relying on Western prescriptions. He maintains that the influence of the colonial powers in the affairs of Africa and Asia continue to be visible. He contends that the old "European Empire" has now made its metamorphosis into a new identity by trying new tricks in ruling the world through default as it creates new laws to legitimise its new operations. He reiterates that direct colonial rule may have gone but colonialism, which covers cultural, economic, and political knowledge is still with us.[686]

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[684] Otwin Marenin, "National Service and National Consciousness in Nigeria." *The Journal of Modern Studies* 17, no. 4 (December 1979): 633.
[685] Nayar, Postcolonialism: A Guide for the Perplexed, 87.
[686] Ibid, xviii – xix.

For Fanon, the notion of universalism should be based on the concepts of dignity, equality and equity that will advance the course of humanity. He believes that any system that only projects and perpetuates injustice and subjugation should not be considered universal since the current discourse perpetuates that injustice and inequality and privileges Western culture to the detriment of other cultures.[687]

From this perspective, Fanon argues that "Black" refers to the non-West and those who have emerged from a different history. He believes that the non-West has the duty to develop on they own by employing the tools and instruments from Western civilisation. But the problem is that the emergence of Western colonialism. It has had a profound influence on the culture of the people, there is a likelihood that this cultural adulteration will in the long run have an adverse effect on the people. Fanon writes:

> If Western civilization and culture are responsible for colonial racism, and Europe itself has a racist structure, then we should not be too surprised to find this racism reflected in the discourses of knowledge that emanate from this civilization and that they work to ensure that structural dominance is maintained.[688]

Fanon underlines the inherent problem of racism in the system which was passed to the selected elite who will perpetuate their legacy. Through the selected elite, they ensure that their political and economic influence continues to be felt by the people.

To sum up Fanon's criticism of colonialism, he believes that the only cure for colonialism which provokes "mental illness" in the colonised and colonisers in a similar way is through freedom. He adduces that the structure of the colonialist system as a "Manichean" world[689] is constructed by the colonialist, in which everything that is white is good and whatever is

[687] Ibid, xvii.
[688] Fanon, *Black Skin, White Masks*, xv.
[689] Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, 31.

black is evil. He contends that since the colonial system is constructed to humiliate blacks, the only panacea available to the people is through "physical and emotional" acts of violence with violence being used at the same speed until the foothold on the people is relinquished. Fanon concludes that brutal revolt has the capability to exacerbate the disorder of the colonised while bringing together the natives as a foundation for a modern country.[690]

For Fanon, the notion of universalism should be based on the concepts of dignity, equality, and equity as that will advance the course of humanity.[691]

Tage S. Rai, Piercarlo Valdesolo and Jesse Graham argue that the failure to accept other people as fellow human beings is a basic agent of violence across cultures and throughout history and it is called "dehumanisation." According to them, this practice is thought to have allowed colonists to kill indigenous peoples as if they were insects, and colonialists to own blacks as if they were pieces of wood. They noted that the dehumanisation theory was constructed along with theories contending that violence is driven largely by instrumental gain or hasty reactions, and that a greater understanding of our shared humanity would lead to more peaceful relationships. Even though these concepts vary in emphasis, together they presume that violence is restricted in part by a sense of moral responsibility and empathy toward fellow human beings, whom we feel have rights and protections that forbid violence. However, they emphasise that dehumanisation on the other hand causes perpetrators to see victims as bestial and, as a result, not permitted to moral duty or compassion, thus allowing wrongdoers to act out their violent desires free of reticence and without compunction.[692]

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[690] Erin, L. McCoy, 2011, "*Frantz Fanon's Call to Anti-Colonial Violence.*" ProQuest Discovery Guides. http://www.csa.com/discoveryguides/discoveryguides-main.php

[691] Ibid., xvii.

[692] Tage S. Rai, Piercarlo Valdesolo and Jesse Graham, "Dehumanisation Increases Instrumental Violence, but not Moral Violence." *Proceedings of the National Academy of Science of the United States of America* 114, no. 32 (August 2017): 8511.

Fanon writes from the point of view of a colonised subject. He is a citizen with a direct knowledge of racial discrimination who has formed a natural and passionate revulsion of racism, especially through his role in the resistance in the Caribbean and France. Fanon contends that when a black man meets the white world, he goes through an experience of fear. His ego disintegrates. His self-esteem vanishes. He ceases to be an inspired person. The entire intent of his comportment is to mimic the Whiteman, to develop like him, and therefore hope to be recognised as a man. He believes that it is a sign of weakness. Fanon concludes if you want to become moral in the white world, Fanon adduces that it is important we start being black, start being true to our identity and who we are.[693]

Fanon's resentment is not limited to a black man who prefers to be identified as white. He is also dismissive of the man who idolises the Negro. Fanon claims he is as naive as the man who despises him. Hence, the fanciful Negro is also a creation of the White man. He exemplifies the reverse side of the Enlightenment. He is fashioned not as a genuine person with true history but an image.[694] He writes, "This Negro was born out of the need of European humanism to rescue itself from its moral purgatory and project itself, and displace, the original inhabitants of Latin America and Caribbean."[695] Fanon insists that freedom starts by acknowledging these structures for what they are. The first thing he notes is the "arrival of the awareness is self-loathing: as I begin to recognize that the Negro is the symbol of sin, I catch myself hating the Negro."[696] Fanon's contentions here is that he is expressing a common sentiment: that if a black man can only see bad about what is his history, culture is not worth living. Rather he should stand up and be counted, be proud of who he is, irrespective of the colonialist denigration of his culture. He notes that there is a way to

[693] Ibid., xiii.
[694] Sardar, "Foreward to the 2008 Edition," xiii-xiv.
[695] Ibid., xiv.
[696] Ibid.

freedom, "to rise above the absurd drama that others have staged around me, to reject the two terms that are equally unacceptable, and, through one human being, to reach out for the universal."[697]

Fanon notes that to rise above the absurd that the colonialists have staged around the colonialised, he has to reject the negative construction of a black man and all he stands for. He doubts the claim of universal nature of western culture which Europeans claim represent civilisation. He queries "if western civilisation and culture are responsible for colonial racism, and Europe itself has a racist structure, then we should not be too surprised to find this racism reflected in the discourses of knowledge that emanate from this civilisation and that they work to ensure that structural dominance is maintained."[698]

However, Fanon's concept of universalism is based on the beliefs of dignity, equality, and respect for each tradition. He believes that universalism can only happen when all traditions and culture are equal.

Nayar describes Fanon as a humanist. He notes that a comprehensive scrutinising of all Fanon's books reveals a new form of humanism, one that would be all-encompassing and would reject the European enlightenment paradigm. Nayar points out that Fanon suggests an ethics of recognition of difference within the postcolonial model as a right step on the path of new humanism. He notes that Fanon suggests that "oppressed peoples join up with peoples who are already sovereign if a humanism that can be considered valid is to be built to the dimensions of the universe" in what is surely universalism.[699] Fanon writes,

Why writes this book?

[697] Ibid.
[698] Ibid., xv.
[699] Nayar, Frantz Fanon: Towards A Postcolonial Humanism." *The IUP Journal of Commonwealth Literature* 111, no. 1 (2011): 3.

Towards a new humanism….

Understanding among men ….

Our coloured brothers….

Mankind, I believe in you….

Race prejudice….

To understand and to love….[700]

Fanon argues that the use of violence has two specific objectives in the new world order, and it can only be realised first, when the coloniser is ejected out of the land of the natives and can only be achieved through violence. Fanon did not see anything wrong in the application of violence to remove the coloniser from the indigenous land. His premise is that the violence of the indigenous people against the coloniser is because of the violence intrinsic in the colonial system. He points out that the colonial violence is rooted in the dialectic of the master-slave relationship, where the only way of achieving selfhood by the brutalised slave is by violence because it is the only language the colonialists understand.[701]

The second points Fanon notes are of the coloniser's self-realisation and the cure of prejudice, an objectives Fanon views as possible only through violence.[702]

Nayar avers that it was on the second method of violence as aimed at self-realisation that Fanon locates the prospects of new identity and humanism. He argues that it is through liberation struggle by the indigenous people that the former slave can assert recognition from the coloniser. Nayar adduces that Fanon maintains that violence by the natives through

[700] Fanon, *Black Skin, White Masks*, 1.
[701] Nayar, "Frantz Fanon: Towards A Postcolonial Humanism," 4-5.
[702] Ibid.

liberation and decolonisation consequently becomes the anterior moment: "a new subjectivity and cultural identity, and a new humanism."[703] On the other hand, Fanon articulates his universalist position when he said:

> If man is judged by his acts, then I would say that the most urgent thing for the African intellectual is the building of his nation. If this act is true, i.e., if it expresses the manifest will of the people, if it reflects the restlessness of the African peoples, then it will necessarily lead to the discovery and advancement of universalizing values. Far then from distancing it from other nations, it is the national liberation that puts the nation on the stage of history. It is at the heart of national consciousness that international consciousness establishes itself and thrives. And this dual emergence, in fact, is the unique focus of all culture.[704]

Fanon's arguments on the "discovery and advancement of universalizing values" are only feasible at the national level. Fanon believes that universalism is in "the stage of history" and "international consciousness." Fanon wants to see equal relationship based on mutual respect between former colonists and colonised natives, and both as equal players in international arena. Fanon believes in a national consciousness and of culture, which "universalises," or "internationalises." He argues that culture helps developing nations establish itself universally, while maintaining its national identity.[705]

Furthermore, Fanon contends that national culture is intricately linked to the struggle for liberation and, by so doing, comprehends the nature of the universality and its relation to culture. Fanon contends that colonialism brings with it cultural apathy, however, he adduces that cultural dynamism can be reclaimed only through "national consciousness," understood

[703] Ibid.
[704] Alexander Fyfe, The Specificity of the Literary and Its Universalizing Function in Frantz Fanon's "On National Culture." *International Journal of Postcolonial Studies* 19, no. 16 (2017): 771.
[705] Ibid.

as a consciousness of the realism of colonial subjugation and one that can only be achieved through involvement in the struggle for liberation.[706]

Therefore, Fanon's voice is as important and relevant today as it was during the 1950s and 60s. Indeed, in many respects it is even more so. For Fanon, the nature and mode of oppression is still with us. It is utopian to try to ascertain how behaviour differs from another kind of inhuman behaviour. The inhumanity of today is not different from the inhumanity of yesteryears for all sources of exploitation resembles one another; they are all applied against the same "object: man." We need to do more, Fanon insists, than simply be aware of this reality; we need to take continuous action to transform and transcend this reality."[707]

Fanon contends that anti-colonial struggle is best fought through the level of violence. To achieve that victory, it must be the collective will of the people and not the national elite so such a situation can produce true nationalists. Fanon cautions against extreme nationalism which he claims may backfire and lead to ethnic and internecine war. He proposes an "awakening of the intelligence and consciousness of the people." He believes that through such sentiments, true leaders and a culture of the people will be triumphant. He said, "the awakening of the whole people will not come about all at once; the people's work in the building of the nation will not immediately take on its full dimension."[708] Fanon wants to shift the focus from nationalism to national consciousness. Such an idea, he believes will possess an "international dimension" and bring together both African intellectuals and the masses.[709]

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[706] Ibid., 770.
[707]Ziauddin Sardar, "Foreword to the 2008 Edition." In Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks, xix.
[708] Pramod K. Nayar, *Postcolonialism: A Guide for the Perplexed* (London: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2010), 87.
[709] Ibid.

Fanon argues that "direct colonial rule may have disappeared; but colonialism, in its many disguises as cultural, economic, political and knowledge-based oppression, lives on."[710] In March 1960 Fanon was appointed Representative of the Algerian provisional Government in Accra, Ghana. While in Accra, Fanon's key interest was to open a southern border in Mali through which arms and men could be sent to aid the Algerian war effort. Hansen contends that Fanon was as also apprised of the armed struggle in Angola and the events in the Congo (now Zaïre). He identifies the social and political ills of Africa and the Third World. Fanon contends that there has been no efficient decolonisation in Africa since colonialism's economic, political, and social structures have not been removed. Fanon states that what occurred at independence was the Africanisation of colonialism. Fanon writes, "There can be no effective decolonisation and consequently no freedom so long as the colonial structures remain. And to achieve this he recommends revolutionary decolonisation, which will not only destroy the formal structures but also liberate alienated consciousness."[711]

Hansen notes that the truth that in some countries of Africa independence was realised without the need of armed conflict does not necessarily invalidate Fanon's thesis. The struggle is not only for power but for decolonization, a social revolution. Autonomy can be taken only as a foothold for revolutionary decolonisation. Hansen contends that it does not appear as if the leaders of Africa's nationalists' movements clearly comprehend the nature and the elements of the revolutionary struggle. For instance, Nnamdi Azikiwe's statement on becoming Nigeria's first African president is particularly interesting. Hansen quotes Azikwe:

[710] Sardar, "Foreword to the 2008 Edition."
[711] Emmanuel Hansen, "Freedom and Revolution in the Thought of Frantz Fanon." *Africa Development* 2, no. 1 (February 1977): 22.

As for me, my stiffest earthly assignment is ended, and my major life's work (sic) is done. My country is now free, and I have been honoured to be its first indigenous Head of State. What more could a man desire in life?[712]

According to Hansen the independence has barely begun, and leaders like Azikiwe have already abandoned it.[713]

Thus, the first generation of African thinkers gained from Fanon's anti-colonial stands. His anti-colonialism and campaign for the dignity of Africans equally inspired African nationalists such as Sekou Toure, Patrick Lumumba, Eduardo Mondlane, Kwame Nkrumah, Ahmadu Bello, and Nnamdi Azikiwe on the resistance against colonialism and imperialism.[714] Again, Fanon was an inspiration and a tonic to the first generation of African writers such as Chinua Achebe, Wole Soyinka, Ngugi wa Thiong'o, Ayi Kwei Armah and a host of others representing the African struggle for cultural identity. All have contributed immensely to the growth of African arts and socio-economic and political development.[715] This was articulated by Hussein M. Adam in the following statements:

A number of African fiction writers have depicted Fanon-type criticisms of the African neo-bourgeoisie in their literary works. At least three such writers have acknowledged being directly influenced by Frantz Fanon: Ngugi Wa Thiong'O, Ayi Kwei Armah and Sembene Ousmane.[716]

Neil Lazurus echoes the same sentiments when he asserts that "not only Ngugi, Sembene and Armah but also Wole Soyinka and Chinua Achebe among others, tended to view the

[712] Ibid., 36-37.
[713] Ibid.
[714] Jock McCulloch, 1981. "Amilcar Cabral: A Theory of Imperialism." *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 19, no. 3 (Cambridge), 504.
[715] Ngugi wa Thiong' O, *Decolonising the Mind: The Politics of Language in Africa Literature*. (Oxford: James Currey, 2005), 98.
[716] Hussein M. Adam, "Frantz Fanon as a Democratic Theorist." *African Affairs* 92, no. 369 (October 1993): 505.

postcolonial situation in the light of the theories of the Third World analyst and revolutionary Frantz Fanon."[717]

Ngugi wa Thiong'O posits that literature is an authoritative medium in developing the cultural ethos of the people. He notes that "every language has its own social and cultural basis, and these are instrumental in the formation of mental process and value judgement…literature as part of the whole ideological mechanism for integrating a people into the values of a dominant class, race, or nation. Imperialism, particularly during colonialism, provides the best example of how literature as an element of culture was used in the domination of Africa."[718]

Ngugi points out that during the colonial rule, the colonialist used western literature and English as an instrument employed in the domination of Africa. He is not saying the English language should not be taught in Africa, but other African languages should be taught in African schools, and certainly not denigrated. Ngugi points out that African languages should re-join themselves to the revolutionary traditions of an organised peasantry and working class in Africa in their fight to defeat imperialism and fashion a higher system of democracy.[719]

Thus, Adam asserts that the alienation of language is part of a feature of colonial domination. He notes that Fanon advances the need to liberate and develop national languages and cultures as part of democratisation.[720]

Adam also argues that African democratic participation would be meaningless without the use of African language spoken by most of the people. He avers that Fanon echoes the

[717] Neil Lazurus, *Resistance in Postcolonial African Fiction* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990).
[718] Ngugi, *Decolonising the Mind: The Politics of Language in African Literature*, 99.
[719] Ibid., 29-30.
[720] Adam, "Frantz Fanon as a Democratic Theorist," 507.

same view when he said that African democratic participation would be empty without active participation of Africans. For Adam, Fanon was among the contemporary scholars who identify class formation and the necessity of class analysis in comprehending African politics. Though Fanon did not underrate the necessity of ascriptive traits like race, language, religion, and ethnicity, Fanon's attachments to the questions of cultural divide is shown by several comments and notes in his works. Adam contends that Fanon maintains that Africa's revolutionary intellectuals will be able to respect 'traditional structures' and help them progress by giving them a 'nationalist' and 'progressive character.' By so doing, Adam posits, Fanon places his trust in sound leadership, in a group of 'revolutionary intellectuals' who would resolve paradoxes innate in class/ethnic features while enabling participatory democracy.[721]

Adam contends that despite Fanon's understanding of the role of ethnic factors in African politics, he is also aware of how primordial cleavages play in African societies: ethnic groups (tribes, clans), and religious communities. Fanon believes none of these groups should be ignored. Fanon disparages African intellectuals and political elites for ignoring significant ethnic, traditional and historical factors.[722]

In advancing fundamental decentralisation, Fanon is partly offering a way to lever on primordial cleavages. Fanon argues that these primordial cleavages can be checkmated through village, district, and regional levels while integrating other groups like trade unions, youth and women's organisations, peasant cooperative associations, and a multiplicity of voluntary organisations. Adam notes this is in keeping with Fanon's voluntarist, free choice idea of democracy.[723]

[721] Adam, "Frantz Fanon as a Democratic Theorist," 508-10.
[722] Ibid., 515-16.
[723] Ibid., 508, 516.

Why is Fanon's thoughts so important to Northern Nigerian causes? Again, why study Fanon? Fanon was a revolutionist, and a staunch internationalist who sees himself as part of anti-imperialist, anti-capitalist, and social crusaders. Critics have often argued that Fanon's works have become immaterial, that his understandings of the coloniser/colonised opposition was facilitated by race, identity, and racism, and are no longer necessary. They argue colonialism has ended, and the indigenous rule has been restored. William Hensen and Umma Musa contend that "the promises by postcolonial leaders are yet to be fulfilled, an issue which is central to Fanon."[724]

Fanon's *The Wretched of the Earth* goes far beyond racially divided peoples. The question is: who were the wretched in Fanon's mind? Obviously, the poor, depraved and backward masses. Fanon was deeply disturbed with problems of race, identity, and colonialism.[725]

The emergence of a divided society, the rise of religious fundamentalists, poverty, marginalisation in Northern Nigeria is consequence of, and a response to, the post-colonial Northern Nigeria which Fanon forewarned more than 59 years ago. It is within this larger insight of Fanon's work and what he advocates in his book that we witness today in the Northern region such as the rise of religious fundamentalists, division, marginalisation, and poverty. All these problems have created disharmony and the rise of the predator class who predominate since post-independence.

Fanon's work inspired a generation of 60s civil rights movements, black nationalists, new left radicals and third world revolutionaries. At the same time, he was criticised by

[724] William W. Hensen and Umma Aliyu Musa, "Fanon, the Wretched and Boko Haram." *Journal of Asia and African Studies* 48, no. 3 (2013): 282.
[725] Ibid.

Eurocentric scholars for his firm believe in decolonisation. Fanon thus became a rallying point of inspired nationalists and masses against imperialism and neo-colonialism.

According to Jock McCulloch, in the works of such political activists like Sekou Toure, Patrice Lumumba, Eduardo Mondlane, and Kwame Nkrumah on the struggle against colonialism, there are several shared fundamentals which, when taken together, found an African theory of imperialism. Rather ironically these shared fundamentals are obviously well defined in the works of Frantz Fanon and Aime Cesaire. They see imperialism and European civilisation as basically vicious. For Fanon and Cesaire, imperialism, they held, "had a distorting effect upon colonial societies, as well as a peculiarly corrupting influence upon the metropoles where it ran hand in hand with the rise of reactionary elements and, in particular, with fascism. Conceding that imperialism was an outgrowth of capitalism."[726]

The wretched of the earth live in Northern Nigeria today, where the rich dominate the poor and the majority oppresses the minority. The trend remains fundamentally the same, despite the racial character of either the "Dominant" or the "Subordinate." Fanon articulates this position when he said, "You are rich because you are white, you are white because you are rich."[727]

Northern Nigeria is diverse and complex. The two main religions Christianity and Islam straddle each other. As noted, the region has been at the centre of ethno-religious conflict and has seen a rise in religious extremism, poverty, marginalisation, and the manipulation of religion by politicians to cause division among the ethnic groups. At all levels of the Northern Nigerian government, there is a high level of mismanagement of the region's resources, corruption, and dishonesty by political leaders. Even the return to democratic rule

[726] Jock McCulloch, Amilcar Cabral: A theory of Imperialism." *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 19, no. 3 (September 1981): 504.
[727] Hensen and Musa, "Fanon, the Wretched and Boko Haram," 285.

in 1999 has not necessarily altered that reality. The masses are abused by politicians with unfulfilled promises. For instance, the masses pour their frustration and anger against the government of President Mohammadu Buhari. The anti-SARS protested the Nigerian police brutalities, extrajudicial killing, imprisonment, extortion, and called for disbandment of SARS.[728] The Special Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS) was set up by the Nigerian government in 1984 to fight organised crime in Nigeria. But SARS, instead of fighting crimes in Nigeria, became a conduit for sleaze and impunity. Stunned by the scale of the protests, and destruction, Nigeria's leaders have promised considerable responses that include probes into police brutalities. The most important step was to disband the Special Anti-Robbery Squad which was seen by Nigerians as corrupt.[729] For instance, we witnessed the rise of the masses in Nigeria against Special Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS). SARS was formed in 1992 to tackle violent crime such as car-jackings, armed robbery and kidnapping. SARS was originally conceived as a covert force, where the officers do not wear uniforms. However, this special arm of the Nigeria police force developed a reputation for brutality, extortion, rape, extrajudicial killings, and torture in Nigeria. Nigerians became impatient with the excesses of police brutality and jungle justice; the masses began a protest to police unrestrained behaviour and called for their disbandment. Which led to the hashtag #EndSARS trending in Twitter. The demonstrators demanded: immediate release of all arrested; justice for those killed by police and compensation for their families; an independent body to investigate and prosecute police misconduct within 10 days of a claim; independent psychological evaluation of disbanded SARS officers before they can be redeployed; increased salaries for police so they are "adequately compensated" for protecting lives and property.[730] In

[728] Rick Gladstone and Megan Specia, "Nigerian Police Brutality Crisis: What's Happening Now." *The New York Times* (London), November 14, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/articule/sars-nigeria-police.html.
[729] Ibid.
[730] Libby George, "Why Are Nigerians Protesting Against Police Brutality." *Reuters* (Toronto), October 16, 2020, https://ww.reuters.com/articule/us-nigeria-protests-police-sars-factbox/why-are-nigerians-protesting-against-police-brutality-idUSKBN2711TK.

response to the demands of the protesters, the police authority announced the disbandment of the unit on October 11, 2020. The President Muhammadu Buhari followed it up with the announcement of police reform and ordered states to set up compensation funds for victims of police callousness.[731]

It is such resistance, anticipated by Fanon, that continues in the present and is justified by the profound failure of the contemporary Northern Nigerian states to deliver on the promises made to the people of the region. Many youths in the region have been unable to find jobs and hence, provided willing recruits for unscrupulous politicians, and Islamic militant groups such as Boko Haram to fuel religious violence in the region.[732]

The mismanagement of the region's resources has been seen in an increase in poverty, unemployment, crime, disease, corruption, and the predator behaviour of the rich against the poor. Such forms of social deterioration are the legacy of the postcolonial Northern Nigerian state after 60 years of Nigerian independence. It is no longer acceptable to the people of the region to explain the region's underdevelopment and impoverishment in terms of the 'evils of colonialism' – a contention that Fanon postulated about. As has been noted in this study, Northern Nigeria is among the most impoverished and underdeveloped region in Nigeria.[733]

Fanon undeniably works in terms of race and colonialism, going beyond his time and place, and conveying a 'universalist' claim. He talks about 'humanity' in general, not black, or African or colonial humanity. In summary, as long as there are wretched communities, people or persons made to live in miserable conditions, as long as there are two types of society, "certain 'species of men by another 'species of men,"[734] i.e., two types of society;

[731] Ibid.
[732] Ibid.
[733] Hensen and Musa, "Fanon, the Wretched and Boko Haram," 289.
[734] Fanon, 27.

the poor and the rich, one that governs and abuses and one who must accept that dominance and abuse, Fanon will remain significant.[735]

Fanon wields an enormous influence in the field of post-colonialism. He also provides us with the understanding of organizational structures in colonial operations. Again, Fanon presents a lucidly and "lived" experience of the colonised people. In attempting to accomplish this, Fanon employs different models, such as psychoanalysis, literary (and poetic) texts, medical terminology, existential philosophy, and negritude.[736]

Fanon's theoretical understanding of the costs of control and subservience was much broader than a mere racial dichotomy. Hence, in Northern Nigeria both tyrants and persecuted are northerners. Religion like nationalism is an identity that can oust all others. Northern Nigerian identity has long been particularly delicate. In northern region, religious identities have supplanted ethno-national ones as the emphasis of allegiance. As Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) and its several successors surfaced from a combustible situation in Algeria, so has Boko Haram, herdsmen and farmers conundrums from a similar situation in Northern Nigeria.[737] The cause, put forward by Fanon is the consequences of bad leadership. Even the return to civilian rule in 1999 has not fundamentally altered endemic corruption, graft and dishonesty at all levels of governance. It is equally at the heart of the conditions of misery and impoverishment that have led to the rise of anti-systemic groupings of Nigeria[738] which especially the Northern youths irrespective of ethnicity and religion to revolt against the oppressive institutions, take their destiny on their own hands and demand for change. The October 2020 revolution in Nigeria was in line with Fanon's preaching and

[735] Hensen and Musa, "Fanon, the Wretched and Boko Haram," 291.
[736] Derek Hook, "Frantz Fanon, Steven Biko, 'Psychopolitics' and Critical Psychology." LSE Research Online (2004): 86, 91.
[737]Hensen and Musa, "Fanon, the Wretched and Boko Haram," 291-92.
[738] Ibid., 285.

writings. Fanon's books may have been written in 1952 and 1963 respectively but it resonates in Nigeria in 2020 by the masses who demanded justice, equity, and fairness. They demanded that Nigerian government not only improve the welfare of the masses but also to improve the welfare of the police.

In Chapter 5, I will examine the thought of a select group of two Nigerian postcolonial writers whose literary enquiry and examination raises useful questions and ways for the postcolonial Nigerian state and peace processes in Northern Nigeria with the focus on Chinua Achebe and Ahmadu Bello.

Chapter 5: Nigerian Postcolonial Thought: An Overview of Chinua Achebe and Ahmadu Bello

5.1 Overview of Nigerian Postcolonial Thought

After a brief overview of Nigerian postcolonial thought, this chapter focuses on Chinua Achebe and Ahmadu Bello, whose literary enquiry and examination raises useful questions and ways for the postcolonial Nigerian state and peace processes in Northern Nigeria. It will show how colonial legacies have impacted both positively and negatively on Nigeria. It will equally show how the postcolonial state has failed to address the social, economic and political demands of the people and the promises made to them.

Nigerian postcolonial writers bring into light the repression of a huge wealth of native cultures under the influence of colonial control.[739] As Ashcroft, Griffiths and Tiffin affirm:

> All postcolonial societies are still subject in one way or another to overt or subtle forms of neo-colonial domination, and independence has not solved this problem. The development of new elites within independent societies, often buttressed by neo-colonial institutions; the development of internal divisions based on racial, linguistic or religious discriminations; the continuing unequal treatment of indigenous peoples in settler/invader societies – all these testify to the fact that post-colonialism is a continuing process of resistance and reconstruction.[740]

Nasser Maleki and Maryam Navidi argue that in the backdrop of a heterogenous society, where colonised often live with their former colonisers, postcolonial authors try to reorder

[739] Nasser Maleki and Maryam Navidi, "Foregrounding Achebe's *Things Fall Apart*: A Postcolonial Study." *Canadian Social Science* 7, no. 6 (2011): 11.
[740] Ashcroft, Griffiths and Tiffin, *The Post-colonial Studies Reader*, 2.

new ethnic and cultural meanings to marginalised groups. Maleki and Navidi aver that postcolonial literature aims to build new identities against this externally imposed border.[741]

In post-colonial discourse, colonial legacy is identified as including an 'epistemic' aspect, i.e., an attack on the culture, ideas and value systems of the indigenous peoples. Colonial discourse shows a new way of thinking in which cultural, intellectual, economic, or political processes are seen to work together in the formation, perpetuation and demolishing of colonialism. Since Africa has also been the central point of the colonising superpowers under different ploys, it has, with the passage of time, created a sense of fragmentation and disintegration within the African community and therefore given birth to postcolonial critics.[742]

The works of the postcolonial thinkers such as Ahmadu Bello and Chinua Achebe's novels and essays have played an important role in the development of Nigerian postcolonial thought and native knowledge systems. Although these essays are mostly by-products of his creative works which articulated itself in the novel form, it is a tribute to Achebe's art that the examinations of his novels, as well as his own essays, are amongst the landmarks of the study on African literature.[743]

Abiola Irele argues that the colonial structure was based on a social division driven by the "colourline" and it was sustained by a cultural ideology which constructed a black man a lesser being. The social partnership between coloniser and the people were therefore constructed, and the people were partitioned into an opposition between white and black.[744]

[741] Maleki and Navidi, "Foregrounding Achebe's *Things Fall Apart*: A Postcolonial Study," 11.
[742] Ibid.
[743] Ibid.
[744] Abiola Irele, "Negritude – Literature and Ideology." *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 3, no. 4 (1965): 501.

He states that the colonial project was constructed as a social change designed at changing the black man to adopt the way of white men assimilate the values of western culture through education. This inferred in most cases to his disconnection from the original traits moulded in him by his unique culture. Western values were therefore a tool of forced assimilation, designed at altering the black man's unique way of life and perception, which go against his traditional values and belief, and are determined by foreign values of a European benchmark.[745]

Echoing Irele's statements, Ali Erritouni infers the structure of colonialism built on Lord Lugard's policies of indirect rule, which allowed the colonial officers to weaken African traditions and lay a foundation for colonial institutions that targeted the indigenous people. Erritouni contends that Achebe notes that those structures are still there, and the people faced another problem of enslavement such as neo-colonialism.[746]

Erritouni further states that Achebe does not heap all the political and economic crisis on the foot of colonialism and neo-colonialism. Achebe believes that the problem with the postcolonial Nigeria state was the inability of the leaders to connect with the masses. He maintained that most of the problem lies heavily on the postcolonial leaders who abandoned the people and instead pursued policies that favoured them and their cronies.[747]

The works of Nigerian postcolonial thinkers contributed immensely to the shaping of Nigerian national identity, consciousness and pride. Consider for example, Nigerian postcolonial thinkers, like Chinua Achebe, Chimamanda Adichie, Wole Soyinka, and Ahmadu Bello. To begin with, they are Nigerians from different ethnic groups and religious backgrounds. Achebe and Adichie are Igbos, Soyinka is a Yoruba and Bello is Hausa/Fulani.

[745] Ibid., 502.
[746] Ali Erritouni, "Contradictions and Alternatives in Chinua Achebe's Anthills of The Savannah." *Journal of Modern Literature* 29, no. 2 (2006): 58.
[747] Ibid.

In addition, Achebe and Adichie are novelists who are Christians, Soyinka is of an African Traditional Religion called Ogun (the god of Thunder), while Bello was a Muslim. Achebe and Soyinka belong to the first generation of Nigerian postcolonial writers. They experienced colonialism and political and social events during British rule. Most of their classics were written from the 1960s to 1990s whilst Adichie belongs to a fifth generation of Nigerian postcolonial writers, post-Biafran, post-Marxist and post-feminist. The fifth generation of writers is described as a generation of writers with new points of view, passion, ethics and concern for the post-colonial state,[748] while Bello was a statesman, politician, and former premier of Northern region before he was assassinated in a coup led by Major Chukwuma Nzeogwu on 1st January 1966. Bello was a defender of indigenisation and regionalism in Nigeria. His book, *My Life* was a chronicle of his life and ambition for the Northern region. These Nigerian postcolonial authors are politically committed activists in Nigerian politics.

My aim in the following is to highlight the richness and importance of Nigerian postcolonial literature in order to put forward inherited colonial legacies and postcolonial crises that have made the Nigerian states ungovernable and undemocratic. The works studied do not argue that pre-colonial Nigeria is the best. After all, before colonialism there were internecine wars, killing of twins and the slave trade.[749] Rather, their emphases are on the positive aspects of pre-colonial Nigeria which were washed away by alien rule in Nigeria, such as its hospitality, languages, brotherhood, culture and tradition. As Onwucheka and Madubuike argue, the behaviour of colonial administrators in Nigeria

[748] Chijioke Uwasombe, "Nigeria's New Writing and the Shrinking Imaginative Afflatus: Some Theoretical and Critical Responses." *The African Symposium*: *An Online Journal of the Educational Research Network* 13, no. 1(2013): 96.
[749] Chinweizu Onwucheka and Jemie Madubuike, "Towards the Decolonization of African Literature." *Transition* 48 (Indiana University Press, 1975), 54.

"blocked the channel of cultural transmission,"[750] and they also believe that two hundred years from now, when the future generations look at history books, they would find that they have nothing to refer to as their languages and symbols.[751]

Although these thinkers differ in scope, their purpose remains same, i.e., to depict the post-colonial situation and work for justice, truth and change. I will especially highlight Achebe because:

- He is not afraid to address real issues that affect Nigerian people such as bad leadership, corruption, nepotism, human rights abuse, imposition of culture, social justice, equality and man's inhumanity to man.

- He expresses' external aspects of human life that go beyond time, hatred, love, conflict, political deception, promises and failure, that are applicable to present day scenario.

- He writes in an ageless style. His thought-provoking arguments and suggestions are "cutting edge" for their time and he focuses on common issues that we are still dealing with today, such as the impact of colonialism, imperialism, neo-colonialism, poor governance, chauvinistic ethnicity and religious extremism.

- His works show that the Nigerians are hardworking, industrious, peaceful and loving.

- Through his works our stories are narrated to the world about Nigeria and Africa that are pure, truthful, unblemished, undistorted, representative and dignified.

[750] Ibid., 54.
[751] Onwucheka and Madubuike, "Towards the Decolonization of African Literature," 54.

I will also highlight Ahmadu Bello because:

- He is a Muslim aristocrat and great-great-grandson of Uthman Dan Fodio.
- His works and speeches show his passion and dreams for Northern Nigeria to be in the same page educationally and developmentally with Southern Nigeria.
- He is also not afraid to evangelise his religion of Islam to other regions, despite his acknowledgement of Nigeria's religious plurality.
- He is a strong defender of regionalism and true federalism. He believes that each region should manage its resources and develop at its own pace without compromising national unity.
- He is also an apostle of the northernisation policy, which he vehemently supported despite criticism from his southern counterparts.

5.2 Introduction

The shift from amalgamation of Southern and Northern Nigeria in 1914[752] to independence in 1960[753] entailed a new dawn during the process of rebuilding a continent that had been ravaged by colonial legacies, and the process of political and economic emancipation. This change is apparent in the vast amount of literature on the subject,[754]

[752] The Nigerian state was born via the amalgamation of the Northern and Southern protectorates in 1914 (Olaopa Olawale Rafiu, Akinola Owolabi and Salaam Najeem, "The Nigerian State, Political Assassination and Democratic Consolidation: A Historical Exploration." *African Journal of Political Science and International Relations* 3, no. 2 (2009):157. See also John Campbell, "Lord Lugard Created Nigeria 104 Years Ago," *Council Foreign Relations*, January 2, 2018, https://www.cfr.org. Ayomide Akinbode. "Why Calabar was never the Capital of Nigeria." historyville, March 11, 2019, https://www.thehistory.com.

[753] Nigeria gained her independence in 1960 from the British Empire and became an independent state (Alka Jauhari. Colonial and Postcolonial Human Rights Violations in Nigeria. *International Journal of Humanities and Social Science* 1, no. 5 (2011): 53. See Tolani Odumade, "Independence Day: 15 Photos of Nigerians Celebrating Independence Day in 1960," *Pulse.ng*, October 1, 2019, https://www.pulse-ng.cdn.ampproject.org. USAID, "History," *USAID*, September 4, 2019, https://www.usaid.gov.

[754] Achebe, *Things Fall Apart* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, New York); Achebe, *Arrow of God* (London: Penguin Books Ltd, 1965); Muiu, Mueni Wa, "Colonial and Postcolonial State and Development in Africa." *Social Research*, 77, no. 4 (2010): 1311-338; Alfred Ndi, (2011). "What happened to post-imperial development in

which indicates colonial legacies as responsible, while a preponderance of evidence shows postcolonial states have not lived up to its hype of "turning water into wine." Rather, it is still promoting the same structures which have caused most African states to be riddled with conflict, war, violence, poverty, disease and food shortages. In the face of this vast and sometimes contradictory history,[755] Nigeria's postcolonial texts emerge to address and challenge this misconception.[756] Nigerian writers, through their works, seek to restore Nigerian's self-confidence and belief that their culture is unique.[757]

The structures established by colonial powers remain today despite efforts to dismantle them. These structures have not yielded positive results but rather fragmented the fragile state of Africa, as various ethnic groups and nationalities in Africa cling to the divisions,

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Africa during the last fifty years? Re-thinking the post-colonial turn in Creative art, social 'writings' and films." *Journal of African Studies and Development* 3, no. 6 (2011); Ngugi wa Thiong'O, *A Grain of Wheat* (Oxford: Heinemann Education Publishers, 1967); Chris, Kwaja, "Strategies for [Re]Building State Capacity to Manage Ethnic and Religious Conflict in Nigeria." *The Journal of Pan African Studies* 3, no. 3 (2009); Lewis, A. n.d. "Postcolonial Literatures and the Ongoing Process of 'Writing Back." *Journal of African Literature and Culture*; Andrew, Barnes, "Some Fire behind the smoke: The Fraser Report and its Aftermath in Colonial Northern Nigeria." *Canadian Journal of African Studies* 31, no. 2 (1997); Walter Rodney, *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*. (London: Bogle-L'Ouverture Publications, 1973); Bill Ashcroft, Gareth Griffiths and Helen Tiffin, *Postcolonial Studies Reader*, ed. Second Edition. (New York: Routledge, 1995); Kehinde, Ayobami, "Post-Colonial Literatures as Counter-Discourse: J.M. Coetzee's Foe and the Reworking of the Canon." *Ufahamu*: *A Journal of African Studies* 32, no. 3 (2006); Osaghae, E., Suberu, "A History of Identities, Violence, and Stability in Nigeria." *CRISE Working Paper* 6 (2005); Charles Ukeje. "Rethinking Africa's Security in the Age of Uncertain Globalisation: NEPAD and Human Security in the Twenty-First Century." *African Journal of International Affairs* 11, no. 1 (2008).

[755] Melville Herskovits cited in Okeke (2008: 002) wrote his essay titled "Does Africa Exist?" He argued, "Africa is a geographic fiction…the map is invested with an authority imposed on it by the map makers and warns of the danger of according to continental designations a degree of reality they do not possess."

[756] Charles Ukeje, "Rethinking Africa's Security in the Age of Uncertain Globalisation: NEPAD and Human Security in the 21st Century." Paper Submitted to the 11th CODESRIA General Assembly, Maputo, Mozambique (2005), 4. The World Poverty Clock indicates that Nigeria has surpassed India as the country with the most extreme poor people in the World. It shows that 86.9 million Nigerians live in extreme poverty which represents nearly 50 per cent of its projected 180 million populations. Yomi Kazeem, "A Dim Outlook: Nigeria has become the poverty capital of the world." *Quartz Africa*, June 25, 2018. https://qz.com/africa/1313380/nigerias-has-the-highest-rate-of-extreme-poverty-globally/. See also Bukola Adebayo, "Nigeria overtakes India in extreme poverty ranking." CNN, June 26, 2018, https://edition.cnn.com/2018/06/26/nigeria-overtakes-india-extreme-poverty-intl/index.html. See Sophie Bouillon, "Nigeria: Africa's top oil producer, world's extreme poverty capital." *IOL*, January 25, 2019. https://www.iol.co.za/news/africa/nigeria-africas-top-oil-producer-worlds-extreme-poverty-capital-18946270

[757] Michael James, "A Postmodern and Postcolonial Analysis of Nigerian Literature." Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts – Integrated Studies, Alberts (2010),11. See Korang, K, "Where is Africa? What is the West's Other? Literary Postcoloniality in a Comparative Anthropology." *Diacritics* 34, no. 2 (2004):57, see also Esty, J, "Excremental Postcolonialism." *Contemporary Literature* 40, no. 1 (1999):49.

artificial boundaries and religions imposed on them by colonial powers without regard to history, language, and custom. It is opportune that this study is coming at a time when the situation in Northern Nigeria is very precarious as the activities of the Islamic terrorist group, Boko Haram,[758] is pushing the country into religious war.[759] For instance, Abdul Azeez Suleman, spokesperson for a coalition of Northern Nigerian Groups in July, 2019, issued a notice to the Southerners to leave the Northern enclave over the suspension of the RUGA settlement proposed by the federal government of Nigeria.[760] This was not the first time it happened in Nigeria. On June 6, 2017, members of youth groups in Northern Nigeria issued a notice to the Igbo (one of the three main ethnic groups) to leave Northern Nigeria within three months and the groups asked their northerners living in Igbo states to leave Igboland.[761]

The election in 2015 and re-election in 2019 of President Muhammadu Buhari, a Muslim and Fulani, has seen an increase in violence, killing, destruction of crops and property by Fulani herdsmen which has resulted in communal conflicts between herdsmen[762] who are

[758] *This Day Newspaper*, Lagos, Nigeria, 3 January 2012. Boko Haram, through their spokesman Abdul Qaqa, announced the group's threat to kill every Southerner and Christian living in Northern Nigeria unless they left immediately – after the group claimed responsibility for the bombing of Saint Theresa's Catholic Church, Madalla, Niger State, Nigeria on Christmas Day 2011, which killed 49 people. See Freedom C. Onuoha (2012), "Boko Haram: Nigeria's Extremist Islamic Sect*."* Report, *Al Jazeera Centre for Studies.* See Orji Sunday, "Nigeria villagers in Borno mourn the dead, lament state failures." *Al Jazeera*, June 18, 2019, https://www.alijazeera.com/news/2019/06/nigeria-villagers-borno-mourn-dead-lament-state-failures-190618120652822.html

[759] Michael Shuaib, "Leadership Hypocrisy Festers 'Boko Haram' Activities in Nigeria – Senator Okorocha." *Capital Post* (Abuja), February 12, 2021. https://www.capitalpost.ng/2021/02/leadership-hypocrisy-festers-boko-haram-activities-in-nigeria-senator-okorocha/.

[760] Anthony Ogbonna, "Northern Group's Threat Over RUGA: Defend Yourselves, Nwodo Urges Ndigbo," *Vanguard*, July 5, 2019. https://www.vanguardngr.com.cdn.ampproject.org

[761]*Sahara Reporters* (2017), "Northern Youths Declare War On Igbos in the North, ask them to 'Leave' within Three Months," saharareporters.com/2017/06/06/northern-youths-declare-war-igbos-north-ask-then- 'leave'-within-three-months. See Suleiman Abdul Aziz the spokesperson for Northern Youths Coalition has asked the Southerners living in the North to leave the region if the Southern governors refused to implement Ruga (Settlement). Victor Ogunyinka. "RUGA: Coalition tasks Ohanaeze, northern groups to repent of ethnic bigotry." *Vanguard* (Lagos), July 7, 2019. https://www.vanguardngr.com/2019/07/ruga-coalition-tasks-ohanaeze-northern-groups-to-repent-of-ethnic-bigotry/. See Wale Akinnola, "Presidency finally condemns northern group's threat on Ruga Settlement." https://www.legit.ng/1247968-presidency-finally-condemns-northern-groups-threat-ruga-settlement.html.

[762] Tenuche Marietu S., Ifatimehin Olarewaju O., "Resource Conflict among farmers and Fulani herdsmen: Implications for resource sustainability," *African Journal of Political Science and International Relations,* Vol. 3 (9), pp. 360-364, September 2009. See Sola Tayo, Fulan Nasrullah, "Nigeria's Government Must Ensure a

predominantly Fulani Muslims, and farmers who are mostly Christians.[763] The lukewarm response of the Nigerian government to these clashes between farmers and herdsmen has added to the complexity.[764] Furthermore, the re re-introduction of the criminal code aspect of the Sharia legal system in 12 states in Northern Nigeria increased the tension between Christians and Muslims.

The adoption of the Sharia legal system for 12 Northern states contravenes the 1999 Constitution of Federal Republic of Nigeria, especially Chapter 1, Section 10, which states no state shall "adopt any religion,"[765] hence, creating national tension, religious uprising and violence across the adherents of the two main religions in Nigeria.[766]

5.3 The Emergence of Militia Groups

Since Nigeria gained its independence in 1960, Nigerian leaders have embarked on unpopular policies which are antidemocratic and divisionary, instead of people-orientated policies that will bring prosperity, freedom and development.[767] The results were unfulfilled dreams for the majority of Nigerians and a country that is heavily indebted to Western based

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Balanced Response to the Pastoralist – Settler Crisis," Chatham House," *The Royal Institute of International Affairs*, 2017.

[763] Mark Amaza, "A Widening Conflict between herdsmen and farmers is redefining Nigeria's geopolitics." *Quartz Africa* (2018), https://qz.com/1204744/nigeria-fulani-herdsmen-clashes-are-redefining-its-geopolitics.

[764] Mark Amaza (2018). See Dapo Akinrefon, Johnbosco Agbakwuru, Victoria Ojeme, Joseph Erunke and Chinonso Alozie, "CAN drag Buhari to UN over RUGA policy." *Vanguard*, July 1, 2019, www.vanguardngr.com. Dapo Akinrefon writes "President Buhari set up RUGA to reduce herders/family skirmishes, many Nigerians especially from the Northern minority and Southern Nigerians opposed the programme calling it land grabbing, Fulanisation and Islamisation of Nigeria through RUGA. The editors claimed that the RUGA settlement "seeks to settle migrant pastoral families which means rural settlement in which animal farmers, not just cattle herders will be settled in an organised place with provision of necessary and adequate basic amenities like schools, hospitals, road networks, vet clinics, markets and manufacturing entities that will process and add value to meats and animal products. The intention of the Federal government of President Buhari was to stop open grazing of cows that continue to pose security threats to herders and farmers. After the backlash by anti-RUGA, the Federal Government suspended the programme." See Precious Bello, "Be vigilant, Buhari's suspension of RUGA can't be trusted – CAN urges Southerners." *Daily Post* (Abuja), July 7, 2019. https://dailypost.ng/2019/07/07/vigilant-buharis-suspension-ruga-cant-trusted-can-urges-southerners/

[765] Refugee Review Tribunal, "RRT Research Response: Nigeria." Research and Information Service Section, Australia (2009).

[766] Ikenga K.E. Oraegbunam, "Sharia Criminal Law and State Secularity Principle in Nigeria: Implications of Section 10 of 1999 Constitution (as Amended)." *Journal of Law, Policy and Globalization* 28, (2014): 39, 50.

[767] Naira with sign: ₦; code: NGN is the currency of Nigeria.

financial organisations[768] (In 2017, Nigeria's nominal GDP was at $394.8 billion (N122.4 trillion.[769] Again, at the end of March 2019 Nigeria's public debt stock stood at N24.947 trillion ($81.274 billion,[770] in addition Nigeria's total public debt increases to N32.2 trillion ($84.57 billion as of September 2020).[771] The breakdown of Nigeria's debt: 1. Nigeria's foreign debt showed that $16.74bn of the debt was multilateral. 2. The $502.38m was bilateral (AFD) and another $3.26bn bilateral from the Exim Bank of China, JICA, India and KFW while $11.17bn was commercial which are Eurobonds and Diaspora Bonds. 3. Total external debt grew by $5.04 billion (N3.9 trillion) within this time, showing a rise of 18.72%. 4. Total domestic debt on the other hand declined by $5.86 billion. Though, it represents a rise in Naira value of N2.09 trillion, largely due to multiple devaluations of the currency during the period.[772]

The 1980s was a period characterised by economic decline, with the Nigerian state going from boom to bust.[773] As the economic hardship bit harder, the state could not sustain itself. Election victories were no longer based on popularity in votes but were rigged.[774] Osita Agbu noted that Nigeria has overseen six elections since 1999, consisting of the 1999, 2003, 2007, 2011, 2015 and 2019 general elections. Apart from for the elections in 2011 and 2015, they were denounced for not meeting the necessary global standards and were consequently

[768] *This Day Newspaper* (Lagos), 17 April 2012. See Bassey Udo, "Nigeria's foreign debt up by 40% under Buhari." *Premium Times* (Lagos), September 19, 2017. https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/243644-nigerias-foreign-debt-40-buhari-nbs.html.
[769] Ndubuisi Francis, Udora Orizu, *This Day* (Lagos), March 15, 2018. https://www.thisdaylive.com/index.php/2018/03/nigerias-external-debt-rises-to-18-19bn-domestic-debt-to-n15-9tn/
[770] Emma Ujah, "Breaking: DMO puts Nigeria's public debt stock at 24.947trn." *Vanguard* (Lagos), July 10, 2019, https://www.vanguardngr.com/2019/07/breaking-dmo-puts-nigerias-public-debt-stock-at-n24-947-trn.
[771] Samuel Oyekanmi, "Nigeria's total public debt rises to N32.2 trillion ($84.57 billion) as at September 2020." *Nairametrics* (Lagos), January 14, 2021, https://nairametrics.com/2021/01/14/nigerias-total-public-debt-rises-to-n32-2-trillion-84-57-billion-as-at-september-2020/.
[772] Oyekanmi, "Nigeria's total public debt rises to N32.2 trillion ($84.57 billion) as at September 2020."
[773] Peter Lewis, "From Prebendalism to Predation: The Political Economy of Decline in Nigeria*." The Journal of Modern African Studies* 34, no. 1 (1996).
[774] Ukiwo, U., Chukwuma, I., "Governance and Insecurity in South East Nigeria" (ed.) CLEEN Foundation, Lagos (2012): vii, see *Human Rights Watch*, 26 April 2007.

deemed not credible. For instance, election rigging in the 2003 general election was rife. Some results were written in the private homes of party members, and in some cases, announced even when the elections did not hold. Agbu points out that in some areas, fictitious thumb-printed ballot papers were filled into ballot boxes and used to compute numbers for pre-determined winners. He contended that security agents were used by the government in power to intimidate and harass oppositions. Money was employed to influence the electorate to vote for candidates of their choice. Hence, the European Union Election Observer Mission (EU-EOM) team led by Max van den Berg cited 12 States where cheating and anomalies were widespread and surmised that the "minimum standard for democratic elections were not met."[775] In order to win rigged elections, politicians turned to local urchins or religious zealots. This gave rise to militia groups, such as the Bakassi Boys[776] and Boko Haram.[777] In the 1980s politicians employed the services of motor park urchins to intimidate oppositions.

The emergence of Boko Haram and other militia groups is a source of alarm among experts concerned with transnational terrorism againt the majority of Nigerians across ethnic

[775] Osita Agbu, "Election Rigging and the Use of Technology: The Smart Card Reader as the Joker in Nigeria: 2015 Presidential Election." *Journal of African Election* 15, no. 2 (2016): 96.

[776] The Bakassi Boys were introduced by the Aba Ariaria Market, Abia State. They were employed as a vigilante group to fight organised crimes, and the whole of the Eastern states adopted it in their various states, especially the states of Imo and Anambra. They were effective in combating crime but, as time went on, the group became "dysfunctional due to politicization, privatization and erosion of public oversight and control" – they became uncontrollable, and responsible for human rights violations, extortion, killing and dispensing punishment without the due process of law (Ukiwo and Chukwuma, 2012: 13-14).

[777] Professor Isaac Olawale Albert argues that the "popular belief of Nigerians is that the governors in various parts of Northern Nigeria were familiar with Yusuf's 'nuisance value." Meanwhile Yusuf was the founder of Boko Haram before he was extra-judicially killed by security forces. When he was arrested, the politicians could not call him to order largely because of the roles he and his followers played in their coming into office. The speedy execution was therefore explained to be a way of ensuring that the insurgents do not live to mention the names of their supporters in government. The truth that is known to many is that "several politicians in the region were given spiritual assistance by the likes of Yusuf for winning elections." I. O. Albert, n.d. "An Alternative Explanation of Religious Fundamentalism in Northern Nigeria." Peace and Conflict Studies Programme, *Institute of African Studies*, University of Ibadan, 4, see Ukiwo and Chukwuma (2012), 13-14. See also *Daily Trust*, Thursday 24 May 2012.

and religious divides.[778] These sects recruit mostly school drop-out youths and university graduates with no access to employment "who believe that their state of hopelessness was caused by a government that imposed western education and failed to manage the resources of the country for the benefit of all."[779] In the absence of positive role models, the youths turn to radical clerics who have anti-establishment and anti-Western values for direction,[780] such as Boko Haram, who insisted on "absolutist" rejection of western education. However, Shi'Yan Uwan Musulmi or Wahhabist Izala sees nothing wrong with Western education. For instance, Yan Uwan Musulmi believes that women should be allowed to have equal both western and Qur'anic education. They believed that it would enable them to have access to western medical treatment, though from a female doctor.[781]

On similar lines, Christian revivalism is also taking place across the country and these organisations also want to use their reach to influence government decisions. According to Tar and Shettima, when it comes to the struggle for power among both Christian and Muslim politicians, there seems to be no hard boundary between faith in the mainstream religions and adherence to bizarre cult practices.[782]

This fragmentation of the country along ethnic and religious lines is one of several reasons why the system inherited from the British cannot work in modern-day Nigeria.[783] To maintain the system in place, the British used three major strands: the Christian Church,

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[778] Méryl Demuynck, Tanya Mehra and Reinier Bergeme, "ICCT Situation Report the Use of Small Arms and Light Weapons by Terrorist Organisations as a Source of Finance in West Africa and the Horn of Africa." *International Centre for Counterterrorism* (2020): 2.
[779] N. D. Danjibo, "Islamic Fundamentalism and Sectarian Violence: The 'Maitatsine' and 'Boko Haram' Crises in Northern Nigeria." *Peace and Conflict Studies Programme, Institute of African Studies*, University of Ibadan, p. 7.
[780] S. Schwartz, "United States Institute of Peace." *Peace Brief 27* (2010). (www.usip.org).
[781] Steven Pierce, "The Public, the Private, and the Sanitary: Domesticity and Family Regulation in Northern Nigeria." *Journal of Colonialism and Colonial History* 14, Issue 3 (Winter 2013).
[782] Saskia Brechenmacher, "Stabilizing Northeast Nigeria After Boko Haram." *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, May 3, 2019. https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/05/03/stabilizing-northeast-nigeria-after-boko-haram-pub-79042.
[783] Michelle James, "A Postmodern and Postcolonial Analysis of Nigerian Literature." Athabasca University, Alberta (2018): 8.

the schools that taught a British curriculum, and the English language.[784] Nigerians who adapted to the British systems were rewarded with administrative jobs, while those who opposed them were isolated from paid jobs. The British, therefore, were able to checkmate any internal unrest and make sure the people worked against each other.[785]

In order to portray the failings in both the colonial and old indigenous world views and to put forward an alternative viewpoint, Nigerian postcolonial scholars employed Nigerian postcolonial methodology. This included utilizing positive models from both civilisations. They moderated their criticism of the British arrangement with an analytical interest at the appropriateness of the indigenous understanding of the current situation of the postcolonial Nigerian state.[786] Foremost among these thinkers of change is Chinua Achebe. Elleke Boehmer praises Achebe's literary influence and recognition worldwide as unquantifiable. Boehmer adduces that despite the death of a literary icon, his reputation at local, national, and international contexts remains unbroken. He points out that Achebe's legacy is remarkably well founded, for at least two reasons: First, there is his role in interrogating what might be termed canonical racism in the academy, especially by way of "An Image of Africa," the bold, uncompromising essay on Joseph Conrad's *Heart of Darkness* in which Achebe scrutinized critics' long-term indifference to the inarticulacy of Africans in the novella. Notably, Achebe's essay has been incorporated together with Conrad's classic in *The Norton Anthology of English Literature* since the anthology's seventh edition, connecting his name permanently to that of the colonial writer, a sign of a significant and enduring excellence in Achebe's work. Boehmer contends that his capability to give memorable, if equally, unavoidably contentious, expression to the underlying concerns of

[784] Ibid.
[785] Ibid., 8.
[786] James, "A Postmodern and Postcolonial Analysis of Nigerian Literature," 9.

the contemporary human and African situations,[787] makes him, for thousands of Africans (like me), a positive model.

5.4 Biography of Chinua Achebe

Chinua Achebe was born in Ogidi in Anambra State, Nigeria on November 16, 1930. He attended St. Philips Central School, Akpaka Ogwe, Ogidi (then a missionary school under the structure of the Church Missionary Society, CMS, now Anglican Communion). In 1944, he opted for Government College, Umuahia, and afterwards, proceeded to University College, Ibadan, Oyo State.[788]

As a student, Chinua Achebe immersed himself in Western literature. At the University College, Ibadan, where his lecturers were mostly Europeans, he was introduced to the works of Shakespeare, Milton, Defoe, Swift, Wordsworth, Coleridge, Keats and Tennyson. But the turning point in his education was the recommended reading of *Mister Johnson*, a 1939 novel set in Nigeria and written by an Anglo-Irishman, Joyce Cary. In this work, the protagonist is a docile Nigerian whose British master ultimately shoots and kills him. Like all reviewers in the Western press, Chinua Achebe's white lecturers praised it as one of the best novels ever written about Africa. But Chinua Achebe disagreed. Achebe began to sense the misreading of African history by Western literature.[789] Achebe was critical of Joyce Cary's novel *Mister Johnson*. Cary's portrayal of Africans in his fictitious novel as "this savage people"[790] did not go down well with Achebe. He said, "at university I read some appalling novels about Africa (including Joyce Cary's much praised *Mister Johnson*) and

[787] Elleke Boehmer, "Chinua Achebe, a Father of Modern African Literature." *PMLA* 129, no. 2 (March 2014): 237.
[788] Amy Tikkanen, n.d. "Albert Chinualumogu Achebe." *Encyclopaedia Britannica*. https://www.britannica.com/biography/Chinua-Achebe.
[789] Jonathan Kandell, "Chinua Achebe African Literary Titan, Dies at 82." *The New York Times* (London), March 22, 2013, https://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/23/world/africa/chinua-achebe-nigerian-writer-dies-at-82.html.
[790] Joyce Cary, *Mister Johnson* (Everyman Library, 1939), 3.

decided that the story we had to tell could not be told for us by anyone else no matter how gifted or well-intentioned."[791] He believes that Africans should tell their own stories, which is reflected in Achebe's novels.

The distortion and falsehoods painted by Europeans were misleading. Achebe thanks one of his lecturers, James Welch who understands that the colonial education provided at the University of Ibadan was only a guide. Instead, Achebe became motivated by Welch's teaching to look inward rather than outside. This helped Achebe to channel his own energy and knowledge into telling his own story, the story of Africa, the story of Nigeria, the story of himself. He writes, "I learned, if I may put it simply, that my story had to come from within me." Achebe said he was spurred to write *Things Fall Apart* because his tutors could not teach across cultures. Despite their intelligence, they lacked the tools to teach across cultures, from English culture to African culture.[792] Most of the stories they relayed to us were instances of an "unbalanced story."[793]

Achebe is universally recognised worldwide as an internationally acclaimed literary giant, a patriarch of African literature, the father of modern African literature, an iconic novelist, poet and storyteller who insisted that all stories must be heard and that every man or woman must be ready to tell their own story as it suits them. Achebe enlivened the English language with native African wisdom. He was a sage with a gift for simple but profound rich words, phrases, and sentences; he led the way and lent a helping hand for others to follow. He was the role model, the man who became an "ancestor" in the full bloom of youth. He also devoted his life to fighting corruption and to the restoration of African values, pride and identity against the Eurocentric distortion of Africans. He also fought against the

[791] Achebe, "Named for Victoria, Queen of England," in *The Post-Colonial Studies Reader*, ed. Second Edition, Ashcroft, Griffiths, and Tiffin (New York: Routledge, 1995), 145.
[792] Achebe, *There Was a Country*. 34.
[793] Ibid.

primitive tag by Europeans and fought against all forms of stereotypes against the black race.

Achebe, also through his serene thoroughness and attention to detail, writes with panache and eloquence. He claims the English language as if it were his own, expressing it in the way that suited him, using rich African idioms and proverbs to convey his messages. He did not shy away from his culture – he loved it and was proud to say it.

Achebe can be likened to a dancing masquerade like the Igbo proverb that states "the world is like a masquerade dancing and to comprehend it or see it better, you do not stand in one place." No single mouth can tell the whole life of *Ugo Bere N'oji*; rather, you only take a slice from the meaty sides of the elephant.[794]

Like Fanon, Achebe brought to the attention of the world the distorted Eurocentric view that Africa was primitive, barbaric and had no identity. Through his work, Achebe lets the people of the world know that the continent is blessed with a rich culture that is unique and worthy of esteem. Achebe lamented how the colonial power, the British, constructed the notion that Nigeria was backward, ignorant, primitive and barbaric. Achebe instead argues the country has a unique culture and tradition, and a cherished history.

Furthermore, Achebe's *Things Fall Apart* presents Igbo society using meta-narrative to relay how the arrival of Europeans on African land, especially in the Igbo nation, marked the beginning of the period of decline, decay, division and hatred. Achebe bemoans the destabilising effects of the imposition of alien language, culture, religion and education upon the people were destabilising. He equally lamented how the forceful imposition of Christianity upon the indigenous people relegated their religion to a background. The

[794] Denja Abdullahi, "ANA V. President in honour of Achebe." *The Sun Newspaper* (London), May 18, 2013.

missionaries employed methods of aggressive conversion as well as enticement – they converted Okonkwo's son Nwoye against Okonkwo's wishes and, in doing so, they pitted the father against his son.[795] In between change and tradition, modernism and postmodernism, in Achebe's *Things Fall Apart*, Okonkwo's son Nwoye welcomes what he perceives to be modern by embracing Christianity over indigenous religion.

The people (i.e., natives) were unable to overcome colonial rule, as some of their brothers and sisters were on the side of the Europeans.[796] Due to the division among the natives, it becomes very easy for the British to introduce their indirect system and divide-and-rule tactics. Achebe uses Umuofia a village setting corresponds to Yeats' memory of a precolonial, "mythological" Ireland of "heroes" and "heroines". On a different level, the binary or hybrid identity is exactly what the postcolonial condition brings into life form.[797]

Achebe is critical of the disharmony that took root in the Umuofia Community because of the introduction of a foreign religion, a different legal system and Western education. The imposition of all these foreign ideas was damaging for the co-existence of the people. As a result of the actions of the colonial power, the peace, bond and unity that Umuofia had once enjoyed was destroyed. The collective will of the people and their voice of participation was hammered down by the colonial power, who replaced the voice of the people with that of their own. The centre which held the people together could no longer hold and things began to fall apart. Peter Childs and Patrick Williams remind us that a sense of ending, of the completion of one phase of history and the emergence of another, is hard to swallow in any given time.[798]

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[795] The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica, "Things Fall Apart." *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, July 19, 2017. https://www.britannica.com/topic/Things-Fall-Apart.
[796] Ibid.
[797] Peter Barry, *Beginning Theory: An Introduction to Literary and Cultural Theory* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1995), 195.
[798] Peter Childs and Patrick Williams, *An Introduction to Post-Colonial Theory* (Harlow: Longman, 1997).

5.5 Overview of *Things Fall Apart*

In Chapter One, Achebe presents the protagonist of his novel Okonkwo, who is well known throughout the nine villages that comprises Umuofia and its neighbouring village Mbaino. At the age of eighteen Okonkwo brought honour to the people of his clan by defeating Amalinze the cat, who was seen throughout the villages and beyond as the cat to whose "back would never touch the earth."[799] After Okonkwo defeated Amalinze the cat, his fame spread far and wide.

Okonkwo does not want to be like his father Unoka who died ten years previously and is describes as lazy, irresponsible and naïve. He lives an extravagant life; wasting the little money that comes his way without minding for tomorrow. Again, Unoka owes almost everybody in the community and this attitude was resented. It brought him to be spite by everybody.[800]

Unoka's borrowing and extravagant lifestyle meant that his family often have nothing to eat. Though he is a gifted flute player, he plays whenever there is *egwugwu* festival. The *egwugwu* festival is an important event in Umuofia. It sometimes lasted for three to four markets of festivities, with people eating and dancing.[801]

Despite these burdens Unoka still enjoyed himself. He plays his flute to make himself and others happy. Unoka equally has a friend called Okoye who he shared a kola nut with. Achebe presents kola nut as an important Igbo ritual. When anyone visits a family, since Igbo society is masculine in nature, the man who is the head of the house will present a kola nut before any formal or informal talks can hold.[802]

[799] Achebe, *Things Fall Apart*, 1.
[800] Ibid., 2.
[801] Achebe, *Things Fall Apart*, 3.
[802] Ibid.

Achebe is describing a precolonial Igbo society with its custom, tradition and religion intact. Instead of introducing western tea and coffee which is the predominant practice in most western civilisation, Achebe introduces the kola nut and palm wine as fashionable with his people. Unoka did not take any title before he died. In Igboland, a title taken is particularly important. It shows fame, success, wealth and acceptance among the people. Again, in Igbo society, you are judged by your own standard not by your father. You must work hard to be famous and respected among your age mates and your clan.

Okonkwo was mindful of his father's shortcomings and he was ready to depart from his father's lifestyle and build him a community far and wide. He thus has to depart his father, build a name of himself, take title, be a successful farmer with large barns full of yams, and marry many wives. At a young age, Okonkwo has already achieved fame by beating the best wrestler in the land Amalenze the cat.[803]

In Igbo society to be successful and famous depends on your own making. It is a republican society; individuals acquire wealth through hard work. It is also a hierarchical society. In the community gathering they have a special place to sit. You can earn it through acquired status not by ascribe status. So, Okonkwo wants to earn the respect of his own peers as well as his kinsmen. While age was respected among his people, achievement was revered. As the elders said, "if a child washed his hands he could eat with kings."[804] It implies if you work hard in Igbo society, no matter where you come from, no matter if you are young or old, no matter whether your father is poor or wretched, if you have earned the respect of the community through your achievement, you can hold your head high among the people.

[803] Achebe, *Things Fall Apart*, 5.
[804] Ibid.

In Chapter Two, Achebe presents how the precolonial Igbo society assemble to discuss an urgent matter. One night the town crier beats his *ogene, Gome, gome, gome, gom*e and announced to the people that the following day "every man of Umuofia was asked to gather at the marketplace tomorrow morning."[805] At the gathering in the community square, Ogbuefi Ezeugo an established orator, informed the people that somebody from the neighbouring village Mbaino has murdered the wife of one of us while at the market at Mbaino. Those sons of wild animals have dared to murder a daughter of Umuofia…he told Umuofia how their daughter had gone to market in Mbaino and had been killed. That woman, said Ezeugo, was the wife of Ogbuefi Udo.[806]

After the speech by Ogbuefi Ezeugo, the crowd went wild, with rage and anger. The people resolved not to turn to war until they send one of their own to present demands from them. Okonkwo is selected to go to Mbaino to deliver the message of Umuofia which is "to choose between war on the one hand, and on the other the offer of a young man and a virgin as compensation."[807] Okonkwo was chosen because he was feared both within and outside his clan. He is also a warrior having already brought five human heads and even used them to drink palm-wine during important festivals. However, Umuofia does not wage war with his neighbours unnecessarily, only if provoked. They must first consult their gods through *agadi-nwayi* or the old woman. She is the one that prepares the warriors' charms to protect them against other clans through their "Oracle of the Hills and the Caves."[808] It is the Oracle of the Hills and Caves that say yes or no to war. Nobody disobeys her. However, when Okonkwo presented the request from Umuofia to the people of Mbaino, the people of Mbaino did not reject the request. They accepted Umuofia's terms to avoid war with them.

[805] Ibid., 7.
[806] Ibid., 8-9.
[807] Ibid., 9.
[808] Achebe, *Things Fall Apart*, 9.

The Mbaino community presents a virgin girl and Ikemefuna, a fifteen-year-old boy to Okonkwo.

When Okonkwo returned, *ndichie* gathered to hear from Okonkwo the report he brought from Mbaino. After deliberation, they agreed that the virgin girl will go to Ogbuefi Udo as a replacement of his late wife. But for Ikemefuna, they ruled that it belongs to the clan and they are not in a hurry to decide his fate, but they agreed that Okonkwo meanwhile should have a custody of the boy on behalf of the clan. Ikemefuna came to live with Okonkwo.

Apart from being a warrior, he is feared both by his wives and children. Nobody wants to be a victim of Okonkwo's fiery anger.[809] It is this fear of failure and not to be seen as his father that drives Okonkwo to go extra miles to prove himself as an independent person and someone capable of feeding and defending both his clan and family. When Okonkwo discovered that his twelve-year-old son, Nwoye was lazy, it drives him insane. He hates laziness and weakness. Constant beating of Nwoye, though, did not change anything. Rather, it bought a despondent behaviour from him. Okonkwo also has his own *Obi* i.e., hut where he lives. To show his enormous wealth, each of the wives has their own hut. He equally has his own gods and ancestral spirits which he worships and offers libation.[810] Though Ikemefuna lives with Okonkwo, the child could not understand why he has to live with a strange family. He was in constant fear of his life.

Chapter Three tells the story of how Okonkwo started life from scratch. He was different from other peers who benefited from the wealth of their father. He must work towards the top, as his father Unoka left nothing for him to inherit. During his lifetime, his father Unoka bemoans his lack of success. He decided to visit the Oracle of the Hills and Cave equally

[809] Ibid., 10.
[810] Achebe, *Things Fall Apart*, 11.

known as Agbala. The people of Umuofia and environs consult Agbala in matters that relate to their wellbeing, progress and their destiny.[811] Many people who have visited the shrine tell horror stories of the shrine, and of the magical power of the Agbala and how their problems were solved after following whatever she told them to do. However, on his visit to the shrine Unoka began to narrate his story with the priestess who interrupts him. "You, Unoka, are known in all the clan for the weakness of the machete and hoes."[812]

Unoka left home dejected. Since the priestess did not offer any remedy. The Oracle said that it was not the fault of the Ani, the god of the earth, but his laziness. Unoka died of strange illness a "swelling which was an abomination to the earth goddess." It is believed in Umuofia that when a man is "afflicted with swelling in the stomach and limbs, he was not allowed to die in the house. He was carried to the Evil Forest and left there to die."[813] This was the fate Unoka suffered. He was carried away to the evil forest to die and rot there. He died a painful and ignominious death. In Igbo culture when a man is not buried by his clan, it is regarded that he leaves the earth without an ancestor, and his spirit roves around the earth.

In order to build himself as a formidable force in the land of Umuofia, Okonkwo must borrow yam seeds for him to succeed from Nwakibie, a wealthy man and a successful farmer, who holds one of the highest titles in the clan: three huge barns, nine wives and thirty children. As tradition demands, Okonkwo took with him two elders, a pot of palm-wine and a cock. While Nwakibie brought his two sons to witness the discussion and request of Okonkwo, in line with Igbo culture.[814] Yam is an important staple food in Igboland. It is also revered. It is well celebrated in Igboland by sons and daughters. In precolonial era, a

[811] Ibid., 13.
[812] Achebe, *Things Fall Apart*, 14.
[813] Ibid.
[814] Achebe, *Things Fall Apart*, 15.

man is not regarded as wealthy unless he has a large barn filled with yams. While they drank their wine, Okonkwo explains his mission to Nwakibie. "I have cleared a farm but have no yams to sow…. If you give me some yam seeds, I shall not fail you."[815]

Nwakibie cleared his throat. 'It pleases me to see a young man like you these days when our youth has gone so soft. Many young men have come to me to ask for yams, but I have refused because I knew they would dump them in the earth and leave them to be choked by weeds. But I can trust you. As our fathers said, you can tell a ripe corn by its look. I shall give you twice four hundred yams. Go ahead and prepare your farm."[816] To increase the size of his farm, he proposes to go to his father's friend Isiuzo for another "four hundred seeds."[817]

The saying 'man proposes, and God disposes,' which implies human beings can make any plans they want, but it is God that decides their success or failure, applies to Okonkwo in that year farming season. Okonkwo had a dream to have a successful harvest, but it was a miserable year. The rain was late to fall and then came too little. A blazing sun that shone constantly and all the yams planted were roasted under the ground. So, he lost all the yams.

It was this misfortune that befall Okonkwo. He had worked hard. He performed all the sacrifices required to pacify the gods as customary, yet he found himself at the mercy of mother earth. The devasting effects of the drought left Okonkwo devasted and dejected. Even when his father, Unoka tries to offer words of advice to him, he rebuffs it.[818] To Okonkwo, his father was not in position to offer advice because he was a failure. Okonkwo was dismayed of his father's nagging because he has grown old and seriously ill.

[815] Ibid., 73.
[816] Achebe, *Things Fall Apart*, 18.
[817] Ibid.
[818] Ibid., 21.

In Chapter Four, Okonkwo is reprimanded. He could not curtail his anger when he refers to his fellow man as woman. The reason is that Okonkwo is less patient with men who have not made it in life. The gathering of the clan was conveyed to discuss the incoming ancestral feast. When Okonkwo saw that Osugo was present, he said: "This meeting is for men." This statement by Okonkwo did not go down well with elders and those present. They immediately rebuked Okonkwo.[819] Okonkwo, realising what his statement will do to his personality and that it was wrong to call fellow kinsman "woman," immediately apologises for his misdeed.

Ikemefuna, meanwhile is nostalgic. At first, he was scared, and wanted to run away, but he was in the good care of Nwoye's mother, who treats him as her own children. Ikemefuna one day asked her adopted mother: 'When shall I go home?' as sometimes, Ikemefuna, will go weeks without eating. When Okonkwo heard it, he will come in and scold him. But with time he comes to overcome his fear.[820] Okonkwo became fond of him and began to regard him as his son. It took Ikemefuna time to call Okonkwo "father."

Ikemefuna came to live in Umuofia during the end of the carefree season between harvest and planting. In the Week of Peace, Okonkwo was punished by Ezeani, the priest of the earth goddess. Okonkwo broke the custom by beating his wife Ojiugo. During the week of peace in Umuofia, Okonkwo notices that Ojiugo, his younger has left her hut to braid her hair without cooking his meal. When Ojiugo returned, Okonkwo beats her for her carelessness, and breaking the sacred week of peace.

When Ezeani, the priest of the earth goddess, *Ani* heard the shameful act by Okonkwo, the priest of the earth goddess Ezeani reminded Okonkwo what he has done was against the

[819] Ibid., 22.
[820] Achebe, *Things Fall Apart*, 23.

custom of Umuofia.[821] For the cleansing of the land as demanded by the custom to avoid the wrath of the gods, Ezeani asked Okonkwo, "you will bring to the shrine of *Ani* tomorrow one she-goat, one hen, a length of cloth and a hundred cowries."[822] Okonkwo showed penitence for his action and provided what the priest requested of him. Okonkwo's actions and remorse show that no matter how big a man is, in Igbo culture, you cannot be bigger than your kinsmen.

After the Week of Peace ushers in the beginning of farming season, men and women began to clear the bushes for the preparation for planting season. Okonkwo and his family were ready for the planting season.[823]

Chapter Five introduces Umuofia's Feast of the New Yam which is celebrated by sons and daughters of Umuofia. The feast is a yearly event, held before the harvest begins. It is to honour the earth goddess, *Ani*. Ani plays an important role in the life of the Umuofia people such as protecting them. It is also the god of fertility.[824]

During the celebration, Okonkwo's anger nearly mars the occasion as he beats up his second wife, Ekwefi. Okonkwo becomes infuriated when he noticed that the Banana tree has been cut down. On inquiry he was told it was his second wife, Ekwefi. She has used the leaves to wrap food for some guests. Okonkwo had to be restrained by family members. In the same day he nearly killed Ekwefi. Okonkwo is known for his farming ability not as a good hunter. He has requested Ikemefuna to fetch his gun, when he heard a murmuring from Ekwefi: "guns that never shot." Unfortunately, Okonkwo heard her mocking. Okonkwo runs to his room, loads his gun, runs out and aims the gun at his wife. His wife panics and runs for her life, but Okonkwo pulls the trigger and shots the woman. It was lucky that the bullet

[821] Ibid., 26.
[822] Ibid.
[823] Ibid., 28.
[824] Achebe, *Things Fall Apart*, 31.

missed her. She falls on the floor. Okonkwo, realising what he has done, runs to the woman and examines her: she was alive. He discovered that the bullet missed her. Okonkwo "heaved a heavy sign and went away with the gun."[825]

The second day of the festival was Umuofia's wrestling match between Okonkwo's village and their neighbours. It was a rematch to Okonkwo having defeated Amalinze the cat at the same wrestling contest. Ekwefi too was a throwback. She loves the festival. Ekwefi was a village beauty.[826] Ezinma is Ekwefi's only daughter and Okonkwo are fond of her, but hardly demonstrates his affection openly. Okonkwo's other daughters are Obiageli, the daughter of Okonkwo's first wife; and Nkechi the daughter of Okonkwo's third wife, Ojiugo. The children relish the beating of the drums which announces the coming of the festival. It rang from the *ilo*, the village playground.[827]

Chapter Six starts with wrestling match at the village place *ilo*, the gathering of who's who of Umuofia. They gathered at the village square, both old and the young, women and children who circle around the "big and ancient silk-cotton tree."[828] The wrestling match commences with the main event. It was Maduka the son of Obierika who won the contest. It thrills Okonkwo's heart because the winner was the son of his best friend.[829]

In Chapter Seven, Ikemefuna has grown to a full man, full of energy and loved by Okonkwo's household. He is close to Okonkwo's son, Nwoye, who sees him as a big brother, and they become inseparable.[830] Nwoye and Ikemefuna enjoy listening to

[825] Ibid., 33.
[826] Ibid., 34.
[827] Ibid., 38.
[828] Achebe, *Things Fall Apart*, 40.
[829] Ibid., 42.
[830] Ibid.

Okonkwo's ancient folklores. Though Nwoye loves his father's stories he prefers his mother's story of the tortoise and his craftiness.[831]

While Okonkwo was happily reminiscing in his obi drinking palm-wine with Ikemefuna and Nwoye, he has an unexpected visitor, Ogbuefi Ezeudu. Ezeudu was the oldest man in the clan. They quietly walked behind his obi. Ezeudu said to Okonkwo:

That boy calls you father. Do not bear a hand in his death. Yes, Umuofia has decided to kill him. The Oracle of the Hills and the Caves has pronounced it. They will take him outside Umuofia as is the custom and kill him there. But I want you to have nothing to do with it. He calls you, his father.[832]

The next day the elders of the nine villages that comprise Umuofia came to see Okonkwo in his obi in the early morning. They informed him that Ikemefuna will be sacrificed to the gods. The news devastated Okonkwo, a child he has come to accept as his own son. He later informs Ikemefuna that he will take him back to his village the next day. Ikemefuna was devastated, though it has been long, he sets his eyes on family. One voice tells him that he might be killed because he suspects their discussion and sudden announcement of his going. Nwoye heard the news and ran to her mother's hut to break the news of Ikemefuna's impending departure. His mother was devastated and she exclaims "poor child."[833]

While the elders walked in silence, Ikemefuna has a premonition of his death at the hand of Umuofia's elders. Ikemefuna began to sing a song in his mind while he carries the keg of palm-wine in his head.[834] Suddenly, a "man who had cleared his throat drew up and raised his machete. Okonkwo looked away. He heard the blow. The pot fell and broke in the sand.

[831] Ibid., 46.
[832] Achebe, *Things Fall Apart*, 49.
[833] Ibid., 50.
[834] Ibid., 52.

He heard Ikemefuna cry, 'My father, they have killed me!' as he ran towards him. Dazed with fear, Okonkwo drew his machete and cut him down. He was afraid of being thought weak."[835]

When Okonkwo returned, he was taciturn Nwoye senses that Ikemefuna is dead. The killing of Ikemefuna did not go down well with Nwoye. For the first time in Nwoye's life, he sees a betrayal by his father and he also remember how twins were thrown away to die in the evil forest. Nwoye describes his feelings after he learns the death of Ikemefuna as awful. He intuits how one day they were returning from the farm when they heard a cry of a baby in the thick of the forest. He later learnt that the baby crying were twins thrown away.[836]

In chapter eight, Okonkwo becomes depressed. He cannot eat food for two days because of the death of Ikemefuna. He relies on alcohol to ease his tension.[837] On the third day, his second wife Ekwefi prepares a meal, a roasted plantain he eats. To kill the boredom, Okonkwo visits his friend Obierika. He congratulates him on the victory of his son Maduka who won the wrestling contest.[838] Obierika asks Okonkwo to stay with them so he can witness the bride price of his daughter. While they wait Oberika questions Okonkwo why he participated in the killing of Ikemefuna, 'a child that calls him father'? Okonkwo says, it was the wishes of the gods, and he cannot do otherwise.[839]

Ibe comes to marry Obierika's daughter, Akueke. Ibe is twenty-five years old. He is accompanied by his father and uncle. Obierika receives them along with his two elder brothers and his sixteen-year-old son, Maduka. Kola nuts were served and palm-wine drank.

[835] Ibid., 53.
[836] Achebe, *Things Fall Apart*, 54.
[837] Ibid., 55.
[838] Ibid., 57.
[839] Ibid., 58.

The two families begin to negotiate for the pride-price through presentation of "broomsticks." At the end, they agree on twenty bags of cowries. Akueke's father Obierika accepted, the bride price was settled.[840] Ibe takes his wife home.

In chapter Nine, While Okonkwo is asleep, he is woken up by his wife, Ekwefi. His wife tells him that his daughter, Ezinma is sick.[841] Okonkwo dashes to Ekwefi's hut. He sees his daughter "lay shivering on a mat" beside a burning fire. Okonkwo takes her pulse and says it was '*iba*' which is malaria. He rushes to the bush to fetches leaves and grasses from barks of trees that are used to treat '*iba*.' Ekwefi kneels beside her sick daughter. She remembers that Ezinma is her only daughter and mean the world to her. Their relationship is like equals.

However, Ekwefi has suffered misfortune in life. She has born ten children and nine of them had died mysteriously, mostly at the age of three. She becomes disheartened with life.[842] The birth of children should be a thing of joy, but to her, it has become a "physical agony." The usual child's ceremony after seven marked weeks ends in regret, as one dies after another.[843]

However, after the death of Ekwefi's second son, Okonkwo consulted a diviner an *Afa* oracle, to find out the problem. The diviner told Okonkwo that his daughter is an *ogbanje*, a wicked child who when they died, returned to their mother's womb to be delivered again. The Afa oracle said to Okonkwo, "When your wife becomes pregnant again, let her not sleep in her hut. Let her go and stay with her people. In that way she will elude her wicked tormentor and break its evil cycle of birth and death."[844]

[840] Ibid., 65.
[841] Ibid., 66.
[842] Achebe, *Things Fall Apart*, 67.
[843] Ibid., 68.
[844] Ibid.

Ekwefi did as she was directed by her husband. But that was not enough to save the child, as the child died prematurely. His death prompted Okonkwo to consult another diviner who is knowledgeable on the cure for *ogbanje*. His name is Okagbue Uyanwa, known around the clan. He asked Okonkwo few questions about the dead child. Then he ordered Okonkwo that in future "there should be no mourning for the dead child."[845] Ekwefi reflects on her life and blamed her *chi*. It was on this premise that Ezinma was born. She resigns to her *chi* for protection of her daughter.[846]

Okonkwo returned from the bush with the medicine. He cuts the grasses, leaves, roots and barks of medicinal trees and shrubs inside the pot and added some water and boiled them. Okonkwo took the hot pot and placed it on a stool. While the pot was streaming, he asks her daughter to place her face directly to the pot and covered her with a blanket.[847]

In chapter Ten, the people of Umuofia gathered at the village square *ilo* for the trial of Uzowulu and his in-laws as it was customary. Uzowulu was the plaintiff. He alleges that his in-law came to his house and beat up his wife Mgbafo and Mgbafo's brother Odukwe took his children away. Odukwe complained that his in-law Uzowulu beats up his wife frequently resulting in her sister's miscarriage.[848]

The nine *egwugwu* represents the nine clans of Umuofia. The leaders of *egwugwu* are called Evil Forest. The nine clans of Umuofia had developed out of the nine sons of the first patriarch of the clan. Evil forest represented the village of Umueru, or the children of Eru, who was the first born of the nine sons.[849]

[845] Ibid., 69.
[846] Ibid., 70.
[847] Achebe's *Things Fall Apart*, 75-6.
[848] Achebe, 78.
[849] Ibid., 79.

The elders seated according to their seniority. The *egwugwu* is seen as a spirit by the people of Umuofia and are perceived to communicate with their ancestors. Once the people are seated, Evil Forest addresses the two parties to the case, Uzowulu, and Odukwe. The Evil Forest first asked Uzowulu to present his case. Uzowulu narrated his case before the Evil Forest. The head of Evil Forest *ogwugwu* replied, 'Your words are good.' 'Let us hear Odukwe.'[850]

Odukwe narrates how Uzowulu beats up his wife even when she was pregnant for him, resulted in her sister's miscarriage. Having listened to both the plaintiff and the accused, the nine *egwugwu* together give their verdict. We have heard both sides of the case,' said Evil Forest. 'Our duty is not to blame this man or to praise that, but to settle the dispute.' He turned to Uzowulu. "Go to your in-laws with a pot of wine and beg your wife to return to you. It is not bravery when a man fights with a woman." He turned to Odukwe, "If your in-law brings wine to you, let your sister go with him."[851]

The verdict was accepted by both Uzowulu and Odukwe. There was no victor, no vanquished. This is in line with Igbo traditional mediation procedure. It helps the people to settle family disputes to the satisfaction of all parties.

In Chapter Eleven, Ekwefi was telling her daughter the story of the tortoise and birds, and how the tortoise tricks the birds into helping him to get to the sky because a feast was being organised for them by the people of the sky. The tortoise chooses to answer, "All of you." When they reached the sky, they were received by the people of the sky. When food and drinks were served to them, the tortoise asks the people of the sky to whom the food

[850] Ibid.
[851] Achebe, *Things Fall Apart*, 82-83.

was prepared for? They replied, "all of you." Because the tortoise's name is "all of you," tortoise will eat up all the food and the birds have nothing to eat.[852]

Chielo the priestess of Agbala, Oracle of the Hills and Caves wants to speak to Ezinma, the daughter of Oknokwo. The parents of Ezinma persuades the priestess to wait till the next day but was reminded by the priestess that they should not disobey the gods. The priestess rebuffs their entreaties and takes Ezinma with him. But Ezinma's mother Ekwefi followed the priestess. The priestess Chielo dares anyone to follow her.[853]

In Chapter Twelve, the priestess Chielo returns Ezinma to her mother's hut without speaking any words to both Okonkwo and Ekwefi. On the other hand, Obierika's compound was agog for her daughter's marriage. His daughters' bridegroom Ibe came with his people. They brought wines and other traditional requirements. As is customary, Obierika presented kola nuts to his in-laws. His eldest brother broke the kola nuts.[854] Okonkwo presents two cocks to the bride and groom.

In Chapter Thirteen, drums and cannon herald the death of Ezeudu, the oldest man in the village, *Go-Di-Di-Go-Go-Di-Go*. *Di-go-go-di-go*. *Diim! Diim! Diim*! boomed the cannon at a distance. When Okonkwo heard the *ekwe*, the hollowed-out wooden instrument, he quivers as he recollects what the old man told him, "That boy calls you father,' he had said. 'Bear no hand in his death.'[855] The entire nine clans attended Ezeudu's funeral. Ezeudu was a great man of Umuofia, a warrior who holds three titles. During his funeral different *egwugwu* came to pay their respect to the great man. It involves the beating of drums, firing of guns, jangling of machetes.[856]

[852] Ibid., 87.
[853] Ibid., 90.
[854] Achebe, *Things Fall Apart*, 104.
[855] Ibid., 106-7.
[856] Ibid., 109.

In the middle of the funeral ceremony, gunshots rent the air, and unfortunately one of the guns fired hit a sixteen-year-old boy. He lays in a pool of blood, dead. It was the late Ezeudu's son. The boy was dancing with his brothers and half-brothers in a traditional farewell dance of his father, when Okonkwo's gun "exploded and a piece of iron had pierced the boy's heart."[857] The entire clans was thrown into confusion. It is a bad omen in Umuofia. Okonkwo has killed his fellow kinsman, and the penalty is to run away from the clan. Though Okonkwo's crime was considered accidental, the punishment for killing fellow clan's man is seven years in exile.[858]

Okonkwo and his family flee to his maternal home, Mbanta. He arranges with Obierika to help him harvest his yam. In the following day, the people gathered and stormed Okonkwo's compound and set his huts on fire, killing all his animals and demolishing his barn. It is in line with the earth goddess to exert justice and cleanse the land which Okonkwo had polluted.[859] Though Obierika was not happy, he wonders how a man like Okonkwo will be so treated with derision considering what he has done for the clan.

In Chapter Fourteen, Okonkwo and his family were received by his mother's kinsmen, Mbanta. Okonkwo's mother's younger brother Uchendu was the eldest surviving member of that family. "Okonkwo was only a boy then and Uchendu still remembered him crying the traditional farewell: 'Mother, mother, mother is going."[860] Okonkwo is given a plot of ground to build his compound, and two or three pieces of land to farm during the farming season. With the help from his kinsmen, Okonkwo built an obi for himself, and three huts for his three wives. He also made provision for his gods and symbols of his departed fathers.

[857] Ibid.
[858] Ibid., 110.
[859] Achebe, *Things Fall Apart*, 110.
[860] Ibid., 112.

To help rebuild his life, Uchendu's five sons donated three hundred seed-yams to assist Okonkwo to plant.

Okonkwo and his family begun the new season with high expectation. They worked hard to plant their seed-yam. Although such passion and power are no longer there in Okonkwo,[861] Okonkwo reflects how he has worked hard to the top only to be caught down by his own chi. "He had been cast out of his clan like a fish onto a dry, sandy beach, panting."[862]

When Uchendu notices Okonkwo's despair, he decides to speak to him after the marriage rites of his youngest son, Amikwu. It was the last ceremony of "confession" having performed the traditional rites of the bride-price and wine carrying to the bride's kinsmen. The ceremony involves the coming together of *umuada* of the kindred, friends and well-wishers from distant villages. This is a ritual performed on a bride, to confess if she is still a virgin. If she says no, then she is fit to marry the groom. It was Uchendu's eldest daughter, Njide who performed the rituals.[863] At the end of the processes, her daughter is still a virgin. Uchendu sacrifices a hen to his ancestors, and Amikwu took his young bride and she becomes her wife.

Chapter Fifteen narrates the second year of Okonkwo's exile and the visit of his friend Obierika to see Okonkwo. Both bags containing cowries. Okonkwo and his family were delighted to receive Obierika. Okonkwo introduces his friend Obierika to Uchendu.[864]

Obierika narrates the visit of white men to Abame during the planting season. He told him how Abame was destroyed and how the survivors took shelters in Umuofia. When the

[861] Ibid., 113.
[862] Ibid., 114.
[863] Achebe, *Things Fall Apart*, 114-15.
[864] Ibid., 118.

people of Abame saw the white men, they described them as an "albino," but some described them as strange beings. The elders of Abame consulted their oracle. The oracle said, "the strange man would break their clan and spread destruction among them.[865] Based on the declaration of the oracle, the people of Abame slay the white man.[866] Obierika continues on that Abame's *afo* market, which is the largest gathering of the people, the white men struck. They surrounded the market and shot men, women and children with their guns. The only survivors were the sick, old men, women and children at home.[867]

Uchendu describes the killing of Abame's people as callous. He equally blames the people of Abame for killing the white man. "Never kill a man who says nothing. What did they know about the man?"[868] Obierika then tells Okonkwo that he brought him the proceeds of his yam they sold. Okonkwo was delighted and thanks his friend Obierika.

In Chapter Sixteen, Obierika returns to Mbanta to visit his friend Okonkwo after the last visit. This time he comes with the news that missionaries have arrived at Umuofia. Not only have they come to Umuofia, but they have also constructed their own church and won over a handful of Umuofia's people and deployed evangelists to nearby villages and towns. He tells Okonkwo that what troubles him most was his son Nwoye's involvement with the missionaries. The presence of the missionaries was a source of worry to the elders and people of Umuofia. He describes those who joined the missionaries as men who are worthless and have nothing to contribute to the community. He believes that the white man will not last long.[869] When Obierika mentions the name of Okonkwo's son Nwoye, he

[865] Ibid., 120.
[866] Ibid., 120.
[867] Ibid., 121.
[868] Achebe, *Things Fall Apart,*
[869] Ibid., 124.

expects Okonkwo to react angrily, instead, he said to Obierika not to mention the name to him.

The coming of the missionaries to Mbanta earlier caused a lot of concern to the people. Though the people of Mbanta troupe out to see the white men, the natives did not take them seriously but made fun of them. The interpreter of the white man was mocked by the people, who mimic their accent.[870] They were astonished when the white missionary told them that he has come to stay with them. They were equally surprised that the white man called their gods "worthless." He continues, "Your gods are not alive and cannot do you any harm…they are pieces of wood and stones."[871] When the statement was interpreted to the people, they burst into laughter among themselves, "These men must be mad…how else could they say that *Ani* and *Amadiora* were harmless and *Idemili* and *Ogwugwu* too?"[872] But for Okonkwo, the men were unconvincing. He notes that the interpreter spoke about the Son of God whose name was "Jesus Kristi." Okonkwo stayed to listen to the white man with the hope he will help chase them away from their town. He asks them, "You told us with your mouth that there was only one god. Now you talk about his son. He must have a wife, then."[873]

In Chapter Seventeen, the missionaries made enquiries from the natives of Mbanta for a plot of land to build their church. The natives informed them to approach the elders of Mbanta for a piece of land. After deliberation among the rulers of Mbanta they agreed to give them the "evil forest." The evil forest is a place where men and women who died of various diseases such as leprosy, smallpox etc. are buried.[874] The missionary cleared the bush and within four days build their own church to the surprise of the natives. The natives

[870] Ibid., 125.
[871] Ibid., 126-27.
[872] Achebe, *Things Fall Apart*.
[873] Ibid., 127.
[874] Ibid., 129.

of Mbanta believe that anyone who entered the evil forest will die. But the missionary did not die after four days had passed. The natives of Mbanta attributed it to "white man's fetish and unbelievable power."[875] The man in charge of the church in Mbanta is Mr. Kiaga.

However, the people of Mbanta believe that their gods and ancestors will punish the white men after seven market weeks.[876] The people of Mbanta have set the limit for their gods and ancestors to act, but unfortunately, the seven market weeks have come and gone. Nothing untold happened to the white missionaries, and instead they were constructing a new red-earth and thatch house for their teacher, Mr. Kiaga. The failure by the Mbanta's gods to strike the white men dead led to more converts such as Nneka the wife of Amadi.

Nwoye also left the house and never returned to his father's compound. He joined the new religion. He was received into the fold by Mr. Kiaga. However, Okonkwo did not receive the news of his son, Nwoye joining the new religion, though he considers Nwoye as not worth fighting for.[877]

In Chapter Eighteen, the people of Mbanta prefer to keep their distance between them and members of the new religion. However, three converts to Christianity had tried to overstep their bounds. The three converts had gone to the town and boasted that the gods of Mbanta's people are dead and powerless. They will henceforth disregard them and burn down all the shrines. The talk outrages the people, and they were accused of blasphemy. The people seized and beat up the three converts.

Rumours among the people are that both the church and government are linked together. They have built a court in Umuofia. The white man has already convicted a man and had hanged him for killing one of their members. Mbanta people believe Mr Kiaga and his

[875] Ibid., 130.
[876] Ibid., 131.
[877] Achebe, *Things Fall Apart*, 133.

followers had conducted themselves well, but if in the future they become troublesome, they will simply show them exit doors.

When some of the new converts saw the presence of *osu* (outcast) in the church, they protested to Mr Kiaga. He explains to the new converts that there is no difference between them and those they called *osu*, since they are united in one God. Some accepted his explanation, and a few walked away. However, one of the members who happened to be an *osu* killed the sacred royal python, a revered creature in Mbanta and in all surrounding villages. This action brought conflict between the people and the church.

After deliberation by the elders, they agree to ostracise the culprits who killed the sacred python from their town and expel the entire Christian community, too. When the news reached Mr Kiaga is told that it was alleged that one of the Okoli was responsible for killing the sacred python. Okoli, however, was not present to answer the allegation against him.[878]

In Chapter Nineteen, Okonkwo approaches the end of his seven years in Mbanta and Okonkwo regards the seven years as wasted. He imagines where he would have been in his hometown, Umuofia and believes he would have been more prosperous in Umuofia. He praises his mother's people, however, for their generosity toward him and his family. Okonkwo sends money to Obierika to build two huts in his old compound. He said he would not ask another man to build his own obi for him, nor to fence his compound.

Okonkwo's final year in exile ends after the last heavy rains of the year begin to fall. Obierika sends a word to Okonkwo that the two huts are ready. Okonkwo begins to arrange for his return, after the rain. He prefers to return earlier to enable him to fence his compound.

[878] Achebe, *Things Fall Apart*, 140-41.

Okonkwo throws a party for his mother's kinsmen as a show of appreciation. Okonkwo invites Umunna and all the descendants of Okolo to the feast. Uchendu welcomes the invited guests. He prays to the ancestors for good health and long life.[879] Okonkwo thanks everybody for honouring his invitation.[880] In response, one of the oldest members of Umunna thanks Okonkwo on behalf of the kinsmen. "When we gather together in the moonlight village ground it is not because of the moon. Every man can see it in his own compound. We come together because it is good for the kinsmen to do so."[881]

In Chapter Twenty, Okonkwo returns to Umuofia and is ready to start new life. His dream of acquiring the highest title in Umuofia and his chance to lead his people against the new religion have dissipated.[882] Yet, Okonkwo believes he can rebuild his life from the scratch. He regrets the path his first son, Nwoye has taken but he has other sons which he will bring up in the line of the tradition of the people."[883]

Okonkwo's daughter Ezinma has grown up into one of the prettiest girls while in Mbanta. The people refer her as "Crystal of Beauty," just as her mother Ekwefi was regarded in her youth. Ezinma has a lot of suitors in Mbanta, but she rejected them, because her father has informed her that he will be happy to see her marry in her hometown Umuofia.[884] Okonkwo asks Ezinma to convince her half-sister Obiageli to do the same, since she wields a great influence over Obiageli.

Obierika tells Okonkwo how Umuofia has changed during his seven years in exile. He notes that the new church in Umuofia has led the people astray. He also points out that even title men like Ogbuefi Ugonna abandoned our custom and joined the new church. Ogbuefi

[879] Ibid., 145.
[880] Ibid.
[881] Ibid., 146.
[882] Achebe, *Things Fall Apart*, 147.
[883] Ibid., 148.
[884] Ibid., 149.

Ogonna became the first of Umuofia's son to receive the sacrament of Holy Communion, or Holy Feast.

Obierika states further that apart from the white man's religion in Umuofia, the white man has equally brought in western government. They built a court where the District Commissioner presides over cases and judge people in ignorance. He also has court messengers who brings in men to them for trial. He notes that many of the messengers came from Umuru on the bank of the Great River, where the white men first came many years ago. It was also the first place they built their place of worship and government house. He adduces that the court messengers were loathed in Umuofia because they are haughty and immodest. The people of Umuofia referred to them as *kotma*.[885]

After Obierika narrated all the events that happened to Okonkwo, Oberika informs Okonkwo the tragedy that befall Abame's people, how they were wiped out by the white man. Okonkwo tells Obierika that he heard the story, but he considers the people of Abame as "weak and foolish." He wonders why they did not stand up to the white man and fight. He does not foresee such things happening to the Umuofia people because they are warriors not cowards. He believes if the white men dare Umuofia people they will fight back. But Obierika replies that it is already too late to fight the white man.[886]

He equally informs Okonkwo how Aneto was hanged over a piece of land. He told him how the white man decided the case in the favour of Nnama's family, because he bribes both the white man's messengers and interpreter. Aneto was also convicted by the white man's court over the killing of Oduche over a piece of land.[887]

[885] Achebe, *Things Fall Apart*, 150.
[886] Ibid.,151.
[887] Ibid., 152.

They lamented that it was the same white men who said that the native's custom is primitive. Obierika retorts that fighting a white man is equally fighting our people. He points out how they cunningly con them to part with their land, and they gave them a piece of land.[888]

In Chapter Twenty-One, the majority of Umuofia do not share the idea of going to war like Okonkwo, who wants to remove the white man from Umuofia. The people of Umuofia agree that the white man's religion is a source of concern.[889] The new religion is beginning to take strong hold in Umuofia thanks to the effort of Mr. Brown. His style of proselytization was seen by the natives as kinder and gentler and with respect to the culture and tradition of the people. He cautions his members from disrespecting the peoples' culture. He also made friends with both the poor and rich in Umuofia and surroundings. He was presented with carved elephant tusk which is a sign of dignity and acceptance. He discusses with the great man of the clan called Akunna about Christianity and convince him to send his sons to be taught in white man's knowledge. Though none of them succeeded in converting each other, they learned from each other about their different religion. Akunna told Mr Brown that there are similarities between the native's religion and the Christian's faith. Though Mr Brown argues that Akunna's gods are images made from wood, his Chukwu is a true God, and any other gods are false.

Mr. Brown made use of his closeness with the people to convert many to Christianity. He builds schools and hospitals. He convinces parents to send their children to school. He told the people that in the future, leaders of the clan will be people who can read and write.

[888] Ibid.
[889] Ibid., 153.

His approach began to gain attention of the people as many enrol in the school to read and write and to enable them to earn a living through teaching and work as a clerk in the office.

When Mr. Brown learns of Okonkwo's returns from exile, he organises his fellow missionary to pay him a visit. Already Okonkwo's son Nwoye has been baptised with an English name, Isaac. Nwoye has been enrolled to training college at Umuru. Mr. Brown was pleased with the development of Nwoye and thought that it will please Okonkwo. But Okonkwo drove them away from his compound and warned them not to return in the future.

Okonkwo's return to Umuofia is not as memorable as he has wished. Though his two daughters elicit interest from among suitors in Umuofia, the people of Umuofia did not take any interest in his return. Umuofia is preoccupied by the new religion which has brought so many changes in the lives of the people. Though there are some who see these changes by the white man as bad, Okonkwo was disappointment by the behaviour of the men of Umuofia.[890]

In Chapter Twenty-two, Reverend James Smith became Mr. Brown's successor. The two have a different approach to the community. While Brown prefers compromise and accommodation with the natives, Smith prefers a hard-line approach. Smith believes in the superiority of whites over the blacks.[891] Smith was critical of Brown's approach to the natives. He prefers Brown did not dine with sinners. Smith expresses shock on the ignorance of the converts to things like Trinity and sacraments. He sees them like "seeds sown on a rocky soil."[892]

Smith's approach played into the hands of Enoch. He has enraged the clan during the annual ceremony to honour their earth deity. The people of Umuofia believe that their dead

[890] Achebe, *Things Fall Apart*, 157.
[891] Ibid., 158.
[892] Ibid.

ancestors re-emerged again through *egwugwu*. It is a taboo in Umuofia for anybody to unmask an *egwugwu* in public or say anything that will disparage the *egwugwu* which they believed to be a spirit. But Enoch defiled the *egwugwu*. He unmasked the *egwugwu* in the public. His action was seen by the people as desecrating their land.[893]

Both old and young men of Umuofia agreed that Enoch has desecrated their land. The next day all the masked *egwugwu* of Umuofia gathered at the market square. They all came from all the quarters of the clan and even from neighbouring villages.[894]

The masked *egwugwu* marched to Enoch's compound and they were followed along with the elders of the clan. But the adherents of the new religion hide Enoch in the "parsonage." They burn down Enoch's house. The *egwugwu* and the elders moved to the church. They were received by Smith and his interpreter, Okeke. The head of *egwugwu* of Umuofia, Ajofia is the spokesman of the nine ancestors who administered justice in the clan. He assured Smith and Okeke of their safety, but that they come for Enoch. Smith refuses to surrender Enoch to them as demanded by *egwugwu*, though he could not stop them from burning the church.[895]

In Chapter Twenty-three, for two days after the burning of the church, nothing happened. The men in Umuofia move around, armed with guns and machetes, not wanting to be caught unaware by the white man. When the District Commissioner returned from his tour, Smith speaks to him. Afterward the District Commissioner requests to speak to the leaders of Umuofia in his office. The elders of Umuofia were not surprised at the invitation. They agreed to meet him, still armed with their guns and machetes. Okonkwo was among the six elders invited.

[893] Ibid., 160.
[894] Ibid., 161.
[895] Achebe, *Things Fall Apart*, 164.

At the meeting between the District Officer and elders of Umuofia, he tricks them to drop their weapons at the entrance. While inside, the District Officer ordered his men to handcuff them and asks them to tell their own side of the story on what transpired between the people of Umuofia and Enoch. Ekwueme spoke on behalf of the elders. The District Officer told them that what they did was unacceptable. The burning of the church will not go unpunished. He told them that they cannot be released until the community pays a fine of two hundred bags of cowries. The District Officer instructed the court messengers to treat them with respect. The six men were handcuffed and led into a guardroom.[896] As soon as the District Officer left, the head messenger shaved the elder's head, treating them with disdain, denied food or drink, even to urinate. They were detained for three days. The messengers taunt them morning and night.[897]

The court messengers went to inform Umuofia that their leaders have been detained by the District Officer order and can only be released on the condition they pay the money.[898] When the news spread all over the town and surroundings, there was panic and sadness among the people, who gathered to discuss the incident. They decide to pay the money.

In Chapter Twenty-four, Okonkwo and his fellow elders were released by District Officer having paid the money. The District Officer told them in the name of the Queen, that he urges them to be law-abiding and peaceful. As the men walk back home, they did not speak to anybody.[899]

The village crier beats his gong in the night to announce to the people of Umuofia of another meeting in the morning. That night Okonkwo slept little though excited that war may be declared against the white men. He swears to his ancestors that he will take revenge

[896] Ibid., 166.
[897] Achebe, *Things Fall Apart*, 168.
[898] Ibid.
[899] Ibid., 171.

against the white man for the humiliation he suffered in their hands. He reflects on how Umuofia conquered their enemies such as Isike and took some of them prisoners. What if Umuofia prefers not to declare war against the white man? He assures himself, he will do it singlehandedly, but his greatest obstacle in the meeting is Egonwanne, a great orator. "His sweet tongue can change fire into cold ash."[900] Okonkwo blames Egonwanne for convincing Umuofia's men to be less belligerent.

The meeting place was filled with people of Umuofia. Okonkwo and his friend Obierika were there, along with men from the nine villages. Okonkwo was especially interested in one person, Egonwanne. He is prepared to attack him if he speaks against Umuofia going to war. Okika, one of the elders detained by white man, urges the people to go to war against the white men even though it involves fighting their brothers.[901]

The meetings abruptly stopped by the arrival of five court messengers. When Okonkwo saw them, he sprang to his feet, trembling with hate. He confronted them. The court messenger tells the gathering of Umuofia that the white man has ordered the meeting to disperse. In a flash of rage, Okonkwo draws his machete and killed one of the messengers.[902]

In Chapter Twenty-five, the District Commissioner arrives at Okonkwo's house with armed soldiers and court messengers. The people of Umuofia gathered. The District Commissioner demands to see Okonkwo, but Okonkwo's friend Obierika told them that Okonkwo is not here with them. The commissioner became angry, threatening to lock them up unless they produce Okonkwo. After brief discussion among the clansmen, Obierika tells the District Commissioner where Okonkwo is. The District Commissioner did not understand what Obierika meant when he said, "Perhaps your men will help us."[903] Obierika

[900] Ibid., 172.
[901] Achebe, *Things Fall Apart*, 174-75.
[902] Ibid., 176.
[903] Ibid., 177.

leads five or six others of his kinsmen. The District Commissioner and his men followed while soldiers are ready to shoot. Obierika leads them to a small bush behind Okonkwo's compound. They came to the tree where Okonkwo hanged himself.[904]

The death of Okonkwo shocked the people of Umuofia. Obierika blames his death on the white men. He points out that without the treatment meted to Okonkwo and the community by the white men, Okonkwo would not have killed himself. He reminds them that Okonkwo was a great man of Umuofia, but now he will be buried like nobody. "That man was one of the greatest men in Umuofia. You drove him to kill himself; and now he will be buried like a dog."[905] Okonkwo's body was brought down by the messengers and the District Commissioner ordered his chief messenger to bring the dead body and all the people present to his court.

5.6 Analysis of Achebe's *Things Fall Apart*

In *Things Fall Apart*, Achebe pointed out the failure of the colonial power to understand indigenous culture, beliefs, values and settings, both in religion, politics, the economy and the social composition of the people. Achebe informs a target readership, not only the Europeans but his own people, that the African "past was not one long night of savagery from which the first Europeans, acting on God's behalf, delivered them."[906] Achebe's *Things Fall Apart* is centred on Igbo Society. It is about the Igbo encounter with Europeans. Achebe presents a community before the arrival of the British with its own rules, laws and taboos which invariably did not appeal to western standards.[907]

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[904] Ibid., 178.
[905] Achebe, *Things Fall Apart*, 179.
[906] Jarica Linn Watts, "He Does Not Understand Our Customs. Narrating Orality and Empire in Chinua Achebe's Things Fall Apart." *Journal of Postcolonial Writing* 46, no. 1 (2010): 65-66. See Lewis, Alaxandra. "Postcolonial Literatures and the Ongoing Process of 'Writing Back." *Journal of African Literature and Culture* (2006).
[907] Michelle James, "A Postmodern and Postcolonial Analysis of Nigerian Literature." Integrated Studies Project Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts-*Integrated Studies*, Alberta (2010): 11.

The story is about a make-believe close-knit community of Umuofia. Achebe showcases an Igbo society that was industrious, vibrant and religious.[908]

Furthermore, Achebe's *Things Fall Apart* presented through meta-narrative shows how the arrival of Europeans in Africa especially in the Igbo nation, marked decline, decay, division and hatred. For instance, the conversion of Okonkwo's son Nwoye to Christianity against his father's wishes pitted a father against his son.[909]

The coloniser's imposition of their language, culture, religion and education on the indigenous people destabilised them and was regarded by Achebe as an act of bad faith. One problem associated with imposition and autocracy is that it breeds resistance and turmoil, and the result is anarchy. The imposition of foreign ideas on the people of Umuofia damaged the co-existence that previously existed. The collective will of the people and the peoples' participatory voice were suppressed and replaced with the voice of the colonial power. The centre, which had held the people together, could do so no longer hold and things began to fall apart.

5.7 Achebe's Other Novels and Analysis

Achebe's *Arrow of God*[910] is a story set in the Igbo community in Nigeria during a period when the colonial power ruled the whole country, and the activities of missionaries were beginning to gain foot in Igboland. In the book, two different cultures clash, marking the turning point in the lives of a people who were at peace with each other until the advent of colonial rule and missionaries. As the people grappled with the assimilation of a foreign culture, their identity, self-confidence and values disintegrated to self-pity and an inferiority

[908] Watts, 71.
[909] Nigeria: "*Things Fall Apart*," http://www.angelfire.com/ex2/poco/kim.html
[910] Achebe, *Arrow of God* (New York: Anchor Books, 1964).

complex.[911] The main character in the book, Ezeulu, is the Chief Priest of Ulu, the most revered god of the Umuaro community. The role of the Chief Priest is highly respected, and the Chief Priest's authority is like that of a modern- day President. The people of the community looked up to him for guidance, security and development. He names the festivals, when to plant crops and when to harvest them, such as the feast of Pumpkin Leaves and New Yam festival. These roles are articulated in this scene:

> Ezeulu beat his *Ogene* Gome Gome Gome Gome…and immediately the children's voices took up the news on all sides. Onwa atuo! onwa atuo! onwu atuo! He put the stick back into the iron gong and leaned it on the wall.[912]

However, the coming of the colonists: Winterbottom, Clarke and Wright in Umuaro changed the whole scenario. They showed contempt for social cohesion and the culture of the people as portrayed with the summoning of Ezeulu to Clarke's office. When Ezeulu came of his own volition, he was put into prison for arriving late.[913]

With *Arrow of God*, Achebe shows how internal discord, planted by an external factor, can be devastating[914]. It was the division and hatred sowed by the colonial power, Britain, that annihilated the people of Umuaro. The Nigerian post-colonial state inherited this divided society with its destabilising effect between the political elite and the masses.[915] A structure of patronage and in what Richard Joseph called "prebendalism,"[916] bribery,

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[911] www.wmich.edu/dialogues/texts/arrowofgod.html.
[912] Achebe, *Arrow of God*, 2-3.
[913] Ibid., 175-176.
[914] www.wmich.edu/dialogues/texts/arrowsofgod.htmi.
[915] Rafiu. "The Nigerian State, political assassination and democratic consolidation: A historical exploration."
[916] Larry Diamond, "Postscript and Postmortem." In Larry Diamond, Anthony Kirk-Greene, Oyeleye Oyediran. *Transition Without End: Nigerian Politics and Civil Society Under Babangida* ed. (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1997), 471. Note: According to Richard Joseph, there is a "prebendal" culture in Nigeria, in which the systematic abuse of state office and resources for individual and group gain is expected and rewarded in the interactions of clients and patrons, politicians and constituencies…" (Ibid).

kickbacks in public office and the practice of intolerance – became the norm rather than an exception.

In Achebe's *No Longer at Ease*,[917] the main character is Obi Okonkwo, the grandson of Okonkwo, the protagonist in *Things Fall Apart*. In the story, the people of Umuofia Progressive Union agree to send Obi Okonkwo to England to obtain a western education.[918] The people's wish is that he would study law in England in order to defend them against other towns that encroach on their land, but Obi Okonkwo studies the English language instead. On his return, Obi Okonkwo is employed as a top civil servant in Lagos as an administrative assistant to the Inspector of Schools. The people of Umuofia expected him to come to thank them, but Obi Okonkwo ignores them. Things soon start going wrong for Obi Okonkwo when he is caught collecting a bribe of twenty pounds from a scholarship applicant in order to favour the candidate. Obi Okonkwo is arrested and detained.[919] The men of Umuofia rally to help.[920] The people of Umuofia forgive him based on the Igbo spirit of *Onyeghalanwanne ya* (meaning brotherhood and togetherness). Subsequently, Obi falls in love with Clara, a woman from the *Osu* caste. His kinsmen did not want anything to do with his choice. Thus, Obi finds himself in another dilemma. He is presented with two cultures, western civilisation, and indigenous culture. If he follows the western culture, his people will despise him; if he chooses the indigenous culture, he will be loved by his people, but he will lose his love, Clara.

In *No Longer at Ease*, Achebe looks at inherited colonial structures such as "Bureaucrats" in government and wonders if the system will function well under the indigenous hands. He was unoptimistic about the indigenous people's capacity to render

[917] Achebe. *No Longer at Ease* (London: Penguin Group, 1967, 2010).
[918] Achebe, *No Longer at Ease*, 4.
[919] Achebe (1967, 2010), 1-2.
[920] Ibid., 4-5.

services effectively without falling at the temptation to corrupt themselves through gratification and bribery. At the end of the story, we find a postcolonial Nigeria mashed in corruption and an indigenous people unable to manage both economy and the political system.

Achebe's *A Man of the People*[921] deals with politics, corruption and how the country experiences political and economic stagnation in post-independence Nigeria. Within the structure of the novel, the political elite is represented by Chief Nanga. The protagonist in the novel is Odili, a young schoolteacher and an activist, who campaigned on the side of marginalised Nigerians to liberate them from the clutches of economic and political corruption and to bring hope to the disappointed masses.[922] As in the other books *Things Fall Apart* and *Arrow of God,* Achebe continues to draw attention to how the colonizers transplanted their values and system into the country's culture. As a result, the country finds it is difficult to move forward and balance the old against the new.[923]

In Achebe's final work before his death, *There Was A Country: A Personal History of Biafra*,[924] Achebe again laments the erosion of ancient African histories and identity through the so-called discovery of Africa by the Europeans. He claims his aim of writing *There Was A Country* was to put African history in a potent and truthful perspective and to set the record straight for the sake of future generations. He ponders how Nigeria, a country so blessed cannot live in peace and develop because of ethnicity and religion.

Achebe also has a conflicting relationship with Christianity. He sees himself as the product of two faiths, Traditional Religion and Christianity. He writes: "I often had periods

[921]Achebe, *A Man of the People* (Oxford: Heinemann Educational Books Ltd, 1966).
[922] Jago Morrison, "Chinua Achebe's *A Man of the People*: The Novel and the Public Sphere." In Morrison J., Watkins S., eds., *Scandalous Fictions* (London: Palgrave Macmillian, 2007), 117.
[923] Marcel Ikechukwu Onyibor, "Igbo Cosmology in Chinua Achebe's *Arrow of God*: An Evaluative Analysis." *Open Journal of Philosophy* 6 (2016): 114.
[924] Achebe, *There Was A Country: A Personal History of Biafra*. Allen Lane an imprint of Penguin Group.

of oscillating faith as I grew older, periods of doubt, when I quietly pondered, and deeply questioned, the absolutist teachings or interpretations of religion. I struggled with the certitude of Christianity - 'I am the Way, the Truth and the Life' – not its accuracy, because as a writer one understands that there should be such latitude…."[925] Achebe's reservation hinges, rather, on Christianity as the religion of the coloniser, and yet, it is the religion of his father and mother.[926]

Achebe's dilemma can be linked to the present religious extremism in Nigeria, with the two main religions, Christianity and Islam, fighting each other for the souls of the people. He contrasts this to his father, Isaiah Achebe and his Uncle Udoh Osinyi who lived side by side despite their different religious beliefs and yet maintained common co-existence and brotherhood.[927]

Therefore, Achebe is suggesting Muslims and Christians can follow the footsteps of Isaiah and Udoh without recrimination and bloodletting.

Achebe's *There Was A Country* focused on his use of language. Achebe communicated daily in his native language, Igbo, but wrote in English, a language he believed was forced on him during his missionary schooling and therefore represents repression and domination. Although he was influenced by great poets like Yeats and Eliot, for Achebe, the oral tradition of Igbo storytelling stands out as the best. He wrote his prose in English because English is widely read. He acknowledged that writing in his native language will slow his message to the outside world. Thus, English to him was a vehicle to convey his messages and African lived experiences to the world stage.

[925] Ibid., 3-14.
[926] Ibid.,10.
[927] Achebe, *There Was A Country,* 13.

5.8 Achebe's Critics and Supporters

Maleki and Navidi argue that Achebe's *Things Fall Apart* shows how he revives the original history of Africa as a historical thinker that had been maligned by the foreign writers. Again, he tries to prove the fact that Africans have their own tradition, history and cultural identity. Thus, heroes and characters in his novels are representatives of their own land, people, culture and tradition.[928]

Michelle James contends that Achebe's writings bring to the world the "postmodern paradox" in the which English language becomes the best tool to convey the feelings of the Nigerian people to the world. It may not present all the experiences of the people to the worldview, but his works have impacted his readers on the understanding and appreciation of African culture.[929]

Cora Agatucci infers that Achebe paints a picture of Africa in a simple language that recognise the peoples' culture and boundaries while at the same time appealing especially to his foreign readers, to whom *Things Fall Apart* is partly directed to. According to Agatucci, Achebe attempts to redeem his tradition and meanwhile point to the way for positive adjustment.[930]

Kaiama Glover argues that Achebe can be very blunt in his criticism of fellow countrymen. Achebe takes it upon himself for "settling down beside the glories" of the nation's history. Nevertheless, Achebe does not run away from criticising Western countries for their roles in Africa's modern woes.[931] Glover believes that Achebe took up the task of

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[928] Maleki and Navidi, "Foregrounding Achebe's Things Fall Apart: A Postcolonial Study," 12.
[929] James, "A Postmodern and Postcolonial Analysis of Nigerian Literature," 18.
[930] Cora Agatucci, "Cultures and literature of Africa, Oral Arts and film." *The Scot Report for Social Sciences Selection*, (1988), 6 October 1988.
[931] Kaiama L. Glover, "Postcolonial Everyman." *The New York Times* (New York), January 31, 2010. http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/31/books/review/Glover-t.html?

addressing issues bordering on colonial and postcolonial reality with "gentle narrative style" in 20th Century and 21st Century Africa.[932]

O.R. Dathorne criticises Achebe's attempts to depict white characters in all his novels and are never seen as people, but as figurative forces against which his heroes react. He observes that in Achebe's *Things Fall Apart* there is a minor disparity (except a degree of militancy) between the Reverend Brown and the Reverend Smith.

Dathorne further observes that in Achebe's *No Longer at Ease*, the protagonist Obi and Mr. Green are pallid images of the old colonial, while Mr. Winterbottom in Achebe's *Arrow of God* is employed to thwart the wishes of a stubborn chief priest. He contends that these characters in the novels have no life of their own, they are only necessary because they strengthen the conflict of disagreements. Again, in Achebe's *A Man of the People*, the American couple who adore everything African are once again a construction out of a generalisation. Maybe it is part of Achebe's plans to make his white characters frightening, but Dathorne observes that their very names imply their obscurity, and, in this manner, Achebe appears to be suggesting their inconsequential role in the history of his own people.[933]

There is little doubt that Achebe was susceptible to dualism through his writings and strong defence of the indigenous system. Achebe is a product of Igbo culture that believes in dualism, the good and the bad. He sees some elements of colonial legacy such as imposition of values, language and religion as not good for his people. At the same time, he praises colonial intervention in stopping the killing of twins, *osu* caste system, as well as the introduction of schools, hospitals, and transport as good omens.

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[932] Ibid.
[933] O. R. Dathorne, *The Black Mind: A History of African Literature* (Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 1974), 160.

Thus, according to Jude Chudi Okpala, dualism is a principle of Igbo metaphysics, which stresses the interface of the "physical and non-physical beings" in human personality. This dualism, which is not anything like Descartes' evident in the vernacular. It means "wherever something stands, something else will stand, something else will stand beside it."[934] The world in which Igbo people live have its double and counterpart in the realm of the spirits [*chi*]. A man lives here and his *chi* there. This is implicit in Achebe's description of the human person in Igbo thought; that a human being is half of a person without his *chi*, which is an invisible divinity. Okpala avers that Igbo culture believes that a man receives his gifts, talents, character or his part in life before he was born.[935]

Okpala further adduces that Achebe embraces this metaphysics in his narrative creativity in *Things Fall Apart*, for the text is loaded with references to *chi*. Such ideas are not overindulgence of language, it is rather, a stimulation of Igbo metaphysics. For instance, Okonkwo, the protagonist in *Things Fall Apart*, has an oscillating fortune, and his exile and his suicide offer a good example. Okonkwo's life is a blend of joy and sorrow. It reflects the Igbo saying *Onye kwe chi ya ekwe* [meaning, if you say yes, your chi will say yes]. Okonkwo was in agreements with his *chi*, and such accord shows confidence, and it is not simply "psychological," but equally ethical and practical for Okonkwo's accord, as his *chi* echoes his accomplishment and feats and his people's appreciation of his honour.[936]

Emeka Nwabueze also argues that Achebe employs dualism as a narrative device in all his novels. Through dualism, Achebe puts up authorial meddling and the imposition of his judgment on the readers, as a result giving him/her the chance to contest meanings and norms that underlie the ordering of Igbo society. Nwabueze observes that Achebe expresses

[934] Jude Chudi Okpala, "Igbo Metaphysics in Chinua Achebe's *Things Fall Apart*." *Callaloo* 25, no. 2 (Spring, 2002): 560.
[935] Ibid.
[936] Ibid., 561-62.

the moral duplicity and ambiguity of norms that guide the Igbo society through the enormous influence of the gods on the life of the society.[937]

Achebe embrace of tradition does not mean he rejects modernism. After all, Achebe was a beneficiary of western education. Achebe's roles as a writer were to highlight the negative consequences of colonialism and to inform the world that Africa had intrinsic value as was wisdom and teach. I do not see anything wrong in his position as an African spokesman read through his works. Though Achebe complains how at a local missionary school they were not allowed to speak the Igbo language and were encouraged to renounce all traditions considered as pagan,[938] Achebe contends that growing up as a Christian allowed him to observe the world more carefully. In an autobiographical essay titled "Named for Victoria, Queen of England," Achebe relates how like Queen Victoria, "he lost…Albert,"[939] as he was baptised as Albert. However, he learns folk stories told by his mother and elder sister, stories Achebe describes as "immemorial quality of the sky and the forests and the rivers."[940]

Achebe also narrates how he learned English at the age of eight. He points out how he was fascinated by stories told first in the Igbo language and later in English. He said, "I probably have spoken more words in Igbo than English, but I have definitely written more words in English than Igbo, which I think makes me perfectly bilingual. Some people have suggested that I should be better off writing in Igbo."[941] He points out that some people in

[937] Emeka Nwabueze, "Theoretical Construction and Constructive Theorizing on the Execution of Ikemefuna in Achebe's *Things Fall Apart*: A Study in Critical Dualism." *Research in African Literatures* 31, no. 2 (Summer, 2000): 171-72.
[938] Lyn Innes, "Chinua Achebe Obituary." *The Guardian* (London), March 22, 2013. https://www.theguardian.com/books/2013/mar/22/chinua-achebe.
[939] Ibid., 145. Achebe, "Named for Victoria, Queen of England." In Ashcroft, Griffiths and Tiffin ed. T*he Post-Colonial Studies Reader*, Second Edition (New York: Routledge, 2006), 145.
[940] Ibid.
[941] Ibid., 143.

order to drive home their points by asking him "in which language I dream." His answer will in most cases surprise them, "I dream in both languages."[942]

Hence, the debate on whether it is appropriate for African writers to use the English language as the medium of expression in their literary writings or whether African writers can ever learn the English language well enough to be able to use it effectively in creative writings?[943]

In June 1962, African writers gathered at Makerere University College, Kampala, Uganda, the theme of the conference was titled: "A Conference of African Writers of English Expression."[944] At the conference some writers had argued that African literature must be written in African languages or lose their artistic legitimacy and independence.[945] Nigerian literary critic Obi Wali argued that African literature should be written in African languages.[946] Wali criticises the conference for not recommending the use of indigenous languages for African writers. He describes African writers as the "European's midwives."[947]

The same sentiment was echoed by Ngugi wa Thiong'o who joined Wali in condemning the use of foreign language in writing African literature. He said, language was the most important vehicle through which power fascinated and held the soul prisoner.[948] Thiong'o decried the neglect of indigenous language by the civilising Europeans as unfortunate. He

[942] Ibid.
[943] Julia Udofia, "The Language of African Literature." *International Journal of Research in Arts and Social Sciences* 3 (2011): 90.
[944] Ngugi wa Thiong'O, "The Language of African Literature." In Ashcroft, Griffiths and Tiffin ed. *The Post-colonial Studies Reader*, Second Edition (New York: Routledge, 2006), 263.
[945] Ibid.
[946] Julia Udofia, "The Language of African Literature," 90.
[947] Achebe, "The Politics of Language." In Bill Ashcroft, Gareth Griffiths, and Hellen Tiffin ed. *The Post-colonial Studies Reader*, Second Edition (New York: Routledge, 2006), 269.
[948] Ngugi wa Thiong'O, "The Language of African Literature," 265.

pointed out how Kenyan children were forced to learn and speak English language against their own language.[949]

However, there are groups who believe the English language has its place along with indigenous languages, as led by Achebe. He said there is a difference between him and Ngugi wa Thiong'O on the use of indigenous language or European languages by African writers; namely indigenous and foreign language will serve both purposes. Achebe also believes writing in English instead of the Igbo language is due to the peculiar nature of Nigeria, since the English language is a medium for communication and a unifying language for all diverse nationalities in Nigeria.[950]

Achebe said he sympathises with Ngugi wa Thiong'O on his predicaments in the hands of colonial masters. However, Achebe believes that instead of blaming the colonial masters for the imposition of English, we should blame it on the people who are desirable to speak the language. Achebe notes that in Nigeria the desire to speak English was already in vogue especially in the coastal regions in the first half of the nineteenth century.[951] He argues that the blame of imposition of English to Africans should not entirely be placed on the colonial masters but on ourselves, our parents, and communities.[952] Achebe believes the idea of teaching in our mother tongues will be exceedingly difficult considering the plurality of African society.[953] So, the argument for the uniformity of indigenous languages as a means of communication and spoken language will be difficult to implement.

In my view, Achebe use of English is justified. Nigeria was colonised by the British and English was adopted as the official language for the purpose of communicating and

[949] Ibid., 265.
[950] Ibid.
[951] Achebe, "The Politics of Language," 270.
[952] Ibid.
[953] Ibid., 271.

understanding among all the nationalities in Nigeria. Therefore, the criticism is wrong when viewed from Nigeria's fragile state structure which has 360 nationalities.

5.9 Biography of Sir Ahmadu Bello

Alhaji Sir Ahmadu Bello, Sardauna of Sokoto, former premier of Northern Nigeria, was a great-great-grand-son of Sheik Uthman Dan Fodio. He was a direct descendant of the prophet on both sides of his patrilineage. He was regarded as one of the most powerful men in Nigeria and headed the biggest political party in Africa, Northern People's Congress (NPC) in the 1950s.[954]

Bello was born on June 12, 1910 at a town called Rabah in the present day Sokoto state. He was assassinated on January 15, 1966 along with his first wife, Goggon Kurya Hafsatu. Bello's father was a district head and a farmer, while his mother is from Sokoto. His grandmother was the daughter of Dabo, Emir of Kano.[955] Bello married five wives and had children. Bello was a devout Muslim. In 1955, he performed the Hajj, becoming Alhaji Ahmadu Bello. Until his death, he visited Mecca yearly to perform the *Umrah*. He walked every day to his local Mosque for prayer. He chose "work and worship" as the motto for Northern Nigeria.[956]

Bello received his education first at the Sokoto Provincial School, studying the Quran, hadiths, and Shariah, and then proceeded to Katsina Teacher Training College. After spending five years at Katsina, he was appointed by the Sultan as a teacher in his former school in Sokoto. In 1934, after teaching several years in the Sokoto Middle School, he entered the emirate administration as district head of Rabah. In 1938 he made an

[954] Stanley Diamond, "Review: The Sardauna of Sokoto: His Life Thus Far." *Africa Today* 10, no. 4 (April 1963): 12.
[955] Ahmed Bello, *My Life* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1962), 1.
[956] New World Encyclopaedia, n.d. "Ahmadu Bello."

unsuccessful claim to the office of Sultan of Sokoto. The new Sultan of Sokoto, Siddiq Abubakar III (1938-1988) conferred on him the honorary traditional title of Sardauna of Sokoto and elevated him to the Sokoto Native Authority Council.[957]

Bello became involved in broader Nigeria political activities. In 1945 he was instrumental in the formation of the Youth Social Circle in Sokoto, a discussion group of northern educators and civil servants. In 1948 this association affiliated with the newly founded Northern People's Congress (NPC), originally created as a cultural organization but destined to become the leading political party in Northern Nigeria. Bello became increasingly active in the NPC and finally its president. In 1949 he was elected by the Sokoto Native Authority to the Northern House of Assembly. Bello was involved in constitutional reform both in Ibadan and London. He became one of the leading spokespersons for the northern position. He contested election in 1952, the first elections held in Northern Nigeria, and was elected to the Northern House of Assembly, where he became a member of the regional executive council. He was made minister of works. One year later, he accepted the regional portfolio of community development and local government. And in 1954, Bello became the first premier of Northern Nigeria, a position he held until his death.[958]

Bello received numerous awards and an honorary Doctor of Law from the University of Nigeria Nsukka in December 1961. He was honoured with a Knight of the British Empire (KBE) by Queen Elizabeth II in 1959. He also established Ahmadu Bello University (1962) in Zaria, the second largest University in Africa, which is named after him. He was the University's first Chancellor. Again, Nigeria's 200 naira note bears his picture. He

[957] Bello, *My Life*, 1, 3.
[958] Ibid., 1, 3, 5.

advocated both national and Pan-African unity. Bello blames the problems of his era on the colonial legacy.[959]

Bello is seen as one of the founding fathers of modern Nigeria, which was established on October 1, 1960 when Bello's NPC formed an alliance with Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe's National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC) to form Nigeria's first indigenous federal government which led to independence from Britain. Notwithstanding Bello's status and political support in the Northern region, he chose to stay on in the North instead of assuming the position of national Prime Minister, which would have obliged him to live in Lagos.[960] There was a coalition of three party structures in 1957 between NPC/NCNC/AG, and the coalition was in place until the 1959 general election when representative fairness between the North and the South was put in place and a consensus reached to base representation on population grounds. Increasing the federal legislature from 181 to 312 and a constituency size defined on a seat/population ratio of 1:100,000 gave the Northern region a majority in the federal legislature against the combined seats of East, West and Lagos.[961]

5.10 Ahmadu Bello's Autobiography, *My Life*

In his autobiography, *My Life*, Ahmadu Bello chronicle his birth, life, and politics. It starts with his birth in 1910, in the little town of Rabah, seven years after the British drives out Sultan Attahiru from his throne, killed and replaced by his own cousin. His father was the District Head and controls forty-eight District heads in Sokoto Emirate, with a population of thirty thousand people.[962]

[959] New World Encyclopaedia, n.d. "Ahmadu Bello."
[960] Ibid.
[961] B. J. Dudley, "A Coalition Theoretic Analysis of Nigerian Politics 1950-66." *The African Review: A Journal of African Politics, Development and International Affairs* 2, no. 4 (1972): 529.
[962] Bello, *My Life*, 1.

Bello reveals that in those days there was no school in his village. When he was five years old, both his half-brothers and three sisters were sent to Mallam Garba, the Liman of Rabah to learn the Holy Koran.[963] Later he went to Sokoto Provincial School, where he was taught English, arithmetic, geography, and history (primarily British), with readings of the Holy Koran.[964] They were also introduced to European games like football, rounders, and fives. Their teachers were all British except for a few teachers who were Hausa and of Fulani extraction.[965]

Bello also completed a five-year course at Katsina. The college was a preparatory ground for teachers. It was the same school Sir Abubakar, the Federal Republic of Nigeria's Prime Minister, was trained. After his education at Katsina he was appointed a teacher at Sokoto Middle School by the Sultan. He was placed on the salary of £60 per annum. He taught English, geometry and Arabic.[966]

Bello emphasises that a big change came to him in 1934 when the Sultan appointed him District Head of Rabah, his birthplace, succeeding his cousin who died after a brief illness. He was twenty-four-year-old. He describes it as a position of responsibility and trust.[967]

In 1938, Bello left Rabah for Gusau. It was the year Sultan Hassan died and was succeeded by Abubakar, who was his nephew. Sultan Abubakar vacated the title of Sardauna immediately to assume the throne of Sultan of Sokoto. Sardauna is peculiar to Sokoto and restricted to men of the ruling house. While at Gusau, he was appointed by the new Sultan as supervisor of fourteen District Heads. He would also oversee branches of Native Administration departments, the sub-treasury which received all money collected on

[963] Bello, *My Life*, 7.
[964] Ibid., 7-8, 20-21.
[965] Ibid., 23.
[966] Ibid., 35-37.
[967] Bello, *My Life*, 39, 41-43.

behalf of the Sokoto Native Administration. The new Sultan promoted Bello to a member of the Sultan's Council in Sokoto at the same time as Sardauna of Sokoto.[968] By 1942 Bello becomes a close associate of British Senior District Officer, Sharwood Smith.[969] However, Bello was accused of collecting cattle tax from the Fulani nomadic cow men without remitting the money to the treasury while at Gusau. After the investigation by the administrative officer in charge of the case, Bello was tried before the Sultan's Court. He was convicted and sentenced to one year's imprisonment. However, Bello appealed against this judgement to the Supreme Court presided over by learned judge, Mr Ames, and two Muslim jurists. He was discharged and acquitted by the jurists.[970]

In 1946 Nigerians began to agitate for a new constitution because the 1922 constitution in operation is seen by many Nigerians as inadequate; for instance, the northerners had no single representatives in the Legislative Council.[971] The discussion led to Richard Constitution of 1946 named after Sir Arthur Richards (Lord Milverton). It makes provision for the first time an Africans being represented on the Legislative body.[972] The new constitution made a provision for new a Regional Council for the north, a House of Assembly, and a House of Chiefs. These bodies discuss bills likely to affect the region and make recommendation to Lagos. The north elects five unofficial members of the Assembly and four in the House of Chiefs.[973]

Initially Bello was not interested in politics. He was occupied with his role, especially in the Sokoto Council. It contemplates furthering his education,[974] however, eighteen months later his dream comes through. He was offered a visit to the United Kingdom under the

[968] Ibid., 49, 51.
[969] Ibid., 54.
[970] Ibid., 58.
[971] Bello, *My Life*, 60.
[972] Ibid., 61-62.
[973] Ibid., 62.
[974] Ibid., 63.

British Council to study local government. On January 10, 1948, he arrives in London. He proceeds to a town called Richmond in Yorkshire. He studies local government and British methods of farming that deals with livestock.[975] After his return from England, coupled with the death of Waziri of Sokoto, Bello was convinced by friends especially Sharwood-Smith to put the country's interest first by contesting for the regional election. He agrees to do so, and wins. At that time in the north unlike other regions, there was no political party but, rather a socio-cultural organisation.[976] In 1949 he travels to Lagos for the first time to meet other politicians from other regions such as Dr Azikiwe and Awolowo.[977]

Bello also meets with other Northern region politicians such as Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, Muhammadu Ngileruma, Wali of Bornu, the legal adviser to Shehu of Borno, Umar Ibn Muhammad Al- Amin El-Kanemi[978] to discuss the shortcomings of Richard's constitution. In the Kaduna meeting, they unanimously agreed to speak with one voice considering the calibre of politicians from the south. In the Ibadan meeting, they met other politicians from other regions and from Lagos. The meeting was presided over by Sir Gerald Howe, the Attorney-General. The outcome of the meeting was the creation of the Ministerial portfolios. The boundary adjustment between the north and the western region, was decided in their favour.[979] Other issues that came out of the meeting was the creation of House of Representatives which replaced the Legislative Council.[980]

Bello emerged as a power broker in Nigeria from the Northern House in 1950 to the Executive Council and lastly to Regional Ministry, including the Works and

[975] Ibid., 64.
[976] Ibid., 64-65.
[977] Ibid., 66.
[978] Alhaji M. Yakubu, "Coercing Old Guard Emirs in Northern Nigeria: The Abdication of Yakubu 111 of Bauchi, 1954." *African Affairs* 92, no. 369 (October 1993): 595.
[979] Bello, *My Life*, 68.
[980] Ibid., 69-70.

Communications in 1952. He was also among those appointed to lead the Northern region delegation in any future deliberation with southern politicians.[981]

The formation of NPC emerged out of a socio-cultural group. The idea was conceived by Dr Dikko, who later headed the Ministry of Health. Bello was elected President, while Abubakar as Vice-President, and Ibrahim Imam, Secretary-General. Bello points out that they chose to call it "Northern" because they wanted to unite the Northern people and they were not looking beyond northern borders. It was a huge success among northerners as they embraced the party.[982]

Bello contends that despite the shortcomings inherent in Native Authority Administration, the Native Authority fares well. He said that Lugard praises the administrative genius of Fulani rulers and their workers and utilises it as the driving force of the Native Administration system. He points out that his regrets are that "the Fulani system did not cover the whole country. An attempt was made by the British to produce an imitation of Fulani Rule in what were then known as the 'pagan areas' and this failed completely."[983]

Another sour point between the north and south was the issue of what type of model will be appropriate for the country: the Westminster model or Presidential democracy? Again, the southern politician agitates for self-government. Bello said during the budget debate of 31st March and 1st April 1953, when a private member's motion was introduced, the motion was tabled by Chief Anthony Enahoro, a member of Action Group. The motion was seconded by Awosika.[984] But Bello said: "Mr President, the people of the North are the best

[981] Ibid., 85.
[982] Ibid., 85.
[983] Bello, *My Life*, 96, 97.
[984] Ibid., 115-6

judges of their own situation and we feel that in our present situation we cannot commit ourselves to fixing a date for the attainment of self-government."[985]

Bello's countermotion was supported by Wali. At the end of the deliberation about the pros and cons, the self-government was defeated. The defeat did not go down well with leaders of the South-west. Bello concluded that southern politicians are troublemakers, and they will do anything to spite them. He said on their way home they were confronted by mobs at Iddo train station. They booed them, to such an extent, they felt their lives were in danger.[986]

After they returned to Kaduna, they concluded that the southern politicians were out to ferment trouble. Bello said, "what kind of trouble had we let ourselves in for by associating with such people?" Bello notes that Lord Lugard's amalgamation were far from popular with them. Because of what happened to them in Lagos, there was a contemplation among the people of the northern region for secession.[987] Bello said, "there were agitations in favour of sucession; we should set up on our own; we should cease to have anything more to do with the Southern people; we should take our own way."[988]

However, while the idea of secession sounds good, the Northern region is land locked. It will pose difficulties for the region especially in access to a seaport. He prefers a modified tone, with looser structure which will give the regions the greatest possible freedom of movement and action; a structure which would reduce the powers of the Centre (federal) yet retain strong national unity. His fellow northern politicians agreed to this proposition.[989] They have a six-week recess and were recalled to Lagos on 18th May to attend an urgent

[985] Ibid., 118.
[986] Ibid., 134.
[987] Bello, *My Life*, 135.
[988] Bello, *My Life*, 135.
[989] Ibid., 136.

matter. However, before the meeting, a fracas broke out in Kano City around the area of Sabon Gari (strangers' quarters). It was a clash between NPC's supporters against Action Group and NCNC's sympathises over the treatment of northern politicians in Lagos. The rioting lasted for two days and led to the death of 31 persons and 241 wounded.[990]

The disagreement between the three parties and the fracas that claimed lives in Kano were a source of worry to the colonial administrators. To stop the crisis snowballing into serious conflict, the British government summoned the leaders to London to find areas of disagreements. There were five delegates each from the major parties. At the London Conference, the northern politicians presented eight demands.[991]

Again, in March 1957 Chief Akintola moved a motion in the House of Representatives for Independence in 1957. But Jaja Wachukwu moved a countermotion to amend the motion and substitute it to independence in 1959. He was supported by Balewa.[992]

5.11 Ahmadu Bello's Critics and Supporters

Bello was anxious with the slow pace of development of the Northern region. He sees it as a point of duty to safeguard the interest of the region from Southern intrusions. Hence, when Nigeria became independent in 1960, Bello preferred to be the premier of the Northern Region, instead of the prime minister of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. Bello's biggest legacy was his northernisation, modernisation and integration of the distinct people of Northern Nigeria. [993]

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[990] Ibid., 136-37.
[991] Ibid., 149-153, 158.
[992] Ibid., 159.
[993] *Your Dictionary Biography*, n.d. "Sir Ahmadu Bello." https://biography.yourdictionary.com/alhaji-sir-ahmadu-bello.

A.H.M. Kirk-Greene argues that Ahmadu Bello has gone back to his origins and revived the principles of his revered ancestors as an example of his own beliefs by restoration of Uthman Dan Fodio's principle of leadership.[994] Thomas Hodgkin contends that Uthman dan Fodio's thesis *Bayan wujub al-hijra* was based on the central bureaucracy which Dan Fodio said should be limited to a loyal and honest *vizier*, judges, a chief of police, and a collector of taxes; and local administration should be in the hands of governors (emirs) selected from the scholarly class for their learning piety, integrity, and sense of justice.[995] Bello shares this same leadership style with his mentor Dan Fodio, which was built on honesty, passion for the people and hardwork. It is the legacy of both dan Fodios that inspired his leadership style and service in Northern Nigeria.

Jibrin Ubale Yahaya argues that Bello was a nationalist, a pan-Nigerian politician who never compromised the unity of Nigeria. He frames his politics and philosophy in three areas: 1. Principles of compromise. 2. The principles of negotiation. 3. The principle of accommodation. He contends that as a nationalist, he is aware of Nigerian diversity, the multi-ethnic composition of the federal arrangement, and the plural mosaic of our religious and cultural diversities. He notes that Bello was not blind to these disparities. He was convinced that Nigeria could rise beyond these constraining factors to build a united nation. Yahaya contends that Bello's principles of compromise, negotiation, and accommodation serve well in his time and would continue to serve us in these periods.[996]

[994] A.H.M. Kirk-Greene, "His Eternity, His Eccentricity, or His Exemplarity? A Further Contribution to the Study of H.E. the African Head of State." *African Affairs* 90, no. 359 (April 1991), 171.
[995] Thomas Hodgkin, "Usman dan Fodio." *Encyclopedia Britannica* (1 Jan 2021). https://www.britannica.com/biography/usman-dan-fodio
[996] Jibrin Ubale Yahaya, "All Assessment of Ahmadu Bello 'Sardauna' Political Ideology Towards Stronger and United Nigeria." *Global Scientific Journals* 6, no. 11 (November 2018): 258.

Ibrahim Gambari argues that Bello's personal and political agency likewise helped in modernizing modern Northern Nigeria, and thus contributed immeasurably to the shaping of the future of the region.[997]

Critics adduce that despite his enormous political clout, his role in national politics remained unpredictable. Bello expressed disdain for the Southern Nigerian brand of politics and had no interest in participating in the federal government in Lagos, which would require him living there.

Sunny Awhefeada accuses Ahmadu Bello of inflammatory statements and being an apostle of the Sokoto caliphate resurgence. This was captured on a speech he delivered on October 12, 1960: "The new nation called Nigeria should be an estate of our grandfather, Uthman Dan Fodio. We must ruthlessly prevent a change of power. We must use the minorities in the north as a willing tool and the south as a conquered territory and never allow them to rule over us or have control over their future." Awhefeada believes that Bello's speech was agenda setting and supported a superiority mentality over other groups in Nigeria.[998]

Stanley Diamond argues that Bello is hostile toward the Western region. Historically, he claims that the hostility between North and West, Fulani and Yoruba stems from the irridentist wars stopped by the British, without having reached a conclusion, certainly not that of the "ancient prophecy, that the Fulani would dip the holy Koran in the sea."[999]

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[997] Ibrahim Gambari, "Ahmadu Bello and the Challenges of Nation-Building in Nigeria." In E. Obadare and W. Adebanwi eds. *Governance and the Crisis of Rule in Contemporary Africa: Africa Histories and Modernities* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 173.
[998] Sunny Awhefeada, "Accomplishing Sardauna's Mission." *The Guardian* (Lagos), January 15, 2018. https://guardian.ng/issue/accomplishing-sardaunas-mission/.
[999] Stanley Diamond, "Review: The Sardauna of Sokoto: His Life Thus Far." *Africa Today* 10, no. 4 (April 1963): 14.

Kirk-Greene believes that Bello fits in to the classification of "culture-hero." He believes that Bello is one of the leaders accustomed to the institutionalised flattery disregarded by the Hausa cultural trait of *fadanci*."[1000]

5.12 Summary

The struggle for independence and development in Nigeria, especially in Northern Nigeria, formed part of the writings of the Nigerian postcolonial writers. To assist in the struggle for political change in Nigeria, Nigerian literature became a rallying point, joining other social forces that opposed the neo-colonial state. They awakened the consciousness of the people to the realities of their situations and took a step further by recommending serious measures such as resistance and mass protest against bad leadership, gross human rights' violations and corruption.[1001]

Achebe and Bello call for good governance and rule of law. They maintain that accountability and transparency in governance will deepen democracy, eliminate bribery and corruption, create an enabling environment for direct investment in the region and consequently create jobs for teeming unemployed youths. It follows that if the youths are gainfully employed, it will turn their mind against anti-social activities and keep them away from being used by religious zealots to foment trouble in Northern Nigeria. This chapter analyses the works of Nigerian postcolonial thinkers, Chinua Achebe and Ahmadu Bello. These postcolonial thinkers argue that Nigerians have the right to know how the country is governed and why the country is underdeveloped: Who is responsible for bad leadership? Who is responsible for lack of development? What is responsible for mass unemployment? Who is responsible for lack of accountability, transparency and corruption

[1000] Kirk-Greene, "His Eternity, His Eccentricity, or His Exemplarity? A Further Contribution to the Study of H.E. the African Head of State," 175.
[1001] Ugwuanyi Dele Maxwell, "Postcolonialism and the Politics of Resistance: Ngugi wa Thiong'O's Wizard of the Crow." *The Journal of Pan-African Studies* 4, no. 5 (2011): 219.

in government? What is responsible for lack of unity and peace among the ethnic groups in Nigeria? What is the way forward for the nation? It is on this note that Nigerian postcolonial authors present the current situation in Nigeria through art. Achebe was not happy about how literature written in the English language had misrepresented and assumed African voices. He stated his annoyance on how this literature was guilty in advancing the British empire through denigration of indigenous culture and tradition. The same sentiment he expressed against indigenous leaders whom he accused of corruption and mismanagement. On the other hand, Bello was critical against British colonial rule and the erosion of the indigenous system in the Northern Nigeria. He accused them of interference and being meddlesome.

The authors studied have also critically analysed the Nigerian situation from their own standpoint. Drawing from their works, I have concluded that Nigeria needs both political restructuring, a Sovereign National Conference and true federalism. Among these are: firstly, that there should be free and fair elections where the vote of the people counts; secondly, the elected government should bring transparency and accountability to government; thirdly, the rule of law and freedom of the press should prevail; fourthly, there should be an independent judiciary, without interference from the government so that both the common man and the rich can obtain justice and fairness; and finally, there is a need to restructure Nigeria through the convocation of ethnic nationalities and religious groups where issues concerning the viability of the present structure, federal system of government, citizenship, secularism, dichotomy between North and South, a revenue- sharing formula, federal character, derivation and self-determination can be debated. The contention of the scholars is that the present system, inherited by Nigerians, is lopsided and does not enhance peace, unity and coexistence among the ethnic groups in Nigeria.

Part III

Chapter 6: The Diagnosis of the Conflict in Northern Nigeria

6.1 Introduction

This chapter diagnoses the conflict in Northern Nigeria and how Northern Nigeria can move from violent conflicts to be a peaceful region. It will also show how various factors contributed to the crisis in the northern region. To do so, it will apply the works of Nigerian postcolonial texts and show how their views have come to bear in the peace process in Northern Nigeria. It has been established that there is a pervasive mutual exclusiveness that exists between the adherents of Christianity and Islam in Northern Nigeria even though they have lived alongside each other for centuries.[1002] Amongst the problems in the northern region is the problem of handling misunderstandings and other social issues which include the distribution of scarce resources, land, and the marginalisation of the minority by the majority.[1003]

The previous chapter explored the works of Nigerian postcolonial thinkers which discussed the failings in both colonial and postcolonial leadership and how the thinkers provided an alternative viewpoint in addressing the problems that confronted Northern Nigeria. This chapter will seek to diagnose and dissect the conflict by identifying the factors militating against peaceful co-existence in the northern region. The factors identified are social reform, good governance and rule of law, corruption, ethno-religious identity, gender equality, and the co-existence of indigenes and settlers. The aim is to analyse how various

[1002] Rofiah Ololade Sarumi, Olumuyiwa Temitope Faluyi and Obianuju E. Okeke-Uzodike, "Transcending Ethnic and Religious Barriers in Decision-Making: A Case of a Muslim Women Civil Organisation in Nigeria." *Journal Frontiers in Psychology, Perspective* 9, 3 (2019).
[1003] David Mickler, Muhammed Dan Suleiman and Benjamin Maiangwa, "Weak States, Regional Power, Global Player: Nigeria and The Response to Boko Haram," *African Security* 2, no. 3-4 (2019): 274.

groups mobilise ethno-religious cleavages to fuel conflicts, and to counter with relevant contributions of Nigerian postcolonial thinkers toward the diagnosis of the conflicts in the region.

The conflict in the northern region is multifaceted and driven by a combination of historical, political, economic, and ethno-religious resentments, such as grievances resulting from a long history of poor governance, elite manipulation, poverty, injustice and inequality.[1004] Achieving peace requires a sense of understanding of the conflict, the drivers of the conflict and various actors. However, this process has been undermined by the failure of the government in the northern region to work successfully with the neighbouring countries to secure a porous border, which has resulted in Boko Haram being able to move freely into Northern Nigeria from countries such as Chad, Niger, and Cameroon in order to train, regroup and recruit new members. In addition, the traditional rulers who are custodians of culture, and who helped in the resolution and settlement of local conflicts and were once revered by the people, have lost their respect and influence due to their partisan involvement in politics. Equally, both reputable Muslim and Christian leaders remain at odds because of their inability to resolve their religious differences and political affiliation.[1005]

A number of prominent Nigerian postcolonial thinkers addressed some of these factors in their novels/books, including Chinua Achebe, Wole Soyinka and Chimamanda Adichie.Though some of these works were written in 1960s, 70s, 80s and 90s, they are still relevant in today's northern Nigeria. Thus, primarily through the works of Achebe and Ahmadu Bello, though also including Soyinka and Adichie, I will examine the above-mentioned issues and contextualise them within the northern region context. Overall, these

[1004] Sarumi, Faluyi and Okeke-Uzodike, "Transcending Ethnic and Religious Barriers in Decision-Making: A Case of a Muslim Women Civil Organisation in Nigeria," 4.
[1005] Patricio Asfura-Heim and Julia McQuaid, "Diagnosing the Boko Haram Conflicts: Grievances, Motivations, and Institutional Resilience in Northeast Nigeria." *Centre for Naval Analyses*, CAN (2015): 15-16.

Nigerian postcolonial authors present a comprehensive engagement with historical events in an appealing way that can contribute to peace and unity in Nigeria.

6.2 The Application of Nigerian Postcolonial Literature

Nigeria saw an explosion of literary works from Achebe, Soyinka, and Adichie who tell and retell Nigerian narratives. A quick look at the literary culture of Nigeria shows that Nigerian postcolonial authors from pre-colonial and postcolonial epochs have always responded to the problems that confronted the country.[1006] Nigerian literature flourished as a protest to the British colonial legacies. The Nigerian postcolonial writers chosen in this study interrogated the failure of the Nigerian state to develop as a country. They argued that post-independence government leaders followed the same colonial legacies of partitioning

[1006] Achebe, *There Was a Country: A Personal History of Biafra*, 2. See Elleke Boehmer, *Stories of Women: Gender and Narrative in the Postcolonial Nation* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005), 27-28. Achebe states "Africa's postcolonial disposition is the result of a people who have lost the habit of ruling themselves. We have also had difficulty running the new systems foisted upon us at the dawn of independence by our colonial masters. Because the West has had a long but uneven engagement with the continent, it is imperative that it understand what happened to Africa. It must also play a part in the solution. A meaningful solution will require the goodwill and concerted efforts on the part of all those who share the weight of Africa's historical burden." Here Achebe interrogates the colonial legacy in Africa and puts the woes of Africa on the doorstep of colonialism in Africa. He believes that the socio-economic and political crises that have bedevilled the continent cannot be solved alone by the political leaders in Africa. He believes that those who created the problem in the first place should help to solve the unending crisis on the continent, Africa. On the other hand, Achebe's *Girls At War* (1972) expresses disgust and anguish that characterised the Biafra/Nigeria Civil War which torn the nation apart. He laments the destruction of lives and property during that period (Boehmer, 2005, p. 1). Again, Achebe avers that the colonial legacy in Nigeria and the introduction of indirect rule in Nigeria was at the heart of the division that Nigeria continues to experience presently. He said: "Britain's indirect rule was a great success in northern and western Nigeria, where the affairs of state within this new dispensation continued as had been the case for centuries, with one exception – there was a new sovereign, Great Britain, to whom all vassals pledged fealty and into whose coffers all taxes were paid. Indirect rule in Igbo land proved far more challenging to implement. Colonial rule functioned through a newly created and incongruous of 'warrant chiefs' – a deeply flawed arrangement that effectively confused and corrupted the Igbo democratic spirit," (Achebe, 2012, 2). It is through these works that these flaws were exposed. For Wale Adebanwi states: "creative writers in Africa do not merely reproduce existing modes of thought, particularly collective thought, they also establish guiding patterns of thought invoking the deliberate, explicit, and individual analytic activity which takes the existing collective worldview of Africans" (406-407). Adebanwi contends that African writers employ folklores, storytelling to tell their stories. Again, through narratives they corrected negative stories told by some Western writers and media against African culture and tradition. The African writers inform their audience though it was not all palatable there was a period of ups and down in Africa especially during the infamous slave trade, where greedy African elites sold their own to other continents, yet, Africa has a proud history and tradition and should hold their head high. Adebanwi gives an example of Achebe's Anthills of Savannah that warn African leaders of the consequences of bad leaders, repressive regime and not investing in the future of the people. He said it shows "a chilling measure of anticipation and forewarning of the dangers of unaccountable and repressive power," (Wale Adebanwi, "The Writer as a Social Thinker," *Journal of Contemporary African Studies* 32, no. 4 (1024): 409).

the Nigerian state alongside the North-south divide, Christian-Muslim dichotomy, and the Igbo, Yoruba and Hausa/Fulani divide. The authors pronounced through their works that good governance and rule of law had eluded the country and the country's wealth and resources have been commandeered by few political and religious elites. They noted that corruption has become the norm rather than exception at the expense of the masses.[1007]

Soyinka's political memoir, *You Must Set Forth at Dawn*, retells the story of General Ibrahim Babangida and Sani Abacha's military dictatorship in Nigeria. He revisits the annulment of the June 12 presidential election by then military president Ibrahim Babangida and how that single act led to the deaths of thousands in Nigeria. Though some of the characters in the novel are fictional imagery, the events being told are factual realities of the Nigerian situation.[1008]

Achebe's novel, *A Man of the People*, paints a picture of politicians in the First Republic of Nigeria as fragmented, corrupt and divided along religious and ethnic identity rather than as unifying national figures. Achebe observes that all major political parties were also fashioned on ethnic images rather than the national party, and thus, most politicians see themselves as representatives of their ethnic group rather than as unifying nationalists. That

[1007]Chijoke Uwasomba, "Nigeria's New Writing and the Shrinking Imaginative Afflatus: Some Theoretical and Critical Responses." *The African Symposium: An online journal of the African Educational Research Network* 13, no. 1 (2013): 96-97.

[1008] Soyinka's work is principally stimulated by issues of politics and governance. In Soyinka's *You Must Set Forth at Dawn* argues that the "promises of independence have vanished, leaving only in their trails, despair and stagnation." He bemoans the postcolonial African leaders for their failure to replace the colonial state in such a manner that will make it "inclusive, participatory and less alienating." Soyinka notes that the colonial structure was undeniably designed on Western values and development as identify from the lens of how the African state was ushered in into the orbit of global capitalist economy. He blames the political elite for their lack of political will to reproduce in Africa the model of development they witness in the cosmopolitan cities of Western countries. He portrays the political elites in Africa as not fit for governance. He bemoans the preponderance of wastefulness, authoritarianism and malfeasance. He describes the African leaders as a "vicious breed" who have no interest of the people at heart. Soyinka portrays them as "self-centred, ostentatious, corrupt and wasteful." He accuses the post-independence leaders of not being sincerely devoted to the task of decolonisation, democratisation and development of the continent. He argues that there is no other way to African development other than democratic rule, good governance and the rule of law. Gbemisola Adeoti, African Literature and the Future: African and the Challenges of the Twenty-First Century, ed. *Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa*, Dakar (2015): 7-8).

division in the First Republic is the same attitude exhibited by Fourth Republic politicians.[1009]

The postcolonial narratives offered in Chinua Achebe's *Things Fall Apart,* Chimamanda Adichie's *Half of the Yellow Sun,* and Soyinka's *The Open Sore of the Continent* were written in an era of Nigerian social history when Nigeria was in search of its identity and voice. Since post-independence until today, Nigeria has struggled and continues to face challenges of leadership, corruption, ethno-religious conflicts and religious extremism. The characters and language used in the literary works mirror the division that takes place in the country brought about by colonial division and away from pre-colonial identity and value.[1010] Achebe in both *Things Fall Apart,* and *Arrow of God,* shows how an imposition of alien rule distorted the peace and stability that existed between brothers using Umuofia as a case study. It was the confusion that brought the disharmony among the people of Umuofia. It was the instability that gave way to misunderstanding, division and subsequently led to fighting in the community. Achebe argues that if Nigerians wish to co-exist as a nation, it has no choice in the foreseeable future but to work together as one Nigeria.[1011]

Soyinka's *Open Sore of the Continent,* and *Kongi's Harvest* argue for the enthronement of probity, accountability and good governance in government. He challenges the post-colonial leaders to show more leadership and to avoid polarising the country into a Hausa Muslim north and Christian south. He contends that if Nigeria does not exist only on a

[1009] Gbemisola Adeoti, "The Military in Nigeria's Postcolonial Literature: An Overview." *Revista Alicantina de Estudios Ingleses*, no. 16 (2003): 7.
[1010] Emma Dawson and Pierre Larrivee, "Attidudes to Language in Literary Sources: Beyond Post-Colonialism in Nigerian Literature." *English Studies* 91, no. 8 (2010): 3.
[1011] Ibid.

physical, geographical and tribal idea but on the collective will of the people to live together, then why should we discriminate based on religion and ethnic origin?[1012]

Adichie's *Purple Hibiscus,* and *Half of the Yellow Sun* equally highlight the troubles and instability in Nigeria caused by the military coup of 1966 and the countercoup which eventually led to the Nigeria-Biafran civil war, brought about by the British colonial policy of divide and rule. Writing in *The Harvard Gazette,* Adichie asks Nigerians to understand our diversities and differences, and that by understanding our diversities, it will help make Nigeria a better place to live.[1013] She criticises pastors associated with Pentecostal churches who treat African Traditional Religion as evil. She cites an example of pastors in her village who go around setting shrines on fire and felling down trees because they suspect a devil living there and accuses them of intimidating people who are not Christians. She believes it is a wrong way to win people to God, stating, "You do not go and burn somebody's shrine and think that they will find your God attractive."[1014]

Achebe, Bello, Adichie and Soyinka urge Nigerians to interrogate the false norms and social assumptions that they have lived by and in so doing, reject the culture of hatred which allow others to deceive them and sow dissatisfaction. Rather, they should encourage themselves and their neighbours to be actively involved in fashioning their own destiny, in partnership with other groups.

6.3 An Overview of Northern Nigeria

[1012] Ibid.
[1013] Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie, "Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie named Class Day Speaker." *The Harvard Gazette* (April 2018). https://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2018/04/chimamanda-ngozi-adichie-named-harvards-class-day-speaker/.
[1014] Susan Van Zanten, "A Conversation with Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie." *The Image Journal*, Issue 65 (2017).

The challenge for political and religious leaders in Northern Nigeria is to find an effective way to coexist.[1015] In 1959, the premier of the Northern region, Sir Ahmadu Bello, in a Christmas broadcast stated:

> Here in Northern Nigeria, we have people of many different races, tribes and religions who are knit together in a common history, common interest and common ideas; the things that unite us are stronger than the things that divide us. I always remind people of our firmly rooted policy of religious tolerance. We have no intention of favouring one religion at the expense of another subject to the overriding need to preserve law and order. It is our determination that everyone should have absolute liberty to practice his belief according to the dictates of his conscience.[1016]

Echoing Ahmadu Bello's sentiments, the current president of Nigeria, Mohammadu Buhari criticises any form of killing in whatever guise.[1017] He points out that peace and co-existence between neighbours can only be achieved if there is sincerity, understanding, cooperation and active participation of communities, religious leaders, youths and stakeholders in those affected areas. He urges the nation to collectively shame those who are stoking the fires of ethnic and religious conflicts for their short-term political gains.[1018]

For Mohammed Sa'ad Abubakar, Sultan of Sokoto, the incessant killing in the north will elude the country of its search for peace until political and religious leaders accept justice in their dealings. He states:

[1015] Umaru, *Christian – Muslim Dialogue in Northern Nigeria: A Socio-Political and Theological Consideration*, 208.
[1016] Ibid., 209.
[1017] Aliyu Adekunle, "Nigeria is not a Fulani Republic." *Vanguard News*, July 14, 2018. https://www.vanguardngr.com/2018/7/nigeria-is-not-a-fulani-republic-oyedepo
[1018] Ibid.

As religious leaders we must come together and realise that there are so many things we have in common than the few things that lead us astray…. We must be very serious about how we do things as religious leaders and if we want to have a country.[1019]

In the aftermath of the Sharia imbroglio, the five Northern Nigerian States instantaneously agreed to suspend the implementation of sharia law in order to soften further incidents of the bloody religious clashes. In reciprocation and a show of a united front, Muslim groups invited Christians on pilgrimages to Mecca. The Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) and Jama'atu Nasril Islamiyya (JNI) published a joint peace agreement that underscored the common brotherhood between Christians and Muslims. The Catholic and Protestants Bishops asked their leaders to teach reconciliation and peaceful coexistence to their adherents.[1020]

Unfortunately, this dream of broad-mindedness and friendship has been overshadowed by years of misgivings and bitter hostilities. One reason for this is that the northern region[1021] is additionally challenged by extreme poverty, mass unemployment, high illiteracy rates, religious indoctrination, corruption, inept leadership and the absence of rule of law. Thus, religion became a means to propagate deep-rooted historical, social, cultural, and ethnic divides.[1022]

[1019] *Vanguard*, "There is too much blood shedding in Nigeria." *Vanguard* (Lagos), July 20, 2018, https://www.vanguardngr.com/2018/07/killingsthere-cant-be-peace-without-justice-says-sultan/

[1020] Olufemi Vanghan, *Religion and the Making of Nigeria* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2016), 196.

[1021] *International Crisis Group*, "Facing the Challenge of the Islamic State in West Africa Province," Report No. 273, May 16, 2019. https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/nigeria/273-facing-challenge-islamic-state-west-africa-province. See Hanah Lola Johnson, "Banned Shia Muslims: Are they a threat to Nigeria and the Sahel?" *Insideover*, September 25, 2019. https://www.insideover.com/terrorism/banned-shia-muslims-are-they-a-threat-to-nigeria-and-the-sahel.html.

[1022] Umaru, *Christian – Muslim Dialogue in Northern Nigeria: A Socio-Political and Theological Consideration*, 209.

Other sources of hostility in the northern region include the conflict within the Islamic groups[1023] and the rejection of the secular status of the region by radical Muslim groups, such as Boko Haram, who oppose western education and are anti-establishment.

Mamadou Traore observes that most conflicts originate from unfairness, and subjugation, and can only be resolved by honest and sincere leaders who have no fear or favour. Religious leaders are responsible to both God and their fellow human being and must be gifted with knowledge in both spiritual and secular matters – social, political and economic, since ignorance is seen as a sin with damaging inclinations.[1024]

Peter Admirand argues that religion is unfairly held fully responsible for world conflicts even as it is also true that many partakers in these conflicts are religious people. The case of Hilter's rise to power in Germany in 1933 involved a supposedly Christian country, and the case of Rwanda's genocide in 1994 the murdering of 800,000 people, with 89.9 percent of the population then claiming to be Christians and 62 percent apparently Roman Catholic. Yet religious voices are needed in any public discussion and process seeing peace.[1025]

For John Onaiyekan, the overall challenge of good governance, participation and honesty is the management of public affairs, and justice for all. He believes that as long as there is no reasonable level of good governance, it will not be possible to secure peace, nor

[1023] *Amnesty International*, "Nigeria: Military must come clean on slaughtering of 347 Shiites." *Amnesty International*, April 12, 2016. See Conor Gaffery, "Nigeria: Amnesty calls for probe of Shiite Mass Graves." *Newsweek* (New York), April 13, 2016. www.newsweek.com/nigeria-amnesty-calls-probe-shiite-mass-grave-447241

[1024] Mamadou Traore, "How religious leaders can contribute to the prevention of ethnic, cultural and religious conflicts." In Ikeogu Oke, *Dialogue on Civilizations, Religions and Cultures in West Africa*, ed. In the framework of UNESCO's inter-Religious Dialogue. Programme Division of Cultural Policies and Intercultural Dialogue held at Abuja, Nigeria (2003), 187.

[1025] Peter Admirand, "Interfaith Dialogue as Presence, Gift and Obligation." *Teaching Religious Education*, Issue Four (2009): 7.

adequately address other areas of human well-being like health, poverty alleviation, and education.[1026]

Hajiya Yusuf, moreover, identifies identity and distribution of resources as the two major issues that fuel conflicts in northern Nigeria. She defines identity as "the mobilisation of people in communal identity groups based on race, religion, culture and language." She argues any alleged imbalance in distribution coincides with identity discrepancies. The mixture of competing identities with broader ideas of economic and social injustice often propels deep-seated conflicts.[1027] Deep-seated hostilities become very volatile when shared identity is mixed with peoples' perception of prejudice and the relegation and redeployment of resources like land, economic and political power, employment and patronage.[1028]

To achieve peace and coexistence in the northern region therefore, social reform, good governance and the rule of law, transparency, ethno-religious harmony, gender equality, and co-existence of indigenes and settlers in the region must be addressed.

6.4 Social Reform

The biggest factor that fuels violence in the northern region is unemployment, poverty and disillusionment of the youths.[1029] Lack of transparency and accountability by previous military and civilian administrations have contributed to the absence of public investment

[1026] John Onaiyekan, "Religion and our common human consciousness." In Ikeogu Oke *Dialogue on Civilizations, Religions and Cultures in West Africa*, ed. In the framework of UNESCO's inter-Religious Dialogue. Programme Division of Cultural Policies and Intercultural Dialogue held at Abuja, Nigeria, (2003), 133.
[1027] Bikisu Yusuf, "Managing Muslim – Christian Conflicts in Northern Nigeria: A Case Study of Kaduna State." *Islam and Christian – Muslim Relations* 18, no. 2 (2007): 241.
[1028] Ibid., 242.
[1029] Neil Munshi gives a graphic picture of unemployment in Nigeria. Munshi states that the unemployment rate in Nigeria stands at 8.2 per cent in 2015 and has risen to 23.1 per cent in the third quarter of 2018. He adduces that young Nigerians aged 15 to 35 constitute 55.4 percent of the unemployed. Neil Munshi. "Nigeria Election Dominated by 'timebomb of Youth Unemployment." *Financial Times* (2019). https://www.ft.com/content/bc74b71a-2628-11e9-8ce6-5db4543da632. See Trading Economics (2019). "Nigeria Unemployment Rate." https://tradingeconomics.com/nigeria/unemployment-rate.

in infrastructure, power generation, hospitals, education, roads and job creation.[1030] Thus, high youth unemployment and corruption both at the public and private sectors have undermined the effectiveness and efficiency of any government expenditures.

Another huge social problem in Nigeria, especially in the northern region, is poverty. Nigeria is ranked among the lowest income earners in the world with the northern region being considered poorer in comparison to their counterpart in the south, despite the northern region having produced more presidents than the south.[1031] Some critics argue that poverty in the region is because of corruption and unfair distribution of the nation's resources which is lopsided and concentrated in a few hands. All these factors have contributed to worsening insecurity and instability in the northern region.[1032] There are also problems of high levels of illiteracy and child destitution within the region.[1033]

On his re-election in 2003, President Olusegun Obasanjo instituted a reform program to move Nigeria forward. The reform agenda was called the National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (NEEDS) and it focused on four core issues: improving the macroeconomic environment, pursuing structural reforms, strengthening public expenditure management, and implementing institutional and governance reforms.[1034] The reform was necessitated by the developmental challenges in the country and the degree of deterioration in the social, political and economic needs of the people. Obasanjo pointed out that the reform became necessary in order to deepen and sustain democracy in Nigeria. He noted

[1030] Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, Philip Osafo-Kwaako, "Nigeria's Economic Reforms: Progress and Challenges." Working Paper, *Brookings Global Economy and Development*, Washington DC, p. 6.
[1031] Emele Onu, Pauline Bax, Mustapha Adamu and Yinka Ibukun, "Six People Fall into Extreme Poverty in this Nation Every Minute." *Bloomberg*, February 22, 2019. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-02-22/six-people-fall-into-extreme-poverty-in-this-nation-every-minute See Gabriel T. Ngbea, Hilary C. Achunike, "Poverty in Northern Nigeria." *Asian Journal of Humanities and Social Studies* 02, Issue 02 (2014):268.
[1032] WorldBank, "Nigeria: Overview." October 13, 2019, https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/nigeria/overview. See Ngbea, Achunike (2014): 268.
[1033] Abidun T. Francis, Onafowora Oluwasolape and Ayo-Adeyekun Ifeoluwa, "Alarming Rate of Child Poverty in Northern Nigeria: Implications for National Security." *American Research Journal of Humanities Social Science* 2, Issue 01 (2019): 2.
[1034] Ibid., 6.

that other reforms were equally necessary such as electoral and political reform and urged the political class, legislature, and judiciary on the need to carry out reforms that will build a workable future for Nigerians.[1035]

Another reform initiated by President Goodluck Jonathan in November 2011 was the Presidential Committee on the Review of Constitutional issues. The basis of the review was to strengthen areas of national consensus as well as the 1999 Constitution based on the recommendations of the committee. The main areas addressed were: National Security, Human Rights and Social Security, the People's Charter and Social Obligations, Environment and Natural Resources, Models and Structure of Government, Public Service, Power Sharing, Local Government Reforms and the Economy. It was necessary, President Jonathan believed, to look at the issues of centralised federalism; whether it was acceptable to diverse religious and ethnic groups.[1036] However, when the government decided to remove the subsidy in fuel in January 2012 based on a review, the decision was rebuked by most Nigerians, which snowballed into demonstration, unrests and strikes by the organised Labour Unions across regions leading to the destruction of property and loss of lives.[1037]

In summary, the socio-economic and political problems that bedevils Nigeria accounts for the social malaises in the country. The rise of Boko Haram and extremist groups in the northern region, poverty, religious revivalism, unemployment and ethno-religious conflicts can be traced to socio-economic marginalisation and political division in the northern region. Widespread illiteracy and lopsided development have contributed to the drawback in Nigeria's march to peace.[1038] Therefore, the security and development of the northern

[1035] Olusegun Obasanjo, "Forward." In National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (NEEDS, "Meeting Everyone's Needs." *Nigerian National Planning Commission*, Abuja (2004).
[1036] European Union Institute for Security Studies, "Nigeria's Stability: The Constitutional Reform." June 11, 2012. https://www.iss.europa.eu/content/nigeria's-stability-constitutional-reform-and-beyond
[1037] Ibid.
[1038] *European Union Institute for Security Studies*, "Nigeria's Stability: The Constitutional Reform," June 11, 2012. https://www.iss.europa.eu/content/nigeria's-stability-constitutional-reform-and-beyond

region rests on the competency of its social service distributions to the people without favouritism and bias. Thus, some critics have argued, for any meaningful reform to take place in the northern region and positively impact the people, there must be an atmosphere of peace, unity and stability.

6.5 Good Governance and Rule of Law

Mohammad Setayesh defines good governance as the "process and structure which directs the socio-political and economic relations, and refers to indicators of good governance as participation, rule of law, transparency and accountability."[1039] Good governance indicates prudent management of state institutions and resources in line with the rule of law to boost the general wellbeing of the people. Good governance touches on issues like efficiency, eradication of corruption which is inimical to development and investment, pledge of civil and human rights and accountability to the citizens.[1040]

Olaide Gbadamosi and O. I. Adewoye adduce that the rule of law denotes to a principle of governance in which all persons, institutions and entities, as well as the state, are answerable to laws that are consistent with universal human rights rules and ethics. Gbadamosi and Adewoye contend that the rule of law is a cornerstone of constitutional democracy and believe that the primacy of law should apply equally without fear or favour; and should be autonomously administered by a competent court that is unbiased, to avoid the dictatorship of the ruler.[1041]

[1039] Mohammad Setayesh and Abass Daryaei, "Good Governance, Innovation, Economic Growth and the Stock Market Turnover Rate." *The Journal of International Trade and Economic Development* 26, No. 7 (2017): 830.
[1040] Abdulhamid Ozohu-Suleiman, "Democracy, Good Governance and Development in Nigeria." *Journal of Public Administration and Policy Research* 8, no. 7 (2016): 84-85.
[1041] Olaide Gbadamosi, O.I. Adewoye, "The Rule of Law as a Catalyst for Sustainable Democracy in Nigeria." *Commonwealth Law Bulletin* 36, no. 2 (2010):348.

Sergent Lyman outlines basic characteristics of liberal democracy as citizen's involvement in political decision making; equality among citizens; some degree of liberty or freedom granted to the citizenry; a system of representation; rule of law; an electoral system based on majority rule; and political education.[1042]

This means that the foundation of any democratic government must be grounded on the rule of law both in its traditional and modern-day meaning and if any nation fails to defend the rule of law, disorder, tyranny and dictatorship will permeate the whole society and social balance will be shattered.[1043]

Gbadamosi and Adewoye believe that the rule of law means that no person is above the law. Government officials, like private citizens, are under an obligation to obey the law. As a power watchdog, the rule of law has two functions – to limit government dictatorship and abuse of power and to make the government more rational and its policies more people-friendly.[1044] He offers the following as goals of the doctrine of the rule of law: supremacy of the rule of law including judicial decisions over person and authorities in a state; supremacy of the constitution; the independence of the judiciary; the right to personal liberty; observance of the democratic practices including the freedom of the press, association; and regular and fair elections as the basis for assuming power in government.[1045] It also implies that the state should not be given advantage over the ordinary citizens. Thus, the rich and the poor should receive equal justice and treatment since the court of law is a beacon of hope for all citizens.[1046]

[1042] Ibid.,
[1043] Ibid., 349.
[1044] Ibid., 349.
[1045] Gbadamosi and Adewoye, "The Rule of Law as a Catalyst for Sustainable Democracy in Nigeria."
[1046] Ibid.

Pius Anyim, former Nigerian Senate President contends that some of the expectations of Nigeria from democratic governance are to create a credible environment for effective governance through the three arms of government that is the Legislature, Executive, and the Judiciary; and to create a secure and free environment for all Nigerians under the protection of law.[1047]

Chukwunonso Okafo argues that every nation relies on other rules through customs, traditions, personality, community, religion, professionals for impartiality and social order. The dependence on these substitute rules is more noticeable in third world countries, such as Nigeria where traditional kinships and the effects of native cultures and systems remain mainly robust despite contemporary national devices. Bearing in mind that customs, tradition and religion are essential for efficient and resourceful justice and social control, these substitute models are part of the nation's rule of law.[1048] Therefore, Okafo contends that rule of law is only one of the models of justice and social control and cannot in itself offer "broad-based, effective, and efficient social control."[1049] Therefore, the contributions of other related justice models are important in the administration of justice in Nigeria especially where kinship is imperative and customary, traditional, religious belief remains strong among the people. Therefore, an alternative interpretation of the rule of law from the cultural standpoint is vital.[1050] Okafo notes that kinship, ethnic, regional, and familial ties remain strong, but sometimes they threaten the rule of law. Certainly, these ancestral bonds lend themselves to positive use; the problem is that they divide the people as well. He contends that in such situations where this application is abused to hamper national unity,

[1047] Ibid., 347.
[1048] Chukwunonso Okafo, "The Rule of Law in a Developing Nation: Limitations, Alternative Models, and the Challenges of Application in Nigeria." *Contemporary Justice Review* 17, no. 1 (2014): 25.
[1049] Ibid., 23.
[1050] Ibid.

they should be identified and addressed because they are hindrances to the enthronement of a fairer society.[1051]

Good governance has gained importance in development literature. Scholars in the development field see it as an effective legal institution.[1052] Thus, the United Nations Development Programme, World Bank, International Monitoring Fund, regional development banks, and the European Union, have paid attention to good governance and rule of law as conditions for granting loans and financial assistance.[1053]

Nigeria returned to democratic rule on May 29, 1999 after three decades of military rule. The democratic structures were established: the executive, legislature and judiciary. However, in the last two decades of civil governance, the system has experienced difficulties arising from poor leadership, corruption, favouritism, nepotism, lack of accountability, and transparency. Most of the elections conducted so far in Nigeria have been characterised by rigging and violence. For instance, former Deputy Senate President, Senator Ibrahim Mantu stated that his political party, the People Democratic Party, PDP, engaged in election rigging for its candidates to win election, particularly the presidential election:[1054]

> What we used to do before, we make provision for INEC, we make provision for security, we make provision for even agents of other parties so that they would not raise any objection to what we are able to get. Whether I rig myself or not, when I provide these resources to the officials, I am rigging the election.[1055]

[1051] Ibid., 37.
[1052] Daniel Stockemer, "Does Democracy lead to good governance? The question applied to Africa and Latin America." *Global Change, Peace and Security* 21, no. 2 (2009): 242.
[1053] Ibid., p. 242.
[1054] Abdulwahab Abdulah, "Election rigging: Should Mantu be persecuted or not?" *Vanguard*, 12 April 2018, www.vanguardngr.com.
[1055] Nicholas Ibekwe, "Why I confessed to rigging election for PDP – Mantu," *Premium Times*, April1, 2018, https://www.premiumtimesng.com.

It is this disenfranchising of Nigerians and the majority of electorates whose votes are not counted that allows unpopular candidates to be fostered on the people. Exploitation of the people has led to bad governance and instability in the country.[1056]

In order for good governance to be called functional, the state must provide stable political freedoms, individual civil liberties, human rights and the rule of law.[1057] The failure of the country's elite to promote good governance, rule of law and national integration generates an environment for economic policies that do not promote people's well-being nor eliminate corruption and waste in public service. The huge unemployment rate in northern Nigeria is a product of these failures as well as the rise in communal, ethnic and religious strife.[1058]

6.6 Corruption

Corruption is difficult to define as it infects every stratum of society. Philips O. Okolo and Akpokighe Okiemute Raymond cited Abdullahi Smith who defines corruption as the "diversion of resources for the betterment of the community to the gain of individuals at the expense of community."[1059] Okolo and Raymond quoted the World Bank which describes corruption as the misuse of public office for private benefits. Public office is misappropriated for private benefits when an official receives gratification or takes an inducement. It is also misappropriated when private officers seriously give inducement to

[1056] Mohammad Setayesh, Abass Daryaei, "Good Governance, Innovation, Economic Growth and the Stock Market Turnover Rate." *The Journal of International Trade and Economic Development* 26, no. 7 (2017): 830.
[1057] Daniel Stockemer, "Does Democracy lead to good governance? The question applied to Africa and Latin America." *Global Change, Peace and Security* 21, no. 2 (2009): 242.
[1058] Haldun Canci and Opeyemi Odukoya, "Ethnic and Religious Crises in Nigeria: A Specific Analysis Upon Identities (1999-2013)." *African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes, ACCORD* (2016). www.accord.org.za/ajcr-issues/ethnic-religious-crises-nigeria/
[1059] Philip O. Okolo and Akpokighe O. Raymond, "Corruption in Nigeria: The Possible Way Out." *Global Journal of Human Social Science* 14, Issue 7 (2014): 33. See Ruth Maclean and Eromo Egbejule, "Nigeria Election: 'Mr Honesty' Tainted by Failure to Tackle Corruption," *The Guardian*, February 11, 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/feb/11/nigeria-election-mr-honesty-muhammadu-buhari-tainted-by-failure-to-tackle-corruption

evade public policies and procedures for modest gain and profit. Public office can also be abused for personal benefit even if no bribery occurs through patronage and nepotism, aside of state assets or the diversion of state resources.[1060]

For S.O. Osoba, corruption is an act of anti-social behaviour conferring improper benefits contrary to legal and moral norms, and which undermines the authorities' capacity to secure the welfare of all the citizens. Osoba observes that corruption in Nigeria became an alternative income of privately amassing wealth during the decolonisation era, in the absence of other ways which later came to define political processes and competition after postcolonial rule. Political life became predominated by a 'winner-take-all' mentality in the election, bitter struggle for power and political suspicion. Even murder became the order of the day, whilst the economy and social institutions dilapidated.[1061]

Corruption is not only peculiar to Nigeria but is a global phenomenon. What makes the Nigerian case different is that it permeates into every stratum of Nigerian society, from government institutions to bureaucratic civil servants. Building on the theoretical construction of Richard Joseph's 'prebendal,' a patronage system of distribution of Nigerian resources among the political class and their patron clientele system and networks of friends are at the heart of Nigeria's corruption. For instance, politics in Nigeria is not about how to improve the welfare of the masses but how to enrich the elite's pockets. Political leaders at the center, states and local councils employ their relatives and friends based on nepotism and favouritism. This attitude undermined transparency and accountability and the effectiveness of the state to function. Most of the money meant for the states are diverted to private hands or siphoned by the political class to service a network of friends. Steven Pierce

[1060] Okolo and Akpokighe, "Corruption in Nigeria: The Possible Way Out."
[1061] S.O. Osoba, "Corruption in Nigeria: Historical Perspective." *Review of African Political Economy* 23, no. 69 (1996).

points out that "patronage largely followed ethnic boundaries, and since the state distributed most economic opportunities, political competition was inevitably a struggle over the resources more than policy."[1062] Government in power tends to favour their friends and relatives in the awarding of contracts and appointment. This is a "culture supporting [a] sociopolitical structure of prebendalism."[1063]

Max Siollum points out how trading between the British businesses and local businesses were conducted during precolonial Nigeria as fraught with corrupt practices. He points out how the chiefs were bribed and how unequal exchamge was conducted by the British businessmen. He said, "British businesses paid local chiefs for permission to trade in their domains by giving them gifts or payment known as 'comey' or 'dash.' Some of the payment was intended for the chief alone, while others shared among his community and followers."[1064] Siollum contended that there was a difference between 'boy's dash' and 'gentleman's dash.' He noted that this kind of trading created a 'systematised' form of exchange and payment. Siollum avers that this exchange becomes rife, and chiefs accepted it as an acceptable means of payment. He posits that "commissions, tipping and other payments for services rendered became deeply rooted in West Africa's businesses and trading systems and were widespread in the 19th century throughout precolonial Nigeria." Siollum named emirs of the Sokoto caliphate, middlemen of the Southeast, Yoruba obas as people that received 'tips and 'top-up' payments from British businesses.[1065]

[1062] Steven Pierce, *Moral Economics of Corruption* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2016), 17.
[1063] Larry Diamond, "Postscript and Postmortem." In *Transition Without End: Nigerian Politics and Civil Society Under Babangida,* ed. Larry Diamond, Anthony Kirk-Greene, and Oyeleye Oyediran (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1977), 471.
[1064] Max Siollum, *What Britain did to Nigeria: A Short History of Conquest and Rule* (London: Hurst and Company, 2021), 49.
[1065] Ibid.

Siollum points out that this method of payment acquired a new name in the late 20th century Nigeria called 'bribery and corruption.' He noted that when English law was moved to West African society, valid trade payments that occurred for centuries were abruptly transmuted into unlawful financial deals. Therefore, Nigeria's present-day bribery is at least partly a child of this complex system of payments, in which stakeholders in Nigeria are trying to minimise the impact of corruption both in public and private institutions in Nigeria.[1066]

According to Steven Pierce, "Nigeria has become almost a synonym for corruption."[1067] He contends that the activities of fraudsters called "419" have tarnished Nigeria's image among a range of nations. Such fraudsters deceive their victims through emails by promising the recipient "a share of stolen government money as a lure into convoluted confidence schemes."[1068] Pierce attributes the prevalence of corruption in Nigeria to oil wealth, ethnic diversity, and the recurring frailty of political institutions and bureaucratic bottleneck. Others include the "persistence of precolonial, patronage-driven political structure and absence of traditional checks on official malfeasance."[1069] The key points raised in Pierce's article, "The Invention of Corruption: Political Malpractice and Selective Prosecution in Colonial Northern Nigeria," was the culture of corruption in the Kano emirate in 1924. Pierce pointed out how corruption was rife in the emirate. He bemoans the manner it was addressed by British colonial administrators as not adequate. He believed that if the corrupt practices in the Kano emirate was investigated properly and offenders punished, it would have served as a deterrent to future offenders. He contends that corruption in Nigeria is the "legacy of a long history of politics, state formation, and economic exploitation, and of a

[1066] Siollum, *What Britain did to Nigeria: A Short History of Conquest and Rule*, 49.
[1067] Steven Pierce. "The Invention of Corruption: Political Malpractice and Selective Prosecution in Colonial Northern Nigeria." *Journal of West African History* 2, No. 2 (2016): 2.
[1068] Ibid.
[1069] Ibid.

complex interplay between indigenous and foreign understandings of appropriate governmental conduct."[1070] The point here is that Nigerian institutions are corrupt and that corruption in Nigeria is a by-product of bad practices in the past and present. This is powered by a patronage system which is entrenched in Nigeria's system.

Corruption remains a pervasive problem in Nigeria[1071] from attaining its greatness. Such corruption takes different methods such as: huge contract fraud to minor bribery, misappropriation to money laundering, pocketing the salaries of non-existent workers and giving choice jobs to cronies and supporters.[1072]

Corruption, it can be argued, is the main cause of ethno-religious conflicts. Poverty and injustice caused by corruption have weakened any sense of mutual tolerance, social solidarity or co-existence, while reawakening social hatred, radicalism and violence. For this reason, corruption must be tackled to overcome ethno-religious conflicts in northern Nigeria.[1073]

For Achebe, corruption in Nigeria has reached an alarming proportion. He argues that "keeping an average Nigerian from being corrupt is like keeping a goat from eating

[1070] Pierce, "Looking Like a State: Colonialism and the Discourse of Corruption in Northern Nigeria." *Society for Comparative Study of Society and History* 48, no. 4 (2006): 888.
[1071] Transparency International notes that President Buhari's administration took a number of measures to combat corruption in Nigeria such as setting up the Presidential Advisory Committee Against Corruption, the improvement of the anti-corruption legal and policy framework in areas like public procurement and asset declaration, and the development of a national anti-corruption strategy, though these efforts have clearly not yielded the desired result. With a score of 27 out of 100 in Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) for Sub-Saharan Africa, Nigeria is ranked 144 out of 180 countries (Transparency International, "Sub-Saharan Africa: Undemocratic Regimes Undermine Anti-Corruption Efforts." January 29, 2019. https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/cpi2018-subsaharan-africa-regional-analysis. See Transparency International, "Nigeria: Corruption Perceptions Index 2018." https://www.transparency.org/country/NGA
[1072] Matthew Page, "A New Taxonomy for Corruption in Nigeria." *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace* (2018).
[1073] Haldun Canci and Opeyemi Odukoya, "Ethnic and Religious Crises in Nigeria: A Specific Analysis Upon Identities (1999-2013)." *African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes, ACCORD* (2016). https://www.accord.org.za/ajcr-issues/ethnic-religious-crises-nigeria/

yam."[1074] He posits that Nigerians are corrupt because the institutions in place make corruption easier and lucrative.[1075] He states:

> We are living witnesses to the failure of the helpless integrity to solve the problem of rampant corruption which threatens now to paralyse this country in every sinew and every limb. Obviously, this situation which has built up over the years will take some time to correct, assuming we want to do it peacefully. But to initiate change, the President of this country must take, and be seen to take, a decisive first step of ridding his administration of all persons on whom the slightest wind of corruption and scandal has blown.[1076]

Achebe concludes by suggesting that it's only when the officers of the government, especially the leadership, take the issue of fighting corruption seriously at all levels of government that corruption will be stamped out in Nigeria.[1077]

Critics have accused the government of President Buhari of lopsidedly fighting against corruption. They accuse him of using the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission, EFCC, Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission, and Code of Conduct Bureau to fight against his political opponents and critics of the government, while at the same time turning blind eyes to his political allies and cronies.[1078] Mike Ozokhome, a lawyer, and Senior Advocate of Nigeria, SAN, asserts: "this government fights corruption within the government with sweet-smelling *Sasarobia* perfume, while it fights corruption against opponents and critics of government with a powerful insecticide."[1079]

[1074] Achebe, *An Image of Africa and The Trouble with Nigeria* (London: Penguin Books, 1977), 58.
[1075] Ibid., 58, 59, 63.
[1076] Ibid., 64.
[1077] Ibid.
[1078] Page, "A New Taxonomy for Corruption in Nigeria." Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
[1079] Sonny Daniel, "Corruption War: Is Buhari giving with one hand and taking with the other" *Vanguard News*, February 10, 2018. https://www.vanguardngr.com/2018/02/corruption-war-buhari-giving-one-hand-taking/

Philips O. Okolo and Akpokighe O. Raymond attribute corruption in Nigeria to non-conformity to religious tenets, imported values and ideas to our culture, ethnicity and religion which encourage nepotism and partiality and a weak legal system. Other reasons include poverty, illiteracy, get-rich-quick schemes, statism, a carefree attitude to public service, the absence of welfare schemes, unemployment, double standard and the dearth of patriotism.[1080]

Okolo and Akpokighe contend that it is in Nigeria that those with questionable wealth are not questioned by the government or security agents, rather, they are regularly decorated and honoured by various communities and religious organisations.[1081] When this happens, a wrong signal that corruption pays is being communicated to the society, especially the youth.[1082] They note that unemployment fuels corruption as youths who are in the high bracket of unemployment are already tools for anti-social activities such as cybercrime, drug peddling, prostitution, political thuggery, assassins, kidnapping and militancy.[1083]

The outcomes of corruption in Nigeria are political, economic and social. In the political sphere, it is an obstacle to democracy and rule of law. In democratic states, institutions of governance lose their legitimacy. Economically, it leads to the weakening of sovereign wealth. Scarce resources are used to finance projects that contribute nothing to the welfare of the people. The sustainable projects that will benefit the people are diverted to private hands or used to construct projects that cost billions of dollars yet are of no benefit to the people. Basic necessities such as: schools, hospitals, roads and provision of electricity and water are neglected. In the social system, people become nonchalant towards civic

[1080] Okolo and Akpokighe, "Corruption in Nigeria: The Possible Way Out."
[1081] Ibid.
[1082] Ibid.
[1083] Ibid.

participation and become unpatriotic to the functionality of the state which results in apathy towards government policies leading to weak civil society and a weak state structure.[1084]

6.7 Ethno-Religious Conflicts in Northern Nigeria

Ethnic resentment that developed under British colonialism is still strong in postcolonial Nigeria. This discontentment has been strengthened by the creation of state and local governments in Nigeria which were intended to integrate the minorities and stop the domination and dictatorship of the major ethnic groups, Igbo, Hausa-Fulani and Yoruba; instead, it opened new crisis at both national, regional and local levels. Some of these conflicts take the form of intra- or intercommunal skirmishes, occasionally across religious borderlines.[1085] Some examples of violent ethno-religious conflicts in northern Nigeria are the Kafanchan- Kaduna crisis in 1987 and 1999, the Zango-Kataf riots of 1992, the Tafawa Belewa clashes in 1991, 1995 and 2000, the Kaduna sharia riots of 2000, and the Jos riots of 2001.[1086]

Government misuse of religion and ethnicity in political discussion has been identified as one of the causes of conflict in northern Nigeria.[1087] Hence, allegations and accusations

[1084] Okolo and Akpokighe, "Corruption in Nigeria: The Possible Way Out."
[1085] Matthias Basedau, Peter Korner, and Johannes Vullers, "Clash of the Denominations in Africa? A Controlled Comparison of Inter-Religious Violence in Cote d' Ivoire, Nigeria and Tanzania." Paper prepared for presentation at 2011 ECPR-IPSA Joint-Conference, University of Sao Paulo, Brazil. *German Institute of Global and Area Studies*, Hamburg 10 (2011).
[1086] Eghosa E. Osaghae and Rotimi T. Suberu, "A History of Identities, Violence, and Stability in Nigeria." CRISE Working Papers, no. 6, *Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity*, University of Oxford, (2005): 19.
[1087] The Ethno-religious conflicts in Northern Nigeria have been traced to the negative indoctrination and radicalisation of adherents by the two main religions in Nigeria by some selfish religious leaders. At the slightest disagreement, these elements become a driver for killing, maiming and burning of property. In condemning the waste of life in Northern Nigeria, Soyinka said, "I would like to transfer that cry from moral zone to the terrain of religion. If we do not tame religion in this nation, religion would kiss us." Francis Anekwe Oborji, "Soyinka: Religion Is Not the Problem with Nigeria." *Premium Times* (Lagos), January 16, 2017. https://opinion.premiumtimesng.com/2017/01/16/176591/
In an interview by JP O'Malley on Wole Soyinka, titled "Wole Soyinka: Straight Talking," Soyinka bares his mind on topical issues especially on religion and ethnicity as it concerns Nigeria. He said most of Nigeria's problems are as a result of artificial boundaries imposed on Nigeria and in doing so, the British did not make any efforts to "facilitate an integration process for the hundreds of tribes that existed in the region." It's on that premise that most of these artificial borders were being seriously defended by groups even at the cause of peace and

of abandonment, subjugation, control and marginalisation are very strong in fuelling ethno-religious strife in the region.[1088]

Political transformation has also been identified as a contributor to inter-religious violence in northern Nigeria. A political transition in 1999, which produced a Christian president in Nigeria, caused an eruption of violence in the northern region. Sharia law was introduced in 2000 as a result. Mohammadu Buhari's third defeat at the 2011 presidential election also led to a violent protest by Buhari's supporters, mostly young Muslim northern youths who fought against security forces. Houses belonging to prominent political and religious elites who supported his opponent at the election were attacked.[1089]

Managing Nigeria's political and ethnic plurality has always seen a drawback. There are high levels of inter-ethnic and inter-religious vendettas in the northern region, to the extent that it seemed as if the region is exhibiting symptoms of a failed state, whose people are perpetually at war with each other.[1090]

The reason for the hostilities among religious and ethnic groups in the region has been adduced by scholars as the absence of a proper mechanism for social control that defined traditional African societies, such as kinship, communalism and religious and political

development. He accuses the politicians of using religion and ethnicity to cause division among the people. Soyinka said, "some power-seeking politicians recognised that just as they used ethnicity to rise to prominence, religion was also a very obliging tool for ascension to power." *NewAfrican* (London), December 14, 2012. https://www.newafricanmagazine.com/3461/. See Mohammed Adow, "Nigerian Ethnic Violence: Conflict Amplifies Religious Divide." *Aljazeera*, August 20, 2019. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/08/nigerian-ethnic-violence-conflict-amplifies-religious-divide-190820103814529.html

[1088] Canci and Odukoya, "Ethnic and Religious Crises in Nigeria: A Specific Analysis Upon Identities (1999-2013)."

[1089] Leena K. Hoffmann, "Who Speaks for the North? Politics and Influence in Northern Nigeria. *The Royal Institute of International Affairs* (2014): 4.

[1090] Sunday O. Uhunmwuangho, "Challenges and Solutions to Ethno-Religious Conflicts in Nigeria: Case Study of the Jos Crises." *Journal of Sustainable Development in Africa* 13, no. 5 (2011).

arrangements that take care of the people. The failure of this institution is in part culpable for the escalation of ethnic and communal strife seen in the region.[1091]

Soyinka's book *The Open Sore of a Continent: A Personal Narrative of the Nigerian Crisis* is an indictment of Nigerian leaders for the economic and political woes of the nation. He blames the political elites for masterminding the crisis in the polity through divide and rule, nepotism, favouritism and clannishness. He contends that lack of infrastructural development is responsible for youth restiveness in the country. Soyinka said, "there have been too many lost moments, moments when this particular disease could have been firmly rooted out, when leadership chose instead to exacerbate such divisions for its own agenda of control rather than set an example in the harmonisation of faiths. We are speaking, to name a concrete instance, of a nation of multiple faiths that has yet to recover from the effects of a mad adventure of being dragged into corporate, national membership of the Organisation of Islamic Council under the dictator Ibrahim Babangida."[1092]

6.8 Gender Equality

Gender equality has been implemented as an important goal for development and cooperation. It involves equal opportunities for women and men in access to valued goods, opportunities, resources, and rewards. Gender equality does not mean that men and women become the same but that their opportunities and life chances are equal. Therefore, gender is often referred to as "socially constructed roles and responsibilities of women and men. It includes the expectations held about the characteristics, aptitudes and likely behaviours of

[1091] Canci and Odukoya, "Ethnic and Religious Crises in Nigeria: A Specific Analysis Upon Identities, 1999-2013."
[1092] Soyinka, *The Open Sore of a Continent: A Personal Narrative of the Nigerian Crisis* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 122.

both women and men (femininity and masculinity). These roles and expectations are learned, changeable over time, and variable within and between cultures."[1093]

Millions of women grapple to find their dreams in a patriarchal society like Northern Nigeria, where they are continuously reminded of the need to be submissive and obedient and that their futures or dreams are in the hands of the male-dominated society who represent and speak for them.[1094] Postcolonial writers like Achebe and Soyinka, in some of their novels, have created characters that submerged women and reduced them to nothing. In Achebe's *Things Fall Apart* and *Arrow of God*, some of the women characters were barely heard. They did not participate in communal meetings and decisions that involved the entire community. In Soyinka's novel, *Lion and Jewel,* the young Sedi marries an old man despite his having too many wives.

In Northern Nigeria, due to the Islamic injunction, women use hijab, a scarf that covers their head and hair while outside their homes. They are not allowed to sit with men in the mosque or pray together. The idea of divorce is frowned at, and adultery can attract a death sentence by stoning.[1095] Freedom of speech or criticism against men is abhorred and

[1093] Beth Woroniuk, "Mainstreaming a Gender Perspective." In *Peace-Building: A Guide*, Luc Reychler and Thania Paffenholz, ed. (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder, 2001), 61.
[1094] Sede Alonge, "My Wife belongs in the kitchen? President Buhari isn't helping Nigerians? *The Guardian*, October 17, 2016. https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/oct/17/wife-job-look-after-me-buhari-nigerian-girls.
[1095] Pierce contends that critics describe flogging as a degrading punishment and uncalled for in modern Northern Nigeria. He writes, "While flogging was undoubtedly a traditional (and therefore, most agreed, appropriate) punishment in many contexts, it was for most commentators problematic: it was applied to women in disregard of their modesty or inherent fragility, applied to people 'too civilized' for it to be an appropriate regulatory mechanism, and too cruel to be used by a civilized government." He notes that flogging was used as a form of punishment to deter crime and it is applied to both men and women, but in cases like adultery or slander, Pierce frowns at the government's uses of flogging to deter crime as not enough, as the purpose it was employed for has been defeated by the lack of "humanitarian requirements they are meant to fulfil." Pierce mentions the case of Safiya Hussaini, Amina Lawal and Bariya Magazau, who were respectively convicted for adultery under Islamic criminal law of Northern Nigeria by stoning and flogging. Though Safiya and Amina's convictions were quashed by Islamic appellate courts, their case was a selective judgment. Pierce is especially critical of the brutal system against young women often coerced into sexual acts. While he notes the prevalence of young schoolgirls who are pregnant while going to secondary school, Pierce believes these girls should be educated and taught how to be responsible women (Pierce, 2001. "Punishment and the Political Body Flogging and Colonialism in Northern Nigeria." *Interventions* 3, no. 2, 207); Pierce (2001), 539, 559.

changing of religion is unacceptable. Parents make a choice of who their children will marry. Honour killing is acceptable. Therefore, the idea of gender equality is seen as a western idea which fanatical groups like Boko Haram believed corrupts women.[1096]

[1096] Aisha Balarabe Bawa argues Northern Nigeria is predominantly Muslim and traditionally a patriarchal society where rigid interpretations of Islam and strong cultural practices interact to tramp on women's right. The culture of patriarchy is a determinant of male dominance over females and as a result, girls' educational development and political participation are controlled by men. Some Imams and Islamists merge local customs and religious practices and employ incendiary interpretations of Islamic law to relegate women to the background. Some Islamists believe that "women are inferior and divinely ordained to be a man's subordinate with passive social roles, and readily offer a latent justification for practices such as gendered educational segregation, career discrimination, polygamy, and political marginalisation." Bawa contends that the practice of "purdah or seclusion determines the extent of women's visibility and mobility in public spaces." She points out that some Islamists opposition of girls' education, women participation in politics and early marriage are to subjugate women to the background. Bawa notes that women have no say to their reproductive body, family planning. They are sex slaves to their husband and have no voice in making decisions on the number of children she wants to bear. However, the coming of Islam in Northern Nigeria has a dual effect on women's status in the area.

First Islam strengthened the patriarchal hegemony of male dominance by perpetuating men's superiority and affirmed women's submissiveness. Islam, however, supports women's education and literacy (Bawa, 2017, "Muslim Women and Sharia Implementation in Northern Nigeria: An Overview of FOMWAN." *UJAH* 18, no. 1, 151, 152, 153). Livi Tennessen argues that those who hide on the cloak of religion to supress women have no basis to do so as Islam encourages women. He cites the case of Hasan al-Turabi. Hasan al- Turabi spearheaded a new wave on Muslim women and political participation within the framework of Islam. Turabi said "a woman can be a leader, a head of state, a minister. She can be everything a man can be." In 1973 al-Turabi published a pamphlet titled "Women Between the Teachings of Religious and Customs of Society," which presses for women's political rights. He notes that during the Prophetic epoch, for instance, women were allowed to participate in congregational prayer, and they took an active role in military expeditions. Muslim women participated actively in the community's economic life and acquire education. He contends that when the opinions of Muslim were sought to decide on a Caliph after the death of Umar Ibn al-Khattab, women were equally consulted. He maintains that "women played a considerable role in public life during the life of the prophet, and they contributed to the election of the Third Caliph. Only afterwards were women denied their rightful place in public life, but this was history departing from the ideal."

It was on this premise that spurred the Sudanese women's advocacy for political inclusion (Tennessen. "An Increasing Number of Muslim Women in Politics: A Step Toward Complementarity Not Equality," CMI Brief, May 2018, 3, 4). In Nigeria, an organisation called Federation of Muslim Women Association of Nigeria (FOMWAN) emerged as a mouthpiece for Muslim women in Nigeria. FOMWAN is a faith-based organisation established to restore the Islamic identity of Muslim women and to re-establish the leadership status which women enjoyed in the precolonial epoch, coordinate the development of Islamic education and awareness among women, and enable Muslim women to express their views on local and national issues. It mobilises Muslim women to paly active roles in all aspects of life, promoting solidarity and uniting Muslim women organisations in the country to speak with one voice on national issues (Sarumi et al 2019: 4). In supporting Muslim women participation in politics in Nigeria, Bilkisu Yusuf, president of the Federation of Muslim Women's Association of Nigeria, said "if hijab uniforms are to be imposed on women, it should also be imposed on men with different colours reflecting the number of wives they have or whether they are single," (Hauwa Mahdi. "The Hijah in Nigeria, the Women's Body and the Feminist Private/Public Discourse." *Institute for the Study of Islamic Thought in Africa*, Working Paper Series, no. 9 (2009):10). Despite there being no formal prohibition of women standing for position in Nigeria as the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria guarantees equal political rights, cultural and social norms, economic and political violence and intimidation continue to shape women's relegation in our society (Kelly, 2019, 7. See Sarumi et al 2019, 1).

It is this control and subjugation of women that Adichie's book, *We Shall All Be Feminists* addressed. The maxim in the book lies in the belief that "what men can do; women will do it better".[1097]

Adichie dismisses the notion that women cannot be as good as men. She gives an example of herself in the family, saying she has interests in the culture and traditions of the Igbo people, which her brothers do not have. She alleges that the idea that women should not be part of community decision making is outdated and believes that by giving women a chance and voice, they can contribute to the development of the country. Men with their physical attributes predominated in the past, but in the contemporary world with advancements in technology and science, physical attributes are no longer fashionable. What is important are traits like creativity and innovative intellect. For Adichie, there is no hormone for the above attributes. Both men and women can equally have these qualities.[1098] Therefore, she claims, any denigration of women will only bring underdevelopment, poverty and instability in Nigeria.[1099]

The poor socio-economic and political involvement of women in decision making and participation in Northern Nigeria has provoked discourse intended to change such prejudices given the role women have played in the national development and stability in Northern Nigeria.[1100] There is an ongoing campaign to put women and men in the same bracket especially in major companies, both private and public, in an effort to change the notion that women are inferior to men both locally and internationally.[1101] Besides the work place, the political sphere in Northern Nigeria includes women. The system, as it is structured, has not

[1097] Chimamanda Adichie, *We Should All Be Feminists* (London: Fourth Estate, 2014), 16.
[1098] Ibid., 17, 18 19 -20.
[1099] Ibid., 24.
[1100] Adejuwon, K. David, "Gender Discrimination and Democratic Governance in Nigeria: An Assessment of Forth Republic (1999-2011)." *Pan African Social Science Review*, no. 12 (2011).
[1101] Ibid.

made it easy for women to get elected to various political posts. Some critics attributed this gap to the huge amount of money involved in the campaign process, first through the rigorous parties' primary process, State and national elections. Secondly, some women are afraid of getting involved in the political mudslinging and in extreme cases, assassination.[1102]

Thus, in Northern Nigeria, elective positions in the state legislative assemblies, federal legislatures assemblies and governors have been dominated by men. Few women have been elected in the First, Second, Third, and Fourth Republic. This exclusion of women in decision making bodies and governance have been accountable to the exclusion of the interest of women in policies that project their wellbeing and voice.[1103]

National Gender Policy represents the basic principle of women's participation and recommends gender equality. Another reason for gender inequality in the northern region is the low enrolment of women in education. This is seen as a result of the British colonial rule due to the resistance of the Emirs to the introduction of Christian Missionaries and the spread of Western education. [1104] Such interpretation of sharia restricts women from seeking employment, elective offices and appointments in both the state and federal government.[1105]

[1102] Ibid.

[1103] Obadiah Maliafia, "Women in Politics and Government." *Vanguard* (Lagos), March 12, 2019. https://www.vanguardngr.com/2019/03/women-in-politics-and-government/

[1104] Eugene Okoli, "Gender Disparity in Nigeria Education: Women's Experience of Barriers to Equal Education Opportunity." Dissertation, *Western Michigan University*, Michigan (2007):54.

[1105] Makama G. Allanana, "Patriarchy and Gender Inequality in Nigeria: The Way Forward." *European Scientific Journal* 9, no. 17 (2013):127. See Adedayo Oluwaseun Adefemi and Ayodeji Temitope Agunbiade (2019) who argue that globally there has been continuous progress in women's participation in political processes despite men's domination especially in Sub-Saharan Africa. This is as a result of the patriarchal nature of African society where women were relegated to the background. Consequently, there have been a number of NGOs and international organisations clamouring for action to remove obstacles prohibiting women for participating in politics. Adefemi and Agunbiade contend that Nigeria is a signatory to the Optional Protocol to CEDAW and two regional instruments such as African Union Protocol on the Rights of Women in Africa and the Solemn Declaration and the Provision of the Convention and Elimination of Discriminatory Practices Against Women (CEDAW) which recommends that 30% of all positions in government be given to women. Despite all these protocols ratified by Nigeria, women in Nigeria have been lagging in politics. For instance, in Nigeria's First Republic only 4 female legislators were elected in Nigeria and before the return to civil rule in 1999 the percentage of seats occupied by women in the National Assembly never surpassed 3.1% and 5% for Federal Executive Council. Adefemi and Agunbiade attribute the problem of women's marginalisation in politics to colonialism.

Islam itself is open to women working, Mohammed first wife supported him. Prophet Mohammed established women's rights to property, inheritance, education and divorce. Prophet Mohammed equally accorded women rights and privileges in the area of family life, marriage, education and economic activities that help better women's position in the society.[1106] Islam acknowledges that education defines the socio-economic development of a society therefore allows women to get education. Prophet Mohammed (SAW) bestowed knowledge upon all Muslims and encouraged them to seek knowledge as far as they could reach, and likewise to seek it all the time. He posits that women in Islam can earn money through business or work. Again, Islam supports inclusion such as:

The editors give an example of the Hugh Clifford Constitution of 1922 which disfranchised women and limited the participation of adults to those who are wealthy. Only in the 1959 general election did women first vote in Southwestern Nigeria, while the women in the Northern region had to wait till 1976 to cast their first vote. In the 1959 parliamentary elections only one woman was selected to the Senate out of 36 members, and in the 312-member House of Representatives, no woman was elected or appointed to the federal cabinet. An exception was in the Executive Council of National Council of Nigeria and Cameroon (NCNC) a political party where the likes of Mrs Magaret Ekpo and Mrs Mary Nzimiro were elected. In Second Republic, women didn't fare well. The aborted Third Republic had women's participation was very low. For instance, in 1990 out of the 1,297 local government elections, only 206 women were elected. In the Senate, 3 women, House of Representatives 12 out of 360 members and in the State House of Assembly across the nation 12 women were elected out of 990 members. Again, in the local government level out of 8,810 councillors, only 143 were councillors, while in the local government chairmanship election only 9 women were elected out of 774 positions available. From election into the National Assembly in 1999, 2003, 2007 and 2011, women represent only 5%.

The only woman who occupied the number four position in political hierarchy in Nigeria was Mrs Patricia Etteh, former Speaker of the House of Representatives in 2007. In 2015 only 8 women were elected to the Senate out of 109, and 20 women to the House of Representatives out of 360-members (Adefemi and Agunbiade, 2019, "Women's Political Participation and Representation in State Legislatures, Southwest, Nigeria." *Journal of Political Science and Public Affairs* 7, Issue 1,1-2, 3-4). Again, in the 2019 Presidential election, only one political party, Allied Congress Party of Nigeria (ACPN) fielded a woman candidate, Mrs Oby Ezekwesili as their flag bearer (Obadiah Maliafia, "Women in Politics and Government," *Vanguard*, March 12, 2019). In the same 2019 National Assembly election, the Senate had only 7 women elected out of 109, which represents 7.3%, while in the House of Representatives, 22 women out of 360 seats were elected, which represents 3.1%. In the same period 2019 of governorship election across 36 states of Nigeria, no women were elected governor (Clifford Ndujihe. "Women Who Will Shape Ninth Senate." *Vanguard* (Lagos), March 4, 2019. https://www.vanguardngr.com/2019/03/women-who-will-shape-ninth-senate/. Luke Kelly, "Barriers and Enablers for Women's Participation in Governance in Nigeria." K4D Helpdesk Report. Brighton, UK. Institute of Development Studies (2019):4. Pierce contends that women have always been part of governance in old Kano before it was conquered by Ultman dan Fodio. He notes that "female seclusion and the radical circumscription of women's lives that seclusion entails are recent, contingent developments." He notes that Hausa states have been Muslim for many centuries and were incorporated into an Islamic theocracy nearly two hundred years ago, but women's seclusion became rife only during the twentieth century. He contends that most Hausa Muslims attribute the change to Islam. Pierce notes that the Fulani emirs of Kano came to power at the beginning of the nineteenth century in a *jihad* aimed at the syncretistic brand of Islam exercised by the pre-*jihadic* Hausa states. Furthermore, placing a new emphasis on Islamic orthodoxy in political life, the jihad equally had other far-reaching social implications. among them, women's participation in politics and the abolition of posts held by women (Pierce, 2003, 464-465).

[1106] Bawa (2017), 157.

- The Islamic Shari'ah recognises the full property rights of women before and after marriage.

- Greater financial security is assured for women. They are entitled to receive marital gifts, to keep present and future properties and income for their own security.[1107]

So, it is right to say that Prophet Mohammed presents the ground for women to flourish and shape their own destiny.[1108]

Other stereotypes and limitation placed on women in Northern Nigeria are assigned assumption or perception by male folks that women are subservient, irrational, inactive, loquacious and overtly poignant, whilst the men are perceived to be knowledgeable, rational and sovereign. Therefore, the Millennium Development Goals initiative has been geared towards eradicating such discrimination against women and improving gender equality and empowerment.[1109]

For various Islamic groups in the northern region, identify as Sunni, Shia or Sufi gender roles are constructed on groups' doctrines that often restrict women to economic reliance on men.[1110] Obviously, such construction of unequal gender roles in the society place women under men's control where the role of cultural norms require women not to act or exist as persons but as subordinates of their husbands.[1111] Sede Alonge argues that in a male-controlled society like Nigeria where women's voices are missing, quieted or hidden and

[1107] Ibid., 158.
[1108] Ibid.
[1109] Adejuwon K. David, "Gender Discrimination and Democratic Governance in Nigeria: An Assessment of Fourth Republic (1999-2011). *Pan African Social Science Review*, no. 12 (2011).
[1110] Office of the National Security Adviser, Federal Republic of Nigeria. "Policy Brief: Understanding the Complex Causes and Processes of Radicalisation." This brief was based on the study conducted for the Office of the National Security Adviser by the *Development Research and Project Centre*, Kano (2015).
[1111] Ibid.

where there is less media and societal attention on gender equality, women are treated with impunity and without the dignity they deserve.[1112]

Alonge cites the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF) statistics which disclosed that Nigeria has the largest number of child brides in sub-Saharan Africa, while Northern Nigeria 23 million girls and women are married in childhood. In a region that has the highest prevalence of child marriage, mostly Muslim and Islamic mores are frequently adduced as defenders to such practices.[1113]

Alonge points at President Buhari's assertions, that his wife belongs in the kitchen in a 2016 interview, as reinforcing the notion that in Nigeria, women are there to massage men's sexual urges. She suggests that President Buhari's statements not only humiliate and demean women, but it also places them in a situation of bondage.[1114] Thus, achieving gender equality will involve changes in institutional practices and social relations through which equality is strengthened and maintained. It also involves a robust voice for women in contributing to law, social justice, and education.[1115]

6.9 Co-existence of Indigenes and Settlers in Northern Nigeria

The inhabitants of every state and local government in Nigeria are formally divided into two groups of citizens; those who are called Indigenes and those who are called Settlers. Human Rights Watch argues that "the indigenes of a place are those who can trace their ethnic and genealogical roots back to the community of people who originally settled there.

[1112] Sede Alonge, "My Wife belongs in the kitchen? President Buhari isn't helping Nigerians?" *The Guardian* (Lagos), October 17, 2016. https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/oct/17/wife-job-look-after-me-buhari-nigerian-girls/
[1113] Ibid.
[1114] Ibid.
[1115] Beth Woroniuk, "Mainstreaming a Gender Perspective." In *Peace-Building: A Field Guide*, Luc Reychler and Thania Paffenholz, ed. (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001): 62.

Everyone else, no matter how long they or their families have lived in the place they call home is and always will be a non-indigene."[1116]

The indigene/Settler conundrum was first laid by the British colonial masters. The idea that indigenes should be kept separate from settlers as (Sabon gari) was to keep away foreigners from meddling with local custom and religion. The reasons were to protect the Muslims in the region which was a predominant religion from the influence of western values, the spread of Christianity and education.[1117] In addition, indigene-ship was a means to retain the land in the community, a measure that is outdated but enjoyed by a good number of Nigerians whose genealogy is linked to ancestral land.[1118]

Some Nigerians believed that the separation was necessary in order to protect indigenous smaller clans of their values, customs, tradition, identity and land against the force of emigrants. However, most ethnic groups use the dissimilarity between indigenes and settlers as a means of delineating the border between people who should be regarded as indigenes and therefore have a right to participate in traditional ceremonies, take traditional titles, and become involved in traditional institutions of leadership from those who should not.

Settler movement from one state to another started at the advent of colonialism with most people looking for work, land and economic means, resulting in the amalgamation of Southern and Northern Nigeria becoming one entity.[1119] This led to the rapid mobility of immigrants and seasonal labourers from one part of the region to the other, leading to the

[1116] *Human Rights Watch*, "They Do Not Own This Place.": Government Discrimination Against "non-Indigenes" in Nigeria." *Human Rights watch*, April 15, 2006. https://www.hrw.org/report/2006/04/25/they-do-not-own-place/government-discrimination-against-non-indigenes-nigeria.
[1117] Human Rights Watch, "They Do Not Own this Place": Government Discrimination Against "Non-Indigenes" in Nigeria. *Human Rights Watch*, April 25, 2006, https://www.hrw.org/report/2006/04/25/they-do-not-place/government-discrimination-against-non-indigenes-nigeria
[1118] Ibid.
[1119] Human Rights Watch, "They Do Not Own this Place': Government Discrimination Against 'Non-Indigenes' in Nigeria." *Human Rights Watch*, April 25, 2006. https://www.hrw.org/report/2006/04/25/they-do-not-place/government-discrimination-against-non-indigenes-nigeria

making of settler areas. The new social relations and settlements were facilitated by colonial policies.[1120] However, some settlers preceded the colonial era, and arrived in their present location as foreigners on the land that had been occupied by the descendants of the present-day indigenes.[1121]

British colonial rule encouraged separation through social-cultural traits rather than uniting communities. This changed the configuration and structure of the localities. The reality is a community besieged with communal conflicts as a consequence of arbitrary colonial construction and boundary adjustment in which settlers and migrants are in conflict. The present Nigerian state no doubt takes its drive and features from the colonial legacy and attitude in a way which demonstrates narrow-mindedness, thoughtlessness and suppressive propensity against its community.[1122] The friction emanating from this has been a major reason why communal clashes have been on the rise in Northern Nigeria. For instance, the enduring ethno-religious strife in Jos in Plateau State reinforces the question of indigenes and settlers in the context of citizenship and identity crisis in Northern Nigeria.[1123]

For Ejikeme Nwagwu, the advent of indigenes and settler conundrums in Northern Nigeria has been on for years and is one of the key causes of inter-ethnic conflict.[1124] The problem stems from the interpretation, meaning, and understanding of the nature of who is an indigene and who is a settler? Who determines what rights indigenes have over the settlers in the competition of scarce resources in the given community?[1125]

[1120] Abiodun Fatai, "Reflection on Conflict and National Security: The Militarization of Civilian Groups in Nigeria." *International Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities Reviews* 6, no. 4 (2016).
[1121] *Human Rights Watch*, April 25, 2006.
[1122] Ibid.
[1123] Human Rights Watch, April 25, 2006.
[1124] Ejikeme J. Nwagwu, "Indigenes and Settlers Conflict in Nigeria: A Negation to National Integration and Nation Building." *Mediterranean Journal of Social Science* 7, no. 4 (2016): 218.
[1125] Ibid.

Though many Nigerians are part of an ethnic community, some are smaller, and some are bigger. The fear by the smaller ethnic groups is of being consumed by the larger ethnic groups around them; and the trepidation of losing their identity, tradition and custom drive them to jealously guard their identity.[1126] An example is the case of the Jukun and Tivs in Wukari Local Government of Taraba state.[1127] Violent clashes between the tribes were recorded in 1959-60, 1964 and 1979-83, the local government elections crisis of 1987, 1990-92, 2001 – 2002, and the August 2010 uprisings and disagreements, centred on the rights and privileges of who is an indigene and who is a settler in Wukari.[1128] The king of Wukari, Dr Shekarau Angyu Masa, Ibi Kuvyo II, claims that the Tivs were stranger in the land of Wukari after the hostilities of 2001 – 2002:

> They (the Tiv) came here to farm, we (the Junkun) allowed them, gave them chieftaincy titles…, Now that their population has increased, they believe they are many enough to colonise us.[1129]

This statement by Dr Skekarau represents the sentiment that reverberates among other communities in Nigeria especially in Northern Nigeria where diverse religions are mixed with different ethnicities.

Another example of indigene and settler conflicts is the ownership of the city of Jos, capital of Plateau state. The laying of claims and counterclaims of who is the owner of Jos is amongst three main indigenous ethnic groups (the Borom, Anaguta and Afizere) whose traditional land meets on an unmarked borderline in Jos town, on the one hand, and the

[1126] *Human Rights Watch*, April 15, 2006.
[1127] Olusola E. Akintola and Akumka J. Yabayanze, "Settler – Indigenes Question in Nigeria: Much Rhetoric, No Answers." *European Scientific Journal* 13, no. 10 (2017): 374.
[1128] Ibid.
[1129] Ibid., 375.

descendants of Hausa/Fulani settlers who initially settled in Jos as traders and tin miners, today known as the Jasawa (a Hausanised term for Jos), on the other hand.[1130]

One question that arises from this is, how long must a people live in a place before they can claim to be an indigene of an area? The second is, why the demarcation between indigene and settler?[1131] If the Hausa/Fulani tribes who have lived in Jos for more than 300 years are still regarded as strangers and are classified as non-indigenes, then who is an indigene? It then means that the qualification of an indigene is belonging to the same ethnic or cultural group. Based on this narrow perspective, it means that an Igbo man from the Southeast region, who was born in Jos, lives in Jos and pays his taxes, is not qualified to be an indigene since his biological parents are not members of the Borom, Anaguta and Afizere ethnic group. Hence, he will be discriminated against in economic and political distribution of resources in the area.[1132]

Every successive government in Nigeria has found it difficult to enter the dichotomy between indigenes and settlers for fear it may lose the support of some powerful ethnic groups in the country. In most cases, the issue of the indigene/settler rift is further politicised by the political and religious actors, and in some cases, the government has ignored warning signs or become partisan in contexts where they are supposed to be neutral, compromising conflict resolution.[1133]

6.10 Citizenship

[1130] Kemi Emina, "Belonging and Non-Belonging: A Discuss on the Indigene/Settler Issue in Jos, Nigeria." *Research on Humanities and Social Sciences* 5, no. 5 (2015):58.
[1131] Nwagwu, "Indigenes and Settlers Conflict in Nigeria: A Negation to National Integration and Nation Building," 218.
[1132] Ibid.
[1133] Ibid., 224.

Another contentious issue in Nigeria that has continued to cause disaffection, disharmony, hatred, friction and hostility is the question of citizenship. The 1999 Constitution defines who a citizen is, positing that everyone born in Nigeria whose parents or grandparents are Nigerians, is a citizen. Paradoxically, not everyone born in the 36 states and Abuja, the capital territory, can be regarded as an indigene of that state. Hence, the problem of the indigene/settler conundrum. Another hindrance to the indigene/settler issue is the practice of federalism and the 1999 Constitution, Section 147, which recognises and legitimises indigeneship, whilst Subsection 3 of the same constitution states that the President shall appoint at least one minister from each state, who shall be an indigene of such state.[1134] There was no reference to settlers. Thus, Nigerian federalism recognises indigeneship at the state level but citizenship at the federal level, though, Section 42, Subsection 2 states that a citizen of a particular community, ethnic group, place of origin, sex, religion or political opinion shall not, by any reason be subjected to any form of discrimination on the reason based on the circumstances of his birth.[1135]

Therefore, indigeneship is seen as a natural connection between a person and his ancestral home where he connects with his genealogy through blood extraction and links with kin and kindred, while citizenship in the Nigerian context is seen as a man-made arrangement conferred on a person living in other geographical areas other than his own.[1136]

There are many tales of Nigerians living outside their states who have had their rights denied, frustrated by their privileges and discriminated against based on their ethnic origin.[1137] An example is Chidera Obiagwu, a native of Aba, in Abia state who has been

[1134] Akintola and Yabayanze (2017), "Settler – Indigenes Question in Nigeria: Much Rhetoric, No Answers," 375.
[1135] Ibid., 372.
[1136] Ibid., 373.
[1137] *This Day*, "The Indigenes/Settlers Dichotomy." *This Day* (Lagos), February 8, 2017, https://www.thisdaylive.com/index.php/2017/02/08/the-indigenesettlers-dichotomy/

living in Katsina state for twenty years; however, when she applied to work in the Katsina state civil service, she was rejected because she was not an indigene of the state.[1138] This is a vexed issues of indigeneship and settlership in Nigeria.

Another case of indigene/settler dilemma in Nigeria is that of Justice Ifeoma Jumbo-Ofo who was born in Anambra state and married to Mr. Ofo, a native of Abia State for more than twenty years. Jumbo-Ofo had spent 14 years in the Abia State judiciary and is a High Court Judge. However, following her nomination by the President of Nigeria on the recommendation of the National Judicial Council (NJC) as a Judge of the Federal Appeal Court, the Chief Justice of Nigeria, Justice Maryam Aloma Mukhtar refused to administer her an oath of office based on a petition against her alleging that she was not an indigene of Abia state, even though she was a citizen by marriage.[1139] Again it highlights the problem women face in Nigeria.

The indigenes and settlers gulf in Nigeria characterise an allegory of a weak federalist system. In other civilised societies, individuals are free to reside anywhere and claim the status of that area as long as all legal requirements are fulfilled. However, this is not the case in Nigeria as citizens can be denied their rights on the excuse that they are non-indigenes.[1140] The urgency then arises to address the indigenes and settler's dichotomy and allow every citizen irrespective of their religion, race, gender or ethnicity, to freely reside in any part of the country without segregation, intimidation, suppression and oppression. They should have the rights to seek employment, vote and be voted for and practice their religion without friction.[1141]

[1138] Dare Odufowokan, "Indigenes and Settlers Cracking Nigeria's hardnut." *The Nation*, November 18, 2012. www.thenationonlineng.net/indigenes-and-settlers-cracking-nigerias-hard-nut/
[1139] Ibid.
[1140] *This Day*, "The Indigenes/Settlers Dichotomy." *This Day*, February 8, 2017. https://www.thisdaylive.com/index.php/2017/02/08/the-indigenesettlers-dichotomy/
[1141] Ibid.

6.11 Conclusion and Summary

There are huge threats to peace in the northern region, particularly endless ethno-religious conflicts, the rise of ethnic minority agitation for self-determination, the Boko Haram insurgency, Fulani herdsmen and farmers' clashes, structural inequality, indigene/settler conundrum, corruption, dysfunctional federalism, and gender inequality.[1142]

Chimamanda Adichie's writing in *The Guardian* and *The New York Times* claims that Nigeria is hard to govern with regional complications, sacred history and a patronage based political system. She notes that there is an enormous problem confronting Nigeria, but President Buhari can do more by prioritising infrastructure, creating a business-friendly environment and reaching out to communities and families who are bereaved rather than pretending that nothing happened.[1143]

There is no doubt that interreligious organisations have contributed immensely in reconciling and building bridges between warring religious groups in Northern Nigeria. Despite their efforts, however, religious violence continues to erupt in Northern Nigeria. One factor for this is that most of the interreligious organisations only respond to religious crisis when the violence has erupted and spread: causing a wider crisis to tackle.

Government sponsored interreligious dialogue groups such as Advisory Council on Religious Affairs (ACRA) and Nigeria Inter Religious Council (NIRC) have also shown an inability to proffer solutions or prevent religious uprisings. This is attributed to the religious and political partisanship of the appointees. On the other hand, the non-governmental

[1142] Imo I. Itah and Luke A. Akpan, "Colonialism and the Post-Colonial Nigeria: Complexities and Contradictions 1960-2015: A Post-Development Perspective." *International Journal of Political Science* 2, Issue 3 (2016).
[1143] Adichie, "Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie: Nigeria's Failed Promises." *The New York Times* (New York), October 18, 2016. https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/19/opinion/chimamanda-ngozi-adichie-nigeria-failed-promises. See *The Guardian* (Lagos), 19 October, 2016, https://t.guardian.ng/news/buhari-has-lost-chance-to-reform-nigeria-says-chimamanda-ngozi-adichie-failed-promises.

interreligious groups are vulnerable to government vacillation, because government see some of them as externally influenced and sponsored. In some cases, they have no funds to expand their activities beyond their areas of operation.[1144]

There is no doubt that there are different tribes that constitute Northern Nigeria. They have their different indigenous beliefs, identity, values and mores, and often had different experiences under colonialism, as the British favoured some groups over others.[1145] Similarly, the indigenous rulers were equally guilty of the same offense of double standards as they also patronised some tribes over others. However, Nigerians cannot continue to squabble over all these mistakes, but must come together as a people through dialogue in order to solve their differences and chart a roadmap to a peaceful society where everybody will live in peace and harmony irrespective of their religion, ethnicity, tribe or tongue.

In summary, this chapter examined the conflict in Northern Nigeria and identified sources of tension and the drivers that fuel the conflict in the region. The chapter further demonstrated how a combination of historical, economic, political and ethno-religious cleavages were responsible for the conflict in the region. It also noted that the conflict is driven by institutional corruption, maladministration, unequal distribution of resources, rule of law, law enforcement and porous borders with neighbouring countries resulting from long decades of injustice, marginalisation, inequality, poverty, severe economic hardship and hopelessness. For this purpose, Boko Haram's message of purifying the society of corrupt political elites and moral decay, by establishing a religious order through Sharia, gained currency among the mass of unemployed youths and despondent groups, who are vulnerable.

[1144] Matthews A. Ojo and Folaranmi T. Lateju, "Christian – Muslim Conflicts and Interfaith Bridge – Building Efforts in Nigeria." *The Review of Faith and International Affairs* 8, no.1(2010):31-38.
[1145] Michelle James, "A Postmodern and Postcolonial Analysis of Nigerian Literature."

The chapter is also built on the works of postcolonial thinkers such as Soyinka's views on religion, Achebe's prognosis on corruption and Adichie's analysis on gender inequality. To conclude: the conflict in northern Nigeria requires an understanding of the complexities of Northern Nigeria and conflict mechanisms, as well as the political will of various key actors in resolving the conflict.

Chapter 7: Building Upon Solutions Offered by Nigerians to Tackle Conflict in Northern Nigeria

7.1 Introduction

Through my previous analysis of postcolonial literature, this chapter offers solutions on how to tackle the conflict in Northern Nigeria. It has been established in the previous chapter that there are factors responsible for the conflict between Christians and Muslims; especially, a lack of understanding and respect for others' religious beliefs, and ignorance of religious texts which preach about tolerance, respect and love. By applying the aims and tenets of interreligious dialogue, this chapter will also offer solutions to help bring about a peaceful coexistence between the two main religions of Nigeria: Islam and Christianity.

Interreligious dialogue has become an important instrument in the world we live in today, especially with the reality of religious pluralism.[1146] Supporting religious pluralism has become a necessity because of divergent religious views, practices, beliefs and religious

[1146] Peter Admirand argues that "religious pluralism humbles certain aspects of faith but may also refine and strengthen faith in the process: removing the dross of insecurity and narrowed thinking and allowing its core essence to glimmer: its golden gleam restored. No alchemy is at work as humbling may also erode and tarnish faith; the need for smelting may be long overdue." Admirand highlights five characteristics of pluralism such as: humble, Just, Compassionate, Pluralist, and Dialogical. He contends that despite the flaws identified by some scholars against pluralism, it remains hope for the poor and marginalised. He contends that pluralism equally strengthens openness and searching. Admirand avers that pluralism can equally be an obscure venture. Again, it disrupts further many boundaries and foundations. Still, it remains an idea worth believing in: seeking to shelter the spiritual yearnings and hopes of others. He states that pluralism can also play an important part in humbling, in pointing out that alternative means can equally be appropriate and valuable. This is a clear objective, although one that could do much to bring interfaith healing, and maybe, at an important juncture, to discontinue or prevent any urge for coercion or brutality (Admirand, 2019, *Humbling Faith, Brokenness, Doubt, Dialogue: What Unites Atheists, Theists, and Nontheists*, 70, 72, 94, 95). Christian O. Ele argues that religious pluralism "implies a diverse variety and multiplicity of faiths found to exist simultaneously in a given society." She contends that religious pluralism has innate unifying powers to change the society positively. Though in a region with fractured relationships, marginalisation, injustice, election fraud, win at all cost attitude, and religious and cultural superiority, there is the foundation for anarchy and bloodshed. An example is Northern Nigeria. She notes that relationship between the two main religions in Northern Nigeria has been largely defined by animosity, bitterness, intolerance and bloodshed. The result is killing of innocent children, women, and men. Ele argues that through religious pluralism, Northern Nigeria will respect and appreciate each other. They will understand that there is a beauty in diversity and that diversity allows the people to make choice. She said "Religious pluralism is a blessing in diversity and not a burden but only when religious leaders and adherents work together in a collective path and with co-responsibility in order to unfold the vast potentials innate in the human person and tap into his natural [talent] given, the enormous resources found in his environment" (Ele, 2019, "Religious Pluralism and Sustainable Development in Nigeria," *African Research Review* 13, no. 1, pp. 26, 28).

traditions. “Pluralists see all religions as equal and believe that when each religion respects and appreciates other religions through dialogue and understanding, peace will reign in the community.”[1147]

The previous chapter discussed major failings in Northern Nigeria, which turned the region into a theatre of war, bloodshed and unwanted destruction of lives and property because of religious bigotry and ignorance. We also discussed the negative impacts of marginalisation, politicisation of religion, corruption, bad governance, citizenship, and the politics of natives and settlers. Unemployment and rule of law have also contributed to the conflicts and hostilities among neighbours.

As it is imperative for Muslim – Christian relations to thrive, this chapter will equally address national sovereign conferences as part of the conflict mechanism in resolving issues like the indigene-ship and settler-ship conundrum which have fuelled conflict in the region. The national sovereign conference advocates the restructuring of the country in line with true federalism, derivation, federal character principle and rule of law, where all citizens are

[1147] John Nalami Hassan, “Mission as Prophetic Dialogue in Christian – Muslim Encounters in Northern Nigeria.” Dissertation presented for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy (Missiology). In the Faculty of Theology at Stellenbosh University, March 2016, pp. 122, 127. Leonard Swidler, Khalid Duran and Reuven Firestone (2007) write “Interreligious dialogue leads to: 1. New information about others; 2. Expanded understanding of ourselves; 3. Changes in attitudes and perspective; and 4. Behavioural change” (Swidler et al. *Trialogue: Jews, Christians, and Muslims in Dialogue*. Twenty-Third Publications, New London, p. 14). For Peter Admirand, “interfaith dialogue, in all its various manifestations and levels, promotes what has become increasingly overlooked – the value of extended face-to-face interactions that promotes honesty and sincerity” (Admirand, 2019, “Humbling the Discourse: Why Interfaith Dialogue, Religious Pluralism, Liberation Theology, and Secular Humanism Are Needed for a Robust Public Square.” *Religions*, 10, no. 450: 11). Anne Hege Grung states that interreligious dialogue involves organised religiously based meeting between people from distinct religious traditions. One of the objectives of this meeting is to increase understanding and lessen tensions across religious lines at local, state and national levels (Grung, 2011, “Interreligious Dialogue: Moving Between Compartmentalisation and Complexity.” *Approaching Religion* 1, 25). Interfaith dialogue can be meaningful, though is very demanding, exhausting, and mind-rattling as Admirand puts it. He notes that “through uncertainty, humility, and frailty, faith can also grow and mature.” Admirand posits that “amidst uncertainty and fear, there can be hope that two strangers from different faith traditions may reach the point, whereas adults they can be present to one another – whether passing basketballs or standing together against injustice – with the familiarity of friends and the bluntness of youth” (Admirand, 2019, *Humbling Faith, Brokenness, Doubt, Dialogue: What Unites Atheists, Theists, and Nontheists*. Cascade Books, Oregon, 115).

free to live in any part of Nigeria without discrimination, marginalisation or being treated as a second-class citizen because of one's cultural or religious background.

The crisis in Northern Nigeria is a consequence of both colonial and postcolonial failures, the failure of leadership to construct a state that is based on justice, equality, fairness and inclusiveness, and the division of Nigeria into religious and regional groups, Igbo, Hausa/Fulani, Yoruba, Ijaw, Tiv, Igala, Kanuri etc. Islam, Christianity and African Traditional Religions have too often created anxiety and animosities, instead of mutual respect and tolerance of each other. Postcolonial leaders appeal to the divisive sentiment of their ethnicity and religion to win elections. There is an absence of moderate nationalism and patriotism towards Nigerian unity. For example, indigeneity was introduced in Northern Nigeria as a means of preserving the sanctity of the different cultural identities within the traditional institutions. However, it has now been used as a political tool for accessing opportunities within the state, particularly at an individual level. Persons "who are born, and all their lives reside in a certain state, pay taxes, speak the local tongue, may be stopped from accessing state opportunities primarily because he/she is not culturally indigenous to that state."[1148]

Wale Adebanwi argues that the struggle of the minority ethnic groups in Northern Nigeria against the majority Hausa-Fulani ethnic control has continued due to the twentieth-century jihad and establishment of the Sokoto caliphate. The Fulani (Muslims) are found in several parts of the minority areas of the geopolitical zones in the north. Many of the ethnic minority groups often assert to be "indigenous" to the areas and regard the Fulani-Hausa as "settlers." Adebanwi notes that the struggle for political, economic, social values and rights in these areas often create violent conflicts between these indigenous ethnic groups and the

[1148] Jeremiah O. Arowosegbe, "Citizenship and Resource Competition in Nigeria." *Anthropological Forum*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (2016).

settler Hausa-Fulani. For instance, the territorial claims and counterclaims over "indigeneity" in the Yelwa area between the Tarok/other ethnic (Christian) groups and the Fulani/other ethnic (Muslim) groups led to blood-letting in 2004. This has led to questioning the citizenship shortfall in Nigeria, and the inconsistencies of reconciling indigenous rights with citizenship rights in a multi-ethnic Nigeria.[1149]

It was this situation that most Nigerian literature such as *There Was A Country: A Personal History of Biafra* written by Achebe; *The Burden of Memory: The Muse of Forgiveness* by Soyinka; and *Half of A Yellow Sun* by Adichie narrated and addressed. The writers argued that the cause of Nigeria's problems lay in the lack of moral standing by the leaders. The authors saw their role in changing society and its leaders through the provision of moral information and serving as the nation's conscience. "The authors used the emotive power of their novels to prompt and initiate a political and economic restructuring of the society in the interest of the oppressed…some school of thoughts maintain that the intention of these novels was to stir up the consciousness of the people into revolutionary action."[1150]

In the northeast, Boko Haram activities have maimed and killed many people and many indigenes are in various camps outside their home, in the north-central and north-west, while the Shiite- Sunni Muslims bicker over who are the authentic Islamic followers and true believers of Allah. Also, in the north-central, the activities of AK-14 wielding Fulani herdsmen have thrown the entire region into mourning through killing and maiming of innocent children, vulnerable men and women.[1151] The church has been active in the development and progress of our community, though its contributions were in most areas

[1149] Wale Adebanwi, "Terror, Territoriality and the Struggle for Indigeneity and Citizenship in Northern Nigeria." *Citizenship Studies* 13, no. 4 (2009): 349.
[1150] F.K. Omoregie, "Rodney, Cabral and Ngugi as Guide to African Postcolonial Literature." *English Department, University of Botswana* (2002): 8.
[1151] Benjamin C. Osisioma, "Conflict Management and Peacebuilding in Nigeria: Finding the Common Ground." Conference Paper, South-East Zonal Summit of the NIM, Abakaliki, Nigeria (2016): 4.

not positive. For instance, in the former apartheid government in South Africa, the Reformed Dutch Church used its political and economic hegemony to guard the rights of the white minority, thereby impoverishing the black majority. The Dutch church supported their position by theological injunctions. This was evident in the church policy of segregation and bias towards the blacks, leading to the rich getting richer, and the poor getting poorer.[1152]

Mukhtar Umar Bunza argues that "there are many important issues that hamper friendly interfaith relations in Nigeria especially between Christians and Muslims within the provincial unit of the northern region." Bunza enumerates them as: Christians versus Muslims, Northern versus Southern, settler versus indigene, dominant versus marginalised, rich versus poor.[1153] He observes that successive administrators as well as non-governmental groups and bodies have used different procedures and strategies to stop interfaith wars and animosities, though they have had little or no victory in most cases. He contends that "when non-religious issues are being used to cause trouble in the name of religion, the adherents of the two main religions, Christianity and Islam may be able to understand the importance for true dialogue and tolerance in the region."[1154]

To overcome the problems posed by religious and non-religious issues such as the socio-economic needs, aggressive competition for land, resource control, competition for political and economic space, and fierce campaigns by Christians and Muslims to win converts, the postcolonial literature offered these solutions in tackling the conflict. They are as follows:

7.2 National Sovereign Conference

[1152] Jerry Pillay, "The Church as a Transformation and Change Agent." *HTS Teologiese Studies/Theological Studies* 73, no. 3 (2017): 9.
[1153] Mukhtar Umar Bunza, "Challenges of Muslim-Christian Relations in Nigeria." In Edmund Kee-Fook Chia (ed.) *Pathways for Ecumenical and Interreligious Dialogue: Interfaith Dialogue* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 70-71.
[1154] Ibid., 70-71.

Abiodun Fatai argues that the increasing neglect of several ethnic and minority groups and the failure to resolve the national question on power rotation, resources distribution, citizenship and federalism have been the cause of ethnic conflict since 1999. He adduces that one of the primary reasons for ethno-religious conflicts in Northern Nigeria is the alleged accusation of neglect, oppression, domination, exploitation, victimization, discrimination and marginalisation of some groups in the region. The cry against marginalisation gave birth to various ethnic militia[1155] such as Oodua People's Congress (OPC), Egbesu Boys of Africa (EBA), Movement for the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB), Niger Delta People Volunteer Force (NDPVF), and Arewa Peoples' Congress (APC),[1156] and others including: Igbo Youth Congress, Ijaw Youth Congress, Bakassi Boys,[1157] and Indigenous Peoples of Biafra (IPOB).The idea for a National Sovereign Conference among the 350 ethnic-nationalities in Nigeria is an attempt to find solutions to the persistent corruption, ethnic prejudice, conflict and distortion of the rule of law which have obstructed socio-economic and political development, communal harmony and the possibility of a progressive united nation.

Gani Fawehinmi, lawyer and Human Rights advocate and presidential candidate on the platform of the National Conscience Party (NCP), argues that the crisis in Nigeria is a result of certain flaws in the making of the Nigerian constitution. He noted the problem started in the 1914 amalgamation of Southern and Northern Nigeria without the inputs of the masses and that process continues up to the present day. Gani points out that the construction of the Nigerian constitution has not taken into cognisance the political, economic, social, cultural

[1155] Abiodum Fatai, "Reflection on Conflict and National Security: The Militarization of Civilian Groups in Nigeria." *International Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities Reviews*, Vol. 6, No. 4 (2016).
[1156] Okumagba Paul, "Ethnic Militias and Criminality in the Niger-Delta." *African Research Review, An International Multi-Disciplinary Journal, Ethiopia* 3, no. 3 (2009): 315-316.
[1157] Austine Ikelegbe, "State, Ethnic Militia, and Conflict in Nigeria." *Canadian Journal of African Studies* 39, no. 3, (2005): 494-495.

and religious particularity of the nation. He contends that most Nigerians have never being given the chance to contribute to shaping the Nigerian constitution through a referendum. He observes that most Nigerians have been treated as inconsequential in changing the Nigerian constitution from 1914 to 1999. Therefore, Fawehinmi claims, the constitution has been imposed on the people.[1158]

There have been a series of conferences that culminated in constitutional enactment and discourse centred on nation building. Nigeria's independence constitution was a result of negotiations between Nigerian nationalists, midwifed by British colonial officers at conferences in Lagos and London in the late 1950s which led to the 1960 independence constitution.[1159] Also relevant are the post-independence constitutional conferences organised by the military government of Generals Murtala Muhammed/Olusegun Obasanjo in 1978, General Sani Abacha's National Constitutional Conference, Chief Olusegun Obasanjo's National Political Reform Conference (NPRC) in 2005, and Dr Goodluck Jonathan's National Conference in 2014.[1160]

Some of the resolutions which were incorporated into national law, like the "Electoral Law Act, 2006", has been amended (Electoral Act 2010)[1161] twice since civilians took over the reign of governance in 1999, whilst other resolutions were not implemented, such as the creation of more states and local government, creation of state police, devolution of power and revenue sharing formula reached at the 2014 National Conference, but the government

[1158] Gani Fawehinmi, "A Call for Genuine Sovereign National Conference, An Alternative to Chaos, Catastrophe and Disintegration." Being Text Speech Delivered at a Press Conference in Lagos, March 22, 2000, https://www.dawodu.com/gani1.htm

[1159] Usman, "Does Nigeria really need a 'Sovereign National Conference'?"

[1160] Premium Times, "Nigeria 2014 National Conference." August 21. 2014. https://www.premiumtimesng.com/national.conference/speech-justice-idris-legbo-kutigi-submission-2014-national-conference-report/ See Olawunmi Ajaja. "Imperative of Sovereign National Conference." *Nigerian Tribune*, May 19, 2019, https://www.tribuneonlineng.com.

[1161] See Salisu Abubakar Maikasuwa, Clerk to the National Assembly, December 29, 2010.

of President Muhammadu Buhari refused to implement them or call for a referendum to either accept or reject them.[1162]

Some scholars believe the conferences were means of pacifying some interest groups, especially at the height of any major national tragedy. For instance, General Sani Abacha's National Constitutional Conference was organised in reaction to the annulment of the June 12, 1993 presidential election which was annulled by General Ibrahim Babangida. Obasanjo's 2005 confab was accused of being a smokescreen for Obasanjo's platform to rewrite the constitution to make way for his third term agenda. Goodluck Jonathan's 2014 National Conference was claimed to be for his re-election agenda rather than overall national interests. The reactionary nature of these conferences minimized the effectiveness and efficiency of the conference in addressing resource distribution, fear of domination, equitable representation and citizenship. This thought is true concerning the political and religious quagmire Nigeria has faced since the return to democracy in 1999 from the Boko Haram insurgency to Fulani herdsmen and farmers clashes in north-central and north-east region, respectively.[1163]

The Sovereign National Conference is charged with debating and discussing issues that will create a better Nigeria; a country where every tribe will find support; and the abandoned, victimised, the underprivileged and the embittered will find comfort. In a nutshell, the Sovereign National Conference is to restructure the nation called Nigeria and institute a new legal framework.[1164] One of the ways, President Goodluck Jonathan maintains, is to invariably bring educational resourcefulness to disadvantaged children from

[1162] *Premium Times*, "Nigeria 2014 National Conference." See Emma Amaize, Jimitota Onoyume, Egufe Yafugborhi, Davies Iheamnachor, Perez Brisibe, Harris Emmanuel and Chioma Onuegbu, "Nigeria: We Don't Need Fresh National Conference – Obasanjo." *allAfrica*, July 21, 2019. https://allafrica.com/stories/201907220018.html.
[1163] Fawehinmi, "A Call for Genuine Sovereign National Conference, An Alternative to Chaos, Catastrophe and Disintegration."
[1164] Ibid.

rural areas in the northern region. He believes a restructured Nigeria should discard the issue of quotas in the country's system that encourages children to rely on a system that helps them to pass their exams without working hard and where mediocrity is rewarded instead of merits.[1165]

Critics argue that the present Nigerian system is dysfunctional. The 1999 Constitution in operation was a by-product of a military inspired constitution. The military in power then put some clauses that cannot be debated by the Constituent Assembly, such as secession, Sharia, resource control, land use act, federalism, fiscal federalism etc. They militarised the constitution claiming that Nigeria is not negotiable. Many thinkers such as Wole Soyinka and Seriake Dickson, the governor of Bayelsa state, disagree. For Soyinka, negotiation is all about resource control and restructuring the country so various ethnic nationalities feel a sense of belonging and at the same time, develop at their own pace without relying on the centre.[1166] Echoing the same sentiment, Dickson argues that he prefers to see Nigeria live as one indivisible country, despite its beauty and multifaceted culture. Nigeria must be restructured into a nation of kindness, truth and love, devoid of dishonesty and inequality.[1167]

7.3 Interreligious Dialogue: Overview of Interfaith Dialogue

7.3.1 Overview

Charles Kimball argues that Christian - Muslim dialogue spans back to the rise of Islam in the seventh century.[1168] Muslims and Christians share a common heritage in the

[1165] Yinka Odumakin, "Ten reasons to Restructure Nigeria." *Vanguard*, September 19, 2017. https://www.vanguardngr.com/2017/09/ten-reasons-restructure-nigeria/
[1166] Anthony Ogbonna, "Nigeria is negotiable," *Vanguard News*, July 15, 2017.
[1167] Ibid.
[1168] The rise of Islam in that period presented a big challenge. In the space of time, Islam spread and altered the character and culture of many countries from Northern India to Spain. This spread of Islam displaced the Mediterranean world and eroded the axis of Christendom to the North. Islam challenged the presuppositions held by Christians. Not only were the Muslims successful in their military and political spread, but their religion

monotheism of the patriarch, Abraham. For more than fourteen centuries, these two main religions have been associated by their varied theological understanding and geographical closeness.

Kimball posits that the history of Christian - Muslim encounters involves an era of serious tensions, hostility, and open conflict as well as times of strained altruism, peaceful coexistence and cooperation. Even in normal circumstances, it was hard for Muslims and Christians to engage each other as equals in interfaith dialogue.[1169] However, developments in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries set the motion for Christian and Muslim interfaith dialogue. Firstly, an improved transportation and communication network aided commerce and migration. Secondly, thinkers and intellectuals contributed a wealth of knowledge on different religious practices, beliefs and traditions. Thirdly, an understanding arose from the contemporary missionary movement among Western Christians. The contacts, experiences and interactions with Muslims and other people of faith led many missionaries to re-evaluate their assumptions.[1170] Participants drawn from diverse religious groups gathered in Edinburgh, 1910. Jerusalem, 1928, and Tambaram, India, 1938. These meetings stimulated the debate and paved the way for ecumenical efforts at interfaith understanding under the auspices of the World Council of Churches established in 1948.[1171] Despite obvious differences between Christians and Muslims in Nigeria, they have the same "fundamental

presented a perplexing and dangerous new intellectual narrative. The Christian, John of Damascus in the eighth century, for example, encountered Muslims in the Umayyad administrative and military centre of Damascus, which made him regard Islam as both an alien tradition and Christian heresy. Again, the Crusades of 1096 cast a negative spotlight on Islam, where stories of chivalry and fighting for holy causes surfaced. It prompted the medieval writers to paint a picture of Islam as an immoral religion motivated by the devil and Antichrist. This can be seen in Dante's *Inferno*, where Muhammed was disfigured and defamed as languishing in the pit of hell because he was "a fomenter of discord and schism." But it was not all negative encounters with Christian's missionaries, there were positive encounters such as St. Francis of Assisi. He visited the Sultan of Egypt in the thick of the Crusaders. He directs his people to live in peace with their Muslim neighbours and avoid unnecessary quarrels and bickering (Kimball, "Muslim - Christian Dialogue.").

[1169] Charles A. Kimball, "Muslim - Christian Dialogue." In *The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Islamic World.* Oxford Islamic Studies Online. http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/articule/opr/t236/e0567

[1170] Kimball, "Muslim - Christian Dialogue."

[1171] Ibid.

beliefs, the same spiritual and moral aspirations, preach love of the neighbour and, above all, abhor violence." What it takes to realise the needed peace is better understanding of the objectives of the diverse religious faiths and the understanding of their fears and apprehensions. Consequently, the Muslims may be right in their antagonism over the Christian tendency to adopt liberal opinions, secular and modernist views, though Muslims have to convince the Christians that their vision of Islamic society offers justice, fairness and freedom of worship to non-Muslim minorities.[1172]

Kimball defines interfaith dialogue as a conversation in which two or more groups seek to express their views and listen respectfully to one another; the zeal to foster understanding; to stimulate communication; to correct stereotypes; to work on specific problems of mutual concern; to explore similarities and differences, and to facilitate means of witness and cooperation.[1173]

Andrew Orton argues that interfaith dialogue is gradually being received all over the world as vital to the establishment of close-knit communities' cooperation and coexistence. He writes, "we live in the conscious presence of difference."[1174] Orton notes that this difference can be seen in the street, at work, and on the television screen where we occasionally encounter different cultures whose beliefs and purposes are different from each other.

Aliyu Ahmed-Hameed suggests that interreligious harmony in Northern Nigeria has been at the lowest ebb due to the murderous activities of Boko Haram. The group's actions have had dangerous ramifications on interreligious coexistence amongst various ethnic groups in

[1172] Nicholas Omenka, "Editorial." In *Bulletin of Ecumenical Theology: Interreligious Dialogue*, ed. (Enugu: SNAAP Press Ltd, 2003), 2.
[1173] Ibid.
[1174] Andrew Orton, "Interfaith Dialogue: Seven key questions for theory, policy and practice." *Religion, State and Society* 44, no. 4 (2016).

the region. As a result, intergroup harmony has become variegated with mutual suspicion, distrust, prejudice and ethno-religious divides.[1175]

In this sense, there is a growing belief by stakeholders that the way to comprehend and address interreligious conflicts is through building intergroup and interfaith dialogue across religious, ethnic and communal divides. This is with the aim of promoting religious understanding, tolerance and cooperation.[1176] The Interfaith Mediation Centre is an interfaith group working to promote mutual trust and tolerance between Christian and Muslim communities. Its objective is to establish peaceful coexistence through non-violence and strategic commitment. For instance, Kaduna State has been the pivot of religious intolerance and conflicts, which have led to death and destruction. Making use of interfaith approaches, the Interfaith Mediation Centre encourages peaceful coexistence and seeks to thwart recurring religious war in the region. It similarly tutors many faith-based local groups to promote peaceful coexistence between groups of all faiths. Through dialogue, the IMC has achieved the following:

1. Facilitation of the Kaduna Peace Declaration of Religious Leaders, signed by 22 senior Christian and Muslim Religious Leaders in August 2002 after the Sharia crisis in 2000 and the Miss World riots in 2002.

2. Facilitated the Yelwan Shendam Peace Affirmation in August 2005 in Plateau State to bridge divisions and foster commitment to peaceful coexistence in the region.[1177]

Ayse Kadayifi-Orellana avers that interfaith dialogue fosters the re(building) of trust relations and enhances social cohesion by tapping into the numinous world of strong

[1175] Aliyu Ahmed-Hameed, "Interfaith Dialogue: Preventing Extremism and Interreligious Conflict in Northern Nigeria." *International Journal of Humanities and Social Science Invention* 4, Issue 11 (2015): 86.
[1176] Ibid.
[1177] *Peaceinsigh*t, "Interfaith Mediation Centre, Nigeria." *Peaceinsight*, https://www.peaceinsight.org/en/organisations/interfaith-mediation-centre/?location=nigeriaandtheme

religious sentiment. She maintains that interfaith dialogue can bring different groups to breakdown prejudice and images; inspire hope; build trust for taking tough decisions; create a sense of social inclusivity; develop models of constructive engagement; transform the conflict; or solve a specific issue facing the faith communities involved. She notes that interfaith dialogue may be organised to share grievances, facilitate transformation of relationship, highlight similarities and differences, encourage apology and/or forgiveness, and encourage mediation.[1178]

For Susan Hayward, interfaith dialogue can promote 'attitudinal' changes. It can be used to serve the cause of the minority by enhancing information and recognition of religious, ethnic, tribal and cultural diversity within a given society.[1179]

Orton, Ahmed-Hameed, Kadayifi etc. emphasised the importance of interreligious dialogue. They believed that dialogue is very important among religious groups and that through dialogue serious issues can be resolved without conflict. It is through interreligious dialogue that various groups will understand and appreciate that both Christianity and Islam are religions of peace.

Ataullah Siddiqui avers that there is no interfaith without faith. He contends that a meaningful dialogue is only possible when people have a deep conviction that their faith has something to offer to the wider society in which they live. He maintains that interfaith dialogue is not positioned on the model of negotiation between parties who have conflicting

[1178] S. Ayse Kadayifci-Orellana, "Inter-Religious Dialogue and Peacebuilding." In *The Wiley-Blackwell Companion to Inter-Religious Dialogue*, Catherine Cornille, ed. (West Sussex: Wiley-Blackwell, A John Wiley and Sons, Ltd, Publication, 2013), 154-155.
[1179] Susan Hayward, "Engaging Across Divides: Interfaith Dialogue for Peace and Justice." *State of the World's Minorities and Indigenous People* (2009).

interests and claims. Instead, it sees its functions as a means of shared empowerment for the faith involved.[1180]

The challenge of interfaith dialogue is the acknowledgement that in order to attain sustainable change in direction and purpose of a religiously identified community, religious actors and institutions must sincerely assist in working for change. Mutual tolerance is important for conflict prevention and resolution, and interfaith initiatives help to increase tolerance between participants through contact with each other in a serene, congenial, and secure environment.[1181]

A look at Christian and Muslim Holy books shows that the practical procedures behind interfaith dialogue are supported by the underlying truth and tenets of both Christianity and Islam which stress the value of peaceful affinity among all humankind. Certainly, both the Bible and Quran preaches peace and love as their key messages and values, for example, Islam literally means peace.[1182]

Gerard Forde suggests that dialogue between Christians and Muslims has become necessary in order to oppose the growing intolerance that has gained currency in the minds of people in the world, especially after 9/11 in the United States, the kidnapping of Chibok girls in north-east of Nigeria, the bombing of the United Nations office in Abuja and so on. He believes that dialogue is an imperative which will help to curb religious extremism, help remove injustice and help to promote peace and harmony and common understanding that

[1180]Ataullah Siddiqui, "The Purpose of Interfaith Dialogue." *The Markfield Institute of Higher Education*, Leicester, mihe.ac.uk

[1181] United States Institute of Peace, "What Works? Evaluating Interfaith Dialogue Programs." Special Report 123 (July 2004): 5.

[1182] Aliyu Ahmed-Hameed, "Interfaith Dialogue: Preventing Extremism and Interreligious Conflict in Northern Nigeria." *International Journal of Humanities and Social Science Invention* 4, Issue 11 (2015): 87.

we all worship one God. He maintains that dialogue is practicing our faith whilst respecting other faiths. It is equally loving your neighbours who are not the same religion with you.[1183]

To Kadayifci-Orellana, a good number of conflicts in the world today are identity conflicts, in which the identity is seen along ethno-religious lines, or where religious traditions are employed to justify violence and paint negative picture of others. There is a predisposition for both Christians and Muslims to generalise negative viewpoints of one another. These actions have led them to falsely label the other; for example: "Muslims are terrorists or support terrorists," "Christians are decadent, immoral and unjust." To participate in interreligious dialogue, such false generalisations should be avoided. Communication and interaction with one another, both in the community and workplace, will show how such stereotyping is harmful.[1184]

Forde points out, however, that past events of violence are not overlooked. Past events have been responsible in shaping the relationship between Christians and Muslims and how they see each other. This shared history includes an array of encounters, stemming from peaceful coexistence and collaboration to shared maliciousness and violent hostilities. It is an established truth that there have been mayhem and prejudice between Muslims and Christians, especially in Northern Nigeria. It is these past experiences that we must learn from but not live with as accepted reality.[1185]

[1183] John Buckley and Paul Colton, "Forward." In *A Journey Together Muslims and Christians in Ireland: Building Respect, Understanding and Cooperation*, Gerard Forde, ed. (Cork: *Cois Tine*, 2013), 3.
[1184] S. Ayse Kadayifci-Orellana (2013).
[1185] Gerard Forde, *A Journey Together Muslims and Christians in Ireland: Building Respect, Understanding and Cooperation* (Cork: *Cois Tine*, Cork, 2013), 21. Leonard Swidler writes that there are ten common-sense rules that have to be observed in order to achieve true mutual learning. Swidler notes that through the dialogue of life, much has been saved and mutual understanding achieved. He said, "dialogue is a conversation on a common subject between two or more persons with differing views, the primary purpose of which is for each participant to learn from the other so that s/he can change or grow." He contends that in order to achieve a meaningful dialogue, each partner must listen to the other as openly and sympathetically as s/he can in an effort to comprehend the other's position. Swidler posits that the participant to dialogue must identify with his faith or ideological community. He gives an example of a Christian and a Marxist. He said, "If I were neither a Christian nor a Marxist, I could not participate as a partner in Christian – Marxist dialogue, although I might listen in, ask some questions

Samuel Huntington in his controversial book *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* argues that people describe themselves in relation to ancestry, religion, language, history, values, customs and institutions. They link with cultural groups, tribes, ethnic groups, religious communities and nations. He contends that people employ politics not just to defend their interests, but to state their identity. He states, "We know who we are only when we know who we are not and often only when we know whom we are against." His analysis hinges on the notion that the threat to world peace is the clash between cultures and the only way to wrestle this ugly incident is to have an international order based on civilisation. Centuries of negative narratives between Muslims and Christians were made to discredit, disprove or denigrate the other's beliefs and symbols. This narrative serves no constructive purpose and is the opposite of dialogue which seeks to reach a true understanding of the others' religion rather than one that is exaggerated or twisted by bias.[1186] Again, unguarded statements encourage division and inflame tense situations. Constant discussion and interaction between Muslims and Christians are ways of overcoming discrimination and lies fabricated by religious zealots to cause bad blood between followers.

for information, and make some helpful comments." Swidler lays ground rules for interreligious dialogue to thrive: "1. The primary purpose of dialogue is to learn, that is to change and grow in the perception and understanding of reality, and then act accordingly; 2. Interreligious, interideological dialogue must be a two-sided project – within each religious or ideological community and between religious or ideological communities; 3. Each participant must come to the dialogue with complete honesty and sincerity; 4. In interreligious, interideological dialogue we must not compare our ideals with our partner's ideals, our practice with our partner's practice; 5. Each participant must define himself. Only the Jew, for example, can define what it means to be a Jew. The rest can only describe what it looks like from the outside; 6. Each participant must come to the dialogue with no hard-and-fast assumptions as to where the points of disagreements are; 7. Dialogue can take place only between equals – both of them coming to learn, or *par cum pari*, as Vatican II puts it. Both individuals must come to learn from each other. Therefore, if, for example, the Muslim views Hinduism as inferior, or if the Hindus views Islam as inferior, there will be no dialogue; 8. Dialogue can take place only on the basis of mutual trust: approach first those issues most likely to provide common ground, thereby establishing human trust; 9. Persons entering into interreligious, interideological dialogue must be at least minimally self-critical of both themselves and their own religious or ideological traditions; and 10. Each participant eventually must attempt to experience the partner's religion or ideology is not merely something of the head, but also of the spirit, heart, and whole being, both individual and communal" (Swidler, *Dialogue for Interreligious Understanding: Strategies for the Transformation of culture – Shaping Institutions* (New York: Palgrave Macmillian, 2014), 47-48, 49-50.

[1186] Ibid., 8, 21.

Therefore, Catherine Cornille lays out an important proposition for interreligious dialogue, which should promote humility, commitment, interconnection, empathy and hospitality. She contends that these principles are deeply rooted in Christian philosophy. Cornille believes that religious commitment is important for everyone taking part in interreligious dialogue. She believes that commitments offer confidence and knowledge for those involved in dialogue whether in individual or group levels, since those people should have a lived sense of religious life compared to those without any religious commitment. She notes that intellectual attainment is not necessarily a prerequisite, though the ability to understand and be better informed about the beliefs and practices of other religions are added advantages. She posits that whilst certain people participate in dialogue out of desire for shared understanding and peaceful coexistence, some are equally drawn to religious aspiration or are in pursuit of truth that is seen to stay principally frustrated inside their own religious tradition.[1187] This means that those participating in interreligious dialogue ideally belong to a specific thought or tradition, believe in certain forms of religious rituals, and are influenced by scholars or theologians. Thus, Cornille notes, dialogue involving, for instance, Shi'ite and Methodists, will likely be distinct from a dialogue between a Sunni Muslim and an Orthodox Christian.[1188]

In light of Cornille's analysis, Muslim-Christian dialogue participants in the 21st Century should seek to comprehend and collaborate with each other in an increasingly symbiotic and religiously diverse community like Nigeria. The voices of Christian and Muslim leaders (and the grassroots) are necessary in order to formulate constructive dialogues. Educational and political education and workshops should promote ways of speaking truthfully and

[1187] Catherine Cornille, *The im-possibility of Interreligious Dialogue* (New York: A Herder and Herder Book, The Crossroad Publishing Company, 2008), 67-68.
[1188] Ibid.

compassionately of other religions, avoiding smears like 'evil', 'demonic', or 'false'.[1189] Dialogue is not about judging, evaluating or making decisions, but about understanding and learning. True dialogue dissipates stereotypes, builds trust, and allows people to be open to perceptions that are very dissimilar from their own. Again, dialogue is another means to rebuild memories and injured hearts.[1190]

This proposition is central to the Northern Nigeria context. Christians and Muslims should know their areas of divergence and disagreement. Both religions should imbibe the spirit of forgiveness and the idea of "live and live" should be a cardinal principle for them. The Christians will have to learn to forgive and forget the past violence visited on them and accept dialogue with the Muslims, at the same time, the Muslims should accept living together with their Christian brothers and sisters, showing mutual respect and tolerance and forgive Christians for their acts of violence and discrimination.

7.4 Christian Approaches to Interreligious Dialogue

Before touching on Christian approaches to interreligious dialogue, it is important to highlight the UN General Assembly's recognition of the importance of interreligious dialogue in our society and the role dialogue has played in settling disputes and spreading love and understanding among religious groups in the world. Echoing the same sentiments, the World Council of Churches, an umbrella of 350 Christian churches, established a sub-unit for the purpose of "Dialogue with Other Living Faiths and Ideologies." The aim is to encourage and assist the Christian community to engage with other faiths in dialogue.[1191]

[1189] Kimball Charles A, "Muslim-Christian Dialogue." In *Oxford Encyclopaedia of the Islamic World.* Oxford Islamic Studies Online (2019). http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t236/e0567
[1190] Friday Ogbuehi, "Critical Appraisal of Dialogue as a Strategy for Religious Conflict Resolution in Nigeria." *Trinity Theological College*, Umuahia, Abia state (2016).
[1191] Ogbuehi, "Critical Appraisal of Dialogue as a Strategy for Religious Conflict Resolution in Nigeria."

Important for our context is Pope John Paul II's visit to Nigeria in 1982, which afforded an important opportunity for Muslims and Christians in Nigeria to interact and find a common ground to reach out to one another especially in the northern region. In his meeting with both Christians and Muslims, Pope John Paul II advised Christians and Muslims to come together to forge a common front in unity, peace and dialogue among themselves. He proclaimed:

> All of us, Christians and Muslims, live under the sun of the one merciful God. We both believe in one God who is the creator of Man. We acclaim God's sovereignty and we defend man's dignity as God's servant. We adore God and profess total submission to him. Thus, in a true sense, we can call one another brothers and sisters in faith in the one God. And we are grateful for this faith, since without God the life of man would be like the heavens without the sun.[1192]

He pointed out that because of their faith in God, Christianity and Islam share many things in common: the privilege of prayer, the duty of justice accompanied by compassion, almsgiving, and most importantly the sacred respect for the dignity of man, are at the foundation of the basic rights of every human being including the right to life of the unborn child.[1193] He advised Muslim leaders to join hands in the name of God and become a 'spearhead' for religious freedom and tolerance.[1194] He posits that both religions can collaborate in the promotion of justice, peace and development. He proclaims his earnest

[1192] Omotayo Yusuf, "5 things that happened when Pope John Paul visited Nigeria." *NAIJ.com*. https://www.legit.ng/800846-flashback-5-memorable-things-happened-last-time-pope-visited-nigeria-photosvideo.html
[1193] Ibid.
[1194] *United Press International* (UPI), February 15, 1982. https://www.upi.com/Archives/1982/02/15/Pope-John-Paul-11-pressed-ahead-today-with-his/

hope of solidarity of brotherhood, under God, will truly enhance the future of Nigeria.[1195] His messages to the people summarise the need to dialogue and to love one another.[1196]

While controversial, Pope Benedict XVI's Regensburg address in September 2006 called both Muslims and Christians to embrace peace and dialogue. He acknowledged some indispensable common ground and understanding among both faiths based on the "Two Great Commandments of love of God and love of neighbours." He sought an open and sincere approach to dialogue with adherents of other religions, and the willingness to promote relationships with other faiths. He believes that dialogue that is sincere and respectful between religions and cultures, is important for the future of mankind.[1197] It was this initiative that became the anchor for Muslim-Christian interfaith dialogue in history,[1198] which is in line with the United Nations General Assembly Resolution (A/Res/65/5) which

[1195]Henry Kamm, "Pope Gets Exuberant Greeting in Nigeria." *The New York Times*, 13 February 1982. https://www.nytimes.com/1982/02/13/world/pope-gets-exuberant-greeting-in-Nigeria-htm

[1196] Yusuf, "5 things that happened when Pope John Paul visited Nigeria."

[1197] Jose Kuruvachira, "Pope Benedict XVI and interreligious Dialogue with World Religions." https://www.academia.edu/19744486/POPE_Benedict_XVI_and_interreligious_dialogue. David Gibson argues that Pope Benedict XVI's speech at Regensburg titled "Faith, Reason and the University: Memories and Reflections," generally took up a tricky concept – the interplay of faith and reason. He wants to show how reason unchained from faith leads to fanaticism and violence. To give credence to what he means, Benedict draws from a 14th Century conversation between Byzantine Christian emperor Manuel II Paleologues, and a Persian Scholar about the idea of Islam. "Show me just what Mohammed brought that was new, and there you will find things only evil and inhuman, such as his command to spread by the sword the faith he preached," Benedict quoted the emperor as saying to his Islamic interlocutor. Benedict contends that in Islamic teaching "God is absolutely transcendent. His will is not bound up with any of our categories, even that of rationality." The statement didn't go down well with the Muslim world by (seemingly) comparing Islam as an example of a religion associated with violence and fanaticism. Not only were moderates upset, but extremist Muslims attacked churches in the West Bank, in Somalia they killed a nun, and in Iraq, they beheaded a priest. For conservative supporters of Pope Benedict, the event proved Benedict and Manuel right. While many Catholic critics of Islam cheered Benedict's address at Regensburg, Benedict explained the emperor's remarks were delivered "with a starling brusqueness, a brusqueness that we find, unacceptable." He went on to say he is "in agreement with Manuel II, but without endorsing his polemic." He also portrays the speech as an attempt to open a dialogue with Islam, rather than presenting it as the Pope's final word on Islam (Gibson, "Regensburg Redux: Was Pope Benedict XVI Right About Islam?" *National Catholic Reporter Publications*, September 11, 2014, https://www.ncronline.org/news/world/benedict-xvi-right-about-islam. See Apostolic Journey of His Holiness Benedict XVI to Munchen, Altotting and Regensburg, September 9-14, 2006, Lecture of the Holy Father, Aula Magna of the University of Regensburg, Tuesday, September 12, 2006. "Faith, Reason and the University Memories and Reflections." (http://www.vatican.va/content/benedict-xvi/en/speeches/2006/september/documents/hf_ben-xvi_spe_20060912_university-regensburg.html

[1198] *World Council of Churches*, "Report on the Inter-religious Tensions in Nigeria, May 1, 2012. https://www.oikoumene.org/en/resources/documents/wcc-programmes/interreligious-dialogue-and-cooperation/accompanying-churches-in-conflict-situation/

was unanimously adopted on October 20, 2010. The purpose of the UN's resolution was to establish every first week of February every year as World Interfaith Harmony Week.[1199]

In response of Pope Benedict XVI's remarks, the Muslim *Ummah* in October 2007 published a document titled "*A Common Word Between Us and You.*" This document, which was an initial proposal later became an open invitation to interfaith dialogue. The open letter was signed by 138 renowned Islamic intellectuals from Egypt, Syria, Oman, Bonia, Russia, and Istanbul and was addressed to Pope Benedict XVI and the Christian world. The proposition was based on verses from the Qur'an and the Holy Bible, which have in common - the love of God and love of neighbour. It was on this premise of the common ground that the Islamic thinkers called for peace and harmony between Christians and Muslims. The document says that Christianity and Islam are the two dominant religions in the world, hence a companionship of goodwill and friendship between Christians and Muslims to form a vital factor in contributing to useful interreligious harmony around the world is needed.[1200]

Rowan Williams, the Anglican Archbishop of Canterbury commended the initiative *A Common Word* document. He claims the document is a key to unlocking the mistrust between the Christians and Muslims and sets the tone for dialogue between the two world dominant religions.[1201]

In conclusion, *A Common Word Between Us and You* was well timed. The document provides the cornerstone for dialogue between Islam and Christianity in Nigeria. It also points the way for Christians and Muslims in Nigeria to come together and address those

[1199] Ibid.
[1200] Umaru, *Christian - Muslim Dialogue in Northern Nigeria: A Socio-Political and Theological Consideration*, 106, See Yazid Said and Lejla Demiri, editors. *The Future of Interfaith Dialogue: Muslim-Christian Encounters Through a Common Word*, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018).
[1201] Umaru, *Christian - Muslim Dialogue in Northern Nigeria: A Socio-Political and Theological Consideration*, 106.

issues that brings misunderstanding, prejudices, suspicion, marginalisation and conflicts.[1202] Clinton Bennett contends that for Muslims, the Qur'an is God's comprehensive, definitive, immutable self-revelation. Many devoted Muslims believe that the Qur'an is the source of all knowledge. Every aspect of Islamic thought begins with the guidance that is found in this holy book. Some Qur'anic passages regarding other religions were 'revealed' to Muhammed in the context of direct encounters with Christians and Jews. Next in authority to the Qur'an, for the majority of Muslims is the collection of Muhammed's statements and doings, the hadiths, which also contain materials related to Christian-Muslim encounter.[1203]

7.5 Muslim Directives on Interreligious Dialogue

7.5.1 Overview

Ra'fat Al-Dajani argues that all three religions Christianity, Islam, and Judaism are intricately interwoven. While Christianity was born from within the Jewish tradition, Islam developed from both Christianity and Judaism. Islam sees itself as the result of the Abrahamic faiths, the final revelation by God in the monotheistic tradition. The Qur'an specifically protects Jews and Christians as People of the Book, as the 'Book' means revelations from God to Jews and Christians which gives them a spiritual linking to Islam. He contends that Islam recognises many of the prophets celebrated by Jews and Christians such as Abraham, Moses, and Jesus. He notes that Muslims do not see Muhammed as a divine being, but as the final prophet through whom God conveyed his message and who serves as an example of piousness to emulate. Muhammed is not the equivalent of Jesus'

[1202] Ibid.
[1203] Clinton Bennett, *Understanding Christian – Muslim Relations: Past and Present*. (London: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2008), 40. See FWM. "A Common Word Between Us and You," General Synod 2019 Convening Circular – Section 4,009 Reports. https://gs2019.anglican.ca/wp-content/uploads/Appendix-5a-A-Common-Word-between-Us-and-You.pdf

divine role for Christians; rather it is the Qur'an that occupies the same significant position in Islam as Jesus does in Christianity.[1204]

There has been a history of Muslim mistreatment of non-Muslims in Muslim lands such as Somalia, where Islam is the state religion and converting to Christianity is prohibited. The terrorist group called al-Shabaab has carried out extermination of Christians and those considered to be moderate Muslims.[1205] Al-Shabaab "openly and publicly claims to be waging war on Christians," and on 2 April 2015 on Kenya's Garrissa University, killed 147 Christian students and injured 79 others. In fact, 150,000 Christians are killed every year by terror groups both in East Africa and in Arab lands.[1206] Another example is Iraq where many Christians fled after the downfall of Saddam Hussein as the persecution of Christians continued unabated. Christians and other minorities have been compelled to convert to Islam, forced to pay excessive tax or be killed. An approximated 100,000 people have fled their houses in Mosul, a predominantly Christian region in northern Iraq as ISIS took over the city in late 2014. ISIS is said to have carried out public execution of Christians, recorded the execution and broadcast it for propaganda objectives, and many churches have been destroyed.[1207] There is no doubt that in some countries, Muslims are being persecuted. According to the *Pew Research Centre*, in 139 countries in 2018, Muslims were bullied or persecuted. For instance, in Asia and the Pacific, harrassement of Muslims were reported in

[1204] Ra'fat Al-Dajani, "The Muslim Jesus Provides Common Ground for Christianity, Islam." *National Catholic Reporter*, August 25, 2017. https://www.ncronline.org/news/opinion/muslim-jesus-provides-common-ground-christianity-islam

[1205] Kate Lyons and Garry Blight, "Where in the world is the worst place to be a Christian?" *The Guardian*, July 27, 2015. https://www.theguardian.com/world/ng-interactive/2015/july/27/where-in-the-world-is-it-worst-place-to-be-a-christian

[1206] European Parliament, "Kenya Killings and Persecution of Christians." *News European Parliament,* 30 April 2015. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20150424/IPR45740/kenya-killings-and-persecution-of-christians

[1207] European Parliament, "Kenya Killings and Persecution of Christians."

70% these countries, while in sub-Saharan Africa the figure rose to 71%, and 31% in America.[1208]

In Pakistan, Christians are treated like a second-class citizen. The churches are targeted for attack and women and children are subjected to sexual abuses. In Sudan with a population of 39.8 million and with Christian population of about 1.9 million which represents 4.80 percent, converting to Christianity from Islam attracts the death penalty.[1209]

Likewise, the advent of Boko Haram in Northern Nigeria has led to the persecution of thousands of Christians and Muslims, many of them kidnapped, maimed and murdered. Again, thousands of Christians mostly farmers, have been killed by Fulani herdsmen. In some parts of Northern Nigeria, Christians are marginalised and denied access to government appointments and land to build churches.[1210]

The relationships among Muslims, Jews, and Christians have been constructed not only by various theologies and beliefs, but generally by the historical settings. It is imperative for a committed Muslim to know what the Prophet did in his relations with Jews and Christians as a means of forming their own behaviour towards Jews and Christians. Qur'an and *Sunna* of the Prophet are fundamental guides for a Muslims in dealing with Jews and Christians. What is significant to recollect is that the historical interactions of Muslims, Jews, and Christians have led to in each community being shaped, affected, and transformed by the others, such that it is hard to see how each religion would be as it is without the presence and influence of the others.[1211]

[1208] *Pew Research Centre*, "Harassment of Religious Groups Countries to be reported in morethan 90% of countries." *Pew Research Centre*, November 10, 2020. https://www.pewforum.org/2020/11/10/harassment-of-religious-groups-continues-to-be-reported-in-more-than-90-of-countries/

[1209] European Parliament, "Kenya Killings and Persecution of Christians."

[1210] Ibid.

[1211] Gordon Newby, "Muslim, Jews, and Christians." *Institute of Islamic Studies* (2006): 1-2. https://iis.ac.uk/academic-article/muslim-jews-and-christians-relations-and-interactions

These efforts reflect the Qur'anic appeal to the *People of the Book* (Christian and Jews) to dialogue with Muslims on the "Common Word." Islamic scholars have tried to interpret and explain the meaning of the *Common Word between us*. These scholars argue that though the Qur'an describes *Common Word* as a shared accord to worship only one God, it does not restrict the use of the single interpretation. These scholars argue that any initiative that can help promote cooperation, understanding and peace between Muslims and Christians should be part and parcel of Qur'anic invitations.[1212] However, some Islamic scholars seek an exclusive interpretation, while some explore the inclusive interpretation path to consist of, for instance, common themes of ethics, justice, fairness, and righteousness.[1213] Another group of Islamic scholars restrict the invitation to the *People of the Book*[1214] who share the Abrahamic heritage while some understand it to mean those religions other than Jews and Christians.[1215]

Islamic theologian, Fethullah Gulen is seen among many Muslims as a great thinker and advocate of interfaith dialogue. His thought on interfaith dialogue is hinged on the four-fold

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[1212] Umaru (2013), 107.

[1213] Bennett, *Understanding Christian – Muslim Relations*, 116, 117, 118. See Charles L. Cohen, Paul F. Knitter, and Ulrich Rosenhagen, *The Future of Interreligious Dialogue: A Multi-Religious Conversation on Nostra Aetate*, ed. (New York: Orbis Books, 2017), 95.

[1214] Daniel A. Madigan argues that Islam is frequently characterised as a "religion of the book," though, Muslims take an almost entirely oral approach to their scripture. He states that the meaning of Qur'an is "recitation" and Muslim beliefs were revealed by God to Mohammed. Madigan notes that the Qur'an is often called *kitab* which means "book." He contends that "it observes and discusses the process of its own revelation and reception; it asserts its own authority and claims its place within the history of revelation." He points out that the Qur'an is important in understanding Islamic religion and identity (Madigan, 2001, *The Qur'an's Self-Image: Writing and Authority in Islam's Scripture.* Princeton University Press). See Glen Cooper who states that "Islam calls itself a 'Religion of the Book,' and its adherents 'People of the Book' (*ahl al-kitab*), the book being of course the Qur'an." The Qur'an plays an important role in the religious life of the believers (Cooper, "The Reviewed Works: The Qur'an's Self-Image: Writing and Authority in Islam's Scripture by Daniel A. Madigan." *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 123, no. 1, (2003):247). John Renard, moreover, argues that the "Qur'an represents the external and immutable word of God made accessible to humankind from a heavenly 'written' original" (Renard, "Reviewed Works: The Development of Exegesis in Early Islam: The Authenticity of Muslim Literature from the Formative Period by Herbert Berg; Literary Structures of Religious Meaning in the Qur'an by Issa Boullata; The Qur'an's Self-Image: Writing and Authority in Islam's Scripture by Daniel A. Madigan; The Biographical Tradition in Sufism: The Tabaqat Genre from al-Sulami to Jami by Jawid Mojaddedi; Biblical Prophets in the Qur'an and Muslim Literature by Roberto Tottoli; Moses in the Qur'an and Islamic Exegesis by Brannon M. Wheeler." *Religion and Literature* 36, no. 2, (2004): 111.

[1215] Umaru, *Christian - Muslim Dialogue in Northern Nigeria: A Socio-Political and Theological Consideration*, 107.

schema of love, compassion, tolerance, and forgiveness.[1216] Drawing an example from modern Turkey, Gulen pointed out how a good number of Turkey's Muslim elite supported the idea for the promotion of tolerance and dialogue with devotees of other religions. He notes that the Ottoman's experience was an indication other states can copy and implement for co-existence, tolerance, dialogue and harmonious living with other religions. He asserts that despite the emergence of contemporary nationalistic concepts, Muslims, Christian and Jews had succeeded to co-exist together more tranquilly and effectively in the Ottoman era. This peace was made possible because of the teaching of the Turkish Sufi masters like Ahmed Yesevi, Yenus Emre, Haji Bayram-Veli, and Aksemseddin and the Sufi[1217] master of Mehmet II, the faith conqueror. All these Islamic scholars to champion the promotion of interreligious dialogue, tolerance and respect for other religions.[1218]

According to Gulen, love is indispensable in the Sufi tradition, which is synonymous to the "beautiful name" of God, '*al-Wadud*,' the Beloved One. He avers that Muslims are assumed to reflect this attribute in their lives by being a person of love. Gulen shared the biblical verse, "You shall love the Lord your God with all your heart, with all your soul, and with all your mind, and you shall love your neighbour as yourself" (Matthew 22 vs 37, 39). This verse reflects in Gulen's concepts of love and compassion.[1219]

Gulen was criticised by some sections of Islamists when he met with Pope John Paul II in February 1997. They accused him of insulting Islam and bringing Islam to disrepute.

[1216] A. Godlas, "Gulen and Sources in Islam for Interfaith Dialogue." *London School of Economics* (2007).
[1217] Sufism can be said to be a movement which aims at making people good and better Muslims. It is a call to them to actualise truly and internally those teachings of Islam they have accepted only formally or intellectually as part of their inheritance. A Sufi relinquishes the worldly pleasures, the cheap sensations, materialism and corruption, but not in the least withdraws from the worldly living. He abides by the Shari'ah, the Cannon law of Islam, goes by *Tarigat*, the spiritual path, to achieve *Abudiat* i.e., the unity of Allah, his beloved. Shahida Bilgies. "Understanding the Concept of Islamic Sufism." *Journal of Education and Social Policy* 1, no. 1 (2014): 55-56.
[1218] Zeki Saritoprak and Sidney Griffith, "Islam in the Contemporary Turkey: Contributions of Fethillah Gulen." *The Muslim World*, Special Issue 95 Issue 3, (2003): 325-471. See Salih Yucel, "Muslim-Christian Dialogue: Nostra Aetate and Fethullah Gulen's Philosophy of Dialogue." *Austrialian ejournal of Theology* 20, no. 3 (2013).
[1219] Ibid.

They claimed that Gulen's visit to Pope John Paul II to an extent would make some adherents of Islam convert to Christianity. In response, Gulen argues that the protest from some Islamists is not of true Islamic character, which has embraced and promoted dialogue with believers of other religions since the inception of Islam. He cautions the adherents of Islam to jettison or purge their minds of confrontational images and the fear that dialogue with other religion will lead to being converted to another religion. This behaviour, Gulen argues, arises from the lack of trust in the Islamic faith. He contends that those who believe in the principles of Islam have nothing to fear in reaching out with other religions. He maintains that dialogue is not an unnecessary enterprise, but a necessary venture. Therefore, it is part of the duty of Muslims to make the world a better, peaceful and safer place to live.[1220]

Gulen constructs his belief on dialogue around this Qur'anic verse, "all mankind, we created you from male or female and have made you nations and tribes that you may know one another" (Qur'an 49:13). He promotes the ecumenical aspect of Islam and its theological foundations for dialogue. He avers that a Muslim is a devotee of Prophet Mohammad and simultaneously a follower of David, Jesus and other biblical prophets. From Gulen's viewpoint, not to have confidence in the biblical prophets stated in the Qur'an is an adequate reason to place somebody outside the circle of Islam.[1221] He notes that Prophet Mohammad rejects the superiority mentality on the ground of colour, nationality, race, geography or profession. He further states that Prophet Mohammad pointed out that there is no "superiority of Arabs over non-Arabs, and of non-Arabs over Arabs."[1222]

[1220] Saritoprak and Griffith, "Islam in the Contemporary Turkey: Contributions of Fethillah Gulen," 325-471.
[1221] Ibid.
[1222] Ibid.

While Samuel Huntington's *The Clash of Civilisations and the Remaking of World Order* predicted a rise in animosities between cultures and religious identities as a source of conflict in the future, Gulen contends that dialogue is necessary to combat such conflicts. It is beneficial to society, especially in a world where ignorance, uncivilised behaviour and extremism helped by social diseases pitched one civilisation against another. He believes that through information, education, tolerance and understanding, peace and reconciliation are possible.

The Islamic scholars and preachers are tasked to develop a theology of peace building based on the Qur'an and the Hadith,[1223] which is a theology that is accommodating to divergent society, a theology that seeks to support Muslims to a genuine engagement with religious others. Hence, understanding the practices of other religions seeks not only the familiarity of the sacred sources of a religion, but also a consciousness of what people truly trust and practice. The Qur'an and Hadith are the guides for Muslims in Northern Nigeria to work together with the Christians in order to build understanding, love, peace, and togetherness, a community of neighbours living in peace and respecting their religious

[1223] Shari'ah refers to a system of Islamic laws that evolved out of the Islamic religion. It is a code of law and behaviour revealed by Allah as that which is proper and right for humans to do. The primary sources of these laws are (i) the revelations recorded in the Qur'an, (ii) the *sunna*, or documented practices of the Prophet as recorded in the Qur'an and Hadith, and (iii) interpretations of the holy texts made by Muslim legal scholars in consultation with the *ijma* (the official position of the *ulama*) and *qiya* (Islamic caselaw). The *ijma* and *qiya* allow al-Sharia to be interpreted in changing times and situations without changing the underlying Qur'anic laws. Al-Sharia is an eternal code of laws ordained by God; it cannot be modified simply to suit social change. Interpretations are based on Islamic principles, and they must embody respect for God and for His people. Muslims must follow al-Sharia, as it is a path laid by Allah Himself. So, it is aptly said that "Shari'ah is Allah's way and Allah's law, as revealed in the Qur'an and demonstrated by the Prophet. It is the duty of every Muslim to follow the Shari'ah in his own behaviour and in his dealings and relationships with other people. The Shari'ah is the law for all Muslims to follow, not man-made laws that change with the fashions of the time" (Toyin Falola, *Violence in Nigeria: The Crisis of Religious Politics and Secular Ideologies* (Rochester: University of Rochester Press, 1978), 73-74. See also the BBC which describes Shari'ah law as Islam's legal system. It is derived from both the Qur'an, Islam's central text, and fatwas – the rulings of Islamic scholars. Sharia literally means "the clear, well-trodden path to water." Sharia law acts as a code for living that all Muslims should adhere to, including prayers, fasting and donations to the poor. It aims to help Muslims understand how they should lead every aspect of their lives according to God's wishes. For instance, a Muslim can turn to Sharia for guidance like family law, finance and business (*BBC*, "What is Sharia and How Is It Applied." *BBC*, May 7, 2014, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-27307249.

diversity.[1224] For instance, in order to lessen the tension that has arisen between Christian-Muslim as a result of the Federal government of Nigeria enrolment of Nigeria into Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC, now Organisation of Islamic Cooperation) in 1986. Some Catholic leaders in Nigeria calls for peaceful dialogue between Muslims and Christians. Again, the Catholic Bishops in conjunction with the Association of Episcopal Churches in a communique titled "Christianity and Islam in Dialogue," identified common grounds between the two main religions called on the Muslim leaders to discard unjust practice against Christians such as categorising non-Muslims as infidels and imposing heavy punishments on Christian convert from Islam, and on Muslim women who marry Christians.[1225]

7.6 The Challenge for Interreligious Dialogue in Nigeria

7.6.1 Introduction

The challenge to interreligious dialogue in Northern Nigeria is that Christians and Muslims should forget their past grievances, animosity, hatred and superiority claims and accept that God created every man and woman equal. Also, Christians and Muslims in Northern Nigeria should realise that Prophet Mohammed and Jesus Christ preach love and reconciliation. One of Jesus' teachings on love is epitomised in John 15:12: "My command

[1224] Saritoprak and Griffith, "Islam in the Contemporary Turkey: Contributions of Fethillah Gulen."

[1225] One of the proponents of peace with the Muslims in Nigeria is Cardinal Francis Arinze, a former Archbishop of Onitsha and President of the Pontifical Council for Interreligious Dialogue. Cardinal Arinze has gained much experience through his humanitarian work during the Nigeria/Biafra Civil War and his avid knowledge on Christian-Muslim conflicts in Nigeria. Arinze called for reconciliation and understanding between Christians and Muslims. He opines that religious conflicts in Nigeria can be attributed to political and economic factors and fuelled by historical memories of wars and violence. He calls for constructive dialogue as a panacea for peace to thrive in Nigeria. On the other hand, some Muslim organisations call for constructive engagement between Muslim and Christian groups. For instance, the Council of Ulama engages other diverse Islamic interest groups into a peace movement. Also, the fallout of the Sharia riots in the Northern region led some Christian leaders to take a moderate position for peace to reign in order to accommodate the expanded sharia as long as it doesn't trample on the rights of the Christian minority in Northern Nigeria. Equally. a majority of Muslims in Northern Nigeria were more ambivalent because of the human carnage of expanded sharia towards national coexistence and unity (Vaughan, *Religion and the Making of Nigeria* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2016), 128, 129, 130, 195).

is this: Love each other as I have loved you." Also in 1 Corinthians 13: 2, we read: "If I have the gift of prophecy and can fathom all mysteries and all knowledge, and if I have a faith that can move mountains, but do not have love, I am nothing." In the same vein, the Qur'an echoes the same sentiment: "Repel that which is evil with that which is better" (Q: 41:34). Prophet Muhammad s.a.w. shows us on how to rise above hate and enmity. He also emphasises that forgiveness is greater than revenge, perseverance is preferred over retaliation, and love is better than hate. He said, "I'd rather hope that Allah will raise from among their descendants, people who will worship Allah, the one, and will not ascribe partners to Him" (Hadith by Imam Bukhari and Imam Muslim). Prophet Muhammad further states that what we love for ourselves should also be what we love for others. In a Hadith, Rasulullah s.a.w emphasises the golden rule, "None of you has faith until he loves for his brother what he loves for himself."[1226] It shows that both Jesus Christ and Prophet Muhammad teach the same thing -- "love." In 1 Corinthians 16:14, we read: "Do everything in love." Paul is contending that love conquers everything. If a Christian or Muslim has love in their hearts, they will not hate each other or take revenge against one another, and peace and harmony can reign among us.

In resolving their differences, they should embrace interreligious dialogue and channel their grievances through Nigeria's Interreligious Council (NIRC), an organisation set up by federal government and made up of Muslims and Christians to tackle misunderstanding that may arise from time to time, rather than taking up arms against each other. By using dialogue, it will usher in peace, tranquillity and progress in the region.

[1226] Ustaz Ridhwan Mohd Basor, "These Incredible Stories of Prophet Muhammad's Love and Mercy Will Inspire You." *HHWT* (Singapore), November 8, 2019. https://www.havehalalwilltravel.com/lessons-prophet-muhammad-love-mercy

Uchenna Ugorie argues that Nigeria has witnessed an increased number of religious violence over the past four decades, particularly since Nigeria's Fourth Republic was born in 1999. This violence has led to loss of lives and property and displacement of thousands of people. He contends that violence has blackened the conscience and militarised the psyche of Nigerians who resort to senseless killing in the name of religion after minor misunderstanding.[1227]

Festus Iyorah contends that Christians of Southern Kaduna feel marginalised and discriminated by Hausa/Fulani political elite in the distribution of resources, appointments and job opportunities in the state.[1228] He notes also that from the 1970s to the early 1990s, the indigenous Christian tribes in the Jos – the Borom, Fizere, and Anaguta held sway over local politics in the area, however, by 1999 political power shifted to Hausa/Fulani who are predominantly Muslims and considered by the indigenes as settlers in the state. In attempt to regain the lost political power by the indigenous people, local politicians appealed to religious sentiments. They instigated their followers to see the other religion as an enemy. This attitude led to religious violence.[1229]

Ugorie further argues that some of the violence and conflict were caused by religious ignorance, intolerance, fanaticism, and political interests, hence thousands of lives have been lost. He notes that though the two religions preach peace, acrimony accrues from a relationship soured by anxiety and grief. The rate of frequent occurrence of this religious violence if not checked will have a serious implication for economic and political stability in the North-East, North-West, and North-Central geo-political zones.[1230]

[1227] Uchenna M. Ugorie, n.d. "Nigerian Inter-Religious Council (NIREC)." *Methodist Theological Institute* (Umuahia): 1.
[1228] Festus Iyorah, "The Interfaith Approach to Longstanding Violence in Nigeria." *Sojourners* (Washington DC), February 26, 2020. https://sojo.net/articles/interfaith-approach-longstanding-violence-nigeria.
[1229] Ibid.
[1230] Ugorie, n.d. "Nigerian Inter-Religious Council (NIREC)," 3.

Patrick Egwu points out the activities of the Boko Haram insurgency in the North-East, bandits in the North-West, and Fulani herdsmen and farmers in North-Central, who have added new dimensions to the religious-based crisis in the region by increasing attacks on Christians and Muslims alike, including razing of churches, mosques and displacement of indigenous people from their land.[1231] Fortunately, there are groups working for peaceful co-existence between Muslims and Christians like the Nigerian Interreligious Council.

7.6.2 Establishment of Nigerian Interreligious Council (NIRC)

The recurrent animosities and conflicts between the adherents of Islam and Christianity were heightened by the adoption of sharia law by 12 states in Northern Nigeria, and especially the bloodletting in Kaduna. It prompted Reverend Yusuf Obaje, the Chaplain of Presidential Villa, Abuja to advise former President of Nigeria, Olusegun Obasanjo to create a body that could take care of religious upheavals in Nigeria. The attention of the religious leaders in the country were equally drawn to healing the wounds, hence a delegation from the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) led by Dr Sunday Mbang, the former CAN's president and the Prelate of Methodist Church of Nigeria, and the late Alhaji Muhammadu Maccido, Sultan of Sokoto and then President of the Nigerian Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs (NSCIA). The duo met on September 1, 1999 and agreed on the need to seek support on the establishment of a body made up of Muslims and Christians to find a lasting solution to the incessant religious violence through seeking dialogue for peaceful resolution of issues, understanding and mutual co-existence between Muslims and Christians.[1232]

The former President of Nigeria (1999-2007) Olusegun Obasanjo inaugurated the Nigerian Inter Religious Council (NIRC) on 29th September 1999. The NIRC was

[1231] Patrick Egwu, "Nigeria's Interfaith Council Fosters Peaceful Christians-Muslims Relations." *National Catholic Reporter* (Kansa City), November 11, 2019. https://www.ncronline.org/news/people/nigerias-interfaith-council-fosters-peaceful-christian-muslim-relations.
[1232] Ugorie, n.d. "Nigerian Inter-Religious Council (NIREC)." *Methodist Theological Institute* (Umuahia): 1.

established as a platform for positive engagement to resolving issues involving the two main religions Christianity and Islam. The council aimed to engender meaningful dialogue, communication, and understanding and to help resolve issues such as mistrust, fear and hostilities among the adherents of the two main religions.[1233]

In 2000 after the disastrous religious disturbances over the introduction of sharia law in Kaduna State, the hostilities between Christians and Muslims led to extensive destruction of lives and properties and the partition of the city of Kaduna into sharia areas and non-sharia areas.[1234] The Council was tasked to find a lasting solution in tackling mistrust and misunderstanding, to bring peace between Christians and Muslims, and to provide an avenue that would advance and reinforce tolerance through interreligious dialogue. The Council was comprised of an equal number of Christians and Muslims (fifty all together) and as noted, was jointly led by the Sultan of Sokoto, the supreme leader of Muslims in Nigeria, and the President of the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN).[1235]

7.6.3 Objectives of Nigerian Interreligious Council (NIRC)

NIRC's objectives are to have positive influence on the Muslim and Christian faithful, enhance religious tolerance and understanding and live as good neighbours.[1236] NIRC emphasises:

1. continuous dialogue and engagement with each other through meetings,

2. religious and peace education, discussions, conferences, seminars, and workshops.

[1233] Mubin Olatoye Raji, "Towards the Sustenance of Religious Tolerance and Harmony in Lagos State: The Role of the Nigeria Interreligious Council (NIRC), Lagos State Chapter." *International Journal of Theology and Reformed Tradition* 7 (2015): 45.
[1234] Matthews A. Ojo and Folaranmi T. Lateju, "Christian – Muslim Conflicts and Interfaith Bridge – Building Efforts in Nigeria." *The Review of Faith and International Affairs* 8, no. 1 (2010):31-38.
[1235] Raji, "Towards the Sustenance of Religious Tolerance and Harmony in Lagos State: The Role of the Nigeria Interreligious Council (NIRC), Lagos State Chapter," 47.
[1236] Ibid.

3. championing frequent interfaith and inter-communal meetings.

4. works in conjunction with the government and security agencies to intervene in conflict situations to restore peace and order.[1237]

5. to achieve a co-existence among all people of Nigeria irrespective of their religious or ethnic affiliations.

6. to promote and inculcate moral, ethical, social and cultural values of the two faiths for the rebirth and rebuilding of a better society.

7. to provide a forum for mutual cooperation and promotion of the welfare of all citizens in the nation.

8. to create channels for the peaceful resolution of any friction or misunderstanding that may arise from time to time.

9. to serve as an avenue for articulating cordial relationships amongst the various religious groups and between them and the government, to assist the federal, state and local governments in Nigeria and the populace by emphasising and accentuating the positive roles religion should play in fostering integral and spiritual development of Nigerians.

10. to make recommendations on such matters at the federal and other levels of government and from time to time refer to the council, to network with organisations of similar aims at home and internationally, for the furtherance of the objectives of the council.[1238]

[1237] Ibid., 122.
[1238] Ugorie, n.d. "Nigerian Inter-Religious Council (NIREC)," 3-4.

Equally, the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN)[1239] and Jamalat-ul-Nasril Islam (JNI)[1240] provide advice and work in conjunction with the NIRC to strengthen peace and understanding between Christians and Muslims through interreligious dialogue.[1241]

7.6.4 Achievements of Nigerian Interreligious Council (NIRC)

NIRC has made inroads in advancing peace in the northern region by promoting the cause of peaceful co-existence, religious tolerance and peace. For example, during the Local government elections in Jos, Plateau State in November 2008 resulted in fracas between the indigenes and Hausa/Fulani, churches and mosques were destroyed which resulted to the death of 800 people.[1242] The co-chairman of NIRC addressed both Muslims and Christians on the importance of religious tolerance and peace. The visit by NIRC's members helped to end the conflicts on both sides.[1243] Alhaji Muhammad Sa'ad Abubakar, the Sultan of Sokoto and Most Reverend John Onaiyekan both co-chairman of NIRC, addressed the two communities, Muslims and Christians over the outcome of Local Government Council elections. Sa'ad Abubakar tasks the leaders and government to "fight poverty and unemployment in order to reduce tension in the country." In the same vein, John Onaiyekan remarks "the problem in Jos is man-made, and since it is man-made is within our control."

[1239] CAN was formed as a mouthpiece of the Christians in Nigeria. CAN was established in 1976 (Falola, *Violence in Nigeria: The Crisis of Religious Politics and Secular Ideologies*, 107-108. Cardinal John Olorunfemi Onaiyekan was born on January 29, 1944 in Kabba, Kogi state, Nigeria. He studied Theology at the Pontifical Urban College, Rome (1963-1965). He was ordained Priest on August 3, 1969. In 1976, he obtained his Doctorate degree at the Pontifical Urban University, Rome in Biblical Theology. In November 1982, he was appointed Cardinal by Pope John Paul II. He was appointed Bishop of Abuja in 1992 and in 1994 he was appointed first Archbishop of Abuja Archdiocese. COFP Foundation. "Biography of His Eminence John Cardinal Olorunfemi Onaiyekan." https://cofpfoundation.org/his-eminence-john-cardinal-olorunfemi-onaiyekan/.

[1240] JNI was established by Northern Muslim scholars for the purpose of spreading Islam and to educate Muslims about the tenets of Islam. The founding fathers were Ahmadu Bello, Sardauna of Sokoto, former premier of Northern region and Sheik Abubakar Gumi. Toyin Falola (1998), 105.

[1241] Umaru, *Christian – Muslim Dialogue in Northern Nigeria*, 122.

[1242] Ian Linden and Thomas Thorp, "Religious Conflicts and Peace Building in Nigeria." *Journal of Religion and Violence* 4, no. 1 (2016): 93.

[1243] Ugorie, n.d. "Nigerian Inter-Religious Council (NIREC)." *Methodist Theological Institute.*

He implores Muslims and Christians to "preach peace, justice, forgiveness and more importantly loving one another irrespective of religious, ethnic or tribal sentiments."[1244]

NIRC advocates prompt intervention in crisis areas to prevent violence and its escalation, respond to burning issues, especially those that can threaten the corporate existence of Nigeria, foster religious understanding and peaceful co-existence through the promotion of dialogue among religious groups, and participate, with NSCIA and CAN leadership and membership seminars and conferences to further promote religious harmony in Nigeria.[1245]

NIRC continues to work together with other agencies for a better society. These include Nigeria's Inter-faith Action Association Against Malaria (NIFAAM), Inter-faith Committee on HIV/AIDS and Inter-faith Anti-corruption Advisory Committee (IAAC). The NIFFAM was created by NIRC to maximise the religious community's contributions to the national campaign against malaria in Nigeria. NIRC has equally worked in conjunction with the Federal Ministry of Health in the fight against malaria and other diseases. For instance, in October 2020, The Nigerian Inter-Religious Council (NIREC) under the leadership of the Co-Chairman, His Eminence Rev. Dr. Samson Olasupo Adeniyi Ayokunle, President, the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) and President of the Nigerian Baptist Convention and His Eminence Alhaji Muhammadu Sa'ad Abubakar, the Sultan of Sokoto, President General, Nigerian Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs (NSCIA) and Professor Cornelius Ofebu Omonokhua, Executive Secretary of NIRC in a joint communique expressed concern over the waves of demonstration happening around the country and praised the youth for crying out against police brutality.[1246]

[1244] Mahmud Lalo, Nigeria: Sultan, Onaiyekan in Jos to Broker Peace." *Daily Trust* (Abuja), December 17, 2008. https://allafrica.com/stories/200812170410.html.
[1245] Ugorie, n.d. "Nigerian Inter-Religious Council (NIREC)," 5.
[1246] Samson Olasupo Adeniyi, Muhammadu Sa'ad and Cornelius Ofebu Omonokhua, "NIREC Calls for Calm, Peaceful and Effective Management of "End SARS" Protesters' Demands." *Nigeria Inter Religious Council* (Abuja), October 21, 2020. www.nirec.org.ng/press-single.php?id=5.

They also worried that if the demonstration is not stopped now and the demands of the demonstrators promptly addressed, such demonstration may be hijacked by the criminals, leading to bloodshed and halting of social and economic activities. They noted that it can also lead to a spike in the COVID-19 pandemic. They point out that as a country coming out from the economic hardship of COVID-19, we should be careful of leading ourselves into another social and economic meltdown.

They call on the government to accelerate action and bring a quick and peaceful resolution to the situation on the ground as any democratic government would do by addressing the agitations of the youths, particularly through reform of the Nigerian Police Force to rid the criminal elements spoiling the image of its role and organisation in Nigeria. They remark: "We equally observe that unemployment has contributed to the continuous availability of the youths on the streets. A gainfully employed youth would not have time for increasing demonstration we had witnessed in the past days. The university lecturers' demands must be seriously addressed as well so that university students who are now available for the protests might be able to go back to their studies."[1247] They urge the Nigerian youths to back down on their agitation and give the government time to respond to their demands. They noted that "all the religions we practice in Nigeria believe in peaceful resolution of conflicts, especially through constructive dialogue." They urge parents to appeal with their children to cease from further going out to demonstrate so that loss of lives might be avoided.[1248]

In addition, NIRC has collaborated with the Economic and Financial Crime Commission (EFCC) to interface with the religious communities by adopting a faith-based community to spread the anti-corruption messages to members. NIRC has also developed teaching

[1247] Ibid.
[1248] Ibid.

manuals for Muslims and Christians to aid them in understanding the preaching of Prophet Mohammed and Jesus Christ.[1249] NIRC has brought Christians and Muslims together in dialogue to tackle destructive religious sentiments between them. Every month both men and women of different religious persuasion attend the NIRC's meeting where faith leaders interact and use the Holy Bible and Quran to preach peaceful co-existence and unity.[1250] For instance, Abubakar Ahmed, an NIRC member, states, "it is through more dialogue we will know the difference that exists between both religions. Dialogue fosters understanding."[1251] In strengthening dialogue between Christians and Muslims, NIRC organises annual meetings where men and women of different faiths dialogue and learn from each other. NIRC is doing what was seen as an "abomination merely 10 years ago: bringing Christians and Muslims together in dialogue to confront harmful religious sentiments. Every month up to 500 women and men attend the general council meeting where faith leaders discuss where they agree on peace using the Bible and the Quran as templates."[1252]

7.7 Muslim – Christian Interfaith Mediation Centre

Key important interfaith bridge builders for Nigeria, and specially in Northern Nigeria, include a Muslim cleric, Imam Mohammed Ashafa, and a Pentecostal pastor, Rev. James Wuye. The two were involved in the Zango-Kataf religious imbroglio in 1992. Ashafa and Wuye were on a mission for revenge when they realised the need for understanding and decided to pursue dialogue. Initially, Ashafa and Wuye had felt a desire to strengthen their faith communities, and to protect them against supposed threats. As the conflicts intensified, both trained militias to coerce and even kill members of the opposite side. Crops and

[1249] Adeniyi, Abubakar and Omonokhua, "NIREC Calls for Calm, Peaceful and Effective Management of "End SARS" Protesters' Demands," 6.
[1250] Iyorah, "The Interfaith Approach to Longstanding Violence in Nigeria."
[1251] Ibid.
[1252] Ibid.

livelihood were ruined. Families were threatened. The need for retaliation on both sides drove the odium, and the leaders' roles became ingrained. Both suffered heavy losses. Imam Ashafa lost two brothers and his mentor also died in the fight. Pastor Wuye lost his right hand and a close relation. Ashafa and Wuye came together in 1995 having rejected retribution but chosen dialogue and compromise. Both learned working together could help protect more people. At first, their voices were careful and shielded but over time, they built up the admiration and conviction necessary to form a partnership.[1253]

They organised workshops and conferences and a public forum in 1996 which centred on verses from the Holy Qur'an and Holy Bible that support compassion, forgiveness and neighbourly affection. Ashafa and Wuye established two programs - Interfaith Mediation Centre, and the Muslim–Christian Dialogue Forum. The organisation has achieved success through seminars on rapprochement and peaceful co-existence both within and outside Kaduna state. Their focus is on pre-emptive and remedial methods that facilitate exchange of information between Christian and Muslim leaders, educate restive youths in the direction of dialogue and forgiveness, promote peace agreements between belligerent groups, and use radio and television as avenues for promoting dialogue and understanding. In August 2002, Wuye and Ashafa were involved in encouraging Christian and Muslim leaders in Kaduna to agree on a peace deal after the Sharia imbroglio that claimed life and property in February 2000.[1254] In 2017, Wuye and Ashafa were awarded the Intercultural Innovation award for their service to humanity and their selfless services to the community at the United Nations

[1253] *United Religions Initiative*, "The Imam and the Pastor." URI, March 27, 2019. https://uri.org/uri-story/20190327-imam-and-pastor.
[1254] Ojo and Lateju, "Christian – Muslim Conflicts and Interfaith Bridge – Building Efforts in Nigeria,"31-38.

headquarters. Wuye and Ashafa were chosen based on their organisation's involvement on interfaith dialogue in resolving farmers/pastoralist crisis in northern region.[1255]

7.8 Reconciliation, Reconstruction and Rehabilitation

Godwin Onuoha writes that Nigeria's post-civil war peacebuilding project was constructed around reconciliation, rehabilitation, and reconstruction policies which shaped the nature of national citizenship, the "peace dividend," and reintegration of the Igbo. The former Head of State, General Yakubu Gowon initiated a policy of reconciliation, reconstruction, and rehabilitation to reabsorb Igbo into a united Nigeria after the civil war (1967-1970). Although efforts at post-war reconciliation and national unity give the impression to have relieved opposing memories of the war in the public sphere, group memories of "hurt," "injustice," and "marginalisation" still thrived in the private sphere which comprises kinship and family units, town unions, and ethnic groups.[1256]

Onuoha opines that the truths of post-conflict societies allow for no firm framework for peacebuilding. Most people face hard choices in addressing tough post-conflict issues, including addressing the legacy of past injustice and atrocities, rebuilding broken relationships arising from conflict, establishing and guaranteeing public safety in every facet of life, and the need for legitimate, effective political and administrative institutions. He argues that the distinctiveness of every post-conflict society makes these processes different

[1255] Initiatives of Change, "The Imam and the Pastor: When Enemies Learn to Trust." *Initiatives of Change*, Switzerland, September 18, 2019. https://www.iofc.ch/stories/imam-and-pastor-when-enemies-learn-trust See *Vanguard*, "Nigerian Pastor, Imam win Intercultural Innovation Award at UN," November 30, 2017. https://www.vanguardngr.com/2017/11/nigerian-pastor-imam-win-intercultural-innovation-award-un/ See *Naijachurchnews*, "Pastor, Imam win award for ethno-religious conflict," November 30, 2017, naijachurchnews.com/pastor-imam-win-intercultural-award/ See Ernest N. Ogbozor, Don John Omale, and Mallam Mairiga Umar (2018), "Building Bridges Between Herders and Farmers in Plateau, Nasarawa, and Kaduna States." *Search for Common Group*. https://www.sfcg.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/final-Evaluation-Building-Bridges-Between-Herders-and-Farmers-in-Plateau-Nasarawa-and-Kaduna-States-Aug See Hamisu Kabir Matazu, "Fulani group blames northern governors for neglect." *Daily Trust*, June 14, 2019, https://www.dailytrust.com.ng/fulani-group-blames-northern-governors-for-neglect.html?ct=t

[1256] Godwin Onuoha, "Memory, Reconciliation, and Peacebuilding in Post-Civil War South-eastern Nigeria." *Social Science Research Council*, Working Papers, no. 19 (2018):2.

in terms of what comes first, what is needed at a particular time should do it, and how it should be done?[1257]

Onuoha writes that post-conflict reconstruction is meaningless unless linked to the "inter-subjective" understanding of the conflict and the post-conflict situation held by people that lived through it, which can aid in crafting better tools for dealing with memory[1258] and can further boost individual and community reconciliation after conflict.[1259]

According to Tatsushi Arai, reconciliation is a sustained social process that seeks to counter revenge while simultaneously promoting healing from trauma and guilt. He opines that while the activities required to facilitate reconciliation focus on "psychosocial" support and relationship building, it is often useful to tie reconciliation processes systematically to livelihood development. Such an integrated approach to reconciliation and development, when planned and carried out skilfully, can bring divided communities together to generate immediate tangible benefits and build relationships. Building a sustainable reconciliation especially in north-eastern Nigeria, include skills-building, mentoring and equipment support for income generation through initiatives like sewing, that purposefully bring men and women from diverse ethnic and regional communities together.[1260]

Hizkias Assefa argues that reconciliation not only tries to seek solutions to the factors responsible for conflict, but works to change the opponents' relationships from that of bitterness and antagonism to acquaintance and concord.[1261] Mehmed notes that

[1257] Ibid.
[1258] The burden of memory is borne and shared by individuals or groups that are socially or culturally knit together, and as such, memory is strongly linked to political and economic processes, practices, and agenda. Nigeria provides a contextual example for exploring the nexus between memory and reconciliation (Onuoha 2018, 5).
[1259] Onuoha, "Memory, Reconciliation, and Peacebuilding in Post-Civil War Southeastern Nigeria," 5.
[1260] Tatsushi Arai, "Conflict-Sensitive Repatriation: Lessons from Displaced Communities in North-eastern Nigeria." *Accord*, April 24, 2017. https://www.accord.org.za/conflict-trends/conflict-sensitive-repatriation/
[1261] Kader Asmal, "Truth, Reconciliation and Justice: The South African Experience in Perspective." *The Modern Law Review* 63, no. 1 (2000):337.

reconciliation as a way of returning to normalcy after an acrimonious past may have gained momentum in the case of Hutus and Tutsis, though this has been greatly debated because of the extent of their spiteful past.[1262] He argues that reconciliation is "transformative" rather

[1262] Tutsis and Hutus are living in the same community once more and must learn how to live side by side – how to co-exist despite the murder, violence and evil. People are learning to be Rwandan together. The organised massacres of the Tutsi people began in April 1994. An estimated 800,000 people, mostly Tutsis including some moderate Hutus, were murdered. It started on April 6, 1994, after President Juvenal Habyarimana, a Hutu died, when his plane was brought down in Kigali. The extremists Hutus accused the Tutsis of carrying out the execution. Shortly after that roadblocks were set up by extremists Hutus, with Tuts men, women and children of all ages murdered with machetes, guns and grenades. One of the perpetrators who participated in the mayhem said, "I was like an animal…I knew most of the people that were killed that day, if not all of them. Because we were neighbour…The objectives were to exterminate them." He stated, "If it happened again, I would die with them, trying to protect." However, the emergence of Kagame's led Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) established mechanisms to rebuild Rwanda which include, reconciliation and national unity, good governance, and reparation of the refuges. *thejournal.ie*. "20 years on: Rwandans learn to live beside the men who killed their children." April 7, 2014. https://www.thejournal.ie/rwanda-genocide-killings-anniversary-1403166-Apr2014/. See *The Conversation*, "Rwanda Can't achieve reconciliation without fixing its democracy." April 25, 2018. www.theconversation.com/Rwanda-cant-achieve-reconciliation-without-fixing-its-democracy-94925

than "restorative."[1263] She concluded that South Africa avoided war because there was seriousness on the part of the government and the people to move on and unite the people.[1264]

[1263] Howard Zehr and Ali Gohar ask this salient question: "how should societies respond to wrongdoing? When a crime occurs or an injustice is done, what needs to happen? What does justice require?" They affirm that whether we are worried about crime or other criminal activities, our legal system invariably has shaped our reasoning about these crimes in our community. They acknowledge that the western legal or criminal justice system has some good elements in it, though there is a growing concern that its application has limits and failures. They note that victims, offenders and community in most cases feel that punishment is not adequately served. Justice professionals such as judges, lawyers, prosecutors, probation and parole officers, and prison staff complained of system failure. They adduce, the "majority of them feel that the process of justice deepens societal wounds and conflicts rather than contributing to healing or peace." They contend that restorative justice emerges in order to address some of these obligations and constraints. Since the emergence in the 1970s, a variety of design programs and approaches have emerged in many communities. For instance, New Zealand since 1989 has made restorative justice the core of its juvenile justice system. They believe that restorative justice as it stands today is the best victim-offender approach for remedies and healing.

Zehr and Gohar also contend that restorative justice is based on three pillars: harm and needs, obligation and engagement. He contends that restorative justice demands that we address victim's harms and needs, hold offenders accountable to put right those harms, and involve victims, offenders and communities in this process. They traced the history of restorative justice to tackling crimes like burglary and other property crimes that are usually seen or often referred as minor offenses. But the application has spread to communities even in serious crimes such as death from drunken driving, assault, rape, even murder. Restorative justice builds on the experience of South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission. They aver that restorative justice is being applied in schools, workplaces and religious institutions. Some groups use conferences, workshops and seminars as means to build and heal communities.

For Heather Wolpert-Gawron, restorative justice can be more effective in dealing with crimes. She contends that it is a "system of criminal justice that focuses on the rehabilitation of offenders through reconciliation with victims and the community at large." Using schools as a case study, Wolpert-Gawron states that restorative justice helps a student to admit what he did wrong and is willing to make amends to those affected, likewise, the community is involved in a positive way in helping both the victim and the offender. Hence, restorative justice accepts that offenders need help as well. The myth is that restorative justice takes the place of harsher punishment. The reality is that restorative justice represents the actions that lead up to more punitive measure should they be inevitable. Eni Alobo and John Inaku argue that restorative justice is a process whereby all the parties with a stake in an offense come together to resolve collectively how to deal with the aftermath of the offense and its implication for the future. They further stated that restorative justice is a process through which remorseful offenders accept responsibilities for their misconduct to those injured, and the community, in response, allows the reintegration of the offender into the community. The emphasis is on restoration. Restoration includes the offender in terms of his or her self-respect, restoration of the relationship between offender and victims, as well as restoration of both offenders and victims within the community. Restorative justice essentially aims to heal the victim's wounds; restores offenders to law abiding lives; repairs harm done in inter-personal relationships and the community; seeks to involve all stakeholders and provides opportunities for those most affected by the crime to be directly involved.

Giving an example of Nigeria, James Hope argues that Nigeria's legal system is framed after English common law. As it is designed today, it provides that an offender should be punished for any crime done to another person. In most cases, Nigeria subscribes to the death penalty. Some schools of thought have argued that it is outdated "Mosaic," and based on the "Hammurabi code" dating 3,500 years ago. It involves offenses that need resolving without going through the processes of court. In pre-colonial Igbo states, for instance, cases like land disputes, marital issues, fighting, and stealing are adjudicated by elders, *Umuada*, *Umuokorobia*, *Ndi-Eze na Ozo*, age-grades, but with the advent of colonialism, some of this adjudication disappeared or eroded, though the idea of restorative justice has been engraved in Nigerian laws to meet the need of the society. The Nigerian criminal system is regulated by the Criminal Procedure Code in Northern Nigeria and the Criminal Procedure Act in Southern Nigeria. An attempt to reform the system was brought about by the introduction of the Administrative of Criminal Justice Act which aims at protecting both the victim and the offender and the community: "the purpose of this Act is to ensure that the system of administration of criminal justice in Nigeria promotes efficient management of criminal justice institution, speedy dispensation of justice, protection of the society from crime and protection of the rights and interest of the suspect, the defendant and the victim." (Howard Zehr and Ali Gohar, *The Little Book of Restorative Justice*. Good Books, Intercourse, Pennsylvania, USA (2003): 2-3, 21, 23.;

Assefa contends that what society refers to as "healing" is the fixing of the deep-seated open wounds caused by the hostilities followed by the reconciliation process. He points out that apart from laying down rules on what to do to achieve reconciliation, there are other factors that can facilitate and help resolve conflicts between parties such as adjudication, arbitration, negotiation and mediation. He notes that the crux of reconciliation is the voluntary initiative of the conflicting parties to admit their obligation and fault. The exchanges that emerge between the parties are not only intended to link one's complaints but also to absorb, in self-reflection, one's own involvement and conduct during the hostilities.[1265]

In other words, Assefa contends that in the process of this type of dialogue, in as much as one ascribes to guilt and responsibility to the opponent for the injury caused by the hostility, one must equally be self-critical and accept blame for his or her own role in the construction or continuation of the hostility and spiteful interface. He acknowledges that the purpose of the conversation is for the parties to accept that their actions have contributed to the conflict and so to seek a harmonious way to reach out to the other party and to refrain from issues that will create problems. They should seek a path to peace and cohabitation. He notes that the role of third parties in reconciliation is to create an enabling environment where the parties involved are helped from moving away from a blame game to engaging with the opponents in a positive way. Assefa submitted that of all the conflict management

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Heather Wolpert-Gawron, "What the Heck Is Restorative Justice." *Edutopia* (2016). https://www.edutopia.org/article/what-heck-restorative-justice-heather-wolpert-gawron. Eni Alobo and John Inaku, "An Appraisal of the Principle of Restorative Justice in the Nigerian Criminal Justice System." *International Journal of Engineering Technologies and Management Research* 5, Issue 12 (2018):139-141; and James Hope, "Restorative Justice: A Panacea to Crime Prevention in Nigeria." *ResearchGate* (2019): 2-3).

[1264] Gemma Mehmed (2001), 7.

[1265] Hizkias Assefa, "Reconciliation." In *Peacebuilding: A Field Guide*, Reychler and Paffenholz, ed. (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 2001), 341-342.

instruments, reconciliation is likely the most efficient and robust means of settling and averting deadly wars.[1266]

7.9 Relief for Victims

The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies describe relief as providing a vital, suitable and appropriate humanitarian assistance to those affected by disaster.[1267] The main aim of intervention is to lessen the effect of any deep suffering by the provision of instant and prompt relief to people affected by disaster. It involves the provision of Internal Displaced Persons (IDPs) camps with vital public health, safety services, food, clothing, medicine and other essential services that help victims to cope with the disaster.[1268]

Protecting the victims of disasters in Nigeria rest with the government of Nigeria. This is in line with the international human rights law that states that it is necessary to give effect to the fundamental human rights to life, food, clothing and shelter.[1269] It is well established in customary international law,[1270] that when a state fails to fulfil its primary obligation to help and protect its citizens, so that "the state is unable to provide relief and unwilling to promptly permit external humanitarian assistance to the victims," satisfaction of these fundamental rights entail that the victims have a right to receive humanitarian aid from external sources.[1271] This imposes on the state both a moral and political obligation to allow the victims access to humanitarian assistance. The state must fulfil its obligation to the

[1266] Ibid.
[1267] International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, "Services for the disaster – affected: Relief." https://www.ifre.org/en/what-we-do/disaster-management-affected/relief/
[1268] National Emergency Management Agency, "Relief Unit," February 16, 2014. https://www.nema.gov.ng/relief-unit/
[1269] *United Nations*, "Deliver Humanitarian Aid," www.un.org
[1270] Customary international law is not a written source. A rule of customary law, e.g., requiring States to grant immunity to a visiting Head of State. The Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), Articles 38 identifies five sources: Treaties between States; Customary international law derives from the practices of the States; General principles of law recognised by civilised nations etc. Christopher Greenwood. "Sources of International Law: An Introduction. Professor of International Law," *London School of Economics* (2008).
[1271] Rohan J. Hardcastle and Adrian T. Chua, "Humanitarian Assistance: Towards a Right of Access to Victims of Natural Disasters." *International Review of the Red Cross*, no. 325 (1998).

international community while that community respects the state as a civilised nation who respects international law and subscribes to the most fundamental human rights and[1272] the right to life.[1273] In compliance with the above statement, Nigeria is a signatory to the African Charter on Human Rights, including the rights to life. The Nigerian government set up a management agency with the duty of meeting the needs of victims of disasters whether natural or man-made. The agency responsible for discharging that duty rests with the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA). The agency is charged with post-humanitarian relief interventions, and the rehabilitation of vulnerable groups affected by disasters be it natural, human induced or technological. This is to enable the affected victims to overcome stress and traumas and enhance recovery.[1274]

NEMA also are concerned with post-disaster humanitarian response and provides shelter, food and clothing for internally displaced persons (IDPs). It also ensures proper and effective management of the camps. The statistics show that for the second quarters of 2011, the number of displaced persons stood at 157,972.[1275] In October 2018, internally displaced persons stood at 2 million.[1276] According to relief web, in the most affected states of Borno, Adamawa and Yobe, it was estimated that 7.1 million inhabitants are in need of humanitarian assistance in 2019 out of total a population of 13.4 million. In addition, over eighty per cent of internally displaced people are in Borno State, the hotbed of the Boko

[1272] Ibid.
[1273] See Article 2 "Right to life" in European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights, 2000; See also Article 4 "Right to life" in American Convention on Human Rights, 1969, see Article 4 "Right to life" in African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, 1981; Article 5 "Right to life" in Arab Charter on Human Rights, 2004: In Ian Brownlie and Guy S. Goodwill, *Basic Documents on Human Rights*, Fifth Edition, ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 807, 935, 1009, 1072.
[1274] National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA), "Relief and Rehabilitation," November 7, 2013, nema.gov.ng/relief-rehabilitation/
[1275] Global Report on Internal Displacement 2019, "Nigeria."www.internal-displacementorg/sites/default/files/publications/documents/2019-IDMC-GRID-spotlight-nigeria
[1276]Saskia Brechenmacher, "Stabilizing Northeast Nigeria After Boko Haram." *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, May 3, 2019. www.carnegieendowment.org. See John Campbell, "Nigeria Security Tracker." *Council on Foreign Relations*, www.cfr.org

Haram activities.[1277] Millions of people were forced to abandon their homes to look for security, having lost their homes and belongings, and again exposed to serious adversity. Such displaced people experience trials with respects to their rights and their welfare condition.[1278]

Food, shelter and non-food items are important to IDPs. Shelter plays an important determining factor for the initial step in responding to a disaster. Shelter is necessary for security and personal safety, protection from the elements and to fight against ill-health and diseases. Shelter support is given to individual families for the repairing or building of abodes or residences of displaced homes within existing space or communities. Other items include clothing, blankets, bedding, stoves, kitchen sets, water containers and hygienic items.[1279]

The post-election violence of 2011 saw about 65,000 persons internally displaced in the northern region. NEMA estimated the figures at 2.1 million from July to October 2012, who were affected in the same year in Northern Nigeria. Also, between January 2013 and February 2014, about 470,565 and 143,164 persons were internally displaced in Nigeria by local conflicts and natural disasters through internal dislodgement cuts across 24 states of the country. For example, under the government of Babatunde Fashola of Lagos state in

[1277] *UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs*, "Nigeria: 2019 Humanitarian Needs Overview." February 1, 2019, www.reliefweb.int

[1278] Ejiofor Onaedo C., Oni Samuel and Sejoro John V., "An Assessment of the Impact of Internal Displacement on Human Security in Northern Nigeria (2009 – 2016)." *Relationes Internationanales*, AUDRI 10, no. 1 (2017): 21. See *Displacement Tracking Matrix* (DTM), "Nigeria – Displacement Report 26 (January 2019)." www.displacment.iom.int. See also *International Migration Agency* (IOM), "Nigeria." June 2019. www.globaldtm.info.

[1279] International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, "Services for the disaster – affected: Relief." https://www.ifrc.org/en/what-we-do/disaster-management/responding/services-for-the-disaster-affected/relief/.

Southwest region of Nigeria, about 1 million residents were removed from their homes, due to demolition of Ijora, Oshodi, Makoko and other areas.[1280]

The continued Boko Haram insurrection in Northern Nigeria has led to an increase of internally displaced persons. The Internally Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) documented over 2,730,000 persons displaced as of 31 December 2020. Most of this displacement was a result of fear for their lives from the persecution of Boko Haram sects and farmers – herdsmen conflict.[1281]

Based on the figure of IDPs in these states, it shows that 13.33 per cent were dislodged from their homes due to communal clashes, 0.99 per cent by natural disasters and 85 percent as a result of Boko Haram attacks in the region.[1282] The UN's World Food Programme in June 2017 cautioned that hundreds of thousands of Nigerians could starve to death in the famine that threatened the northeast due to lack of aid and funds to feed the IDPs. It required $172 million to feed them. Also, the states of Adamawa, Borno and Yobe have the most humanitarian needs with over 5 million people facing "acute food insecurity," especially needing food aid are vulnerable children, men and women.[1283] According to a Food Security Information Network report in 2019, about 4.5 million people are projected to face food crises and insecurity in Northern Nigeria as a result of disrupted agriculture and marketing of goods in the region.[1284]

[1280] Ejiofor, Oni and Sejoro, "An Assessment of the Impact of Internal Displacement on Human Security in Northern Nigeria (2009 – 2016)," 21-22.

[1281] Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, "Nigeria," https://www.internal-displacement.org/countries/nigeria. See Odita Sunday, "Several injured as 3-Storey building collapses in Lagos." *The Guardian*, June 27, 2019. See Thomson Reuters, "Islamist insurgents kill at least 20 civilians in northeast Nigeria village – source." *Reuters*, June 26, 2019.

[1282] Ejiofor, Oni and Sejoro, "An Assessment of the Impact of Internal Displacement on Human Security in Northern Nigeria (2009 – 2016)," 23.

[1283] *Worldwatch Monitor*, "Nigeria." July 2017. https://www.worldwatchmonitor.org/2017/07/food-aid-starts-reach-5m-boko-haram-victims-now-risk-famine

[1284] FSIN, "2019 Global Report on Food Crises: Joint Analysis for Better Decisions." *Food Security Informative Network*, 2019. http://www.fsinplatform.org/sites/default/files/resources/files/GRFC_2019-Full_Report.pdf

According to *Foreign Affairs*, the clashes between herders and farmers have killed 10,000 people[1285] and 228,500 internally displaced persons as of January 2019[1286] in the northern region are a result of ethnic-religious tension between the dominantly Muslim – Fulani herders and mostly Christian farmers in North-central. This has resulted in food scarcity in the region, as the activities of Fulani herdsmen have prevented the farmers to run away from their farms and communities.

As noted, the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria places the responsibility of the welfare and the security of its citizens on the government. Unfortunately, the subsequent and present government have failed to live up to the expectation of the citizens in discharging their constitutional responsibilities in providing adequate security and secured homes for IDPs leading to fear and disease among the people. According to Osagie, the team leader for Christian relief agency Open Doors, the Churches are one of the major sources of food and cash to the people in the region but have been overstretched. He noted that the Open Doors provides food and cash for 15,000 families, a projected 75,000 individuals in worst case scenarios.[1287]

[1285] llo, Jonathan-Ichaver and Adamolekun, "The Deadliest Conflict You've Never Heard of Nigeria's Cattle Herders and Farmers Wage a Resource War." See Mahr. "Guns, religion and climate change intensify Nigeria's deadly farmer-herder clashes."

[1286] *UNHCR*, "Nigeria Regional Refuge Response Plan 2019/2020." www.unhcr.org

[1287] Ibid. Muslim Public Affairs Centre (MPAC) is an NGO devoted to the defence of Muslims in Nigeria. They are involved in the following: Muslim empowerment and promoting individual liberties, religious, civil and political rights of Muslims, promoting the integration of Islam into Nigerian pluralism, spreading positive and constructive relationships between Nigerian Muslims and other elements in society; building the Muslim constituency to become an influential component in the Nigerian politics, at all levels of the policy-making arena; and making Islamic ethical values available to the Nigerian political process. It operates on the core Islamic values of justice, mercy, human dignity, freedom, the sanctity of human life and equality for all. MPAC involves interfaith dialogue, and the core of its activities are peacebuilding, human rights, security, and economic and social development. MPAC hinges their involvement in interfaith dialogue based on The Charter of Madinah set for the citizens of Medina city state and the Treaty of Hudaibiyah made with the people of Makkah which form two important documents based in the Qur'an. MPAC notes that in Medina, all people irrespective of religions have equal rights and enjoy a happy and peaceful life under the jurisdiction of the Charter of Medina. Prophet Muhammed abandoned the title of "Rasulullah" (Allah's Messenger) while writing the treaty of Hudaybyiah (with the disbelieving people of Mecca) just for peace to reign. MPAC contends that in participating in interreligious dialogue they are guided by verses in the Qur'an: "there is no compulsion in religion: verily the right path has become distinct from the wrong path. Whosever disbelieves in Tagut and believes in Allah, then he has grasped the most trustworthy handhold that will never break. And Allah is all hearer, all-knower." MPAC is involved in

The federal government has made several efforts to solve the problem of the IDP crisis in Northern Nigeria, yet the problem remains. There are still issues of overcrowding, hunger, poor sanitation, joblessness and insecurity in the camps. In order to address the serious issues in the northeast, the federal government set up the North-East Development Commission (NEDC) in October 2017 and the Presidential Committee on North-East Initiative (PCNI) in 2016, but it seems that these initiatives have had no impact on the suffering and neglect of the IDPs. The failure of the state to address the problem in the North-East was due to lack of planning, inadequate programmes, inefficient delivery and corruption among the officers. Therefore, there is an urgent need for the government and these organisations charged with taking care of IDPs to function effectively and come up with better strategies for tackling corruption and improving security and accommodations.[1288]

It is imperative that those in authority make funds available, provide security, sanitation and medicine. The government should take up their responsibility in line with their domestic and international obligations. Again, the private sectors, especially Churches and Mosques, should take a proactive role in providing more for the IDPs. With deeper cooperation, those in need can be better supported.

7.10 The Pursuit of Justice

David G. Mann, a judge of Plateau State High Court, argues that a functional administration of justice can go a long way in fashioning a conducive setting for the progress

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the provision of aids and relief materials. They want to show Muslim presence in these camps located at Maiduguri, Abuja and Gombe. MPAC aims to alleviate the suffering of the victims of the Boko Haram insurgency, inter-communal violence and perennial flooding (MPAC. "Welcome to MPAC Nigeria." https://www.mpac-ng.org.

[1288] Ibid, 24.

of any nation.[1289] He thinks that functional and effective management of justice is important to the progress and development of any country such as Nigeria. Mann quoted George Washington, the US' first President, who in his letter to his Attorney General, Edmund Randolph emphasised the importance of an efficient justice by stating:

> Impressed with a conviction that the due administration of justice is the firmest pillar of good government, I have considered the first arrangement of the Judicial department as essential to the happiness of our country, and to the stability of its political system; hence the selection of the fittest characters to expound the law, and dispense justice, has been an invariable object of my anxious concern.[1290]

The Merriam Webster Dictionary defines justice as "the maintenance or administration of what is just especially by the impartial adjustment of conflicting claims or the assignment of merited rewards or punishments."[1291] In this context the pursuit of justice involves the whole of judicial procedure carried out in an effective, reasonable and impartial way.

John Rawls argues that justice is the first integrity of social institutions, as truth is of the system of thought. He posits that a theory no matter how refined and reasonable it may be, must be allowed or reviewed if it is found to be incorrect. Similarly, laws and institutions, no matter how effective and well organised they may be, must be changed or stopped if they become unfair. Rawls maintains that everybody should enjoys the sanctity of law established on justice and that even the happiness of the people cannot prevail. This means that injustice, the loss of freedom for some, is made right by a greater good shared by others. He contends that in an impartial society, the rights of equal citizenship are assumed as

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[1289] David G. Mann, "Curbing Delays in the Administration of Justice: Case Management in the Magistrate Courts." A Paper Presented by Justice David G. Mann at the Orientation Course for Newly Appointed Magistrates on 24th July 2017, 2. Justice David G. Mann is a Judge of High Court of Plateau State.
[1290] Ibid., 2.
[1291] *Merriam Webster*, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/justice.

resolved and the privileges protected by justice are not imperilled to political bargaining or to the dictates of social interests.[1292]

Nlerum Okogbule argues that the political and constitutional development of Nigeria has been entwined with the advancement and defence of human rights. She notes that from Nigeria's pre-independence constitutional conference, through the First, Second, Third, and Fourth Republic of Nigeria, human rights questions have received favourable attention in both legal and political discourse. There has been, however, a continued struggle for the defence of the human rights of individuals, groups and communities in Nigeria. Examples abound such as the Willinck Commission and the Oputa Panel, which were established to promote and protect human rights and justice in Nigeria. The Willinck Commission was to lessen the feeling of minority groups in Nigeria against marginalisation during the colonial era. The Human Rights Violations Investigation Commission (HRVIC), otherwise called the Oputa Panel, was set up to examine the causes, nature, and extent of human rights violations, assassinations, and attempted killings between January 15, 1966 and May 28,

[1292] John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice*, Revised Edition (Harvard: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1971, 1999), 3-4. Joseph Rivera argues Rawl's objective versus subjective circumstances of Justice and contends that for us to survive, we need the necessities of life. These basic necessities constitute the objective, important elements of our existence, without which, we would be living in a Hobbesian era of life 'short, brutish and nasty.' According to Rivera, humanity needs food, shelter and water in order to avoid diseases, sickness and attacks. We work together to explore our potential in order to survive in the face of wants. Through our collective enterprise, we work together for the betterment of humankind. It is this cooperation that leads us to form an association, belonging to groups. It helps us to put our heads together. Rivera comments: "we automatically feel the need to belong to a group precisely because we as a species have engaged in cooperation as a necessary venture for mutual advantage for all involved." He notes that no one can contemplate having a society free from conflict and violence. To overcome wants, Rivera adduces that there is a need for communities to agree on how to preserve, manage and distribute resources, but it is always a contentious issue on how resources can be used for the benefit of all. He writes: "mutually advantageous cooperation among (or between groups), moreover, does not yield forth similar religious or moral life plans." He notes that how we enjoy life varies and how we achieve life also varies according to our choice. He adduces that the objective circumstances of justice are attained as long as staying alive is assured. Rivera contends that the subjective circumstances of Justice reflect the individual's own pursuit of good, morality, truth and the beautiful. Rivera contends, "these moral categories and judgments …consist of a set of doctrines that individuals abide by and thus also regard as worthy of recognition." He maintains that this can stimulate in us loyalty based on bias and passion, spawning in the process real support among people who share the same belief. According to Rivera, Rawls refers to this judgment as "comprehensive doctrines." Rivera maintains, "no doubt we have different and sometimes incompatible ends and purpose advanced by the subjective character of comprehensive doctrines we respectively adopt" (Rivera, "The Original Position' as Public Performance: Liberalism, Pluralism, and Asceticism." *Religions* 10, no. 462 (2019): 2-3.

1999. The HRVIC was charged to identify perpetrators (individuals or institutions), determine the role of the state in the violations, and to recommend means to pursue justice and prevent future abuses.[1293]

Okogbule contends that access to justice merely denotes the applicable and practical instruments prevailing in any society intended to guarantee that the citizens have the chance to seek compensation for the abuse of their legal rights within the legal system. Okogbule argues that access to justice should not be restricted to the technical contrivance for the determination of disagreements, but comprises other issues such as the bodily circumstances of the premises where justice is administered, the quality of the human and material resources available, the quality of justice delivered, the time it takes for the delivery of justice, the observance of the general principles of the rule of law, the affordability of the cost of seeking justice in terms of time and money, the quality of the legal advisers that assist the litigants, and the incorruptibility and impartiality of operators of the system.[1294]

In Achebe's *Things Fall Apart*, the concepts of justice are demonstrated or shown in the clan of Umuofia's hierarchical system of respect. The Umuofia's respect is based on a meritocratic system of rewarding successful men and women in the clan. The people of Umuofia "judged a man by the work of his hands"[1295] Okonkwo's accomplishments[1296] were due to his hard work and the system that allowed anyone to aspire to any position without hindrance. This is the testament of the proof that people who live under fair equality of opportunities, even if born without privilege, can still succeed. This principle of

[1293] *United States Institute of Peace*, "Truth Commission: Nigeria." Monday 14, 1999. www.usip.org.
[1294] Nlerum S. Okogbule, "Access to Justice and human rights protection in Nigeria: Problems and Prospects." *Sur. Rev. International Direitos human* 2, no. 3 (2005).
[1295] Matthew-Mary Okeke, "The Concept of Justice in Chinua Achebe's Things Fall Apart and John Rawls' A Theory of Justice." *Profsmof WorldPress. Com* (2013). https://profsmof.worldpress.com/2013/02/13/the-concept-of-justice-in-chinua-achebes-things-fall-apart-and-John-rawls-a-theory-of-justice/
[1296] Okonkwo is the protagonist or main character in Achebe's *Things Fall Apart*. He is a fulfilled man, respected member of the Umuofia clan.

accomplishment is in agreement with Rawls' principle of justice, which states that one is at liberty to have individual property, every person can see and have offices or attend to a position within the rules of fair play of opportunity, and social justice should be established to the utmost advantage of the less privileged in the society.[1297]

As noted previously, Soyinka's works, covering all genres (novels, poetry, music and plays), criticised the misuse of power and the perpetuation of injustice by the political elite. His abiding interest in justice was demonstrated in the funeral oration of the burial of Bola Ige, then Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Nigeria, who was assassinated by an unknown person on December 23, 2001 at his residence in Ibadan, Nigeria.[1298] Soyinka pointed out that political assassination has become an acceptable practice in the Nigerian political topography committed by men who are intolerant to the politics of dialogue."[1299]

Soyinka's political memoir *You Must Set Forth At Dawn* equally laments the lack of social justice. He argues that every constitution should uphold social justice. He believes that the constitution is a contrivance of a people's dignity. If the people's dignity is condensed, the inherent response of the people is to repossess their dignity back through defiance. He maintains that "justice is an ethical, cultural, political and economic given in society…justice is a project that cannot be made dependent on accident of circumstances, or a combination of circumstances that defines its elected custodian."[1300] Soyinka contends that no political system can be deemed to be perfect in all areas. But the constitution must be framed in such a manner that it foresees all types of likelihoods that may arise, and the ability to checkmate the situation that may lead to breakdown of law and order. Soyinka

[1297] Matthew-Mary Okeke (2013).
[1298] Fola Ojo, "ICYMI: As Osun decides, who killed Bola Ige?" Punch Newspaper, September 21, 2018. See New York Times, December 25, 2001.
[1299] Dipo Irele, "Igilango Geesi in the Public Sphere: Soyinka's Intervention in Nigerian Political Discourse. *Africa Development*." *Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa* XL, no. 4 (2015):138-139.
[1300] Ibid., 147-148.

claims that "to deny that justice is to encourage every unit to seek his or her own justice through whatever means, and that guarantees only one end: a state of anomie."[1301]

It is necessary to emphasise that access to justice is incontrovertibly a necessary test for measuring not only the rule of law in any given society, but equally the level of governance in the society.[1302] Crimes perpetrated by Boko Haram in the northern region or Fulani herdsmen in the North-central continue to pose security challenges.[1303] In its 2015 report, the Office of Prosecutor (OTP), acknowledged six potential cases of Boko Haram committing crimes against humanity, however, two cases of such crimes were committed by the Nigerian security forces. Human Rights Watch, World Report 2019, states that Boko Haram are, however, involved in adductions, suicide bombings, and attacks on civilian targets. As of 2019, none of the 150 established cases against Boko Haram forwarded to the Attorney General of Nigeria have been given the attention it deserves, thereby denying the victims justice. What is more worrying is that atrocities committed in the name of religion, political violence and ethnic conflicts were not mentioned in the preliminary examinations?[1304]

Thus, to make sure that justice is served for the victims, the OTP should make it as a matter of urgency to immediately proceed to formal investigation. This justice must be achieved for all victims in the northern region.[1305] In the same vein, Amnesty International reports on 10 December 2018 that since 2009, the Northeast has been a theatre of armed insurrection between Boko Haram and the Nigerian military, with serious gross human

[1301] Irele, "Igilango Geesi in the Public Sphere: Soyinka's Intervention in Nigerian Political Discourse. Africa Development," 148.
[1302] Ibid.
[1303] Ewelina U. Ochab, "The Situation in Nigeria – Is There Any Progress Towards Justice for the Victims?" *Forbes*, April 30, 2018. https://www.forbes.com/sites/ewelinaochab/2018/04/30/the-situation-in-nigeria-is-there-any-progress-towards-justice-for-the-victims/.
[1304] Ibid.
[1305] Ibid.

rights abuses and violation of international humanitarian law committed on both sides. The group lamented the failure of Nigerian government to investigate and bring to justice those alleged to have committed crimes against humanity.[1306] It is thereby apparent that when the ICC carries out their duty effectively without fear or favour, without political or religious consideration, justice will be achieved for the victims of these atrocities.

7.11 Peacebuilding (State, Religious Leaders, NGOs)

Peacebuilding aims to smooth a transformation from small-minded, exclusionist, unfriendly, preconceived and arrogant notion to more open-minded and tolerant behaviour.[1307] Again, solving ethno-religious conflicts entails first a knowledge of how religious traditions and identities fuel a culture of violence. Secondly, it focuses on religious values, traditions, texts, and myths that emphasise justice, tolerance, coexistence, and peace to rebuild confidence. It equally allows us to advance intervention policies that stress the religious basis of tolerance, compassion and cooperation that permit religious leaders, laymen and women to be instruments of peace in various communities.[1308]

Kadayifci-Orellana argues that transmuting vicious wars involves first substituting cultural violence with cultural peace by drawing from religious, cultural, and regional symbols, values, myths, and images that encourage reconciliation, coexistence, and peace. Since traditional conflict resolution methods are inadequate in tackling and solving ethno-religious identity conflicts, academics and experts developed new ideas to address the remote causes of violence often referred to as peacebuilding. Peacebuilding is seen as a

[1306] *Amnesty Internationa*l, "Nigeria: Willingly Unable: ICC Preliminary Examination and Nigeria's failure to address Impunity for International Crimes," 10 December 2018. https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/afr44/9481/2018/en/
[1307] S. Ayse Kadayifci-Orellana, "Inter-Religious Dialogue and Peacebuilding." In *The Wiley-Blackwell Companion to Inter-Religious Dialogue*, Catherine Cornille, ed. 154.
[1308] Ibid., 152, 163.

"whole host of activities and modalities of intervention designed to bring about a state of peaceful relations by conflicting parties."[1309]

Kadayifci-Orellana stresses that peacebuilding is an intricate and lively means of altering relationships, perceptions, attitudes, behaviours, interests, and basic instruments that reassure and solve violent conflicts. She notes that peacebuilding addresses the immediate causes of the hostilities through enduring economic and social justice requirements, the reform of political institutions of governance, firming up the rule of law, and healing through understanding. It equally denotes to machineries and instruments that can stop violence, destroy it, change it, or solve it. She stresses that changing behaviour and attitudes by rebuilding trust is very vital in peacebuilding and that in serious conflict situations, the parties are not just quarrelling over mundane things but from destroyed social relationships. Kadayifci-Orellana understands that though religious images, texts and symbols are employed as means of discord and doubt between faith-groups using demonization and dehumanisation, it is the same faith-groups traditions that can use such resources to solve the same problem.[1310] Peacebuilding must seek to address the causes of violence and build reconciliation, solidarity, tolerance, unity, equality, dialogue, cooperation, and appreciation of cultural and religious diversities.[1311]

Nigerian academic Anthonia Uzuegbunam sees peacebuilding as a recognition and beacon of actions required for change toward a more workable nonviolent approach and that institutions of governance can avoid a return into violence. She notes that peacebuilding is seen as an effort to overcome the structural, personal and cultural paradoxes that trigger violence, particularly in the robust backing of conciliatory mediation. This was articulated

[1309] Kadayifci-Orellana, "Inter-Religious Dialogue and Peacebuilding," 151.
[1310] Ibid.
[1311] Umaru, *Christian – Muslim Dialogue in Northern Nigeria*, 141.

in Chapter VI of the United Nations Security Council as its top priority as peacebuilding has become an important element by both government and NGOs for sustenance of peace and harmony.[1312]

Boutros Boutos-Ghali, the former Secretary-General of the United Nations, praises peacebuilding as a construction of a new atmosphere that will usher in peace and harmony and lead to the end of conflicts. He envisages that peacebuilding to heal both interstate or intrastate hostilities.[1313]

The United Nations' Policy Committee asserts that "peacebuilding involves a range of measures targeted to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacities at all levels for conflict management, and to lay the foundations for sustainable peace and sustainable development." The United Nation's Policy Committee stresses that peacebuilding is valuable as it seeks to reduce the threat to peace by putting in mechanisms that will expedite actions through humanitarian assistance, development, governance, security, and justice.[1314]

The Kroc Institute stresses the need for peacebuilding to work over a long period for all manner of people and to promote sustainable friendships both nationally and locally. Peacebuilding should strive to connect people and groups with political elite and government officers with the purpose of resolving the hostilities and try to find common ground to construct strong societies, institutions, policies, and friendships that are healthier

[1312] Anthonia O. Uzuegbunam, "Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), Conflicts and Peacebuilding in Nigeria." *Open Journal of Philosophy* 3, no. 1A (2013).
[1313] Paul F. Diehl, *Peace Operations: War and Conflict in the Modern World* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2008),10.
[1314] Benjamin Chuka Osisioma, "Conflict Management and Peacebuilding in Nigeria: Finding the Common Ground." Conference Paper, South-East Zonal Summit, NIM, Abakaliki, Nigeria, (2016):8.

and efficient to strengthen peace and justice. Sustainable peacebuilding talks about human rights, economic prosperity and environment as well as conflict.[1315]

Benjamin Osisioma enumerates conditions for positive peacebuilding, which include the need to create an environment supportive of self-sustaining durable peace; reconciliation with opponents; preventing resumption of conflicts; integrating civil society; creating rule of law mechanisms; and addressing underlying structural and societal issues. He also advises that efforts should be made towards identifying the remote causes of the conflicts and creating an atmosphere for the peaceful resolution of the conflict.[1316]

Martha Mutisi stresses that for the maintenance of peace in the community, sustainable development should be at the centre of post-conflict reconstruction. She notes that a development-centred approach to post-conflict peacebuilding satisfies certain requirements though economic engineering cannot unavoidably achieve the tasks of re-establishing security, warranting political participation, bringing about reconciliation and helping create all-encompassing societies. Development has been key in a 'peace dividend' approach including transitional justice, security sector reform, institution building, and democratisation. Mutisi notes that scholars and actors in peacebuilding argue that peace without development is problematic and that development comes with security, and peace and security will impede falling back to violence.[1317]

In addition, the United Nations' Human Development Report noted that nine out of the ten lowest Human Development index countries have experienced armed conflict at some point since the 1990s. They argue factors responsible for these crises was due to unequal access to resources, poor economic growth and poverty. They also observed that though

[1315] Osisioma, "Conflict Management and Peacebuilding in Nigeria: Finding the Common Ground."
[1316] Ibid., 8.
[1317] Martha Mutisi, "Building and Sustaining Peace: The Development -Peacebuilding Nexus in Post-Conflict Reconstruction in Africa." *Africa Peace and Conflict Journal* 3, no. 1 (2010): 25-26.

conflict is one of the main hindrances to development, development is perceived as a driving force for peacebuilding. This postulation has given stimulus to the development inspired model as a template employed in peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction.[1318]

Besides developments and economic schemes in post-conflict reconstruction, there are other mechanisms that can help restore peace in conflict prone regions such as Northern Nigeria. Several religious individuals and faith-based organisations have contributed immensely to peacebuilding. They have either individually or collectively mediated or resolved conflicts such as the Peace Initiative Network (PIN), which is a peacebuilding organisation founded by Michael Olufemi Sodipo in 2004 and other like minds across religious lines who promote interreligious dialogue.[1319]

Another group is the International Dialogue Centre (KAICIID) established in November 2012. This intergovernmental organisation is a partner for UN agencies, national governments and global active religious and interreligious organisations. KAICIID promotes and uses interreligious dialogue to support conflict prevention and resolution, sustainable peace and social cohesion; promotes mutual respect and understanding among different religious and cultural groups to counteract the abuse of religion to justify operation, violence and conflict. For example, KAICIID organised series of workshops involving Christian and Muslim students from the Kaduna Polytechnic University where they are taught dialogue, challenge hate speech, and value one another's differences. The workshops were held in Kaduna state because of its centrality with both Muslims and Christians in the North. Again, Kaduna state has been a hot belt of religious violence because of perceived communal diversities. The young Christians and Muslims were at first unenthusiastic to

[1318] Mutisi, "Building and Sustaining Peace: The Development -Peacebuilding Nexus in Post-Conflict Reconstruction in Africa."
[1319] *Peace Direct*, "Local Voices for Peace in Northern Nigeria." *Peace Direct* (2016). https://www.peacedirect.org

attend the workshops, but with communication, information and what they stand to gain both for themselves and the community at large, they changed their minds and participated. After the workshops, they became allies in fighting against extremism, hate speeches and violence.[1320] They also learned difference can be seen as a strength. This is chiefly necessary as it is work towards settling differences with others. Being reconciled with foes can be particularly challenging and it requires commitment of resources, time, energy and importantly our position as we take up social justice role to champion peaceful coexistence in our communities.[1321]

7.12 Conclusion

When Nigeria gained independence in 1960, Achebe said, "It was as if the rains had come after a long period of harsh winds and bushfires."[1322] The pathology of colonialism was deep-rooted, and the wounds showed themselves in many unexpected ways. The Cold War was lingering in the background, but we could no longer go on blaming others and freeing ourselves of the need to act.[1323]

Achebe's proposed solutions to Nigeria's ills were straightforward and practical - a staged approach to building democratic institutions, holding free elections to put good candidates in office, developing a "justice system that can thrive and flourish, free press that will exert checks and balances and put anti-corruption laws on a firm footing."[1324]

[1320] KAICIID, "Project Snapshot: Nigeria Small Grants, KAICIID, 2019. https://www.kaiciid.org/publications-resources/project-snapshot-nigeria-small-grants.
[1321] Deirdre Jonese, "Interreligious Dialogue, Peace, and Reconciliation." *Berkley Centre for Religion, Peace and World Affairs*, Georgetown University (2017). https://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/responses/interreligious-dialogue-peace-and-reconciliation. See Mercy Corps. "Does Peacebuilding Work in the Midst of Conflict: Impact Evaluation of a Peacebuilding in Nigeria." *Mercy Corps*, Portland, May 2019. http://www.kpsrl.org/sites/default/files/2019-05/PGR_NigeriaImpactEvaluation_Rlo_FINv3_Web.pdf.
[1322] Nicholas Wroe, "Chinua Achebe: A Life in Writing." *The Guardian*, International edition. https://www.theguardian.com/culture/2010/dec/13/chinua-achebe-life-in-writing .
[1323] Ibid.
[1324] Wroe, "Chinua Achebe: A Life in Writing."

The main thrust in this chapter is to develop and analyse the solutions offered by Nigerian Postcolonial Literature to tackle conflict in Northern Nigeria through national sovereign conferences, reconciliation, reconstruction and rehabilitation, relief for victims, healing of traumas and forgiveness, pursuit of justice, and peacebuilding with contributions of state institutions, religious leaders, NGOs and interfaith groups playing a key role in education, enlightenment, mobilisation, mediation and dialogue with other faiths in the northern region.

This chapter discussed Christian-Muslim hostilities and hatred as a result of new waves of revivalism, religious fanaticism and competition for scarce resources. Religious dialogue is deemed key solution to solve the perennial conflict in the region. Interaction between Muslims and Christians through neighbourly activities such as cleaning of the markets, schools, and social functions such as inter-marriages, marriage rites, burials, political associations, clubs, and alumni is advocated. The government, moreover, has a responsibility to ensure that the victims of religious violence are treated fairly, and the state pays compensation to these victims as a way of healing and relief for trauma caused by the loss of their livelihood and family. I argued that the solution lies in interreligious dialogue, which builds and supports tolerance, love, compassion, empathy, respect and harmony as keys to peaceful co-existence in Northern Nigeria.

I believe that the three tiers of government should not patronise any religion in the state because it gives the impression that one religion is superior to another. Religious freedom should be practiced anywhere in the country irrespective of whether Christians or Muslims are in the majority or minority.

In the next chapter, this work will make recommendation and summarises the entire body of the research.

Chapter 8: Recommendations and Conclusion

8.0 Introduction

The previous chapter identified solutions offered by Nigerians to tackle conflict in Northern Nigeria. This chapter develops those recommendations with the aim of achieving peace in Northern Nigeria. The factors identified and analysed include true federalism: fiscal/federalism, resource control, and derivation principle.

8.1 Overview

This research explores Nigerian postcolonial thought and peace processes in Northern Nigeria as a methodology to address factors responsible for the breakdown of law and disharmony in Northern Nigeria. This is significant research as it addresses the breakdown of peace processes in Northern Nigeria by emphasising the need for interreligious dialogue between the two main religions, Christianity and Islam, as a key factor in establishing lasting peace and unity in Northern Nigeria. Therefore, this research wanted to answer the central research question, defined as: why have peace processes failed in Northern Nigeria while to a lesser degree or not at all in Southern Nigeria?

This research was structured into three parts: After a historical overview of Northern Nigeria and general introduction in Part I, the second part explored key postcolonial thinkers and Part III examined factors responsible for the breakdown of law and disharmony in Northern Nigeria. The rationale of this research was to explore the need for solutions that would address the conflict in the region caused by ethno-religious conflict, religious extremism, poverty, the rivalry between indigenes and settlers and among the two main religious faiths, true federalism, power sharing and lack of education.

The main findings and central argument are that religious and non-religious factors contributed to the conflict in Northern Nigeria.

After an introductory first chapter, Chapter 2 examines the historical background of Northern Nigeria and its postcolonial history. It also examines the influence of the Sokoto Calphate in the region. The colonial and postcolonial era was studied in other to show how the past epoch shaped Northern Nigeria's socio-political and economic underdevelopment. The chapter equally examined the effects of the military interregnum in Northern Nigeria, the Second/Third/Fourth Republic and how both military rule and politicians manipulated the system against the people, which resulted in the mismanagement of the economy. It ends on a discussion of the Nigerian peace process and why it has failed in Northern Nigeria, including government attempts to dialogue with Boko Haram.

Chapter 3 examines postcolonial theory, emergence, aims, role, development, criticism, and relevance to Nigeria. Scholars like Sugirtharajah and Ashcroft see postcolonialism as indicating historical epochs that are consequences of colonialism or what deals with the aftereffects of colonialism. It interrogates dominant knowledge systems in order to recover the past from Western defamation and misrepresentation of the colonial era and continues to interrogate neo-colonising tendencies after the declaration of independence. The people have yet to come to terms with the many years of colonial legacy which are still visible on the minds of postcolonial scholars. The postcolonial thinkers challenge the bad image painted by the colonial masters that African culture is primeval and want to inform the rest of the world that such labels of the indigenous culture are erroneous. Therefore, as noted above, postcolonialism should not be seen as an extension of colonialism, but as an academic field to tackle the harms that arose during European colonialism.

Chapter 4 of this research surveys classic postcolonial thought and explores the works of Frantz Fanon. This theorist focused on the exploitation of the colonised, the inhumanity of man to man, and the evil of colonialism and neo-colonialism. It emphasises how post colonialism emerged as an attempt to reject colonial rule, cultural domination and misrepresentation of the colonised. The main argument in this chapter is the rejection of imposed colonial rule, culture, education, religion and language by the colonised; and the emergence of postcolonial literature probing the import of alien culture and other forms of colonial legacies. Fanon used his works to critique the colonial legacy through postcolonial analysis and used his works to reconstruct postcolonial identity. Through his literature, Fanon tackled the assumptions and views of colonial help by Western nations. He wants us to discard the colonial mentality that everything Western is superior. He wants us to see the world as being equal, where all countries stand at the same level. He equally rejects the stereotyping of Africa as indolent, uncivilised, immoral, brutal and dishonest. He concludes that Africans should be allowed to make their own judgements and decide what they want and how to speak for themselves instead of somebody speaking on their behalf.

Chapter 5 explores the works of two Nigerian postcolonial thinkers whose literary questions and scrutiny raised valuable interrogations and made ways for the postcolonial Nigerian state and peace processes in Northern Nigeria. Nigerian scholars, Chinua Achebe and Ahmadu Bello, show how colonial legacies in Nigeria tore the people apart. Through the divide-and-rule policy, the various ethnic groups were dealt with under different policies. The chapter also explores the postcolonial state failure to address the socio-political and economic demands of Nigerians, and to fulfil the promises made to the people. The thrust of these writers is to work for justice, equity, truth and change. The thinkers, through their works, reshaped Nigerian identity, consciousness and pride. The centrality of their arguments was to debunk the colonial power's argument that Nigerians are ungovernable,

backward, primitive and uncivilised. Rather, the writers portrayed the richness and uniqueness of Nigerian culture. This is not saying that all aspects of the Nigerian cultural past were best, ignoring wrongs like the killing of twins, internecine wars and the slave trade, but that there are positive aspects of that past such as hospitality, languages, fraternity, culture, custom and tradition which were destroyed by alien rule.

Chapter 5, thus, argues that the Nigerian postcolonial writers are telling a familiar story. The thinkers are inspired to tell their stories because of the wrong images and single dominant story told by the colonial power, the British, who constructed the notion that Nigeria was regressive, primeval and ill-informed. The thinkers rejected this subjective narrative and argued that Nigeria has a unique culture, values, and morals along with a cherished history of which we should be truly proud of.

The struggle for self-rule and development and a society free from elite manipulation, especially in Northern Nigeria, formed part of the works of Nigerian postcolonial thinkers. The scholars appealed to the people of the region who desire good governance and economic development and radical political and social change. To assist the people for socio-economic and political change in Northern Nigeria, the creative literature became a rallying point and joined other political activists who opposed the neo-colonial state. The writers drew on the experiences of the past and contemporary situations to show their concern and commitment to total freedom of the people both from imposed values and internal subjugation. The thinkers, through their work, awaken the consciousness of the people to the realities of their situations and take a step further to recommend drastic measures such as resistance and mass protest against inept leadership, dictatorship, corruption and bad governance. The thinkers exposed the weakness of leadership and the dictatorial, oppressive, divide-and-rule strategy of postcolonial leaders. It was at the centre of this manipulation that different ethnic groups in the northern region were meant to see themselves as opposed. It was these differences

that the politicians exploited and sowed a seed of discord and disunity among the people. The result was perennial conflict between different ethnic groups and between Christians and Muslims. The thinkers were aware of the enormous problems faced by Nigeria. They were equally aware that through their works some of these obstacles and challenges can be overcome through enlightenment, education and information.

The theme of chapter 6 is the diagnosis of the conflict in Northern Nigeria. The chapter sought to build upon the arguments from chapters 2 to 5 that explored key postcolonial thinkers. It also examined how the works of Nigerian postcolonial thinkers shaped the peace process in Northern Nigeria. The postcolonial thinkers discussed the failings of both colonial and postcolonial leadership and how peace can be restored in the region.

Chapter 5 also examines how these Nigerian Postcolonial thinkers defined and assessed the peace process in the Northern region. The chapter establishes that there was a mutual exclusiveness that exists between many believers of Islam and Christianity in the northern region even though they have lived alongside each other for centuries.

Chapter 6 identifies the problems inherent in Northern Nigeria, such as handling disagreement and misunderstanding, the misinterpretation of sacred texts, ignorance and lack of information on what both Prophet Muhammad and Jesus Christ stand for, and other non-religious issues which include the distribution of scare resources, land, and marginalisation of the minority by the majority in the region.

Finally, chapter 7 argues that resolving the conflict in Northern Nigeria requires an understanding of the complexities of the region and applying conflict mechanisms, such as robust community engagement, rehabilitation programme,[1325] creating an enabling

[1325] Jennifer Chidinma Ogbogu, "Nigeria's Approach to Terrorist Rehabilitation." *Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses* 8, no. 4 (2016):18.

environment supportive of self-sustaining, durable peace, integrating civil society, rule of law,[1326] as well as the political will of the key various actors in resolving the crisis. These mechanisms will help to end both the religious and non-religious issues in the northern region.

In support of the research objectives, chapter 7 scrutinises and evaluates the developed themes made by the findings, their suggestions and general argument. The findings, it is argued, justified the original hypotheses, the theoretical framework and the central research questions and offered solutions which can help bring about a peaceful coexistence between the two main religious faiths: Christianity and Islam; namely, through applications of interreligious dialogue.

In *Humbling Faith, Brokenness, Doubt, Dialogue: What Unites Atheists, Theists, and Nontheists*, Peter Admirand argues that dialogue presupposes mutual respect and dignity and that interfaith dialogue and learning demonstrate the others as presence and gift. In theory, such dialogue should be a sacred, trusting environment where individuals of opposed faiths and cultural settings allow themselves and their creeds to be as visible and clear as possible. Admirand posits that members offer their values, hopes, and beliefs to one another at the same time sharing and being present to each person's related, but different stories and language. The gains and objectives can be rich and multifaceted.[1327]

For Swidler, dialogue is about increasing our capacity for attention, awareness, learning and listening from each other, and discovering what it means to be human in a pluralist society. For Muslims and Christians in Northern Nigeria, interreligious dialogue is

[1326] Osisioma, "Conflict Management and Peace Building in Nigeria: Finding the Common Ground." Conference Paper, South-East Zonal Summit, NIM, Abakaliki, Nigeria (2016): 8.
[1327] Peter Admirand, *Humbling Faith: Brokenness, Doubt, Dialogue – What Unites Atheists, Theists, and Nontheists* (Oregon: Cascade Books, An Imprint of Wipf and Stock Publishers, 2019), 99.

necessary for negotiating peace and harmony among the communities.[1328] The findings regarding the central research questions and the research's theoretical frameworks further revealed that both religious and non-religious issues are the causes of the breakdown of law and order in Northern Nigeria.

In Chapter 8, I offer recommendations for how Northern Nigeria can be a peaceful and harmonious entity where peace and unity reign between various ethnic groups and the two main religions – Christianity and Islam. With peace and coexistence in the region, prosperity, progress and development can proceed.

Therefore, the recommendations are intended to address the recurrent conflicts in Northern Nigeria such as true federalism. The implementation of this recommendation, it is argued, can foster peace and remove the cause of conflict in the region.

As noted in this work, applying interreligious dialogue is an important means to bring peace to the region, especially while turning to the diagnosis and offered solution of Nigerian postcolonial thought, method and approaches in the peace process in Northern Nigeria. This combination, it is argued, would help address the religious and non-religious issues to regain peaceful coexistence, harmony, respect, love and fraternity among the people of the Northern region. Again, the northern region has been at the centre of ethno-religious violence and has seen an upsurge in religious extremism, especially given the threat posed by religious fanaticism and its capacity to enflame violence across the region. For a peaceful and stable Northern Nigeria, there is a need for national dialogue, interreligious dialogue, healing, reconciliation, and the pursuit of justice as a solution to achieving peace and harmony in the region.

[1328] Umaru, *Christian – Muslim Dialogue in Northern Nigeria*, 164-165. See Swidler, *Dialogue for Interreligious Understanding*, 48.

8.2 Key Emphasis of Nigerian Postcolonial Thought

Nigerian postcolonial writers tell stories about Nigeria and Africa that are narrated to the world by their own people, in creative ways showing the Nigerian political and social landscape in all its variety and complexity.

The Nigerian postcolonial thinkers' critique those inherited colonial legacies and postcolonial crises that have made the Nigerian states ungovernable and undemocratic. These thinkers are not saying that our past can be claimed as the best, as before colonialism there were internecine wars, killing of twins and the slave trade. Nor are they afraid to address real issues that affect Nigerian people such as bad governance, inept leadership, corruption, nepotism, favouritism, human rights abuse, imposition of culture, social injustice, inequality and man's inhumanity to man.

Nigerian postcolonial writers employ imagery, satire, characters, and languages to convey to the world the culture, identity, values, hospitality, social, economic and political life of the people in contrast to the backward and uncivilised Eurocentric literature which negatively portrays the people of Africa. They equally show that people are hardworking, industrious, peaceful and loving.

Through their thought-provoking suggestions, Nigerian postcolonial scholars are as "cutting edge" for their time, because they focused on common issues, such as the impact of colonialism, imperialism, neo-colonialism, chauvinistic ethnicity and religious fanaticism.

Majority of Nigerians were unanimous in their assessments of the violation of the Nigerian Constitution by the defenders of the Sharia penal code introduced by the twelve Northern Nigeria governors. They affirmed that what the governors did contravened the

constitution of Nigeria which prescribed a secular status first adopted by the founding fathers of Nigeria.

Nigerian postcolonial scholars avoided dismissing positive models from civilisation; they instead moderated their criticism of the British arrangement with an analytical interest of the appropriateness of the indigenous understanding of the current situation of the postcolonial Nigerian state.[1329]

The Nigerian postcolonial writers contributed immensely to the shaping of national identity, consciousness and pride. For instance, Achebe's book *Things Fall Apart* brought to the worldview the distorted Eurocentric view that Nigeria has no identity; through his work, he informs the world that Nigeria has a unique culture, deserving of pride. Also, Achebe uses his work to show the balance between Igbo religious beliefs and what it stands for.

Nigerian postcolonial thinkers are concerned about the breakdown of peace and harmony in the northern region and have critically analysed the Northern Nigerian situation from their

[1329] Nic Cheeseman and Jonathan Fisher argue that postcolonial states replicated core attributes of colonial rule. Colonialism strengthened the tyrannical elements within African societies, while subverting the elements of transparency and accountability. The cumulative impact of these policies made it very hard for most African nations such as Nigeria to forge a democratic and developmental model. Imoh Imoh-Itah, Luke Amadi and Roger Akpan contend that the present-day development predicament of Nigeria reflects a post-oil economy along with revived local crises, leading to the Boko Haram insurgency in the northeast, cattle rustling, Fulani herdsmen and rural violence in northcentral Nigera, the Shiite verse Sunni invigoration in the northwest, the agitation for self-determination by the Indigenous Peoples' of Biafra (IPOB), and the uprising and kidnapping of expatriates by Niger Delta militants, and the rise of nationalist ethnic groups like Oodua Peoples' Congress and Arewa Peoples' Congress. According to Chinua Achebe, the British made sure that on their departure, political power went to conservative elements who did not play any role in the struggle for independence. Achebe contends "creative writers in independent Nigeria found themselves with a new terrifying problem on their hands. They found that the independence their country was supposed to have won was totally without content." He adduces that in this tragic manipulation, Nigeria was a sump of corruption and misrule. Public servants assisted themselves willingly to the nation's commonwealth. Elections were openly rigged. Achebe notes that the social malaise in Nigerian society was political corruption. The structure of the nation was that there was an inherent power struggle among the ethnic groups. He points out that in order to retain power they appealed to tribal sentiments, which they have exploited to this present day. Cheeseman and Fisher. "Political Entrepreneurs: How Colonial Rule Committed to Fragile Authoritarianism." *Quartz Africa* (New York), November 2, 2019. https://qz.com/africa/1741033/how-colonial-rule-committed-africa-to-fragile-authoritarianism-2/. See Imoh-Itah, Amadi and Akpan, "Colonialism and the Post-Colonial Nigeria: Complexities and Contradictions 1960-2015: A Perspective." *International Journal of Political Science* 2, Issue 3 (2016): 9; Achebe, (2012),51-52.

own standpoints and, as a conscience of the nation and have concluded that Northern Nigeria needs both political restructuring,[1330] a sovereign national conference[1331] and interreligious dialogue for peace and stability to reign.

8.3 Recommendations

Research has a responsibility to contribute to an existing body of knowledge, either by supporting through objective studies, the findings of previous research or by providing new knowledge that challenges the existing models. For Northern Nigeria to achieve peace, the region needs to address the factors that caused the breakdown of peaceful coexistence. Northern Nigeria is notable for ethno-religious conflict, religious fundamentalism, poverty, power sharing and the competition between indigenes and settlers, together with rivalry

[1330] Restructuring implies both political re-configuration of the country and devolution of powers to the constituent units. Some argue it is the "re-organisation and re-arrangement of the nature of resource control by the various governments and regions to foster unity and development." The protagonist-antagonist positions on restructuring have culminated in the conflict of interest and even physical violence between the two main religions, as Christians and Muslims on the one hand and the South-North dichotomy on the other, which has resulted in loss of lives and properties. A prominent northern leader, Alhaji Tanko Yakasai, stated that the north has a reservation for restructuring because it aimed to deny the north revenue and representation. Yakasai said, "the idea behind the agitation for restructuring is to demolish those two advantages that are naturally due to the north in terms of representation and revenue sharing." But another leader, Balarabe Musa, Second Republic governor of Kaduna State, differs, saying: that, the ways and manners are heading to can best be described as "on the verge of becoming a failed state." He prays Nigeria remains one country despite the contradictions in the country. Pro-democratic activists Idika Kalu, former Minister for Finance, Femi Fani-Kayode, former Minister for Aviation, Dr Chukwuemeka Ezife, former Governor of Anambra state, Femi Falana, a lawyer, Senior Advocate of Nigeria (SAN), Yerima Shetima, and President Arewa Youth Consultative Forum all agree there is a need to practice true federalism based on six geo-political zones in the country that should become the federating units. They all agreed that restructuring Nigeria has become necessary (Ideobodo Nwafor-Orizu, Okolo Modesta Chinyere and Eze Kierian Tochukwu (2018). "Political Structuring in Nigeria: The Need, Challenges and Prospects. Department of Public Administration and Local Government." University of Nigeria, Nsukka, *ResearchGate* (2018). https://www.researchgate.net/publication/328517752_POLITICAL_RESTRUCTURING_IN_THE_NEED_CHALLENGES_AND_PROSPECTS. See Dapo Akinrefon. "The Way forward, Falae, Musa, Nwabueze, Kalu, Ogbeh," *Vanguard*, February 12, 2012. https://www.vanguardngr.com/2012/02/the-way-forward-by-falae-musa-nwabueze-kalu-ogbeh. See Farayibi Adesoji Oladapo. "The Structure of Nigeria's Restructuring Rhetoric." National Discourse, *Centre for Allied Research and Economic Development*, Ibadan, Nigeria (2017).

[1331] A National Conference was set up by President Goodluck Jonathan in 2013. He said that the National Conference was set up as "our efforts to strengthen national unity and consolidate democratic governance in our beloved country." Jonathan posits that "the most compelling task before us, as we move ahead and contemplate what our nation will be at the end of its second century, is to lay a much stronger foundation for faster development." He noted that the National Conference is a very important avenue for the voices of our people to be heard. Our people have yearnings and desires that need to be discussed. Their representatives at this conference are neither usurping the role of the National Assembly nor the Executive. They are complementing us in our march towards a greater and stronger union. One of the conferees said that the "national conference is an avenue for struggle. It is an opportunity to struggle for a better future." Orike Ben Didi, *Deepening Nigeria's Democracy; Issues and Challenges before the National Conference* (Port Harcourt: Orchid Publishers, 2015), 14, 34, 37, 42.

between many Christians and Muslims. To arrest the religious conflict in the region and institute peace and harmony among the people of Northern Nigeria, the following recommendations will help address the need for true federalism: fiscal federalism/resource allocation, resource control, and derivation principle.

8.3.0 True Federalism

8.3.1 Introduction

Following upon the analysis of Nigerian postcolonial thought and the peace process in Northern Nigeria, the factors responsible for breakdown of peace and coexistence in the region as discussed in the previous chapters 5 and 6, the breakdown of relationship between the diverse ethnic groups in one hand and the resentment between the two main religions in the region, Christianity and Islam, these acrimonious relationship can be improved or achieved, if the following recommendations are adhere to such as true federalism.

The clamour for true federalism has been a central feature in the Nigerian political lexicon. It is however, characterised by both relativities and controversies. The relativities centre around the divergent and occasionally contradictory views on what 'fiscal/true federalism' means and the controversies surrounding Nigerian federalism. Sometimes, those references are knowingly and intentionally made by the elites and politicians to attain their selfish ends of accessing state power and resources, and or gaining political legitimacy from their ethnic-religious group, geo-political zones and other particularistic interests.[1332]

The neglect of various ethnic and minority groups and the inability to resolve the national question on power sharing, resource distribution, citizenship and federalism have been the root causes of ethnic conflict. The ethnic conflict in Northern Nigeria is the apparent

[1332] Isah Shehu Mohammed and Ahmed Aliyu Aisha, *Federalism: An Overview of the Nigerian Perspective* (Mauritius: Lap Lambert Academic Publishing, 2020), 90-91.

allegation of abandonment, persecution, dominance, manipulation, discrimination, favouritism and marginalisation of some ethnic groups in the region. The cry of this marginalisation gave birth to various ethnic militia and secessionists demanding for true federalism through the convocation of National Sovereign Conference or amendment of the 1979 Constitution that will guarantee equity, fairness and justice to all federating units in Northern Nigeria. it is on that note that this work recommends true federalism. Federalism was initiated and adopted by Nigerian nationalists such as Ahmadu Bello, premier of Northern Region and leader of Northern People's Congress (APC), Obafemi Awolowo, premier of Western Region, and leader of the Action Group (AG), and Nnamdi Azikiwe, premier of the Eastern Region, and leader of National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC). For instance, Ahmadu Bello is a strong advocate of federalism as a system of government that is apt for Nigeria and understands the ethnic diversities, the multi-ethnic composition of Nigeria's federal arrangement, and the plural mixture of the religious and cultural differences. But he was convinced that Nigeria could rise, as noted in Chapter 6 beyond these constraining factors to build one inseparable entity.[1333] But the military interregnum in Nigerian politics and centralisation of administrative power in the centre, reversed this federal arrangement agreed with nationalists in 1954. The original agreement that regions control their resources and pay tax to the centre was reversed and resource control placed in the hand of the centre. The region/states were stripped of their resources against the spirit of federalism. These erosions have led to acrimony, antagonism, infighting, and marginalisation by some ethnic groups against other ethnic groups. This conflict has led to calls to return to true federalism or disintegration as some ethnic groups feel the distribution was lopsided. This thesis argues that true federalism will help allay the fear and

[1333] Jibrin Yahaya, "An Assessment of Ahmadu Bello Sarduana Political Ideology Towards Stronger and United Nigeria." *Global Scientific Journals* 6, no. 11 (November 2018): 258.

marginalisation of ethnic groups in Nigeria and help build a coexistence among ethnic groups in Northern Nigeria.

Ladipo Adamolekun and S. Bamidele Ayo argue that the formal adoption of a federal administration system in Nigeria in 1954 stemmed from an agreement reached between Nigeria's nationalist leaders. They stated that the federal system was deemed appropriate for accommodating the country's different ethnic, religious, linguistic, and regional groups and interests within one common politico-administrative unit. Referring to the 1954 agreement, the country's first prime minister, Abubakar Tafawa Balewa said in the Federal House of Representatives in 1957: "I am pleased to see that we are all agreed that the federal system is, under the present conditions, the only sure basis on which Nigeria can remain united."[1334]

Isah Shehu Mohammed and Ahmed Aliyu Aisha echo the same sentiment that the groundwork of Nigerian federalism was laid in the regional structure which then constitutionally recognised three main regions: East, North and West. They duo further stated that by October 1954 regionalism and federalism had become institutionalised in the political landscape of Nigeria.[1335]

Ladipo Adamolekun adds that the Eastern and the Western Regions became self-governing in 1957, and the Northern Region in 1959. He further states that a federal system of administration was maintained in the Independence Constitution of 1960, as well as in the Republican Constitution of 1963; Presidential Constitution of 1979; the revised Presidential Constitution of 1989. Adamolekun points out that in 1963 a new region was created the Mid-Western Region, making the nation a federation of four regional

[1334] Ladipo Adamolekun and S. Bamidele Ayo, "The Evolution of the Nigerian Federal Administration System." *Publius* 19, no. 1 (Winter, 1989): 157.
[1335] Ibid., xxii-xxiii.

administrations. Again, in 1967, a twelve states federal structure was created, with six states as successors to the Northern Region and six states as successors to Eastern and Western Regions. Furthermore, in 1976 another seven states were created, bringing the numbers to nineteen states.[1336]

Rotimi T. Suberu also, two states were created in 1987 bringing it to twenty-one, then nine other states were created, bringing it to thirty states in 1991, finally another six states, were created, bringing it to thirty-six federal structure in 1996.[1337]

In addition, The Nigerian federalism operates a tripartite system consisting of a federal government, thirty-six states and Abuja (the Federal capital territory), and 768 local government areas.[1338]

Cletus Ekok, Patrick Owan Bisong and Umo Antgha contend that the 1989/1999 Constitution conferred legal recognition to 774 local government areas created by successive military regimes.[1339]

Dele Babalola agrees that Nigeria's federal experience started in 1954 under the guidance of the British colonial power and the central purpose of the federation was to hold various ethnic groups together.[1340]

[1336] Ladipo Ademolekun, "Introduction: Federalism in Nigeria." *Publius* 21, no. 4 (Autumn, 1991): 1-3.
[1337] Rotimi T. Suberu, "Reinventing the Architecture of Nigerian Federalism." *The Brown Journal of World Affairs* 12, no. 1 (Summer/Fall, 2005): 149.
[1338] O. Lucky Ovwasa, "Fiscal Federalism in Nigeria: A Historical Analysis." *Transafrica Journal of History* 24 (1995): 70.
[1339] Cletus Ekok, Patrick Owan Bisong and Umo Antigha, "States and the Local Government Areas Creation as a Strategy of National Integration or Disintegration in Nigeria." *Journal of Educational and Social Research* 3, no. 1 (January 2013): 240.
[1340] Dele Babalola, "The Origins of Nigerian Federalism: The Rikerian Theory and Beyond," *Federal Governance* 8, no. 3 (2013): 43.

Likewise, Jonah Isawa Elaigwu argues that mutual suspicion and fear of domination among diverse ethnic groups within the geopolitical zones in Nigeria strengthened the British authority's intention to promote the idea of federalism in the country.[1341]

Adamolekun avers that two events in Nigeria's political development in the 1960s had a deep effect for the development of the federal system in Nigeria: 1. The advent of military rule on January 15, 1966 was especially pervasive, and 2. The civil war of 1967-1970. The impact of military rule with its unitary hierarchical structure and inherent randomness and despotism on the federal system. The abortive attempt of the first military Head of state to replace the federal structure with a unitary administration in 1966 was followed by countercoup of 1966 followed with secession of the Eastern region in 1967 that culminated in thirty-month civil war.[1342]

Ekok, Bisong and Antigha aver that the history for a regional and state creation in Nigeria is derived from the Northern, Western and the Eastern regions from the ethnic minority agitation against the British inspired three region federal structure which secured autonomy and hegemony for the Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba and Igbo majority nationalities. They contend that state creation was believed to allay the ethnic minority fear of marginalisation, and the creation of state was anticipated to correct the politico-structural inequality arising from the unequal size of the Northern Region dominated by the Hausa-Fulani ethnic group. Though, Ahmadu Bello's led NPC's government notably opposed the creation out of Northern Region because they felt that such idea was likely to reduce the Northern Region hegemony at the centre.[1343]

[1341] Jonah Isawa Elaigwu, "The Federal Republic of Nigeria." In A. Majeed, R.L. Watts and D.M. Brown, *A Global Dialogue on Federalism* 11 (2006):211.
[1342] Ademolekun, "Introduction: Federalism in Nigeria," 5.
[1343] Ekok, Bisong and Antigha, "States and Local Government Areas Creation as a Strategy of National Integration or Disintegration in Nigeria," 240.

Adele Jinadu identifies four sets of positive actions in the Nigerian situation. They include 1. measures designed to eliminate certain barriers, such as discriminatory rules; 2. hidden biases in access routes for some ethnic groups, which are inherent in the basic institutional arrangements of the state; 3. measures that give some ethnic-group members access to institutions where they would not have been admitted through competitive selection processes; and 4. proportional representation for ethnic group.[1344] Jinadu contends that these approaches are centred on a perception of educational disparity between some states regarded as "educationally disadvantaged" and others considered as, "educationally advantaged" though that representation, moreover, is taken to be useful for safeguarding equality and stability.[1345]

Asadu Ikechukwu and Nwofia Johnson Emeka argue, that the discrepancy in Nigeria's federal arrangement has been a persistent source of conflict in Nigeria. They contend that the adoption of the federal system is to accommodate Nigeria's multi-ethnic nationalities. Ikechukwu and Emeka contends that the discontent among the component units highlights an unending search for an acceptable revenue sharing formula that is acceptable to all ethnic groups in Nigeria. Again, the contention identified is that the current formula gives more revenue to the central government rather than the state and local governments. Ikechukwu and Emeka claim that state and local government areas have more responsibilities for the provision of social amenities to the people. Also, the central government suffocates the subnational government's ability to provide social amenities and achieve other

[1344] Adele Jinadu, "Federalism, the Consociational State, and Ethnic Conflict in Nigeria." *Publius* 15 (Autumn, 1985):71-100.
[1345] Ibid.

constitutional duties, hence it amplifies crisis of relative deprivation, increases corruption, and deepens ethnic politics.[1346]

Ikechukwu and Emeka point out that the problem of ethnic balance is compounded by the association of the various ethnic groups with religious affiliations, a reality which has not been resolved by national leaders. However, the volatile nature of religion in the country's politics perhaps informed the decision of the National Population Commission not to include either "tribal origins" or "religion" as part of the entries for the population census of 1991.[1347]

8.3.2 Definition of Federalism

Nwaeze Chinwendu argues that true federalism pertains to a political arrangement where power is shared between the central and various regional governments or component units. Chinwendu notes that there is devolution of power among the three levels of government which was lay down in the constitution, clearly established.[1348]

Similarly, Moses M. Adagbabiri and Ugo Chuks Okolie argue that federalism is a system fashioned to incorporate people in a society who are different ethnically, culturally, geographically, and even religiously. They contended that federalism is a system of government in which two co-equal supreme levels of government both acts directly on citizen through in their own laws under a written constitution. Each component part of government within a federation exists independently to one another but as an autonomous entity capable of conducting its own will free from directive of any other government. It is a form of decentralization of the financial, political, and administrative resources of

[1346] Asadu Ikechukwu and Nwofia Johnson Emeka, "Federalism and Imbalance in Revenue Allocation in Nigeria: Implications for Socio-economic Development." *International and Public Affairs* 2. no. 2 (2018):39.
[1347] Olowu, "The Literature on Nigerian Federalism: A Critical Appraisal," 164.
[1348] Nwaeze N. Chinwendu, "True' Federalism in a well-structured Nigeria: The Panacea to her Economic Development Challenges." *Greener Journal of Economics and Accountability* 6, no. 2 (2017): 27.

government.[1349] They further stated that federalism implies an arrangement used in political powers are constitutionally distributed between central and component units. It is a means that empowers each group in a plural society to look after its internal affairs free from outside meddling. They contended that in true federalism, each unit has a right to exploit its resources for the wellbeing of its people and payment of proportionate taxes and other royalties to the centre.[1350]

Equally, Mohammed Isah Shehu, Mohammed Fuad Bin Othman and Nazariah Binti Osman aptly assert that federalism is a system in Nigeria which operates constitutionally and refers to the system of government with more than one level of government, each with different taxing powers, expenditures and responsibilities which in Nigeria, involves of three levels.[1351]

In the same vein, Rotimi Suberu states that federation is a polity that is divided into territorial sub-units that relish constitutionally rooted autonomy in some policy-making domains as well as representation within the machinery of the polity-wide government. The constitutional entrenchment of sub-unit autonomy is what distinguishes a federation from a decentralized unitary state, where the powers of subnational governments are typically granted, and are revocable, through ordinary national law.[1352]

Nigerian states were built on consensus by the founding fathers based on federating units. This was done to stop the domination of major groups, Igbo, Yoruba, Hausa-Fulani from

[1349] Moses M. Adagbabiri and Ugo Chuks Okolie, "Federalism and Political Restructuring in Nigeria: The Panacea for Mutual Coexistence and Management of the Nation's Resources." *The Journal of International Social Research* 11, Issue 59 (2018): 312.
[1350] Ibid., 304.
[1351] Mohammed Isah Shehu, Mohammed Fuad Bin Othman and Nazariah Binti Osman, "Resource Control and Allocation in Nigerian Federalism: The Oil Dilemma." *International Journal of Management Research and Review* 7 Issue 3 (2017): 239.
[1352] Rotimi Suberu, "Federalism in Africa: The Nigeria's Experience in Comparative Perspective." *Ethnopolitics* 8, Issue 1 (2009): 67-68.

dominating the minority groups in Nigeria. It is also to give the minority sense of belonging in Nigeria. It was also to avoid the marginalisation of the minority by the majority. But the creation of states by successive military government and military rule in Nigeria distorted the federal system arrangement. Nigeria on paper is practising federalism but in practical terms Nigeria is operating a unitary system of government because power is centralised in the centre. The federating units are starved of funds to carry out their social functions. The contentious issues in Nigerian federalism are the revenue sharing formula and derivation. Revenue allocation is the principle of sharing the country's wealth to all federating units: centre, states, and local governments areas (see fiscal federalism/revenue allocation: 8.3.5, pp.493-496). Its sharing formula is based on population which means that states with the highest number of people receive more allocation. However, Nigeria's census figures have been manipulated by those in power to favour their region. Again, the derivation principle is based on certain percentage of value of resources accruing from one state then returned to the state through a certain percentage (see derivation principle, 8.3.7, pp. 500-503). For instance, there is a 13% derivation formula paid to oil producing states in Nigeria. The oil producing states of Niger Delta rejected the 13%. They believe it is their right to appriopate the natural resources in their region and pay a certain percentage to the federal government in the form of tax. They claimed it is their God given natural resources. They claimed that it should be used to develop their region since they are the people that suffer more from gas flaring and ecological disaster. Again, the question of revenue allocation has been a subject of debate in Nigeria for some time. Various commissions set up in Nigeria from 1946 to 1987 to find an acceptable formula have all ended in rejection by the federating units; for example, the Okigbo Revenue Allocation Commission set up by Alhaji Shehu Shagari to come up with equitable sharing formula. Okigbo's commission recommended: federal government = 58.5%, states = 26.55%, local council areas = 10%, and oil producing states

= 5%. However, Okigbo's recommendation was rejected by the federating states. The states claimed that they have more social and economic responsibilities than the federal government. So, the federating states demanded more money.

Akpan H. Ekpo and Abwaku Englama argue that the core of the government at the three tier levels is to bring economic development through the provision of infrastructure to the people. Ekpo and Englama believe that the fiscal arrangement within the federating units should enable states to to carry out their constitutional obligations to the people. Ekpo and Englama adduce that the struggle for the control of authority and a reasonable distribution of the resources by the units that make up the federation is guided by the need for even development, fiscal impartiality, and fair play.[1353] However, the situation in Nigeria is different from countries that practice true federalism. Nigeria's system relies more on 'sharing' than 'generating.' Both federal, states, and local governments have paid less attention to how to increase revenue generation in their areas.[1354] Until there is a true federalism where all component units can rely on their resources and pay tax to the centre, revenue sharing formula, fiscal federalism and derivative principle and management will continue to be a contentious issue in federating units in Nigeria.

Ademolekun points out that state creation has previously been an indication of military decisiveness, the inherent arbitrariness in the military methodology. Many Nigerians voiced frustration about the boundaries of the new states while others protested the location of state capitals. For examples, there were extensive protests in some parts of the north, some of them violent as in Kano and Sokoto states.[1355]

[1353] Akpan H. Ekpo and Abwaku Englama, "Fiscal Federalism in Nigeria: Issues, Challenges and Agenda for Reform." In *Economic Policy Options for a Prosperous Nigeria,* eds. Paul Collier, Chukwuma C. Soludo, and C. Pattillo (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 221.
[1354] Ibid.
[1355] Ademolekun, "Introduction: Federalism in Nigeria," 10.

Ademolekun further contends that given the obvious weakness of the 36-states government vis-à-vis the federal government, especially in economic terms, will this lead to a de facto unitary system? Will this drift towards overcentralisation not aggravate the competition for the control of political power at the centre with the financial and patronage resources that flow from it, thereby compromising the nurturing of democratic politics that would appear to be more well-suited with decentralised political arrangement? Or are we expected to see the rearranging of states based on regional, ethnic, linguistic, religious and other factors to constitute neutralising forces to the powerful federal government? What would be the outcomes of this model of progress for the stability of the federation?[1356]

8.3.3 Reasons for Federalism

Daniel Bach contends that Nigerian federalism offered three key structural-functional characteristics. Most Important was the "tripolar regional division" of Nigeria with an in-built lop-sidedness ensuing from the physical, demographical, and constitutional domination of the Northern region. The second attributes were a properly open and competitive political system together with regionally based political parties and predisposition for them to find single-party systems through their control of the regional governments. The third characteristic was Nigeria's revenue-allocation formula, built on the derivation principle sympathetic to those regions where resources are exploited.[1357]

Anthony Harold Birch avers that the idea of federalism was necessitated by socio-economic factors as the reasons for countries adopting federalism:

1. Mutual compatibility of main value.

[1356] Ibid., 11.
[1357] Daniel C. Bach, "Indigeneity, Ethnicity, and Federalism." In *Transition Without End: Nigerian Politics and Civil Society Under Babangida*, Diamond, Kirk-Greene, and Oyediran, ed. (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 1997), 334.

2. A distinctive way of life.

3. Expectations of stronger economic ties or gains.

4. Marked increase in political and administrative capabilities of at least some participating units.

5. A multiplicity of ranges of communications and transactions.

6. Superior economic growth on the part of at least some participating units.[1358]

Birch argues that among the criteria mentioned, only four were responsible for the introduction of federalism in Nigeria. They are expectations of stronger economic ties or gains; a marked increase in political and administrative capabilities of at least some participating units; and a multiplicity of ranges of communications and transaction.[1359]

8.3.4 The Causes of Conflicts

The practice of federalism in Nigeria has been plagued by meddlesomeness by the military and political class. First, military incursion into Nigeria politics, and second, the manipulation of the system by the politicians. This distortion of federalism by operators has created conflict among diverse groups.

Over the course of 60 years of independent nationhood, comprising 30 years of military rule, the Nigerian federation saw encouraging political signs intending growth to the three classic challenges of the postcolonial Nigeria namely: national unity, democratic stability and socio-economic development. However, the record of the central government in managing this triple challenge is mostly disastrous. Various commentators have portrayed the Nigerian federation as violently divided, democratically unstable, economically

[1358] Anthony Harold Birch, "Approaches to the Study of Federalism." *Political Studies* 14 (1966): 23.
[1359] Ibid.

dysfunctional and, ultimately, headed for collapse and disintegration. At the heart of such cynical assessments is the recognition of the widespread political corruption connected with the organization of the Nigerian federal system around the intergovernmental sharing of centrally collected oil revenues, much of which is then misappropriated by the ethnopolitical elite at the federal, state and local levels.[1360]

These crises in the polity are because of militarisation of the citizens as due to three decades of military rule. By the time democratic governance resumed in Nigeria, when the military handed over the mantle of leadership to civilians on 29 May 1999, Nigerian federalism had been disproportionately centralised.[1361]

On why a central government has become so strong against the spirit of federalism since 1965, Eliagwu articulates the factors responsible for it:

1. Military rule,
2. The civil war,
3. The creation of states,
4. The increase in petro-naira, and
5. Demands for federally desirable harmonisation, and international trade and globalisation.[1362]

The erosion of federalism was caused by the military government and consisted of unelected officers who imposed themselves on Nigerians. Again, the military rule by degrees and assumed functions constitutionally reserves or shared among three levels of

[1360] Suberu, "Federalism in Africa: The Nigerian Experience in Comparative Perspective," 67-68.
[1361] Elaigwu, "The Federal Republic of Nigeria," 76.
[1362] Ibid.

government were conscripted in one hand through military degrees, democratic institutions were abolished, and some politicians were imprisoned (under General Mohammadu Buhari) and banned for participation in politicking (under General Ibrahim Babaginda). For instance, matters in the concurrent list such as tertiary education, television, and newspapers (e.g., New Nigerian newspapers) were banned and editors arrested for publishing materials government considered as incitement or against its policy.[1363]

The problem is that most of these states were to satisfy some politicians and many of these states are not viable and cannot meet up the management of the state. They mostly depend on the federal government for money to run their respective states. Due to lack of internally generated revenue some of the state cannot provide infrastructural developments and employment to the teeming population. Few resources available were not fairly distributed rather it is shared among the politicians and its supporters.

Nigeria returned to democratic rule on 29 May 1999, hitherto the journey to federalism began in 1939 On the road of managing Nigerian diversity in the 21st century, there has been trials along the road, coupled with Nigeria's population explosions, climate change, the fierce competition for scarce resources, the rise of Pentecostal gospels and the rise of Islamic movements, which constitute problem to secular positions of the northern region. Elaigwu suggests perceptively:

1. The Nigerian federalism, at the dawn of the twenty-first century is characterised by strong unitarist streaks as a response to almost three decades of military rule.

2. There are, therefore, intense pressures for a review of the legislative list to devolve many of the powers concentrated at the centre to subnational units.

[1363] Ibid.

3. Resource distribution and/or management have become important issues of debate as Nigerian groups reassess the federation.

4. In the context of the new democratic polity, new issues have emerged as part of the politics of federalism in response to the explosion of subnational identities, and

5. The quality of leadership is important in effecting the necessary compromise in Nigeria's reconciliation system.[1364]

This means Nigeria's brand of federalism remains perplexing. Nigeria's federalism concentrates power at the centre. It is one lacking respect, making it looks like master – servant relationship. This lopsided relationship explicates why many of Nigerian governors are lazy, shuttling habitually to Abuja for "federal grants" in the face of diminishing internally generated revenues. The central government has become a 'leviathan,' accumulating more power roughly in the same amount that states are losing.[1365]

Adagbabiri and Okolie point out that Nigeria federal system has wavered between the excessive regionalism that marked the first Republic (1960 – 1966) and the excessive centralization of the military, and relatively the post-military era. Inconsistencies in Nigeria's federal system, such as the colonial factor, military rule and structural imbalance, over-centralisation of power in the central government, and others, have overtime entrenched several confusing issues and challenges within Nigeria federation. The competing issues comprise but not restricted to resource control, revenue allocation, state creation, federal character question and leadership crisis.[1366]

[1364] Elaigwu, "Federalism in Nigeria's New Democratic Polity." *Publius* 32, no. 2 (2002): 73.
[1365] Moses M. Adagbabiri and Ugo Chuks Okolie, "Federalism and Political Restructuring in Nigeria: The Panacea for Mutual Coexistence and Management of Nation's Resources." *The Journal of International Social Research* 11, Issue 59 (2018): 304.
[1366] Ibid., 304.

Adagbabiri and Okolie further state that from the pre-colonial to post-independence epoch and up to the current democratic dispensation, resource control has continued to be the most contentious subject among the three levels of government. The dispute in Nigeria's federal system is the central government harnesses the natural resources and shares revenue with states and local governments. This is an aberration in federal system, in which the state or the regions control resources located in their areas and pay taxes to the centre.[1367]

Again, some ethnic groups contend that the census was manipulated or rigged by politicians for some ethnic groups. This sharing of the national cake has made many states to be lazy and made the centre all powerful who use the riches to penalise any opposition.

Mohammed and Aisha contend that Nigerian federalism in the past faced several complex challenges, including dealing with disputes, ethno-religious militancy, recurring decimal and or tensions over fiscal federalism, revenue allocation and population census figures, ethnicity, terrorism/insurgency etc. They pointed out that the post-colonial challenges to Nigeria federation was on how to synchronise and/or the differing interest of the various ethno-regional and faith groups and in the same vein allay the fear of domination and marginalisation by one group. Mohammed and Aisha note that serious problems linked with the operation of federalism in Nigeria since its introduction in 1954, have been eroded and as such impacted negatively on the nation's politics, growth, and development.[1368]

Musa Abutudu contends that many political actors have demanded the correction of perceived structural defects inherent in Nigerian federalism. Abutudu notes the demands for

[1367] Ibid.
[1368] Mohammed and Aisha, *Federalism: An Overview of the Nigerian Perspective*. 138.

justice, fairness, and justice in the allocation of political space by the minorities and marginalised groups.[1369]

The structural imbalance of the federating units of Nigerian federalism has also been recognised as one of the main problems of Nigerian federalism, just as the quota system conflicted with attempts to foster the development and the constitution of 1954, which granted powers to the regions and denied the centre an absolute power. Though Nigerian federal at some point been reduced to competition for resources, intergovernmental relations, and resource control/allocation. However, accommodating divergent voices in a federal set up, especially in Nigeria has been a challenging task to politicians and stakeholders and many of the expectations tied to establishing federalism have become illusion, thus necessitating calls for true federalism in Nigeria.[1370]

Critics worried that Nigerian federalism depicts more, the elements of centralised federalism as the federating units are not constitutionally permitted to vary from the central government and all energies are made to safeguard critical policies and operations, despite the variances. It however stresses that questions associated to federalism should not be restricted or abridged to focus on power relations and distribution only, but appropriate focus should be given on inclinations of relations among the component units in order to guard their respective interests while at the same time conserving the union.[1371]

Mohammed Isah Shehu, Muhammad Fuad Bin Othman and Nazariah Binti Osman aver that one of the major problems linked with Nigerian federalism is how to arrive at popular

[1369] Musa Abutudu, "Federalism, Political Restructuring, and the Lingering National Question." In Adejumobi Said *Governance and Politics in Post-Military Nigeria*, eds (New York: Palgrave Macmillian, 2010), 23.
[1370] Mohammed and Aisha, *Federalism: An Overview of the Nigerian Perspective*. 140.
[1371] Ibid., 141.

and equitable revenue sharing and resource control among its component units as there has been no acceptable revenue allocation formula.[1372]

Echoing the same sentiments, Adagbabiri and Okolie aver that the conflict over the distribution of state resources and its control within communal territories heightened the difficulties of political accommodation in Nigeria's federalism. This is evidenced in the various ethno-religious conflicts that pervade the nation. They argue the need to reposition and restructure Nigerian federalism for shared co-existence as management of the country's resources. Adagbabiri and Okolie further take a glance at what represents true federalism. Joining federating units should exercise ownership over the resources in their areas for the benefits of their people and then pay taxes and other royalties to the central government, this is the standard practice in North America.[1373]

The sharia conundrum that cast a dark shadow over Nigerian federalism. According to J. Isawa Elaigwu and Haba Galadima the roots of this problem can be traced to number of factors:

1. Religion has always formed a shadow over Nigerian federalism and has since May 1999, not only formed a darker shadow over the polity, but even threatened to eclipse it.

2. The crisis over sharia is not its existence but over the nature of nature of sharia and the extent of its implementation.

[1372] Mohammed Isah Shehu, Muhammad Fuad Bin Othman and Nazariah Binti Osman, "Resource Control and Allocation in Nigerian Federalism: The Oil Dilemma." *International Journal of Management Research and Review* 7, Issue 3 (2017): 240.
[1373] Adagbabiri and Okolie, "Federalism and Political Restructuring in Nigeria: The Panacea for Mutual Coexistence and Management of Nation's Resources," 304.

3. Conflicts over sharia have raised essential constitutional and political questions of intergovernmental relations in the federation.

4. The implementation of sharia poses challenges for Nigeria's judiciary.

5. While federalism has encouraged the "self-determination" of constituent units to be aggressive on certain issues, it sought to provide a medium for effecting compromises and forging techniques for managing conflicts in the polity.[1374]

Suberu points out that the autonomy exhibited by northern Muslim states in legislating Islamic criminal law conflicts with the dependence of these states, and Nigerian states on centrally collected oil revenues rely for almost all their finances. This fiscal dependence has driven the worst illogicality in Nigerian federalism including the hyper-centralisation of intergovernmental relations, the monumental levels of political corruption and economic inefficiency at all levels of the administrative system, the relentless conflicts over revenue sharing and persistence pressures towards the disintegration of the country. He contends that these pathologies are structurally imbedded in the nation's monolithic oil-centric political economy which will only be restructured by years of devolved economic and political development. However, if they are genuinely executed, suggestions to promote effectiveness in the management of oil revenue could be efficient in building the capability of the federal system to better serve people's hope for lasting democratic governance.[1375]

Suberu further argues that the economic and political liabilities that plague the current Nigerian states have provoked debates on the need to restructure Nigerian federalism. He points out that three paths to federal system reform have featured notably, such as, the Sovereign National Conference (SNC), Constitutional review or amendment, and non-

[1374] J. Isawa Elaigwu and Haba Galadima, "The Shadow of Sharia over Nigerian Federalism." *Publius* 33, no. 3 (Summer 2003):123-24.
[1375] Suberu, "Reinventing the Architecture of Nigerian Federalism," 153.

constitutional renewal. He notes that the idea of SNC draws its inspiration from the national conference and the model that became popular in the Republic of Benin and other French-speaking African nations in the 1990s as a mechanism for promoting the displacement of dictatorial regimes by diverse coalitions within civil society. In Nigeria, it is currently organised into associations such as Pro-National Conference (PRONACO), and the Ethnic Nationalities Forum (ENF). These elements regard Nigeria's current federalism as fundamentally flawed and envisage a convention of ethnic nationalities and other civil society groups that would craft new articles of association for the country or even amicably dissolve the federation if necessary.[1376] However, despite the flaws in its multi-ethnic federal structure, Nigeria demonstrates the capability for the resourceful adjustment of federalism in a society otherwise unsettled by ethnic division, economic underdevelopment and political uncertainty.[1377]

I believe that achieving a true federalism in Nigeria that guarantee fairness, equity, and justice. Those issues, such as fiscal federalism/revenue allocation, resource control, and derivation principle, have divided the Northern Nigeria along religious and ethnic lines and, in most cases, created hatred and driven various groups to conflict. Such must be restructured in line with true federalism. I recommend the following remedy as a way to achieving peaceful coexistence in Northern Nigeria.

8.3.5 Fiscal Federalism/Revenue Allocation

According to Asadu and Nwofia various sharing formulas had been recommended and applied, but none lasted. The principle are basic needs, minimum material standards, balance development, derivation, equality of access to development opportunities, independent

[1376] Ibid., 150.
[1377] Ibid., 153.

revenue/tax effort, absorptive capacities, the fiscal efficiency, minimum responsibility of government, population, social development factor, equality of states, land mass and internal revenue generation. Proponent of federal school of thought argue that the centre has more responsibilities as such should have larger share of federal generated revenue, since its responsibilities cut across the state boundaries. On the other hand, proponents of state posit that the real development takes bottom-up dimension and therefore the state and local governments should have more of the money because they are closer to the grassroots. The proponent of state school of thought argues further that state should be allowed to control resources derived from their state, they argue that fiscal independence is the mark of true federalism.[1378]

Asadu and Nwofia argue further that the tensions heightened by fiscal relationship and inequality and agitation has threatened the unity and peace of the nation and fuel mutual distrust and hatred among the ethnic nationalities and groups in Nigeria. Since Mohammadu Buhari came to power in 2015, different ethnic nationalities have increased their agitation and demand for either true federalism or self-determination and some have called for the restructuring of the country.[1379] This fiscal federalism aims to achieve the following:

1. Ensuring correspondence between sub-nationals spending responsibilities and their financial resources so that functions assigned to the sub-national government can be effectively carried out.

2. Increasing the sovereignty of the sub-national government by incorporating motivation for resource mobilization.

[1378] Ikechukwu and Emeka, "Federalism and Imbalance in Revenue Allocation in Nigeria: Implications for Socio-economic Development," 39-40.
[1379] Ibid., 39-40.

3. Ensuring that the macroeconomic management policies of the central government are not undermined or compromised.

4. Giving the expenditure discretion to the sub-national government in appropriate areas to increase the efficiently of public expenditure and improve the accountability of sub-national services.

5. Integrating intergovernmental transfers in ways that are administratively simple, transparent, and based on objective, stable, non-negotiable criteria etc.[1380]

According to Mohammed and Aisha, fiscal federalism is simply the distribution of expenditure responsibilities, the allocation of taxation power, intergovernmental transfers for adjusting fiscal imbalances, the management of regional borrowing and institutional mechanisms for fiscal relations between the levels of government. They further stated that fiscal relation in federalism are the fundamental and divisive issues which must be handled with care.[1381]

Thus, revenue allocation is a method of sharing the centrally generated revenue among the different levels of government and how the amount allocated to each levels of government is shared among its federating units. It is a mechanism for sharing the national financial resources between the several levels of government in the federation with the aim of enhancing sustainable economic growth and development. Hence, it reduces inter-governmental conflicts while helping the country in achieving national unity.[1382]

Although issue of equitable distribution of revenue in Nigeria have not gone down well by federating units in Nigeria, some states have accused the federal government of dubious

[1380] Ibid., 42.
[1381] Mohammed and Aisha, 32.
[1382] Ikechukwu and Emeka, "Federalism and Imbalance in Revenue Allocation in Nigeria: Implications for Socio-economic Development," 42-43.

methods to arrive at figures that are politically inspired. During these allegations, various governments in Nigeria have set up committees at different periods to examine different fiscal issues with a way of recommending an acceptable formula that is fair and just. They are Phillipson Commission (1946); Hicks – Phillipson (1951); Chicks Commission (1953); Rainsman Commission (1958); Binns Commission (1964); Dina Interim (1968); Aboyede Technical Committee (1977); Okigbo Commission (1980); and Revenue Mobilization Allocation and Fiscal Commission (1989). The rest of the commission mentioned above were ad hoc in character were from Revenue Mobilizations Allocation and Fiscal Commission (RMAFC) which was set up with legal instrument to deal with periodic and developing fiscal issues.[1383]

However, the benchmark for revenue allocation which centred on derivation advanced by the oil producing region such as Niger Delta has been opposed by non-oil producing regions such as core northern states which are mainly semi-arid, argue that natural resources, no matter where it is located, belong to the federal government, hence should be shared without discrimination. This proposition held by the core northern states married with the position held by the federal government. By this position advanced by the federal government, it means that all the revenues accrue from all states irrespective whether it is oil or solid minerals wherever they are deposited when mined the proceeds must be paid to the federation account which in turn shared it among the component units. This arrangement has led to the bitter political struggle to win election at the centre at all means by various ethnic nationalities, especially the major ethnic groups.[1384]

8.3.6 Resource Control

[1383] Ibid.
[1384] Ikechukwu and Emeka, "Federalism and Imbalance in Revenue Allocation in Nigeria: Implications for Socio-economic Development," 43.

Conflicts in society are avoidable. Conflicts in society have different dimensions, though they are mainly arisen out of competition, marginalisation and or disagreement over resources. The availability and extent to which natural resources are explored and harnessed has much impact on the types and character of the conflicts which occur in a state and or society. Mohammed and Aisha pointed out the manifestation and highlight such arguments and conflicts in the federal systems/federations over both access to and control of such resources determined by numerous other factors comprising:

1. The nature and pattern of the resource's exploration and allocation.
2. The laws which provide for and regulate the exploration and harnessing/allocation of such resources.
3. How the constituents relatively understand and desire to purse their interests in arranging and practicing the federal system.
4. Whether federalism is developing/evolving/developed, fragile/stable federations.
5. Whether the federation relies on natural resources or has non-natural resource sources of revenue.
6. Willingness of the elites and political class to make compromises.
7. Prudent management or otherwise of the resources.
8. The proportional, even, and uneven distribution of such resources.
9. The extent of the societal pluralities/heterogeneities of the society.
10. The extent to which the population is willing to unite or otherwise.[1385]

[1385] Mohammed and Aisha, *Federalism: An Overview of the Nigerian Perspective*. 159.

So, it is right to say that Nigeria is no different to such resource conflict, natural resources which are vital and pivotal point of conflicts, disagreements and even threats of secession in the Nigerian federation,[1386] for instance, in 2000 12 states in Northern Nigeria adopted Sharia law against the provision of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, which in Section 10 prohibits the adoption of any state religion. This interprets to a unilateral secession from the secular status of Nigeria.[1387]

Since then, groups have emerged to demand secession because of the lopsided nature of Nigerian federalism such as in: the Southeast, the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB), Movement for the Actualisation of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB), Eastern Security Network (ESN); Southwest, Oodua Action Movement, Yoruba Liberation Command (YOLICOM), Oduduwa Grand Alliance for Independence (OGAFI), Ilana Omo Oodua, in South-South, Ijaw National Congress (INC), Ijaw Youth Council (IYC), Niger Delta Avengers; in North-Central, Middle-Belt Forum (MBF).[1388] Others in core northern Nigeria are: Arewa People's Congress, Arewa Youth Congress (AYC), Boko Haram[1389] etc.

Shehu, Othman and Osman observe that resource control and allocation are an important part of the federal system. But stiff disagreements, regional economic and political power game and controversies over the resource control and allocation have negatively overshadowed the success of its true federalism.[1390]

[1386] Ibid.
[1387] News Express, "Ukiwe, Nwodo, Prof. Akintoye, other heavyweights petition UN, others; give 90-days ultimatum for Sovereign National Conference to discuss Nigeria's Amalgamation." *New Express* (Lagos), March 2021. https://newsexpressngr.com/news/119363.
[1388] News Express, "Ukiwe, Nwodo, Prof. Akintoye, other heavyweights petition UN, others; give 90-days ultimatum for Sovereign National Conference to discuss Nigeria's Amalgamation."
[1389] Chinwokwu Chijioke Eke and Michael Eraye Christopher, "Militancy and Violence as a Catalyst to Kidnapping in Nigeria." International Journal of Police Science and Management 21, no. 1 (2019): 23.
[1390] Shehu, Othman and Osman, "Resource Control and Allocation in Nigerian Federalism: The Oil Dilemma," 237.

Adagbabiri and Okolie further posit that resource control became a pertinent question in central government – state relations in Obasanjo's regime, with the coastal states (Cross River, Delta, Akwa Ibom, Edo, Bayelsa, Rivers, Ondo, and Ogun) demanding that the natural resources sited offshore ought to be treated or considered as placed within their respective states. They claimed that the coastal states were short-change by Decree No. 106 of 1992 which revoked an onshore/offshore dichotomy in calculating the amount of revenue ensuing straight from any natural resources resulting from any state pursuant to section 162(2) of the constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999.[1391]

Adagbabiri and Okolie also adduce that the central government in Nigeria occasionally take over individuals, groups, or community properties for prevailing public purposes. Lands may be forcibly seized for economic and social programmes, such as the building of health centres, schools, roads, mining, oil exploration etc. Though, Section 44 (3) of the 1999 Constitution, which is an exception to Section 44 (1) provides:

> Notwithstanding the foregoing provisions of this section, the entire control of the minerals, mineral oils and natural gas in, under or upon any land in Nigeria or in, under or upon the territorial waters and the exclusive economic zone of Nigeria shall vest in the government of the Federation and shall be managed in such manner as may be prescribed by the National Assembly.

Adagbabiri and Okolie aver that Section 44 (3) of the 1999 Nigerian Constitution vested the power to regulate and control natural resources on the Central government without recourse to federating units or the area where the natural resources were found.[1392] They contended that the forceful acquisition of properties must be an exception, not the rule. They

[1391] Adagbabiri and Okolie, "Federalism and Political Restructuring in Nigeria: The Panacea for Mutual Coexistence and Management of Nation's Resources," 305.
[1392] Ibid., 308.

believe that it is wrong to take away these properties that belong to individuals, groups, or communities because in a true federalism, each state has the right to utilise its resources for the wellbeing of its people and to pay a proportionate tax. This is a true meaning of resource control. They opine that the forceful takeover of natural resources by the central government is wrong since it was done by fiat without agreement or in accord with the people, hence robs off the people of their own means of sustenance.[1393]

8.3.7 Derivation Principle

Adagbabiri and Okolie argue that derivation is a right, not charity on the part of a 'benevolent' of government at the centre, the form and manner of payment depends on the nature of property forcefully taken. They pointed out that Section 162(2) of the 1999 Constitution, dealing with the formula for revenue allocation provides that:

> The president, upon the receipt of advice from the revenue mobilization allocation and fiscal commission, shall table before the National Assembly proposals for revenue allocation from the Federation Account, and in determining the formula, the National Assembly shall take into account, the allocation principles especially those of population equally of states internal revenue generation, land mass, terrain as well as population density. Provided that the principles of derivation shall be constantly reflected in any approved formula as being not less than thirteen percent of the revenue accruing to the Federation Account directly from any natural resource.

Adagbabiri and Okolie frown at the thirteen (13) percent derivation[1394] given to oil producing states as an act of injustice. They adduce that this narrow-mindedness by

[1393] Ibid., 309.
[1394] Michael Eboh, "13% Derivation: Eight States receives N6trn in 11years – Reports." *Vanguard* (Lagos), February 3, 2021. http://www.vanguardngr.com/2021/02/13-derivation-eight-states-receive-n6trn-in-11-year-report/.

government and law makers were one of the injustices in the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria.[1395] Accordingly, true federalism was articulated in Section 140 (1) of the 1963 constitution inter alia: "There shall be paid by the federation to each region a sum equal to fifty (50) percent of (a) the proceeds of any royalty received by the federation in respect of any minerals extracted from that Region and (b) any mining rents derived by the federation from within that Region."[1396]

This Section 140 (1) of the 1963 Republican Constitution was drafted by postcolonial leaders of the First Republic to protect the region that lay the golden goose. It was also designed to dispel the fear of marginalisation and allay injustice against oil/solid mineral producing states. Hence the spirit of true federalism states that: "the component states constitutionally control the resources, which are found within their geographical spread, and pay a certain percentage of revenue derived from such resources to the federal government."[1397] In doing so it will help promote justice, fairness and equity in our community.

Making a case for Northern Nigeria, Mohammed and Aisha state that Northern Nigeria is blessed with both solid mineral and agriculture, with arable land. They pointed out that the northern region produced a quarter of the total gross domestic agricultural and allied products home to the region. They noted that at the dawn of independence, Nigeria's revenue generation was from agriculture, and Nigeria export both food and cash crops – cocoa, cotton, rubber, and groundnut, hides and skin, among others. Mohammed and Aisha also point out that the problem started in Nigeria when the monoculturisation of the

[1395] Adagbabiri and Okolie, "Federalism and Political Restructuring in Nigeria: The Panacea for Mutual Coexistence and Management of Nation's Resources," 304.
[1396] Ibid., 9.
[1397] Ibid.

country's economy and revenue generation from the 1970 shifted to oil dependent from the previous agro-allied sectors of the economy.[1398]

Oil in Nigeria brings benefits, but also conflict and controversies in Nigeria, in the central government against states' government or over allocation and control of onshore and offshore, fiscal federalism/resource control and derivative principles.[1399]

Chinwendu concludes that Nigeria's federal system, its features are more unitary than federal. She maintains that advocates of true federalism believe that erosion of federalism is the reverse to development and conflict in the system.[1400] There are many reasons why a nation like Nigeria adopts federalism:

- Federalism can promote economic prosperity. This could be achieved by removing internal barriers to trade through economies of scale, and the retention of resource ownership by constituent units.

- In federalism, abuse by the centre is less unlikely, as it may protect individuals, especially minorities, against the dictatorship of the majority.

- Federalism can also be preferred as the appropriate political order to better promote cooperation, justice, equity and equality, or other values among and within member states. More specifically, federal arrangements can accommodate minority constituents desirous of self-determination and the preservation of their culture, language and religion.

[1398] Mohammed and Aisha, *Federalism: An Overview of the Nigerian Perspective*. 160.
[1399] Ibid., 160-161.
[1400] Chinwendu, "True' Federalism in A Well-Structured Nigeria: The Panacea to the Economic Development Challenges," 27.

- Such transparent autonomy and immunity arrangements are obviously preferable to the political conflicts that might arise from such groups' attempt to succession.[1401]

- True federalism anchors the rule of law, equity, justice and equality among constituent units, and can promote peaceful co-existence, economic prosperity, harmonious trade and economic cooperation as opposed to unitary system.[1402]

As emphasised, Northern Nigeria is bedevilled with serious economic and developmental challenges, such as political instability, extreme poverty, high rate of unemployment, low and unstable economic growth, dearth of infrastructure and depreciation of the naira currency, militancy, insurgency and corruption.[1403] Therefore, there is a need for proper true federalism to be implemented in Northern Nigeria. True federalism will help each region address local issues which are fundamental to their local needs, where regions' control their resources at their own disposal and use them to develop their own areas rather than relying on federal allocation. It can also solve the problem of marginalisation and isolation of political rent and distribution. Crucially, the competition for political patronage that has contributed to instability can be eliminated, thus leading to transparency and accountability in governance.[1404]

For Nigeria to return to part federalism the country should return to weak centre and allow more power to be exercise by the federating units. This will allow the regions to develop their areas as they deem it fit, promote their culture and identity, and grow their economy and local laws without interference from the centre.

[1401] Ibid., 27.
[1402] Ibid.
[1403] Ibid., 40.
[1404]Johnbosco Agbakwuru, "Tinubu, Yoruba leaders meet Buhari in Aso Rock over killings in South West," *Vanguard Newspaper* (Lagos), June 25, 2019. https://www.vanguardngr.com.

8.4 Conclusion

This thesis attempts to show that the conflict in Northern Nigeria is multidimensional and driven by a combination of historical, political, economic and ethno-religious bitterness. The conflict was propelled by grievances resulting from a long history of bad governance, elite manipulation, injustice and inequality, religious extremism (Christians and Muslims aggressive campaigns to win souls, and the use of religion as a legitimising tool of control), poverty, unemployment, marginalisation, and rivalry between indigenes and settlers. Britain's colonial legacies in Northern Nigeria and the divide-and-rule actions of postcolonial leaders fostered an acrimonious relationship between the two religions. The British created a system to protect the Northern Muslims from encountering Christianity and the rest of the ethnic minorities. They also fashioned the so-called settler's quarter called *Sabogari* as a means of nurturing division among the people.

On attainment of independence in 1960, Northern Nigeria was characterised by poor leadership, sectional interest divided along religious fault lines, and as educationally backward. The transition from colonial rule to indigenous rule was disastrous. The colonial power, the British, bequeathed to the northern region a divided country. However, independence was presented to the political elite as an opportunity to address and redress this problem and to chart a direction for the postcolonial state. This opportunity, though, was abused by the political elite. Instead of moving the nation forward, the political elite were busy manipulating religious division, identity and ethnicity. The disagreement and squabbling among the elite deepened and, as a result, Northern Nigeria could not make any progress in its economic and political development. This instability paved the way for religious extremism and atavistic political and economic competition.

Lastly, this thesis identified factors and solutions in resolving the conflict in Northern Nigeria such as a national sovereign conference, interreligious dialogue,[1405] reconstruction, reconciliation and rehabilitation, relief for victims, healing of traumas and forgiveness, the pursuit of justice, and peacebuilding. This work, thorough examining postcolonial writers and theorists, demonstrated that interreligious dialogue, tolerance, love, compassion, empathy, respect and harmony are vital to peace and harmony in Northern Nigeria.

From the finding of this work, the following is evident:

(1) The postcolonial writers provide the opportunity to dissect the causes of the dilemmas and provide a way forward in Northern Nigeria.

(2) Through indigenous literature we can promote our cultures to the world and disabuse the mind of doubters that Nigeria is uncivilised.

(3) Postcolonial theory has brought to light that the colonial legacies in sub-Saharan Africa continued after the colonialism had ended.

(4) Established postcolonial thinkers such as Said, Spivak, Bhabha, Fanon, Rodney, wa Thiong'o, Armah, Achebe, Bello, Soyinka and Adichie exposed the crude policy of colonialism and its stereotype against Africa. This literature stimulates the Africans to fight for their future and seek greater development.

(5) The inability of the government, both at the centre and regionally to provide socio-economically for the needs of the people, has led to poverty, unemployment, and marginalisation of the minority groups.

[1405] Patrick Egwu, "Nigeria's Interfaith Council Fosters Peaceful Christian-Muslim Relations." *National Catholic Reporter*, November 11, 2019. See KAICIID. "International Dialogue Centre to Fund Interreligious Projects in Nigeria." KAICIID, July 24, 2019. https://www.kaiciid.org/news-events/news/international-dialogue-centre-fund-interreligious-projects-nigeria-0

(6) The power struggle between the two dominant religions, Christianity and Islam, is responsible for religious conflict, the resurgence of new age religion and religious violence.

(7) The inherent political system bequeathed to us by the colonial master, Britain, was a major problem.

(8) The re-introduction of Sharia penal codes by the twelve states of Northern Nigeria, its amplification, and the indifferent conditions of many who had celebrated its adoption, led to more frustration and cynicism towards the government. The disenchantment following the implementation of Sharia law opened the region's social space for the breeding of fundamentalist faith ideologies and the revival of radical Islamism such as Boko Haram.

(9) Global warming and struggle for resource control over land and grazing rights led to clashes between Fulani herdsmen and farming communities which resulted in thousands being killed and many losing their homes and property.[1406]

(10) The inconsistency of government policy, distorted federalism, corruption, rigged elections, policy reversals and poor policy execution hindered people's confidence in the government and raised questions regarding its legitimacy to rule successfully and competently.

(11) Northern Nigeria's Islamic revival, religious leaders and more importantly religious scholars have increasing influence over politics. Some Muslim clerics are unwilling to talk about politics, instead choosing a range of options, either by encouraging followers to vote

[1406] Mohamed Yahya, "Nigeria Must Lead On Climate Change." United Nations Development Programme, October 4, 2019. https://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/blog/2019/nigeria-must-lead-on-climate-change.html. See Nnimmo Bassey. "I See How Climate Change Will Lead to Conflict in my Home Country, Nigeria." *The Guardian*, March 18, 2019. https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/mar/18/school-climate-change-strikers-paris-agreement-fossil-fuels

during an election or remain apolitical in the faces of electoral fraud. In some cases, some clerics have become deeply involved in party politics and are obviously partisan. The opening of public space has unquestionably created conflict.[1407]

To repeat, some critics have attributed the conflict in Northern Nigeria to religious variances. Such variances, bias or even detestation are serious issues hampering peaceful coexistence in the region. Religion provides a major tool for categorising and demonising rivals. It can also incite vulnerable adherents to violence to attain greater power once clasped in religious terms. Whilst majority of Muslims see Sharia as a sincere submission of their religious faith to their daily lives, most Christians see it as rendering Nigeria an Islamic state.[1408]

Other critic state that religion is a substitute for or a superficial part of deeper resentments and that issues triggering and driving the conflicts surpass it to comprise a multifaceted fusion of history, political, economic, and ethnic issues.[1409]

Ashafa and Wuye opine that religion these days instead of serving as a source of healing sickness, hunger, and poverty, and stimulating calmness and peaceful coexistence among human beings, is used to cause problems It brings pain instead of harmony, grief instead of happiness, prejudice and devastation instead of reconciliation and progress. This is shown in the relationships between the followers of Islam and Christianity.[1410]

However, both Muslims and Christians in Northern Nigeria should understand that every citizen has a stake in the progress and development of the region. Whatever the differences

[1407] Nwaeze N. Chinwendu, "True' Federalism in a well-structured Nigeria: The Panacea to her Economic Development Challenges." *Greener Journal of Economic and Accountancy* 6, no. 2 (2017):40.
[1408] Ibid.
[1409] Crisis group, "Northern Nigeria: Background to Conflict." *Crisis Group,* Africa Report, No. 168, December 20, 2010.
[1410] Jeffrey Haynes, "Conflict Resolution and Peacebuilding: The Role of Religion in Mozambique, Nigeria and Cambodia." *Commonwealth and Comparative Politics* 47, no. 1 (2009):67.

of opinions, creed, or belief, we must learn to tolerate and respect each other. We must understand that violence, killing and the burning of churches or mosques doesn't achieve anything we need as with dialogue. When we dialogue, respect, tolerate and understand our differences, we build a harmonious society. Generally, religious violence can be eliminated if we promote peace, respect, tolerance, economic prosperity and hope and solidarity. What it entails is that religious leaders, clerics, pastors, priests, and imams in the northern region to engage one another in constant dialogue, and equally, to involve the youths in constant dialogue, education and development. The religious leaders should especially avoid inflammatory rhetoric[1411] and aggressive proselytization to win souls and be voices of calm when conditions are dire.

In summary, the analysis of Reverend Father Cornelius Afebu Omonokhua, like the postcolonial authors highlighted above, provides us with the tools to approach dialogue. He notes that dialogue has been employed in Nigeria to help individuals and communities to resolve deep-rooted conflicts and to build deeper understanding of testy issues.

Omonokhua avers that dialogue is not about judging, weighing, or making decisions, but furthering understanding and learning. He declares that dialogue ousts stereotypes, builds trust, and allows people to be open to viewpoints that are very dissimilar from their own. He claims that dialogue is a positive means to cure memories and broken hearts. He notes that in dialogue, education, formation, awareness and understanding are vital words. He observes that Nigeria as a nation has experienced various destabilising forces such as ethno-religious conflicts, slavery to colonialism, civil war, military rule, militancy, the Boko

[1411] For example, the rhetorical conflation of Boko Haram and Fulani herders increases the nation's political temperature, as well as the risks of authorities using ethnic profiling against the Fulani. Secondly, some politicians, journalists and Christian hardliners claimed that the Fulani herders committed atrocities against farmers, mainly Christians, represents another form of "jihadism." This has fueled suspicion among Christians that Northern Muslims want to Islamise the country by force. It was on this account that the farmer-herder violence has fueled serious tension not just in the Northern region but entire nation. See Alex Thurston. "Nigeria: Jihadist Groups, Migration and Underlying Causes." *OASIS*, 2019. www.oasiscenter.eu.

Haram insurgency and Fulani herdsmen to the degree that the worth of trust has been substituted with bias, presumption and shared doubts.[1412] Therefore, through dialogue, respect, tolerance and understanding of our diversity, we can build a society were equity, fairness and justice are the norm.

Omonokhua opines that despite the current trials in Northern Nigeria, he believes that dialogue has been key in solving disagreements in the region. In the dialogue of life, many Christians, Muslims and traditional religions in Northern Nigeria live under the same roof, go to the same school and work together in the same company and offices. Diverse people of different faiths in Northern Nigeria often meet in life situations, such as burial ceremonies and trade or join together to fight prejudice and inequality. Theological exchanges between, clerics, imams, and other religious leaders are taking place, as well as their followers and community members.[1413]Therefore, there is a real hope that, with these changes and suggestions, peace can reign in the northern region, especially if Christians and Muslims continue to incorporate dialogue to promote peace, tolerance and understanding.

From the findings, there is little doubt that controversies over the nation's religious identity have brought an increase in tensions between Christians and Muslims. Economic dissatisfaction, corruption in government, the waste and decay of social institutions, and an increase of criminality in the country, have all created a sense of disappointment. However, democratic rule in Nigeria has had a different effect in the minds of the people. In some regions, it brought peace, calmed tensions, increased accountability and transparency, respect for the rule of law, fairness and gender equality and freedom of expression, though communal competition for resource control has deepened. This differs from region to

[1412] Cornelius Afebu Omonokhua, "The Need for Interreligious Dialogue," *Carefronting Nigeria*, 2018. https://carefronting.org/the-need-for-inter-religious-dialogue/
[1413] Ibid.

region. Whilst some regions in Nigeria have managed to provide a sense of inclusion for all the communities in the new democratic dispensation, some feel excluded.[1414]

As noted above, Cornille's idea of humility, commitment, interconnection, empathy, and hospitality are important elements in interreligious dialogue, and for our context, in Nigeria. Her argument hinges on dialogue being conducted in a conducive environment of humility and tailored towards uprightness, acknowledging reality and other faiths with open doors. For Cornille, through hospitality, we take into accounts others' belief and that comes through as sincerity in our dialogue. Through interreligious dialogue, Muslims and Christians in Northern Nigeria can work towards living in harmony, peaceful co-existence and solidarity. By accidents of birth, Nigerians have found among themselves different faiths, hence, adherents need to appreciate one another as brothers and sisters, for better co-existence.[1415] Through interreligious dialogue, Christians and Muslims in Northern Nigeria can respect each other, and live in peace and harmony. Religious violence, ethno-religious strife, disagreement, prejudice and lack of understanding and respect can, finally, be really diminished, if not one day, even eliminated.

[1414] Crisis group, "Northern Nigeria: Background to Conflict." *Crisis Group* Africa Report, No. 168, December 20, 2010. See Crisis Group, "Stopping Nigeria's Spiralling Farmer-Herder Violence." *Crisis Group* Africa Report, No. 262, July 26, 2018. See Crisis Group, "Returning from the Land of Jihad: The Fate of Women Who Lived with Boko Haram." *Crisis Group*, Africa Report, June 21, 2019.
[1415]Ottuh Peter and Ottuh John, "Christian – Muslim Relations in Nigeria: The Problems and Prospects." *An International Journal of Arts and Humanities* 3 (2), no. 10 (2014): 59-60.

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